Mindanao peace process timeline

Mindanao peace process timeline By Al Jacinto THE Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is the vanguard of the Islamic movement in the Bangsamoro homeland in Mindanao and the neighboring islands. The MILF was formed in 1977 when Sheikh Salamat Hashim, supported by ethnic Maguindanao Muslims from Mindanao, split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) of Nur Misuari, advocating a more moderate and conciliatory approach toward the government. When Hashim split from the MNLF, he took with him most of the group's more traditionally Islamic leaders, including Rashid Lucman, Domacao Alonto, and Salipada Pendatun. The MILF has always placed greater emphasis on Islam than the MNLF, and most of its leaders are Islamic scholars from traditional aristocratic and religious backgrounds.

n January 1987, the MNLF signed an agreement relinquishing its goal of independence for Muslim regions and accepting the government's offer of autonomy in September 1996. The MILF originally seeks to establish an independent Islamic state similar to Iran, comprising Mindanao island, Palawan, Basilan, Sulu archipelago, and neighboring islands. In support of this aim, the organization has carried out a campaign of attacks against civilian and military targets throughout the southern Philippines. The MILF is believed to have 12,000 members, according to the Philippine military, but an MILF plenum in Maguindanao province in May 2005 drew more than 2 million Muslims. The following are significant dates, involving the Muslim separatists and the Philippine government: October 1972 -- The MNLF launches its separatist war in the southern Philippines. Misuari leads the group; Hashim was in-charge for foreign relations. December 1976 -- The MNLF and Manila sign the Tripoli Agreement, which provides for 13 Muslim areas of autonomy in the southern Philippines. In these areas, Muslims are allowed to operate their own religious courts and schools, administrative and financial systems. Two provisional autonomous regions were to be formed. July 1978 -- Salamat splits with the MNLF to fight for a separate Islamic state in Mindanao. His group comes to be called The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). September 1986 -- President Corazon Aquino meets with Misuari in the Philippines after being in exile in Libya and elsewhere since the 1970s. October 1992 -- The first round of exploratory talks between the government of Fidel Ramos and the MNLF was held in Tripoli, Libya. October 1993 -- The first round of formal negotiations between Manila and the MNLF is held in Jakarta, Indonesia. Officials sign an interim ceasefire agreement. November 1995 -- Manila and the MNLF sign an interim peace agreement during the third round of formal talks in Jakarta. September 1996 -- Misuari signs a formal peace agreement with Manila that ends the 24-year separatist rebellion. Misuari is elected governor of the Armm and becomes chairman of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, which will oversee the development of 14 mostly Christian provinces, including Armm's four provinces and nine cities.

July 1997 -- Manila signs a ceasefire agreement with the MILF, which now has about 14,000 members. March to August 1998 -- The May Presidential elections caused the suspension of the peace talks. August 1998 -- Signed general framework agreement of intent between RP under President Joseph Estrada and MILF in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao province; March 1998 -- Agreement creating a quick response team signed in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao; February 1999 -- Joint acknowledgement of MILF camps signed in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao; agreement to reaffirm pursuit of peace also signed; October 1999 -- Agreement to hold the opening of the formal peace talks signed in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao; December 1999 -- Agreement on the rules and procedures on the conduct of the formal peace talks; December 1999 -- The signing of the joint statement of the formal opening of the peace talks; October 1999 -- Second joint acknowledgement of MILF camps; March 2000 -- Agreement on safety and security guarantees signed in Cotabato City; April 2000 -- Signing of the aide memoir in Cotabato City; MILF unilaterally signs a suspension of the peace talks memo; June 2000 -- Military forces invaded main MILF headquarters Camp Abubakar As Siddique in Maguindanao, and other major rebel camps after MILF fails to sign peace accord on government deadline. Ceasefire broken and peace talks collapsed. December 2000 -- Bombings hit Manila, MILF, Jemaah Islamiya blamed. January 2001 -- President Gloria Arroyo opens contacts with MILF. March 2001 -- Arroyo signs ceasefire with MILF, and resume peace talks; agreement on the general framework for the resumption of the RP and MILF peace talks signed in Kuala Lumpur; June 2001 -- Agreement on peace between the RP and the MILF signed in Tripoli, Libya; August 2001 -- Implementing guidelines/ceasefire on the security aspect of the RP and MILF agreement on peace signed in Putrajaya, Malaysia; May 2002 -- Implementing guidelines on the humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development aspects of the Tripoli agreement on peace signed; signed a joint communiqué/creates ad hoc joint action group of GRP and MILF (to run after terrorists, criminals in central Mindanao) in Putrajaya, Malaysia; February 2003 -- Truce broken anew after military forces attacked major MILF camp in Buliok in Maguindanao province; ceasefire enforced three weeks later;

