Modern History Ann Ngo European Conflict Notes

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   1    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  Conflict  in  Europe  1935  –  1945   1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions     DICTATORSHIPS  IN  GERMANY  AND  ITALY  

     

 

In  dictatorship,  ruler  has  absolute  power,  authority  to  govern  as  pleased  with   whatever  laws  &  no  opposition.  All  political  parties  are  banned  and  criticism  is   forbidden,  with  all  sectors  of  society  strictly  controlled.     Frequently  arise  when  democratic  rule  breaks  down;  when  parliaments  cease  to   govern  effectively.   Hitler  and  Mussolini  Dictators  who  dominated  Europe,  working  as  partners.  Their   appeal  undeniable.  Peacetime  economic  policies  beneficial  in  creating  employment   and  restoring  prosperity    Fascist  rule   Hitler  strongly  influenced  by  Mussolini  showing  him  the  effect  of  patriotic  speeches,   uniforms  and  ceremonies  on  mass  audiences.   Foreign  polices  of  Hitler  &  Mussolini  opportunistic,  aggressive  and  dangerous     helping  to  exacerbate  tensions  between  older  established  European  powers  and   newly  independent  states  created  at  Versailles     In  Europe  by  1935  democracies  of  Brtain  and  France  hoped  to  maintain  terms  of   Treaty  of  Versailles  settlement;  whilst  dictators  determined  to  destroy  status  quo   Evident  in  Churchill’s  history  of  WW2  “Gathering  Storm”  writing  that  in  1935  Hitler   ready  to  make  first  open  challenge  to  Versailles  settlement,  in  announcing  creation   of  German  air  force  and  expansion  of  German  Army.  Almost  same  day,  Mussolini   began  to  move  against  Abyssinia   Greatest  advantage  for  dictators  was  democratic  powers’  memories  of  WW1    fear   of  another  war  outweighed  desire  to  protect  terms  of  Treaty  of  Versailles    policy   of  appeasement.     Kershaw  argues  that  Hitler  never  gave  up  long  term  goals  of  glorious  expansion  

 

Dictatorship  in  Germany    Hitler’s  Germany  responsible  for  much  devastation  of  war;  could  have  waged  war   without  Mussolini.  Eventually  saw  Italian  alliance  as  burden  claiming  it  was  main   cause  of  German  defeat.        AJP  Taylor  shifted  focuse  of  WW2  being  just  “Hitler’s  war”   -­‐ Germany’s  desire  for  land  in  Eastern  Europe  and  position  of  dominance  in   central  Europe  not  Hitler’s  creation  or  product  of  Nazi  ideology.  Had  been   part  of  German  foreign  policy  since  19th  cent    Bullock  has  criticised  Taylor  for  neglecting  “Mein  Kampf”      Kershaw:  Hitler’s  interlocking  aims  based  in  world  view  dominated  by  concept  of   racial  struggle  as  key  determinant  of  history    

Nazi  Foreign  Policy    

Date   1933   October  

Nazi  Action   Germany  leaves   League  of  Nations    

Germany  leaves  

Significance   Contract  of  League  is  part  of  hated  Treaty  of   Versailles    Hitler  wins  plaudits    freedom  of   action  abroad    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  



 

1934   January              

July   1935   January            

March        

June    

Disarmament   Conference     Germany  and  Poland   sign  10  Year  Non-­‐ Aggression  Pact            

Aborted  Nazi  coup  in   Austria   Saar  region  returned   to  Germany          

Germany  brings  in   conscription      

Anglo-­‐Germany  Naval   Agreement  

Allows  Hitler  to  profess  peaceful  intentions:   Germany  agrees  with  disarmament.     Poland  inferior  Slav  nation  which  had  taken  German   lands  in  1919    retribution.  Hitler  had  no  intention   of  honouring.  Yet  had  several  benefits  as  it    Highlights  German  peaceful  intentions    Gives  Poles  false  sense  of  security      Prevents  possibility  of  Polish-­‐Soviet  Pact    

Austrian  Chancellor,  Dolfuss  assassinated.  Austrian   Nazi  Party  fails  in  attempt  to  take  power;  Hitler   denies  involvement.   Small  area  positioned  on  Franco  German  border,   rich  in  coal  &  iron  ore.  After  25  years  of  it  under   League  of  Nations  jurisdiction,  Saar  people  allowed   to  vote  to  join  France  or  rejoin  Germany    Massive  pro-­‐German  vote    Nazi   propaganda    Hitler’s  1st  territorial  gain    

Hitler  announces  plans  for  500  000  army  and  major   rearmament    Against  Versailles  Treaty;  Britain  &  France   take  no  action    Hitler’s  confidence  boosted    

1936   March  

Remilitarisation  of   Rhineland  

           

           

July  

Outbreak  of  Spanish   Civil  War  

   

  November    

Axis  Agreement    

Anti-­‐Comintern  Pact  

Germany  allowed  navy  35%  size  of  Britain’s  &  =   num  of  submarines    Britain  acts  independently  of  France    Versailles  Treaty  further  eroded   Demilitarisation  of  Rhineland  (1919)  meant  to   suppress  French  fears  of  future  German  invasion.   Hitler  orders  German  troops  in  Rhineland  with   orders  to  withdraw  if  France  acts    France  &  Britain  do  nothing  despite  breaking   of  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  Locarno  Treaty     weaknesses  revealed    Germany’s  strategic  position  strengthened    

Hitler  provides  open  support  to  Franco’s  fascist   forces  in  Spain,  allowing  troops  to  gain  valuable   “practice”    

Germany  and  Italy  announce  creation  of  Rome-­‐ Berlin  Axis    

1937   April    

Guernica    

Germany  &  Japan  sign  Anti-­‐Comintern  Pact  aimed   against  Russia   Spanish  town  systematically  bombed  &  destroyed   by  Germ  aircraft  

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   3  

November   1938   March          

Anti-­‐Comintern  Pact   Anschluss            

Munich  Conference   `   September  

 

Italy  accedes  to  Anti-­‐Comintern  Pact  creating  Rome-­‐ Berlin-­‐Tokyo  Axis   Fearing  German  invasion  Austrian  Chancellor   Schnuschigg  calls  referendum  on  issue  of  German   independence    Hitler  anticipates  this  by  sending  German   troops  in  Austria  to  “restore  order”    Britain  and  France  again  take  no  action    

1939   March  

German  invasion  of   rest  of  Czech  

                 

         

Hitler  demands  cession  of  Sudetenland  to  Germany   containing  3  million  Germans  but  also  Czech’s   defences  &  industrial  centres.    Hitler  ripped  up  Munich  Agreement    Britain’s  policy  of  appeasement  over   Hitler  demands  of  Poland  that  it    Return  Danzig  to  Germany    Allow  construction  of  road  across  Polish   Corridor  which  separates  Germany  from  East   Prussia  

May  

 

 

 

August        

September  

Guarantees  for  Poland       Clear  Hitler’s  next  target  is  Poland      Britain  offers  guarantee  to  Poland  to  assist  if   Pact  of  Steel   attacked  by  G   Nazi-­‐Soviet  Pact        

Poland  

Germany  and  Italy  sign  10  year  military  and  political   alliance    

Germany  and  Soviet  Union  sign  non-­‐agression  pact     Hitler  could  invade  Poland  without  interference   from  Russia  Hitler  “opportunist”    

1  Sept:  Germany  invades  Poland   3  Sept:  Britain  (and  later  France)  declares  war  on   Germany  

      Dictatorship  in  Italy    Became  fierce  Socialist,  although  despising  middle  class  socialists  as  they  too   moderate.  Despised  anyone  who  not  ready  to  do  battle  against  injustice  of  world.   Pursued  career  in  journalism  to  express  strong  criticisms  and  opinions    powerful   and  troublesome  agitator    Leading  left  wing  agitator  who  dreamt  of  revolution  which  would  make  all  men  his   subjects.  Believed  like  Marx  that  war  ideal  breeding  ground  for  revolution    urged   Italy  to  join  war  on  side  of  Allies.  Socialists  furious  and  expelled  him  from  party    Italians  not  satisfied  with  their  share  of  break  up  of  Austro-­‐Hungarian  Empire  in   Peace  Treaty:  Trentio  and  Trieste  as  they  felt  deserved  greater  rewards  for   sacrifices.  Demands  for  various  territories  rejected,  nationalistic  Italians  furious    Yet,  Italians  frightened  post  WW1  as  had  unstable  home  front  with  Italian  trade  and   industry  collapse.  Spent  huge  sums  of  money  financing  war,  and  owed  billions  to  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

   

 



 

France,  Britain  and  US  who  supplied  Italy  with  majority  of  armaments  and  coal.  No   money  left  to  repay  debts     Returning  soldiers  found  no  employment  and  no  money  to  support  families.  State   did  nothing  to  assist.  These  victorious  soldiers  looked  upon  by  people  at  home  with   distrust  and  dislike.     Much  political  unrest  with  so  many  political  parties  with  varying  ideas  as  to  how   country  should  be  governed   Italy  post  WW1:  external  and  internal  political,  economical  and  social  conflict/strife  

         

Mussolini  &  Fascism    Mussolini  would’ve  been  quite  helpless  without  Hitler,  never  being  able  to  challenge   democracies  successfully  on  own.  However,  it  was  Mussolini  who  had  shown  Hitler   way,  inventing  Fascism,  the  right  wing,  violently  anti-­‐democratic  movement  which   spread  throughout  Europe.      Fascism  brought  freedom  through  authoritarianism,  heroism  and  nobility  through   discipline  and  sacrifice    Due  to  Fascist  censorship  and  control  of  the  means  of  mass  communication,   Mussolini  presented  to  his  people  and  world  as  the  “Ubermensch”  –  the  man  of   inflexible  resolution,  devoted  public  servant  who  laboured  for  his  people  and  the   man  of  strong  passions  but  discipline      Young  Mussolini  had  way  of  making  friends  and  relations  adore  and  admire  him   when  talking  or  making  speeches.  Could  excite  people  and  hold  them  spellbound.    General  fear  of  Communist  Revolution  from  Catholics,  upper,  middle  and   peasantry  classes  and  industrialists    turn  to  Mussolini   -­‐ Catholics  bitterly  opposed  Communist  as  they  were  anti-­‐God  and  wished  to   destroy  Church   -­‐ Upper  and  middle  class  terrified  that  lives  of  comfort  and  prosperity  would   cease.  Knew  their  estates  would  be  split  among  peasants   -­‐ Peasants  afraid  of  losing  plots  of  land  and  freedom  to  become  servants  of   state   -­‐ Industrialists  opposed  comnst  declaration  to  set  up  workers’  committees  &   run  factories  themselves    Fear  of  left  wing  violence  and  ideals  of  Communism  eventually  turned  Italian   people  to  Mussolini  who  seemed  capable  of  uniting  Italy    Strikes  and  riots  got  worse    squabbles  in  Parliament  grew  more  bitter    liberals   began  to  doubt  Parliament’s  capabilities  of  solving  breakdown  of  government.   Dread  of  anarchy  and  fear  of  communism  persuaded  liberals  to  accept  Mussolini,   believed  could  use  “heroic”  leader  to  save  democracy  then  rid  him.    Mussolini  and  storm  troopers  (Arditi)  started  fights,  riots  and  disturbances  in   streets  against  Socialists  and  Communists  whom  they  blamed  for  initiating   investigation  of  Mussolini,  resulting  in  him  being  placed  in  prison  for  plotting   against  the  state.  Arditi  marched  off  into  country  to  search  out  Communists  and   Socialists  and  punish  them.  Merely  doing  what  police  afraid  or  incapable  of  doing    Communists  tried  to  get  revenge    almost  civil  war.  Although  Communists  didn’t   do  efficient  job  as  storm  troopers,  always  made  to  appear  that  Communists  in  the   wrong  during  this,  Mussolini  made  speeches  and  wrote  articles  telling  Italians  how   he  was  saving  them  from  horrors  of  Communism    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   5   











     



 

Mussolini  and  his  Arditi  seemed  so  strong  and  Government  seemed  so  weak  by   comparison    appeal  despite  violence.  Appealed  to  patriotic  feelings  of  Italians   making  them  feel  nationalistic   Socialists’  general  strike  in  1922  enabled  Mussolini  to  “punish”  socialists.  Broke  into   Socialist  Party  buildings  and  smashed  everything.  Police  and  general  public  agreed   with  Mussolini  that  Fascists  just  doing  what  govt  afraid  to  do    Mussolini  declared   in  October  “unless  the  government  is  handed  over  to  us,  we  shall  march  to  Rome”.  Few   days  later,  ordered  government  to  resign   Next  day  25  000  Blackshirts  set  off  to  Rome  “March  to  Rome”  yet  Mussolini  stayed   behind  being  cautious  as  didn’t  want  people  to  think  he  trying  to  take  over   government  by  force,  waiting  to  be  invited  to  become  PM.  Army  waiting  for  him  to   declare  martial  law,  which  would  give  him  authority  to  take  any  action     Government  finally  decided  to  declare  martial  law  and  drew  up  necessary  decree.   But  at  last  moment,  King  Victor  Emmanuel  refused  to  sign  with  excuse  that  rule  by   army  would  plunge  country  into  civil  war.     Refusal  to  sign  Declaration  of  Martial  Law  in  October  1922  took  away  from   government  its  one  chance  of  stopping  Fascists.  Mussolini  correctly  guessed  that   PM  would  very  shortly  resign  and  King  would  be  forced  to  invite  him  to  from   government  as  no  other  candidates.     Changes  Mussolini  gradually  implemented  to  “protect  the  state”   -­‐ Put  Fascists  into  all  important  positions  of  Government,  Police  and  Civil   Service.  Gradual  process    hardly  anybody  realised   -­‐ Altered  voting  system  to  ensure  he  had  large  majority  in  Parliament.   -­‐ Disbanded  Royal  Guard  and  put  Fascist  Militia  in  place   -­‐ Newspapers  censored   -­‐ Parliament  became  mere  talking  house  with  no  powers  to  make  laws  or   criticise   Editor  from  respected  newspaper:  “He  has  given  to  the  Government  freshness,  youth   and  vigour  ...  saved  Italy  from  the  Socialist  danger”   With  Mussolini  as  leader,  Italians  felt  secure  and  contented.  More  work  and  more   money,  and  delighted  when  strikes  forbidden  by  law     Working  class  viewed  him  as  simple  man  who  loved  hard  work  reinforced  through   propaganda   Socialists,  Communists  and  Royalists  objected  to  some  of  his  implementations     The  April  elections  of  1923  last  free  elections.  Mussolini  destroyed  democracy  and   in  less  than  5  years  became  complete  dictator,  and  more  and  more  popular.     This  popularity  maintained  through   -­‐ Propaganda:  made  people  believe  that  Fascism  was  philosophy  which  would   bring  back  to  the  Italians  all  heroic  courage  of  ancient  Romans.  Slogans   painted,  special  illustrated  books  for  kids   -­‐ Fascist  youth  organisations   -­‐ Pulling  down  of  half  Eternal  City  of  Rome  to  remind  Italians  of  their  glorious   past   -­‐ New  schools,  railway  stations  and  motorways  built   -­‐ Great  areas  of  marshland  drained  and  turned  into  fertile  farmland     increase  of  production     Papacy  and  Italian  Government  had  been  on  extremely  bad  terms  since  1871.  Now   Mussolini  persuaded  Pope  to  give  up  his  claim  to  Rome,  while  agreeing  in  return  to   recognise  the  tiny  Vatican  City  as  completely  independent  state    hero  of  Catholics  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

 

Fascist  Italy    Not  nearly  as  hard  nor  tough  as  in  Nazi  Germany    Mussolini  had  no  pride  in  Italy’s  priceless  art  treasures.  Willingly  have  exchanged   them  for  few  great  battlefield  victories  yet  Italian  people  confident  that  he  would   never  lead  them  into  great  war.  Proud  of  their  Duce  for  making  Italy  feared  abroad   and  grateful  so  security  at  home    Germans  obeyed  Hitler  with  fanatical  enthusiasm  and  ready  to  sacrifice  everything   for  him.  However  Mussolini  complained  he  most  disobeyed  man  in  history.  Nothing   he  did/said  could  make  Italians  law  abiding.      When  Mussolini  implemented  laws  against  Jews  to  impress  Hitler,  Italians  saw  it   that  Jews  didn’t  suffer  to  same  extent  as  German  Jews.  Very  few  murdered  or  sent  to   prison.      Mussolini  knowing  how  deeply  religious  most  Italians  were,  didn’t  attempt  like   Hitler  to  persecute  Chruch.      The  King  grew  to  dislike  Duce  intensely,  and  this  was  reciprocated  by  Mussolini.   However  a=Army  still  looked  on  King  as  head  of  State  rather  than  Mussolini.    Mussolini  formed  special  Blackshirt  divisions,  but  they  never  took  complete  control   of  Italian  Army  like  SS  took  control  of  German  Army.      

Italian  Foreign  Policy    Mussolini  asserted  that  Italy  must  be  an  expanding  power  and  that  “imperialism  is   the  basis  of  life  for  every  people  which  tends  to  expand  economically  and  spiritually”.      Corfu:  August  1923  Italian  general  and  staff  killed  on  Greco-­‐Albanian  border     Mussolini  sent  ultimatum  to  Greek  government  demanding  apologies  and   compensation.  When  not  received,  bombarded  &  occupied      

Short  Term  Aims      Sought  to  revise  revision  of  1919  Paris  Peace  Settlement  like  Germany   -­‐ Treaty  of  London:  Italy  promised  various  lands.  Promises  not  kept     angered  Italians    Develop  Italian  military  power  to  be  respected  in  Europe   -­‐ Pursued  rearmament,  conscription  and  military  strength  similar  to  Hitler      

Long  Term  Aims    Revive  glories  of  ancient  Roman  Empire  and  Have  Italy  recognised  as  one  of  “Great   Powers”    Keep  Austria  independent  of  revived  Germany    Extend  Italian  economic  influence  into  Balkans,  Spain  and  North  Africa  &  Make   Mediterranean  “Italian  Island”    Achieve  by  imperialist  expansion  the  iron,  coal,  oil,  cotton  and  other  raw  materials   which  Italy  needed    Kept  attention  of  Italian  people  focussed  on  grievances  and  glories  and  thereby   diverted  from  economic  and  political  dissatisfaction  with  Mussolini’s  regime.      Living  space  for  Roman  Empire  &  become  famous  conqueror    Capture  Abyssinia   (only  independent  country  left  in  Africa)   -­‐ Attack  launched  in  1936  and  victory  achieved  in  few  months.   -­‐ Fascists  and  Italian  nationalists:  pride  and  nationalistic   -­‐ European  countries  and  League  of  Nations:  shock  and  condemnation     resolution  forbidding  members  to  sell  war  material  to  Italy    however,   proved  they  were  powerless  to  stop  small  war    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   7    

Showed  2  great  dictators  could  break  international  law  whenever  they  liked   and  get  away  with  it   Mussolini’s  foreign  policy  similar  objectives  to  Hitler’s  but  lacked  fanatical   ideological  elements.  Racism  almost  absent  from  Italian  policy  &  not  until  became   closer  to  Hitler,  anti-­‐Semitism  part  of  domestic  policy.     -­‐



Steps  to  Securing  These  Aims    Regimentation  of  a  nation:  military  strong  so  that  all  foreign  ambitions  backed  by   power    Heavy  armament  expenditure:  special  aid  to  arms  factories,  large  army  conscripted,   large  air  force  built  up,  substantial  navy  with  submarine  fleet    Disapproval  of  League  of  Nations:  Mussolini  stressed  national  authority  as  higher   principle  than  international      Use  of  economic  influence:  Italy  sent  support  to  Albania  and  by  1926  Treaty   strengthened  influence  over  Albania.  Italy  practically  dominated  Adriatic  Sea.      Alliance  with  Germany:  1930s  Mussolini  switched  to  supporting  Hitler  in  hope  of   receiving  backing  for  moves  which  might  bring  Italy  into  conflict  with  France  and   Britain.     -­‐ November  1936:  Axis  Agreement     -­‐ Axis  Powers  joined  to  help  right  wing  Spanish  Dictator  General  Franco  in   Spanish  Civil  War   Date   Nazi  Action   Significance   1923  July   Italy  takes  ownership   Action  comes  from  eventual  post  war  treaty   of  Rhodes  &  islands  of   arrangements  (Treaty  of  Lausanne)  with    Turkey   the  Dodecanese  from       Turkey   Italian  border  commissioners  murdered  on  Greco-­‐   Alabanian  border.  Italy  demands  from  Greece   Corfu  Incident     apology  and  indemnity    Greece  appeals  to  the  League    Italy  bombards  Corfu    Council  of  Ambassadors  arbitrates;  Greece   pays  up  &  Italy  leaves  Corfu    Propaganda  victory   1924   Issue  of  Fiume   Italy  annexes  Fiume  form  Yugoslavia  but  decides  not     March   to  take  any  of  Dalmatian  coast.  Fiume  emotional     issue  in  Italian  politics  after  1919   1925   The  Locarno  Treaty   At  Locarno,  Mussolini  plays  statesman.  Locarno   October   agreement  guarantees  west  European  frontiers  and   seen  as  major  step  in  cementing  peace  of  post  war   Europe   1926     Albanian  Affairs   Mussolini  takes  keen  interest  in  Albania      Supports  Albanian  King  Zog    Italy  soon  dominates  Albanian  politics   1928   Abyssinian  Affairs   Mussolini  signs  Friendship  Treaty  with  Abyssinia.   However  also  sends  arms  and  troops  to  adjacent   Italian  colonies  of  Eritrea  and  Somalia   1934  July   Dolfuss  Assassination     Assassination  of  Austrian  Chancellor  Dolfuss  raises   fears  that  Germany  about  to  move  into  Austria  to   support  local  Nazi  Party  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

 

Mussolini  moves  troops  to  Brenner  Pass  and   indicates  Italy  wont  allow  German  takeover   of  Austria    This  action  persuades  Hitler  to  keep  out   Italy  not  yet  in  German  camp  despite  similarity  of   ideology  and  foreign  aims   Britain,  France  and  Italy  meet  at  Stresa,  forming  a   common  “front”  to  stand  up  to  any  possible  future   German  aggression   

1935   April      

October        

Stresa  Front      

Abyssinian  Invasion        

League  Sanctions  

November       Hoare-­‐Laval  Pact   December  

 

Italian  army  invades  Abyssinia    Mussolini  declares  beginning  of  new  Roman   Empire    Stresa  Front  collapses    

League  of  Nations  imposes  half  hearted  sanctions   against  Italy    

1936  July  

Spanish  Civil  War  

   

   

November   League  Sanctions   1937   February    

Italy  leaves  League  of   Nations    

November     Anti-­‐Comintern  Pact  

Britain  and  France  offer  to  carve  up  Abyssinia  with   Hoare-­‐Laval  Plan,  causing  outrage  and  both  men   resign   Mussolini  joins  Hitler  in  supporting  Fascist  forces  of   General  Franco.  Italian  forces  suffer  badly  on   Guadalajara  Front  in  June  1937    

Foreign  Minister  Ciano  signs  treaty  with  Germany   that  forms  Rome-­‐Berlin  Axis   Condemned  by  League  for  actions  in  Abyssinia  and   now  key  partner  of  Hitler,  Italy  sees  no  point  in   further  League  membership    

Italy  joins  Germany  and  Japan  in  Anti-­‐Comintern   Pact  aimed  at  Soviet  Union.  Now  Rome-­‐Berlin-­‐Tokyo   Axis   1938   Munich  Conference     Mussolini  intervenes  last  minute  to  bring  on   November   conference  to  settle  Czech  crisis   1939   Annexation  of  Albania   Italy  annexes  Albania.  More  symbolic  act  than  real     April   as  Italy  long  dominated  Albania        

 

May  

     

     

Pact  of  Steel  

Germany  invades   September   Poland  

 

Italy  and  Germany  sign  alliance.  Doesn’t  commit   Italy  to  fight  with  G    Significance  is  to  remove  perceived   inferiority  of  Italy  that  now  marked  Axis   relationship    

Italy  doesn’t  go  to  war  with  Germany.  Foreign   Minister  Ciano  attempts  to  organise  a  “Munich-­‐ style”  conference  over  Poland;  fails.  Italy  will   eventually  join  Germany  when  it  declares  war  on   Britain  and  France  in  June    1940    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   9      

Similarities  and  Differences  of  the  Dictatorships     Similarities    Nationalists  who  wanted  more  territory    Resented  Treaty  of  Versailles      Militarists  who  glorified  war    Suppressed  opposition  by  force  and  intimidation    Abolished  other  parties,  developing  private  armies  and  used  propaganda    Used  mass  meetings  to  influence  people    Made  use  of  scapegoats  (Jews  in  Germany;  Communists  in  Italy)    Agreements  /  compromises  with  Church    Aimed  for  economic  self  sufficiency  and  industrial  improvement    Organised  youth  movements  for  physical  fitness    

Differences    Hitler  wanted  more  territory  to  unite  German  speaking  people  (lebensraum);   Mussolini  wanted  to  gain  empire  to  give  importance  to  Italy  in  effort  to  restore  days   of  old  Roman  Empire.    Hitler  gained  power  legally  although  took  time  and  extensive  use  of  propaganda;   Mussolini  took  power  by  force  when  marched  on  Rome  gaining  power  quickly    Hitler  made  extensive  use  of  intimidation  and  abolished  all  former  government   bodies.  Mussolini  had  no  comparison  to  Hitler’s  SS  and  Gestapo  and  retained   monarchy  (too  violent  a  change  to  remove  them)    Nazi  Germany  better  organised  with  hierarchy  of  officials;  Fascist  Italy  no  organised   body.  Hitler  developed  totalitarian  state  and  Mussolini  set  up  dictatorship    Mussolini’s  secret  police,  OVRA,  not  nearly  as  cruel  or  efficient  organisation  for   terror  as  Gestapo.  

THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  AND  COLLAPSE  OF  COLLECTIVE  SECURITY:  ABYSSINIA,  SPANISH  CIVIL   WAR    

The  League  of  Nations    Based  on  President  Wilson’s  14th  point,  the  primary  purpose  of  the  League  of   Nations  was  to  promote  international  cooperation  and  to  achieve  international   peace  and  security.      As  a  body,  was  to  find  ways  to  prvent  disputes  from  leading  to  war.  Member  states   were  supposed  to  find  security  through  justice    Wilson’s  original  intention  was  for  League  to  monitor  and  make  periodic   adjustments  to  various  traties  signed  during  1919  and  1920.  Instead,  it  used  to   enforce  provisions  upon  Germany    1921:  in  accordance  with  Article  14  of  Covenant,  League  created  Permanent  Court   of  International  Justice.  Submission  of  disputes  to  Court  voluntary  but  many   members  signed  statute  binding  themselves  to  accept  Court’s  decisions.  Created   primarily  to  be  arbitrator  in  disputes.   -­‐ Weakness:  unless  both  parties  agreed  to  adjudication  of  dispute  by  Court,   Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  hear  case    Court  empowered  to  give  advisory  decision  on  dispute  upon  reference  from  either   assembly  or  Council    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

     

 

Council  virtually  executive  committee  of  League  consisted  of  representatives  of  5   Great  Powers  with  non-­‐permanent  elected  representatives  of  other  member   countries.      To  maintain  peace,  all  members  undertook  to  “respect  and  preserve  as  against   external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and  political  independence”  of  other   members.      Members  agreed  if  there  was  a  dispute,  they  will  submit  matter  to  arbitration  or   inquiry  by  Council  and  not  resort  to  war  until  3  months  after  award  by  arbitrators   or  report  by  Council.      Under  Article  16,  if  member  state  acted  in  defiance  of  Court  of  Council,  their  trade   and  financial  relations  with  other  members  states  would  be  severed  and  thus   prevention  of  all  financial,  commercial  or  personal  intercourse  with  other  members.    Senate  of  US  Congress  refused  to  ratify  Treaty  of  Versailles  &  thus  League  Covenant   asserting  it  wasn’t  ideal  of  international  peace  rejected  but  lack  of  clearly  specified   guarantees  and  methods.  Felt  economic  sanctions  and  blockades  too  negative,  and   slow  and  suspicious  of  what  they  as  open-­‐ended  wording  on  defence  issues.    Insisted  decision  to  commit  US  troops  to  any  military  or  disciplinary  action   shouldn’t  rest  with  League  but  whole  of  congress.    This  refusal  was  to  have  detrimental  consequences  in  that  League  lost  vital  member   changing  British  and  French  attitudes  to  League.   -­‐ With  US,  functioned  with  mixture  of  realism  and  idealism   -­‐ Without  US,  for  Britain  dangerous  concept  whose  obligations  needed  to  be   watered  down  and  for  French,  weakened  collective  security  became  poor   substitute  for  rigorous  application  of  Treaty  of  V   -­‐ Action  of  US  destroyed  Guarantee  Treaties  between  France,  Britain  and  US.     Structure  of  the  League    Council:  executive  committee  of  League  whose  decisions  had  to  be  unanimous.  Was   to  comprise  of  5  permanent  members  (US,  Japan,  Britain,  Italy  &  France)  &  4  non-­‐ permanent  members    Assembly:  all  members  had  3  delegates  in  assembly  and  could  discuss  any  League   issue.  Each  nation  has  one  vote  and  votes  had  to  be  unanimous.    Secretariat:  permanent  body  which  carried  out  day  to  day  work  of  League;   international  public  service    Legal  Political  Structures:  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice;  Council  for   Protection  of  Minorities;  Mandates  Commission    Socio-­‐Economic  Structures:  Health  Organisation;  International  Labour   Organisation;  Refugee  Organisation   

 

British  and  French  Attitudes    With  protection  of  Royal  Navy,  one  of  strongest  advocate  of  land  based   disarmament  and  positive  advocate  for  Collective  Security.      Britain  enthusiastic  supporter  of  League  principles.  People  used  to  idea  of  self   determination  and  to  practice  of  political  rights  and  responsibilities  under  free  govt.   As  taxpayers,  reluctant  to  endorse  heavy  defence  spending  &  welcomed   disarmament  and  collective  security  with  relief      French  couldn’t  accept  League,  as  didn’t  offer  any  real  guarantee  against  further   German  aggression  and  not  capable  of  stopping  invasion  of  French  territory.    US  failure  to  ratify  Versailles  Treaty  cancelled  Anglo/American  guarantee  of   protection  for  France’s  eastern  frontiers  and  undermined  France’s  belief  in  Allied   collective  promises.  Didn’t  seem  possible  for  Britain  alone  to  contain  Germany    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   11     

 

AJP  Taylor:  French  wanted  League  to  develop  into  system  of  security  directed   against  Germany;  British  regarded  as  system  of  conciliation  which  would  include   Germany.  French  believed  last  war  caused  by  German  aggression;  British  came   more  and  more  to  hold  it  happened  by  mistake.    

Italian,  Chinese,  Japanese,  German  and  Soviet  Attitudes    Italy  expressed  dissatisfaction  with  results  of  Peace  Treaties.  As  Mussolini  gained   power,  demonstrated  thinly  disguised  contempt  for  League  principles.   Demonstrated  less  and  less  interest  in  preserving  peace.      China  unable  to  benefit  from  new  internationalism,  due  to  civil  war  and  revolution.   At  first,  looked  eagerly  to  League  as  insurance  against  Japanese  aggression.  Ideas  of   democracy  appealed  to  growing  number  of  intellectuals  in  govt.      However  news  of  Great  Power  agreements  with  Japan    seemed  to  Chinese  that   preservation  of  world  peace  called  for  sacrifice  of  homeland.      Japan  began  exploring  possibilities  of  Democracy.  Technical  and  industrial   experience  enabled  Japan  to  take  advantage  of  all  war  caused  shortages  around   world.  Model  democratic  govt  of  Japan  embraced  policy  of  “enlightened  peace”.    Exclusion  of  Germans    denial  of  League  principles.  Appeared  Germans  ostracised   by  rest  of  world,  denied  self  determination,  ethically  separated,  economically   strangled  and  subject  to  invasion  at  whim  of  Allies    Bolsheviks  dismissed  League  of  Nations  and  Collective  Security  as  “Capitalist  Ploys”   and  sympathised  with  shaky  Weimar  Republic.  Russia  pursued  official  policy  of   neutrality  and  disarmament,  and  concluded  series  of  neutrality  pacts  with  Baltic   States  and  Middle  East  nations.   Evident  Dangers  for  League    Peacekeeping  initiatives  of  new  organisation  little  effect  on  fighting  between   communists  and  fascists  in  Italy,  Bolshevik  purges  in  Russia  and  outbreak  of  war   between  Russia  and  Poland  in  1920.  Many  statesmen  agreed  with  General  Smuts:   League  would  never  “carry  on  to  prevent  war”    Confidence  in  League  waning.  Articles  of  League  bound  in  everyone’s  minds  with   harsh  terms  of  Treaty  of  V    some  of  noblest  ideals  seen  as  impractical  and   compromises  evidence  of  weakness    End  of  decade  coincided  with  economic  collapse  on  global  scale.  League  needed   investments  of  time  and  faith  to  survive,  and  stability  of  healthy  world  trade   balances.      Collapse  of  stock  market  (1929)  pulled  financial  blocks  from  post  war  world.  In   ensuing  depression  pursuit  of  peace  submerged  beneath  avalanche  of  national  self   interest.      Lord  Robert  Cecil,  founding  father  of  League  recognises  weaknesses  of  Article  10.  In   handling  acts  of  aggression,  could  give  no  advice  unless  unanimous  &  no  obligation   of  members  of  League  to  accept  advice.    France’s  invasion  of  Ruhr  aroused  widespread  criticism  throughout  Europe.  France   seen  as  aggressive  and  uncooperative.  France  justified  high  level  of  armaments  with   their  genuine  apprehensive  to  security,  conscious  of  smaller  population  and  lower   birth  rate,  dreading  combination  between  Germany  and  Russia  against  ally  Poland.    With  absence  of  US  from  League,  Britain  in  particular  led  League’s  quest  for   collective  security  and  disarmament  working  for  peace  and  conciliation.    Foreign   policy  of  Great  Britain  identical  with  am  of  League  of  Nations    policy  of  peace    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

 

Disarmament    The  League  sought  to  replace  an  international  system  of  collective  security  for  old   system  of  every  State  relying  for  defence  on  own  armed  forces.  Only  when   Individual  states  became  convinced  that  alternative  provided  by  League  workable,   could  League  members  proceed  with  plans  to  disarm.      While  major  countries  remained  outside  League  system  of  collective  ecurity,   member  nations  didn’t  feel  safe    Doubts  whether  member  nations  powerful  enough  to  deter  aggression.  Whilst   disarmament  basis  of  world  peace  and  principle  of  collective  security  praised,   international  situation  not  favorable  to  large  scale  disarmament.    Refusal  of  US  to   join  weakened  possibilities  of  disarmament.      Britain  and  France  felt  burden  on  themselves  too  heavy  and  changed  attitudes  to   League   -­‐ France  set  alternative  system  of  alliances  with  Rumania,  Yugoslavia,  Czech   and  Poland,  treaties  whose  existence  indication  of  lack  of  confidence  in   League.      At  Washington  Conference  of  1921-­‐22  limitation  of  battleships  in  ratio  of  Great   Britain:US:Japan:France:Italy.      Numerically  limited  only  to  battleships  although  max  size  set  for  capital  shits,   aircraft  carriers  and  cruisers   -­‐ Applied  to  only  one  aspect  of  naval  armaments   -­‐ Limited  to  few  countries  only    January  1930:  same  5  powers  convened  in  London.  Agreements  as  to  capital  ships   and  regulations  of  submarine  warfare  accepted  by  each  of  States  but  differences   failed  to  bring  general  agreement  on  further  limitation  of  all  types  of  cruisers,   destroyers  and  submarines.      Three  Power  Naval  Treaty  of  March  1936  between  France,  Britain,  and  US    defined   certain  qualities  limitations  and  permitted  any  signatory  to  exceed  these  limitations   if  felt  being  outclassed  or  outbuilt  by  non  signatory  power.      International  cooperation  towards  limitation  of  naval  armaments  achieved  little.   Even  less  progress  made  within  League  towards  general  disarmament.      May  1920:  Permanent  Advisory  Commission  on  Disarmament  set  up.    1922  Draft  Treaty  of  Mutual  Assistance  drawn  up.  Assistance  to  victim  of  aggressor   to  come  from  member  States  of  continent  only.  Scheme  rejected  by  Britain  and   Dominions    Locarno  Pact,  ratified  in  Dec  1925,  gave  France  to  a  degree  security  it  lost  when   Guarantee  Treaties  of  1919  not  eventuated.  Brought  Germany  into  League    world   power  status.  This  treaty  brought  appearance  of  security  to  Europe  and  began   period  of  intensified  hopes  for  general  disarmament.      

Peace  Pact  of  Paris  /  Kellogg  Briand  Pact  1928      Frank  Kellogg,  Secretary  of  US,  converted  Aristide  Briand’s  (French  PM)  bilateral   agreement  to  multi  lateral.    Pact  enjoyed  enormous  popular  enthusiasm,  attitude  of  govts  appears  to  have  been   recognition  of  necessity  to  affirm  Pacts’  principles  mixed  with  doubt  of  its   effectiveness  in  cause  of  peace    Whilst  Pact  brought  countries  outside  League  (US  and  Russia)  into  system  of   “collective  security”  Pact  didn’t  propose  any  action  against  country  breaking  pledge.   No  sanctions;  rested  solely  on  good  faith  of  signatories    

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   13    

Disarmament  Conference    Disarmament  Conference  for  February  1932  planned  –  disregarding  reserves,   personnel  and  conscription  to  be  limited,  and  land  wartime  material  subjected  to   budgetary  limitation.      However,  Stresemann  now  dead,  Nazis  increasing  influence  and  whilst   Disarmament  Conference  may  have  been  effective  in  1925  or  1928,  serious  doubts   on  how  effective  in  1932    2  Feb  1932:  Geneva  Disarmament  Conference  opened.    Basis  for  continuing  conference:  limitations  placed  on  calibre  of  certain  specified   weapons,  numbers  of  aircraft  reduced,  chemical  and  bacteriological  warfare  banned    14  Oct  1933:  Germany  withdraw  from  Conference  and  shortly  after  Mussolini  made   clear  he  thought  conference  waste  of  time    ceased  to  exist.   Collapse  of  Collective  Security    Peace  initiatives  of  1920s  genuine  attempts  to  ensure  end  of  war.  But  never  came   time  when  all  weapons  and  fears  discarded.  Old  armaments  replaced  with  better   armaments.    Article  8:  “maintenance  of  peace  requires  reduction  of  national  armaments  to   lowest  point  consistent  with  national  safety  and  enforcement  b  common  action  of   international  obligations”    French  claimed  under  constant  threat  from  German  aggression.  Germans  made   national  grievance  of  fact  they  stood  defenceless  amidst  hostile  France,  &   communist  Russia    Britain  and  US  having  come  to  satisfactory  agreement  over  warship  ratios,  not   gratly  worried  about  armies  and  expressed  anxious  sympathy  for  everyone.    Collective  Security  worked  to  a  degree  at  diplomatic  level  but  apart  from  sanctions,   “common  act”  represented  undefined  force  that  didn’t  exist.  Neither  collective  nor   secure      Depression  increased  siege  thinking.  Interest  in  Disarmament  Conferences  renewed   in  hope  of  reducing  defence  spending.  But  economic  nationalism  took  precedence   over  all  other  nationalism:  tariff  walls  and  trade  preferences  needed  armies  and   navies  to  defend  them.      By  Jan  1932,  Allies  fallen  foul  of  each  other  and  growing  “psychology  of  fear”   dominated  councils  of  world    March  1933:  Japanese  resigned  from  League  over  Manchuria.  By  this  time,  Nazis  in   full  control  of  Germany  and  looked  down  upon  principles  of  international   cooperation.  October:  walked  out    By  1934,  everyone  conceded  Disarmament  Conference  failed      

Success  and  Failures  of  The  League:  International  Disputes   Aaland  Islands    Inhabitants  under  control  of  Finland  wished  to  join  with  Sweden  and  agitated   accordingly.  Finns  arrested  leading  agitators  and  this  created  tension  between   Sweden  and  Finland:  Sweden  feeling  bound  to  protest  against  such  actions.      Britain  brought  case  before  League  Council  who  appointed  committee  to  visit   Sweden,  Finland  and  Islands  to  gather  evidence.      July  1921:  gave  decision  –  prefaced  by  international  convention  guaranteeing   neutrality  of  islands,  Finland  given  sovereignty  but  self  govt  &  freedom  to  use   Swedish  language  given  to  islanders.  Both  parties  accepted    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

 

Corfu  Incident    Members  of  Italian  boundary  commission  fixing  border  between  Albania  and   Greece  murdered  in  Aug  1923.  Italian  govt  demanded  official  apology  and   indemnity  of  50  million  lira;  and  Italian  involvement  in  apprehension  of  murders.   Greece  refused  and  appealed  to  League  for  aid.    Italians  bombarded  and  occupied  island  of  Corfu.  Italy  ill  disposed  to  direct  League   intervention  hence  League  council  asked  Council  of  Ambassadors  to  arbitrate.  They   temporised  by  awarding  Italians  indemnity  on  condition  Corfu  evacuated    dispute   settle    Showed  League’s  authority  weakened  when  major  powers  involved;  certainly  if  that   power  unwilling  to  permit  League  negotiation    Involvement  of  ambassadors  essentially  compromise  by  big  powers    

Mosul  Dispute    Dispute  between  Turkish  and  British  mandate  controlled  Iraq  (Mesopotamia).   British  attempted  to  take  most  of  Mosul  and  add  to  Iraq  although  it  hadn’t  been   conquered  in  WW1.  Claimed  disputed  region  necessary  to  Iraq’s  defence  and   economy.  Turks  claimed  it  not  spoil  of  war  and  local  population  favoured  Turkish   rule.      Emergency  council  meeting  held  and  temporary  demarcation  line  (Brussels  Line)   laid  down  roughly  along  Britain’s  desire.      By  1925  neutral  commission  appointed  by  League:  favoured  Turkey  in  that  right  by   conquest  of  Britain  &  Iraq  denied.  However,  suggested  provided  British  mandate   over  Iraq  continued,  people  better  off  under  Iraqi  rule.      Turkey  requested  Permanent  Court  determine  binding  nature  of  commissioners   award  and  whether  Turkish  reps  have  right  to  veto    Council  ruled  award  binding   but  in  accordance  with  Covenant,  unanimity  exclusive  of  votes  of  parties  in  dispute.      Turkey  rejected  decisions,  further  disorders  occurred  and  Brussels  Line  became   permanent  Turkey/Iraqi  border.  Rights  of  Turkish  minorities  in  Mosul  guaranteed    Example  of  League  failing  to  deal  with  issues  outside  Europe    

Graeco-­Bulgarian  Dispute  of  1925:      Oct  1925  –  Greek  troops  crossed  into  Bulgarian  territory  and  Bulgaria  appealed  to   League.  Council  at  Paris  at  time,  acted  immediately  and  ordered  military  attaches  of   Great  Powers  in  Athens  to  report  facts.      Greeks  reported  at  fault  and  Council  fixed  sum  which  Greece  was  to  pay  in   reparations.      This  success  raised  hope  that  it  created  precedence  for  future  cases  with  equally   good  results    Must  be  considered  though,  that  Greece  only  small  power  and  thus  no  political   complications    

Bolivia,  Paraguay  and  the  Chaco:      Dispute  at  end  of  1928  between  Bolivia  and  Paraguay  over  possibly  oil  rich  Chaco   region.  Agreed  to  submit  dispute  to  arbitration  of  Pan-­‐American  Conference  on   Arbitration  and  Conciliation.  Immediate  dispute  settled  but  cause  of  dispute   remained  with  no  long  term  solutions.  1932:  hostilities  broke  out  again  and  neither   League  nor  other  American  Nations  able  to  intervene  and  by  mediation  bring   fighting  to  end.  1934:  League  Comission  of  Inquiry  outlined  peace  treaty  fair  to  both   parties  yet  refused    chairman  suggested  embargo  on  arms  shipments  to  warring    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   15    



