Mexico's Supreme Court Ruling on Cannabis - English Translation

AMPARO IN REVIEW 237/2014 AND RECURRING complainers: ***** MINISTER SPEAKER: Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea SECRETARIES: ARTURO BÁRCENA ZUBIETA IBARRA ANA MARIA OLGUÍN PARTNERS:

WILLIAM KOHN ESPINOSA MICHAEL OSCAR CASILLAS SANDOVAL

Mexico City. Agreement of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of the nation from the ** of ** two thousand  fifteenth.

JUDGMENT Reconciliation Relapse under review under 237/2014, filed by the plaintiffs ***** ***** ***** ***** and *****, against the judgment dated ***** by the Eleventh District Judge Administrative in Matters Federal District, in the indirect amparo *****.

I. BACKGROUND 1.

Facts giving rise to the dispute

On 31 May 2013, *****, *****, *****, *****, in its own right and as proxies **** * requested in writing

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to the Federal Commission for the Protection against Sanitary Risk (herein after COFEPRIS), decentralized body of the Ministry of Health, the issuance of a permit that would allow them to consume regularly, and for purely recreational or entertainment purposes, the drug cannabis sativa (indica and American, in prepared resin and seeds) and psychotropic THC (Tetrahydrocannabinol, the following isomers: Δ6A (10a), Δthe 6th(7) Δ7 Δ8, Δ9, Δ10 Δ9 (11) and theirvariants), stereochemical which are known as "marijuana". Furthermore, within the said brief, the representatives of ***** also requested authorization to carry rights correlative to the "consumption" of marijuana, such as planting, growing, harvesting, preparation, possession, transportation, employment, use and generally any act related to the recreational use of marijuana by the petitioners and partners mentioned, excluding expressly commercial transactions, such as distribution, sale and transfer of the same.1 *****, the Executive Director of Regulation of Narcotics and Psychotropic Chemicals COFEPRIS informed the petitioners that they could not be issued the authorization requested, in accordance with Articles 235 and 237 -regarding the drug "cannabis sativa" - as well as 245, 247 and 248 of -regarding psychotropic "THC". According to the General Health Law it is prohibited throughout the country the performance of any act related to the aforementioned substances..2 1 Application

to the ***** Notebook protection, folio 68-69. response to the request by the plaintiffs now. Notebook under ***** 45.hander 2 COFEPRIS

2. Indirect amparo demand In response to the above, lodged on 5 July 2013, ***** with *****, *****, ***** and **** * they promoted an indirect amparo against the refusal of their request, claiming the unconstitutionality of Article 235, last paragraph, 237, 245, section I, 247, last paragraph, and 248, all of the General Health Act.3 In this claim for protection, the complainants put forward in summary the following arguments: Concepts of violation first to fifth. Undue restriction of the fundamental rights to personal identity, self-image, free development of personality, self-determination and individual freedom, all in relation to the principle of human dignity and the right to health4 After exposing the constitutional, conventional and jurisprudential framework regarding the fundamental rights to identity, personal self-image, free development of personality, self-determination and individual liberty, which arise from the same recognition of human dignity and the right to health,the plaintiffs argued that the prohibitionist policy toward marijuana use established in the contested articles 3 In

this regard, the complainants identified as responsible authorities to the following: (i) President (for the enactment of the General Health Law); (Ii) Secretary of the Interior (for the endorsement of the Act); (Iii) Deputy Director General of the OfficialGazette (the publication of the decree by which the law was enacted); (Iv) Congress(for the issuance of the General Health Law); (V) Ministry of Health, (vi) Foreign Secretary,(vii) Secretary of Defense, (viii) Navy Secretary (ix) Secretary of Finance and Public Credit (x) Economy Secretary (xi ) Secretary of Communications and Transportation, (xii) Ministry of Social Development, (xiii) Secretary ofEducation, Public (xiv) Secretary of Labor and Social Security, and (xv) Head of the Federal District (all for the endorsement of the this law); and (xvi) Executive Director of Regulation Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances and Chemical Federal Commission for the Protection againstRisk Sanitary(for the implementation of the General Health Law). Folio 2 turn back to 4notebook

under***** (claim for 4. protection.) Request for defense, folio 13-76.

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is not exceeded by screening tests established by the Supreme Court for making restrictions on fundamental rights. Indeed, the plaintiffs argued that the state can not undermine or eliminate the actions an individual may take to be individualized in society, unless there is an overriding interest that justifies, as the individual has a right to choose freely and autonomously his or her life project and how they will achieve the objectives that are relevant; in other words, the state can not impose models and standards of living upon citizens, or intervene in matters within the sphere of the personal and private. In view of the above, the plaintiffs argued that by using marijuana, people project their preferences and features that differentiate them from the rest of society. Thus, the prohibition of marijuana is unconstitutional because it involves the suppression of behavior that gives the individual a specific difference according to its uniqueness. That restriction is not justified, and the imposition of a single standard of healthy living is not admissible in a liberal state, which bases its existence on the recognition of the uniqueness and independence of each human. They also noted that the choice of using marijuana is a strictly personal decision, because it is the individual who suffers the change in perception, mood and state of consciousness brought about by the use of marijuana. It is the individual who deals with the consequences of his or her decision, without disturbing or

affecting the rest of society. Therefore, through these prohibitionist measures, the state assumes that the individual has no rational capacity to dispose of his body, mind and person. 5