July 2003 -- Hashim dies from illness in Maguindanao; July 13, 2003 -- Hashim's military deputy Murad Ibrahim takes over as new leader of the MILF, continues peace talks with government; October 2004 -- International truce observer arrives in Mindanao; December 2004 -- Ad hoc joint action group formally implemented; January 2005 -- Truce broken after MILF forces, led by Abdulrahman Binago, attacked troops, ceasefire enforced weeks later; February through December 2005 -- Exploratory talks on ancestral domain; breakthrough on contentious issue of ancestral land achieved at peace talks in Malaysia between government and MILF rebels; February 2006 -- Talks resume in Malaysia, agreement reached on ancestral domain. The Philippine has been plagued by insurgencies throughout the history. Defined as an “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict:, insurgency is said to be a form of modern warfare. Differences in ideology and faith, problems of underdevelopment and poverty, and social dissatisfaction are some of the main issues that have given rise to insurrections in the country. The longest running insurgencies in the country are being waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines - New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) and it’s affiliate groups that are mainly based in the whole islands and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Movements operating in Mindanao. Through the Government has greatly diminished the numbers and arms of insurgent groups through successful military campaigns, uprisings have not been completely eradicated. Both insurgent groups continue to operate and engage in criminal and terrorist activities that threaten the country’s internal security and hamper nation building. How can successful military campaigns in history help in addressing insurgency in the Philippines? What other strategies employed in the past by governments, in the Philippines and abroad, can be adopted to address the present problem of insurgency in the country? These are the questions that this article aims to answer. The article begins by tracing the development of insurgency group in the Philippines, including their ideology, cause, aims, and their means to realize those aims. The article will examine the military strategies being used by the present Philippine Administration in countering contemporary insurgency problems in the country. It will also look into the successful counterinsurgency operations of past Philippine administrations, as well as of selected countries and examine whether we can adopt those operations to address our present insurgency problem. Communist Insurgency The communist insurgency in the Philippine scan be traced to the peasant rebellions during the late 19th century up to the early 20th century. Rural revolts among peasants became common at the time due to issues on land tenancy and growing population pressures. The agrarian unrest continued until the 1950s, covering mostly Central Luzon and Visayas, which spurred the armed struggle of the combined forces of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, established in 1930, and the Hukbalahap war guerillas. The rebellion declined in the 1950s but residuals of the old Huk army played significant roles in the establishment of the New People’s Army. Internal schism due to ideological differences and party leadership rivalries within the PKP resulted in the establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The organization was founded in 1968 by Jose Maria Sison and other young revolutionaries in

Central Luzon. Like Sison, most members of the political group were educated youths from the middle class who were disgruntled with the government. The CPP’s ideology was largely drawn from the Chinese communism of Mao Zedong and its model agrarian revolution, unlike the Soviet-oriented PKP. Sison and his cadres criticized the subservient policy of the Philippines to the United States, describing the country as “a semifeudal, semicolonial society ‘ruthlessly exploited’ by United States imperialists, the ‘comprador big bourgeoisie,’ landlords, and bureaucratic capitalists.” Armed revolution was regarded as the only way to overthrow the United States-sponsored government, free the people from their oppression, and institute a people’s democratic revolution. The party sough to promote their ideology by using the following causes: the land tenancy system and a peasant desire for agrarian reform; unemployment and poor economic conditions, including an extremely inequitable income distribution; and a lack of government credibility due to corruption and abuses. The CPP encountered a main problem after its inception – it promoted a peasant-led revolution and the party had no peasant base and no knowledge in guerilla warfare. The problem was solved after a few months when the party found an ally in Bernabe Buscayno. Buscayno, better known as Kumander Dante commanded a group of peasant guerillas, which emerged from the past PKP-Huk actions in the late 1960s. Convinced by the party’s ideological zeal, Buscayno submitted under the leadership of the Party. Hence, the CPP-New People’s Army was born. The CPP-NPA operations concentrated on the agrarian reform in the rural areas. The group engaged in banditry, extortion for revolutionary taxes and bombing of important establishments in the areas, to advance their causes.