    Manchuria    By  end  1931:  Japan  invaded  Manchuria  following  explosion  on  Manchurian  railway   in  Sept  1931,  Jap  troops  moved  to  take  control  of  providence.  1932:  Shanghai   bombed  and  further  provinces  annexed  by  Japanese    Feb  1932:  in  attempt  to  conceal  aggression  as  separatist  movement,  Manchurian   leaders  declared  independence  and  new  state  named  Manchukuo  under  presidency   of  ex  Emperor  of  China,  Pu-­‐Yi    These  actions  violated  obligations  to  Covenant  of  League,  Kellogg-­‐Briand  Peace  Pact   and  Nine  Power  Treaty  of  1922  which  guaranteed  territorial  integrity  of  China    21  Sept  1931:  China  appealed  to  League  under  Article  11  of  Covenant.    By   December,  Commission  of  Inquiry  adopted  by  Council.  League  condemned  Japan      This  international  Commission  aka  Lytton  Commission  sent  to  Manchuria  to  report   on  incident.  Consisted  of  Britain,  Italy,  Germany  and  US.  During  this,   -­‐ Chinese  govt  began  boycott  of  Japanese  goods  and  business  firms   -­‐ Japanese  Navy  in  early  1932  landed  troops  in  Shanghai  to  suppress  anti-­‐ Japanese  rioting    May  1932:  negotiations  completed  for  withdrawal  of  Jap  forces  and  ending  of   boycott    Sept  1932:  Japanese  govt  recognised  state  of  Manchukuo  while  Lytton  Commission   still  preparing  report   -­‐ Indicated  little  respect  Japan  had  for  principles  of  League    October:  Commission  rejected  Japan’s  reasons  for  invasion  but  didn’t  call  for  return   to  status  quo  and  instead  called  upon  Japan  and  China  to  have  talks.  Suggested   China  set  up  in  Manchuria  autonomous  govt  which  would  acknowledge  Chinese   suzerainty.    Neither  side  agreed.    During  1933,  Japanese  continued  aggressive  actions  towards  China  ignoring  League   plans  for  acceptance  of  various  responsibilities  towards  League.  March:    Japan  left   League  month  later    May:  China  compelled  to  accept  Tangku  Agreement:  unequal  military  truce  which   offered  little  except  certainty  of  further  hostilities    Illustrates  when  major  power  chose  to  defy  League,  League  has  no  power  to  stop  it.    Highlighted  League’s  inability  to  prevent  international  conflict.    Without  US  or  USSR  League  essentially  European  body  and  Japan,  China  and   Manchuria  beyond  its  capabilities  or  members’  interests    Fundamental  principle  of  League  was  “collective  security”:  if  one  member  attacked,   other  League  members  rally  in  defence  of  member  and  force  back  down  of   aggressor.  Japan  shown  inadequacy  of  this  principle.    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

countries    put  into  operation  by  September  1934  and  supported  by  28  countries   incl  US.  Nov  1934:  Paraguay  rejected  peace  plan  formulated  by  League  Assembly.   Arms  embargo  on  Bolivia  lifted  and  Feb  1935,  Paraguay  served  notice  of  intention   to  resign  from  League   Revealed  limited  power  of  League  to  bring  about  settlement  of  dispute.   Revealed  shallowness  of  belief  in  ideals  of  League  held  by  major  powers  of  smaller   countries.     Reinforces  theory  that  as  strength  of  League  lay  in  Euope  its  abilities  to  settle   dispute  confined  to  that  continent.  Outside  Europe,  had  neither  support  nor  interest   of  more  influential  members  

 

Abyssinia  (Ethiopia)    Abyssinia  provided  Mussolini  with  opportunity  for  imperial  expansion.      Other  factors  encouraging  Mussolini  to  be  involved:   -­‐ Italian  economists  argued  Abyssinia  rich  in  resources  &  would  provide  Italy   w  food  &  export  markets   -­‐ Political  motive:  divert  people’s  home  discontents  to  unite  nation  around   common  patriotism   -­‐ Restore  Italian  honour  in  face  of  humiliation  by  Abyssinia  at  Battle  of  Adowa    December  1934  some  Italian  soldiers  killed  in  clash  at  Walwal;  incident  Mussolini   used  as  excuse  for  invasion.  Also,  border  dispute  occurred  over  territory  lying   across  Abyssinia  and  Italian  Somaliland.  Abyssinia  appealed  to  League  for   arbitration   -­‐ Commission  decided  in  September  neither  caused  clash  but  made  no  award   concerning  ownership   -­‐ Abyssinian/Italian  relations  deteriorated  with  Italy  preparing  for  military   action  and  Abyssinia  making  several  appeals  against  this  to  League.      Britain  tried  to  encourage  Abyssinia  to  accommodate  Italy  and  offered  path  to  sea   and  use  port  of  Zeilia  in  British  Somaliland  as  part  of  its  attempts  to  prevent   outbreak  of  war    3  October  1935:  Italian  armies  moved  into  Abyssinia  from  Eritrea  in  north  and   Somaliland  in  south    Italian  strength  &  brutal  willingness  to  use  all  modern  weapons  including  gas   quickly  wore  down  Abyssinians.      7  Oct:  League  Council  declared  Itay  to  be  aggressor      11  Oct:  Assembly  agreed  to  impose  economic  sanctions  against  Italy  excluding  coal   and  oil;  however  a  few  states  (Austria,  Hungary,  Albania  and  Swtiz)  refused  to  apply   sanctions    League  agreed  to  impose  sanctions  against  Italy.  However  were  half  hearted  and   ineffective   -­‐ Oil  and  coal  not  included:  key  resources  for  nation  at  war   -­‐ Austria.  Albania,  Switzerland  and  Hungary  refused  to  endorse  sanctions   -­‐ Germany  and  Soviet  Union  helped  Italy    Sanctions  did  nothing  to  assist  Abyssinia.  Their  weak  nature  provided  further   evidence  to  weakness  of  League    December  1935:  secret  Hoare-­‐Laval  Plan  providing  for  sacrifice  of  60  000  square   miles  of  Abyssinia  to  Italy   -­‐ Foreign  ministers  of  France  and  Britain  devised  plan   -­‐ Limited  sanctions  maintained  but  no  attempt  to  blockade  Suez  Canal  or   interfere  with  Mussolini’s  access  to  war  zone   -­‐ Upon  being  revealed  to  public,  ensuing  outcry    territorial  concessions   abandoned   -­‐ Britain  strongly  in  favour  of  sterner  sanctions  against  Ital  but  France   continued  to  stall    deteriorated  relationship      By  April  1936  Abyssinian  capital  Addis  Ababa  captured    9  May  1936:  Italian  king  Victor  Emmanuel  III  crowned  emperor   -­‐ Power  of  Collective  Security  demonstrated  as  sham   -­‐ Integrity  of  Great  Powers  compromised   -­‐ League  received  crippling  blow  from  which  never  recovered    

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   17    



        

Invasion  occurred  despite  efforts  of  League’s  appointment  oif  arbitrators  who   reported  in  Sept  1935  neither  side  at  fault  in  disagreements.  Sought  to  persuade   Abyssinia  to  accept  changes  with  Italy’s  colonies   France  and  Britain  had  potential  to  stop  Italy   -­‐ Both  had  colonies  next  to  Italy’s  colonies   -­‐ Britain  could  have  denied  Italy  use  of  Suez  Cana;   -­‐ However,  both  concerned  with  possible  future  German  actions.  Had  formed   Stresa  Front  with  Italy  aimed  to  keep  Germany  in  check;  feared  action   against  Italians  would  destroy  this   AJP  Taylor:  “this  was  the  death  blow  to  the  League  as  well  as  to  Abyssinia”   Despite  weak  nature  of  sanctions,  imposition  destroyed  Stresa  Front   By  Nov  1936  Italy  became  Germany’s  axis  partner  and  in  Feb  1937,  Italy  walked  out   of  League.     With  Europe’s  attention  seized  s=by  events  in  Abyssinia,  Hitler  took  opportunity  to   send  troops  into  demilitarised  Rhineland   Proved  concept  of  collective  security  dead  and  ineffectiveness  of  League  of  Nations   Transformed  Italy  from  nation  willing  to  stand  up  to  Hitler  to  one  willing  to  become   Hitler’s  loyal  partner   Encouraged  Hitler  to  believe  he  could  get  away  with  acts  of  aggression  

Rhineland    Britain,  France  and  Italy  signed  Stresa  Pact  to  confirm  frontiers  and  present  solid   front  against  German  rearmament.  Britain  and  France  looked  to  own  defences  and   Russia  and  France  signed  mutual  assistance  agreement    Hitler  raged  at  France’s   encirclement  of  Reich    Britain  had  fine  disregard  for  League,  Locarno,  Versailles  Treaty  and  Stresa  Pact,   signed  Anglo-­‐German  Naval  Agreement  which  allowed  Reich  Navy  to  build  up  to   33%  of  British  Fleet    France  and  Italy  outraged  and  possibilities  of  alliances  to  stop  Hitler  destroyed    Weakness  of  Allies,  conciliatory  attitude  of  Britain  and  Mussolini’s  success  in   Ethiopia  encouraged  Hitler  to  take  step  her  had  been  contemplating  as  part  of   foreign  policy    7  March  1936:  Hitler  summoned  ambassadors  of  France,  Britain,  Italy  and  Belgium   to  propose  plan  for  demilitarisation  of  both  sides  of  Rhine  and  25  year  arms   limitation  and  non  aggression  pact.      Germany  ultimately  took  gamble  in  believing  France  wouldn’t  attack.  France  simply   sent  13  divisions  to  man  Maginot  Line  and  seeked  assistance  from  Britain  –   however,  Britain  believed  this  wasn’t  its  concern    Remilitarisation  of  Rhineland  altered  balance  of  power  in  Europe:     -­‐ France  no  longer  secure  from  attack  behind  buffer  zone,  with  vulnerable   frontiers.  Geographically  cut  off  from  mutual  assistance  allies     -­‐ With  refortified  western  frontier,  Hitler  now  looked  eastwards   -­‐ Belgium  declared  neutrality    Maginot  Line  couldn’t  be  extended  along   Belgian-­‐German  border   -­‐ Loss  of  Locarno  and  Britain’s  failure  to  take  positive  action  further   undermined  Anglo-­‐French  ally    

Spanish  Civil  War,  July  1936  –  March  1939    Spain  hadn’t  been  major  power  in  European  affairs    1923  –  1929:  military  dictatorship  under  Primo  de  Rivera.  Overthrown  in  1930.  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  



   





 











 

1931:  King  Alfronso  XIII  abdicated    democratic  republic.  Survived  uneasily  for  5   years  deeply  dividing  nation   Republicans:  Socialists,  Communists,  Anarchists   -­‐ Supported  newly  elected  Popular  Front  govt   -­‐ Opposed  power  of  Church  and  landowners   -­‐ In  favour  of  more  equal  distribution  of  nation’s  wealth   Nationalists:  landowners,  businessmen,  devout  Catholics,  military  officers,  Spanish   Fascists  Party   -­‐ Opposed  newly  elected  Popular  Front  govt   -­‐ Sought  to  maintain  much  more  traditional  and  conservative  nature  of   Spanish  society   -­‐ Wished  to  maintain  church  power   Spanish  Civil  War  started  July  1936.  Group  of  military  officers,  based  in  Spanish   Morocco,  revolted  against  govt.  Leadership  of  rebels  soon  came  under  General   Franco  seeking  to  destroy  “godless,  communist  govt”   Torture,  massacres  and  indiscriminate  civilian  kills  common  as  seen  in  systematic   bombing  of  Guernica,  1937   This  incident  further  consolidated  divisions  within  Europe  which  were  solidifying   -­‐ Germany  and  Italy  gave  solid  backing  to  Nationalists   -­‐ Britain  and  France,  though  supporting  non-­‐intervention,  generally   sympathetic  to  Republicans   Germany  involved  for  various  reasons   -­‐ Desire  to  prevent  spread  of  Russian  Bolshevism     -­‐ Need  to  acquire  cheap  raw  materials  fro  Spain   -­‐ Decision  to  test  battle  readiness  of  German  air  force  and  equipment   -­‐ Need  to  divert  and  weaken  Italy:  if  it  preoccupied  with  events  in  Spain,  Italy   would  be  less  likely  to  seek  new  friendships  with  Britain  or  France   Germany  and  Italy’s  firm  backing  of  Nationalists  cemented  relationship  and  further   highlighted  Italy’s  increasing  junior  status  in  Axis  partnership   -­‐ Italy  had  up  to  60  000  “volunteers”  fighting  for  Franco,  and  huge  amounts  of   supplies  &  equipment   -­‐ Germany  provided  substantial  military  equipment  and  given  chance  to   experiment  with  new  technology  and  steel.  Also  sent  teams  of  military   specialists    demonstrated  strength  in  being  dominating  power  in  Europe     -­‐ Germany’s  Condor  Legion  destroyed  Guernica    Luftwaffe  valuable   experience  in  support  tactics   Britain  and  France  encouraged  non-­‐intervention  in  Spain   -­‐ Discouraged  their  citizens  from  joining  the  fighting   -­‐ Actively  tried  to  prevent  arms  getting  in  (to  Republican  side)  which  Germans   and  Italy  had  no  misgiving  s  ignoring  calls  for  non-­‐intervention   Soviet  assistance  to  Republicans  distrusted  although  significant   -­‐ 1000  aircraft,  900  tanks,  arms  and  ammunition   -­‐ Stalin  opposed  fascism,  but  nobody  believed  Stalin  was  whole  heartedly   fighting  for  democracy   Spanish  Civil  War  took  on  idealistic  flavour   -­‐ Thousands  of  youth  from  all  over  world  joined  International  Brigades  fought   on  side  of  Republicans   -­‐ International  volunteers  on  Nationalist  side,  including  Irish  Blueshirts   -­‐ Intensity  of  war  produced  great  art  from  those  such  as  Hemingway,  Orwell   and  Picasso  

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   19      



Highlighted  incapacity  of  League  of  Nations   Demonstrated  unwillingness  of  democracies  to  resist  aggression.  Destructive   capabilities  of  airpower  horrified  Allies  and  convinced  them  there  was  no  real   defence  against  bombs:  to  fight  risked  obliteration;  survival  meant  appeasement.     Americans  became  even  more  sure  of  soundness  of  their  policy  of  isolation.  

Reasons  for  Failure  of  League  of  Nations    League  rested  on  principle  of  “internationalism”  –  hat  nations  would  sacrifice   national  gain  for  common  good    basic  flaw  of  League  as  it  was  promoting   internationalism  in  world  obsessed  by  nationalism.  Inter-­‐war  period  saw  rise  of   aggressive  nationalist  regimes  in  Europe.  League  structure  based  on  nationalism     made  Assembly  and  Council  unworkable    Attempts  to  strengthen  League  (e.g.  1923  Draft  Treaty  of  Mutual  Assistance)  failed.   Nations  didn’t  want  to  get  dragged  into  conflict  that  had  nothing  to  do  with  them   just  because  had  signed  up  to  collective  security    League’s  aim  of  disarmament  rested  on  fatal  contradiction:  Article  8  called  for   powers  to  disarm  to  level  consistent  w/  national  safety    interpreted  as  “a  bit   stronger  than  neighbour”    disarmament  impossible   -­‐ Signatories  to  League  Covenant  had  agreed  upon  disarmament  but  in   practice  Germany  only  nation  to  be  disarmed  and  this  was  against  its  will.   -­‐ Britain  and  US  made  some  concessions  towards  disarmament   -­‐ German  General  Stff  made  secret  preparations  for  rearmament  and  training.   Treaty  of  Rapallo  with  Russia  1924,  allowed  German  pilots  to  train  with   Soviet  forces  dispute  restrictions  in  Treaty  of  V    Never  reflected  true  reality  of  world  balance  of  power;  could  only  be  as  strong  as   membership.  US,  greatest  power,  never  member;  Germany  1926-­‐1933;  Japan  left   1933;  Italy  left  1937;  Soviet  Union  1934  –  1939.  League  relief  on  Britain  and  France   who  after  1919  clearly  became  2nd  rate  powers  in  economics  and  military   -­‐ Defeated  Germany  refused  admission  until  Treaty  of  Lucarno  1926.  Prior  to   this,  judged  by  victors  to  have  been  cause  of  war  thus  denied  entry  into  post   war  family  of  nations   -­‐ Fear  of  Communist  Russia:  existence  of  Communist  state  substantially   altered  balance  of  power  and  encouraged  Allied  attempts  to  isolate  regime     international  outcast  like  Germany  for  decade   -­‐ League  provided  little  support  to  newly  independent  countries  of  Eastern   Europe,  many  which  fell  victim  to  conservative  groups  which  asserted   control  over  govt   -­‐ Wilson  frustrated  with  atmosphere  of  implacable  hostility  towards  Germany.   Congressional  opposition  within  USA  to  both  League  and  Treaty  of  Versailles   intense.  Upon  his  death,  Senate  refused  to  ratify  Treaty  and  US  withdrew   from  European  commitment    US  military  guarantees  of  European  security   withdrawn    unilateral  action  on  part  of  member  states.  Britain  support  F   by  self    Failure  to  address  ethnic  rivalries:  new  nations  established  after  collapse  of  Austro   Hungarian  empire  in  1918  were  subject  to  intense  ethnic  rivalry  provoking  violence   and  oppression.     -­‐ Ethnic  Germans  in  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia  felt  they  had  been  denied   national  self  determination.  Poland  included  1  million  Germans,  6  million   White  Russians  and  3  million  Jews.  League  could  offer  little  assistance  to   these  minorities  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

  



  

      

Success  relied  upon  Anglo-­‐French  cooperation;  however  their  interests  opposed   -­‐ France  wanted  strong  League  to  ensure  security  in  Europe   -­‐ Britain  wanted  flexible  League  with  fewer  commitments  as  its  interests   outside  Europe   Obsessed  with  security  after  horrors  of  WW1,  France  wanted  to  use  League  to   enforce  Versailles  Treaty.  League  became  seen  as  conservative  body  backing   interests  of  established  powers   -­‐ E.g.  Corfu:  involvement  of  major  powers  =  weakening  of  League   Article  10:  members  undertook  to  guarantee  each  other  against  aggression  formed   basis  for  maintenance  of  peace  by  collective  action.  However  many  doubts     Threat  of  war  only  be  moved  by  disarmament.  However  this  couldn’t  take  place   when  ability  of  League’s  collective  security  to  protect  members  doubted.     Structural  weaknesses  of  League  not  sufficient  to  explain  failure.  League  failed  not   for  structural  reasons  but  because  members  didn’t  believe  it  could  work.  Required   faith  &  participation  of  all  nations  of  world    didn’t.     Collapse  of  collective  security  through  failure  of  League  encouraged  Nazi  regime  to   continue  with  demands  for  territorial  adjustments.    

BRITAIN,  FRANCE  AND  THE  POLICY  OF  APPEASEMENT:  AN  ASSESSMENT       



Appeasement  was  the  policy  of  inaction  against  aggressors  out  of  fear  of  provoking   outright  violence   For  the  generations  who  carried  scars  of  Great  War,  another  war  within  own   lifetime  unthinkable.   Concepts  such  as  League,  Collective  Security,  international  cooperation,  and  self   determination  unworkable   Question  of  how  to  maintain  peace  of  much  discussion.  Disarmament  failed  and   rearmament  unpopular.  Suggestion  aggression  could  be  stopped  by  heavy  guns  &   strong  armies  unacceptable  to  majority  free  world   Mid  1930s:  aggressive  states  possessed  such  formidable  destructive  power  that   people  and  leading  statesmen  of  democracies  convinced  no  defence  against  them     adopted  policy  of  conciliation  in  hope  that  when  states  satisfied,  could  calm  down   and  world  would  have  survived   Appeasement  was  genuine  conviction  that  peaceful  example  and  outstretched  hand   of  friendship  would  eventually  overcome  war-­‐like  designs  of  predator  nations.   Believed  conflict  would  bring  total  obliteration    

  Britain    Appeasement  was  nothing  new  to  Britain  as  it  had  been  a  feature  of  British   diplomacy  for  centuries.  Since  16th  cent,  Britain’s  main  interests  has  been  in  trade,   naval  power  and  development  of  empire.      Britain  been  prepared  to  make  concessions  to  European  powers  &  leave  them  alone   so  it  could  pursue  worldwide  ambitions    policy  in  19th  cent    Only  when  its  interests  under  direct  threat  would  it  intervene  in  European  affairs.      Appeasement  had  been  in  operation  since  1919:  Lloyd  George  sought  to  moderate   Treaty  of  Versailles  during  Peace  Conference.  Realised  British  economy  needed   stable  &  prosperous  German.  Churchill  supported  view    Appeasement  in  1930s  context  seemed  logical  option:  combination  of  changing   international  realities,  depression,  guilt  over  Versailles,  psychology  of  British  nation    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   21  



 

 











 

across  all  classes  and  strong  views  of  men  in  power    created  environment  in   which  appeasement  seemed  logical  option   Up  to  1930s  British  deeply  committed  to  disarmament  and  Collective  Security.  After   Depression,  taxpayers  reluctant  to  allow  govt  to  buy  guns  and  bombs    armament   spending  fell   Joad  Resolution:  undergraduates  at  Oxford  signed  “refusing  to  fight  for  King  and   country”   Majority  of  Britains  preferred  to  ignore  reports  of  German  arms  rebuilding.   Believed  Germany  had  been  harshly  treated  by  Treaty  of  Versailles.  Hitler  appeared   to  them  a  politician  with  reasonable  demands  such  as  the  settlement  of  territorial   grievances  and  recognition  of  rights  of  German  minorities  in  Poland  and  Czech   By  1934,  some  began  to  listen  to  Churchill  and  Government  Defence  Requirement   Committee  who  identified  Germany  as  Britain’s  long  term  enemy.     By  1936  majority  of  Britons  including  PM  Chamberlain,  came  to  accept  that  for   defence  of  country,  necessary  to  rearm  and  equip.  Chamberlain  believed  war  was   the  “ultimate  waster  and  negation  of  human  values”.  He  ready  to  pursue  any  course   and  calm  grievances  to  stave  off  major  conflict.     Many  possessed  pro-­‐German  attitudes  in  believing  Hitler  not  threat.  Lloyd  George   considered  Hitler  “reasonable  man  with  reasonable  aims”;  and  many  regarded  him,   as  “a  positive  force  against  Bolshevism”.  Impressed  by  Reich’s  ability  to  recover   from  years  of  guilt  and  Depression.     Lord  Halifax  began  to  advise  Baldwin’s  govt  (British  PM  before  Chamberlain)  in   1935  about  same  time  Anthony  Eden  appointed  Foreign  Secretary  in  1935.  Halifax   and  Eden  agreed  German  reoccupation  of  Rhineland  not  serious  threat.     Chamberlain,  who  succeeded  Baldwin  in  1937,  took  active  interest  in  foreign  affairs   and  genuinely  believed  Germany  been  punished  severely  by  Treaty  of  Versailles.     -­‐ Believed  differences  could  be  solved  through  personal  negotiation  and   concession   -­‐ Assumed  some  of  Hitler’s  claims  reasonable  and  other  claims  consistent  with   rights  of  Germans  to  self  determination  and  re-­‐emergence  as  major  power.     -­‐ Believed  League  of  Nations  ineffective  in  solving  international  disputes   Chamberlain  and  British  Conservative  Party     -­‐ Refused  to  deal  seriously  with  Soviet  Union   -­‐ Detested  Communist  ideology   Govt  reluctant  to  commit  too  much  money  to  rearmament  in  context  of  largely   appeasement-­‐minded  general  public.    However,  from  1936,  steadily  increasing   commitment  to  rearmament  based  on  defence.     Plan  was  to  prevent  enemy  attack  with  boats  and  planes.  Navy  upgraded,  and   airforce  spending  increased.         Need  for  land  army  not  considered  imperative  except  to  honour  Imperial   commitments.  Tank  production  half  hearted;  and  recruitment  slow.  By  1939,  army   weakest  force  

 

France    France’s  recovery  from  Depression  slower  than  rest  of  Europe:  declined  from  its   position  of  power  in  1920s  and  defeatism  abroad.  Govts  fell  one  after  the  other;   strikes,  violence  and  political  upheaval  determined  undermined  fighting  capabilities   of  nation  and  made  cohesive  defence  plan  impossible.      Technically  admirable,  outrageously  expensive  and  strategically  unsound  Maginot   Line  absorbed  significant  part  of  defence  budget  despite  its  lack  of  use.    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

  



 

 



 

1935:  military  service  extended  to  2  years  and  definite  plans  made  to  upgrade   airforce.  Navy,  kept  its  prestige  due  to  Italian  competition  in  Mediterranean,  most   efficient  of  forces  and  orders  to  increase  steel  production  included  plans  for  tanks   and  armaments.     Leon  Blum  headed  group  amalgamated  of  anit-­‐fascist  factions  that  called   themselves  Le  Front  Populaire.  Committed  to  collective  security,  disarmament  and   social  reform.  Came  to  govt  at  time  when  France  deeply  divided  by  factions  within   and  shortly  to  face  German  invasion  of  Rhineland.   One  of  their  first  acts  was  introduction  of  40  hour  week,  which  was  bad  news  for   rearmament  plans  and  gave  rise  to  remark  that  invasion  of  Sunday  would  be  illegal.     Blum  in  accord  with  appeasement  policies  of  Chamberlain.  Prepared  to  adopt  any   mixture  of  actions  to  preserve  peace.  Despite  objections  from  extreme  left  of  party,   supported  limited  rearmament.     Within  a  year,  Le  Front  Populaire  divided  and  fell  to  series  of  unsuccessful   Socialists,  Radicals  &  combinations   Political  struggles,  strikes  and  street  violence  continued  to  plague  France  so  defence   system  in  disarray  and  its  people  cynically  convinced  that  could  never  withstand   organised  might  of  Reich.   This  situation  in  France  was  significant  contrast  to  Germany’s  attitude  to  military   training,  rearmament  and  war  where  ultimately  whole  economy  geared  to  war   production.  In  interests  of  economic  self  sufficient  and  lebensraum,  Germany   believed  needed  to  expanded  eastwards  through  Austria    

Appeasement  in  Action    Epitome  of  policy  of  appeasement  was  Munich  Conference  of  1928.  However,   British  govt  had  been  pursuing  policy  long  before  then.  Lloyd  George  endeavoured   to  soften  Versailles  Treaty  in  1919  and  various  trade  and  reparation  agreements   made  with  Germany  in  1920s    However,  it  was  in  1930s  that  appeasement  became  key  element  of  British  policu.  It   manifested  itself  in  both  active  and  passive  way.  Sometimes  it  was  case  of  acting  to   make  concessions  and  others  was  case  of  simply  not  reacting  to  action  taken  by   dictators.      

Factors  behind  Policy  of  Appeasement    Popular  dread  of  another  war.  New  tech  made  certain  future  war  would  be  worse   w/  ppl  suffering  far  more   -­‐ British  public  opinion  overwhelmingly  pacifist  as  evident  in  Joad  Resolution    British  preoccupied  with  domestic  matters.  It  took  considerable  time  to  move  out  of   depression  and  unemployment  remained  high.  PM  Chamberlain  had  genuine  hopes   to  create  better  Britain,  spending  money  on  health  and  housing  rather  than  defence.      Hitler  admired  by  many  in  Britain’s  ruling  classes.  Brought  stability  and  discipline   to  country  and  provided  defence  against  communism.    Anti-­‐Semitism  of  upper  class   also  encouraged  indulgence  towards  Nazis    International  reality  of  times  seemed  to  point  to  logic  of  appeasement.      No  other   alternative   -­‐ Britain’s  main  partner  was  France  who  was  riven  with  internal  divisions  and   placing  its  faith  on  Maginot  Line,  defence  line  along  German  border   -­‐ Britain’s  armed  forces  been  allowed  to  run  down.  British  believed  taking  on   Germany  would  be  suicidal  and  appeasement  gave  Britain  chance  to  rearm   (not  view  shared  by  all)    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   23     -­‐ -­‐          

Russia  sought  opposition  to  Nazism  but  Stalin  not  trusted  &  purges  of  1930s   weakened  Red  Army   League  of  Natiosn  and  principle  of  collective  security  dead  as  proved  by   Manchuria  and  Abyssinia    

Appeasement  in  Action  up  to  September  1938    

Act  of  Appeasement   German   Rearmament    

January   1935  

Franco-­‐Italian   Agreement  

 

 

March   1935  

Germany   introduces   conscription   Anglo-­‐German   Naval  Agreement  

June  1935    

   

  





December   1935  

Hoare-­‐Laval  Plan  

 

March   1936  

Remilitarisation  of   Rhineland  



 

1936  –   1939  

Spanish  Civil  War  

 

January   1938  

Chamberlain’s   attitude  t  ideas   from  US/USSR  

 

Significance   Accepted  as  sad  but  inevitable  consequence  of   failure  of  Disarmament  Conference   Germany  played  up  fear  of  communism   Germany  only  seeking  equality   French  Foreign  Minister  Laval  indicated  to   Italians  that  France  accepted  designs  on   Abyssinia   Act  was  against  Treaty  of  Versailles   Britain  mildly  protested   Germany  allowed  35%  of  British  naval   strength  and  equality  in  number  of   submarines   Directly  contravened  Treaty  of  Versailles  and   sanctioned  Hitler’s  moves  to  cancel  Versailles   armaments  provisions   Britain  acted  without  consulting  France       weakened  Stresa  Front   French  and  British  Foreign  Ministers  offered   to  carve  up  Abyssinia  for  Italy.   Italy  would  be  given  enough  land  for  1.5   million  people  to  end  fighting   Hitler’s  action  directly  contravened  terms  of   1925  Locarno  Pact  which  guaranteed  western   European  frontiers.     Beyond  protest  note,  Britain  and  France  did   nothing.  Great  boost  for  Hitler   British  view  Hitler  merely  “going  into  his   backyard”   Britain  and  France  pushed  for  non-­‐ intervention  and  avoided  involvement   Germany  and  Italy  filly  backed  Nationalists   and  no  action  taken  against  them   Only  Soviet  Union  assisted  Republican  case   In  Jan,  US  President  Roosevelt  floated  idea   calling  for  powers  to  convene  as  means  of   returning  to  peaceful  diplomacy.  Chamberlain   rejected  this  “bomb”  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

Date   October   1933  

  

March   1938  

Austria  

 

Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Litvinov’s  similar   proposal  called  “wooly  rubbish”   Hitler’s  march  into  Austria  greeted  with  shock   and  sense  of  bewilderment   Britain  accepted  “Anschluss”  as  inevitable.   After  all,  Austrians  were  German  speaking    

 

                       

German  Expansion:  Austria,  March  1938    After  murder  of  Austrian  Chancellor  Dollfuss  and  debacle  of  Nazi  coup  in  July  1934,   Hitler  resolved  to  win  Austria  by  “peaceful  penetration”.      Austro-­‐German  Agreement  of  July  1936  established  German  recognition  of  Austrian   Sovereignty,  an  agreement  of  non-­‐interference  in  each  other’s  internal  affairs,   Austria’s  recognition  of  its  Germaness,  a  lowering  of  tariffs  and  customs  laws,  and   permission  for  Nazi  papers  to  be  published  in  Vienna.   -­‐ Hitler  had  invasion  force  on  standby  but  was  assured  would  be  no  effective   opposition  from  Austria  or  from  the  “weak  little  worms  of  western   democracy”    All  that  remained  was  for  Hitler  to  remove  minor  objectives  such  as  weaning   Mussolini  fro  his  support  of  Austrian  Independence  and  convincing  strong  Catholic   faction  in  Austria  there  would  be  no  need  to  fea  anti-­‐religious  feelings.      Rome-­‐Berlin  Axis  of  1936  removed  some  opposition  and  joint  action  in  Spanish   Civil  War  and  Italy’s  membership  of  Anti-­‐Comintern  Pact  strengthened  ties  between   the   fascist  powers.   German  Expansion:  Summary     By   time  Hitler  ready    1935:  conscription   to   move,  had    1936:  builds  fleet  and  airforce   Mussolini’s    1936:  Germany,  Italy  and  Japan  agree  to  join  forces   implicit    1936:  new  weapons  tried  out  in  Spanish  Civil  War   acceptance  and    1938:  Germany  took  over  Austria    1939:  Germany  seized  Czechoslovakia   support  from    1939:  Germany  and  Russia  sign  treaty   Austrians  who    1939:  invasion  of  Poland    Britain  declares  war   saw   Anschluss  as   salvation  of  their   depressed  and   humbled  homeland.      However  there  was  considerable  opposition  to  Nazis  in  Austrian  Army  and  within   govt.  Schuschnigg  campaigned  support  within  League,  particularly  Britain    Vague  mumblings  from  London  indicated  majority  of  British  public  believed  Hitler   was  best  thing  for  Austria    French  input  minimum  because  at  time,  France  was  between  govts.      

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   25        

Schuschnigg  introduced  conscription  and  strengthened  frontiers  but  was  then   forced  to  accept  Berchtesgarten  Protocol.  There  was  to  be  no  military  provocation.     In  last  attempt  to  resist,  Schuschnigg  organised  plebiscite.  Hitler  readied  panzers  &   artillery  to  cross  border   Schuschnigg  had  no  choice  but  to  give  in  to  avoid  slaughter  of  thousands.  Thus   lowered  frontiers  to  Wehrmacht  and  resigned  from  office.     12  March  1936:  Seyss  Inquart  and  cheering  crows  welcomed  German  troops  into   Austria.  By  end  of  March,  independent  Austria  ceased  to  exist.    

The  Czechoslovak  Crisis:  September  1938    State  of  Czechoslovakia  arose  out  of  ruins  of  former  Austro-­‐Hungarian  Empire  in   1919.  Stretched  over  800km  from  Germany  to  Romania  threatening  its  survival.      State  dominated  by  Czechs  of  the  west  of  country  in  former  region,  Bohemia.  Also   contained  2  million  Slovaks  in  east  (often  looked  down  on  by  advanced  Czech   brothers);  750  000  Hungarians,  90  000  Poles  and  over  3  million  German  speaking   people  in  western  border  region  known  as  Sudetenland.    Mid  1938:  following  success  of  Anschluss,  Hitler  made  it  clear  he  intended  to  add   Sudetenland  to  Reich  and  bring  home  the  3  million  Sudeten  Germans  to  fatherland   Sudetenland  had  local  Nazi  Party  who  began  campaigning  for  incorporation  into   Riech.    In  April,  SPD  leader  Henlein  presented  Karlsbad  Demands  which  called  for     -­‐ Complete  autonomy  for  Germans  in  Czechoslovakia   -­‐ Recognition  of  exclusive  German  area   -­‐ Protection  for  Germans  outside  Sudeten    President  Benes  rejected  claims  and  seeked  assistance  from  Allies.  Russia  and   France  rallied  to  the  call.  Reluctant  Britain  agreed  to  stand  by  only  if  Benes  would   accept  Karlsbad  Demands  as  basis  of  negotiation.  Eventually  agreed  in  May,  all   major  powers  warned  Hitler  invasion  would  be  met  with  their  combined  forces    Hitler  furious  and  made  clear  he  intended  to  use  force  to  gain  Sudetenland.   “Operation  Green”  was  finalisation  of  invasion  plans  and  1  Oct  was  date  chosen.    Alarmed  they  not  prepared  for  war,  Britain  and  Drance  lost  confidence  in   themselves  and  each  other.  Everyone  distrusted  Russia’s  intentions  and  was  doubt   as  to  Soviet  ability  to  mount  effective  support.  Collective  Action  began  to  falter    Chamberlain  horrified  by  idea  Britain  might  go  to  war  and  risk  lives  of  its  people   over  obscure  issue  in  central  Europe.  He  knew  how  vulnerable  Britain  was  to  air   attack  and  dreaded  prospect  of  German  bombs  falling  on  home  front    Distrustful  of  Soviet  and  prompted  by  French  PM  Daladier,  Chamberlain  decided  to   approach  Hitler  “man  to  man”.  15  September  1938:  flew  to  Germany  and  met  Hitler   at  Berchtesgaden.  Hitler  demanded  that  he  get  Sudetenland  and  if  not,  ne  was   prepared  to  risk  world  war.      Anglo-­‐French  Plan:  in  belief  Hit  er  could  be  forestalled  if  offer  good  enough,  Britain   urged  Prague  to  transfer  all  areas  with  over  50%  Sudeten  inhabitants  to  Reich.   Czechoslovakia  asked  to  sacrifice  itself  for  peace;  and  Britain  and  France  would   guarantee  new  Czech  frontiers.  Benes  rejected  proposals    Pleaded  with  France  to  honour  its  alliance  but  Chamberlain  made  clear  that  if   Czechoslovakia  refused  to  sign,  Britain  and  France  would  abandon  it  to  tanks  and   bombs  of  Nazi.  He  added  Benes  was  to  order  his  army  “not  to  provoke  Hitler  in  any   way”.    Russia  ready  to  support  Czech  resist  but  anti-­‐Soviet  factions  threatened  to  split   Prague  govt  if  this  considered  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

   

  

 

Anglo  French  Plan  had  to  be  accepted.  Agreed  on  strict  condition  that  France  and   Britain  would  never  allow  German  invasion  of  what  remained  of  Model  State.     22  September:  Chamberlain  met  Hitler  at  Godesberg  to  present  new  proposals.   Hitler  stunned  as  hadn’t  expected  this  much;  achieved  through  policy  of   appeasement.  Thus  began  to  make  further  demands   -­‐ All  Czech  nationals  were  to  evacuate  specified  areas  leaving  possessions   -­‐ Defences  were  to  be  abandoned  intact   -­‐ Germany  would  guarantee  no  new  borders  until  Hungary  and  Poland   received  their  cut   -­‐ Military  occupation  and  region  in  German  hands  by  28  September   London  and  Paris:  immediate  rejection  of  changed  plans.  British  govt  agreed  to   support  France  if  it  felt  obliged  to  fight.  Hitler  threatened  Czech  annihilation     State  of  Emergency  called,  reservists  called  up,  civil  defence  measures  put  into   place.   Chamberlain  sent  personal  advisor,  Horace  Wilson,  to  tell  Hitler  how  unnecessary   war  was.  These  pleas  with  Mussolini’s  intervention  broke  the  stalemate.  Hitler   invited  Chamberlain  to  attend  conference  in  Munich  

Munich  Conference,  September  1936    Main  players  at  Munich  Conference  were  Hitler,  Mussolini,  Chamberlain  and   Daladier  (France).  Czech  and  Russians  not  invited.  Mussolini  was  to  act  as  mediator    30  September  1938:  Hitler’s  demands  granted  and  Sudetenland  ceded  to  Germany.   Czechoslovakia  informed  if  it  didn’t  accept  agreement,  it  would  face  Germany  alone   in  any  conflict.      Czechoslovakia  ceased  to  exist  and  in  its  place  was  new  German  state  of  Czechia    November  1938  Czech  had  to  hand  over  rich  coal  mining  area  of  Teschen  to  Poland   and  southern  border  regions  to  Hungary.  Loss  of  Sudetenland  considerable  for   Czechoslovakia:  loss  of  land,  3  million  citizens,  work  force,  and  much  of  its  industry   and  mineral  resources  and  border  defences.      War  been  avoided  and  Britain  rejoiced.  Before  leaving  Munich,  Chamberlain  had  2nd   meeting  with  Hitler  in  trying  to  persuade  him  to  sign  2nd  document  which  both   promised  to  seek  peaceful  resolution  of  all  future  issues  between  Britain  and   Germany    Anglo-­‐German  Agreement    At  the  time,  was  variety  of  views  regarding  Munich  Agreement.  Media  praised   Chamberlain  as  hero.   -­‐ Chamberlain  believed  he  gained  “peace  with  honour”  and  had  assured   Europe  “peace  in  our  time”   -­‐ German  Foreign  Minister  Ribbentrop  chided  Hitler  for  signing  second   agreement.  Hitler  was  overheard  saying  it  “was  just  a  scrap  of  paper”   -­‐ Some  opposed  Munich.  First  Lord  of  Admiralty,  Duff  Cooper,  resigned  in   protest    Churchill  believed  Czechs  could  have  won  much  better  negotiation  deal  than  Britain   and  France  managed.   -­‐ “the  partition  of  Czechoslovakia  under  pressure  from  England  and  France   amounts  to  the  complete  surrender  of  the  Western  Democracies  to  the  Nazi   threat  of  force”    Significance  of  Munich  Conference   -­‐ Germany  emerged  as  most  powerful  state  in  Europe.  Hitler  humiliated   Britain  and  France  by  forcing  complete  dismemberment  of  state  created  at   Versailles  Conference    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   27    

Hitler  concluded  Western  statesmen  unlikely  to  oppose  him  or  be  drawn  into   war  on  any  other  territorial  problem  in  Europe   -­‐ Soviet  Union  realised  Britain  and  France  too  weak  to  resist  Hitler.  Stalin   began  pact  with  Germany  to  avert  confrontation,  at  least  until  Soviet  forces   could  be  strengthened   -­‐ Hitler  realised  to  bring  Germans  to  accept  and  support  war,  campaign  of   intense  psychological  preparation  necessary    Fuhrer  Myth  and  idea  of   Lebensraum  discussed  in  media;  Germany  short  of  space  and  surrounded  by   hostile  nations   -­‐ After  conference,  opinion  in  Britain  swung  drastically  against  Germany.   Chamberlain  accelerated  rearmament  program   Intervention  of  Chamberlain  and  Mussolini  at  Munich  deprived  Hitler  of   opportunity  to  completely  obliterate  Czechoslovakia.     Nonetheless  21Oct  1938,  ordered  German  armed  forces  to  prepare  for  disposal  of   remainder  of  Czechosl   15  March  1939:  German  troops  commenced  operations  against  rest  of  state   AJP  Taylor  argues  Munich  was  a  pivotal  moment  but  Chamberlain’s  error  was  to  be   persuaded  to  follow  a  more  aggressive  policy.  He  argues  a  more  vigorous   appeasement  should  have  been  pursued  in  1939   Charmley  believes  Chamberlain  achieved  best  possible  for  Britain  and  time,  given   economic  restraints  and  wide  dispersal  of  British  power  across  empire.     Peter  Howard,  Frank  Owen  and  Michael  Foot  accuse  Baldwin  and  Chamberlain   of  being  “blind  to  the  purposes  of  the  criminal  new  Nazi  war  power”.  They   misjudged  Hitler  and  so  neglected  Britain’s  armaments    

   

 

 

End  of  Appeasement    In  months  following  Munich  Agreement,  was  notable  easing  of  tension  in  Europe   -­‐ Dec  1938:  Germany  recognised  sanctity  of  French  borders   -­‐ Hitler  tried  to  negotiate  deal  with  Poland  whereby  it  offered  future  gains  in   Ukraine  for  return  of  Danzig  and  permission  to  build  road  across  Polish   Corridor  to  East  Prussia   -­‐ Meetings  continued  between  British  and  Germany,  and  British  and  Italian   figures   -­‐ As  late  as  March  1939,  much  of  British  press  remained  optimistic  abpout   chances  of  peace    Ultimately  in  March  1939,  Hitler  resumed  the  aggression   -­‐ 15  March:  German  troops  marched  into  rest  of  Czechoslovakia.  Bohemia-­‐ Moravia  incorporated  into  Reich  while  Solvakia  became  Nazi  puppet  state.   Hungary  took  more  of  southern  region  Ruthenia   -­‐ Week  later,  Germany  seized  Lithuanian  port  of  Memel  and  its  surrounding   district.     -­‐ April:  Mussolini  annexed  Albania      Munich  Agreement  ripped  up.  Churchill  had  been  right  all  along.  Finally,   Chamberlain  govt  forced  to  abandon  policy  of  appeasement    31  March:  Britain  announced  would  formally  guarantee  independence  of  Poland.   Hitler  knew  if  attacked  Poland,  Britain  declare  war.  Similar  guarantees  followed  for   Romania,  Greece  &  Turkey.  France  followed.      In  his  speech,  Chamberlain  said  Britain  committed  to  “lend  the  Polish  govt  all  the   support  in  their  power”   -­‐ Announcement  brought  end  to  appeasement;  and  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

-­‐

 

     

-­‐

Tacitly  allowed  foreign  govt  to  determine  British  policy.    

SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  NAZI-­SOVIET  NON-­AGGRESSION  PACT   Background  to  Soviet  Foreign  Policy    Stalin  was  as  great  opportunist  as  Hitler.  Survival  of  Soviet  Union  and  then   development  of  Soviet  power  were  what  mattered.  Stalin  agreed  to  sign  trade   agreement  with  capitalist  enemy  to  achieve  such  goals    Great  Depression  of  1930s  welcomed  in  Moscow   -­‐ Evidence  of  collapse  of  capitalism.  Soviet  Union  only  nation  free  of  economic   depression   -­‐ Prompted  Stalin  to  order  brother  communist  parties  in  Europe  not  to   cooperate  with  other  parties.  Gave  instructions  to  allow  fascist  parties  to   come  to  power  as  this  would  worsen  social  tensions  and  lead  more  quickly   socialist  revolution   -­‐ Proved  disastrous  esp  in  Germany  where  failure  of  SPD  and  KPD  to  work   together  allowed  Hitler  to  gain  and  consolidate  power    By  mid  1930s,  Stalin  realised  mistake  and  now  encouraged  communist  parties  to   participate  in  anti-­‐Fascist  ‘Popular  Front’  govts  as  in  France.  Stalin  also  intervened   in  Spanish  Civil  War  on  side  of  Republicans    Hitler’s  unchecked  advances  during  1930s  alarmed  Stalin  greatly.  For  Hitler  to   achieve  dream  of  lebensraum,  Soviet  Union  had  to  be  destroyed;  but  Soviet  in  no   state  to  fight  war  in  1930s   -­‐ Stalin  turned  nation  upside  down  as  attempted  to  rapidly  industrialise  with   series  of  brutal  Five  Year  Plans.  Achievements  enormous  but  would  have   been  disaster   -­‐ Soviet  countryside  in  state  of  virtual  civil  war  as  Stalin  sought  to  collectivise   agriculture     -­‐ Politically,  Soviet  Union  tore  itself  apart  during  1930s  as  series  of  purges  saw   millions  executed  or  sent  to  ‘gulga’  (Soviet  prison/labour  camps)   -­‐ 1937,  Red  Army  purged:  Russia’s  leading  general  and  other  top  army  men   shot  on  12  June;  and  half  officer  corps  either  shot  or  imprisoned    

Foreign  Policy  in  1930s    In  early  1930s,  Soviet  signed  several  non  aggression  pacts  w/  neighbours  including   Poland,  Finland  &  Estonia.      Agreement  signed  with  France  in  1932  and  Italy  in  1933    1934:  Soviet  Union  joined  League  of  Nations  and  established  diplomatic  relations   with  US    May  1935:  Franco-­‐Soviet  treaty  of  mutual  assistance  signed.  Widened  to  involve   Czechoslovakia  in  1936  but  Soviet  only  committed  to  help  Czechoslovakia  if  France   did.      Situation  worsened  considerably  for  Soviet  from  1936:  G  became  more  powerful   and  aggressive  and  Allies  not  responding   -­‐ German  rearmament  continuing  and  German  military  prowess  in  Spain  been   noted   -­‐ Hitler  moved  into  Rhineland,  had  achieved  Anschluss  and  in  Sept  1938  been   handed  Sudetenland   -­‐ Western  democracies  made  clear  had  no  intention  of  standing  up  to  Hitler    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   29   

 





  









Both  Germany  and  Western  powers  realised  position  of  Soviet  Union  would  be  vital   in  event  of  war.  Co-­‐operation  of  Soviet  Union  with  West  threatened  Germany  w/   prospect  of  2  front  war  and  only  Soviet  intervention  could  save  Poland  form   invasion  by  Germany.   Both  West  and  Germans  looked  to  Soviet  Union  in  mid  1939  as  possible  aly  in  future   war.  However,  British  and  France  half  hearted  about  linking  with  Soviet.   West  viewed  Soviet  with  suspicion.  Chamberlain’s  distrust  for  Stalin  and  dislike  of   Communism  blinded  him  to  possibility  West  and  Soviet  of  common  interest  in   opposing  Hitler.     Some  in  Britain  like  Churchill  suggested  joining  with  Soviet  against  Russia.     -­‐ Chamberlain  not  keen   -­‐ Stalin  remained  distrustful  of  west;  suspected  Britain  &  France  pushing   eastwards  to  confront  Russia   -­‐ When  Britain  offered  Poland  guarantee  in  March  1939,  and  Hitler  renounced   German-­‐Polish  Non  Aggression  Pact,  and  Anglo-­‐German  Naval  Agreement,  a   chance  of  an  Anglo-­‐Soviet  agreement  seemed  possible   -­‐ British  negotiators  sent  to  Moscow  but  were  too  junior,  lacking  in  authority   and  half  hearted   By  June  1939  Halifax  recognised  that  the  policy  if  appeasement  not  effective  against   Hitler’s  policy  of  lebensraum.  Thus,  Britain  entered  treaties  of  mutual  defence  with   Poland  and  Turkey;  and  guaranteed  assistance  to  Greece  and  Romania.  Initiated   under  belief  that  if  these  countries’  security  and  indefence  were  threatened,   Britain’s  would  be  too   Britain’s  policy  now  aimed  at  isolation/encirclement  of  Germany  and  Italy  to   prevent  them  from  acquiring  desired  living  space   Soviets  had  watched  West’s  policy  of  appeasement  with  Hitler  with  alarm.  Had  been   supporters  of  collevtive  security  had  had  witnessed  consistent  failure.     Furthermore,  in  1938  British  rebuffed  Soviet  approaches  for  major  power   consultations  after  German  absorption  of  Austria,  and  kept  Soviets  out  of   negotiations  with  Germany  over  fate  of  Czechoslovakia.  Soviet  not  invited  to  Munich   Conference.     During  northern  summer  of  1939  British  fumbled  negotiations  with  Soviets.  Sent   junior  delegation  to  Moscow  for  talks.  Rebuffed  suggestions  of  Soviet  support,   which  would  have  involved  Red  Army  troops  being  given  access  to  Polish  and   Romanian  territory  in  operations  against  Germany.  Offered  little  to  Soviet   Stalin  realist  and  man  who  wanted  to  extent  Soviet  power  in  Eastern  Europe.  Saw   that  alliance  with  West  offered  prospect  of  war  with  now  gain;  whereas   negotiations  with  Germans  offered  him  deal  giving  him  control  of  eastern  Poland   and  Baltic  states,  offering  gain  without  war    Stalin  agreed.     By  1939  Germany  stood  on  brink  of  war.  German  acquired  Austria  and  Czech  and   already  instigated  plans  for  invasion  of  Poland.  Hitler  less  worried  about  West   reaction  compared  to  Soviet    Pact    Poland  isolated   Stalin  distrustful  of  west  and  Hitler  realised  attack  on  Poland  would  involve  him  in  2   front  war    enemies  came  to  arrangement.  Both  sides  began  sending  out  signals  to   each  other     -­‐ April:  Hitler  announced  his  intention  of  dealing  with  Poland  in  major  speech   and  pointedly  made  no  anti-­‐Soviet  references     -­‐ Stalin  replaced  Jewish  Foreign  Minister  Litvinov,  with  Molotov   -­‐ June:  via  Italian  Foreign  Minister  Ciano  Hitler  let  Stalin  know  arrangement   could  be  made  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

 

Early  august:  Ribbentrop  let  it  be  known  Soviet  interests  in  Poland  and  Baltic   respected   -­‐ After  personal  exchange  of  messages  between  Hitler  and  Stalin  in  mid   August,  agreed  Ribbentrop  should  fly  to  Moscow   -­‐ 23  August:  German  Soviet  Non-­‐Aggression  Pact  signed.  Agreed  to  remain   neutral  if  other  became  involved  in  war.     Secretly,  Poland  divided  between  them  and  agreed  that  Soviet  should  take  control   of  Latvia,  Estonia,  Bessarabia  and  Finland.  Germany  to  control  Lithuania.     Hitler  and  Stalin  still  detested  and  didn’t  trust  each  other.  However,  suited  them   both  to  come  to  agreement   Pact  eliminated  chance  to  avoid  war  and  sealed  Poland’s  fate   -­‐

    

                         

Why  Hitler  and  Stalin  Signed  Non-­Aggression  Pact   Stalin   

be  

  

Summary   Hitler  made  hostility  to  Soviet  Union  known  as  soon  as  he  gained  power.   Long  term  goal  of  achieving  lebensraum  would  be  at  Soviet  Union’s   expense.  As  Nazi  power  grew,  Stalin  sought  agreements  with  France  and   Czechoslovakia.  Stalin  concerned  at  west’s  willingness  to  give  in  to  Hitler,   exp  after  Munich.   March  1939:  Britain  offered  guarantee  to  Poland  and  Stalin  hoped  similar   agreement  could  be  reached  with  Western  Powers.  However,   Chamberlain  not  keen  on  working  with  Stalin.  Hence,  Stalin  became  open   to  idea  of  agreement  with  Hitler  

West   couldn’t   trusted:   Munich   and   Western  

indecisiveness  throughout  1939  proven  that   Britain’s  guarantee  to  Poland  made  war  in  west  inevitable.  Hoped  Hitler  would   exhaust  himself  against  France  and  Britain   Deal  with  Hitler  cold  given  Stalin  share  of  Poland  and  provide  security  buffer   between  Germany  and  Russia   With  Hitler  busy  in  west,  Russia  would  have  time  to  consolidate  and  strengthen   forces  

 

Hitler      

Two  front  war  dangerous.  Deal  with  Russia  will  lead  to  Poland’s  quick  defeat  and   then  Germany  can  deal  with  western  antions   Soviet  Union  could  be  dealt  with  once  western  nations  been  defeated  

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   31     

Neutralising  Soviet  Union  would  avoid  getting  into  mess  Germany  found  itself  in   July/August  1914  

   

Nazi-­Soviet  Non  Aggression  Pact:  23  August  1939    Ribbentrop  arrived  in  Moscow  23  August.  Germany  and  Soviet  Union  signed  10  year   non  aggression  pact.  He  and  Molotov  both  knew  by  singing  Pact,  approval  given  to   Germany  to  invade  Poland    Article  2:  either  Germany  or  Russia  involved  in  war  with  third  power,  other  would   not  get  involved   -­‐ Guaranteed  neutrality  if  other  state  became  involved  in  war.      Article  7:  agreement  would  take  immediate  effect.  Hitler  was  in  hurry  and  has  1   September  deadline  for  invading  Poland    Nazi-­‐Soviet  Pact  contained  secret  protocols  which  created  German  and  Soviet   spheres  of  influence   -­‐ Germany  could  receive  western  Poland  and  Lithuania   -­‐ Soviet  Union  would  receive  Baltic  States  of  Latvia,  Lithuania  and  Estonia  in   June  1940.    Pact  lasts  for  two  years  until  Germany  invaded  Russia  in  Operation  Barbarossa      Phillip  Bell:  as  to  why  Russians  chose  Axis  powers  over  Allies  “instead  of  a  risk  of   war,  they  [the  Germans]  could  offer  neutrality  ..  spheres  of  influence  ..  [and  were]   ready  to  carve  up  Poland  ...  the  Germans  could  deliver  the  goods  forthwith,  whereas   the  British  and  French  could  deliver  nothing”    Evans  stated  Stalin  gained  comfort  from  not  having  to  fight  in  1939  against   Germany  and  from  gaining  spheres  of  influence   Danzig  and  Polish  Corridor    Hitler’s  intention  to  attack  Poland  signalled  in  April  1939  when  withdrew  from   German-­‐Polish  Non  Aggression  Pact  signed  in  Jan  1934.  Agreement  designed  to   allay  Polish  fears  of  German  aggression  and  to  assure  Europe  Hitler  was  man  of   peace.    Northern  summer  of  1939  Hitler  increased  pressure  on  Poland.  Used  number  of   issues  to  force  Poland  into  corner.  Accused  Poles  of  persecution  of  German  minority   and  made  territorial  demands    Called  for  transfer  of  port  of  Danzig  to  Germany  and  grating  to  Germany  of  new   rights  of  access  across  Polish  Corridor  to  East  Prussia.    Danzig  Poland’s  only  outlet  to  sea  and  guaranteed  economic  independence.  Almost   wholly  population  German    lebensraum    unification  all  Germans  under  Third   Reich      Germans  believed  frontiers  of  Poland  of  military  importance  and  obtaining  food   supplies  in  thinly  populated  areas.  Believed  Polish  Corridor  of  “psychological  and   economic  importance”    Although  secret  clause  of  pact  agreed  on  partition  of  Poland,  Allies  guaranteed   Poland  automatic  intervention  in  event  of  any  attack  in  formal  alliance  (25  August   1939)    Hitler  delayed  invasion  plans  as  had  hoped  to  bluff  Allies  into  another   appeasement      Ready  to  invade  in  August  1939.  Conclusion  of  German-­‐Soviet  Pact  secured   Germany’s  eastern  frontier  from  prospect  of  Soviet  action      Germany’s  final  list  delivered  to  Britain  meant  that  Danzig  and  Corridor  must  be   sacrificed  and  Poland  denied  equal  negotiating  status  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

         

1  Sept  1939:  Germans  invaded  Poland.  Britain  and  France  demanded  German  cese   military  action  threatening  war.  Hitler  ignored  demands   3  Sept  first  Britain  then  France  declared  war  on  Germany.     Poles  rejected  German  proposals  and  Hitler,  who  already  singed  Case  White   (invasion  of  Poland)  made  move   German  SS  disguised  as  Polish  soldiers  attacked  radio  station  on  German  border     Germans  attacked      Britain  declaration  of  war     ANALYSIS:  CAUSES  OF  THE  CONFLICT  (OUTBREAK  OF  WAR  IN  1939)  

1.  Entirely  the  Fault  of  Hitler  (and  to  a  lesser  extent,  Mussolini)    War  result  of  Nazi  aggression.  Germany  never  accepted  Paris  Peace  Settlement  of   1919  and  even  Weimar  Republic  govts  before  1933  sought  to  bring  about  changes.      Stresemann  nay  have  signed  Locarno  Agreement  in  1925  guaranteeing  west   European  frontiers,  he  never  signed  agreement  guaranteeing  east  European   borders.  Hitler,  upon  coming  to  power,  made  clear  his  prime  objective  was  to  tear   up  Treaty  of  Versailles.  Had  no  respect  for  international  agreements     -­‐ Versailles  armament  clauses  discarded  as  Germany  introduced  conscription,   built  up  massive  army,  created  air  force,  built  heavy  guns  and  submarines;   each  contravention  to  Versailles  Treaty   -­‐ Remilitarisation  of  Rhineland  in  1936,  Anschluss  in  1938  and  subsequent   actions  over  Czechoslovakia  affirm  his  aggressive  intentions;  Poland  came  as   no  surprise    Thus  to  fight  Hitler  was  to  fight  for  international  law,  justice,  morality  and  spirit  of   collective  security  and  League  of  Nations.     -­‐ Concentration  camps  and  full  horror  of  Nazism  apparent   -­‐ Documentary  evidence:   o Mein  Kampf  made  no  secret  of  intentions   o Documents  such  as  Hossbach  Memorandum  and  minutes  of  Wansee   Conference  (decision  to  implement  Final  Solution)    Thus  Britain  and  France  had  no  choice  but  to  fight  in  1939  arguing   -­‐ Did  all  they  could  to  avoid  war:  Munich   -­‐ War  and  camps  was  Hitler’s  fault    

2.  Fault  of  Britain  and  France    Although  Hitler’s  aggression  can’t  be  questioned,  reason  war  came  was  because  of   weakness  of  other  powers  who  chose  not  to  stop  him.  Allowed  him  to  get  away  with   continuations  of  aggressive  acts.      Pressured  by  pacifist  public  opinion,  fearful  of  another  war  and  dominated  by  Nazi   admiring  aristocrats,  British  govts  took  line  of  least  resistance:    German  rearmament  allowed  in  name  of  equality  and  justified  by  fear  of   communism    Britain’s  armed  forces  allowed  to  run  down  to  point  of  where  standing  up  to  Hitler   was  no  longer  option    Chamberlain’s  stubborn  refusal  to  seriously  consider  working  with  Soviet  Union   gave  Stalin  no  other  choice  but  to  sign  Nazi-­‐Soviet  Pact    

3.  Circumstances  of  1930s  Gave  Western  Leaders  No  Alternative  to  the  Policies  they   Pursued  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   33     





Military  leaders  were  warning  govt  there  was  no  way  Britain  could  take  on  3   enemies  simultaneously  (Germany,  Italy  &  Japan)  and  best  policy  was  to  reduce   number  of  one’s  potential  enemies    appeasement   1967:  British  govt  began  30  Year  Rule:  allowed  classified  official  documents  to  be   opened  up  to  researchers:     -­‐ Opened  up  significant  material  which  suggested  economic  restraints   seriously  restricted  options  of  govt  in  dealing  with  Hitler     -­‐ Also  suggested  that  Chamberlain’s  actions  needed  to  be  reevaluated  in  more   positive  manner.     Variation  of  this  theme  is  to  see  British  govt  behaviour  in  1930s  as  keeping  in   balance  with  traditional  British  foreign  policy.  Britain  hadn’t  involved  itself  in   European  affairs  until  apparent  that  single  power  about  to  destroy  balance  of  power   and  dominate  continent     -­‐ Before  1939  Britain  attempts  hands  off  approach  but  once  apparent   Germany  intends  to  dominate  continent,  Britain  forced  reluctantly  to  enter   war    

4.  Failure  of  Principle  of  Collective  Security  and  the  Operation  of  the  League  of   Nations    Great  hope  for  European  peace  after  1919  was  League  of  Nations.  Based  on   principle  of  collective  security,  great  hopes  for  League.    Idea  of  collective  security  based  on  internationalism,  idea  that  nations  will  sacrifice   selfish  national  interest  for  common  good.    However,  inter-­‐war  period  showed  this   optimism  misplaced    Internationalism  never  had  chance   -­‐ Great  War  in  part  been  caused  by  forces  of  nationalism   -­‐ Wartime  propaganda  encouraged  acceptance  of  narrow  nationalism   -­‐ Death  and  destruction  of  war  bred  desire  for  security  and  revenge,  hardly   notions  conducive  to  idealistic  internationalism      1920s  and  1930s  saw  steady  rise  of  far  right  nationalistic  thinking,  not  restricted  to   only  Germany  and  Italy.  Inter  war  period  saw  steady  end  of  democracy  and   appearance  of  right  wing  nationalistic  dictatorships  in  which  such  regimes  were   antithesis  of  internationalism      Even  League,  meant  to  be  home  of  internationalism,  rooted  in  selfish  nationalism   -­‐ Votes  in  Council  and  Assembly  always  had  to  be  unanimous     -­‐ Disarmament  encouraged  to  point  consistent  with  national  safety  which  was   always  point  where  one  stronger  than  one’s  neighbour     -­‐ Many  issues  excluded  from  League  jurisdiction  because  powers  involved   feared  national  interests      

5.  Failings  of  Individual  Statesmen    International  relations  branch  of  politics  intensely  personal.  History  is  not  about   abstract  developments  but  about  individual  people  making  individual  decisions.      Dishonest,  lying,  duplicitous  nature  of  men  like  Hitler  and  Mussolini  speaks  for   itself.  Their  fondness  for  opportunism  did  much  to  poison  international   environment.  Stalin  could  be  considered  in  this  light  too    At  time  when  Britain  needed  strong  leaders,  willing  to  take  stand  and  made  difficult   decisions,  it  had  likes  of  Baldwin,  Chamberlain,  Hoare  and  Halifax   -­‐ Baldwin  admitted  not  pushing  rearmament  in  1935  election  as  knew  public   opinion  wouldn’t  accept  it  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions  

 

 

Rather  than  beef  up  League  over  Abyssinia,  Hoare  sought  deal  with   Mussolini  in  Hoare-­‐Laval  Plan   -­‐ Chamberlain’s  naivety,  and  obstinacy,  combined  with  firm  control  over   cabinet,  allowed  no  alternatives  to  appeasement.  Chamberlain  often  ignored   or  bypassed  foreign  minister  and  diplomats  with  disastrous  consequences     -­‐ Lord  Halifax  still  sought  accommodation  with  Hitler  in  May  1940   Middlemass  attacks  Chamberlain  for  running  foreign  policy  as  a  “one  man  band”   controlling  Foreign  Office  and  allowing  no  dissent.  Believed  Chamberlain  totally   misunderstood  Hitler,  believing  his  aims  limited  to  righting  wrongs  of  Versailles   and  was  man  with  whom  one  could  negotiate     RAC  Parker  rejects  notion  that  Chamberlain  had  no  option  but  to  follow   appeasement  due  to  economic  and  political  restrains.  States  there  was  variety  of   policy  options  which  Chamberlain  skilfully  hid.     -­‐





 

6.  To  Place  Responsibility  for  Outbreak  of  War  on  Shoulders  of  Individuals  too   Simplistic    Attempts  to  explain  outbreak  of  war  by  examining  those  overwhelming   developments  of  the  interwar  period:   -­‐ Strength  of  inter-­‐war  pacifism   -­‐ Growth  of  nationalistic  right  wing  political  movements   -­‐ Failure  of  principle  of  internationalism      Could  be  strongly  argued  direct  link  between  depression  of  1930s  and  eventual   outbreak  of  war    Onset  of  Depression  in  Germany  gave  death  blow  to  Weimar  Republic  and  Hitler   opportunity.  Hitler  didn’t  get  into  power  because  of  Depression,  however   chancellorship  avoidable  if  it  weren’t  for  depression    Japan  suffered  enormously  from  Depression;  reliance  on  export  markets  caused   massive  unemployment  as  protectionism  grew.  Hardship  at  home  major  factor  in   decision  of  Japanese  leaders  to  pursue  expansionist  policies  in  1930s.  Japanese   aggression  had  2  key  effects  on  Europe   -­‐ Served  as  example  to  Hitler  and  Mussolini   -­‐ Served  to  destroy  principle  of  collective  security  and  highlighted  failure  of   League  of  Nations    Major  impact  on  British  economy   -­‐ Major  factor  determining  Chamberlain’s  policies  in  1930s  was  weakness  of   British  economy  as  slowly  came  out  of  depression   -­‐ Revisionist  writers  argue  strongly  economic  restraints  tied  hands  of  British   in30s  in  dealings  w/  Hitler      

7.  Paris  Peace  Settlement  of  1919    1919  Peace  Settlement  was  essentially  compromise  which  pleased  no  one:  too   harsh  for  Americans,  too  weak  for  French,  “stain  on  national  honour”  for  Germans    Had  settlement  been  savagely  hard  on  Germans,  and  maintained,  German  revival  as   occurred  under  Hitler  might  have  been  avoided    Had  settlement  been  moderate,  accepted  fault  of  all  in  bringing  about  war  and   allowed  Germany  to  negotiate,  bitterness  and  resentment  which  boiled  under   surface  in  Germany  mightn’t  have  developed    Signs  that  Peace  Settlement  deeply  flawed:  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   35    

French  General  Marshall  Foch  said  of  decision  to  create  Polish  Corridor  and   separate  East  Prussia  from  rest  of  Germany  “There  is  the  root  of  the  next   war”   AJP  Taylor  states  Versailles  Treaty  failed  to  deal  with  issue  of  German  power.   Further  argues  that  far  less  onerous  for  Germany  than  domestic  propaganda  tried   to  make  out.  Germany  survived  as  united  and  potentially  strong  state  that  quite   capable  of  dominating  continent  of  Europe   -­‐ Geographically  intact,  apart  from  losing  small  border  areas.  Lost  only  13%  of   territory   -­‐ Despite  provisions  of  Treaty,  Germany’s  economy  still  potentially  strongest   in  Europe  



 

Richard  Overy    International  system  which  existed  during  inter  war  period  didn’t  reflect  reality  of   international  power.  Such  disparity  didn’t  mean  war  inevitable  but  meant   international  environment  unstable  to  which  Hitler  took  advantage,  and  with  which   appeasers  had  to  cope   -­‐ 1815  –  1914:  no  major  war  in  Europe  involving  more  than  2  major  powers   as  powers  accepted  concept  of  balance  of  power     -­‐ Rise  of  new  forces  such  as  democracy.  Nationalism  and  German  power  upset   this  equilibrium    Inter-­‐war  period  didn’t  experience  peace.  US  isolationism,  Germany’s  early   weakness  &  Russia’s  concentration  on  developing  its  revolution,  fate  of  Europe  in   hands  of  Britain  &  France    didn’t  reflect  true  balance  of  power     -­‐ After  1919,  Britain  became  second  rate  military  and  economic  powers.  Never   recovered  in  economic  strength  after  war,  and  was  preoccupied  with   imperial  matters   -­‐ Left  France  with  job  of  upholding  post  war  settlement.  Economically  and   thus  militarily,  France  could  never  be  match  for  Germany    “there  was  a  growing  contradiction  between  the  existing  international  system  and   the  reality  of  power  made  more  dangerous  by  restless  political  forces  released  by   economic  modernisation  and  the  rise  of  mass  politics”    

AJP  Taylor    Refused  to  see  Hitler  as  embodiment  of  evil  and  unique  presence  in  European   politics    Taylor  argues  Hitler  had  no  long  term  plans  for  war,  no  preconceived  blueprint  for   taking  over  Europe.     -­‐ Mein  Kampf  and  Hossbach  Memorandum  were  no  more  than  political  day   dreaming    Hitler  opportunist  and  when  war  came  in  1938,  it  was  fault  of  bungling  diplomacy     2.  Course  of  the  European  War     GERMAN  ADVANCES:  THE  FALL  OF  POLAND,  THE  LOW  COUNTRIES  AND  FRANCE   The  Fall  of  Poland  September  –  October  1939    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  

-­‐

  

 

  

 

   







 

Blitzkrieg:  military  tactic  devised  by  Germans  whereby  victory  believed  to  come   with  short,  sharp  attacks  rather  than  long,  drawn  out  war    short  war  before   British  or  French  armies  could  mount  effective  resistance.     Aim  was  to  smash  enemy’s  defences  with  sudden  combined  attack  by  aircraft,  tanks   and  infantry   Germany  had  developed  new  doctrines  of  warfare  involving  combined  and   coordinated  attacks  by  different  elements  of  armed  forces/  army  developed  plans   around  mobility  of  tanks  or  panzers.  However,  in  actuality,  lack  of  any  real   coordination  at  highest  level.  Structure  of  armed  forces  chaotic  and  subject  to   whims  of  Hitler   1  September  1939:  German  invasion  of  Poland.  Luftwaffe  struck  Polish  airfields,   railroads  and  other  major  lines  of  communication   3  September:  Britain  and  France  honoured  guarantee  to  Poland,  declaring  war  on   Germany   Polish  forces  inferior  to  German  army  with  abundant  amounts  of  supplies  and   weapons  with  brilliant  coordination  and  mass  formation.  Air  force  (Luftwaffe)   destroyed  most  of  Polish  air  force.     Polish  armies  attacked  and  surrounded  individually  in  blitzkrieg  style   8  Sept:  German  forces  involved  in  6  day  battle  near  River  Bzura    Polish  forces   exhausted  fell  back  to  Warsaw    Germans  besieged.  28  September  Warsaw  fell   -­‐ Despite  Britain  and  France’s  promises  to  assist,  it  was  very  difficult  for  them   to  do  so  due  to  their  limited  forces  who  were  prepared  to  fight.  The  distance   was  also  considerable    Germany  won  dramatic  and  rapid  victory  prompting  Stalin  to  intervene  in  Poland   by  this  rapidity.   Polish  losses  were  much  more  significant  in  comparison  to  Germany’s  and  almost  1   million  Poles  became  POWS  to  Soviet  and  Germany   28  Sept:  German  Foreign  Minister  Ribbentrop  finalised  details  of  Nazi-­‐Soviet  Non   Aggression  Pact  dividing  P   Results  of  campaign   -­‐ In  the  2  years  Soviets  ruled,  1/5  of  populace  arrested   -­‐ During  their  5  year  rule,  Germans  killed  1/5  of  populace   30  November:  Soviet  attacked  Finland  as  Stalin  aimed  to  consolidate  control  over   Baltic  Sea.  Finns  fought  back  gallantly  much  to  surprise  of  Stalin.  Ended  in  March   1940  with  Soviet  experiencing  much  more  considerable  losses.  Finland  kept   independence  but  had  to  surrender  10%  territory   Often  assumed  little  British  and  French  could  do  to  save  Poland  which  is  true  to  an   extent.  However,  Maginot  mentality  caused  democratic  powers  to  miss  opportunity.   Germans  had  no  tanks,  little  air  support  and  only  3  days  worth  of  ammunition;   whereas  French  had  superior  weaponry  and  advantages   BH  Liddell  Hart  emphasises  situation  in  Poland  very  much  to  Germany’s  advantage   for  achieving  success  as  it  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  German  territory  &  “Poland   was  all  too  well  suited  for  demonstration  of  Blitzkrieg”  

The  Fall  of  Denmark  and  Norway  April  1940  (Operation  Weserunbung)    October  1939  –  April  1940:  Phoney  War  as  virtually  no  fighting  took  place  following   the  fall  of  Poland.  Despite  numerical  superiority,  Allies  failed  to  effectively  use  this   period.  Difference  between  opposing  forces,  not  attrition  as  in  WW1,  but  approach   to  modern  technology.  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   37      

 

 





  

Rapid  German  attack  using  formations  of  tanks  and  armoured  vehicles,  heavy   artillery  and  close  air  support  caught  Allies  by  surprise.     Indeed  actions  did  take  place  during  these  6  months:   -­‐ Minor  skirmishes  along  Maginot  Line  between  French  and  German  troops   -­‐ Finnish  Soviet  War  continued   -­‐ SS  busy  reorganising  Poland   Phoney  war  came  to  abrupt  end  when  German  forces  invaded  Denmark  and   Norway   Britain  had  considered  plans  to  cut  off  Swedish  iron  ore  supples  to  German  having   major  impact  on  German  war  production  as  Germans  got  half  iron  needed  for   making  weapons  from  Sweden.  This  ore  reached  Germany  via  Norwegian  port  of   Narvik.   British  decided  to  take  action  in  Norway  and  began  mine  laying  operations  along   Norwegian  coast  hoping  to  disrupt  German  shipping   9  April:  Hitler  launched  Operation  Wesrubung,  a  direct  attack  on  Denmark  and   Norway.  Denmark’s  King  Christian  X  surrendered  next  day.  Gave  themselves  supply   bases  for  invasion  of  Norway   Allied  troops  had  minor  holds  in  central  Norway  and  pounded  German  positions  in   Narvik.  Royal  Navy  attacked  and  British  troops  sent  to  northern  Norway  but  British   forces  poorly  trained,  poorly  equipped  and  didn’t  have  adequate  fighter  planes  to   protect  them  from  German  air  attacks.     British  army  failed  to  develop  plans  for  coordinating  infantry  &  tanks.  British  navy   slow  to  modernise  &  strategists  failed  recognise  importance  of  aircraft  carriers  &   need  for  improved  anti-­‐submarine  capability.    With  collapse  of  France  in  matter  of  weeks,  allied  troops  withdrawn.   10  June:  Norway  surrendered.   NOTE:  blame  for  resulting  fiasco  in  Norway  fell  on  Chamberlain’s  shoulders  forcing   his  resignation  when  Members  of  Parliament  refused  to  support  his  govt.  Replaced   by  Churchill.    

The  Fall  of  the  Low  Countries  and  France  May  –  June  1940    10  May:  German  forces  attacked  Low  Countries  (Belgium  and  Netherlands)  as  part   of  Operation  Fall  Gelb    German  forces  able  to  quickly  cut  through  Netherlands  with  Nazi  sympathisers  and   German  nationals  succeeding  in  capturing  vital  bridges  and  communications.   Rotterdam  bombed  reducing  it  to  nothing  (14  May)  and  within  days  Netherlands   surrendered    10  May:  German  airforce  bombed  Belgian  airfields.  Attack  on  Belgium  and  France   coordinated  to  start  with  invasion  of  Netherlands.  Belgian  army  surrendered  in  late   May,  two  weeks  after  France  overrun.  Allied  leaders  appalled  at  defection  for  now   placed  British  and  French  troops  in  even  more  danger.      British  &  French  commanders  believed  German  attack  of  France  to  be  similar  to   Schlieffen  Plan  with  massive  German  advance  across  Belgium  sweeping  towards   Channel  coast  &  Paris.  Believed  no  rapid  German  advance  could  penetrate  heavily   forested  Ardennes  region  or  strong  Maginot  Line  on  France’s  common  border  w/   Germ   -­‐ Ardennes  lightly  defended  due  to  assumption    Instead  of  striking  at  France  across  border  protected  by  Maginot  Line,  Germans   attacked  through  forested  areas  of  Ardennes.  Hitler’s  blitzkrieg  tactics  and  his   generals’  skill  completely  routed  their  allied  opponents.  This  took  them  round  the  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  

 

 

  

    

 

end  of  the  Maginot  Line  and  enabled  them  to  punch  a  hole  in  the  French  defences  at   a  very  weak  point.  French  never  recovered;  army  split   General  von  Bock  advanced  through  Belgium  w/  massive  force  similar  to  1914.   Allied  commanders  ordered  half  forces  to  deal  with  threat.  This  simply  diversion   11  May:  General  von  Leeb  started  attacks  along  Maginot  Line  tying  down  Anglo-­‐ French  forces   In  centre  b/w  von  Bock’s  and  von  Leeb’s  forces,  in  the  Ardennes  and  Luxemberg   region,  General  von  Rundstedt  (German)  prepared  massive  force  to  invade  France.   46  divisions  w/  copious  amounts  of  weaponry   ‘Battle  for  France’:  11  day  campaign.  Dramatic  and  decisive.  Allied  forces  to  north  in   Belgium  and  to  south  around  Maginot  Line  now  completely  separated.   20  May:  German  forces  reached  coast  at  Abbeville.   German  advance  so  rapid  that  forward  units  in  danger  of  being  cut  off  and  running   out  of  fuel    24  May:  Hitler  ordered  forces  halt  to  consolidate  positions   27  May:  port  of  Boulogne  taken  and  Calais  surrounded   Major  General  RH  Barry  contrasts  Allied  and  German  strategies   -­‐ Allied  command:  slow  and  unimaginative  in  thought.  However,  does   acknowledge  that  Allies  had  potential  to  overcome  Germany’s  forces  if  they   had  reacted  more  quickly.     -­‐ German  plan:  bold  and  risky  

Dunkirk    Consequently,  British  forces  ordered  back  towards  Dunkirk.      PM  Churchill  gave  order  for  Operation  Dynamo  –  evacuation  of  all  allied  troops  to   England.  Arguably  greatest  rescue  exercise  of  its  kind  in  history:  850  vessels  from   navy  warships  to  personally  owned  fishing  boats  brought  out  of  France  allied   troops  and  civilians    Largely,  evacuation  only  possible  as  Hitler  inexplicably  decided  not  to  destroy  allied   troops  as  they  evacuated  as  post-­‐war  peace  terms  would  soon  be  discussed    Belgium,  the  Netherlands  and  Luxembourg  lost  to  Germans.  France  about  to  fall.    Besides  from  large  numbers  of  death  in  BEF,  valuable  and  abundant  weapons  were   left  in  France  and  over  100  aircraft  lost  during  evacuation    4  June:  Dunkirk  captured    

Why  German  Panzers  Halted  rather  than  Press  on  to  Destroy  BEF    German  tanks  not  close  enough  to  BEF  during  Operation  Dynamo  as  French  1st   Army  sacrificed  itself  in  heavy  fighting  helping  BEF  escape    Hitler  believed  racial  affinity  between  Germans  and  British  and  didn’t  see  them  as   enemy    Hitler  hoped  to  make  peace  with  Britain  after  fall  of  France  and  made  repeated   offers  throughout  1940.  Possible  avoided  destruction  of  BEF  as  would  have  made   peace  harder  later    Goering  wanted  some  glory  hence  wanted  Luftwaffe  to  destroy  BEF,  so  panzers   halted    

Fall  of  France    5  June:  Germans  resumed  attacks  against  French  targeting  Paris  &  areas  to  east.  By   9  June,  French  army  in  retreat.  10th:  Mussolini  declared  war  on  France.  13th:  Paris   declared  open  city  to  avoid  destruction  of  historic  architecture  and  treatures.  14th:   Germans  entered  Paris.      

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   39   

 

    







 

           

16  June:  PM  Reynaud,  wanted  to  fight  on  from  North  Africa,  resigned  as  majority  of   Cabinent  voted  to  request  armistice  Replaced  with  Marshal  Petain,  eager  to  sign   armistice  under  belief  struggle  useless.   22  June:  armistice  signed  with  Germany  and  Italy  on  24  June.  Officially  over  on  25   June.   Armistice  included:   -­‐ Division  of  France  into  two  zones.  Germans  occupied  north  and  western   seaboard   -­‐ Rest  of  France  to  be  administered  by  French  regime  based  at  Vichy,   collaborated  loyally  with  the  Germans  throughout  the  war.  Regime  hated  by   most  Frenchmen  who  saw  supporters  as  traitors.  Many  French  resisted  both   Nazis  and  Vichy  in  underground  Free  French  Resistance  movement   Although  armistice  stated  French  navy  wouldn’t  be  controlled  by  Germans,  Britain   concerned   French  ships  in  British  ports  &  Alexandria  in  Egypt  easily  disarmed.  However,  at   Oran  in  North  Africa,  a  major  French  naval  force  was  free  of  British  control.   3  July:  Admiral  Somerville  (Britain)  delivered  French  naval  commander  ultimatum  –   all  French  vessels  must  sail  to  British  ports  or  scuttle  themselves   French  refused.  Somerville  attacked  French  fleet  at  Oran.  Britain  &  US:  act  of  British   defiance  supported.     One  chief  reason  for  defeat  was  confidence  French  placed  in  Maginot  Line:  long   series  of  concrete  fortifications  running  down  their  eastern  border  with  Germany     French  generals  unprepared  for  what  actually  occurred.     French  decided  it  would  dominate  as  trench  warfare  had  dominated  in  WW1  whilst   Germans  correctly  decided  modern  weaponry  made  trenches  and  static  defences   irrelevant.  French  refused  to  take  offensive  and  obsessed  with  sheltering  behind   defensive  positions.     Other  factors  for  rapid  collapse  of  France   -­‐ German  superiority  in  manpower,  air  power,  leadership  and  fighting  spirit   -­‐ Failures  of  French  General  Staff  during  interwar  years  to  adopt  strategies   based  on  mobile  warfare,  forcing  them  to  rely  on  static  lines  of  defence  such   as  Maginot  Line   -­‐ Failure  to  prepare  defensive  positions  along  frontier  in  Ardennes   -­‐ Political  and  economic  turmoil  in  France  during  1930s  which  sapped  will  the   resist;  many  Nazi  sympathisers  among  conservatives  as  there  were   defeatists  among  left  wing.     Colonel  Goutard  attacks  French  military  leaders  for  clinging  to  outmoded  tactics   and  being  incapable  of  adapting  innovative  tactics  of  enemy.  Argues  Germans  not   overwhelmingly  powerful  but  rather  France  lost  because  of  nation’s  moral  laxness   and  pleasure  seeking  “chance  of  victory  was  actually  there”   NOTE:  Hitler’s  Generals  were  initially  in  favour  of  bold  and  imaginative  action  rather  than  Hitler’s  belief  and   faith  placed  in  blitzkrieg.  Thus,  the  earlier  successes  reinforced  his  personal  confidence  to  the  point  that   later  decisions  were  ill  considered  and  misinformed    Germany’s  eventual  defeat.  

THE  AIR  WAR  AND  ITS  EFFECTS:  THE  BATTLE  OF  BRITAIN  AND  THE  BLITZ,  THE  BOMBING  OF   GERMANY  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  

 

 

By  this  point,  Germany  had  gained  number  of  advantages    Swedish  iron  ores  secured    Control  of  Norwegian  and  Low  Country  coasts  gave  Germany  strategic  advantage   over  Britain    Collapse  of  France  gave  Germany  control  over  Western  Europe     The  Battle  of  Britain    By  18th  June  all  British  forces  withdrawn  from  France.  Hitler  now  mainly  focussed   on  invading  Soviet  Union  in  belief  Britain  would  quickly  fall  without  European   allies.    Historians  still  debate  Hitler’s  intention  to  invade  Britain.  Would  have  preferred  not   to  have  fought  Britain  as  British  were  Aryans.  After  fall  of  France,  Hitler  assumed   Britain  would  logically  reach  agreement  with  him  and  thus  offered  numerous.   However,  Churchill,  recently  appointed  PM,  refused  armistice    Britain’s  refusal  forced  Hitler  to  invade  Britain  in  Operation  Sea  Lion.  For  success,   necessary  to  control  sea  and  air;  however  Goering  convinced  Hitler  his  Luftwaffe   could  do  job    Throughout  summer  1940:  German  airforce  sought  to  overcome  RAF  and  control   airspace.  Airspace  vital  otherwise  RAF  and  Royal  Navy  would  destroy  invading   forces  before  reached  shores    Littler  cooperation  between  German  Army,  Navy  and  Air  force;  although  each  had   impressive  build  up  of  forces  which  own  ideas  and  plans  of  how  and  where  invasion   would  initiate.    From  10th  July,  Luftwaffe  attacked  shipping  convoys  in  English  Channel,  Channel   Ports  and  British  Radar  stations    Luftwaffe  looking  for  weaknesses  in  British   forces    8  –  18  August,  attacks  concentrated  on  airfields  used  by  RAF  front  line  groups      By  late  August,  Fighter  Command  running  out  of  aircraft  and  pilots    Evening  25/26  August  RAF  bombers  launched  minor  attack  on  Berlin.  Hitler  furious   and  ordered  Luftwaffe  switch  attack  from  airfields  and  control  centres  to  London   itself.      From  7  September,  Germans  began  night  air  raids  to  stop  Britain  repairing  damage   during  the  night.      Hitler  ordered  change  of  targets  to  cities  and  industries  in  hopes  of  breaking  British   morale  and  destroying  factories  which  built  fighter  aircraft.  However,  gave  British   chance  to  repair  airfields  and  radar  sites  and  RAF  chance  to  rebuild  and  reorganise   forces    defences  operational  again    As  British  controllers  figured  out  German  targets  now  London  and  industrial  areas,   had  time  to  assemble  fighters  to  attack  German  formations  and  break  them  up   before  had  chance  to  bomb.  Came  as  shock  to  Luftwaffe  pilots  who  been  told  British   Fighter  Command  been  practically  wiped  out    Germany  failed  to  gain  air  superiority  with  twice  the  amount  of  losses  compared  to   RAF.      17  Sept:  Hitler  called  off  Operation  Sea  Lion  indefinitely.    Victory  due  to:   -­‐ Radar  making  it  possible  to  detect  and  tract  German  fighters  before  reached   Britain.   -­‐ British  aircraft  production  increased  dramatically  under  direction  of  Lord   Beaverbrook  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   41    

German  decision  to  switch  from  airfields  and  radar  stations  to  blitz  the  cities   occurred  just  as  Fighter  Command  near  collapse   -­‐ Dowding  System  provided  RAF  with  sophisticated  detection  and  command   system   -­‐ Luftwaffe  lacked  specific  aims  and  often  operated  independently  of  rest  of   German  military   -­‐ RAF  pilots  displayed  enormous  skill  and  courage  in  face  of  odds.   -­‐ As  RAF  fighting  over  home  territory,  planes  could  land  &  refuel  easily  and   spend  more  time  in  the  air.  Fallen  aircraft  might  be  repaired,  downed  pilots   could  be  rescued.  Luftwaffe  didn’t  have  advantages.     -­‐ Germans  failed  to  recognise  importance  of  radar.  RAF  had  excellent  early   warning  system   -­‐ German  Messerschmitt  BF  109  excellent  fighter  but  short  on  range    limited   operational  time   -­‐ Messerschmitt  had  to  escort  and  protect  German  bombers    operated  at   lower  altitudes    limited  in  manoeuvre    it  couldn’t  exploits  one  of   greatest  assets  which  was  at  high  altitudes    Key  Turning  Point:  ‘stalemate’  ensued  in  that  Hitler  failed  to  defeat  Britain  and   Churchill  not  strong  enough  to  attack  Germany.      Major  implications  for  future  course  of  war   -­‐ Hitler  had  to  face  two  front  (and  later  three)  war   -­‐ Decreased  chances  of  success  of  Hitler’s  invasion  of  Soviet  Union   -­‐ Prevented  Italian  and  German  forces  from  taking  North  Africa  and  gaining   control  of  Middle  East  oil  supplies  and  Suez  Canal   -­‐ Allowed  US  to  base  itself  in  Britain    If  German  victory  had  been  achieved,  highly  likely  German  victory  in  WW2    Political  result:  allowed  Churchill  to  remain  great  leader.  If  Britain  had  been   defeated,  his  own  Conservative  Party  would  have  removed  him  from  power;   particularly  as  Chamberlain  and  Halifax  favoured  armistice       The  Blitz  (53  Nights)    7  Sept:  Luftwaffe  dropped  bombs  on  London  and  industrial  areas  trying  to  destroy   morale    ‘Blitz’    Since  start  of  war,  British  had  preparations  against  bombings  with  civilian  defence   organisation  ‘Air  Raid  Precautions’  set  up.  Citizens  issued  with  gas  masks,  air  raid   shelters  constructed,  air  raid  sirens  installed  in  each  area,  barrage  balloons  floating   above  cities  and  blackout  regulations    Blitz  did  less  damage  than  expected  and   didn’t  destroy  morale    15  September:  Germany  launched  massive  daylight  bombing  raid  on  London.   Daylight  attacks  lasted  until  30th    German  bombers  then  switched  tactics  to  attacking  at  night  with  Luftwaffe’s   attention  now  on  Britain’s  towns  and  cities  and  centres  of  production   -­‐ German  daylight  bomber  losses  too  large   -­‐ Nonetheless,  RAF  developed  night  fighters  equipped  with  radar    Raids  that  did  occur  during  day  mostly  aimed  at  engaging  RAF  fighters  to  disrupt   defensive  operations  over  South  East  Britain.      7  –  13  Nov:  London  main  target  and  bombed  almost  every  night   -­‐ Not  only  symbolic  target  of  London,  but  across  wide  range  of  industrial  &   communications  centres      Sept  1940  –  May  1941:  Main  force  of  Blitz  occurred  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  

-­‐

 

       



By  May,  Hitler’s  attention  fully  focussed  on  plans  for  Russia  and  needed  air  force  in   east  although  Britain  would  continue  to  be  bombed  intermittently  throughout  war:   60%  of  housing  destroyed  or  damaged   Some  positive  aspects  to  Blitz  campaign  for  Britain   -­‐ Industrial  production  not  been  drastically  hurt;  industry  able  to  recover   -­‐ Britain’s  ports  still  able  to  function   However,  as  bombing  got  worse,  more  British  resolve  hardened.  Resolve  to  fight  on.   Churchill’s  visits  to  bombed  areas  well  received   29  December  1940:  worst  night  of  bombing  for  London  with  much  in  flames   although  St.  Paul’s  Cathedral  survived    symbol  of  Britain’s  will  to  resist   Reporting  of  American  journalist  Edward  Murrow  during  Blitz  gradually  created   sympathy  and  admiration  in  US  for  Britain  despite  US  strong  isolationist  policy  to   avoid  being  dragged  in  European  war.     Dennis  Richards  emphasises  that  Battle  of  Britain  major  turning  point  as  fighter   pilots  and  presence  of  navy  in  Channel  halted  Hitler’s  path  of  conquest  allowing  for   the  mighty  alliance  of  Russia  and  US    victory   AJP  Taylor:  major  factor  in  victory  was  lack  of  clarity  in  German  strategic  aims  in   comparison  to  British  certainty  of  purpose.  Goering  couldn’t  decide  locality  of  target   Liddell  Hart  argues  damage  inflicted  and  disruption  caused  by  Luftwaffe  greater   than  generally  admitted  particularly  on  industrial  production.  If  Luftwaffe  allowed   to  persist  in  campaign  of  attacking  industrial  centres,  damage  could  have  been   greater   -­‐ “not  succeeded  in  its  object  of  destroying  the  RAF’s  fighter  strength  and  the   British  peoples  morale”   Overy  suggests  debate  over  morality  of  allied  bombing  has  turned  focus  away  from   how  successful  it  has  been  in  severely  affecting  German  war  front  weakening   economy  and  destroying  weapons  and  numbers  of  workers.  Additionally,  he   suggests  Hitler  looking  for  quick  way  to  force  British  to  negotiate  or  create  right   conditions  for  invasion  rather  than  attack  simply  due  to  enragement.    