Moreover, the complainants also argued that the prohibitionist policy derives from contested articles by violating the right to health in its negative aspect, understood as the ability or power to have personal control over one’s health. So, they noted that the state can not interfere with the freedom of individuals to control their health and body. That is, the state can not interfere with the freedom inherent in the right to health to control one’s own health. In this regard, plaintiffs argued that the ban on marijuana is based on a prejudice sustained by moral values and not on scientific studies, thus revealing that the state has not acted in an ethically neutral manner. Plaintiffs also warned that the state has taken a paternalistic stance by treating citizens as if they were not rational enough to make their own decisions. Taken to its extreme, this stance could go so far as to prohibit substances such as tobacco, alcohol, sugar, fat or caffeine. The plaintiffs concluded that the prohibitionist regime constitutes a restriction on the rights previously indicated; that said regime is not consistent with the requirements of the proportionality test, as it does not have legitimate aim, because the imposition of a single standard of healthy living is not permissible in a liberal state that bases its existence on the recognition of human uniqueness and independence. The state has argued that the prohibitionist regime is instrumental in preventing risks to health or to fight addictions,

and yet it has not been shown that the decriminalization of marijuana increases demand and consumption. Indeed, the prohibitionist regime 6.

has not decreased demand or consumption. And finally, it is not proportional, as there are less restrictive ways to protect the health, and damages generated by the ban are higher  than the benefits it has brought. Sixth concept of violation. This is a violation of the objective purpose of criminal law as well as individual and personal liberty as a result of the criminalization of marijuana consumption 5 Finally, the plaintiffs also alleged that the state exceeded its powers to legislate in matters of public health and in the determination of the offenses by criminalizing the consumption of marijuana, in violation of the objective purpose of criminal law and and individual personal freedom of individuals, principles set out in Article 73, Sections XVI and XXI of the Constitution of the United Mexican States. This is so, according to the complainants, as the consumption of marijuana by individual people does not affect the freedom of others, so there is no justification for the criminal law to interfere and limit this sphere of freedom of the individual. 3. Processing of the indirect amparo and its corresponding resolution As a matter of duty, to hear the case corresponded Judge Eleventh District for Administrative Matters in the District,and Federal by car *****, registered the case under number

***** dossier and he agreed to process the claim.6 5 Request 6 Auto

for defense, folio 77-85. admission. ***** Notebook protection, folios 71 to 73.

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Subsequently, *****, once the appropriate procedural steps completed, the District Judge issued a final judgment by denying protection  of the Constitution to the complainants to support the arguments summarized below. a) After exposing the constitutional, conventional, doctrinal framework and legal respects of the challenged provisions and the fundamental rights which were estimated by the violated plaintiffs, the District Judge called their arguments unworkable concepts of violation regarding the moral person named plaintiff *****, while human dignity, and in Consequently the rights derived therefrom, such as privacy, free development of personality, self-image or self-determination, is itself only humans, so the said complainant could not allege a violation of such rights.7 b) However, with regard to the other complainants, the District Judge proceeded to respond to the concepts of violation related to human dignity, stating that it may derive rights to personality, physical and mental integrity, to privacy, to name, to self-image,marital status and even a right to personal dignity; which although not recognized expressly in our Constitution, it is possible to derive them from the international treaties signed and ratified by Mexico, as well as the self-recognition of human dignity in Article  1 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the District Judge District noted that the concepts of violation were unfounded related to the violation of

these rights, because from their perspective the contested articles: (i) do not constitute an encroachment on the right to privacy insofar as they 7 Judgment

of amparo, fojas149-164 .

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require people to reveal aspects of their private lives; (ii) do not violate the right to free development of personality and self-image, then how to choose the appearance, activity or manner in which the plaintiffs wish to project and live their lives; (iii) does not violate the principle of self-determination, and that the state has an obligation to take all measures required to protect and make effective a right, in this case the health; and finally, (iv) do not jeopardize the right to dignity, and do not create a hazard intended to impose models and standards of living that are beyond the individual. It is the duty of the state to provide everyone the greater enjoyment of physical and mental health through the fight against addiction.8c) Moreover, the District Judge responded to the concepts of violation referred to (the violation of the right to health of the plaintiffs), noting that they proved unfounded, while agreeing that to the prohibition against marijuana contained in the contested articles are suitable measures to protect the life and health of the people by avoiding the proliferation of harmful substances. This holds if one takes into consideration that the misuse of psychotropic and narcotics has become one of the most serious public health problems, so there is great concern by the federal government to generally maintain strict control. In addition, in response to the argument of the complainants regarding there are less burdensome alternatives that would allow

JUDGMENT OF 8amparo,

folios 165-180.

