Mirasol vs CA

MIRASOL VS CA [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The

Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim. Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. (2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional. (3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to

actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Berces, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 112099. February 21,1995) ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents Ponente: QUIASON FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987). ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18. HELD: NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied. RATIO: The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention. An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952) FACTS: Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA 304, which provides that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended however that the word “shall” used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. The lower court sustained Respondent company. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company. HELD: No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word “shall” is imperative. However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, “at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years.”, the interest to be charged, that the verb phrase is mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to the condition of the availability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are “available loanable funds.” In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.

withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner. The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a Motion to Withdraw Information.

Respondent Abalos thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of the petition for review before the DOJ.

In another resolution, the DOJ denied the Motion for

Adasa vs. Abalos Bernadette Adasa vs. Cecille Abalos G.R. No. 168617 February 19, 2007 Chico-Nazario, J.: Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner Bernadette Adasa, through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge and consent and that despite repeated

Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language “may” utilized in Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned.

demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. A resolution was issued by the

Issue: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of

Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable

Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory such

cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two

that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal

separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of

despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned?

Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under

Held: No. When an accused has already been arraigned,

Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the

the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review

Revised Penal Code, as amended.

due course and must dismiss the same. If the intent of

Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City

Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of

Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner later filed a Petition for

Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a

Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the DOJ reversed

petition for review despite its being out rightly dismissible,

and set aside the resolution of the Office of the City

such as when the accused has already been arraigned, or

Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to

where the crime the accused is being charged with has

already prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has been committed, or that there are legal or factual grounds warranting dismissal, the result would not only be incongruous but also irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give the second sentence of Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but would also render its other mandatory provisions – Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.