  The  Bombing  of  Germany    1920s  &1930s:  RAF  believed  strategic  bombing  war  winning  weapon    Harris,  architect  of  the  allied  bombing  campaign,  put  great  faith  in  bombing  arguing   surest  way  to  defeat  enemy  was  to  destroy  its  war  potential.  Later  greatly  criticised   for  strategy  of  “area  bombing”  attacking  entire  cities  rather  than  specific  targets    Placed  in  difficult  role  as  govt  privately  supported  tactic  of  area  bombing  with  its   inevitable  result  of  heavy  casualties  among  German  civilian  population;  yet  publicly   wished  to  downplay  tactic  to  avoid  conflict  with  religious  and  humanitarian   opinion.      April  1940:  decided  to  confine  Bomber  Command  to  mainly  night  bombing  for   survival  reasons  as      15/16  May  1940,  96  strong  force  of  British  two  engine  bombers  attacked  the  Ruhr   industrial  area.  Only  ¼  crew  claimed  to  have  found  actual  target  area    1940:  Night  bombing  inaccurate  and  ineffective;  however  attacks  on  German  cities   angered  Hitler    switch  to  the  Blitz  which  key  factor  helping  Britain  win  in  Battle  of   Britain.    1941:  reports  of  ineffectiveness  of  Bomber  Command  very  alarming.  Although   significant  amounts  of  bomber  aircraft  were  lost,  German  anti-­‐aircraft  guns  had   more  copious  amounts.  Night  flying  and  poor  navigation  equipment  accounted  for   most  of  losses.    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   43   





   



 

Harris  =  Change.  Firmly  convinced  of  efficiency  of  bombing  and  realised   concentration  of  force  would  work.   -­‐ Reorganised  crews  to  produce  teams  of  highly  trained  specialists  and  older   bombers  withdrawn   -­‐ New  navigational  aids   -­‐ Introduced  new  taacics  concentrating  bombers  in  time  and  space  to  produce   maxim  devastation   1943  &  1943:  Several  developments  assisted  Harris     -­‐ Aircraft  production  efficient.  Over  1000  bombers,  178  of  which  new  four   engine  Lancasters  able  to  fly  greater  distance  and  carry  greater  bomb  load   -­‐ Improvements  in  navigation  equipment   -­‐ Improved  flying  techniques:  adding  bomb-­‐aiders  to  crews  and  pioneered   ‘pathfinder’  crews  who  led  bombing  groups  to  targets   -­‐ From  August  1942:  American  Air  Force  joined  RA  widening  bombing  options   and  greatly  increased  allied  power  in  bombing  campaign   -­‐ Multitude  of  technological  improvements:  Bomber  Command  developed   ‘window’  whereby  hundreds  of  strips  of  aluminium  foil  dropped  and  on   German  radar  stimulated  Lancaster  bomber    German  radar  ineffective   January  1943:  Churchill  met  President  Roosevelt  –  bombing  campaign  given   priority  to  weaken  and  destroy  the  German  military,  industrial  and  economic   system  undermining  morale.  Britain  and  US  began  tactic  of  combined  day  and  night   bomber  offensives   -­‐ Americans  belief  in  possibilities  of  strategic  bombing  (bombing  specific   targets)  bombed  by  day.  Americans  targeted  Germany’s  aircraft  production   and  oil  industry   -­‐ British  with  area  bombing,  bombed  by  night   Late  July:  5  day  period  Allied  bombing  of  Hamburg  pulverised  massive  concentrated   attack.  Fires  caused  by  incendiary  bombs  merged  together  killing  and  reducing   many  to  homelessness     However,  ‘success’  of  attack  didn’t  allow  Bomber  Command  to  gain  tem  of   disposable  fuel  tanks  of  airspace  over  Germany.  German  air  defence  improved  and   by  late  1943  Bomber  Command  faced  major  losses   Development  of  system  of  disposable  fuel  tanks  gave  fighters  greater  range  and   allowed  them  to  accompany  bombers  on  longer  missions.     November  1943  –  March  1944:  Battle  of  Berlin.  Further  away,  more  heavily   defended,  harder  target  to  find,  Berlin  suffered  less  damage.  By  March  1944,   bombing  offensive  failing  to  reduce  German  war  production  or  break  morale   decisively   Early  1944:  German  fighter  losses  enormous  and  front  line  fighter  aircraft  had  to  be   withdrawn  front  battle  fronts  to  protect  Germany    weakened  German  military   position  on  Eastern  Front  against  Russia;  and  significantly  reduced  their  aircraft   numbers  later  in  France   By  middle  1944  Overy  suggests  defeat  of  German  air  force  become  accomplished   fact.  Allied  bombers  now  free  to  destroy  German  cities.     From  April  1944:  British  and  American  bombers  began  preparing  for  D-­‐Day  by   attacking  transportation  targets  and  German  Air  Force  in  France    operations   often  split  into  several  different  smaller  attacks    German  night  fighters  much  less   time  and  fewer  large  bomber  streams  to  intercept    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  

 

 

     



Beginning  of  1945:  Germany’s  only  aerial  response  came  from  development  of  V1   and  V2  rcoekts  causing  great  alarm  in  Britain  but  had  no  bearing  on  outcome  of   war.   American  P51  Mustang,  aircraft  with  range  of  heavy  bomber,  arrived  as  long  range   escort.  Could  reach  Berlin  and  outpace,  outdive  and  outturn  best  German  fighters.   German  fighter  force  never  recovered.  Allies  won  command  of  air.     German  defencelessness  against  Allied  bombing  seen  in  the  bombing  of  Dresden  in   Feb  1945.   Bombing  gradually  destroyed  Germany’s  economic  base.  Oil  supplies  reduced,   chemical  production  cut,  railway  system  severely  weakened.  German  industry   relied  on  stockpiles  and  desperate  underground  production  employing  slave  labour   Many  question  morality  of  allied  bombing  today;  however  effectiveness  on   weakening  Germany’s  ability  to  wage  war  not  denied.   Controversial  Allied  bombing  tactics   -­‐ Britain  and  US  suffered  large  casualties  in  bombing  raids   -­‐ RAF  used  incendiary  bombs  as  part  of  ‘area  bombing’    large  German   civilian  casualties     Murray  and  Millett  argue  strategy  of  strategic  bombing  “essential  to  the  defeat  of   Nazi  Germany”  although  didn’t  live  up  to  expectations,  definitely  slowed  down   German  industrial  production.  Forced  Germans  to  shift  resources  away  from   military  at  front  to  anti-­‐aircraft  defence  at  home.    

      OPERATION  BARBAROSSA,  STALINGRAD  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  CAMPAIGN   Operation  Barbarossa   Background    22  June  1941:  German  forces  invaded  Soviet  “Operation  Barbarossa”    Hitler  made  clear  his  intention  to  invade  with  ideological,  racial,  strategic  and   economic  motives   -­‐ Lebensraum:  to  create  Aryan  empire  required  living  space  found  in  vastness   of  Russia   -­‐ Slavs  of  Russia  racial  inferiors  to  become  future  slave  force.     -­‐ Russia  would  provide  grain,  oil  and  other  resources  needed  by  the  Reich     -­‐ Defeat  of  Russia    isolate  Britain  to  defeat  with  submarine  force    By  May  1941:  Hitler  consolidated  position  in  Eastern  Europe     -­‐ Hungary  and  Bulgaria  joined  Axis    25  March  1941  Yugoslavia  joined  Axis  powers  when  signed  Tripartite  Pact.  Few   days  later,  Prince  Paul’s  pro-­‐axis  govt  overthrown   -­‐ Hitler  alarmed    invasion  of  Yugoslavia  commencing  w/  attack  on  Greece   -­‐ 6  April:  German,  Italian  and  Hungarian  forces  attacked  Yugoslavia     -­‐ By  late  May,  Axis  forces  control  of  Yugoslavia  and  Greece  and  expelled  Allied   forces  here    Significant  German  victory  but  actions  in  the  Balkans  delayed  invasion  of  Russia  by   a  month     The  Attack    Stalin  had  been  warned  by  British  intelligence  and  own  sources  yet  chose  not  to   believe    invasion  shouldn’t  have  come  as  suprise    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   45    



    

 

   

German  attack  of  monumental  proportions  with  3.2  million  troops  and  vast   weaponry   German  forces  divided  into  3  armies  with  Leningrad,  Moscow  and  Kiev  as  targets.   -­‐ Often  out  of  radio  contact  with  each  other;  attacked  simultaneously  on  a   3200km  front   -­‐ Army  Group  North  moved  through  Baltic  States  towards  Leningraf   -­‐ Army  Group  Centre  towards  Moscow   -­‐ Army  Group  South  aimed  to  capture  Ukraine  and  target  Kiev.   Needed  swift  victory  as  longer  it  lasted,  greater  chance  for  defeat:  Russia  vast,   sources  limitless  and  Russian  winter  helped  defeat  enemies  in  the  past.  Planned   that  blitzkrieg  tactics,  aim  of  destroying  Red  Army  in  field,  would  finish  off  Soviet   Union   Hitler  overestimated  the  abilities  of  his  armed  forces  whilst  underestimating   resistance  mentality  of  Russians   Soviet  forces  unprepared  for  onslaught  with  many  troops  still  training  for  sporting   events  in  late  June.  Took  hours  to  realise  under  attack.      22  June:  Germany  attacked  with  1200  Soviet  aircraft  destroyed  by  noon     spectacular  initial  process   Mid  July:  with  100km  of  Leningrad  but  Hitler  ordered  to  pause  while  infantry   consolidated  in  Baltic  States   Armies  reached  outskirts  of  Leningrad  and  Kiev  (never  really  capturing  Moscow)   but  met  by  determined  Soviet  resistance.  Hitler  made  serious  tactic  error  in  dividing   his  commands  &  change  priorities  in  middle  of  campaign   -­‐ Army  Group  Centre  towards  Moscow  temporarily  halted   -­‐ Two  of  these  redeployed.  First  advanced  north  to  support  German  position   in  Leningrad  (however  position  didn’t  improve  as  Russians  fought  back  and   refused  to  surrender    stalemate    siege    1.5  million  Russians  died  from   military  confrontations,  freezing  weather,  diseases  and  starvation)  and  other   moved  south  towards  Kiev   -­‐ After  40  day  battle,  Army  Group  South  captured  Kiev  w/  extensive  casualties   on  both  sides   -­‐ Change  of  tactics  delayed  attack  on  Moswo  by  nearly  2  months   By  end  July:  German  forces  captured  Bialystol,  Minsk,  Uman  and  Smolensk   Army  Group  Centre  similarly  stalled  by  Hitler  who  insisted  tank  divisions  should   head  south  to  assist  capture  of  Kiev.  Hitler’s  generals  argued  should  be  allowed  to   push  to  Moscow  but  Hitler  argued  Kiev  needed  to  secure  food  supplies  of  Ukraine   and  provide  springboard  to  move  on  oil  wells  of  Caucasus   19  Sept:  Kiev  captured     However,  German  forces  slowed.  Leningrad  not  captured    3  year  siege   October:  Hitler  launched  Operation  Typhoon  (attack  on  Moscow)   However,  autumn  rains  turned  poor  roads  into  quagmires    slowed  progress.  By   Nov,  Russian  winter  played  its  role.  Initially  assisted  German  forces  as  frost  made   easier  to  move  across  hardened  ground.  Yet  as  temperatures  dropped,  advance   halted.  German  soldiers  neither  equipped  nor  trained  for  such  conditions   -­‐ Inadequate  clothing  and  lack  of  supplies    hypothermia,  frostbite  and   trench  foot   -­‐ Engine  sumps  froze,  tank  mechanisms  broke  down,  power  line  snapped   -­‐ Goering  promised  Luftwaffe  would  keep  German  army  supplied;  yet  in   freezing  conditions  parachute  drops  had  to  be  employed  to  deliver  supplies   which  often  lost  or  fell  into  Soviet  hands.    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  

 

 

 



   

-­‐ Strong  soviet  resistance    another  seige   Close  to  Moscow,  German  army  most  vulnerable,  short  of  food,  medicines  and   ammunition    Soviet  attack   Late  1941:  Stalin  decided  to  defend  capital  at  all  costs  as   -­‐ Nov:  ‘rasputitza’  (time  of  no  roads)    rain,  hail  and  snow  rapidly  turned   Moscow  into  frozen  and  muddy  quagmire.  Airports  closed  and  plummeting   temps.     -­‐ Sorge  (Stalin’s  spy  in  Tokyo)  reported  Japan  intended  to  launch  offensive   against  US    war  on  two  front  fear  dismissed    Stalin  moved  entire   Siberian  Army  Corps  from  eastern  Russia  where  has  been  fearing  Japanese   attack  to  Moscow    750  000  men  demoralised  Germans   -­‐ Soviet  Red  Army  replacing  staggering  losses  at  remarkable  speed   -­‐ US  entered  WW2  after  Japan  attacked  American  naval  base  at  Pearl  Harbour   Dec  1941    ally  with  enormous  military  potential     -­‐ Stalin  placed  great  faith  in  General  Zhukov  whose  strategies  dismissed   options  of  defence  or  withdrawl  and  kept  attacking  until  victory  achieved     further  demoralised  Germans   Mid  October:  chances  of  German  army  faded.  Stalin  placed  General  Zhukov  in  charge   of  defence  of  Moscow.  He  organised  series  to  anti-­‐tank  defences  around  Moscow  to   slow  German  advance.  His  organisational  skills  and  weaponry  appropriate  to   Russian  conditions  worked  to  their  advantage.     Stalin  learned  from  intelligence  forces  Japan  planning  attack  US    Stalin  moved   entire  Siberian  Army  Corps  west  to  face  Germany.  As  they  trained  &  equipped  for   severe  winter,  appearance  lowered  German  morale   5  Dec:  Zhukov  launched  counter  attack.  Germans  forced  to  back  up  to  300km   although  Germany  hadn’t  been  defeated.  However,  Moscow  saved,  Blitzkrieg  failed   and  Hitler  faced  feared  drawn  out  campaign  against  Russia   1941:  Russia  faced  much  defeat.  German  military  skill,  Soviet  unpreparedness,  low   morale  and  defeatism  amongst  Soviet  population  combined  with  massive  military   loss    defeat  seemed  certain   Stalin’s  orders  to  not  retreat  led  to  unnecessary  losses;    however  Soviet  survived   Barbarossa  

  Reasons  for  Failure  of  Operation  Barbarossa     Geography:  vastness  of  Russia  caused  disorientation  and  deep  sense  melancholy   amongst  German  troops.  Size  made  difficult  for  Germany  to  keep  forces  supplied.   Soviet  Union  also  followed  scorched  earth  policy  destroying  anything  of  value  to   Germans    Japan’s  decisions  to  expand  southward:  with  no  threat  of  Japanese  attack  Stalin   could  move  well  trained  and  well  equipped  Siberian  forces  westwards.  With  this,   Zhukov  able  to  bring  out  Soviet  Union’s  new  military  hardware  such  as  K1,  K2  and   T34  tanks    Goering’s  promise  that  army  would  be  resupplied  in  Russia  never  realised.   Luftwaffe’s  cargo  missions  over  Russian  skies  continually  threatened  by  Red  Army’s   anti-­‐aircraft  crews.  German  plans  risked  destruction  of  flew  too  low;  landing  heavy   aircraft  dangerous  because  of  frozen  airstrips    essential  war  materials  (medicine,   food  and  ammunition)  packed  into  crates  and  parachuted  from  high  altitudes     frequently  missed  targets  and  captured  by  Russian  troops    Role  of  Stalin:  decision  to  stay  in  Moscow  raised  Soviet  morale.  His  use  of  nationalist   and  religious  propaganda  sustained  people.  Interfered  less  in  military  affairs  than    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   47    

   

  The  Battle  of  Stalingrad   Background    Little  chance  Army  Group  North  making  breakthrough.  Leningrad  destroyed  due  to   siege  in  Jan  1944  but  Russian  surrender  not  likely.  Similarly,  chance  of  Army  Group   centre  breaking  into  Moscow  not  likely.    Army  Group  North  (Leningrad)  and  Army  Group  Centre  (Moscow)  could  not  be   moved  unless  Red  Army’s  forces  in  these  cities  surrendered    unlikely    Army  Group  South  looked  more  promising.  Once  spring  arrived  in  1942,  Hitler   launched  another  attack  as:   -­‐ Must  win  in  Russia  or  be  taken  prisoner   -­‐ Could  not  withdraw  because  safe  retreat  impossible    April  1941:  Hitler  launch  Operation  Blue  into  south  of  Russia    divided  Army   Group  South  &  launched  2  pronged  attack   -­‐ Army  Group  A  to  head  into  Caucasus  with  intention  of  capturing  Soviet  oils   wells.  Hitler  believed  by  denying  Stalin  of  main  oil  supplies,  Soviet  war  effort   would  be  greatly  disadvantaged   -­‐ Army  Group  B  to  cut  off  River  Volga  by  capturing  Stalingrad.  Operation   twofold:  Volga  key  communication  centre  and  essential  waterway  and   Stalingrad  significant  industrial  centre.  Supported  by  Italian,  Hungarian  and   Romanian  troops.  Led  by  General  Paulus      However,  taking  Stalingrad  unnecessary  as  not  strategically  important  and  Volga   could  have  been  easily  cut  further  south.  Hitler  gave  city  greater  significance  than  it   deserved  due  to  name  ‘Stalingrad’      29  May:  German  forces  scored  major  victory  near  Kharkov  taking  significant   numbers  of  prisoners,  tanks  &  guns.  Further  victories  followed  at  Kerch  and   Sevastopol  in  June  and  at  Rostov  on  River  Don  in  late  July     The  Battle    When  Paulus  began  attack  on  Stalingrad,  Soviet  forces  outnumbered  4  to  1.    August:  launched  massive  two  day  aerial  bombardment  destroying  more  than  ¾  of   city.      Fighting  involved  not  grand  movements  but  rather  individually  fought.  German  and   Soviet  troops  often  fought  hand-­‐to-­‐hand  combat.  Lone  snipers  key  figures  in   fighting.    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  



Hitler.  Officers  promoted  on  merit  and  trust  of  Zhukov  major  factor  in  ability  for   Soviet  survival   Hitler’s  Interference:  Hitler  didn’t  allow  generals  to  run  things.  Direct  intervention   arguably  prevented  capture  of  Leningrad.  Decision  to  take  Kiev  before  Moscow  gave   defenders  breathing  space  to  prepare  defence.  Frequent  arguments  with  generals   slowed  German  process   Climate:  Russian  winter  (-­‐40  temps)  unexperienced  by  Germans  who  unprepared   for  it.  Russians  had  advantage   Christian  sees  failure  of  Barbarossa  as  crucial  moment  in  war  which  “enabled   Russia  to  exploit  to  full  its  huge  reserves  of  raw  materials  and  labour”   Bullock  argues  main  factor  for  failure  of  Barbarossa  was  Hitler’s  nature  as   interfering  figure  who  didn’t  trust  judgement  of  generals  ignoring  reality  of   campaign   Overy  emphasis  significance  of  Hitler’s  tactically  unsound  practice  of  purging   senior  officers  in  bringing  about  negative  effect  on  Germany’s  war  effort    

 

  

       

Red  Army  attempted  to  prevent  Paulus’  troops  from  capturing  city.  Soviet  forces   established  front  line  along  Volga  River  and  refused  to  retreat.   Every  citizen  in  Stalingrad  helped  to  defend  city    Rattenkrieg  (‘rat  war’).  Women   and  children  created  simple  yet  deadly  mines  and  booby  traps  out  of  recycled   explosives    urban  guerrilla  warfare   19  November:  Zhukov  launched  Operation  Uranus  at  Stalingrad  –  plan  to  trap  all   German  forces  inside  Stalingrad.  Zhukov’s  plan  was  to  encircle  Paulus’  6th  Army  in   giant  pincer  movement  trapping  German  forces   -­‐ From  South  would  be  General  Vatutin’s  forces   -­‐ From  North  came  larger  force  to  attack  Paulus’  vulnerable  north  eastern   flank   -­‐ Essentially  both  Russian  armies  progressively  encircle  city  until  met  creating   a  large  circular  war  zone  that  included  the  city   23  Nov:  2  Soviet  forces  met  at  Kalach  Bridge    trapping  Paulus’  300  000  men   inside  city  and  couldn’t  escape   Paulus’  Army  Group  A  bogged  down  in  Caucasus,  Luftwaffe  find  almost  impossible   to  supply  forces,  north  eastern  flank  (Italian,  Hungarian  and  Romanian  troops)   exposed  and  winter  arrived   12  Dec:  Attempt  made  to  relieve  Paulus  with  force  led  by  General  Manstein   (Operation  Winter  Tempest).  However,  force  too  small  and  couldn’t  reach  city   Paulus  sought  permission  from  Hitler  to  surrender;  yet  refused.  Promoted  to  Field   Marshall  –  no  German  Field  Marshall  ever  surrendered.   31  Dec  1942:  Russian  troops  captured  Paulus’  headquarters    German  6th  Army   surrendered  due  to  cold,  lack  of  food  and  ammunition,  and  disease.  German  force   300  000  men  lost  and  91  000  marched  off  to  horrific  Soviet  imprisonment.     Lasted  approx  200  days  with  22  German  generals  and  nearly  280  000  Axis  troops   captured  upon  conclusion    forced  to  prison  camps  where  many  died  in  captivity   McCauley  argues  significance  undeniable  boosting  Soviet  morale,  High  Command   showed  could  match  battle  tactics  with  best  of  them  and  never  again  did  Soviet   troops  flee  battle   Samsonov  high  praise  for  efforts  of  Soviet  people  and  Communist  Party:  efficient   war  economy  and  ability  of  generals  to  plan  major  campaigns.     -­‐ “the  impressive  results  of  the  Stalingrad  battle  created  favourable  conditions   for  operations  by  Anglo-­‐American  forces  against  Nazi  Germany  and  its  allies”  

  Significance  of  Russian  Campaign    Kharkov  captured  by  Soviet  offensive  but  by  mid  March,  it  and  Belgorod  were  again   in  German  control    1943  onwards:  Soviet  forces  began  gain  advantage  in  quantity  and  quality  of   equipment   -­‐ Soviet  production  greatly  rationalised    only  small  number  of  different   types  of  aircraft  produced  but  on  mass  scale   -­‐ American  supplies  granted  to  Russia  through  Lend  Lease  scheme  beginning   to  make  themselves  felt.    Mid  1943:  Hitler  committed  forces  to  massive  contest  at  Kursk  “Operation  Citadel”   lasted  from  5  –  12  July.    Soviet  forces  established  salient  around  Kursk  and  was  temptation  to  push  further,   although  Stalin  resisted.  Temptation  for  Germans  to  cut  it  off,  which  Hitler  couldn’t   resist.      Bulge  in  front  line  to  be  site  of  greatest  tank  battle  in  history    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   49      



 

         

Russians  now  superior  in  numbers  and  equipment.  Commanders  learned  lessons   well   Early  July:  defence  lines  comprising  mines,  tank  defences  and  masses  of  heavy  guns   stretched  for  50  miles.  No  weak  spot  in  Russian  line   July  1943:  Hitler  ordered  General  von  Kluge  and  von  Manstein  to  strike  into  Russian   fortification  at  Kursk   5  July:  German  forces  attacked  salient  from  north  and  south.  However,  blitzkrieg   over;  German  tanks  didn’t  slice  through  enemy  rather  used  technique  “Panzerkeil”   attacking  by  means  of  armoured  wedge  against  equally  powerful  force.  240km  front   for  7  days   -­‐ AJP  Taylor  “with  tanks  fighting  tanks  there  was  no  room  for  the  infantry  and   the  German  guns  couldn’t  fire.”   Battle  joined  with  1500  tanks  on  each  side.  Very  close  to  victory  at  one  stage,  Hitler   broke  off  engagement  on  12  July  to  deal  with  Anglo-­‐American  landings  in  Sicily.     Losses  on  both  sides  colossal  but  Red  Army  could  make  up  its  losses  whereas   Wehrmacht  couldn’t.   Battle  of  Kursk  turning  point  of  war.  German  forces  would  launch  great  offensive  on   Eastern  Front  again.  Initiative  truly  passed  to  Red  Army.  All  Hitler  could  do  in  east   was  to  delay  advance  of  Soviet  forces   Following  Kursk,  Soviet  victories  began  to  multiply   -­‐ 5  August:  Red  Army  captured  Belgorod   -­‐ 23  August:  Kharkov  retaken   -­‐ 8  Sept:  Donetsk;  10  Sept:  Mariupol   -­‐ Late  Sept:  Smolensk  retaken   -­‐ 6  Nov:  Kiev  captured   By  late  1943  Hitler’s  gamble  in  Russia  failed  with  Operations  Barbarossa  and  Blue   failing  to  achieve  objectives.  Wehrmacht’s  preferred  tactic  of  blitzkrieg  blunted  by   determined  Soviet  resistance   Russian  campaign  forced  Staln  to  become  increasingly  focused  on  people  of  Russia   rather  than  himself.  Closely  identified  himself  with  Red  Army  and  its  commanders   Used  Red  Army  along  with  German  incvasion  as  excuse  to  neutralise  potential   threat  from  Russia’s  ethnic  groups  who  openly  hostile  to  Stalin’s  regime  and  sought   own  political  autonomy.  Stalin  accused  of  treason   Stalin’s  significant  control  over  Russia’s  war  economy;  redirecting  nation’s   industrial,  agricultural  and  manufacturing  resources  into  total  war  effort   Fighting  in  Russia  and  in  north  Africa    simultaneous  fronts  placed  strains  on   German  war  effort   1943  –  1944:  Allied  nations  opened  up  more  fronts  in  Italy  anf  France  firther  testing   emotional  resolve  and  military  capabilities  of  Germany   Hitler’s  Russian  campaign  and  significance  of  war  not  always  been  adequately   acknowledged   British  and  American  historians  focus  on  own  nation’s  roles  in  war  AND  Stalinist   Russia  particularly  secretive    difficult  to  understand  whole  story.   However  has  been  growing  acknowledgement  in  the  West  of  vital  role  played  by   Soviet  Union  in  defeat  of  Nazi.  Vital  to  acknowledge  Soviet  Red  Army  continuously   engaged  bulk  of  German  army  from  June  1941  to  May  1945   Hitler  and  German  High  Command  failed  due  to  following  factors:   -­‐ Size  of  Soviet:  operation  in  Soviet  unlike  campaigns  in  Low  Countries  and   France  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  

 

 

-­‐

 

Determination  and  Resilience  of  Soviet  Resistance:    Wehrmacht   underestimated  enemy.  Soviet  industry  met  demands  of  war  and  produced   tanks  in  quantity  and  quality  to  match  German  panzers.  Tanks,  skill  and   courage  of  crew,  aid  from  US  and  Britain    formidable  force   -­‐ Ruthless  Nature  of  Stalinist  Regime:    Stalin  used  threat,  execution,   imprisonment  and  propaganda  to  maintain  Soviet  resistance.     Overy:  “the  struggle  for  Kursk  tore  the  heart  out  of  the  German  army  ...  it  was  the   point  at  which  the  initiative  passed  to  the  Soviet  side”   Liddell  Hart  argues  Russian  campaign  highlighted  one  major  flaws  of  German   command  structure.  Admiration  for  German  ability  to  resist  numerically  stronger   forces.  However  problem  lay  in  Hitler’s  refusal  to  allow  retreats  without  his   permission  which  rarely  given.    

   June  1941:  Operation  Barbarossa  commences      Sept  1941  –  Jan  1944:  900  day  siege  of  Leningrad      Oct  1941:  Kiev  surrenders      Nov  1941:  Moscow  besieged      June  1942:  Operation  Blue  commences      August  1942:  Stalingrad  besieged        July  1943:  Battle  of  Kursk             THE  BATTLE  OF  EL  ALAMEIN  AND  THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  CONFLICT  IN  NORTH  AFRICA  TO  THE   EUROPEAN  WAR   Background  to  the  North  Africa  Conflict   Italy  Enters  War    10  June  1940:  Italy  entered  war  eager  to  capitalise  on  Germany’s  swift  defeat  of   French.      1940:  Italy  not  prepared  for  long  time  war  critically  short  of  military  vehicles  and   supplies  as  result  of  Mussolini’s  involvement  in  Spanish  civil  war.  Naval  and  air   forces  also  weak    Nonetheless,  late  1940  Mussolini  stroked  fascist  blow  on  both  sides  of   Mediterranean  Sea  by  attacking  Egypt  (Sept)  and  Greece  (Oct).  Assault  on  Egypt   resulted  for  Campaign  in  North  Africa    Mussolini  had  3  ambitious  goals  in  North  Africa   -­‐ Capture  British  Egypt  as  victory  in  Cairo  would  provide  Hitler  and  Mussolini   control  of  Suez  Canal,  vital  link  between  Mediterranean  Sea  and  Indian   Ocean   -­‐ Seize  control  of  Mediterranean  Highway,  vital  coastal  road  linking  Tunisia   with  Libya  and  Egypt   -­‐ Use  Egypt  as  springboard  to  launch  new  offensive  into  Middle  East  oilfields    Italy’s  early  wartime  performance  cause  of  concern  for  Hitler   -­‐ Italy’s  32  divisions  struggled  against  France’s  6  divisions  in  June  1940.  Small   advance  into  France  only  achieved  with  help  of  German  forces  attacking   French  rear   -­‐ June  1940:  Italian  base  in  Libya  attacked  by  British  naval  forces   -­‐ September:  2  Italian  destroyers  sunk  in  Libya  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   51    

-­‐

October  1940:  Italian  forces  attacked  Greece  where  army  got  bogged  down   in  mountains  of  northern  Greece  and  thousands  died  from  cold  winter.   Italian  forces  driven  back  into  Albania  by  December   By  May  1941:  British  forces  taken  all  of  Italy’s  East  African  Empire  

  Early  Actions  in  North  Africa    Since  1911  Italy  possession  of  colony  of  Libya  in  North  Africa,  situated  west  of   Egypt.  Now  under  British  control    Sept  1940:  strong  Italian  force  invaded  Egypt  and  set  up  fortified  camps.  British   commander  in  Chief  in  North  Africa,  General  Wavell,  launched  attack  against  these   camps  in  Operation  Compass.  During  next  80  days  Italian  army  now  undersupplied   progressively  pushed  back  750km  as  Allied  forces  thrust  into  Libya   -­‐ 10  Dec  1940:  Sidi  Barrani  captured  with  34  000  Italian  prisoners   -­‐ Early  Jan  1941:  Australian  6th  Division  led  attack  into  Libya.  Bardia  captured   w/  70000  Italian  prisoners   -­‐ 22  Jan:  British  &  Australian  forces  captured  Tobruk  w/  port  facilities,  stores   of  supplies  &  prisoners   -­‐ Important  bases  along  the  Mediterranean  Highway;  Bardia,  Tobruk  &   Benghazi  captured  eventually.    By  Nov  1940  numerically  stronger  Italian  forces  completely  defeated.  British   advanced  500  miles  and  taken  significant  numbers  of  prisoners,  tanks  and  guns.      Feb  1941:  Hitler  decided  to  send  General  Rommel’s  Afrika  Korps  to  Libya.  This  force   trained  for  rapid  movements  and  consisted  of  hundreds  of  tanks,  thousands  of  field   guns  and  numerous  infantry  divisions       Rommel  in  North  Africa    March  1941:  Rommel  launched  counter  attack  against  British  forces  driving  them   out  of  El  Aghelia  back  towards  Tobruk.  Rommel’s  tank  commands  challenged  and   eventually  reconquered  many  towns  and  bases  along  the  Mediterranean  Highway   previously  won  in  Operation  Compass    April:  Rommel’s  German-­‐Italian  forces  launched  3-­‐pronged  attack  against  British   forces.  Italans  retook  Benghazi    7  April:  Rommel  captured  Derna  and  British  Generals  Neame  and  O’Connor    British  position  weakened  as  many  troops  now  in  Greece  involved  in  failed  attempt   to  defend  country    Mid  April  Rommel  began  siege  of  Tobruk  lasting  242  days  (April  –  December  1941)   -­‐ Tobruk  important:  only  allied  base  in  between  Alexandria  in  Egypt  &  Sfax  in   Tunisia  (1600m  distance).  Seaport  had  best  facilities  for  1500km,  water   distillation  plant  and  strong  defence  arrangements   -­‐ Strategic  value  for  future  of  North  Africa  campaign  recognised  by  both  sides   -­‐ Next  8  months,  allied  troops  mostly  Australians  held  on  against  constant  Axis   air,  sea  &  land  attacks.     -­‐ Tobruk  periodically  attacked  by  Rommel’s  tanks  and  troops  and  Liftwaffe   -­‐ Mid  Nov:  British  8th  Army  launched  Operation  Crusader  to  relieve  Tobruk;   British  light  tanks  suffered  great  losses.  Rommel  launched  attack  on  British   forces  but  also  suffered  heavy  casualties.     -­‐ 7  Dec  (after  40  day  battle  of  Operation  Crusader):  Rommel  withdrew  forces.   Tobruk  saved  w/  high  losses  for  both  sides   -­‐ Dec:  allied  forces  able  to  evacuate  troops  from  Tobruk  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  

-­‐

 

-­‐



  

Jan  1942:  Rommel  began  2nd  desert  offensive  moving  from  El  Aghelia  to   Agedabia    succeeded  in  driving  British  back.  29  Jan:  Benghazi  fell   -­‐ Next  4  months,  each  side  held  ground  building  up  supplies  and  fortifying   positions   -­‐ June:  Tobruk  fell  to  Germans   July  1942:  Rommel  pushed  his  Afrika  Korps  deeper  Egypt;  threatened  Cairo    1st   Battle  of  El  Alamein.  For  almost  a  month,  both  sides  battled  with  neither  winner.   Atrocious  conditions.  Fought  in  trenches  and  attempted  to  locate  strategic  positions   hidden  periodically  due  to  severe  sandstroms     By  August  1942:  stalemate  ensued  in  desert  war.  Rommel’s  Afrika  Korps  and   Britain’s  8th  Army  taken  battering  but  no  clear  winner  emerged     Churchill  aimed  for  victory  hence  reorganised  senior  staff    General  Montgomery   new  commander  of  8th  army   This  force  would  confront  Rommel’s  entire  Afrika  Korp  in  Battle  of  El  Alamein    

  Background  to  the  Battle  of  El  Alamein    Rommel  fortified  his  position  west  of  El  Alamein  with  masses  of  anti-­‐personnel  and   anti-­‐tank  mines.  German  troops  referred  to  area  as  ‘devil’s  garden’.  Rommel  known   for  desire  to  take  offensive      However,  his  position  in  North  Africa  deteriorating  and  Rommel  knew  longer   delayed  attacking  British  position,  less  chance  of  success:   -­‐ Late  August:  British  &  Axis  tank  strength  approx  equal  but  in  following   weeks  British  balance  favoured   -­‐ Rommel’s  long  lines  of  communication  made  them  vulnerable  to  British  air   attacks   -­‐ Rommel’s  attempts  to  outflank  British  position  at  El  Alamein  late  August   1942  failed  as  his  forces  faced  dense  minefields,  strong  resistance  and   repeated  air  attacks   -­‐ Reinforced  by  men  and  material,  Montgomery’s  position  growing  steadily   stronger.  By  Oct,  Rommel  outnumbered  2  to  1  and  many  of  his  troops  Italian   infantry.  More  than  half  armour,  worn  out  vehicles     -­‐ Tank  battles  relied  on  plentiful  supplies  of  fuel;  Rommel’s  Afrika  Korps   critically  short  of  fuel.  Rommel  hoped  for  short  battle.       The  Battle  of  El  Alamein    By  Oct  1942  Afrika  Korps  had  secure  front  line  west  of  El  Alamein.  Resembled   ground  level  fortress  and  protected  by  entrenched  positions,  barbed  wire  and  more   than  500  000  anti-­‐personnel  and  anti-­‐tank  mines    However,  Afrika  Korps  faced  long  term  problem  of  fuel.  Tanks  and  vehicles  required   vast  amount  of  petroleum  products  on  regular  basis  to  ensure  mobility.  Major   supply  located  in  Tunisia  1500km  away    hoped  attack  against  Montgomery’s  8th   army  would  be  short.   -­‐ If  besieged,  Germans  would  become  vulnerable    Despite  this,  Rommel’s  infantry  and  tanks  had  high  level  mobility.  Only  they  knew   secrets  out  of  maze  to  attack  8th  army’s  front  lines    Montgomery’s  front  line  strong  and  attempted  to  mislead  enemy.  Throughout  Oct,   carried  various  ruses  to  confuse  Rommel’s  aerial  reconnaissance  units   -­‐ Establishing  forward  positions  which  would  then  be  abandoned   -­‐ Dummy  pipelines   -­‐ Jeeps  masked  with  camouflage  so  resembling  tanks    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   53    

    

  

Montgomery’s  battle  plan  reminiscent  of  Great  War.  Intended  to  launch  frontal   attack  against  Rommel’s  central,  by  direct  confrontation  at  most  strongly  defended   position.     Massive  artillery  bombardment  was  to  be  followed  by  infantry  advance  while  tank   forces  would  defend  flanks   Rommel  expected  Montgomery  to  attack  his  flanks  and  when  this  occurred  Rommel   planned  for  his  panzer  units  to  launch  large  sweeping  movements  and  eventually   encircle  them.  This  occurred  to  Afrika  Korps   For  Montgomery’s  plan  to  succeed,  minesweeping  vehicles  and  sapper  units  must   create  new  ‘roads’  through  Rommel’s  minefield  maze    tanks  and  infantry  could   move  forward   8th  army  had  advantage  of  200  000  men  and  1000  tanks  outnumbering  Afrika  Korps   at  least  2  to  1   23  Oct  1942:  Battle  opened  w/  planned  artillery  bombardment  along  10km  front.   Masses  of  incendiary  &  explosive  shells  rained.  Rommel  in  Germany  when  attack   began,  receiving  medical  treatment.  Returned  25  Oct  to  find  commander  died  of   heart  attack   Battle  raged  10  days.  Tank  battles,  mass  infantry  advances  and  hand  to  hand   fighting.  Human  losses  extensive   By  2  Nov.  Rommel’s  tank  strength  dangerously  low    request  for  more  men  and   fuel.  Hoped  German  forces  could  be  brought  from  Russia  to  assist  his  Afrika  Korps   but  Hitler  refused  to  divert  armies  from  Eastern  Front   4  Nov:  sought  Hitler’s  permission  to  withdraw.  Hitler  refused  as  he  faced  possible   disasters  in  North  Africa  and  Russia.  Realising  hopelessness  of  situation,  Rommel   withdrew  west  into  Libya  

  The  End  of  Conflict  in  North  Africa    8  Nov:  120  000  strong  Anglo-­‐American  force  under  Generals  Eisenhower  and   Patton  landed  in  Morocco  and  Algeria  as  part  of  Operation  Torch;  and  had  to  cope   w/  Hitler’s  fury  over  disobedience    Faced  possibility  of  being  trapped  between  allied  forces  moving  east  and  west   across  North  Africa    retreated  towards  Tunisia.      Poor  planning,  slow  movement  and  torrential  rain  slowed  movement  of  allied   troops  from  the  west  while  Axis  reinforcements  arriving  daily.    By  Jan  1943  stalemate  developed  in  Tunisia    Pate  Jan:  again  disobeying  orders,  Rommel  abandoned  Tripoli  and  retreated  to   Mareth  in  southern  Tunisia    Feb:  Rommel’s  forces  attacked  US  forces  at  Battle  of  Kasserine  Pass,  western   Tunisia.  Lost  2000  men;  US  10000      March:  Montgomery  defeated  German  attack  at  Medenine  in  south  of  Tunisia.   Rommel  finally  left  North  Africa    Late  March:  Montgomery  succeeded  in  driving  Axis  forces  north  from  Mareth  Line    Early  May:  remaining  Axis  forces  in  Tunisia  vastly  outnumbered,  short  of  fuel,  food   and  other  supplies.      13  May:  Axis  forces  surrendered.  Few  hundred  escaped  but  130  000  taken  prisoner.      Allies  now  in  control  all  North  Africa     The  Significance  of  the  Campaign  in  North  Africa    Campaign  diverts  German  resources  and  attention    turning  point  but  in   comparison  to  Russian  campaign,  only  minute.    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  2.  Course  of  the  European  War  



 

           

    

The  British  were  isolated  and  alone  against  Nazi  Germany  and  faced  constant   bombing  during  the  Blitz;  hence  war  in  North  Africa  of  great  significance  for  Britain   Strategically,  region  important.  Britain  relatively  weak  in  Mediterranean.  Once   Russia  entered  war,  Axis  success  in  North  Africa  would  enable  forces  to  link  with   German  forces  in  Southern  Russia  through  Middle  East   If  Britain  could  retain  and  perhaps  increase  control  of  North  African  coast,  would   open  way  for  possible  counter  attacks  on  Italy  and  German  occupied  territory   anywhere  in  Mediterranean.   Failure  to  hold  North  Africa  would  allow  Middle  East  oil  supplies  to  fall  into  hands   of  Axis  powers.  Germany’s  shortage  of  resources  crucial  factor  in  eventual  defeat   Britain  controlled  Egypt  thus  Suez  Canel  which  provided  quick  route  to  India,  Far   East,  Empire  &  Persian  Gulf.  Canal  itself  vital  British  Imperial  trade  link  with  India,   South  East  Asia,  Australia  and  New  Zealand   Allied  control  of  North  Africa  made  direct  allied  attack  on  Italy  possible  via  Sicily   from  safe  base  in  Egypt  (Operation  Husky).  This  offensive  prefaced  liberation  of   Italy  and  eventual  collapse  of  Mussolini’s  govt   Mid  1944  Hitler  faced  fighting  3  fronts:  North  Africa,  Greece  &  Russia    strain  on   Germany’s  resources   Though  important  in  weakening  Axis  cause,  was  on  Eastern  Front  in  Russian   campaign  where  war  turned  decisively  in  allies’  favour  due  to  scale  of  German   losses  and  magnitude  of  Russian  war  effort.     Augured  well  for  future  Anglo-­‐American  cooperation   Boost  to  British  morale.  Britain  not  experiencing  much  success.  US  not  yet  factor  in   war;  Russia  appeared  to  be  in  trouble  and  Singapore  lost   -­‐ Knowles  emphasises  success  of  Battle  of  El  Alamein  on  British  morale   Significance  still  debated.  Many  military  historians  argue  was  theatre  of  war  that   gain  undue  attention  &  fame   Barnett  argues  British  overcommitted  themselves  in  North  Afrika  hence  badly   weakening  their  forces  in  South  East  Asia.  Also  argues  played  less  important  part  in   Germany’s  ultimate  defeat  than  Russian  campaign   -­‐ Evidence:  2nd  Battle  of  El  Alamein  wihcih  was  largest  of  all  dessert  battles,   Montgomery  engaged  only  4.5  German  divisions  whilst  at  same  time  Soviet   confronted  190  divisions   Thomson  argues  campaign  in  North  Africa  did  little  to  ease  pressure  on  Eastern   Front  but  great  impact  on  wider  European  war.  Strategic  terms,  gigantic  flanking   movement.    