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the purposes of the state, the District Judge carried out a test of proportionality with regard to the contested articles, arriving at the following conclusions: (i) the unclaimed items updated consistently constitutionally valid to avoid the involvement of third party rights restriction, through objectively expressly contained in the Constitution, namely the protect right to the health of people; (Ii) the legislation at issue is instrumentally appropriate and suitable to meet the stated objective; and (iii) the measure is proportionate, since it does not ban marijuana but simply establishes conditions, which results in a minimal impact on rights.9 d) Finally, regarding concept of violation based on the idea that the criminalization of the consumption of marijuana violates the objective purpose of criminal law and violates individual and personal freedom, the District Judge called it unfounded in part, arguing that Congress has powers to issue such rules. The District Judge also found the idea irrelevant, because the argument of the plaintiffs was based on premises that were dismissed by analyzing previous concepts of  violation.10

II.

RESOURCES SERVICE

1. Principal resource review filed by the plaintiffs Unhappy with the amparo judgment, the plaintiffs filed an appeal for review. 11 Judgment Ruling 10of

of under, folios 180-206. amparo, folio 206 -212.

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for review. . Notebook under review under 237/2014, folios 143-291

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In their letter, the applicants presented in brief the arguments set out below: Grievance second to sixth. Undue foundation and motivation of the District Judge regarding the restriction of rights fundamental to personal identity, self-image, free  development of personality, self-determination and individual freedom, all in relation to the principle of human dignity  and the right to the provision of health12 Applicants argued that the District Judge ignored most of the arguments presented by the plaintiffs in the concepts of violation, which were aimed at sustaining the unconstitutionality of the challenged, considering that the provisions constituted an unjustified restriction on the rights fundamental to personal identity, self-image, free development of personality, self-determination and individual freedom, all in relation to the principle of human dignity and of the right to health. According to the complainants, the District Judge merely offered "free and improperly motivated" reasons to argue that the prohibitionist policy did not violate those  rights. Indeed, firstly, the appellants argued that the fact that the state has an important aim is not reasonable to limit a human right, it is essential also to examine whether the restriction fulfills the other requirements of the test established by the Supreme Court. In this

regard, the appellants argued that the District Judge ruled that the prohibitionist policy was instrumental in protecting the health while there were less restrictive measures to achieve the objective sought 12 Appeal

for review, folios 23-130.

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without exposing the reasons to substantiate his statement and without   regard to evidence to the contrary. Based on the above, the applicants argued that contrary to the provisions of the District Judge, the contested regulation does impose models and standards of living upon individuals, because only the identity of each person is respected if it he or he is allowed to act upon their own traits, world views, conceptions of the good life and elements that define his or her singular view of the world. In this regard, the appellants argued that they would achieve these objectives by using marijuana, in the same way that other people achieved from practicing sports, hobbies, food they like and the company they kept, without the state being permitted to stigmatize and prohibit such behavior, except where it has been proven conclusively that such activity violates the rights of third parties. In connection with the foregoing, the applicants argued that the District Judge made very narrow interpretations of the rights to the free development of personality and privacy. The Judge did not take into consideration that one’s own "life plan" includes everything that the individual wants to do with his life and his body. This is not limited to appearance and profession, but includes also private, social, and recreational activities; cultural, leisure  and recreation. In addition, it also took into consideration that privacy does not only include the right not to disclose information, but also the right to keep the person and body in the private sector.

In addition, the appellants challenged the statement made by the District Judge in meaning that the authorization for

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performing acts related to marijuana use can affect society in general, because there is no scientific evidence that the consumption of this substance can affect any other than the person who consumes it. In another vein, the appellants argued that the District Judge was oblivious to rule on the scope of the  right to health, particularly with regard to the possibility of having one's own health. This, considering that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations in its General Comment No. 14, provided that the right to health implies the right to control one's health and body, which prohibits individuals from being subjected to interference and non-consensual health treatments. Seventh grievance. Improper foundation and motivation of the District Judge regarding the argument about the violation of the objective purpose of criminal law as well as individual liberty  as a result of the criminalization of marijuana consumption13 Moreover, the applicants argued that the District Judge wrongly described as irrelevant their arguments by  alleging that the challenged articles transgressed the power  to establish offenses. In this sense, they argued that the District Judge held that through a literal reading of Article 73, Sections XVI and XXI, it was clear that the Congress is authorized to issue rules. However, these considerations do not detracted from the plaintiffs’ claim for protection because the District Judge

failed to make a teleological interpretation  of those constitutional rules, which is to say that while indeed the Congress is entitled to legislate 13 Appeal

review, folios 130-143.