Southern Philippine Secessionist Groups

The Muslim secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines is rooted in the centuries-old resistance of Muslim Filipinos against Spanish colonization. The destruction of the traditional patterns of authority and communal autonomy, curtailment of individual freedom, and the introduction of a new religion fueled the resistance of the Muslims in Mindanao. Unlike their counterparts in Luzon and Visayas, the Muslims of Mindanao refused to submit to Spanish authority. Such resistance has endured to this day. Whereas the communist party aims to overthrow the government to establish a socialist state, Muslim secessionist groups want to cede from the Philippines and form a separate Bangsamoro (Islamic State). The Muslim separatist sentiment is caused by the following main factors: first, Muslim fear that their religious, cultural, and political traditions may be weakened or destroyed by forced assimilation into a Catholic-dominated Philippine Republic. Second, Muslims resent the influx of migrants from Luzon and Visayas, which dispossessed them of their ancestral and communal lands and turned them into a minority in their own land. Third, Muslims reject the economic underdevelopment and poverty of Mindanao. Rabasa and Chalk notes that 15 of the Philippine’s poorest provinces are located in the region, which also has the country’s lowest literacy rate (75 percent) and life expectancy (57 years). Moreover, most provinces have limited or no access to basic social services, such as electricity and water supply, education, and health. Fourth, is the Mindanao tradition of warlordism, banditry, and blood feuds among ethnic groups. The Muslim Secessionist Movement is comprised of three groups. The (1) Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); (2) the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was founded by Nur Misuari, an educated Tausug, in 1971. The MNLF believe that (1) the Moro people constitute a distinct bangsa (nation) that has a specific Islamic historical and cultural identity; (2) the bangsamoro (Islamic nation) has a legitimate right to self-determination; and (3) the MNLF has a duty and obligation to wage a jihad against the Philippine State. As such, the movement fought for due representation of Muslims in the Philippine political process. In 1996, peace talks between the Government and MNLF have resulted to the establishment of the Zone of Peace and Development (ZOPAD) in Mindanao; the creation of Southern

Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD); and Misuari’s election as governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, which gave the Muslims a stake in the political process of the country. Thus, only the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf remain in the Muslim secessionist movement at present. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a breakaway group from the MNLF, which left its parent organization in 1980. Differences in the two group’s goals paved the way for such separation. The MILF has a more religious orientation than the MNLF. Aside from pursuing nationalist objectives, the group also aims to promote Islamic ideals in the country. Hashim Salamat, the group’s leader states that their political objective is to create a separate Islamic State encompassing provinces in Mindanao where Muslims are majority. The Shari’a (Islamic Law) will be observed in all aspects of life in the said Islamic State. The MILF aims to attain such goal thru da’wa(Islamic preaching) and jihad (holy war). As a revolutionary military force, MILF does not practice indiscriminate violence against civilians. Its violent activities, mostly in the form of orthodox guerilla warfare, are only aimed at the Philippine Military. However, the also group uses terrorist-type tactics to extort revolutionary taxes. The Abu Sayyaf Group (literally “Bearer of the Sword”), a fundamentalist organization was founded in1989 and was originally named Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), due to its link with the Mujahideen movement in Afghanistan. The majority of the group’s members are Muslim youths, with many of the older cadres reportedly veterans of the Afghan war. The Abu Sayyaf does not only want to establish a separate Islamic state governed by the Shari’a. The group also wants this state to be exclusive for Muslims. The Abu Sayyaf does not practice religious tolerance towards nonMuslims. The activities of the group are terrorist in nature and are tied to the integrated effort among Muslim fundamentalists in asserting the dominance of Islam in global politics. The Abu Sayyaf Group received international attention when they abducted and hostaged some foreigners in Sipadan, Malaysia.