3.  Civilians  at  War     SOCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  THE  WAR  ON  CIVILIANS  IN  BRITAIN   Reaction  to  the  Outbreak  of  War    1939:  British  went  to  war  with  sense  of  weary  resignation  in  comparison  to  sense  of   patriotism  &  adventure  in  1919.  Simply  desire  to  get  job  done.  No  lengthy   recruitment  campaigns  as  conscription  introduced  in  April  1939    British  govt  reacted  to  start  of  war  by  initiating  legislation  that  had  profound   impact.  By  1940  Acts  in  place:    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   55     







Sense  of  relief  as  war  came  and  illusions  of  appeasement  over.  Relief  tempered   strongly  by  sense  of  fear.  Everyone  believed  Nazi  Germany  going  to  be  formidable   enemy   Since  Munich  Crisis  of  September  1938,  country  preparing  for  war.  Air  raid  shelters   built  across  country   -­‐ In  London  underground  city  stations  used  as  public  air  raid  shelters  with   almost  200  000  people   Horror  of  WW1  was  use  of  gas    widely  believed  gas  would  be  used    since  1938   civilians  issued  with  gas  masks  &  no-­‐one  allowed  to  leave  home  w/out  one;   although  gas  never  used  as  weapon  against  civilians   Within  days  of  start  of  war  over  1.5  million  children  evacuated  from  Britain’s  cities   to  countryside  to  spare  horror  of  expected  bombing  onslaught.  Once  ‘phoney  war’   set  in,  many  returned  home.    

The  Blitz    British  cities  never  experienced  mass  level  of  bombing  German  cities  (e,g.  Dresden   and  Hamburg)  experienced    However,  German  bombing  still  had  major  effect  on  industrial  and  civilian  areas    Early  Sept  1940  –  May  1941:  London  experienced  the  Blitz.  German  bombing   initially  carried  out  during  day  but  form  early  Oct  switched  to  night    Later  in  war,  British  cities  endured  smaller  scale  attacks  and  from  1944  the  V1  and   V2.  German  ‘V’  rockets  not  very  effective  but  caused  enormous  fear  amongst  civilian   population    14  Nov  1940:  massive  raid  launched  against  Coventry.  Cities  and  towns  considered   of  economic  value  attacked    1941:  ports  main  targets  as  bombing  tried  to  assist  German  U-­‐boat  campaign  in   Battle  of  the  Atlantic    German  air  attacks  has  several  aims   -­‐ Initially  soften  country  for  possible  German  invasion   -­‐ Destroy  Britain’s  ability  to  produce  needs  of  war   -­‐ Key  aim:  break  morale  of  British  civilian  population    German  bombing  failed   -­‐ Luftwaffe’s  failure  in  Battle  of  Britain  ended  real  prospects  of  German   invasion   -­‐ Though  bonbing  did  do  great  damage,  particularly  to  working  class  housing,   often  located  near  their  places  of  work,  British  economic  production  never   seriously  threatened.     -­‐ Rather  than  low  morale,  probably  increased  it    faced  enemy  with  great   resilience  and  determination  in  ‘spirit  of  Dunkirk’    Nov  1938  Chamberlain  appointed  Sir  John  Anderson  head  of  Air  Raid  Precautions   Bureau  (ARPB).  One  of  1st  duties  to  create  Air  Raid  Warden’s  Service.      Simple  backyard  refuges,  known  as  ‘Anderson’s  shelters’  became  reality.  Roof  of   shelter  composed  6  sheets  of  galvanised  metal  bolted  together  at  top.  Shelters  only   2m  x  1.5m  but  offered  some  protection  from  falling  debris.  Half  buried  in  ground   with  earth  heaped  on  top  of  metal  roof.  Entrance  protected  by  steel  shield  and   earthen  blast  wall.      Sandbags  (400  million  by  1941)  piled  around  shopping  centres  and  public   buildings.    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  3.  Civilians  at  War  

 

  

 

 

  

Huge  ‘barrage’  balloons  tied  with  cables  to  wagon  or  truck  conspicuous  above   London’s  skyline.  Prevented  Luftwaffe  from  dive  bombing  and  helped  pinpointing   target  more  difficult.     After  battle  at  Dunkirk  British  finally  began  to  take  warnings  seriously     Many  precautions  in  place  to  deal  with  expected  air  attacks.  To  make  difficult  for   German  bombers,  ‘blackout’  enforced  across  country.  As  soon  as  air  raid  siren   sounded,  street  lights  turned  off,  car  headlights  dimmed  and  windows  covered  with   thick  curtains  to  conceal  internal  lighting   -­‐ Heavy  fines  for  disobeying  blackout  regulations  which  rigorously  enforced   by  air  raid  wardens   Fearing  invasion,  beaches  covered  in  barbed  wire,  pillboxes  set  up  in  southern   England  and  signposts  removed   On  streets  air  raid  wardens  blew  whistles  that  signalled  appeal  for  public  to  seek   safety.  Often  assisted  by  Britain’s  Local  Defence  Volunteers  (LDVs)  also  known  as   ‘Home  Guard’   -­‐ May  1940:  created  comprised  of  assorted  collection  of  boys  and  old  men   often  armed  only  with  sticks  and  pikes.  Armed  with  attitude  rather  than  guns     -­‐ Home  Guard  resistance  icon  of  Britain’s  home  front.   -­‐ Under  General  Ironside,  Home  Guard  had  1.5+  million  members  by  1942   -­‐ By  end  of  war,  evolved  into  decently  trained  and  armed  organisation.   Members  prepared  and  willing  to  take  on  any  German  parachute  landing   Before  blitz  began  ten  of  thousands  children  evacuated  to  countryside  and  billeted   by  ‘parent  helpers’  who  received  small  fee  from  government   Largest  public  defence  shelters  located  underground  in  London’s  railway  stations   and  slept  here  on  daily  basis.   Above  ground  traffic  accidents  increased  to  intolerable  levels.  In  dark  people   accidentally  run  over  by  cars  or  down  stairs  and  into  canals.      

Government  Controls    National  Service  (Armed  Forces  Act):  all  men  18-­‐40  liable  to  be  conscripted   -­‐ 1941:  lifted  to  51   -­‐ Exemptions:  reserved  occupations,  conscientious  objectors  and  those  in  very   poor  health    Security  measures:    Emergency  Powers  Act  gave  govt  power  to  direct  workers  including  women    National  Registration  Act  introduced  forcing  people  to  carry  identity  papers    Treacheries  Act  used  to  imprison,  watch  or  ban  people  of  organisations  considered   threat  to  security  e.g.  British  Fascist  Party  of  Oswald  Mosley    Many  people  of  German  or  Italian  descent  interned  or  sent  overseas    National  Service  (Armed  Forces)  Act:  required  all  men  18  –  40  be  available  for   nationwide  conscription.  In  1941  conscription  age  lifted  to  51.    National  Registration  Act:  required  all  citizens  to  carry  identity  cards    Treacheries  Act:  defined  all  forms  of  sedition  or  treason.  British  Union  of  Fascists   banned  in  1940  with  founder  Mosley  imprisoned    Emergency  Powers  Act:  gave  govt  right  to  conscript  workers  into  essential  war   industries  (e.g.  steel  and  textiles).  Women  20-­‐30  became  official  part  of  war  effort    Essential  Works  Order:  introduced  by  Minister  of  Labour  Bevin.  Specific   industries  (e.g.  railways,  aircraft  production  and  munitions)  and  workers  under   govt  control.  Provided  job  security  and  eliminated  industrial  strikes    moving   towards  total  war      

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   57   Propaganda,  Censorship  and  the  Media    Under  John  Reith,  Ministry  of  Information  (MOI)  established  controlling  amount   and  nature  of  information  British  allowed  to  receive  in  all  aspects  of  public   communication,  media,  entertainment  and  culture.      Its  Censorship  Board  vigilant  and  undertook  actions  such  as     -­‐ censoring  soldiers’  letters  home  to  pushing  anti-­‐German  message  and   encouraging  people  to  be  careful  what  they  say  in  case  of  German  spies   -­‐ graphic  photos  of  war  zones,  injured  children  or  dead  soldiers  banned  form   media    Censorship  never  developed  in  Britain  to  extent  in  Germany;  Churchill  believed   better  to  tell  people  the  truth      1  Sept  1939:  BBC  television  service  closed  down.    Radio  and  wireless  became  key  disseminators  of  govt  information  and  propaganda.   Initially  radio  broadcasts  comprised  sombre  music  and  severe  news  bulletins.   However  became  clear  people  needed  entertainment    Early  1940s:  humour,  music  and  shows  maintained  morale  similar  to  Germany   -­‐ Armed  Forces  Radio  Network  established  providing  popular  major  artists   such  as  George  Formby    Cinema  popular  escape  from  tribulations  of  daily  life  w/  Walt  Disney  classics  &   ‘Gone  with  the  Wind’  v  popular    Propaganda  existed  everywhere  abd  extolled  the  virtues  and  sacrifices  of  British   soldier  and  home  front  counterparts.  Anti  German  messages  fact  of  daily  life    Another  major  output  of  MOI  was  British  Broadcasting  Commission  (BBC).  BBC   reported  news  in  factual  way  and  never  editorialised.     -­‐ Details  of  casualties  read  out  but  not  explained   -­‐ Churchill  insisted  British  citizens  should  have  access  to  truth    1940:  Armed  Forces  Radio  Network  commenced  operation.  Extremely  popular   broadcasting  for  12  hours  a  day.  Songs  and  music,  mostly  nostalgic  but  sometimes   humorous,  became  front  line  trademarks    The  Entertainment  National  Services  Association  (ENSA)  and  the  Council  for   the  Encouragement  of  Music  and  Arts  (CEMA)  also  controlled  by  MOI.  Provided   live  entertainment  throughout  workforce  through  singers,  comedians,  poets  and   musicians.   -­‐ No  one  paid  creating  sense  of  nationalism  &  community  bonding  as   amateurs  encouraged  participate.      MOI  used  public  cinema  for  propaganda  purposes.  Cinema  inexpensive  and  one  of   most  popular  forms  of  entertainment  during  war  years.  Newreels  and  films  had   themes  emphasising  patriotism,  heroism  &  sacrifice    MOI’s  film  censors  insisted  imported  movies  conform  to  at  least  one  of  four   categories:  satire,  comedy,  adventure  or  compassion    ‘Black  propaganda’  or  purposely  distorted  information  common  during  WW2.   Germany  saturated  Britain’s  airwaves  with  nightly  program  created  by  William   Joyce  member  of  British  Union  of  Fascists  who  defected  to  Berlin.  His  editorials  and   exaggerated  British  accent  caused  much  entertainment.     -­‐ Londoners  never  believed  his  messages  which  always  focused  on  Britain’s   “hopeless  situation”    In  response,  Britain’s  Political  Warfare  Executive  (PWE)  created  program  entitled   Gustav  Siegfried  hosted  by  Sefton  Delmar.  His  broadcasts  anti-­‐German  and  anti-­‐

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  3.  Civilians  at  War  

   

 

British  creating  confusion  and  distortion  but  satisfied  objectives  of  PWE’s   propagandists.    

Rationing    Blitz  feared  by  Battle  of  the  Atlantic  posed  greatest  threat  to  Britain’s  survival   during  war.  This  battle  prevented  Britain  from  obtaining  many  commodities  such  as   sugar,  tea,  fruit,  oil  and  rubber  from  trading  partners  in  America  and  Europe.      Overy  “the  Axis  knew  how  much  the  oceans  mattered  which  is  why  they  made  such   strenuous  efforts  to  sever  the  arteries.  By  1942  German  submarines  were  sinking   British  ships  faster  than  could  be  replaced”    British  imported  much  of  its  food  thus  from  start  of  war  govt  paid  great  attention  to   food  rationing.      Petrol  rationing  started  in  1939    Jan  1940:  food  rationing  began  for  butter,  bacon  and  sugar   -­‐ Meat,  tea,  margarine,  fats  and  jam  eventually  added  over  next  year   -­‐ Dec  1941:  points  system  introduced  giving  each  person  16  points  to  ‘spend’   at  any  shop  on  items    Citizens  issued  with  ration  booklet  which  contained  coupons  for  different  products.   Money  and  relevant  coupon  necessary  to  purchase  commodities.    Main  issue  for  all  shoppers  was  amount  of  products  for  sale.  Ration  coupons  placed   severe  limitations  on  distribution  of  all  items  and  prices  fixed.      Ministry  of  Food  exhorted  people  to  try  substitute  foods  such  as  carrot  tart  and   American  Span    Eggs  rare  as  many  chickens  had  been  killed.  Average  1  egg  per  fortnight.  From  July   1942,  dried  eggs  appeared    Full  cream  ‘National  Dried  Milk’  available  for  small  children.      People  treated  far  better  during  war  than  depression    health  standards  during   war  actually  rose    Minister  of  Food,  Lord  Woolton,  initiated  several  food  schemes  to  deal  with  food   crisis   -­‐ People  exhorted  to  grow  vegetables  in  ‘victory  gardens’    simple  vegetable   patch   -­‐ His  BBC  program  ‘Kitchen  Front’  promoted  ideas  for  producing  nutritious   food  w/  limited  resources    Exotic  products  like  chocolate  highly  valued.  Tobacco  and  alcohol  not  rationed  but   trading  hours  limited    Clothes  also  rationed.  Encouraged  to  make  own  clothes,  recycle  old  garments,  make   clothes  from  blankets  and  used  curtains.  Nylon  stockings  almost  impossible  to  get     women  resorted  to  drawing  line  up  back  of  leg    June  1941:  ration  coupons  for  certain  items  of  clothing  esp  woollen  garments  and   leather  boots  and  shows    Concentrated  beetroot  used  as  lipstick  and  bicarbonate  of  soda  became  substitute   for  deodorant.      Thriving  black  market  for  goods  in  short  supply  and  many  people  survived   bartering  goods.  Most  British  faced  life  stoically.  Govt  successful  in  ensuring  degree   of  equality  during  war  years    feeling  of  nationalism   -­‐ Lives  of  Britain’s  poorest  classes  improved  significantly  as  now  access  to   many  foods  at  fixed  prices    

Health  of  the  Nation    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   59       

4.6+  million  children  born  during  war  years.  Despite  threat  of  German  bombing    and   wartime  privations,  most  healthy  generation  yet   1939  –  1945:  infant  mortality  fell  by  10%;  maternal  mortality  fell  by  40%.     Govt  introduced  series  measures  to  improve  health  of  nation   -­‐ Diphtheria  immunisation  introduced.  Deaths  from  this  disease  fell  by  75%   (1938  –  1945)   -­‐ By  Sept  1941:  all  school  children  received  free  milk.  Scheme  lasted  until   early  1970s   -­‐ By  1945:  half  all  school  receiving  school  meals   -­‐ Emergency  Hospital  Service  widened  availability  of  medical  services  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  3.  Civilians  at  War  

 

Women  During  the  War    Millions  of  men  in  armed  services,  women  needed  to  fill  gaps  left  by  men.  Industrial   jobs  &  armed  services   -­‐ By  1944  90+%  of  women  directly/indirectly  involved  in  war  effort.  Many   paid  but  majority  volunteers.      Served  in  civil  defence  jobs  such  as  Air  Raid  wardens  and  the  ATS  (Auxiliary   Territorial  Service)    Served  in  WWS  (Women’s  Voluntary  Service).  Set  up  workers’  canteens,  civil   defence  &  organised  evacuations    Many  joined  armed  service:  WAAF  (Women’s  Auxiliary  Air  Force);  WRNS   (Women’s  Royal  Naval  Service);  and  service  jobs  including  communications,   repair  work  and  clerical  jobs    First  Aid  Nursing  Yeomanry  (FANY):  driving  ambulances  and  providing  minor   medical  and  nursing  services    Auxiliary  Territorial  Service  (ATS):  operating  searchlights  and  acting  as  sentries,   mechanic  and  messengers.      Special  Operations  Executive  (SOE):  decoders,  translators,  spies,  assassins,   double  agents  and  forgers    2+  million  worked  in  industry:  Munitions  Industry  &  transport  serving  as  drivers,   conductors  &  canal  operators    Nursing  at  home  and  overseas    80  000  women  served  in  Women’s  Land  Army  in  basic  farming  work  freeing  up   agricultural  workers  to  fight   -­‐ Duties  involved  basic  farming,  planting  and  harvesting  and  repairing  tractors    Rat  Catchers  Corp:  worked  in  bomb  damaged  areas  and  urban  slums  looking  for   specimens  destined  for  medical  research.             Social  Trends   Statistics  can  be  misleading  but  Home  Office  figures  from  time  reveal  trends    Dramatic  fall  in  crime  possibly  due  to  increased  surveillance  of  populace  and   millions  absent  in  armed  forces    Drunkenness  reduced.  Might  be  caused  by  govt’s  restrictions  on  pub  opening  hours      War  years  led  to  concern  about  moral  standards   -­‐ Increase  in  promiscuity  and  premarital  sex    uncertainty  of  war   -­‐ Divorce  petitions  increased  with  most  on  grounds  of  adultery   -­‐ In  last  year  of  war,  70  000+  illegitimate  children  born    Millions  of  American  troops  based  in  Britain  during  war.  Attitude  of  British  towards   Americans   -­‐ Gratitude  as  believed  presence  of  American  troops  would  lead  to  inevitable   defeat  of  Germany  

  -­‐

 

-­‐ -­‐

Deep  resentment  as  Americans  had  more  money,  smarter  uniform  and  were   ‘taking  our  women’                                             ‘overpaid,  oversexed  and  over  here’   By  end  of  war,  over  15  000  British  women  married  American  servicemen  

Long  Term  Social  and  Economic  Effects    10  May  1940:  Churchill  took  over  from  Chamberlain  as  PM.  Became  clear   Chamberlain  lost  confidence  of  parliament  and  country.  Churchill’s  cabinet  and   ministry  contained  Labour  and  Conservative  ministers.  During  war,  Churchill  often   received  more  support  from  Labour  members  than  from  own  Conservative      Churchill  PM  and  Minister  of  Defence.  Wanted  to  keep  control  of  military  policy  and   believed  that  as  former  military  figure  could  deal  with  service  leaders  between  than   anyone.    Halifax  Foreign  Minister  until  Nov  1940  when  succeeded  by  Antony  Eden  whose   poor  health  and  fervent  admiration  of  Churchill  allowed  the  PM  to  dominate  foreign   policy  with  two  main  results   -­‐ Churchill  remained  almost  completely  preoccupied  with  military  and   diplomatic  aspects  of  war   -­‐ Domestic  affairs:  social  and  economic  policy,  industrial  relations  and  post   war  planning  became  domain  of  Labour  ministers    Impact  of  conflict  created  altering  cultural,  social  and  economic  changes.  Those  who   survived  Luftwaffe’s  blitzkrief  emerged  with  stronger  belief  in  ability  to  ensure   personal  hardship.  Could  empathise  more  closely  with  battelfied  emotions  and   experiences  of  British  soldiers    Attlee,  Morrison  and  Bevin  dominated  domestic  affairs  with  two  main  results   -­‐ Labour  seen  as  party  for  post  war  reconstruction  &  reform  championing   policies  for  planning  future   -­‐ When  General  Election  held  in  1945,  Churchill  thrown  out  despite  gratitude   nation  felt  for  him.  His  party  was  the  party  of  depression  and  appeasers    Britain’s  wartime  govt  put  in  place  series  of  ‘blue  prints’  for  future  direction  of   Britain’s  society  and  economy   -­‐ Beveridge  Report  published  in  1942  proposed  sweeping  measures  to   improve  well  being  of  British  people  to  ensure  no  repetition  of  suffering  of   1930s.  Offered  blueprint  for  Britain’s  future  Welfare  State.  Beveridge   followed  up  his  1st  report  with  ‘Full  Employment  in  a  Free  Society’  (1944)     sought  to  ensure  mass  unemployment  of  1930s  wouldn’t  be  repeated  in  post   war  era   -­‐ 1936:  John  Keynes  published  ‘General  Theory  of  Employment,  Money  and   Interest’    thesis  was  that  govts  could  manipulate  national  economy   avoiding  repeat  of  depression.  Keynesian  economics  would  dominate   thinking  of  western  govts  for  next  30  years   -­‐ 1944:  Richard  Butler’s  Education  Act.  School  leaving  age  raised  to  15,  free   milk,  school  meals  and  medical  services  part  of  work  of  Local  Education   Authorities.  ’11  plus’  exam  would  offer  chance  for  working  class  children  to   enter  grammar  schools.      Setbacks,  suspicions,  embarrassments  and  opinions:   -­‐ Non  compliance  with  conscription”  soldiers  on  active  duty  disappeared  from   units.  Males  eligible  for  National  Service  failed  to  comply  with  call  up  notices   -­‐ 1941:  100  000  ration  booklets  stolen  from  Ministry  of  Food’s  head  office  and   never  found    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   61    

1940  –  1945:  60  000+  conscientious  objectors  who  refused  to  serve  in   armed  forces  charged  under  Treachery  Act  (1940).  Many  imprisoned.   Cole  and  Postgate  examine  war  years  from  working  class  perspective  and   assessment  of  impact  of  war  is  positive.  Argue  Britain  approached  tasks  of  war  in   united  manner  whereby  public  interest  overrode  private  interest.  Social  class   transcended  through  implementations  such  as  Home  Guard   -­‐ “  ..  the  British  common  people  cannot  be  separated  from  that  of  all  the   nation”   Marwick  argues  war  brought  social  and  economic  revolution.  Argues  existing   institutions  challenged  by  needs  of  war  and  when  shown  to  be  inadequate,  changed   (e.g.  hospital).     -­‐ “  ..  the  struggle  for  civilian  survival  at  home  initiated  lasting  social  changes  ...   Great  Britain  emerged  from  this  war  a  very  different  type  of  society  with  a   new  emphasis  on  social  equality”   -­‐





 

     

Despite  such  inconveniences  life  continued  for  average  citizen.  Everyone  knew  now  directly  part   of  war  effort.  This  holistic  attitude  and  sense  of  community  important  psychological  assets;  and   strengthened  Britain’s  home  from  resistance  mentality.  

The  Early  Years  of  the  War     Rather  than  eagerness  and  romantic  perceptions  adventure  and  patriotism  that   accompanied  outbreak  of  WW1,  that  of  WW2  generally  more  foreboding.      After  much  foreign  policy  success  in  1930s  and  after  Munich  Conference  Germans   didn’t  expect  to  have  to  fight    Early  Blitzkrieg  successes  welcomed  in  Germany  and  Hitler  popularity  at  peak  in   July  1940.  However  this  emotion  for  Hitler  represented  relief  on  part  of  people  not   desire  for  further  conquest.      Right  wing  propaganda  in  Germany  post  WW1  argue  Germany  lost  war  as  German   army  “stabbed  in  back”  at  home.  Hitler  believed  German  failure  in  WW1  because  of   collapse  at  home  front    close  attention  to  morale    Determined  to  maintain  morale  and  normality  of  German  life.  Apart  from  few  basic   rationing  measures,  was  “business  as  usual”  inside  Germany   -­‐ No  switch  to  total  war  production  as  occurred  in  Soviet  and  Britain   -­‐ Women  no  rush  into  factories  as  Nazi  ideology  believed  separate  spheres  for   men  and  women;  women  belonged  at  home    ideology  overriding   practicality     o Overy  challenges  this  arguing  women  always  made  up  key  part  of   German  labour  force.  1939  comprised  37%  and  in  1945  51%.  Should   acknowledge  that  many  foreign  female  labourers  working  in  Germany   contributing  to  this  figure.  “women  in  Germany  played  a  major  part  in   keeping  the  war  effort  going”   -­‐ Goering  stated  in  June  1940  wouldn’t  authorise  use  of  female  labour  as  could   cause  too  much  unrest.    Sept  1939  decrees  introduced  removing  paid  holidays  and  1.25  pay  for  overtime   and  Sundays.  Oct:  wage  freeze  imposed.  Measures  received  much  opposition  that   removed  in  Dec    Euthanasia  Policy  quickly  dropped  following  strong  opposition  from  Catholic   Church.  Resumed  in  1942  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  3.  Civilians  at  War  

SOCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  THE  WAR  ON  CIVILIANS  IN  GERMANY  

  







 

Not  until  late  in  war  that  Germans  began  to  suffer  on  home  front.  Approx  35%   Germany’s  food  needs  came  from  occupied  areas  and  domestic  agriculture  able  to   benefit  from  good  weather  and  use  foreign  labourers   Despite  Hitler’s  concerns  morale  not  concern  for  Nazis  during  early  war.  Swift   defeat  of  Poland  with  relatively  light  casualties  convinced  most  people  of  Hitler’s   genius  and  strength  armed  forces.     During  phoney  war,  life  unaffected  by  war.  Rapid  successes  in  west  from  April  –   June  1940  further  calmed  any  concerns  people  might’ve  had.  Further  emphasised   by  Goebbels’  wartime  propaganda   -­‐ Newsreel  films  showing  Wehrmacht  marching  through  Warsaw  of  Paris   -­‐ War  heroes  paraded  through  streets   -­‐ As  in  Britain  Goebbels  realised  value  of  providing  comedy  &  light   entertainment  on  radio  and  cinema   However  Germany’s  early  easy  Blitzkrieg  successes  not  good  for  Home  Front  or   longer  term  war  effort.  Convinced  Nazis  no  need  for  severity  at  home.  Germany   could  survive  off  resources  of  nations  conquered    carelessness  on  Home  Front   continued  when  sense  dictated  total  war  should  been  introduced  immediately  

Evacuation    As  in  Britain,  parents  urged  to  evacuate  children  from  major  cities.  Most  went  to   specially  established  camps  run  by  Hitler  Youth  set  up  throughout  Reich  and   occupied  territories  such  as  Poland  and  Hungary   -­‐ Children  undertook  programs  of  Nazi  indoctrination    Class  differences  emerged  as  middle  class  families  able  to  move  away  from  towns   together  whilst  workers’  children  sent  away  from  parents.  Natural  desire  to  keep   families  together    usually  children  kept  as  home    Families  that  evacuated  together  often  met  hostility  in  countryside,  being  blamed   for  food  shortages,  inflation  and  rising  crime  rate    Refugees  fled  to  Black  Forest,  Bavaria  and  rural  parts  of  Eastern  Germany      

Total  War    Coordination  of  all  human  and  material  resources  by  centralised  state  authority    By  end  1942  war  clearly  not  going  in  Germany’s  favour.  Britain  still  resisted,  Afrika   Korps  defeated  at  El  Alamein,  US  now  in  war  and  defeat  looming  at  Stalingrad.   Military  setbacks    Germany  reverted  to  total  war    18  Feb  1943  Goebbels  announced  at  famous  speech  at  Berlin  Sportpalast  “total  war   means  a  shorter  war”.  Policies  in  all  areas  (economic,  levels  of  repression,   propaganda)  more  extreme    During  this  period  propaganda  became  more  strident  and  harsh   -­‐ Imagery  used  more  extreme  and  contained  crude  Jewish/Slav/Bolshevik   caricatures   -­‐ Link  between  Jews  and  Communists  emphasised   -­‐ Atrocity  stories  spread  through  German  media  about  Russian  actions  in  east   -­‐ April  1943:  Goebbels  emphasised  Soviet  forces  massacred  thousands  Polish   officers  at  Katyn  Wood    Jan  1943:  Casablanca  Conference  between  Churchill  and  US  President  Roosevelt   called  for  “unconditional  surrender”  of  Germany  before  peace  talks  could  occur.   Goebbels  argued  this  showed  allies  intended  treating  Germany  far  worse  than  in   1919    no  choice  but  to  fight  to  bitter  end.    

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   63     







Death  of  Frtiz  Todt  in  Feb  led  to  appointment  of  Speer  as  Armaments  Minister   whose  influence  on  German  war  effort  enormous.  Some  historians  suggested  his   efforts  added  2  years  to  length  of  war.  Speer  attempted  to  drag  Germany  into  total   war.  Not  completely  successful  but  significant  impact     -­‐ Genius  at  organisation,  true  technocrat.  Revamped  German  production  by   introducing  principles  of  mass  production  and  improvisation    increasing   efficiency  of  production   -­‐ Rationalisation  in  several  areas  reducing  models  of  anti-­‐tank  weapons,  air   craft  models  &  truck  types   -­‐ Conditions  of  workers  in  Germany:  Speer  claimed  treid  to  improve  workers’   conditions  and  to  have  disobeyed  Hitler’s  order  to  lay  waste  Western   Germany.  Also  no  problem  using  imported  slaves  form  occupied  areas  and   “worked  to  death”   Despite  Speer’s  efforts,  wartime  Nazi  Germany  plagued  with  what  he  called   “arthritic  organisational”  system.  Red  tape  and  layers  of  bureaucracy  still  hindered   production  with  incredibly  decentralised  regime   Contrary  to  popular  belief,  Nazi  Germany  not  highly  centralised  system  in  which   nothing  happened  without  Hitler’s  word.  Many  centres  of  power  in  regime  each   trying  to  maximise  own  power:   -­‐ SS  empire  being  developed  by  Himmler  and  Heydrich.  SS  ran  concentration   camps,  had  own  schools,  factories  legal  and  judicial  systems  and  even  own   army  Waffen  SS.   -­‐ 32  Gauleiters  in  Germany.  These  were  regional  Nazi  governors.  Powerful,   had  access  to  Hitler  and  endeavoured  to  build  up  own  power  even  to  point  of   hoarding  badly  needed  supplies  army  needed   -­‐ Goering  tried  to  hang  on  to  aircraft  production  long  after  limitations  clearly   revealed   -­‐ Eichmann  job  of  organising  Final  Solution    commandeered  railway  stock   even  when  army  needed   -­‐ Bormann,  headed  Nazi  Chancellery  from  May  1941  sought  to  develop  own   power  base.  As  war  continued  became  Hitler’s  confident  and  no  access   gained  to  Fuhrer  without  Bormann’s  consent   Duffy  belies  allied  victory  due  to  Hitler’s  failure  to  have  long  term  strategy  and  his   belief  in  strength  of  own  will  

Economic  Issues    Prior  to  1943  German  economy  not  mobilised.  Rather  industrial  production  focused   on  quick  victory  proven  by  blitzkrieg  successes  in  1940    Rigid  govt  control  of  all  industrial  resources,  mass  production  and  highly  mobile   and  flexible  workforce  existed  in  US  and  Britain  but  not  Germany.  Production  levels   in  Germany  lagged  behind  economic  achievements  of  Allied  powers.    German  wages  remained  high    equal  level  of  consumerism.      Affluent  and  politically  connected  German  businessmen  profited  from  war.    Concept  of  total  war  simply  unknown  in  Germany  before  1943.    Wehrmacht’s  invasion  of  Soviet  Union  in  1941  placed  great  pressure  on  economic   and  military  resources.  2  years  later  after  defeats  in  Russia  and  North  Africa,   Germany  forced  into  total  war  effort    1943  –  1945:  Germany  attempted  to  maintain  and  enforce  European  empire  while   nation’s  economic  superstructures  pushed  to  limits    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  3.  Civilians  at  War  

 

  



As  war  intensified  industrial  morale  deteriorated.  Absenteeism,  accidents,   inefficiency  and  indifference  replaced  National  Socialist  enthusiasm  upon  which   Nazi  state  build   By  late  1944  Germany  faced  2  major  problems   -­‐ Had  to  continued  to  fight  in  Europe  or  lose  war   -­‐ Industrial  networks  now  pushed  to  maximum  capacities,  had  to  be  defended   at  all  costs.     -­‐ Successful  solutions  to  these  problems  not  found  

 

Consumer  Issues    Shortages  and  rationing  became  facts  of  life.  Ration  books  required  for  nearly  every   domestic  and  personal  necessity.  By  1945  weekly  allowances  of  food  such  as  sugar,   meat  and  dairy  fats  severely  reduced.     -­‐ Bartering  common  and  black  market  industries  thrived    Anti  Nazi  resistance  groups  smuggled  in  prohibited  items  such  as  French  and   English  newspapers,  clothing  and  books.  Sheltered  Wehrmacht  deserters  and  those   escaped  from  concentration  camps    School  children  conducted  scrap  metal  drives  to  collect  household  copper,  brass,   steel  and  iron  utensils  to  be  recycled  for  military  purposes.      Woollens  essential  for  Wehrmacht’s  winter  uniforms    civilian  garments   manufactured  from  alternative  fabrics  which  wore  out  quickly      

Role  of  Women    Labour  of  women  ran  counter  to  entrenched  Nazi  philosophy  which  saw  women  as   homemakers    Initial  needs  of  war  met  by  transferring  working  women  from  consumer  sector  to   more  essential  war  industries    To  sustain  morale,  govt  introduced  generous  allowances  for  families  of  those   drafted  into  armed  forces.  Employed  women  lost  up  to  4%  of  family  allowance     disincentive  to  remain  in  employment    Army  call  for  compulsory  labour  service  resisted  by  Nazi  leadership.  Reliance   placed  on  campaign  urging  women  to  volunteer.  Many  women  simply  rejected   notion  of  war  work    Burden  fell  on  working  class  women  who  resented  middle  and  upper  class  who   carried  on  with  lifestyle    Employers  reluctant  to  employ  women  and  preferred  workers  provided  by  Sauckel     forced  labour.    As  more  men  drafted  into  armed  forces,  need  for  female  labour  greater    13  Jan  1943  Hitler  signed  decree  requiring  women  17  –  45  register  for  war  work.   Decree  not  rigidly  enforced  and  only  limited  success.  Categories  of  exemption   allowed  and  clear  Hitler  remained  reluctant  to  conscript  married  women  with   children,  older  women  or  middle  class  women  unused  to  factory  work    Jan  1944  Hitler  told  Sauckel  to  get  extra  4  million  workers  needed  from  occupied   territories    Women  who  worked  in  factories:  manufacture  of  munitions  of  weapons    Millions  used  in  transport,  administration,  communications  and  commerce.  With   men  gone  from  land,  women  left  to  manage  farms  aided  by  young  women  from   Reich  labour  service  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   65     



By  July  1941  growing  demand  for  female  personnel  met  by  young  women  from   Reich  labour  service  when  6  months  labour  service  extended  by  further  six  months   of  war  service.     From  mid  1943  women  deployed  as  anti-­‐aircraft  auxillaries  to  replace  men  in   servicing.  1944  replaced  men  manning  searchlights  

Allied  Bombing  of  Germany    Prior  Sept  1939  Germany  put  in  place  system  of  air  raid  precaution  wardens,  fire   drills  and  blackout  precautions.  By  end  of  1940  bomb  shelters  constructed  in  major   cities.      After  war,  much  blame  about  morality  of  allied  bombing  of  Germany.  Mass  aircraft   formations  carpet  bombed  entire  towns.  These  tactics  ensured  civilian  casualties   would  be  high  as  damage  indiscriminate    Bomber  Command  Chief  Harris  defended  his  tactics  and  pointed  out  risks  air  crews   faced  on  such  missions.  Regardless  of  morality,  enormously  effective  in  weakening   German  war  effort    Allied  Bombing  Command  (ABC)  composed  almost  entirely  of  American  and  British   aircraft.  Accelerated  bombing  missions  over  Germany  from  March  1944.  Daylight   and  nocturnal  raids  conducted    ABC  accepted  unknown  numb  of  civilians  would  be  killed.  Justified  as  it  hoped  to   end  war  as  quickly  as  possible  and  extract  revenge  for  Luftwaffe’s  bombing  of   Britain  in  1940.  Few  attempts  made  to  discriminate  between  war  industries  and   civilian  sectors   -­‐ Germany’s  homefront  would  have  to  share  blame  and  pay  price  for  Hitler’s   regime    Two  theories  concerning  aerial  devastation  emerged   -­‐ Tactical  bombing:  policy  of  destroying  specific  targets  such  as  military  units   and  their  resources.  Technology  of  WW2  limited    no  guarantee  bombs   would  land  precisely  where  aimed.  Wind  and  flying  conditions  also  affected   aim   -­‐ Saturation  or  ‘carpet’  bombing:  employed  dozens  of  aircraft  and  release  of   hundreds  of  tons  of  bombs  simultaneously  over  wide  target  zone    max   results  guarantee.      Germans  had  to  face  bombing  on  scales  significantly  larger  than  Blitz.  During  Blitz   43  000  British  dead.    Late  July  1943  Bomber  Command  launched  Operation  Gomorrha  against  Hamburg.   Use  of  incendiaries  whipped  fire  storms  burning  everything.  Enormous  effect:  30   000  –  40  000  people  died;  500  000+  homeless    Similar  actions  taken  against  other  German  cities  include     -­‐ Cologne  (May  1942);     -­‐ Hamburg  (July  –  August  1943):  incendiary  bombs  reached  1000  degrees   Celsius   -­‐ Dresden  (Feb  1945):  destruction  so  complete  impossible  to  accurately   calculate  number  dead   -­‐ Soviet  attacks  on  Berlin  (April/May  1945)   -­‐ Before  end  of  war  ABC  released  nearly  3  million  tons  of  bombs  and   explosives  over  Germany.  7.5  million  German  homes  destroyed  and  approx  1   million  civilians  died  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  3.  Civilians  at  War  

 

  

 

Impact  of  allied  bombing  on  German  economy  significant.  Much  economic  activity   dispersed  from  major  cities  or  forced  underground    definite  limits  on  potential   German  output  and   -­‐ Oil  supplies  reached  critically  low  levels   -­‐ Chemical  production  drastically  reduced   -­‐ Railway  system  greatly  disrupted   July  1944  Bormann  announced  reductions  in  assistance  to  victims  of  bombing  and   by  1945  govt  couldn’t  meet  basic  needs   Amazingly  German  morale  survived  to  end  in  most  places.  Unlikely  this  result  of   affection  for  regime  or  patriotic  fervour.  Rather,  realised  no  choice  but  stick  out  to   end.  

 

Historical  Debate    Divided  over  effects  of  Allied  bombing  on  civilian  morale  and  German  war  effort    British  planners  hoped  intensive  bombing  of  cities  would  cause  morale  to  crumble   and  encourage  active  opposition  to  Nazi  regime.  Did  happen  partly  due  to  control   maintained  by  Nazis  and  spirit  of  defiance    Keegan:  German  civilian  morale  never  broken  by  bomber  attack    Kitchen:  Allied  bombing  had  shattering  effect    Burleigh:  agrees  civilian  morale  didn’t  collapse;  but  also  points  to  2/3  of  population   of  Hamburg  fleeing  city  between  raids.  Also  suggests  leadership  and  people  became   so  great  people  simply  tried  to  survive   -­‐ “if  the  direct  impact  of  bombing  on  war  production  was  as  low  as  is  often   claimed,  then  why  were  so  many  men  and  munitions  redeployed  from  the   land  war  to  defending  German  cities?”    Overy:  significant  indirect  effects  of  bombing    divert  scarce  resources  to  rebuild   factories  &  communications    reduction  in  output  of  weapons  by  approx  50%.   Flood  of  refugees  strained  rationing  system   -­‐ “urban  society  was  transformed  by  the  large  scale  evacuation  of  cities,  the   massive  destruction  of  housing  and  amenities  and  the  almost  constant  state   of  alarm.  Bombing  strained  emergency  services  and  the  German  welfare   system  almost  to  breaking  point”    Sustained  intensity  of  Allied  bombing  raids  mean  10x  more  German  civilians  killed   than  number  in  Britain    

Repression  and  Opposition    German  home  front  didn’t  suffer  opposition  or  industrial  disruption  experienced   during  WW1.  Critical  difference  was  Nazi  Germany  police  terror  state.    During  1930s  Himmler’s  SS  police  system  able  to  reach  into  every  corner.  All   Germans  knew  price  of  opposition  or  careless  comment  could  mean  visit  from   Gestapo  or  end  in  concentration  camp.  War  strengthened  power  of  security  forces    Sept  1939:  Reich  Central  Security  Office  set  up  under  Heydrich.  Job  to  coordinate  all   police  forces  in  Reich  and  increase  efficiency    Sept  1941:  ‘Night  and  Fog  Decree’  introduced.  Gave  regime  power  to  arrest  anyone   and  detain  without  trial  and  deny  knowledge  of  such  action.  People  would  just   disappear.      Nazis  never  hid  reality  of  concentration  camps  from  Germans.  Opening  of  camp   always  front  page  story.   -­‐ 1933  –  1945:  3+  million  Germans  spent  time  in  concentration  camp   -­‐ By  1945  714  000  Germans  in  concentration  camps  for  political  crimes    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   67      

 

 

Pretence  at  judicial  procedure  disappeared.  Getapo  and  SS  free  to  act  as  saw  fit.   “People’s  Court”  known  for  dispensing  swift  and  party  justice     Reports  of  SD  revealed  from  1943  many  Germans  unhappy  with  regime   -­‐ Many  disillusioned  and  saw  war  as  disaster   -­‐ Anxiety  at  anti-­‐Semitic  policies   -­‐ Goebbels  no  longer  trusted  and  people  listened  to  foreign  broadcasts   Open  opposition  to  Nazi  regime  limited  to  small  number  brave  individuals:   -­‐ Hans  and  Sophie  Scholl  who  organised  White  Rose  resistance  movement   Army  opposition  to  regime  unsuccessful  during  July  1944  bomb  plot  on  Hitler’s  life   led  by  Stauffenberg.  Failure  of  plot    conspirators  rounded  up  and  shot    stiffer   repression  

Berlin:  The  Death  of  a  City    Jan  –  April  1945:  Berlin  subjected  to  intense  Allied  bombing  while  Allied  armies   moved  closer  to  nation’s  capital    30  Jan:  Morale  plunged  as  Radio  Berlin  announced  25  000  ton  passenger  liner  sunk   by  Russian  submarine.  4000  drowned  with  only  900  survivors    Feb:  ‘General  von  Steuben’  ship  carrying  3000+  wounded  soldiers  torpedoed.    300   survived    American  and  Russian  armies  containing  nearly  2  million  troops,  tanks  and  field   guns  created  wide  perimeter  around  nation’s  capital.  Roads  blocked.  Escape   impossible    Battle  of  Berlin  (16  April  –  2  May)  devastated  city.  Its  suburbs  subjected  to  intense   rocket  attacks  for  2  days  as  Red  Army  moved  closer  to  target  of  Hitler’s  bunker.   Wehrmacht  didn’t  surrender  as  expected    German  units  outnumbered  but  fought  back  with  determination      Vengeful  Russian  army  extended  no  mercy  to  Berlin’s  population.  Looting,  rape  and   murder  occurred.  Russians  simply  killed  anyone  who  impeded  their  forward   progress.      21  April:  Russian  tanks  entered  Berlin’s  city  centres.  City  now  cut  off  from  world    2  May:  General  Weidling,  commandant  of  Berlin,  surrendered  city  to  Russians              

Nazi  Ideology    Hitler’s  war  was  racially  based  with  deep  ideological  aims.  Sought  to  gain  control  of   land  and  economic  resources,  to  unite  national  groups,  seek  revenge,  achievement   of  ‘lebensraum’  in  the  east  and  creation  of  German  empire  peopled  by  racially  pure   Aryans  served  by  slave  force  of  undesirable  groups  such  as  Jews    Based  on  Darwinist  approach  to  race  –  development  of  life  process  of  evolution  that   species  survived  based  on  ability  to  adapt  to  environment  i.e.  survival  of  fittest     ‘rise  and  fall  of  nations’    Social  Darwinism    Nations  succeeded  in  history  because  contained  superior  human  beings  with   superior  culture    existence  of  superior  and  inferior  races;  Aryans  believed  to  be   supreme  race    Hitler  believed  Aryan  racial  stock  and  Germanic  culture  would  enable  Germany  to   lead  world.  Germanic  empire  in  east  hoped  to  be  created  for  German  population   that  would  reach  250  million  by  end  of  cent    lebensraum    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  3.  Civilians  at  War  

NAZI  RACIAL  POLICES:  THE  HOLOCAUST  AND  THE  PERSECUTION  OF  MINORITIES  

   



For  Aryan  race  to  succeed  in  historical  mission,  essential  that  Aryan  blood  stock  be   kept  pure.   Nazi  policies  identified  several  ‘impurities’   -­‐ Non  Aryan  racial  types  such  as  Slavic  people  and  Gypsies   -­‐ Handicapped  and  mentally  ill   -­‐ Homosexuals     -­‐ Greatest  threat  believed  to  be  the  Jewish  race   Roberts  argues  Germany  lost  war  because  of  its  single  minded  preoccupation  with   racial  aspect  and  ideological  war  aims.  Believed  ideology  always  prevailed  to   disadvantage  of  Germany   -­‐ When  war  going  badly  “final  solution”  pursued  forcefully   -­‐ Scarece  transportation  resources  waster   -­‐ Millions  of  potential  workers  gassed   -­‐ Social  Darwinist  thinking  forbade  retreat  or  compromise.     -­‐ “the  real  reason  that  Hitler  lost  the  Second  World  War  was  exactly  the  same   reason  that  caused  him  to  unleash  it  in  the  first  place:  he  was  a  Nazi”.    