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on these matters, the fact is that that power is not free and unrestricted. Torts first and eighth. Improper assessment of evidence by the District Judge.14 Finally, the appellant argued that the District Judge  conducted an inadequate analysis of the evidence, because the Judge overlooked the sophisticated and serious facts given at trial in a study by the Beckley Foundation, as the Foundation is accredited with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, and the report was prepared by scientists and researchers of high reputation and recognition. So, by not assessing that report, the District Judge based his  decision on social prejudice and conjecture without scientific support, as the document revealed enough data for actual health effects from the consumption of marijuana, its possible effects compared to other drugs, and the objective degree of danger from marijuana. In addition, the appellants argued that the 2011 National Addiction Survey was assessed incorrectly, as it was given an inappropriate scope and probative value, considering that such a document does not establish that marijuana use has stopped or diminished, nor make any assessment of the strategy implemented in our country to combat  drug use. Such misjudgment led the District Judge to conclude that variations in marijuana

use are a consequence of the prohibitionist policy of our country, without considering that the survey found no causal link between the two. 14 Appeal

for review, folios 10-23 and 144-49.

14. 2.

Resource revision filed by the Ministry of Health on behalf of the President

Moreover, by letter filed on January 30, 2014, the Assistant Director of Administrative Resources of the Coordination General of Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Health Secretariat lodged an adhesive revision, representing the President of the Republic and the Health Secretariat, arguing in essence that the grievances listed below: First offense. Regarding the assessment of the evidence byJudge District15 Responsible authorities argued that the grievances and facts asserted by the complainants are unfounded regarding alleged improper evaluation of the evidence offered during the injunction, because although the District Judge District did not analyze each and every one of the pieces of evidence offered by the plaintiffs, the fact is that through the documents exhibited is no claim of the plaintiffs credited because it is information  of no scientific value. Second and Third grievances. Regarding the analysis that the

District Judge regarding the alleged violation of the complainants’ fundamental rights16 On the other hand, the responsible authorities also  argued that the grievances of the complainants should be declared unfounded and inoperative, because cannabis prohibition established by the contested legislation is a legal control and a valid protection of the right to health. 15 of

adhesiveResource review, folio 5-9. 16 adhesive Resource review, folios 9-30.

15. They also noted that the restrictions in question  are duly justified, while the measures (i) are admissible, as they are aimed at protecting the right to health of society in general; (Ii) they are necessary, since it is scientifically proven that the effects of marijuana use are harmful to the physical and mental health of people; and finally (iii) they are proportionate, given that the degree of restriction is amply rewarded by the  benefits gained by protecting the health of the general population,  and in particular the health of minors. In fact, according to the state authorities, the  prohibition contained in the contested articles is not arbitrary or capricious, while as noted by the district court itself it does not violate the right to privacy, free development of personality, personal identity or self-determination, nor  violates the right to health, as it is a measure instrumentally appropriate for attaining the objectives of protection of life and health, it does not intervene in the private and personal sphere of the individual. In addition, the responsible authorities claimed that in fact there does not exist as such a prohibition on the consumption of cannabis, under which in accordance with Article 479 of the General Health Law, there is permission for personal consumption

as established in the table of orientation of  maximum levels of personal consumption of various materials.

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Finally, policy makers noted that the District Judge  correctly noted that the rights claimed by the plaintiffs are confined exclusively to the human being, so it was not possible to extend them the moral person complaining, making them inoperative arguments in this regard. III.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE APPELLATE COURT

The appeal aforementioned revision was referred to the Fifth  Appellate Court in Administrative Matters of the First Circuit,  which, by car *****, ***** formed the record and the declared admissible  appeal review.17 The Appellate Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the amparo review, since it is matter on which there remained a problem of constitutionality, specifically, with respect to Articles 235 last paragraph, 237, 245, section I, 247, last paragraph, and 248 of the General Health Law about which there is no case law, so that the original jurisdiction of the High Court updating to hear the present case.18 Accordingly, the Appellate Court referred the case to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. 19 IV. PROCESSING BY THIS SUPREME COURT

In view of the above, by order of April 9, 2014, the  Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation took its original competition,  to hear this under review in registering 17 Auto

admission. Notebook under review ***** index in theCourt, Appellate folios 152-52. 18 Resolution of the Appellate Court. Notebook under review ***** index in the Appellate Court, folios 368-380 back. 19 Office of referring the matter to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. Notebook amparo 237/2014 review, foja 2.

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the matter with the file number 237/2014 and taking turns to Minister Arturo Zaldivar Lelo de Larrea for study.20 Subsequently, by order of 24 April 2014, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court took over the hearing in this under review, and the cars were sent to Minister Arturo Zaldivar Lelo de Larrea to prepare the corresponding draft resolution.21 V. COMPETITION The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation  has jurisdiction to hear this appeal for review, in terms of the provisions of Articles 107, section VIII, paragraph (a) of the Constitution of the United Mexican States; 83 of the Amparo Act effective from April 2, 2013; 21, section II, subsection (a) of the Organic Law of Judicial Power of the Federation; and 86 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, in relation to the provisions of the first and third points of the General Agreement 5/2013, issued by the Plenary of the High Court on 13 May 2013.