Some Strategies Employed by the Government

The Philippine Government has changed its strategy in countering insurgency along with the changes of administrations over the years. The government has employed both peaceful and military means in its attempts to eliminate insurrection in the country. The Aquino Administration engaged into peace talks with the National Democratic Front, which touched on the issues of poverty alleviation, productive employment generation, equity and social justice, and human rights promotion. The government proposal came under the theme “Food and Freedom, Jobs and Justice” as the key to peace. However the peace talks did not prosper as hostilities continued between Philippine government and rebel groups. Similarly, the Ramos Government engaged the Moro National Liberation Front in peace negotiation, as it focused on peace and security. The talks succeeded and resulted in the establishment of the Zone of Peace and Development (ZOPAD) in Mindanao and Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), which provided Muslims a stake in the country’s political process and the right to shape the future of Muslim Mindanao. In exchange of the MNLF’s return and adherence to the government, an amnesty program was accorded to the group along with a socio-economic package for development with the assistance of United States-funded Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Program. The said program has since provided former MNLF members a means of livelihood and developed poverty-stricken areas in Mindanao. Further, qualified combatants were integrated to the AFP/PNP. The Estrada Administration had initially pushed peace negotiations with the MILF, which formally started on October 29, 1999. The peace talks’ initial aims were to reintegrate the MILF to the mainstream society, attain lasting peace in Mindanao through a meaningful autonomy program, and a consolidation of peace efforts. However, said talks

were aborted as the Estrada Government implemented an all-out war engaged policy against militant Muslims.

What has the Philippines got to learn from other countries?

Insurgency is not a unique experience of the Philippines. Many countries, developed or developing, have been beset by insurrections. However, the government of some of these countries have already overcome or contained their local insurrections. The following section will provide the experiences of selected countries, which succeeded in combating local insurgencies.

The Thai Experience

Thailand has experienced the same insurgency problems as the Philippines, which date back to the establishment of the Communist party of Thailand in the 1920s. Since then, communist insurgency had been a national concern that had beset a number of Thai Governments and dominated military and police activities for more than twenty years. From a peek strength of about 12,000 armed insurgents in the late 1970s, the number of armed guerillas and separatists had declined to 600 in 1987. Observers in Thai politics downplay the importance of the communist ideology to the local insurgency. Local insurrections emerged out of people’s discontent with the government, which only concentrated in the capital. The neglect of the peripheral areas of the country has alienated many rural inhabitants and ethnic minorities. This resulted to the resentment that steadily grew in the 1960s and 1970s, which communist ideologues were able to exploit. However, the Thai government has successfully downplayed communist insurgency in the country by the late 1980s. The government employed “coordinated government efforts combining military and police actions with social and economic policies”, which effectively reduced the level of insurgency. Credit is also due to the extensive military aid and technical assistance that the United States had provided to the counterinsurgency program in 1950s. The 1970s signaled the Thai government’s resolve to put an end to the communist insurgency, by increasing the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency operations. In 1974, the government established the Internal Security Operational Command (ISOC) under the military’s Supreme Command to coordinate and integrate the counterinsurgency efforts of various government agencies. In the early 1980s, the government reoriented their counterinsurgency programs to focus more on neutralizing the communists’ tactics than simply killing the insurgents. The said approach led to an increased coordination among civilian, police, and military agencies. Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda took over as director of a reorganized ISOC in 1987, indicating an increased emphasis on the political rather than the military aspect of the government’s counterinsurgency programs. The government also crafted a new policy that addressed the political and social aspects of insurgency problem. The policy offered amnesty to all insurgents and included measures to improve social and economic conditions that give rise to the insurgency. At the same time, the Thai military conducted selective but aggressive and effective operations against insurgent and guerilla bases in the remote mountainous areas. The government’s approach resulted in the weakening of the communist movements and the increased surrender of more insurgents, which led to the elimination of insurgency in the country.