 

Historical  Debate    Essence  of  Holocaust:  perverted  science  and  inherent  racist  thinking  combined  with   Nazi  ideology  to  bring  about  systematic  destruction  of  Jews  in  Europe  and  other   threatening  minorities    

Intentionalists    Argue  it  was  Hitler’s  intention  all  along  to  exterminate  Jewish  race  and  that  Nazi   ideology  consistently  presented  Jews  as  sub-­‐human  species  to  be  eliminated    Once  gained  power  in  1933,  in  position  to  start  putting  plans  into  practice.  Early   war  victories  placed  more  Jews  under  his  control    mission  possible    Hilter  told  Reichstag  if  was  war,  would  mean  end  of  Jews  in  Europe.  Planned  from   beginning  but  not  until  1940s  that  Hitler  felt  secure  enough  politically  to  start  mass   murder  of  Jews.      Evidence   -­‐ Mein  Kampf   -­‐ Consistency  of  utterances  against  Jews   -­‐ Steadily  increasing  pressure  placed  on  Jews  in  1930s   -­‐ Speech  of  Jan  1939  threatening  end  of  Jews:  “result  will  be  annihilation  of  the   Jewish  race  in  Europe”    

Structuralists    Argue  it  wasn’t  Hitler’s  intention  form  start  to  destroy  Jews.  As  time  went  on,  esp   during  war,  Nazi  regime  became  radicalised  and  spun  out  of  control    events  of   Holocaust      Nazi  propaganda  and  anti-­‐Jewish  speeches  existed,  but  no  documentary  evidence  to   show  Hitler  planned  mass  murder  of  millions  from  start.      Argue  Final  Solution  forced  on  Germany  because  so  many  countries  refused  to  take   Jewish  refugees  and  war  situation  brought  so  many  Jews  under  German  control   creating  food  supply  and  settlement  problems.      Evidence   -­‐ Attempts  at  Jewish  emigration  in  late  1930s  whereby  Himmler  encouraged   emigration  of  Jews    true  policy  to  rid  Germany  of  Jews.    

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   69    

Documentary  evidence  plan  made  to  ship  4  million  Jews  to  Madagascar  in   1940.  Failure  to  defeat  Britain  made  impossible   -­‐ Desire  of  Nazi  leaders  to  ‘work  towards  the  Fuhrer’   Goldhagen  argued  not  only  mass  murder  of  Jews  consistent  plan  of  Hitler’s  but  able   to  do  so  due  to  long  standing  and  violent  strain  of  anti-­‐Semitism  in  German  culture   which  meant  Germans  believed  policy  of  mass  killings  justified   -­‐



 

The  Development  of  Anti-­Semitic  Policies  Pre-­War  Germany    Anti-­‐Semitism:  irrational  and  often  violent  hatred  of  Jews    Suggested  reasons  for  development  of  anti-­‐Semitism   -­‐ Jews  were  ‘Christ  Killers’  thus  persecution  by  Christians  as  they  responsible   for  crucifying  Christ   -­‐ Following  Roman  expulsion  of  Jews  from  Palestine  70AD  Jews  eventually   sought  refuge  in  range  of  lands  across  Europe,  Middle  East  and  North  Africa   o In  some  countries,  Jews  gradually  assimilated   o Others,  retained  geographical,  religious  and  cultural  separateness   which  made  them  easily  scapegoats  particularly  in  case  of  defeat  of   WW1    Hence,  Hitler  and  Nazis  didn’t  invent  anti-­‐Semitism  as  existed  across  Europe.   Believed  Jewish  conspiracy  existed  to  take  over  work    Hitler’s  electoral  support  rose  steadily  during  early  1930s  reaching  37%  by  July   1932.  However  little  indication  that  his  anti-­‐Semitism  was  reason  so  many  Germans   voted  Nazi.  More  likely  desperation  caused  by  depression  and  belief  Nazis  offered   hope  for  future    Yet  once  in  power,  Nazis  introduced  series  of  anti-­‐Semitic  measures   -­‐ Initially,  anti  Jewish  measures  caused  inconvenience  and  humiliation  e.g.   excluded  from  parks  &  buses   -­‐ Gradually  excluded  from  professions  e.g.    medicine  and  education   -­‐ 1935  Nuremberg  Laws  denied  Jews  German  citizenship  and  forbade  marital   or  sexual  relations  between  Aryans  and  Jews   -­‐ Nov  1938:  Jews  across  Germany  attacked  in  govt  organised  program  ‘Night   of  the  Broken  Glass’  whereby  thousands  rounded  up  and  sent  to   concentration  camps   Moving  Towards  the  Holocaust    Conquest  of  Poland  presented  Nazis  with  what  to  do  with  Poland’s  estimated  3   million  Jews   -­‐ Oct  1939:  Jews  from  Austria  and  Moravia  sent  to  Poland    1940:  ghettos  set  up  in  Polish  cities  e.g.  Warsaw  &  Lodz.  Purpose  to  separate  Jewish   from  non-­‐Jewish  populace    Conditions  atrocious.  Thousands  crammed  into  tiny  areas;  food  supplies  poor;  &   medical  supplies  non  existent    Hitler  encouraged  Hews  to  leave  Germany  as  easy  solution.  Numerous  attempts   made  before  1941  to  find  ‘territorial  solution’  to  this  problem.     -­‐ 1940:  after  France  surrendered  Hitler  considered  sending  thousands  of  Jews   to  Madagascar,  French  colon.  However,  later  rejected  this  option  as  Allies   had  control  of  South  Atlantic  and  Indian  Oceans    June  1941:  Germany  invaded  Russia  in  Operation  Barbarossa.  Early  German   victories  spectacular  and  vast  area  of  Russian  territory  came  under  German  control.   These  western  regions  if  Russia  inhabited  by  millions  of  Jews  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  3.  Civilians  at  War  

 

  

  



   

German  army  followed  by  SS  units  ‘Einsatzgruppen’  who  were  killing  squads  with   purpose  to  seek  out  Jews  and  kill  them.  Throughout  2nd  half  of  1941,  tens  of   thousands  Jews  systematically  murdered  by  these  squads   However,  shooting  activities  of  Einsatzgruppen  inefficient  and  time  consuming     ‘Jewish  problem’   31  July  1941  Goering  requesting  Heydrich  present  plan  which  would  bring  about   solution.    At  Nuremberg,  Goering  claimed  working  under  Hitler’s  orders.     Before  end  of  1941  Nazis  began  experimenting  with  various  gassing  techniques   -­‐ Sealed  trucks  crammed  with  prisoners  filled  with  carbon  monoxide   -­‐ At  Chelmno  and  Belzec  concentration  camps,  series  of  poisonous  gasses   tested   Jan  1942:  Wansee  Conference  where  decided  to  ‘seek  a  final  solution’  to  the  Jewish   problem    gas  all  Jews   -­‐ Blueprints  made  for  design  of  gas  chambers  and  crematoria,  lists  drawn  up   of  how  Jews  to  be  exterminated  in  each  country   -­‐ Some  of  Germany’s  top  industrial  firms  involved  in  this     Jews  to  be  deported  to  new  and  larger  camps  in  east  e.g.  Auschwitz  and  Treblinka  in   Poland    ‘resettlement’   Himmler’s  ‘Death  Head’  units  ran  camps  supported  by  Gestapo  officers  and   Wehrmacht  troops.    

The  Final  Solution    Late  1943  all  death  camps  fully  operational.  By  early  1945  as  Allied  forces  moved   closer  to  Germany  all  death  camps  ceased  operations    Throughout  1943  and  1944:  Jews  from  all  over  Europe  shipped  to  death  camps.   Jews  from  occupied  western  Europe  sometimes  paid  for  their  faired  to  east   believing  they  being  ‘resettled’.  Order  of  who  go  first  often  decided  by  Jews’  own   leaders    Normal  manner:  Jews  to  be  herded  onto  cattle  trucks,  sealed,  crowded,  stifling  in   summer  &  freezing  in  winter    Upon  arrival,  met  by  screaming  SS  guards  ordering  out  of  trucks  with  bodies  of   already  dead  to  be  removed  first.  Lined  up  receive  examination  from  SS  doctor   -­‐ If  ‘doctor’  believed  could  work  (young  and  healthy)  would  gesture  to  one   side  often  worked  to  death   -­‐ If  doctor  deemed  unable  to  work  (old,  sick,  pregnant)  sent  different  way  to   be  gassed  immediately      Forced  to  undress,  would  be  ordered  to  line  up  and  take  turns  in  delousing  shower   hundreds  at  time  and  door  sealed.  Small  children  sometimes  tossed  over  people’s   heads    Roof  each  gas  chamber  was  small  metal  grill  which  dropped  pellets  of  Zyklon  B  gas.   Grill  closed  and  gas  did  job    After  15  mins,  door  opened  and  Jewish  ‘volunteer  prisoners’  had  job  of  extracting   bodies  from  chamber.  Taken  to  crematoria  to  be  incinerated    Once  apparent  war  lost,  SS  stepped  up  process  of  killing.  Eichmann  ensured   valuable  resources  made  available  for  shipping  Jews  to  death  camps  instead  of   being  used  for  Army.  By  end  of  war,  6+  million  Jews  murdered    Camps  ran  very  efficient,  businesslike  manner  with  continual  recycling   -­‐ Gold  fillings  and  remaining  jewellery  extracted  from  bodies   -­‐ Human  hair  shaved  off  and  kept   -­‐ Possessions  kept  for  reuse    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   71    



 

Camps  in  east  had  another  function  other  than  death  and  slavery.  Perverted  medical   science  given  free  rein  as  ‘doctors’  such  as  Mengele  performed  medical  experiments   on  prisoners.  Might  be  injected  with  diseases  in  order  to  trace  progress  of  infection,   be  subjected  to  intense  cold  or  intense  air  pressure   Goldhagen  suggests  4  things  needed  for  Holocaust:  Hitler’s  decision,  German   control  over  the  Jews,  organisation  and  resources  allocated  to  operation  and  large   number  of  people  to  follow  through.  Argues  ‘no  Germans,  no  Holocaust’    German   political  culture  developed  to  point  where  masses  of  ordinary  Germans  satisfied  to   go  along  with  Holocaust.   -­‐ “  ..  the  vast  majority  of  the  German  people  (came)  to  understand,  assent  to,   and  when  possible,  do  their  part  to  further  the  extermination  of  the  Jews”  

The  Persecution  of  Minorities      Though  Jews  principal  victims  of  Nazis’  barbarism,  not  only  victims.  Many   minorities  that  didn’t  fit  in  with  Nazi  vision  of  racially  pure  and  perfect  future:   gypsies,  homosexuals,  mentally  ill,  people  who  suffered  forms  of  social  deviancy  like   alcoholics    Gypsies  viewed  as  not  racially  German    danger  of  racial  pollution.    Didn’t  fit  into   Nazi  ideal  of  ‘People’s  Community’.  By  1945  Nazis  murdered  200  000+  gypsies    March  1943:  Himmler  ordered  special  gypsy  camps  to  be  set  up  in  Auschwitz  where   some  became  subjects  of  medical  experimentation.  Closed  in  1944    Berlin  conference  in  Jan  1949  decided  to  expel  German  gypsies  to  occupied  Poland   though  mass  deportation  never  took  place  due  to  overcrowding  in  Polish  centres.   -­‐ Overy:  “no  general  plan  of  extermination”    Severe  penalties  in  Nazi  criminal  code  for  being  identified  as  homosexual.  At  camps,   forced  to  wear  pink  triangle  and  constantly  targeted.  Many  Nazis  themselves   homosexual  (SA  leader  Ernst  Rohm)    homosexual  allegations  often  used  as  means   of  discrediting  opponents.  Calculation  of  murders  difficult  as  overlaps   -­‐ Burleigh  suggests  reason  for  antagonistic  attitude  towards  homosexuality   was  biology  as  homos  couldn’t  breed    Mentally  ill  and  handicapped  targeted  from  1939  in  euthanasia  program.  Didn’t  fit   image  of  future  pure  and  perfect  Nazi  empire.  Extermination  program  for  them   referred  to  as  Operation  T4.  Taken  to  1  of  6  special  facilities  and  gassed  using  pure   carbon  monoxide.  Temporarily  stopped  after  objection  from  Catholic  Church  but   recommenced  in  1942.  Up  to  275  000  killed.  “Handicapped”  included  prostitutes   and  alcoholics                                

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  3.  Civilians  at  War  



                         

4.  End  of  the  Conflict    

D-­DAY  AND  THE  LIBERATION  OF  FRANCE  

Background  to  D-­Day    Mid  1943:  outcome  for  Allied  victory  most  probable   -­‐ Rommel  been  driven  out  of  North  Africa  following  defeat  at  El  Alamein  and   in  Tunisia   -­‐ Allies  taken  Sicily  and  beginning  slow  march  through  Italy   -­‐ Germans  lost  initiative  on  Eastern  Front  following  Soviet  success  in  Battle  of   Kursk     -­‐ Allies  gained  upper  hand  in  Battle  of  the  Atlantic   -­‐ Allied  bombing  would  have  eventual  devastating  effect  on  German  industry    However,  Allies  knew  victory  against  Germany  would  require  attack  on  German-­‐ occupied  France  to  be  followed  by  eventual  driving  out  of  Wehrmacht      Washington  Conference  of  May  1943:  decision  to  invade  France    Quebec  Conference  in  August:  plans  accepted    By  end  of  year,  US  General  Eisenhower  appointed  Supreme  Allied  Commander  of   Operation  Overload;  General  Montgomery  Commander  of  Land  Forces;  Admiral   Ramsay  Commander  of  Naval  Forces  Russians  not  satisfied  who  had  been  suffering   for  over  2  years   -­‐ Soviet  losses  ran  into  millions;  land  destroyed   -­‐ Stalin  suspected  western  powers  happy  to  see  Nazis  and  Communists   destroy  each  other  in  bloody  war  of  attrition     -­‐ Stalin  questioned  western  courage     -­‐ When  Roosevelt,  Stalin  and  Churchill  met  at  Tehran  Conference  in  Nov  1943,   western  leaders  promised  Stalin  they  would  open  another  front  in  France  by   May  1944    Though  Stalin’s  arguments  valid,  decisions  to  invade  France  matter  that  could  not   made  lightly.  German  defences  strong  and  if  allied  amphibious  landing  failed,  might   take  more  extended  periods  to  attempt  again.  Dangers  of  cross-­‐Channel  attack   revealed  during  attack  on  France  port  of  Dieppe  in  1942    Roosevelt  wanted  to  work  with  Stalin  and  keen  for  Soviet  intervention  against  Japan   in  Pacific  War.  However,  Churchill  deeply  suspicious  of  Stalin  and  sought  allied  front   in  Balkans  to  prevent  complete  Soviet  post  war  takeover  of  Eastern  Europe    Cold   War  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   73     

Also  danger  Soviet  Red  Army  might  march  into  Germany  alonr    though  decision   to  invade  France  in  1944  taken  because  of  military  position  of  German,  also  had  eye   on  post  war  situation  in  Europe  

Preparations  for  D-­Day    German  position  in  west  protected  by  Atlantic  Wall  stretching  2700km  from   Norway  to  Spain  along  French  coastline.  Comprised  series  concrete  bunkers,  tank   traps  and  artillery  with  purpose  of  preventing  amphibious  landing  craft  from   beaches.  Normandy  less  heavily  fortified.       -­‐ 1943:  Hitler  believed  Atlantic  Wall  Germany’s  best  strategic  option.  With   defeats  in  Britain,  North  Africa  and  Soviet  Hitler  forced  to  accept  Nazism   could  be  defeated.     -­‐ Hence  reliance  in  1943  on  Atlantic  Wall  admission  Wehrmacht  would  have   to  fight  from  defensive  and  static  positions     -­‐ Suitable  as  had  landing  beaches  and  offered  port  of  Cherbourg  as  easy  access   for  troops  coming  directly  from  US    German  defence  line  varied  in  depth:  few  hundred  metres  to  many  km    By  late  1943,  Germans  expecting  allied  attack  in  France  though  didn’t  know  precise   location.  Hitler  ordered  more  troops  into  France  and  sent  Rommel  to  be  Rundstedt’s   deputy,  laying  millions  of  mines    Allied  attack  clearly  coming  but  German  intelligence  still  didn’t  know  where   -­‐ Attack  on  Norway  considered  possibility.  Allied  bogus  intelligence  tried  to   deceive  Germans  into  thinking  this  might  happen  in  Operation  Bodyguard.   False  information  leaked  which  allies  knew  Germans  would  be  able  to  pick   up   -­‐ Most  likely  location  for  allied  attack  near  port  of  Calais,  35km  from  British   coast   -­‐ True  allied  choice:  Normandy    Rommel,  commanding  German  forces  in  northern  France,  wanted  to  spread   reserves  along  coast  so  could  immediately  attack  any  landing  forces.  Knew  allied  air   forces  would  make  it  very  difficult  to  redeploy  more  distant  units.    Rundstedt  wanted  strong  central  reserve  that  only  be  sent  into  attack  once  clear   where  main  Allied  landings  taking  place.      Ended  up  with  compromise:  some  reserves  near  Normandy  coast,  but  not  allowed   to  be  deployed  without  permission  from  Hitler      

Operation  Bodyguard    Operation  an  attempt  to  keep  D  Day  invasion  secret  by  creating  false  fronts  and   distributing  misleading  information  in  bid  to  convince  Wehrmacht’s  intelligence   bureau  that  Allied  attack  would  occur  in  either  Norway  or  French  port  city  of  Calais    Allies  need  location  kept  secret  to  avoid  Germany  strengthening  defences    result   in  horrific  Allied  death  rates    Location  kept  secret    Germans  spread  defensive  forces    To  gain  as  much  information  as  possible  about  landing  areas  agents  dropped  into   France;  aircraft  flew  reconnaissance  missions  along  entire  French  coastline  so  as   not  to  alert  Germans  of  real  target    Hitler’s  hunch  backed  by  Rommel  was  attack  in  Normandy;  however  Hitler’s   hesistancy  and  caution  stoped  him  fortifying  Normandy  at  expense  of  Calais    Two  phoney  armies  created  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

 

 

1st  US  Arm  Group  in  England   British  4th  Army,  headquartered  in  Scotland   Massive  amounts  of  info  stated  these  forces  would  liberate  Norway  and   Calais  sometime  in  1944   Secrecy  maintained  in  variety  ways   -­‐ Allies  leaked  stream  false  intelligence  which  knew  Germans  would  decipher   -­‐ Allied  commanders  like  Montgomery  given  look-­‐alikes  who  would  make   appearances  far  from  where  real  person  was    hoped  German  spies  inside   England  would  relay  such  information   -­‐ Phoney  armies  and  air  squadrons  gathered  in  locations  well  away  from  real   embarkation  points   -­‐ March  1944:  ‘ghost  army’  built  up  in  Scotland  which  by  use  of  carefully   constructed  wireless  traffic  suggested  Norway  invasion  target.     Real  preparations  took  months   -­‐ Allies  constructed  giant  floating  harbours  ‘mulberries’  which  towed  across   Channel  to  be  used  to  disembark  troops,  tanks  and  supplies  with  secrecy   -­‐ Flexible  pipelines  laid  beneath  Channel  in  Operation  Pluto  which  would   eventually  give  allied  forces  1.5  million  L  petroleum  products  a  day   -­‐ German  radar  stations  tracked  for  years.  March  1944  attack  launched  on   German  radar  station  in  Ostend  to  assess  capability  of  allied  air  forces  to  take   out  German  radar.  Its  success  gave  allies  hope  they  would  be  able  to  take   German  radar  in  France   By  mid  1944  Britain  became  giant  aircraft  carrier.  Amphibious  landing  craft  being   prepared  while  allied  air  forces  had  12  00  aircraft  at  their  disposal.  Throughout  May   exercises  taking  place  all  over  country   French  Underground  Movement  launched  new  operations  in  May  which  sabotaged   German  resources  and  blew  up  selected  bridges  and  railroad  lines  as  part  of  Allied   plan.   Nazi  Germany’s  Abwehr  one  of  best  intelligence  organisations  in  WW2  very   suspicious  of  this  info  but  couldn’t  afford  to  dismiss  an  intelligence  date  that  could   change  Germany’s  tactics   Allied  ground  forces  under  command  of  General  Montgomery’s  21st  Army  Group.   Developed  plan  and  stuck  to  it  so  successfully  German  actions  predictable.  Failure   was  never  admitting  to  it  when  parts  of  plan  went  astray   Plan  was  for  British  and  Canadian  attacks  on  Allied  left  to  drawn  in  German   reserves  while  allowing  American  units  on  right  to  advance  more  quickly.     5  June:  dates  set  for  invasion;  however  on  3  June  meteorologist  Group  Captain  Stagg   warned  Eisenhower  of  weather    postponed  invasion.  Next  day,  Stagg  told   Eisenhower  worst  of  storm  over.  Eisenhower  knew  if  didn’t  attack  immediately   would  be  another  month  before  tides  right   6  June:  attack  commenced   -­‐ -­‐ -­‐













 

  

D-­Day  6  June  1944    Objective  of  Allies  to  link  occupied  areas  ASAP  and  break  into  Normandy  proper   before  turning  east  to  push  Germans  back  to  Paris  and  beyond.      Major  obstacle:  nature  of  Norman  countryside  -­‐  Bocage  vegetation  in  France  also   assisted  German  defences.  Deep  hedges  rooted  in  sand  dunes  provided  strong   additional  wall  of  defence  difficult  to  break  through.   -­‐ Endless  network  of  high  sandbanks  contained  dense  hedges  strong  enough   to  resist  bullets  &  vehicles    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   75   





 







 

Initial  assault  onto  beaches  of  Normandy  involved  50  000  men.  Inside  France  up  to   100  000  members  of  French  Resistance  assisted  with  guerrilla  attacks  on  German   positions   During  stage  one,  naval  and  aerial  bombardments  would  attempt  to  destroy  Atlantic   Wall  that  protected  Normandy’s  beaches.  Parachute  drops  which  included   thousands  airborne  troops  had  2  missions   -­‐ Destroy  Wehrmacht’s  lines  of  communications   -­‐ Enforce  new  resistance  strongholds  created  by  French’s  anti-­‐Nazi   underground  movemen   2+  million  men  shipped  to  France  during  entire  operation.  Allies  used  12  00  aircraft   comprising  fighters,  bombers,  transports  and  gliders,  139  warships,  221  smaller   combat  vessels,  landing  craft,  and  merchant  ships   5th:  Allied  paratroopers  dropped  behind  beaches  of  Normandy  and  Atlantic  Wall  in   6  different  waves   Targeted  area  extended  approx  110km  along  beaches  of  Normandy.  Allied  troops   allocated  specific  landing  areas  which  divided  into  five  sections  from  east  to  west   -­‐ Sword  (British),  Juno  (Canadian  and  British),  Gold  (British),  Omaha  (US)  and   Utah  (US)   -­‐ Beaches  attacked  at  different  times  due  to  tide.  Began  at  630am  at  Utah   Beach   -­‐ Overall  successful  but  heavy  loss  at  Omaha  beach  where  stiff  resistance  and   steep  cliffs    casualties   Simultaneously  parachute  drops  occured  over  Calais,  Allies’  phoney  target.  However   paratroopers  here  not  human.  Were  1m  long  dummies  specialy  weighted  and   equipped  with  parachutes  that  opened  automatically  and  had  self  detonating   explosives  attached  to  clothing     Glider  planes  carrying  radio  equipment  and  commando  units  would  also  attack   Normandy.  Waited  on  runways,  along  with  Allied  fighter  aircraft  and  heavy   bombers     Order  of  attack   -­‐ British  6th  airborne  division  arrived  by  glider  to  seize  bridges  on  River  Orne   and  take  German  artillery  battery  at  Merville.   -­‐ US  82nd  and  101st  airborne  divisions  landed  in  south  east  corner  of  Cotentin   Peninsula   -­‐ Following  ferocious  aerial  bombardment,  allied  warships  then  launched   massive  barrage  against  German  defences   -­‐ Landings  at  Sowrd,  June,  Gold  and  Utah  achieved  efficiently  and  with   relatively  light  casualties.  German  counter  attack  between  Juno  and  Sword   defeated.  British  troops  began  moving  inland   -­‐ Things  not  as  straightforward  at  Omaha  and  Americans  became  pinned   down  on  foreshore.  Suffered  3000  casualties  on  that  first  day   th 6  June:  50  000+  Allied  soldiers  left  transport  ships  and  boarded  vast  network  of   flat  bottomed  landing  craft.  French  coastline  5km  away   By  nightfall  156  000  allied  troops  landed  in  Normandy.  By  12  June,  326  000  troops   ashore  and  bridgehead  50miles  wide  been  gained.     -­‐ Allied  invasion  force  faced  many  problems  prior  to  getting  ashore.  Required   to  get  close  to  beaches  while  being  pounded  by  Atlantic  Wall’s  coastal   artillery.  Thousands  soldiers  jumped  waist  or  shoulder  deep  into  ocean   carrying  25km  of  weapons  and  equipment   -­‐ Drowning  distinct  possibility  unless  could  move  rapidly  out  of  surf    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

 

 

Beaches  ‘No  Man’s  Land’   German  resistance:  at  all  levels  standard  of  German  leadership  higher  overall  and   German  troops  fought  in  knowledge  their  tanks  vastly  better  than  Allies’.     German  resistance  fierce  but  several  disadvantages   -­‐ General  Rommel,  overall  command  of  area  gone  back  to  Germany  to   celebrate  wife’s  birthday   -­‐ Allies  had  command  of  skies  and  no  German  bombers  attacked  landing  sites   -­‐ Germans  limited  numbers  of  feared  panzers  in  Normandy  region  to  resist   invasion   -­‐ Allies  playing  to  their  strengths  in  particular  deploying  weight  of  artillery   and  air  firepower  to  which  Germans  had  no  answer   All  Allied  soldiers  had  goal  of  moving  forward  and  hopefully  finding  shelter  on   higher  ground.  Predictably  unit  cohesion  broken  as  soldiers  grabber  wounded   comrades  and  attempted  to  find  safety  zones  that  didn’t  exist   By  18  June  US  forces  reaches  west  coast  of  Cotentin  Peninsula  and  trapped  German   garrison  in  Cherbourg     19  -­‐22  June:  raging  storm  destroyed  1  floating  harbour    temporary  halt  to  air   strikes  &  nearly  cut  off  supplies   26  June:  British  forces  attacked  west  of  Caen  in  Operation  Epsom;  heavy  losses   forced  them  to  halt.  Montgomery  severely  criticised  for  this  action   By  2  July:  a  million  men  landed  in  France   9  July:  British  forces  captured  Caen   Mid  July:  US  forces  took  St  Lo  after  solid  German  resistance  and  British  forces   managed  to  clear  area  around  Caen  despite  losing  100+  tanks    Allies  ready  to  breakout  from  Normandy     Roberts:  “it  is  more  than  doubtful  that  an  invasion  in  1943  could  have  succeeded”   -­‐

 



     

  

Hitler’s  ‘Doodlebugs’    12  June  1944:  Hitler  responded  to  Allied  invasion  of  France  by  ordering  10  V1   rockets  to  be  launched  against  Britain.  4  reached  Britain  and  one  hit  London    V1  Rocket  25m  and  carried  1000kg  of  explosive  with  400km  range    mass   destruction  f  new  form  of  aggressive  and  indiscriminate  warfare  unknown  to  Allied   power    V2  used  later  in  war.  Deadly  as  made  little  noise  and  nearly  impossible  to  detect  by   Britain’s  radar  networks  before  cargo  exploded.      Added  chilling  and  unpredictable  chapter  to  war.    At  same  time  helped  to  justify  Allied  nations  decision  to  conduct  saturation   bombing  raids  over  Germany    

Liberation  of  France    Late  July:  allies  commenced  breakout  from  Normandy.  Within  6  weeks,  Paris   liberated,  Germans  driven  out  of  France  and  Allies  reached  Belgium.      French  resistance  forces  gained  control  of  Brittany  almost  making  US  General   Patton’s  entry  there  unnecessary      Canadian  troops  launched  Operation  Totalise  aimed  to  trap  German  troops  near   Falaise.  Called  off  on  11  August.  American  forces  then  moved  eastward  and   cornered  German  troops  in  ‘Falaise  pocket’.     -­‐ 50  000  captured,  10  000  killed  but  30  000  escaped  with  armour  fleeing   eastward  across  River  Seine  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   77      

     

Mid  August:  US  and  French  troops  invaded  southern  France  in  Operation  Anvil  and   advanced  north  through  Rhone  Valley   15  August:  workers  in  Paris  went  on  strike  and  joined  by  police.  Hitler  ordered   Paris  be  levelled  but  German  governor  von  Choltitz  refused.  He  surrendered  city  to   French  2nd  Armoured  Division  on  25  August;  Free  French  leader  de  Gaulle  arrived   26th    Paris  liberated  25th  August  1944   Following  days,  retribution  carried  out  against  those  French  who  collaborated  with   Germans.  10  000  executed   By  Oct:  de  Gaulle  restored  order.  Replaced  Vichy  appointees  with  Resistance  leaders   and  Resistance  forces  disarmed  or  merged  into  French  army.     At  same  time  Franc  ebeing  freed,  British  forces  to  north  had  crossed  River  Seine   heading  eastward   By  late  August:  US  forces  close  to  River  Meuse  while  British  forces  gained  control  all   bridges  over  River  Somme   1  Sept:  Canadian  forces  liberated  Dieppe.  By  3  Spet  allied  forces  had  moved  into   Belgium  and  captured  Brussels.  Antwerp  liberated  on  4  Sept   Campaign  took  about  7  weeks.  Losses  on  both  sides  considerable:  400  000  Germans   died,  200  000  allied    

Assessment  and  Significance  of  Normandy  Campaign    Decapitation  common.  Extensive  wounds,  psychological  or  physical,  trademarks    Human  and  material  losses  extensive.  Significant  fatalities,  missing  troops  in  action   and  hospitalised  with  wounds.  Vehicles  and  tanks  lost    Thousands  of  hectares  of  valuable  French  farmland  destroyed.  French  civilians   often  caught  in  cross  fire  between  2  armies.    Allied  powers’  successes  in  France  represented  major  defeat  for  Nazi  Germany.    This  and  Russia  reconfirmed  Hitler’s  disintegrating  power.      1943  Mussolini’s  regime  ended  and  Italian  govt  surrendered  to  Allies.  In  response,   Hitler  ordered  his  armies  to  invade  Italy  late  in  year.   -­‐ 5  June  1944  (one  day  before  Operation  D  Day  launched)  Allied  forces   entered  Italy’s  capital,  Rome.  Hence,  Hitler’s  bid  to  maintain  southern  front   in  Italy  failed.        Wehrmacht’s  ongoing  losses  in  men  and  war  materials  now  serious  issue.  Hitler’s   armies  numerically  reduced,  overextended,  undersupplied  and  vulnerable.   Nonetheless,  remained  resolute  and  refused  to  accept  defeat    Late  1944:  Axis  alliances  rapidly  falling  apart.  In  Pacific  War  Japanese  forces   suffered  major  defeats    Allied  invasion  of  Japan  distinct  possibility.      In  Europe  Hungary  and  Romania  soon  surrender  to  Russians    In  post  D  Day  period,  Hitler  no  longer  any  viable  allies.  Also  feared  reprisals  from   worst  enemy:  Russia.    

Summary  of  D-­Day  and  Liberation  of  France    Great  secrecy  underscored  preparations  mostly  taking  place  in  England.  Clever   camoflauge  tactics  by  British  and  Americans  concealed  concentration  of  troops  and   aircraft  in  south  of  England    threw  off  Luftwaffe  reconnaissance  aircraft    Hitler  and  generals  aware  invasion  in  making  but  miscalculated  landing  zones,   believing  attack  would  take  place  in  vicinity  of  Calais,  40km  from  English  port  of   Dover.   -­‐ Series  huge  concrete  fortifications  and  defensive  structures  (Atlantic  Wall)   built  along  north  east  coastline  of  France    limited  value  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

 

  







           

Actual  landings  postponed  for  several  days  due  to  bad  weather  but  finally  took   place  on  6  June.  Massive  floating  harbours  towed  across  drop  off  points  along   Normandy  peninsula  where  beached  to  form  port  facilities  necessary  to  unload   millions  of  tonnes  of  war  materials   Mass  strength  of  Allies  overwhelmed  defences  which  put  up  stiff  resistance.  Having   established  crucial  bridgehead  through  which  war  effort  flowed,  Allies  finally  broke   through  German  lines  where  could  deploy  mechanised  armour,  something  enemy   lacked   Hitler’s  failure  to  throw  invaders  back  in  sea  within  first  few  days  doomed  German   defence  to  eventual  collapse.  By  this  point  in  war,  Allied  airpower  had  30:1   superiority  over  Luftwaffe  which  couldn’t  offer  protection  against  bombing  attacks   on  panzer  reserves  being  hauled  form  rear  on  rail  network   By  end  July  1944  Allied  foothold  expanded  into  larger  bridgehead  100+km  wide  

RUSSIAN  COUNTER  OFFENSIVES  1944   Soviet  Offensives  January  –  December  1944    Following  Battle  of  Kursk,  initiative  on  Eastern  Front  now  with  Red  Army.  From   Kursk  to  end  of  war,  Russian  forces  on  Eastern  Front  gradually  pushed  Germany   and  its  allies  back    As  Red  Army  progressed,  Soviet  influence  being  planted  in  liberated  areas     planning  post  war  situation.      Overy  dismisses  view  that  Soviet  had  overhelming  advantage  in  numbers,   contending  that  sharp  increase  in  number  of  battlefront  weapons  on  Soviet  side  and   great  improvements  in  way  weapons  organised  changed  balance  in  fighting  power    Soviet  leaders  learned  from  earlier  defeats  and  introduced  military  reforms  which   enabled  them  to  fully  exploit  range  of  weapons  produced  in  factories    5  Jan  1944:  Soviet  forces  began  offensive  to  recapture  western  Ukraine  and  Crimea.   Initial  target  Kirovgrad  which  fell  to  Russians  on  8  Jan.      27  Jan:  siege  of  Leningrad  broke    End  of  Feb:  Germany’s  Army  Group  North  routed.  Three  German  divisions  wiped   out  with  many  others  gravely  weakened.  Soviet  forces  capture  almost  200  tanks  and   1800  artillery  guns  in  fighting  at  start  1944    Mid  March:  Soviet  forces  manage  to  split  Germany’s  Army  Group  South  and  poised   to  advance  on  Romania.      Throughout  April  Red  Army  fights  to  free  Crimean  Peninsula  of  Axis  forces.  Crimean   port  of  Sebastopol  finally  taken  on  9  May.  German  losses  exceed  100  000    Early  June:  Soviet  forces  attack  Finnish  forces   -­‐ Massive  Soviet  artillery  barrage  forces  Finnish  forces  to  retreat  to  stronger   defence  line   -­‐ 15  July:  Finnish  forces  manage  to  hold  off  Soviet  forces  in  Karelian  Isthmus     -­‐ 2  Sept:  Finns  make  peace.  Peace  agreement  extremely  moderate  and  allows   Finland  to  remain  independent  and  capitalist  through  entire  Cold  War    22  June  1944:  General  Zhukov  commenced  Operation  Bagration  to  push  Germans   out  of  Soviet.  Soviet  launches  massive  assault  on  strongest  of  Hitler’s  eastern  forces,    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   79  

  



 

  

  



 

 

Army  Group  Centre  along  700km  front.  Attack  to  move  across  Belorussia  towards   Poland.  Effectively  destroyed  Army  Group  Centre   -­‐ Operation  preceded  by  major  supporting  operations  involving  laying  of   mines  and  sabotage  actions  against  German  communications   -­‐ Jordan:  “Operation  Bagration  was  Hitler’s  worst  military  setback  of  the  war   ..  dramatically  turned  the  tide  of  war  against  the  Third  Reich”.     Zhukov  armies  had  4  assets:  quest  for  victory,  speed,  mobility  &  overwhelming   manpower  resources   Soviet  advance  rapid  &  strong  and  captured  German  soldiers  shown  no  mercy  by   Soviet  captors.  Thousands  executed    Army  Group  entre  ceased  to  exist   June  and  July:  Russian  offensive  steamed  path  of  destruction  towards  Poland.   Wehrmacht’s  supply  lines  and  retreat  routes  cut  and  military  resources  captured.   German  units  progressively  encircled  or  overrun  by  Zhukov’s  tank  units.  No  mercy   or  compassion   Early  July:  Soviet  forces  begin  campaign  to  drive  Germans  out  of  Baltic  states  of   Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania.  Success  here  would  threaten  German  food  supplies   and  links  to  Sweden  and  Finland   11  July:  Red  Army  forces  capture  Minsk.  German  losses  exceed  100  000.     17  July:  Soviet  forces  enter  Poland.  Within  less  than  fortnight  Lvov  liberated  &   Soviet  forces  reach  River  Vistula   -­‐ Soviet  forces  moved  too  quickly  so  outpaced  support  units.  By  time  Poland   reach,  Zhukov’s  tanks  short  of  fuel.  Thus  operation  temporarily  postponed   but  Stalin  achieved  goal.  Wehrmacht’s  Army  Group  Centre  (one  of  Hitler’s   strongest  military  assests)  broken   Beginning  August:  Russia  forces  rested  on  Vistula,  short  distance  from  Warsaw   August:  Polish  resistance  forces  rise  up  against  Germans  in  Warsaw.     12  August:  coup  against  pro-­‐German  government  of  Romania.     -­‐ 12  Sept:  Romania  surrenders  to  Soviet  Union   -­‐ Romania  rewarded  by  receiving  back  area  of  Transylvania  it  lost  to  Hungary     Sept:  Soviet  Union  declares  war  on  Bulgaria,  invades  and  quickly  takes  control   -­‐ 8  Sept:  new  Bulgarian  regime  declares  war  on  Germany     Early  Sept:  Soviet  forces  begin  attack  in  Carpathian  Mountains  on  their  way  to   Slovakia.  Eventually  break  through  in  Nov   British  forces  occupy  Athens  in  Oct  and  German  forces  leave  country  on  19  Oct   -­‐ Brief  civil  war  breaks  out  in  that  country  between  communist  and  royalist   forces  which  ends  in  Dec  but  Greece  not  be  settled  land  yet   Yugoslav  1st  Army  begins  advance  on  Belgrade  and  Marshal  Tito’s  Liberation  Army   captured  Belgrade.  Managed  to  free  his  country  of  German  control  without  Red   Army.     Baltic  states  fall  under  Soviet  control  and  by  early  Oct  Russia  in  East  Prussia.     By  end  1944,  Hitler’s  empire  in  central  and  eastern  Europe  greatly  diminished.   Consisted  of  western  Poland,  most  of  Czechoslovakia,  western  Hungary,  Croatia,   Slovenia  and  northern  Italy.     Allies’  successes:  Hitler’s  armies  beaten  on  two  fronts.  New  Russian  offensive  also   launched  against  the  Balkans,  Hungary  and  Romania    eventually  all  succeeded.   However,  Stalin’s  attitude  towards  Poles  created  bitter  controversy    

 

Warsaw  Uprising:  August  –  October  1944  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

 

  



 

 









    

1  August:  Polish  resistance  groups  began  uprising  against  German  forces  in  Warsaw   prompting  retaliation.  Polish  forces  equal  to  Germans  but  latter  had  advantage  in   tanks  and  air  support.  200  000+  Poles  killed   Soviets  made  no  attempt  to  help  claiming  needed  to  resupply  front  line  forces.   Suited  Stalin’s  purpose  to  have  Germans  kill  off  anti-­‐communist  Polish  patriots   -­‐ Stalin  guaranteed  Polish  Underground  his  total  support  if  members  rose  up   &  help  defeat  Germans.     Polish  resistance  supported  by  Polish  govt  in  exile  in  London  and  hoped  to  gain   control  of  city  to  be  in  stronger  negotiating  position  with  advancing  Red  Army.     Stalin  ordered  Zhukov  to  create  neutral  perimeter  16km  outside  Warsaw  and  wait.   Intentions  clear:  eliminate  2  problems  (Poles  and  Germans)  by  allowing  them  to   destroy  each  other.     By  late  August:  German  superior  in  air  power  and  artillery  too  much  for  Polish   resistance  forces.     Stalin  moved  forces  away  from  River  Vistula  front  and  allow  battle  to  take  course.   Stalin’s  tactics:   -­‐ Allow  Germans  to  destroy  Polish  resistance   -­‐ Move  in  and  destroy  German  forces   -­‐ Poland  then  under  total  Soviet  domination   AJP  Taylor  suggests  alternative  explanation  is  that  Red  Army  stretched  its  lines  of   communication  so  that  in  no  position  to  assist  Poles.  Not  view  accepted  by  most   historians   -­‐ Similarly,  Altgovzen  argues  that  as  Soviet  forces  made  way  through   Belorussia  and  across  Polish  border,  were  exhausted    no  position  to  assist   Polish  action  against  Germans     Mid  Sept:  Soviet  Marshal  Rokossovsky  attacked  eastern  quarter  of  Warsaw   -­‐ By  14th:  Germans  driven  out  of  area   -­‐ Soviet-­‐backed  Polish  army  moved  in  to  take  control  of  bridgeheads  in   Warsaw   Oct:  Poles  appealed  for  armistice,  which  Germans  granted.  66  day  Warsaw  Uprising   resulted  in  200  000  Poles  sent  to  concentration  camps  or  forced  into  slave  labour.   Population  of  Warsaw  dropped  from  1.3  million  to  `162  000  people   Warsaw  rising  came  to  end  on  2  Oct  as  last  Polish  fighters  surrendered.  Germans   evacuated  city  sending  200  000  Poles  in  concentration  camps  and  destroyed   everything  path.     Poland  liberated  in  Jan  1945  

 

FINAL  DEFEAT  1944  -­  1945   



By  autumn  1944  confidence  among  allied  leaders  war  closing   -­‐ D  Day  success  and  within  3  months  Germans  almost  driven  out  of  France   -­‐ June:  Rome  captured   -­‐ Red  Army  thrown  Germans  out  of  its  territory  and  poised  to  move  on   Germany   Allied  bombing  continuing  to  have  devastating  effect  on  Germany  economy  

  (1)  The  War  in  the  West:  September  –  December  1944    Early  hopes  German  defeat  in  France  would  bring  end  to  war  cancelled  out  by   several  factors:    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   81    

Though  Montgomery’s  troops  took  port  of  Antwerp  on  4  Sept,  failed  to  push  on  to   secure  port’s  approaches    “among  principal  causes  of  Allied  failure  to  break  into   Germany  in  1944”  (Hastings).      Hastings  also  draws  attention  to  differing  personalities  of  Eisenhower  and   Montgomery  and  tensions  caused.  Sept  Montgomery  required  to  hand  over  role  in   command  of  Allied  ground  forces  to  Eisenhower.  M  continually  looked  for  ways  to   enhance  importance  of  his  role  in  battle  for  Germany    may  explain  his  decision  to   make  dash  for  Rhine  crossing  Arnhem  which  ended  in  disaster.      Eisenhower  been  criticised  for  being  too  cautious  in  advancing  Allied  front   eastwards  whereas  better  filed  commander  might  have  launched  offensives  to  take   Allies  to  Rhine  while  Wehrmacht  still  reeling     Operation  Market  Garden  (17  –  25  Sept  1944)   Background    One  of  worst  Allied  defeats  in  WW2.  Largest  airborne  assault  in  military  history    25  July  Operation  Cobra  (move  out  of  Normandy)  began.  American  troops  moved   south  from  St  Lo  and  captured  Avranches  by  1  August.  Consisted  US  and  Britain   forces   -­‐ Aggressive  plan  to  destroy  all  German  units  in  France  then  move  forwards   towards  Germany    Major  logistical  problems  stalled  progress  after  initial  successes.  Forces  required   support  systems  incl  fuel    fuel  and  logistical  depots  to  be  found.  Eisenhower   accepted  Montgomery’s  plan  of  Holland  as  new  Allied  supply  base  enabling  assault   on  Siegrfried  line,  Germany’s  border  defence  network.  Patton  and  Bradley  (US)   disagreed   -­‐ Plan  accepted  as  included  destruction  of  Hitler’s  V1  and  V2  rocket  bases   secured  along  coastline  of  Netherlands  and  Belgium    bring  end  to   devastation  rockets  causing  in  Britain    Success  of  Operation  Market  Garden  depended  on  precise  timing  and  total   coordination  of  component  parts.  Destruction  of  Wehrmacht’s  units  in  Holland   crucial.  None  of  goals  of  operation  achieved    Plan  required  5  bridges  be  captured  as  Montgomery’s  armies  moved  closer  to   Germany.  Arnhem  bridge,  located  on  Rhine  River,  most  important  target    Success  depended  on  2  critical  factors:   -­‐ Airborne  units  (Operation  Market)  must  land  in  specific  drop  zones   -­‐ Allied  ground  forces  (Operation  Garden)  must  provide  combat,  transport   and  logistical  support  to  airborne  troops  as  combined  task  force  moved   forward.  Garden  troops  also  responsible  for  neutralising  all  Wehrmacht   forces  located  in  5  bridge  areas   -­‐ Together,  airborne  and  ground  units  would  seize  5  bridges  and  then   establish  new  front  along  Siegfried  Line.  Once  accomplished,  subsequent   operations  would  be  launched  in  order  to  destroy  rocket  bases  in  Holland.      