VI.OPPORTUNITY

Needless First esta Chamber to rule on opportunity this application for review, as the Fifth Court Collegiate in Administrative Matters of the First Circuit and the made calculation in Its resolution of *****, concluding that filing was made in the same time22 . 20 and

turn Registry Agreement. Notebook 237/2014 under review, pages 323-325. Agreement. Notebook 237/2014 under review, hander327. 22 ResolutionAppellate Court. Notebook under review ***** index in the Appellate Court, folios 372-372 back. 21 avocamiento

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VII. STANDING AND ORIGIN The plaintiffs filed an appeal to review, asserting  procedural law that accorded by paragraph (e) of Section I of Article 81  of the Law of Amparo, according to which may appeal review against a decision issued by one district judge. Consequently, it is undeniable that if the ruling went to the indirect amparo, ***** denied the protection to the complainants, they have the legal standing to fight, having not  satisfied the claim by which promoted the request for defense. In fact, the origin comes from the fact namely that the appeal was filed against the interpretation that a District Court held, in the sense that were constitutional Article 235, last paragraph, 237, 245, section I, 247, last paragraph, and 248 of the General Health Law, considering that they do not transgress the fundamental rights of dignity, personal identity, personality rights, self-image, free development of personality, self-determination, individual personal and physical freedom and the right to one’s own health. Mindful of the above, it should be noted

that this appeal is appropriate and was presented by legitimized part, having been filed by the complainants. On the other hand, the use of adhesive revision was also brought by party entitled, since the public server brought that on behalf of the President, they are entitled in the case in accordance with Article87 of the Law of Amparo.

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VIII. STUDY BACKGROUND The appellants originally raised, in their request for a defense on unconstitutional grounds, several articles of the General Health Law, arguing that they establish a "prohibitionist policy "regarding the individual consumption of marijuana, believing that it unduly limited, among others, the fundamental rights to personal identity, self-image, free development of personality and self-determination, all in relation to the principle of human dignity. Accordingly the prohibition of marijuana involves the suppression of behavior that gives the individual a specific difference according to their uniqueness. The appellants argued that this  restriction is not justified and that the imposition of a single standard of healthy living is not admissible in a liberal state, which bases its existence on the recognition of uniqueness and human independence. In essence they argued that the ban on marijuana is based on a prejudice sustained by moral values and not on scientific studies, thus revealing that the state has not acted ethically neutral.

In the judgment of amparo, the District Judge described as unfounded the arguments of the plaintiffs, noting among other things that the contested provisions do not limit the right of the complainants to choose their appearance, activity or how they wish to plan and live their lives, nor are they intended to impose models and

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standards of living that are unrelated to the complainants, but that they are directed to protect and make effective the right to health of the general population. Unhappy with that decision, the plaintiffs filed a petition for review, which they argued primarily that--contrary to the provisions of the District Judge--the contested rules impose models and standards of living outside individuals, because the identity of each person is respected only if allowed to act upon their own traits, worldviews, conceptions of the good life. In this sense, they argued that they "singularizarían" and would achieve those  objectives through marijuana use, in the same way that other people achieved from the sports they play, hobbies they enjoy, food they like and the company they keep, with the state prohibiting and stigmatizing such behavior, except if it’s been proven conclusively that such activity violates the rights of others. So, the First Chamber notes that the grievances raised by the appellants, particularly those identified as second, third, fifth and sixth, which together are aimed at combating the District Judge's decision to consider the contested constitutional rules, are essentially

sound and sufficient to overturn the judgment under appeal and give constitutional protection to the plaintiffs on the ground that they limit unjustifiably the fundamental right to free development of personality. In contrast, as shown below, they are unfounded assert grievances made by the Assistant Director of Legal Affairs, Human Rights, of the Secretariat of Health, representing

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the President of the Republic and the Health Secretariat, in which the constitutionality of the provisions are sustained. Before entering an analysis of the grievances, the First Chamber considers important to note that although the request for defense noted among the complainants to the moral person named *****, we see that in the contested judgment the District Judge declared inoperative all arguments related to that entity, considering that human dignity is a fundamental right it may just be inherent to individuals.23 In this sense, it does not appear that the complainants have raised wrong one in the appeal to combat ineffectiveness decreed by the District Judge, so the First Chamber considers that the determination question must be firm and, therefore, the study carried out by the High Court over the right to free development of the personality shall be limited only to the following plaintiffs: *****, *****, **** * and *****. It should be noted that while the arguments on the concepts of violation are directed to challenge generically the "prohibitionist policy" that prevents plaintiffs from using marijuana, and the policy identifies the contents of at least eight articles General Health Law (234,

235, 237, 245, 247, 248, 368 and 476), the fact is that the District Judge determined that the challenge had been taken only against Articles 235, last paragraph, 237, 245, section I, 247 23 Judgment

of amparo, folios 149-165.