The British Experience

The United Kingdom’s insurgency problem in Northern Ireland can be compared to that of the Philippines in Mindanao. The conflict and insurgency problem in the territory has both political and religious underpinnings. The conflict is brought about by the continuous power struggle between the Unionists, who would like to maintain the territory’s union with Great Britain and Nationalists, who would like to cede the union to establish a separate state or to reunite with Ireland. The struggle is further exacerbated as the religious dimension set in. Most, if not all, Unionists are Protestants who have the monopoly of political power in the process. Historically, Irish Catholics have been subjected to all kinds of political, social and economic discrimination, as they were perceived to be disloyal to the Crown. Catholics were not accorded the right to suffrage until the early 20th century. They were not allowed to run for office or hold government position. Moreover, they were also not accorded equal work opportunities with their Protestant counterparts. The political and religious tensions further increased due to lack of contact between the two conflicting groups. When the Northern Ireland government was not able to contain violence between Protestants and Catholic extremist groups, Great Britain decided to intervene in the territory in 1969, after successfully quelling counterinsurgencies in Malaya (present Malaysia), Kenya, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus. Great Britain’s counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland has been described only as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). The said approach involved a “political/military strategy which coordinates governmental, judicial, economic, social and psychological agencies and dimensions, and aimed at containing, isolating and destroying identifiable resistance.” British counterinsurgency operations has five important elements: the identification of the enemy and its reasons for existence; the coordination of all government resources to eliminate the insurgency; the containment and the tactical attrition of the enemy; the political and military isolation and frustration of the insurgents; and the enemy’s total destruction. It is important to note Britain’s emphasis on psychological warfare operations to defeat the IRA insurgency. Kitson, Britain’s premier military strategist, who authored the counterinsurgency bible “Low Intensity Conflict”, believed that “it is in men’s minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided”. Thus, British counterinsurgency strategists concentrated on influencing and conditioning the mindset of the people on how they saw the problem in the North. Also part of the psychological warfare, Britain demonstrated the full strength of the state by implementing laws and regulations to quell the insurgency. Through IRA has continued to operate in the country, The British and Northern Irish Governments were able to reach a ceasefire agreement with the insurgency group. Moreover, the Belfast Agreement was signed by the involved parties in 1998, which included the devolution of autonomy to the territory, a power-sharing scheme between the Unionist and Nationalist parties, and the promotion of equal rights between Catholics and Protestants. The prospect of peace in the country is further maintained with IRA’s latest pronouncements of decommissioning its weapons and implementation of the 1998 Belfast Agreement.

Lessons Learned

Counterinsurgencies “require an interconnecting system of actions – political, economic, psychological, and military – that aim at the [insurgents’ intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.” Thus far, efforts of the Philippine Government to combat insurgencies in the country have remained to be a partial success. While the successful military offensives have continued to reduce the number of insurgents over the years, said insurgent movements still and will continue to operate in the country, until the deep-seated factors of insurgency and terrorism are dealt with by the government. The absence of a holistic and a comprehensive approach by the Philippine Government in addressing insurgency and its underlying causes continues to be a setback in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy. The non-continuance of the

government’s counterinsurgency policies, which tend to change along with the country’s change of leadership, has also become an obstacle in the total elimination of rebel groups. Military operation is only part of the counterinsurgency equation and only offers a short-term solution to insurgency. The complete eradication of insurgency will only be attained by the total elimination of its underlying causes. As such, a comprehensive and a holistic approach must be employed. Since insurgencies are primarily political in nature, the Philippine Government must develop solutions that would address the political grievances of insurgents. The government must continue its amnesty program towards the rebels and work towards the rebels and work towards their reintegration to the Philippine society. Justice and reconciliation must be properly balanced. The government must encourage the democratic participation through the proper means and processes. Estrada’s double policy of engaging MILF insurgents in peace talks and then waging an all-out war against them has destroyed whatever confidence base the government has created with the dissidents. As such, new trust and confidence-building activities are needed to put insurgents in the negotiation table. Moreover, the government must also ensure to deliver whatever promise they would make to the former dissidents. Poverty and underdevelopment have been pointed out as one of the main causes of rebellion. Most analysts agree that the best way in combating insurgency and rebellion “lies with implementing a sustained economic development program”, as this would not only undermine the civilian support base of the insurgents, but also would remove both groups’ raison d’être. Psychological warfare operations, which include intelligence-gathering and propaganda play an important role in winning the war against insurgency. The government must win the support of the rest of the population especially those residing near the insurgent-infested provinces so as to prevent them from supporting the rebels. Knowledge on one’s enemy increases the probability of defeating such enemy. The creation of an independent government organization with the power to coordinate military and nonmilitary actions is crucial in addressing the country’s communist and secessionist insurgencies. Such organization can provide the continuity and the consistency of the approaches and strategies that will be used to quell insurgencies and terrorist activities. The Philippine Government may get ideas from the strategies that the Thai and British Governments had utilized in solving their local insurgencies. However, the employment of these strategies does not guarantee full success. The nature and causes of insurgency is not static. They change as they adapt to the new political, social, and economic environments. Differences of the time frame and the social and political landscapes of the country may affect the results of implementing the said strategies, despite seemingly striking similarities. A successful counterinsurgency must employ approaches and strategies that are specifically accustomed to the political, social, and economic conditions of the Philippines.