Problems    Allied  intelligence  authorities  suspected  Wehrmacht  had  strong  military  profile  in   Holland.  Suspicion  confirmed  by  reconnaissance  planes  that  photographed  large   numbers  of  German  tanks  and  artillery  throughout  Arnhem  area.  Photographs   ignored  or  downplayed    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  



  







   

Dutch  underground  correctly  warned  Allied  headquarters  that  Wehrmacht  units   constantly  manoeuvring  in  5  bridge  areas.  This  information  rejected  as  Britain’s  spy   network  believed  all  Dutch  resistance  groups  penetrated  by  Germany   Enigma  machine,  Allied  powers’  greatest  intelligence  asset,  neutralised  during   Operation  Market  Garden.  Valued  as  could  be  used  to  transmit  messages  and  battle   orders  from  Wehrmacht’s  headquarters  to  Germany’s  naval  fleets  and  combat  units.   Codes  and  messages  not  sent  from  Berlin  to  Wehrmacht  units  in  Netherlands  as   Holland  very  close  to  Germany.  Rather,  Wehrmacht  used  own  complex  network  of   radio  frequencies,  many  not  yet  deciphered  by  Allied  intelligence  experts.     -­‐ As  such,  Montgomery  couldn’t  identify  intentions  or  movements  of  German   forces  in  Holland   Allied  officers  provided  with  maps  of  Arnhem  area  but  majority  maps  outdated  and   inaccurate.  Discrepancies  varied  1.5-­‐2km    infantry  movements  and  targets  only   estimated    great  risk   Most  allied  ground  units  had  radios  with  different  frequencies  or  ‘crystals’   (components)    inter  unit  communications  compromised.  Error  discovered  only   after  units  landed  in  Holland   Reinforcements  couldn’t  be  supplied  due  to  strict  timing  schedules  which  left   Market  Garden  forces  isolated  in  Holland.     Re-­‐supply  operations,  if  necessary,  would  consist  of  parachute  drops.  Risky  in   combat  zone   Bad  weather  predicted  for  August/  strong  winds,  rain  and  fog  expected  in  Britain   and  over  all  airborne  drop  zones  in  Netherlands   In  event  Operation  Market  Garden  failing,  precise  plan  to  evacuate  Allies  form   Holland  essential.  No  realistic  plan  every  developed  as  Montgomery  supremely   confident  operation  would  succeed.    

 

The  Battle    Mid  Sept:  allied  forces  taking  control  of  Belgium  and  Netherlands;  Brussels  and   Antwerp  already  fallen.      17  Sept:  General  Montgomery  launched  Operation  Market  Garden  with  aim  to   outflank  German  defences  in  Netherlands  by  seizing  bridgeheads  over  Rhine  behind   Siegfried  Line  (pre  war  German  defensive  line  in  west)   -­‐ To  be  prelude  for  advance  across  River  Rhine  into  Germany    Hopes  for  Operation  too  optimistic  form  start   -­‐ Allied  intelligence  in  region  poor   -­‐ British  not  able  to  use  Enigma  machine  to  decipher  German  communications   as  in  region  German  army  using  different  radio  frequencies   -­‐ Maps  outdated;  no  provisions  for  reinforcements  or  proper  evacuation  if   things  went  wrong.  Montgomery  certain  would  succeed      Initially  campaign  went  well    US  paratroopers  of  101st  and  82nd  airborne  divisions  dropped  at  Eindhoven  and   Nijmegen  with  aim  of  capturing  bridgeheads  of  Rivers  Meuse,  Rhine  and  lower   Rhine    1st  British  airborne  division  and  Polish  brigade  dropped  at  Arnhem  but  many  units   landed  several  km  from  target  bridge    Ground  forces  joined  w/  101st  and  82nd  by  19  Sept  but  unable  to  battle  way  through   to  British  forces  at  Arnhem    Forces  at  Arnhem  faced  strong  German  resistance  and  gradually  squeezed  into   narrow  perimeter      

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   83     

 



Operation    then  turned  into  major  disaster   -­‐ Force  at  Arnhem  supposed  to  hold  out  for  2  days;  were  for  10   -­‐ Poor  weather;  German  forces  stronger  than  expected;  inability  of  allied   forces  to  get  supplies  and  reinforcements  to  Arnhem  either  by  air  or  using   Highway  69;  and  lucky  German  discovery  of  allied  battle  plans  in  downed   plane    all  turned  Montgomery’s  operation  into  fiasco   German  forces  took  revenge  on  hundreds  of  Dutch  people  for  the  operation   believing  they  behind  the  planning   German  forces  in  west  commanded  by  General  Model.  Managed  to  organise  strong   defensive  line  along  West  Wall.  Allied  progress  in  region  now  slow  and  costly   -­‐ Patton’s  forces  attacked  Metz  in  early  Oct   -­‐ Hodge’s  1st  army  took  Aachen  in  Nov.  Bradley’s  forces  tried  to  expand   success  at  Aachen;  little  success   Canadians  captured  Boulogne  (22  Sept)  and  Calais  (30th).  French  forces  captured   Strasbourg  by  Jan  1945  

The  Results   Operation  Market  Garden  failed  for  many  reasons:    German  forces  in  Holland  far  greater  than  Montgomery  expected.  Immediately   launched  offensive  and  took  advantage  of  every  Allied  setback    Poor  weather  ongoing  issue.  1st  Polish  Airborne  Brigade  didn’t  participate  in  initial   attack  on  Arnhem  as  transport  planes  grounded  by  adverse  flying  conditions  in   Britain.  Poles  joined  campaign  1  day  late  reducing  effectiveness  of  Montgomery’s   plans    Montgomery’s  airborne  drop  zone  in  Holland  far  too  large  extending  over  100km.   Many  airborne  units  missed  specific  targets  by  3-­‐5km.      19  Sept:  German  patrol  found  briefcase  containing  plans,  drop  zones  and  battle   orders  for  every  Allied  unit  in  Holland  compromising  Operation    Flatlands  surrounding  5  bridges  vast  combat  zone.  Allied  forces  couldn’t  effectively   coordinate  transport  and  logistical  duties  along  Highway  69,  main  road  to  Arnhem.   Isolated  battles  became  major  engagements  hampering  2nd  Army’s  mobility    Wehrmacht  employed  panzer  units  and  armoured  vehicles  which  rapidly  encircled   or  destroyed  Allied  soldiers  armed  with  only  rifles  and  machine  guns.      Bridges  of  Veghel  and  Grave  captured  but  major  campaigns  occurred  at  Eindhoven,   Nijmegen  and  Arnhem.  By  Day  3  of  Operation  Allied  offensive  failed.  Allied  soldiers   ran  out  of  supplies    hand  to  hand  fighting    Allied  aerial  evacuation  from  Holland  began  on  Day  8;  disorderly  and  poorly   planned.  After  fighting  for  a  week  soldiers  forced  to  swim  across  canals  when  boats   couldn’t  be  found.  Equipment  discarded  and  all  Allied  vehicles  abandoned.  Many  got   lost  and  thousands  captured  by  Germans    Weeks  following  Operation,  Abwehr’s  agents  launched  new  attack  on  Dutch   Underground  and  nearly  destroyed  it.  Wehrmacht  also  accused  people  of  Holland  of   organising  Operation.  Accusation  false.  Hundreds  of  civilians  killed  as  part  of   German  warning  to  Netherlands    

Operation  Market  Garden:  Assessment    Operation,  conceptually,  represented  Montgomery’s  talents  as  theorist  and   strategist.    However,  based  entirely  on  presumptions,  speculations  and  estimations.  Plan  didn’t   seriously  consider  or  provide  for  Wehrmacht’s  ability  to  retaliate  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

 

     



 

No  operations  against  Hitler’s  V1  and  V2  rockets  took  place  as  expected   Allied  evacuation  from  Holland  uncoordinated,  insufficient  and  embarrassing.   Achieved  none  of  its  goals.     Oct:  Montgomery  criticised  for  slow  progress  in  new  operation  to  capture  Scedlt   Estuary,  vital  maritime  link  to  port  of  Antwerp  in  Belgium   Montgomery  accepted  Operation  as  failure  but  continued  to  defend  it:  “it  could  have   succeeded  in  spite  of  my  mistakes  ..  given  the  aircraft,  ground  forces  and   administrative  resources  necessary  for  the  job”   Hitler’s  victory  in  Holland  timely  and  provided  some  psychological  relief  after   defeats  in  Russia,  Italy  and  France.  During  Operation,  Wehrmacht  resourceful  and   aggressive  improving  its  morale.   Late  1944:  Montgomery,  Patton  and  Bradley  continued  to  argue  over  tactical  and   strategic  issues   Hitler  aware  Allied  command  divided.  Took  advantage  of  disunity:  ordering  new   offensive  to  begin  in  Belgium    

 

The  Battle  of  the  Bulge    After  allies  retreated  from  Holland,  Hitler  summoned  Rundstedt  and  Model  to  plan   division  of  combined  armies  of  Patton  and  Montgomery  by  driving  panzer  wedge   between  theme  at  town  of  Bastogne  in  Belgium    Once  accomplished,  Wehrmacht  would  launch  new  offensive  and  recapture  port  city   of  Antwerp    Rundstedt  and  Model  didn’t  like  plan  as:   -­‐ Germans  risked  being  surrounded  if  outmanoeuvred  by  Allied  opponents   -­‐ Allied  powers  total  air  superiority  in  Western  Europe  with  new  technological   advancements  such  as  ‘Typhoons’  and  ‘Mustangs’  with  ability  to  disable  and   destroy  any  tracked  vehicle     -­‐ Wehrmact’s  units  not  at  full  strength  due  to  excessive  losses  caused  by  Allied   counteroffensives     -­‐ Believed  major  campaign  in  Nov  risky  because  of  snow  and  freezing   temperatures  which  brought  on  defeat  in  Russia’s  winter  1942-­‐43    Hitler  unmoved  by  such  reservations  as  believed  new  blitzkrieg  through  Ardennes   would  succeed    By  end  1944  final  defeat  Germany  eminent.    Pressed  on  all  sides  and  short  of   supplies  German  position  hopeless.  Hitler  himself  not  inspiring  leader  earlier.  Had   only  one  hope:  allies  disunited  in  aims.     -­‐ Stalin  deeply  distrusted  by  western  allies  esp  Churchill.  Relations  with  Soviet   always  been  poor  prior  1939  and  many  never  forgave  Stalin  for  signing  Nazi   Soviet  Pact  in  1939   -­‐ Relations  between  allied  commanders  strained.  Patton  &  Bradley  often   disagreement  w  Montgomery    Against  this  background  in  Dec,  Hitler  took  offensive  for  one  last  time  in  Operation   Autumn  Mist;  Ardennes  offensive  or  The  Battle  of  the  Bulge.  Offensive  based  on   presumptions,  speculations  and  hope    Aim  to  split  allied  forces  in  two,  drive  to  Antwerp  whose  capture  would  cripple   allied  supply  base.   -­‐ If  this  successful  in  trapping  allied  forces  on  coast,  might  be  able  to  force   negotiated  peace.      16  Dec:  German  offensive  in  Ardennes  began.  German  force  of  24  divisions  slammed   into  allied  forces    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   85   













 





Wehrmacht’s  armies  re-­‐grouped,  troops  transferred  to  new  units  and  every  soldier   fit  for  duty  assembled  for  Hitler’s  major  gamble.  Teams  of  German  soldiers  dressed   in  British  or  American  uniforms  infiltrated  Ardennes  creating  diversions  and   attempting  to  gain  information  from  Allied  soldiers  after  invasion  began   British  and  Americans  taken  completely  by  surprise.  German  forces  pushed  through   lightly  defended  Ardennes  region  of  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  but  failed  to  make  it   to  Meuse  River.   -­‐ Instead  succeeded  in  creating  ‘bulge’  in  American  line   -­‐ Ardennes  region  one  of  weakest  parts  of  Allied  line  held  by  mix  of  resting   veterans  and  inexperienced     -­‐ Broke  through  Allied  line  along  attack  front  while  small  groups  of  special   forces  penetrated  deeper  into  Allied  territory  spreading  confusion  and  panic.     Allied  intelligence  authorities  completely  unaware  of  Hitler’s  intentions.  Engima   machine  not  used  weeks  prior  to  invasion  due  to  Belgium’s  close  proximity  to   Germany    Allies’  greatest  intelligence  asset  neutralised   19th  Hitler  ordered  commencement  due  to  weather.  Low  cloud  cover  and  dense  fog   would  keep  Allied  aircraft  on  group  increasing  safety  of  his  armoured  units.  Allied   reinforcements  quickly  diverted  to  deal  with  attack:   -­‐ Montgomery  placed  in  charge  of  Anglo-­‐American  forces  north  of  German     advance  and  Bradley  to  south.  Part  of  Patton’s  US  3rd  Amry  changed  frot  and   attacked  north  and  reduced  bulge  Germans  had  driven  into  Allied  line   -­‐ 2  US  airborne  divisions  brought  in  by  road   -­‐ Montgomery’s  forces  moved  to  stop  enemy  crossing  River  Meuse   -­‐ Patton  stopped  attack  in  Saar  and  moved  north  to  attack  German  southern   flank   German  attack  began  to  weaken  by  late  Dec  and  as  weather  improved,  allied  air   power  became  decisive.     -­‐ Completely  overcome  by  mid  Jan   -­‐ German  supply  system  stretched.  It  and  front  line  forces  came  under   continuous  attack   Operation  had  one  mission:  drive  wedge  into  Allied  line.  German  assault  successful   for  1st  3  days.  Bulge  75km  wide  and  50km  deep  divided  Montogmery’s  forces  in   northern  Belgium  from  Patton’s  armies  in  south   Battle  of  the  Bulge  continued  for  5  weeks.  During  this  period,  entire  Ardennes   Forest  witnessed  massive  tank  movements  including  attacks,  retreats  and   attempted  escapes.  Confusion  and  disorientation  common     24  Dec:  leading  panzer  units  ran  out  of  fuel  near  Meuse  River  effectively  ending   Germany’s  forward  assault     Shift  in  weather  changed  course  of  battle.  Fog  and  low  cloud  cover  over  Ardennes   lifted    Eisenhower  sent  300  ‘tank-­‐buster’  aircraft  to  Belgium.  Snow  created  white   carpet  allowing  General  Model’s  tanks  to  be  clearly  seen  by  Allied  pilots.  Typhoon   and  Mustang  aircraft  caused  major  damage   1  Jan  1945:  Patton’s  3rd  Army  nearly  surrounded  large  German  force.  Patton   requested  reinforcements  from  Eisenhower  who  ordered  Montgomery’s  forces  to   move  south  immediately.  But  Montgomery’s  armies  left  positions  2  days  later   eventually  linking  up.  But  during  critical  48  hours,  many  Germans  escaped   -­‐ Patton,  Bradely  and  Eisenhower  highly  critical  of  Montgomery’s  behaviour.   Hitler  convinced  Ardennes  campaign  would  succeed.  In  Jan  became  clear  offensive   might  fail,  launched  2  more:  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

 

 

Operation  Bodenplatte:  attack  on  27  Allied  airbases  in  France  and  Low   Countries.  Luftwaffe  damaged  or  destroyed  more  than  500  allied  aircraft  but   its  losses  also  extensive   -­‐ Operation  Northwind:  attack  into  Alsace-­‐Lorraine  region  of  France.  Failed   and  represented  Wehrmacht's  final  operation   Ardennes  Offensive  costly  campaign  for  both  sides.  Certainly  disturbed  allied  plans   for  moving  into  Germany,  but  also  gravely  weakened  Germany’s  fighting  capacity.   Apart  from  100  000  manpower  losses,  Germans  also  lost  600+  tanks  and  assault   guns,  1000+  aircraft  and  6000  vehicles.     US  repairs  also  high  but  they  could  replace  theirs,  Hitler  couldn’t   3  Jan:  major  attacks  from  north  of  Bulge  ad  largely  recovered  by  middle  of  month.   AJP  Taylor:  “brilliant  in  conception,  impossible  to  execute”   Cole:  “  ...  without  a  viable  strategic  objective  in  view”   -­‐



     

The  Battle  of  the  Bulge:  An  Assessment    25  Jan  1945:  Hitler’s  gamble  in  Ardennes  ended  in  failure.  Victory  expected  and   retreat  never  realistically  considered    desperate  campaign  in  worst  climatic   conditions      Germany’s  blitzkrieg  into  Belgium  initially  successful  but  success  short  lived.     -­‐ Jan:  German  units  forced  to  fight  way  out  of  Belgium  as  Allied  armies   regrouped  and  attempted  to  destroy  them.  Many  panzer  groups,  now  out   fuel,  sabotaged  their  tanks  and  surrendered    Allied  powers’  air  attacks  on  Wehrmacht’s  positions  intensified  paving  way  for   Allies’  eventual  victory.    Ardennes  campaign  showed  mass  attack  by  tanks  had  no  hopes  of  success  against   enemy  who  has  complete  superiority  in  air  power    Allies  severely  damaged  Germany’s  war  resources  in  Belgium    After  Battle  of  Bulge,  Nazi  Germany  faced  6  realities   -­‐ Wehrmacht  no  reserve  troops   -­‐ Wehrmacht’s  manpower  losses  during  1944  severe   -­‐ Equipment  losses  significant   -­‐ New  blitzkriegs  not  be  considered   -­‐ Third  Reich’s  empire  in  Europe  ended   -­‐ Allied  armies  now  closer  to  Germany    12  Jan:  while  Battle  of  Bulge  contested,  Stalin  launched  new  offensive  towards   Germany.  By  then,  Balkans  liberated  and  Hungary  and  Romania  surrendered.  Hitler   had  no  allies    7  March:  after  10  day  battle  at  Remagen  Bridge,  Allies  crossed  Rhine  River  and   entered  Germany      

               

SUMMARY   Aiming  at  Antwerp,  the  bold  offensive  broke  through  to  depth  of  130km  but  failed  due  to  Allied  air   attacks  and  counter  offensive  on  3  Jan  1945.  In  trying  to  delay  end  of  war,  Germany  sustained  120   000  casualties  and  lost  500  tanks  and  1600  planes.  No  one  profited  from  offensive  with  exceptions   of  Russians,  for  Hitler  gambled  away  last  reserves  needed  for  defence  in  east.  

(2)  The  War  in  the  West:  January  –  May  1945    No  more  allied  disasters.  March  into  Germany  through  early  months  of  1945  fairly   smoothly  though  German  forces  resisted  best  they  could.    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   87    

By  5  Match  US  9th  army  reached  Cologne  while  futher  south  1st  and  3rd   armies  took  Bonn.   -­‐ 7  March  US  forces  captured  undammed  railway  bridge  at  Remagen  where   German  troops  still  retreating.  Bridge  crossing  captured.  Made  German   defence  of  Rhineland  impossible   -­‐ By  early  March,  allied  forces  were  along  River  Rhine  from  Holland  to  Swiss   border     Allies  continued  push  into  Germany:   Early  Feb:  Allied  offensive  oped  at  north  end  of  line  in  early  Feb  fighting  battle   through  Reichswald  forest  and  close  to  Rhine   22  March:  Patton’s  forces  crossed  Rhine  between  Mainz  and  Worms  and  moved  into   northern  Bavaria   28  March:  Montgomery’s  forces  crossed  into  Germany  n  north  and  defeated  final   German  stand   28  March:  General  Hodge’s  forces  crossed  Remagen  Bridge  and  reached  Marburg  to   east   Throughout  March,  Allies  advanced  form  west  but  at  slow  progress  as  wherever   opposition  existed,  forces  halted  and  bombarded  defenders  into  submission   General  Bradley’s  forces  moved  into  central  Germany  and  captured  Leipzig   British  forces  moved  across  northern  Germany   -­‐ 24  April:  Reached  River  Elbe   -­‐ 27  April:  captured  Bremen  and  Lubeck  on  Baltic  Sea  on  2  May   -­‐ 3  May:  Hamburg  fell  without  resistance   Hitler  still  issuing  usual  orders  of  no  retreat.  Reality  was  increasing  numbers  of   German  troops  too  glad  to  surrender  to  Allies  to  keep  themselves  sage  from   Russians.     5  May:  US  3rd  Army  took  Linz  in  Austria  and  Pilsen  in  Czechoslovakia  on  6th   US  7th  Army  was  resisted  strongly  at  Nuremberg.  Then  crossed  Danube  =,  captured   Berchtesgaden  and  met  some  of  US  5th  Army  moving  north  from  Italy   Over  next  few  days  various  German  units  surrendered  in  Italy,  Holland  and  France.     7  May:  Germans  agreed  to  unconditional  surrender   Midnight  8  May:  war  in  Europe  over  

       



      

(3)  The  War  in  the  East:  January  –  May  1945    Final  Russian  offensive  in  east  due  to  begin  on  20  Jan  1945  but  brought  forward  to   12  Jan  after  plea  from  Churchill  to  relieve  pressure  German  offensive  action  in  west   causing  western  allies    12  Jan:  Russian  forces  struck  on  several  fronts  across  1200km  distance  from  Baltic   in  north  to  Carpathian  Mountains  in  south.  Attacking  forces  comprised  of  Ukranian,   Belorussian  and  Baltic  forces    Germans  completely  overwhelmed  and  no  choice  but  to  fall  back  form  odd  pockets   of  resistance  which  held  for  as  long  as  possible.  8.5  million  Germans  fled  from   Reich’s  eastern  provinces  from  Jan-­‐Feb    German  morale,  fuel  and  supplies  of  all  forms  equipment  low.      Germans  convinced  by  years  of  Nazi  propaganda  Russians  were  bloodthirsty   barbarians.  Those  who  sought  survival  by  desertion  or  showed  ‘lack  of  will’   randomly  executed  by  own  side    Political  Russian  agitators  lectured  troops  on  need  to  exact  vengeance  for   devastation  inflicted  on  Soviet  by  Operation  Barbarossa.  Genuine  patriotic  spirit.  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

-­‐

 



  





     

Secret  police  (NKVD)  and  counter  intelligence  organisation  (SMERSH)  inflicted   severe  punishment  on  anyone  who  faltered     To  the  north,  Red  Army  entered  East  Prussia.  Feelings  of  anger  and  Red  Army’s   regulation  allowing  each  man  to  send  home  monthly  parcel  of  his  spoils     destruction  and  looting.   People  and  property  suffered  as  Russians  carried  out  mass  rapes  and  killings   Resulted  in  refugees,  many  who  died  from  winter  cold  and  hunger.  Some  simply  run   over  or  machine  gunned  by  passing  Soviet  tanks.   Soviet  advance  irresistible   -­‐ Zhukov  and  Konev  reached  Oder  River  by  mid  Feb  before  turning  north  to   pin  down  remaining  German  forces  in  corners  of  East  Prussia  and  Latvia     -­‐ Some  of  Zhukov’s  forces  only  65km  from  Berlin  but  lines  of  communication   stretched  and  stretch  of  German  forces  on  either  flank  unknown.  Stalin   ordered  Zhukov  pause  and  regroup   -­‐ Advance  on  southern  front  slowed  as  Red  Army  took  month  to  capture   Hungarian  capital,  Budepest   -­‐ Soviet  forces  reached  Austrian  frontier  on  20  March  and  took  Vienna  on  14   April   By  end  Jan  Russians  overrun  Upper  Silesia  and  liberated  Auschwitz.  Russian  POWs   here  and  in  other  liberated  camps’  freedom  temporary.  Stalin’s  1942  decree  that   any  Russian  who  captured  considered  traitor    interrogated  by  own  side  before   transported  to  Soviet  ‘gulag’  where  many  died.     April:  Soviet  attack  on  Berlin  reached  climax   -­‐ Soviet  forces  led  by  Zhukov,  Konev  and  Rokossovksy   -­‐ Scale  of  attack  enormous  with  2.5  million  men,  tanks,  aircraft  and  artillery   guns.  Germans  did  have  anything  like  scale  of  equipment  of  enemies  and   when  did  have  tanks,  lacked  fuel.     To  ensure  fastest  progress  Stalin  gave  Zhukov  and  Konev  permission  to  take   Berlin  according  to  who  got  their  first.  Two  fronts  met  to  complete   encirclement  west  of  Potsdam  on  25th.     -­‐ 19  April:  outskirts  Berlin  reached  and  by  25  April  city  encircled   -­‐ Berlin  reduced  to  ruins  as  Soviet  guns  pounded  city     -­‐ German  defence  incapably  led  by  old  men  and  14  year  old  boys     30  April:  stormed  Reichstag  building  but  Hitler  had  already  committed  suicide.     1  May:  Red  Flag  flying  over  Reichstag  building   2  May:  Nazi  Part  dissolved   7  May:  Donitz  representatives  signed  overall  unconditional  surrender  at   Eisenhower’s  HQ  at  Reims   8  May:  surrender  repeated  at  Soviet  HQ     Western  Allies  celebrated  VE  Day  (Victory  in  Europe)  on  8th    

     

THE  NUREMBERG  WAR  CRIMES  TRIALS   

 

Defendants  charged  with  one  or  more  of  following  offensives   1. Crimes  against  peace   2. Crimes  against  humanity   3. War  crimes   4. Conspiracy  to  commit  crimes  against  peace  or  humanity  

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   89     

  

 



  





At  Teheran  Conference  (1943)  Allies  agreed  that  if  defeated  Axis  powers,  legal   action  should  be  taken  against  al  Nazi  and  Japanese  officials.   Basis  of  trials  established  in  London  Charter:  “bring  to  trial  &  punish  the  major  war   criminals  of  Axis  countries”   Allies  created  International  Military  Tribunal  (IMT)  a  new  self  proclaimed  and   unprecedented  legal  entity  in  post  war  Berlin.  Court  proceedings:  Nov  1945  –  Oct   1946   Examination  of  the  Charter  of  the  International  Military  Tribunal  illustrates  attitude   of  Allies.  Bitterness,  revenge  prevailed   Late  1944:  Hitler  ordered  destruction  of  concentration  camps  before  arrival  of   Soviet  armies  but  couldn’t  really  be  carried  out.     Following  conclusion  of  war,  leading  Nazis  on  trial  in  front  of  International  Military   Tribunal  to  account  for  responsibilities  of  scale  or  war  and  extent  of  human   atrocities.     Roosevelt,  Stalin  and  Churchill  agreed  on  terms  under  which  trials  to  operate  in   London  Charter  of  August  1945   However,  is  history  always  written  by  victors?  If  Axis  powers  had  won  Allies  would   be  condemned  for  bombing  of  Dresden;  which  Axis  were  now  being  tried  for   bombing  of  Warsaw   Nonetheless,  Nazi  leaders  needed  to  be  made  example  of  because:   -­‐ Usually  actions  of  individuals  or  junior  officers  who  lost  control  or  acted  as   direct  result  of  extreme  stresses  of  wartime  situations.  However,  German   atrocities  part  of  official  govt  policy   -­‐ Ensure  Germans  realised  what  happened  and  culprits  were  people  whom   Germans  supported  earlier.  Brought  home  to  those  Germans  who  claimed   ignorance  of  camps    enormity  of  crimes  committed     -­‐ Idealistic  hope  similar  acts  of  barbarism  wouldn’t  be  repeated  if  Nazis  made   example  of   -­‐ UN  initiating  and  trials  hoped  to  show  it  body  willing  to  ensure  international   peace  and  morality     24  leading  Nazis  to  be  tried  but  Himmler,  Goebbels  and  Ley  committed  suicide;   Krupp  too  ill  and  Bormann  never  captured  thus  tried  ‘in  absentia’   Trial  of  Nazi  war  criminals  didn’t  end  in  1946.  Decades  after  war  former  Nazis,   concentration  camp  guards  and  SS  officers  tracked  down  and  brought  to  justice.     Trials  created  controversial  legal  precedent.  In  future  years,  more  Nazi  officials,   prison  camp  guards  and  military  officers  arrested  and  brought  to  trial.  Influenced   wide  variety  of  international  jurisprudence  issues  in  post  war  period   1950:  UN  General  Assembly  requested  International  Law  Commission  use   proceedings  of  Nuremberg  as  basis  for  drafting  new  international  criminal  codes.   Also  helped  form  charters  for  organisations  such  as   -­‐ Genocide  Convention  1948   -­‐ Geneva  Convention  on  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War  1949   -­‐ Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  1948   John  Man  discusses  in  ‘Nazism  on  Trial’  inconsistencies  of  Nuremberg  Trials.   Argues  how  nation  could  be  tried  for  aggression  or  breaking  treaty  as  no  legal   framework  existed.   -­‐ No  Italians  placed  on  trial   -­‐ Position  of  Soviet  Union  compromised.  Germans  accused  of  conspiracy  in   plans  for  invasion  of  Poland  which  clearly  part  of  Nazi  Soviet  Pact.  Pact   ignored  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

 

  -­‐ -­‐

Yet  when  Germany  invaded  Russia,  same  pact  deemed  treaty  broken   However  “does  not  in  any  way  diminish  the  crimes  of  the  vanquished,  nor   the  need  to  punish  them”  

   

ANALYSIS:  REASONS  FOR  ALLIED  VICTORY   1.  The  General  Interpretation  of  the  Reasons  for  Allied  Victory      Germany  simply  overwhelmed  by  vastly  superior  economic  and  military  strength  of   allies  against  whom  fighting.  Eventually  found  itself  facing  Britain  and  its  empire,   Soviet,  France,  US,  Italy  (from  1943)  and  host  of  resistance  and  partisan  movements    Greater  allied  production  of  war  materials    Germany’s  over-­‐extended  lines  of  communication    Germany’s  failure  to  take  advantage  of  unpopularity  of  Stalin’s  regime  amongst   various  nationalities      Liability  of  Italy  as  ally    Superior  allied  political  and  military  leadership;  and  Superior  allied  intelligence    Allied  control  of  air;  seas  and  allied  victory  in  Battle  of  the  Atlantic    Failure  to  gain  control  of  North  Africa,  Suez  Canal  and  Middle  East  oil;  and  Failure  to   take  Moscow  in  1941    Becoming  bogged  down  on  Eastern  Front      This  interpretation:  No  single  key  factor  which  accounts  for  victory  of  allied  powers.   War  too  vast,  too  many  people  and  too  many  nations  with  too  many  aspects  for  there  to   be  one  overriding  explanation  for  allied  victory      

2.  Allied  Victory  was  Due  to  Allies’  Gained  Control  of  the  Air    Mid  1944:  strategic  offensive  bombing  campaigns  did  little  to  affect  outcome  of  war.   Indiscriminate  bombing  of  cities  failed  to  break  ill  of  Germans  who  completely  in   grip  of  Nazi  regime    After  this,  airpower  better  directed  to  paralysing  movement  of  German  forces  on   ground  or  reserves  in  train  from  rear,  or  towards  crippling  vital  war  industries      Allied  control  of  air  and  overwhelming  superiority  of  allied  air  power  made   impossible  for  Germany  to  achieve  long  term  military  objectives  and  did  much  to   weaken  German  economy    Luftwaffe  failed  in  Battle  of  Britain  and  Blitz    any  possible  German  invasion  of   Britain  had  to  be  postponed  indefinitely    Hitler  would  always  face  2  front  war  if   decided  to  move  east   -­‐ German  bombing  didn’t  manage  to  affect  British  morale;  arguably  increased   British  determination   -­‐ Made  possible  later  intervention  of  US   -­‐ German  bombing  didn’t  have  debilitating  effect  on  British  economy      Allied  bombing  major  impact  on  Germany’s  ability  to  sustain  war.     -­‐ Became  impossible  for  industry  to  be  geographically  concentrated  hence   impossible  to  maximise  production   -­‐ Forced  German  airforce  to  divert  most  its  fighters  to  defence  of  Germany  and   reduce  sharply  production  of  bmber  aircraft    reduced  German  frontline  of   much  needed  aircraft.     -­‐ Factories  dispersed  across  country  or  forced  underground     -­‐ Germany’s  railway  network  greatly  disrupted,  chemical  and  oil  production   badly  affected    munitions  production  more  problematical     -­‐ German  cities  pulverised  creating  host  of  humanitarian  and  social  problems    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   91    

Forced  Hitler  and  generals  to  think  of  radical  retailiations.  Too  much  faith  in   V1  and  V2  rockets  which  expensive  and  limited  impact.     Ability  of  allies  to  escort  long  range  bombers  with  fighters  later  in  war  to  have   major  effect   -­‐ Early  bombing  raids  over  Germany  fangerous  as  long  distance  planes  lacked   fighter  protection    when  flew  over  Germany  became  vulnerable  to  attack.   Bomber  losses  very  high  early  in  war   -­‐ By  late  1943,  system  perfected  to  enable  fighters  to  fly  distances  as  great  as   bombers    forced  Germans  to  divert  many  its  fighters  to  home  front  to  deal   with  allied  bomber/fighter  threats   -­‐ Hence,  weakened  German  tactical  aerial  strength  on  Eastern  Front  &  in   Normandy.  As  fighters  had  to  be  moved  from  front,  gave  vast  aerial   superiority  to  Soviet  forces  in  east  &  allied  forces  in  Normandy     -­‐ Germany  forced  put  more  effort  to  producing  anti-­‐aircraft  taking  up  33%   artillery  production  by  1944   -­‐ Allies  superiority  evident  in  D  Day;  allies  had  12  000  aircraft  whilst  Germans   had  less  than  500   -­‐ Eventual  allied  success  in  Battle  of  the  Bulge  owed  much  to  superior  air   power   Allied  air  forces  superiority  of  70:1  in  invasion  of  France   -­‐





3.  Allied  Victory  was  Due  to  Allies’  Gained  Control  of  Sea    Roosevelt  and  Churchill  extremely  worried  about  dominance  of  Axis  forces  in   Atlantic    Allied  losses  at  sea  reached  catastrophic  levels  during  1st  3  years  of  war   -­‐ 1940:  1000  allied  ships  sunk  by  German  submarines  (1/4  of  Britain’s   merchant  marine)   -­‐ Jan  –  April  1941:  2  million  tons  shipping  sunk   -­‐ By  early  1943  Britain  had  2  months  oil  supplies  left    Failure  to  gain  control  sea  would  be  disastrous  for  allied  war  effort   -­‐ Britain  could  be  starved  out  as  relief  on  imported  food   -­‐ Links  to  empire  and  Middle  East  oil  would  be  cut   -­‐ Would  be  impossible  to  import  badly  needed  munitions  and  war  equipment   from  North  America   -­‐ Would  be  impossible  for  Americans  to  ship  over  the  millions  of  men  who   would  be  needed  to  take  on  Germans  in  Italy  and  France    Necessity  inspired  allied  technological  innovation  by  end  1943  to  wrest  control  of   Atlantic  from  German  submarine  packs   -­‐ Development  of  long  range  aerial  surveillance,  improved  convoy  systems   and  development  of  centimetric  radar  helped  turn  tide    Allied  control  of  sea  made  possible  massive  American  contribution  to  defeat  of   Germany    

4.  War  was  Lost  on  Eastern  Front    Hitler’s  failure  to  defeat  Soviet  dragged  German  army  into  long  drawn  out  war  of   attrition  on  Eastern  Front  which  destined  to  lose  longer  conflict  went  on    Red  Army  put  up  unexpected  resistance.  Major  defeat  of  Germans  on  Eastern  Front.   Soviet  forces  destroyed  or  disabled  estimated  607  divisons  between  1941  –  1945.      1941:  Germans  close  to  defeating  Soviet    Operation  Barbarossa  achieved  initially  enormous  success  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

 

 

Luftwaffe  decimated  Soviet  air  force  during  first  few  days  operation     By  autumn  of  1941  western  Russia  in  German  hands,  Leningrad  under  siege,   Kiev  taken  and  Moscow  about  to  be  attacked     However,  Moscow  survived  in  Dec  1941   -­‐ Zhukov  military  skills   -­‐ Transfer  of  750  000  Siberian  forces  westwards   -­‐ Errors  on  German  side  in  timing  and  supplies,  Russian  scorched  earth  policy,   inadequate  and  inappropriate  German  equipment   -­‐ Winter   Russia’s  survival  in  1941    change  to  mobilise  enormous  economic  and  human   resources   -­‐ Industries  moved  east  to  escape  German  bombing.  Soon  achieved   unbelievable  feats  of  production   -­‐ Soviet  wartime  production  noted  for  its  simplicity  and  rationalisation   -­‐ Surge  of  patriotic  and  religious  fervour  amongst  Russian  people  which   spurred  them  on  to  superhuman  efforts   -­‐ Soviet  Union  centralised  police  state  which  made  rapid  mobilisation  of   nation  easy  to  achieve   As  result  of  such  factors,  Soviet  able  to  gradually  defeat  German  forces  even  though   human  and  economic  costs  enormous.     -­‐ Stalingrad  marked  turning  point  on  Eastern  Front   -­‐ Kursk  initiative  slip  away  from  Wehrmacht   -­‐ 1944+  Russian  forces  able  to  push  back  Germans  to  own  land     -­‐ -­‐







 

5.  Allied  Victory  Result  of  Intervention  of  US    US  deciding  factor.  Even  before  its  entry  done  much  to  sustain  British  war  effort.  US   human,  economic  and  military  resources  vast  and  superior.  Their  business   expertise  brought  wartime  production  levels  to  extreme.    Economist  Goldsmith  claimed  gross  domestic  product  of  Allies  won  war.    Overy  argues  economic  size  doesn’t  explain  outcome  of  war.  Germany  had  greater   industrial  capacity  than  Britain.  Argues  no  other  way  to  defeat  Germany  than  defeat   it  on  battlefield      Nonetheless,  vast  supply  of  American  armaments  and  equipment  supplied  and   sustained  the  war  on  Western  Front  and  provided  vital  aid  for  Russia.  Most  Soviet   rail  network  supplied  with  locomotives,  wagons  and  rails  made  in  USA    Before  Dec  1941:  Americans  assisting  Britain   -­‐ Churchill  managed  to  do  deals  with  Roosevelt  on  gaining  extra  destroyers   -­‐ US  and  Britain  established  moral  high  ground  in  conflict  with  singing  of   Atlantic  Charter   -­‐ Lend-­‐Lease  system  did  much  to  assist  British  and  Soviet  Union    US  military  key  factor  in  bringing  Germany  down   -­‐ Much  of  bombing  of  Germany  carried  out  by  American  air  force   -­‐ US  navy  crucial  in  getting  supplies  across  Atlantic     -­‐ From  1944  main  military  engagements  in  Western  Europe  dominated  by   American  army  led  by  American  generals.  Allied  supreme  commander,   Eisenhower,  was  American      American  economy  couldn’t  be  matched  in  its  efficiency  and  ability  to  produce   -­‐ Productivity  in  shipbuilding  increased  by  25%  a  year  during  war      In  long  drawn  out  war,  Germany  couldn’t  survive  against  such  economic  and   military  power    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   93     

By  comparison,  German  lacked  allies  who  capable  of  offering  real  assistance   -­‐ Italy  relatively  weak   -­‐ Japan  fought  own  separate  war  

 

6.  Weakness  of  German  System:  Structuralist  vs  Intentionalist  Historical  Debate    Hitler’s  ambitions  far  exceeded  Wehrmacht’s  ability  to  fulfil  them    Germany’s  industrial  infrastructures  couldn’t  match  combined  economic  strength  of   Allied  powers    Axis  alliance  eventually  collapsed    Engima/Ultra  intelligence  codes  represented  major  Allied  asset    Nazi  racial  policy  towards  minorities  in  captured  territories  encouraged  resistance   groups.  Ukrainians  for  example  keen  to  thrown  off  Russian  rule  but  atrocities   committed  against  them  assured  fight  against  Gs    Organisation  of  Germany’s  war  effort  poor.  Failed  to  make  best  possible  use  of   available  resources.  Different  sections  of  Nazi  state  made  decisions  about  war  and   wartime  economy  often  overlapping  or  contradicting    Hitler’s  inadequacies  and  mistakes  as  war  commander  contributed  to  Germany’s   defeat.  Decisions  to  attack  Soviet  before  defeating  Britain  and  to  declare  war  on  USA   disastrous      Late  start  of  campaign  against  Soviet  in  1941    German  troops  arrived  outside   Moscow  as  winter  commenced.  Extreme  cold  critical  for  unprepared  army    Joint  American  and  British  invasion  of  North  Africa  in  Nov  1942  (Operation  Torch)   came  as  surprise  to  German  High  command    evacuation  impossible    only  had   choice  of  resisting  or  surrendering.  Victory  in  North  Africa  provided  Allies   secure  base  from  which  to  mount  invasion  of  Southern  Europe   -­‐ Sept  1943:  sea-­‐borne  landings  in  Sicily  (Operation  Avalanche)   -­‐ August  1944:  invasion  of  Southern  France  (Operation  Anvil  changed  to   Dragoon)    Divisions  among  German  High  Command  prevented  development  of  cohesive   defensive  strategy  to  meet  expected  invasion  of  France  in  June  1944.    

 

Structuralists    Acknowledge  validity  of  intentionalists  but  argue  Germany’s  defeat  and  collapse  of   Nazism  result  of  structure  of  Nazi  regime  and  inner  workings   -­‐ Lack  of  centralised  control    rivalry  and  gross  economic  inefficiency   -­‐ Failure  to  immediately  go  to  total  war   -­‐ As  regime  radicalised  and  spiralled  out  of  control,  obsession  with  racial   issues  diverted  resources  and  manpower  from  main  aim  of  fighting  war.      