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last paragraph and 248 of that law.24 Thus, since it is a decision that was also not contested by the appellants, the First Chamber understands that it must also be firm. In order to justify the announced decision and to respond to the arguments raised by the appellants in relation to the constitutionality of the unclaimed items ordered by the District Judge, the First Chamber considers it necessary to develop the following points: (i) explain the regulatory framework of narcotic drugs and psychotropic provisions of the General Health Act; (ii) establish the impact of the legislative measure at issue prima facie content of the fundamental right to free development of personality;and (iii) determine whether the measure exceeds the four steps of the proportionality test: (1) constitutionality of the measure aims pursued; (2) suitability; (3) need; and (4) strict proportionality. Finally, (iv) there are presented findings of the constitutionality of the articles challenged and (v) the effects of the grant of protection needed.

I. Regulatory framework on the control of narcotics and

psychotropic substances in the General Health Law Sections XXI and XXII of article 3 of the General Health Law 25 takes into consideration matters of public health,  prevention and sanitary control in the consumption of "drugs" and  "psychotropic substances".26 24 Judgment

of amparo, folio XXX. otherwise indicated, all items whose contents are listed in this section correspond to the General Health Law. 26 Article 3 . In terms of this law, it is a matter of general health [...] XXI. The prevention of drug and psychotropic and anti-drug program; 25 Unless

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In this regard, in accordance with Article 194 does "health check" to all actions of counseling, education, sampling, testing and, where appropriate, application security measures and sanctions that the Ministry of Health performs about the process, use, import and export  of various substances and objects, among which are narcotic and psychotropic substances.27 Specifically, health and control over narcotic and psychotropic substances is regulated in Chapters V and VI of Title Twelfth General Health Act  and in Chapter III of Title II of the Regulation of Health Products. In this regard, it should be noted that the Act provides for a similar regulatory framework for narcotics and psychotropics. First, the legislature established a list  to determine which substances should be considered as  narcotics and psychotropic substances (Articles 234 and 245). It determined that all acts related to narcotics or psychotropic substances, or any product that contains, requires an "authorization" from the Ministry of Health and XXII. The sanitary control of products and services and import and export. important to note that according to Article 197 of the General Health Law, the term "process" all activities relating to the production, processing, manufacturing , preparation, storage, mixing, conditioning, packaging, handling, transportation, distribution,storage and sale or supply to the public. Article 194. For the purposes of this title, the term disease control all the actionsof counseling, education, sampling , verification and where appropriate, implementing measures securityand sanctions exerted by the Ministry of Health with the participation of producers, traders and consumers, based on that established the official Mexican standards and 27 is

other provisions. The exercise of sanitary control shall apply to: I. Process, import and export of food, soft drinks,beverages, alcoholic cosmetics, toiletries, snuff and raw materials and, where appropriate, additives used in their preparation; II. Process, use, maintenance, import, export, and final disposal ofequipment, medical prosthetics, orthotics, functional aids, diagnostic agents, supplies ofuse, dental surgical materials, healing and hygienic products, and III. Process, use, import, export, application and disposal of pesticides, plant nutrients and toxic or hazardous to health substances as well as materials rawinvolved in its production. Sanitary control of the process, import and export of drugs, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the raw materials necessary for itssubstances. development, responsible exclusively to the Ministry of Health, based on the potential health risks that these products represent

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can only be granted for medical and / or scientific purposes (Articles 235 and 247, respectively). In this line, there is also an express prohibition  to grant the above mentioned authorization for drugs and psychotropic substances (Articles 237 and 248). Indeed, in accordance with Articles 235 and 247  and Article 44 of the Rules of Inputs for Health, any person who intends to plant, cultivate, prepare,   condition, acquire, possess, trade, transport, prescribe  medically, supply, use, use, consume and, in general, any action related to the substances listed in the Articles 234 and 245 of the General Health Act, or any product that contains, must have an "authorization" from the  Ministry of Health and can perform only those actions that have medical and / or scientific purposes.28 Article 235. The planting, cultivating, harvesting, processing, preparation, conditioning, acquisition, possession, trade, transport in any form, prescription, supply, employment, use, consumption and, in general, any act related to narcotics or any containing product that is subject to: I. The provisions of this Act and its regulations; II. International treaties and conventions to which the United Mexican States are a party and which has entered into under the provisions of the ConstitutionUnited of the Mexican States; III. The provisions issued by the General Health Council; IV. What other laws establishing general provisions and related matters; 28

V. (Repealed). VI. The provisions related to emit other Federal Executive intheir respective areas of competence. The acts referred to in this Article may be made onlymedical andpurposesHealth. forscientificand require authorization from the Ministry of Article 247. The sowing, cultivation , harvesting, processing, preparation, conditioning, acquisition, possession, trade, transport in any form, prescription, supply, employment, use, consumption and, in general, any act related to psychotropic substances or any product that contains, is subject to: I. The provisions of this Act and its regulations; II. International treaties and conventions to which the United Mexican States are a party and which has entered into under the provisions of the ConstitutionUnited of the Mexican States; III. The provisions issued by the General Health Council; IV. What other laws establishing general provisions and related matters; V. (Repealed) VI. Provisions concerning that issue other Federal Executive  intheir respective areas of competence.

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However, Article 368 stipulates that "health authority"  is the administrative act by which the health authority permits a public or private transactions person related to human health, in the cases and with the activities,   conditions and procedures determined by the General Health Act itself. However, Articles 237 and 248 expressly prohibit the issuance of  the authorization have been referred in respect of certain  substances considered as a serious public health problem, among which are the narcotic drug "cannabis sativa, indica and American or Marijuana" and the psychotropic "tetrahydrocannabinol '(THC), the isomeric Δ6A (10a), Δ6A (7), Δ7 Δ8, Δ9, Δ10 Δ9 (11) and its stereochemical variants, substances in dispute in this appeal for review.29 In this regard, it is important to note that Articles 238 and 249  provide an extraordinary course to allow the acquisition of  narcotic and psychotropic drugs referring to the aforementioned Articles 237 and 248 for purposes of scientific research, for which it will be necessary that the body or institution acts referred to in this Article may be made onlymedical andpurposes,to forscientific and required, like the respective substances, authorized by the Ministry of HealthProducts. Regulation of Health Article 44. The collection, processing, manufacture, preparation, mixing, conditioning, packaging, handling, storage, marketing, importation, exportation, prescription, supply, possession, transportation, employment, use, consumption and, in

general, any act related to narcotics and psychotropic substances, except without thosetherapeutic value and are commonly used in the industry may be used onlymedical for and scientific purposes, after authorization of the Secretariat. 29 Article 237. It is prohibited in the country, all the acts mentioned in Article 235 of this Act, with respect to the following substances and plants: opium prepared forsmoking, heroin or diacetylmorphine, its salts or preparations, cannabis sativa, indica and American or Marijuana, Papaver somniferum, or opium poppy, Papaver bactreatum and novogratense Erythroxilon or cocaine, in any form, derivatives or preparations. The same prohibition may be established by the Ministry of Health to other substances referred to in Article 234 of this Act, when considered they can be replaced in their therapeutic uses other elements that, in his opinion, do not cause dependence. Article 248. It is forbidden all acts mentioned in Article 247 of this Act, with respect to substances listed in Section I of Article 245.

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concerned present a research protocol approved by the Health Secretariat30 Thus, the First Chamber understands that the contested rules  are subject to a "system of administrative bans" which is part of the regulatory framework provisions of the General Health Law for  the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which constitutes a  legal obstacle to lawfully perform all actions necessary to be in a position to carry out the consumption of marijuana (planting, growing, harvesting, preparation, conditioning, possession, transportation, etc.).  For one, the last paragraphs of Articles 235 and 247 stipulate that the authorization for the studies and acts related to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances  is subject to the condition they have only "medical and / or scientific" purposes, excluding the possibility that marijuana can be used for "recreational or leisure" purposes. The numerals 237 and 245, in conjunction with Article 248, establishes an express prohibition so sharp that the Ministry of Health was unable to issue the authorizations that the complainants requested in relation to the use of marijuana for the purpose of exercising their right to free development of personality. Article 238 for scientific research only, the Ministry of Health authorized agencies or institutions that have presented research protocol 30

approved by that agency, the acquisition of drugs referred Section 237 ofthis Act. Such organizations and institutions communicate to the Ministry of Health the result of investigations conducted and as used. Article 249 for scientific research only, the Health Department may allow the purchase of psychotropic substances to which section I ofLaw, Article 245 of this to be delivered under control bodies or institutions that have presented research protocol approved by that Unit, which in turn inform the said Secretariat the result of investigations conducted and howis used.

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In this vein, it is important to note that although  Article 478 of the General Health Law,31 in conjunction with Article 479, states that the Public Ministry will not exercise criminal action against persons possessing five grams of marijuana, the Supreme Court has interpreted that provision to contain an   exclusive responsibility,32 which only means that in such cases it should not apply to the person who committed the crime  in question, but does not establish in any way an authorization or a right to personal consumption, but is only meant to decriminalize consumption in a very small amount. Those provisions do not allow in any way the carrying out of other  activities correlated to consumption, such as planting, growing,  harvesting, preparation, transportation, etc. It should be noted that the aforementioned items are not not  part of "the system of administrative bans" contested by the complainants, but of the “punitive system" under the General Health Law and the Federal Penal Code in relation to the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, so they are not relevant precepts regarding the constitutionality approach proposed by the complainants, which straightened only against the numerals that form the aforementioned "administrative system of prohibitions," among which obviously are not

Article 478. The Public Ministry will not exercise criminal action for the offense under the preceding article against whoever drug addict or consumer and possessing any of the narcotics listed in the table, equal to or less than the amount provided therein for its strict staff and outside places specified in section II of section 475 of thisconsumption. Act The ministerial authority shall inform the consumer the location of the institutions or centers for medical or counseling for the prevention of drug treatment. 32 In this regard see the thesis category "crime against health. ARTICLE 478 OF THE GENERAL HEALTH LAW, by providing for not applying the exclusion of liability in respect ofdrug addicts HOLDERS any narcoticIN DETENTION CENTER, EVEN IF quantitydoes not exceed the legal limit does not violate the guarantee of equality "[ninth period; Record 162 389; Instance First Chamber; Type of Thesis: Isolated; Source: Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette; Volume XXXIII, April 2011;Matter (s): Constitutional; Thesis: 1a. LII / 2011; Page:. 307] 31

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Articles 478 and 479 of the General Health Law. Once the scope of the contested rules are established, then it will be analyzed if such an administrative "prohibitions system" generates the damages that the plaintiffs argue. In this sense, even though the appellants argue violations of the rights of personal identity, self-image, privacy and human dignity, the First Chamber considers that all these fall under  the right to free development of personality. Thus, it is necessary to explain the premium content facie this right and then decide whether the claimed items affect such content.