Historian  Richard  Overy     “There  was  nothing  preordained  about  allied  success”.  Pre  El  Alamein/Stalingrad   allied  victory  uncertain  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

 

Intentionalists    Argue  defeat  of  Germany  and  collapse  of  Nazism  direct  result  of  war  which  was   product  of  Hitler’s  intention  all  along  to  pursue  lebensraum  in  east   -­‐ Poor  preparation   -­‐ Failure  to  defeat  Britain  and  Russia   -­‐ Extensive  nature  of  war  which  stretched  Germany’s  limited  resources  

   





  

                                                                       

Key  argument  is  result  of  war  cannot  be  explained  by  simply  stating  that  allies  had   more  resources  than  Axis   Why  were  allies  able  to  maximise  economic  superiority?   -­‐ Overy  points  to  factors  such  as  internal  political  rivalries,  military   interference,  military  interference  and  lack  of  mass  production   Why  Germany  not  able  to  maximise  economic  strengths?   -­‐ Germany’s  economic  technological  failures.   -­‐ 1944:  could  fire  rockets  into  England  but  still  needed  1.25  million  horses  to   move  its  army   Production  and  invention  sealed  allied  victory.  Allies  proved  capable  of  maximising   production  whether  through  US  business,  heroic  Russian  sacrifice  or  British  grit,   whereas  Germany  didn’t.     Invention  and  innovation  won  battle  in  air  and  at  sea   Combined  with  superior  allied  leadership  and  moral  high  ground    allied  victory.     Raises  great  paradox  of  WW2  that  western  democracy  saved  by  exertions  of   communism.  States  without  efforts  of  Soviet  difficult  to  see  how  democracies  could   have  defeated  Germany  

                                                                                                         

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  4.  End  of  the  Conflict  

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   95  

                                 

HSC  Style  Questions     1.  Growth  of  European  Tensions    2009  HSC:  To  what  extent  was  the  policy  of  appeasement  responsible  for  the   outbreak  of  war  in  Europe?    2008  HSC:  Assess  the  significance  of  the  Nazi-­‐Soviet  Aggression  Pact  to  the   outbreak  of  war  in  1939    2006  HSC:  Evaluate  the  view  that  the  dictators  Hitler  and  Mussolini  were  primarily   responsible  for  the  tensions  that  led  to  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe  in  1939.       To  what  extent  are  the  dictators,  Hitler  and  Mussolini,  to  blame  for  causing  the   tensions  that  brought  on  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe  in  1939?   Three  possible  lines  of  argument   1. Hitler  and  Mussolini  entirely  to  blame  for  bringing  tensions  that  led  to  war  in  1939   2. Despite  evil  intentions,  Hitler  and  Mussolini  not  to  be  blamed  for  tensions;  merely   taking  advantage  of  opportunities  that  arose.  Blame  lies  elsewhere   3. Dictators  should  take  an  extent  of  the  blame  but  too  simplistic  to  place  entire  blame   on  their  shoulders.   Discussion  for  3rd  argument    In  superficial  way,  blame  clearly  lies  with  dictators  for  causing  tensions  that  led  to   war  in  1939.  Their  aggressive  paths  significantly  contributed  to  outbreak  of  war   -­‐ Long  term  aims  of  both  Hitler  and  Mussolini  involved  tearing  up  Treaty  of   Versailles.  Had  no  intention  of  respecting  status  quo  and  made  clear   prepared  to  go  to  war  to  support  such  aims   o Identify  aims  and  explain  significance   -­‐ Hitler’s  actions  in  Rhineland,  Anschluss,  Sudetenland  and  Czechoslovakia   showed  him  to  be  bent  on  European  domination.  His  steady  rearmament  and   threats  of  war  kept  tensions  high   -­‐ Hitler’s  move  against  Poland  upset  European  balance    western  powers  had   to  stop  him   o Britain  and  France  endeavoured  to  maintain  peace  and  forced  to  war   by  Nazi  aggression  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   97    

Mussolini’s  actions  also  caused  tensions  to  rise.  Actions  in  Abyssinia  and   Spain  did  much  to  destroy  principle  of  collective  security   However,  though  Hitler’s  and  Mussolini’s  actions  clearly  raised  tensions  and   undermined  League  and  Collective  Security  war  actually  resulted  as  result  of  failure   of  other  powers  to  stand  up  to  them     -­‐ Define  appeasement   -­‐ Argument:  appeasement  encouraged  dictators  in  aggression,  appeasers   totally  and  naively  misunderstood  type  of  men  dealing  with.  Failure   adequately  rearm    little  alternative  to  appeasemt   -­‐ However,  appeases  achieved  what  they  could  and  faced  with  economic  and   strategic  restraints   o Revisionist  line  of  thought   -­‐ Soviet  decision  in  August  1939  to  deal  wi/  Hitler  rather  than  stand  up  to  him     war  over  Poland  inevt  



 

To  what  extent  was  the  collapse  of  collective  security  the  main  cause  of  the  tensions   that  led  to  the  outbreak  of  conflict  in  Europe?    Line  of  argument:  principle  of  collective  security  great  idealistic  hope  of  inter-­‐war   period.  Belied  powers  working  through  League  of  Nations  could  work  together  to   prevent  aggression  and  chain  of  events  led  to  war  in  1914.  Collective  security   collapsed,  unable  to  handle  realities  of  European  and  world  politics    no  means  to   stop  aggression  of  Axis  powers  whose  actions  increased  tensions  in  Europe.  Only   response  to  this  aggression  in  form  of  appeasement  which  doomed  to  fail    Background  of  League  and  how  operated.  Explain  idea  of  collective  security.     -­‐ Article  10:  Collective  Security  Article     -­‐ Article  12:  Arbitration  Article   -­‐ Article  16:  Sanctions  Article    Collective  security  unable  to  function  due  to  realities  of  European  and  world   politics.  Reasons  for  failure:   -­‐ Failure  of  internationalism  in  world  of  aggressive  nationalism   -­‐ Failure  of  League  to  reflect  true  balance  of  power   -­‐ Inability  of  Britain  and  France  to  do  job   -­‐ Lack  of  any  coercive  machinery  so  nations  like  Japan  could  act  with   impunity.      Failure  of  collective  security  enabled  dictators  to  act  without  fear  of  any  retribution.   Hitler  and  Mussolini  further  acted  to  heighten  tension  in  Europe     -­‐ Hitler’s  conquests  in  Rhineland,  Austria,  Czechoslovakia,  Spain;  Italy  in   Abyssinia      Without  collective  security,  Britain  and  France  resorted  to  appeasement   -­‐ Merely  encouraged  dictators  leading  to  eventual  fall  and  events  of  1939    Had  collective  security  had  support  of  all  major  powers  and  League  able  to   overcome  nationalistic  urges  of  time,  tensions  in  Europe  may  been  controlled.  Its   collapse  gave  dictators  chance.  Western  response  of  appeasement  failed  due  to   complete  misunderstanding  of  nature  of  Hitler  and  Mussolini.  Thus,  collapse  of   collective  security  main  cause  of  tensions  that  led  to  outbreak  of  conflict  in  Europe     2.  The  Course  of  the  European  War    2009  HSC:  Assess  the  significance  of  the  conflict  in  North  Africa  to  Allied  victory  in   the  European  War    2007  HSC:  Evaluate  the  view  that  Operation  Barbarossa  was  the  major  turning   point  of  the  European  War  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  HSC  Style  Questions  

-­‐

 

How  significant  was  Britain’s  survival  in  1940  to  the  eventual  outcome  of  the  war  in   Europe?     Assess  success  of  German  strategies  during  course  of  the  European  War  in  the   period  September  1939  to  June  1941   1. German  strategies  in  period  extremely  successful  as,  by  and  large,  Germany  had   achieved  aims  it  set  out   2. German  strategies  successful  as  by  June  1941  Germany  gained  control  over  whole  of   Europe  and  faced  only  isolated  and  weakened  Britain     3. German  strategies  failed  by  June  1941  because  as  Germany  contemplated  attack  on   Russia,  knew  it  would  be  facing  two  front  war   4. German  strategies  mixed  success,  at  best,  in  period  up  to  June  1941  and  only  gained   measure  of  success  because  of  weakness  of  opponents     Discussion  for  4th  argument    Superficial  look  at  map  of  Europe  in  June  1941  might  lead  one  to  conclude  German   military  strategy  long  success  story.  Axis  control  of  Europe  stretched  from  Arctic  to   Sahara,  from  Atlantic  to  Russian  frontier.  Apart  from  Britain,  faced  no  opposition  in   Europe.  However  on  closer  examination  been  setbacks.  Future  far  from  certain  and   Germany  yet  to  be  tested  by  hardening  enemy    Hitler’s  strategy  against  Poland  in  Sept/Oct  1939  seems  to  have  been  extremely   successful   -­‐ Wehrmacht’s  use  of  blitzkrieg  tactics  worked  very  effectively   -­‐ Poland  defeated  inside  a  month  with  light  German  casualties   -­‐ Pre-­‐war  agreement  with  Soviet  Union  been  honoured   -­‐ Poland’s  quick  defeat  meant  wouldn’t  face  2  front  war    However  on  closer  examination  success  in  this  campaign  shouldn’t  be  exaggerated   -­‐ Poland’s  defences  clearly  no  match  for  German  offensive  forces   -­‐ Polish  strategy  of  fighting  in  open  west  [played  into  Germany’s  hands   (blitzkrieg)   -­‐ Poland’s  quick  demise  helped  by  Soviet  invasion  from  east   -­‐ Invading  Poland  now  left  Hitler  with  west  to  deal  with  while  Soviet  resided   on  Germany’s  new  frontier   -­‐ Germany  couldn’t  fight  on  as  it  needed  to  replenish  its  war  supplies    Victory  in  west  spectacular  as  Germany  overran  Denmark,  Norway,  Low  Countries   and  France   -­‐ Swedish  iron  ore  supplies  secured   -­‐ Control  of  Norwegian  and  Low  Countries’  coasts  gave  German  strategic   advantage  over  Britain   -­‐ Collapse  of  France  gave  Germany  control  of  Western  Europe   -­‐ Britain  remained  in  war  but  greatly  weakened  and  isolated    However,  results  of  campaigns  in  west  revealed  limits  of  German  strategy   -­‐ As  each  nation  conquered,  large  occupation  forces  required  to  control  lands   (400  000  in  Norway)   -­‐ Poor  French  leadership,  low  morale  &  willingness  to  deal  w/  Hitler  eased   German  western  campaigns.   -­‐ Occupying  Germans  faced  strong  resistance  movements  (e.g.  France)   -­‐ Failure  to  knock  Britian  out  of  war  reveal  several  problems  with  German   strategy   o E.g.  weaknesses  in  Luftwaffe,  errors  of  judgement  on  Hitler’s  part   

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   99    

Britain’s  constant  presence  in  war    Hitler  always  have  2  front  war  if   decided  on  attacking  Russia   Events  closer  to  June  1941  revealed  similar  flaws.  Axis  success  in  Balkans  and  North   Africa  suggested  continuation  of  successful  German  strategy     -­‐ Allies  been  gained  in  Eastern  Europe   -­‐ Yugoslavia  and  Greece  easily  defeated  and  allied  troops  forced  out  of  Greece   and  Crete   -­‐ Rommel’s  presence  in  North  Africa  re-­‐established  Axis  advantage  in  North   Africa   However  on  closer  examination  situation  not  as  good  as  seemed   -­‐ Balkans  campaign  meant  Hitler’s  planned  attack  on  Russia  delayed   o Explain  significance  of  this:  time,  winter  etc   -­‐ German  presence  in  Greece  and  North  Africa  result  of  Italian  failures.  Italy   not  useful  ally   -­‐ Commitment  in  North  Africa    Germany  having  to  fight  on  another  front     -­‐





 

To  what  extent  was  the  Russian  campaign  a  turning  point  in  the  European  War?   1. Russian  campaign  clearly  turning  point  of  war  as  up  until  this  point  Germany  had   virtual  non  stop  military  success.  Failure  to  gain  quick  success  in  Russia  revealed   flaws  in  blitzkrieg  and  long  drawn  out  war  would  benefit  Russia  due  to  its  vast   resources  and  huge  population  compared  to  Germany’s  limited  strength     2. Russian  campaign  clearing  very  important  but  to  argue  it  was  turning  point  is   unhistorical  as  should  not  be  considered  in  isolation  from  other  events  in  war   Discussion  for  1st  Argument    Prior  to  Russian  campaign  Germany  had  experienced  almost  non  stop  military   success  using  blitzkrieg  tactics    Germany  in  almost  invincible  position  in  June  1941   -­‐ Refer  to  its  allies,  weakness  of  potential  opponents,  control  of  resources,   strength  of  navy    Early  part  of  Russian  campaign  proved  the  point    However,  Barbarossa  failed  to  achieve  its  goals  in  1941:   -­‐ Explain  goals,  show  what  went  wrong  and  suggest  why   -­‐ What  was  implication  of  failure?    Germany  took  up  offensive  again  in  1942  with  some  success  but  then  experienced   horrors  of  Stalingrad   -­‐ Explain  importance  of  consequences  of  Germany’s  failure  at  Stalingrad    Germany’s  failure  at  Kursk  sealed  its  fate   -­‐ Explain  significance  of  Kursk,  Russia’s  growing  strength  &  tactical  skills  and   what  meant  for  wider  war   -­‐ Germany  lost  the  initiative  on  Eastern  Front    Might  suggest  Germany  lost  its  opportunity  for  victory  in  wra  with  defeat  in  Russia   -­‐ Failure  in  Russia  coincided  with  defeat  in  North  Africa,  growing  presence  of   America  and  growing  Anglo-­‐American  control  of  Atlantic    Failure  in  Russian  campaign  sealed  matter  of  when  Germany  would  lose  rather  than   if    turning  point    

Assess  the  significance  of  the  conflict  in  North  Africa  to  the  course  of  the  European   War.  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  HSC  Style  Questions  

 

  





  



Allied  success  in  North  Africa  of  major,  if  not  decisive,  importance  for  course  of  War.   Provided  allies  with  major  strategic  and  economic  advantages,  boosted  British   morale  and  augured  well  for  future  Anglo-­‐American  cooperation.  Severely   weakened  Axis.  However  as  turning  point  in  war  didn’t  have  decisive  impact   Germany’s  failure  in  Russian  campaign  had   Provide  narrative  background  of  events  in  conflict  in  North  Africa   -­‐ Early  allied  success  against  Italy,  arrival  of  Rommel,  success  of  Afrika  Korps,   Battle  of  El  Alamein  and  eventual  removal  of  Axis  troops  from  North  Africa.     Allied  success  in  North  Africa  enormous  strategic  implications   -­‐ Allied  control  of  Mediterranean  and  opportunities  this  gave  for  future   campaigns   -­‐ Maintained  British  control  of  Suez  Canal  (importance)   -­‐ Prevented  possible  linking  of  Rommel’s  forces  with  those  inside  Russia   Secured  allied  control  of  Middle  East  supplies   -­‐ Refer  to  Axis  difficulties  in  gaining  oil  supplies     Boost  to  British  morale     -­‐ Explain  Britain’s  long  series  of  setbacks   After  early  difficulties  in  Operation  Torch,  later  stages  of  conflict  in  North  Africa   showed  Ango-­‐American  forces  could  work  well  together   -­‐ Examples  of  actions  in  Sicily,  Italy  and  later  France   However  though  conflict  in  North  Africa  important  and  certainly  weakened  Axis   cause,  was  on  Eastern  Front  in  Russian  campaign  where  war  turned  decisively  in   allies’  favour  due  to  scale  of  German  losses  and  magnitude  of  Russian  war  effort.    

 

3.  Civilians  at  War    2007  HSC:  To  what  extent  did  Allied  and  Axis  strategies  during  World  War  2  affect   civilians?     Evaluate  the  view  that  Germany’s  defeat  in  World  War  2  was  the  result  of  domestic   failure    Failure  to  go  to  total  war   -­‐ Concern  of  home  front  morale  maintained   -­‐ Wasted  production  of  unessential  products   -­‐ Allies’  preparation  much  more  long  term  and  thus  successful    Influence  of  ideology  overriding  practicality   -­‐ Use  of  women.  Speer’s  attempts  limited   -­‐ Pursuit  of  Holocaust:  waste  of  resources  and  soldiers    Military  interference   -­‐ Too  many  models    limits  possibility  of  mass  production    Structure  of  Nazi  regime    domestic  failure   -­‐ Empire  building   -­‐ Rivalries   -­‐ Waste  and  duplication    confusion.       Explain  the  origin  and  impact  of  the  Holocaust    cause  and  effect    Nazi  ideology  deeply  rooted  in  19th  cent  Social  Darwinist  ideas  and  strong  belief  in   superiority  of  Aryan  culture    anti  Semitism  widespread  in  early  20th  cent.  Hitler   promoted  such  ideas  long  before  gained  office.  Once  in  power,  in  position  to   promote  racial  beliefs  gradually  throughout  1930s,  and  then  with  horrific  efficiency   during  war  leading  to  Holocaust.  However  some  historians  suggest  Holocaust  came    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   10 1    



   

not  specifically  from  Nai  ideology  but  nature  of  Nazi  regime  and  extreme  conditions   it  faced  during  war   Holocaust  direct  result  of  Nazi  ideology  put  into  practice   -­‐ Explain  nature  of  Nazi  ideology   -­‐ Discuss  Social  Darwinism,  Aryan  culture,  Volkgemeinschaft     -­‐ Conclude  with  obsession  Nazis  had  about  racial  purity  and  perfect  race  and   implications  for  Jews  and  minority  groups   Hitler’s  obsession  with  racism  and  anti-­‐Semitism  predates  coming  to  power   -­‐ Mein  Kampf   -­‐ Intentionalist  School  of  Thought   Once  in  power  able  to  pursue  these  policies  in  1930s   -­‐ Nazi  anti-­‐Jewish  legislation  and  Crystal  Night   Onset  of  war  put  into  sharper  contrast  what  to  do  about  Jews  and  minority  groups   -­‐ Once  in  control  of  Eastern  Europe  and  much  of  Soviet  Nazis  now  able  to  put   ideological  beliefs  into  widespread  practice   Explain  impact  of  Nazi  beliefs  on  Jews  and  other  minority  groups  now  that  Nazis  in   control   -­‐ Creation  of  ghettos   -­‐ Construction  of  camps   -­‐ Resettlement     -­‐ Implementation  of  Final  Solution.    

4.  End  of  the  Conflict    2008  HSC:  Evaluate  the  view  that  the  air  war  determined  the  outcome  of  the   European  War    2006  HSC:  To  what  extent  was  the  Soviet  Union  responsible  for  Allied  victory  in  the   conflict  in  Europe?    Assess  the  view  that  the  Allied  victory  in  World  War  2  was  due  to  the  war  at  sea.      Assess  the  view  that  the  defeat  of  Germany  was  primarily  the  result  of  the  entry  of   the  US     Assess  the  importance  of  the  air  war  in  the  eventual  victory  of  the  allied  powers  over   the  Axis   1. Air  war  quite  simply  key  factor  which  explains  eventual  allied  victory  over  Axis   powers.  If  allies  not  gained  and  maintained  control  of  air,  Axis  powers  would  have   survived  and  probs  gone  to  victory   2. Air  war  simply  one  of  variety  of  factors  which  explain  eventual  victory  of  allies   powers.  Of  equal  importance  was  outcome  on  Russian  front,  victory  in  North  Africa,   allied  supremacy  in  Atlantic  and  superior  political  and  military  leadership  of  allies   3. Air  war  eventually  of  little  consequence  in  final  outcome  of  war.  Allied  victory  came   for  overwhelming  economic  and  military  superiority  against  which  Axis  powers  had   no  answer    minor  significance   4. Air  war  factor  of  first  importance  in  eventual  allied  victory  over  Axis  powers.   However,  alone  would  not  have  led  to  defeat  of  Germany.  Crucial  factor  was  success   of  Red  Army  on  Eastern  Front     Discussion  for  4th  Argument    Air  war  of  major  importance  in  explaining  why  allied  powers  achieved  victory  over   Axis.  Made  possible  survival  of  Britain  in  1940;  if  Britain  falled  in  1940  German  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  HSC  Style  Questions  

 

 











 

victory  highly  likely.  Had  catastrophic  effect  on  German  war  production    made   impossible  for  Germany  to  match  allied  production.  Indirectly,  but  crucially,  air   power  weakened  German  military  position  in  east  and  later  Normandy.  German  war   effort  most  effectively  destroyed  due  to  efforts  of  Soviet  Union  in  east   Luftwaffe  failed  to  win  Battle  of  Britain  and  to  damage  morale  British  people  during   Blitz   -­‐ Britain  survived  Battle  of  Britain  due  to  skill  and  courage  of  RAF,  use  of  radar   and  German  errors   -­‐ Hitler’s  decision  to  bomb  London  and  other  cities  gave  Fighter  Command   breathing  space.  Failed  to  break  will  of  British  people   Failure  to  defeat  Britain  of  crucial  long  term  significance     -­‐ Hitler  destined  to  fight  2  front  war.  Explain  significance   -­‐ Britain’s  survival  meant  North  Africa  wouldn’t  fall  Axis   -­‐ Britain’s  survival  made  possible  later  crucial  involvement  of  US  and  invasion   of  France   -­‐ Also  made  possible  bombing  of  Germany   Bombing  of  German  far  worse  than  anything  British  experienced  (give  examples).   Major  impact  on  weakening  German  war  effort   -­‐ Ceiling  put  on  production  despite  efforts  of  Speer   -­‐ Railway  network  disrupted   -­‐ Chemical  and  oil  production  suffered   -­‐ Major  social  disruption  occurred   Allies’  success  in  developing  long  range  fighter  escorts  for  bomber  force  meant   Germans  had  to  switch  fighter  aircraft  to  home  front  and  produce  more  anti-­‐aircraft   guns   -­‐ Weakened  German  military’s  tactical  air  strength  on  Eastern  Front  and  later   in  Normandy   -­‐ Instead  of  producing  offensive  weaponry  Germans  used  scarce  resources  to   defend  cities  &  economy   However  it  was  on  Eastern  Front  that  effected  German  army  most   -­‐ Wehrmacht  bogged  down  on  Eastern  Front   -­‐ Failure  to  defeat  Red  Army  in  1941  allowed  Russia  to  take  advantage  of   enormous  human  and  economic  resources   o Led  to  defeats  at  Stalingrad,  Kursk,  Operation  Bagration   -­‐ German  losses  on  eastern  front  enormous  and  Germans  simply  couldn’t   replace  them   -­‐ Part  reason  for  inability  to  replace  losses:  impact  of  allied  bombing  campaign   against  G  home  front  

To  what  extent  were  the  events  of  the  final  twelve  months  of  the  war  responsible  for   the  allied  victory  in  the  European  War?   1. Actions  in  final  12  months  decisive  in  determining  outcome  of  war.  Up  to  that  point,   war  on  knife  edge   2. Outcome  of  events  of  final  12  months  result  of  events  earlier  in  war    

Discussion  for  2nd  Argument    During  final  12  months  of  war  Germans  fought  with  great  tenacity.  Allies  clearly   didn’t  have  clear  run  to  Berlin.  However,  with  only  occasional  exception  was  story   of  one  defeat  after  another  and  this  due  to  earlier  events  in  war.  Thus  final  12  

 

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   10 3  













months  of  war  didn’t  decide  outcome  of  war.  Rather  events  earlier  in  war   responsible  for  deciding  outcome  of  final  12  months     Mid  1944  Axis  powers  in  increasingly  desperate  position   -­‐ Steadily  pushed  back  on  Eastern  Front   -­‐ North  Africa  long  lost  (brief  mention)   -­‐ Italy  facing  allied  onslaught   -­‐ Bombing  campaign  hurting  Germany   In  this  context    allies  invaded  Normandy   -­‐ Details  of  D  Day   -­‐ Operation  Overlord  only  possible  because  of  survival  of  Britain  in  1940   (brief)   -­‐ Massive  US  presence  in  Overlord  couldn’t  have  happened  without  Anglo-­‐ American  control  of  sea   o Battle  of  Atlantic   -­‐ Allied  air  superiority  only  possible  because  of  Germany’s  need  to  divert   fighters  to  Home  Front   Massive  Russian  offensives  of  1944  (give  examples)  steadily  pushed  Germans  back   to  their  own  land  and  defeat  Axis  allies  one  by  one.  Germans  simply  cannot  match   size  and  speed  of  Russians   -­‐ Failure  to  innovate  sees  German  forces  still  reliant  on  horsepower  whereas   Red  Army  totally  mechanised.  Lend-­‐Lease  helped  Red  Army   -­‐ Axis  forces  suffer  air  inferiority  for  same  reason  as  in  Normandy     -­‐ Failures  in  German  economy  prevented  maximisation  of  output  so  can’t   equal  Russian  power   -­‐ Allied  bombing  major  problem   German  resistance  to  allied  move  through  France  and  into  Low  Countries  strong  but   ineffective   -­‐ Use  of  heavy  armour  in  Falaise  Gap  holds  up  allied  advance  but  allied   destruction  of  that  armour  disastrous  as  Germans  cannot  replace   -­‐ Similarly  on  Eastern  Front  actions  against  Red  Army  (examples)  led  to   destruction  of  tanks  and  aircraft  that  cant  be  replaced   -­‐ Re-­‐emphasise  that  inability  to  replace  armour  and  aircraft  result  of  earlier   actions  in  war   Moments  of  significant  German  resistance.  Operation  Market  Garden  and  Ardennes   Offensive  (some  detail)   -­‐ Allied  disaster  at  Arnhem  short  lived  acquittal   -­‐ Allied  air  power  finally  destroys  German  advance  at  Ardennes  which   petering  out  anyway   -­‐ Brave  German  resistance  against  Russians  as  Red  Army  descends  on  Berlin   led  by  Volkssturm  troops  indicating  desperation   Germany  finally  destroyed  by  allied  advances  from  west,  south  and  east.  Unable  to   rsist  these  advances  because  of  impact  of  allied  actions  earlier  in  war.    

 

To  what  extent  was  the  collapse  of  collective  security  the  main  cause  of  the  tensions   that  led  to  the  outbreak  of  conflict  in  Europe?   The  outbreak  of  the  conflict  in  Europe  was  the  result  of  a  variety  of  factors  in  a  gradual   process  from  1935  –  1945.  The  collapse  of  collective  security  accounts  for  the  main  cause  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  HSC  Style  Questions  

 

 

of  this  outbreak  as  its  failure  exacerbated  the  tensions  in  Europe.  The  League  of  Nations   was  instigated  to  achieve  international  peace  and  security  post  World  War  One,  yet  its   structural  weaknesses  disallowed  for  a  strong  consolidation  of  collective  security.   Consequently,  the  dictatorships  of  Hitler  and  Mussolini  were  able  to  pursue  their   aggressive  foreign  policies  without  fear  of  reprimand.  Upon  recognising  the  failure  of   collective  security,  the  Allies  resorted  to  the  ineffective  policy  of  appeasement  which   further  encouraged  Hitler  and  Mussolini  to  act  without  concern  of  consequences.  As  such,   the  collapse  of  collective  security  is  to  hold  primary  responsibility  for  the  outbreak  of   conflict  in  Europe.       The  aims  of  the  League  of  Nations  were  never  realised,  thus  impacting  its  chances  of   success  to  which  it  is  to  hold  primary  responsibility  for  the  outbreak  of  conflict  in  Europe.   The  League  of  Nations  had  been  instigated  based  on  Wilson’s  Fourteen  Points  in  the  hopes   of  international  cooperation.  Theoretically,  Article  10  of  the  Covenant,  the  Collective   Security  Article,  called  for  members  to  guarantee  each  other  against  aggression  for  the   maintenance  of  peace  by  collective  action.  However,  the  structural  weaknesses  of  the   League  did  not  allow  for  this  to  occur.  Despite  the  sanctions  of  the  League  Covenant,  the   organisation  did  not  possess  a  true  balance  of  world  powers,  and  hence  the  consequences   of  breaking  articles  are  not  considered  severe.  The  United  States,  for  example,  did  not   ratify  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  as  it  recognised  that  the  League  lacked  clearly  specific   guarantees  and  methods.  Furthermore,  the  Soviet  Union  was  refused  membership  based   on  fears  of  Communism.  Thus,  these  two  powerful  nations  were  not  included  in  the   provisions  of  disarmament  as  outlined  in  Article  8  of  the  League  Covenant  requiring  for  the   “reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  national  safety”.  As  a   result,  member  nations  did  not  disarm  completely  as  the  Covenant  called  for  disarmament   based  on  the  defence  of  their  nation.  With  two  super  powers  not  bound  by  such  policies,   effectively  disarmament  failed  as  signatory  nations  feared  their  security.     With  the  US’  absence,  Britain  and  France  were  the  two  ‘superpowers’  of  the  League.   However,  not  only  was  there  a  lack  of  confidence  in  their  leadership  ability,  but  their   interests  also  conflicted.  Historian  AJP  Taylor  emphasises  that  France  wanted  the  League  to   develop  into  a  system  of  security  uniting  European  powers  against  Germany;  however,   Britain  regarded  the  League  as  a  system  of  conciliation  which  would  include  Germany.   With  such  structural  weaknesses  evident,  members  began  to  lose  confidence  in  the  League.   Members  recognised  that  theoretically,  the  Articles  of  the  League  encompassed  much   justice  and  nobility;  however,  the  majority  of  them  were  impractical.  With  this  loss  of  faith,   member  nations  were  generally  uncooperative,  disconnected  and  in  the  interwatr  period   nationalism  took  precedence  over  hopes  of  internationalism.    Thus,  the  very  attitudes  and   goals  of  nations  during  this  period  never  allowed  for  the  success  of  the  League  of  Nations   nor  that  of  collective  security   The  conflict  of  Abyssinia  is  an  example  whereby  the  failure  of  collective  security  allowed   for  Mussolini‘s  aggressive  foreign  policy  to  take  place;  thereby  holding  primary   responsibility  for  bringing  about  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe.  Abyssinia  provided   Mussolini  with  an  opportunity  for  imperial  expansion,  the  restoration  of  Italian  honour  and    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   10 5    

As  a  result  of  the  failure  of  collective  security,  the  Allies  resorted  to  the  policy  of   Appeasement  which  strongly  contributed  to  the  outbreak  of  conflict  in  Europe.   Appeasement  was  the  policy  of  inaction  against  aggressors  out  of  fear  of  provoking  an   outbreak  of  war.  The  failure  of  the  League  of  Nations  created  an  environment  whereby   appeasement  seemed  to  be  the  only  logical  option,  despite  its  ineffective  nature.  This  was   because  the  Allies,  particularly  France,  wanted  to  avoid  another  international  war  as  the   existence  of  war  weariness  was  still  strong.  The  governments  understand  that  any   alternative  would  culminate  in  much  social  and  political  discontent,  thereby  encouraging   peace  regardless  of  the  repercussions.  Consequently,  Mussolini  and  Hitler  were  practically   encouraged  to  pursue  their  policies  of  expansionism  as  they  pleased,  without   repercussions,  further  heightening  the  tensions  in  Europe.  The  Czechoslovakia  Crisis  is  an   example  whereby  appeasement,  as  a  result  of  the  failure  of  collective  security,  contributed   to  the  outbreak  of  conflict  in  Europe.  Czechoslovakia  had  emerged  post  1918  with  a   multinational  population,  most  significantly  including  that  of  an  estimated  3  million   Germans  in  the  Sudetenland.  In  accord  with  Hitler’s  policy  of  lebensraum,  he  wanted  to   unite  them  into  the  Third  Reich  and  was  prepared  to  go  to  war  in  doing  so.  In  the  Anglo-­‐ French  Plan,  Britain  and  France  had  urged  President  Benes  of  Czechoslovakia  to  concede  to   Hitler’s  territorial  demands  to  preserve  peace  in  Europe.  This  called  for  the  transfer  of  all   areas  with  over  50%  of  German  inhabitants  to  the  Third  Reich;  however  Benes  refused.     Nonetheless,  these  nations  decided  to  sacrifice  Czechoslovakia’s  nationalism  for   international  security,  and  thus  divided  Czechoslovakia  up  accordingly,  giving  in  to  Hitler’s   demands.  Hitler  had  not  been  expecting  this  and  henceforth  made  more  territorial   demands.  France  had  agreed  to  protect  Czechoslovakia’s  remaining  borders  if  it  accepted   the  Anglo-­‐French  Plan;  yet  upon  Hitler’s  further  demands,  France  no  longer  honoured  such  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  HSC  Style  Questions  

economically  viable  resources  and  export  markets.  Mussolini  had  used  the  death  of  Italian   soldiers  in  a  clash  at  Walwal  as  an  excuse  for  invasion.  Abyssinia  appealed  to  the  League  of   Nations  for  assistance;  yet  they  simply  declared  that  neither  party  were  at  fault  for  the   clash.  Upon  recognising  the  failure  of  the  League  to  implement  sanctions,  Mussolini   invaded  Abyssinia  with  brutal  willingness.  It  was  only  then  that  the  League  Council   declared  Italy  to  be  the  aggressor.  As  a  result  the  League  imposed  sanctions  on  Italy  which   ultimately  did  not  have  a  significant  effect.  They  placed  a  ban  on  economic  commodities,   however  excluded  coal  and  oil  which  were  the  necessities  of  war;  and  nations  such  as   Austria,  Hungary  and  Switzerland  refused  to  impose  the  sanctions.  Furthermore,  Italy  had   Germany’s  military  and  economic  support  which  overrode  the  minor  effects  of  the   sanctions.  As  such,  Mussolini’s  actions  in  Abyssinia  caused  the  tensions  in  Europe  to  rise   and  effectively  undermined  the  principles  of  collective  security.    Hence,  it  can  be  seen  that   although  this  invasion  significantly  contributed  to  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe,  the   failure  of  collective  security  ultimately  allowed  Hitler  and  Mussolini  to  break  international   law  without  repercussions,  to  which  it  is  to  hold  primary  responsibility.  Historian  AJP   Taylor  emphasises  the  ineffectiveness  collective  security  in  promoting  its  aim  of   international  peace:  “this  was  the  death  blow  to  the  League  as  well  as  to  Abyssinia”  

 

promises  reflecting  the  extent  of  their  aversion  to  war.  Britain  and  France,  in  accord  with   the  allied  policy  of  appeasement,  continued  to  concede  to  Hitler’s  demands.  On  20   September  1938  at  the  Munich  Conference,  Hitler’s  demands  were  granted  and   Sudetenland  ceded  to  Germany  at  the  expense  of  Czechoslovakia’s  nationalism  and   integrity  which  had  been  compromised  by  the  allies  in  their  upholding  of  the  policy  of   appeasement.  Historian  AJP  Taylor  argues  that  the  Munich  Conference  was  a  critical   moment  whereby  the  Allies  failed  to  pursue  an  aggressive  policy  of  appeasement.     The  inevitable  should  not  be  discussed  in  history,  yet  it  is  evident  that  the  League  of   Nations  possessed  the  potential  to  suppress  the  outbreak  of  conflict  in  Europe.  Ultimately,   the  League  failed  to  overcome  its  weaknesses  of  member  states’  nationalism  and  structural   flaws  in  response  to  which  Hitler’s  and  Mussolini’s  aggression  simply  increased,   exacerbating  the  existing  tensions  and  thus  the  likelihood  of  the  outbreak  of  war.   Furthermore,  the  principles  of  collective  security  were  further  undermined  in  the  Allies’   adoption  of  the  policy  of  appeasement  of  which  it  can  also  be  argued,  directly  lead  to  the   outbreak  of  the  war.  Theoretically,  collective  security  was  intended  for  a  consolidation  of   international  peace  in  Europe;  yet  its  failure  led  to  a  disorganised  system  of  powers  who   could  not  overcome  their  ideological  differences.  Nationalism  consistently  took  precedence   over  internationalism  which  was  necessary  in  consolidating  the  success  of  collective   security.  As  such,  the  failure  of  collective  security  can  be  seen  as  the  primary  cause  for  the   exacerbation  of  tensions  in  Europe  and  consequently  that  of  the  outbreak  of  conflict.         Word  Count:  1373    

To  what  extent  are  the  dictatorships  of  Hitler  and  Mussolini  the  main  causes  of  the   tensions  that  brought  on  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe?   The  conflict  in  Europe  was  caused  by  a  variety  of  factors  in  a  gradual  process  from  1935  –   1945.  The  dictatorships  in  Italy  and  Germany  played  a  significant  role  in  accounting  for  the   outbreak  of  war,  although  they  alone  were  not  the  main  cause.  Rather,  the  allied  policy  of   appeasement  and  the  failure  of  collective  security  allowed  these  dictators  to  freely  pursue   their  aggressive  ideological  policies  without  repercussions.  Hence,  there  is  to  be  an  equal   balance  of  blame  among  these  factors  for  the  “main”  cause  of  the  outbreak  of  war  in   Europe  in  1939.     The  dictatorships  in  Italy  and  Germany  of  Mussolini  and  Hitler  respectively,  were   significant  causes  in  bringing  about  the  conflict  in  Europe.  Both  these  dictators  shared   aggressive  and  opportunistic  foreign  policies  which  exacerbated  the  outbreak  of  war.  Both   the  short  term  aims  of  the  foreign  policies  in  Italy  and  Germany  were  to  tear  up  the   provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  for  primarily  nationalistic  reasons.  Italy  did  not   receive  the  territories  it  had  been  promised  by  the  allies  and  hence  wanted  to  pursue  a   policy  of  aggressive  expansionism  as  Mussolini  believed  imperialism  defined  a  nation’s   greatness.  Hitler  was  also  dissatisfied  with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  in  terms  of  its    

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   10 7    

The  Czechoslovakia  Crisis  is  an  example  whereby  both  the  dictatorships  of  Hitler  and  the   policy  of  appeasement  are  to  hold  equal  significance  in  the  conflict  in  Europe.   Czechoslovakia  had  emerged  post  1918  with  a  multinational  population,  most  significantly   that  of  an  estimated  3  million  Germans  in  the  Sudetenland.  In  accord  with  Hitler’s  policy  of   lebensraum,  he  wanted  to  unite  them  into  the  Third  Reich  and  was  prepared  to  go  to  war   in  doing  so.  In  the  Anglo-­‐French  Plan,  Britain  and  France  had  urged  President  Benes  of   Czechoslovakia  to  concede  to  Hitler’s  territorial  demands  to  preserve  peace  in  Europe.  This   called  for  the  transfer  of  all  areas  with  over  50%  of  German  inhabitants  to  the  Third  Reich;   however  Benes  refused.  Nonetheless  in  the  secret  Hoare-­‐Laval  Plan,  these  nations  divided   Czechoslovakia  up  accordingly  and  planned  to  give  into  Hitler’s  demands.  Hitler  had  not   been  expecting  this  and  henceforth  made  more  territorial  demands.  France  had  agreed  to   protect  Czechoslovakia’s  remaining  borders  if  it  accepted  the  Hoare-­‐Laval  Plan;  yet  upon   Hitler’s  further  demands,  France  no  longer  honoured  such  promises.  Britain  and  France,  in   accord  with  the  allied  policy  of  appeasement,  continued  to  concede  to  Hitler’s  demands.  On   20  September  1938  at  the  Munich  Conference,  Hitler’s  demands  were  granted  and   Sudetenland  ceded  to  Germany  at  the  expense  of  Czechoslovakia’s  nationalism  and   integrity  which  had  been  compromised  by  the  allies  in  their  upholding  of  the  policy  of   appeasement.  Historian  AJP  Taylor  argues  that  the  Munich  Conference  was  a  critical   moment  whereby  the  Allies  failed  to  pursue  an  aggressive  policy  of  appeasement.  Hence   the  dual  significance  of  the  dictatorship  in  Germany  and  that  of  the  policy  of  appeasement   is  evident  in  accounting  for  main  causes  of  the  conflict  in  Europe.     The  failure  of  collective  security  allowed  the  dictatorships  in  Italy  and  Germany  to  continue   pursuing  their  policies  of  expansionism  without  repercussions;  hence  both  factors  are  to   hold  equal  significance  in  bringing  about  the  conflict  in  Europe.  The  League  of  Nations  had   been  instigated  based  on  Wilson’s  Fourteen  Points  in  the  hopes  of  international   cooperation.  Yet  there  were  structural  weaknesses  in  this  organisation.  Signatories  of  the   League  Covenant  promised  to  submit  to  the  League  Assembly  in  matters  of  dispute  rather   than  resorting  to  war.  However,  both  parties  had  to  agree  to  a  hearing  otherwise  the  Court   of  the  League  did  not  encompass  the  jurisdiction  to  do  so.  Article  10  of  the  Covenant  states   that  in  handling  acts  of  international  aggression,  no  advice  could  be  given  unless  it  was   voted  on  unanimously;  and  furthermore  members  of  the  League  were  not  obliged  to  accept  

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  HSC  Style  Questions  

economic  and  social  burdens  on  Germany  and  the  international  humiliation  it  bore.     Similar  to  Mussolini,  Hitler  wanted  to  pursue  a  policy  of  aggressive  expansionism  in   accordance  with  his  long  term  aim  of  lebensraum.  Hitler  hoped  to  unite  all  the  German   speaking  Aryans  into  the  Third  Reich  and  Mussolini  to  unite  the  Roman  Empire  as  a   famous  conqueror.  These  policies  required  ‘living  space’  in  which  both  dictators  pursued  to   conquer  territories  in  an  aggressive  manner.  Thus,  these  dictators  were  able  to  pursue   their  desires  without  much  interference  from  the  allies.  However,  it  must  be  considered   that  their  pursuit  for  territory  and  their  aggressive  policies  were  not  the  main  cause  for  the   outbreak  of  war.  The  allied  policy  of  appeasement  which  allowed  them  to  do  so  is  to  hold   equal  significance.    

 

such  advice.  Additionally,  despite  the  sanctions  of  the  League  Covenant,  the  organisation   did  not  possess  a  true  balance  of  world  powers,  and  hence  the  consequences  of  breaking   articles  are  not  considered  severe.  The  United  States,  for  example,  did  not  ratify  the  Treaty   of  Versailles  and  did  not  believe  in  the  necessity  of  the  League  of  Nations,  hence  it  was  not   a  member.  Furthermore,  the  Soviet  Union  was  refused  membership  based  on  fears  of   Communism.  Thus,  these  two  powerful  nations  were  not  included  in  the  provisions  of   disarmament.  As  a  result,  member  nations  did  not  disarm  completely  as  the  Covenant   called  for  disarmament  based  on  the  defence  of  their  nation.  With  two  super  powers  not   bound  by  such  policies,  effectively  disarmament  failed  as  signatory  nations  feared  their   security.  Hence  the  dictatorships  of  Hitler  and  Mussolini  recognised  the  failure  of  collective   security  which  allowed  them  to  pursue  their  aggressive  policies  of  expansionism  without   repercussions.   The  conflict  of  Abyssinia  is  an  example  whereby  the  dictatorship  in  Italy  and  the  failure  of   collective  security  are  to  hold  equal  significance  in  bringing  about  the  outbreak  of  war  in   Europe.  Abyssinia  provided  Mussolini  with  an  opportunity  for  imperial  expansion,  the   restoration  of  Italian  honour  and  economically  viable  resources  and  export  markets.   Mussolini  had  used  the  death  of  Italian  soldiers  in  a  clash  at  Walwal  as  an  excuse  for   invasion.  Abyssinia  appealed  to  the  League  of  Nations  for  assistance;  yet  they  simply   declared  that  neither  party  were  at  fault  for  the  clash.  Upon  recognising  the  failure  of  the   League  to  implement  sanctions,  Mussolini  invaded  Abyssinia  with  brutal  willingness.  It   was  only  then  that  the  League  Council  declared  Italy  to  be  the  aggressor.  As  a  result  the   League  imposed  sanctions  on  Italy  which  ultimately  did  not  have  a  significant  effect.  They   placed  a  ban  on  economic  commodities,  however  excluded  coal  and  oil  which  were  the   necessities  of  war;  and  nations  such  as  Austria,  Hungary  and  Switzerland  refused  to   impose  the  sanctions.  Furthermore,  Italy  had  Germany’s  military  and  economic  support   which  overrode  the  minor  effects  of  the  sanctions.  As  such,  Mussolini’s  actions  in  Abyssinia   caused  the  tensions  in  Europe  to  rise  and  effectively  undermined  the  principles  of   collective  security.    Hence,  it  can  be  seen  that  although  this  invasion  significantly   contributed  to  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe,  the  failure  of  collective  security  ultimately   allowed  Hitler  and  Mussolini  to  break  international  law  without  repercussions,  to  which  it   is  to  hold  an  equally  significant  role.  Historian  AJP  Taylor  emphasises  the  ineffectiveness   collective  security  in  promoting  its  aim  of  international  peace:  “this  was  the  death  blow  to   the  League  as  well  as  to  Abyssinia”   Although  the  dictatorships  in  Italy  and  Germany  and  their  aggressive  policies  of   expansionism  significantly  contributed  to  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  allied  policy  of   appeasement  and  the  failure  of  collective  security  are  to  hold  equal  significance.  Due  to   such  misgivings,  they  ultimately  allowed  these  dictatorships  to  pursue  a  boundless  policy   of  expansionism;  although  the  Allies  themselves  were  in  a  much  stronger  position  to   suppress  them.  Thus,  while  the  dictatorships  played  a  critical  role,  they  cannot  be  deemed   the  ‘main’  cause  of  the  conflict  in  Europe  alone  as  there  were  a  variety  of  factors  in  a   gradual  process  rather  than  the  perceived  immediate.     Word  Count:  1289    

International  Studies  in  Peace  &  Conflict:  HSC  Style  Questions  

HSC  STUDY  BUDDY   10 9