II. Analysis of the impact of the measure challenged in the premium content facie the free development of personality

The modern theory of fundamental rights draws a distinction  prerequisite for understanding the way in which the constitutional courts  often control the constitutionality of rules through the principle of proportionality: the scope of the fundamental right and the extent of their protection. 33  According to this distinction, the examination of the constitutionality of

a legislative measure must be carried out through a two-stage analysis. First, it must be determined whether the contested provision  affects the prima facie scope or content of the right at issue. 34  In other words, it must be established whether the contested legislative measure limits 33 Barak,

Aharon, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations, trans. Doron Qalir, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 19. 34 Bernal Pulido, Carlos, The principle of proportionality and fundamental rights, Madrid,CEPC, 2007, p. 45.

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the fundamental right.35 At this stage of analysis is necessary to resort to the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions.  On the one hand, we must determine the scope of the prohibition or obligation set by the   legislative provision at issue. On the other hand, we must also interpret the constitutional provision that hosts the fundamental right in question, in order to determine the scope or content of this. Thus, in this first stage, we must determine if the behaviors are covered under the fundamental right in question. If the conclusion is negative, the test should end at this stage with the statement that the legislative measure at issue is  constitutional. But if the conclusion is positive, it upgrades to another level of analysis. In the second stage of analysis, it must be determined whether the   standard actually involved in the fundamental right is constitutional. So, at this stage of the analysis we should consider whether there is a constitutional justification for legislative action to reduce the extent of protection that initially granted the right. This exercise involves  examining whether the legislative intervention meets the  requirements of the principle of proportionality: a constitutionally valid purpose, suitability, necessity and proportionality.

35 Barak,

cit., p. 26.

30

According to the above, the First Chamber proceeds to  determine whether the legislative measure limits the raw content of the facie  right to free development of personality. First, it should be noted that the Mexican Constitution  grants broad protection to empower people, to ensure the enjoyment of certain goods which are indispensable for the choice and realization of life plans proposed by individuals.36 Thus, in general terms it can be said that fundamental rights are accorded to "entrench" those goods  against state measures or actions of third parties that may affect personal autonomy.37 In this way, the rights considered to be "off limits" to state action are linked to the satisfaction of those commodities that are necessary for the satisfaction of any plan of life.38 In this vein, rather than the more generic is required  to ensure the autonomy of people is the freedom from any conduct that does not harm others.39 The Constitution and international treaties  recognize a catalog of "rights of freedom" that result in permissions to perform certain actions that are considered valuable for the autonomy of individuals (expressing

opinions, moving unimpeded, freedom of association, freedom to adopt a religion or other belief, the right to choose a profession or work, etc.), and which also involve targeting the government and third parties, since imposing negative bans intervenes or obstructs the actions permitted by 36 Nino,

Carlos, Ethics and Human Rightslimits.A test basis, 2nd ed., Buenos Aires, Astrea, 1989, p. 223. 37 Nino, op. cit., p. 223. 38 Garzón Valdés, Ernesto, "Something about 'the preserve'" Doxa. Journal of Philosophy of Law no. 6, 1989, p. 209. 39 Nino, op. cit., p. 223.

31

the fundamental right in question.40 However, the right to free development of personality protects a "residual area of freedom" not covered by other public freedoms.41 As the German Constitutional Court explained  in Elfes,42 these fundamental rights protect the freedom of human performance of certain "living space." These, according to historical experience, are more likely to be affected by the government  when a certain "vital space" is operated through a state measure and is not expressly protected by a specific right of freedom. In these cases, people can invoke the  protection of the right to free development of personality. Thus, this law can come into play whenever an action  will not be supervised by a specific right of freedom. 43 In this regard, the specialized doctrine has indicated that the right to free development of personality involves "a radical rejection of the ever-present temptation of state paternalism, who think they know better than the people what is good for them and what they should do with their lives,” so it can be said that this right is “the constitutional proclamation that respects the rights of others, that each human being is the best judge of their own interests" (emphasis added).44

40 Alexy,

Robert, Theory of fundamental rights, trans. Carlos Bernal Pulido, Madrid, CEPC, 2007, pp. 197-201. 41 Díez-Picazo, Luis Maria, System Fundamental Rights, 2nd ed., Cizur Menor, Thomson Civitas, 2005, p. 70. 42 BVerfGE 6, 32, judgment of 16 January 1957. Quoted by the translation contained in Kommers, Dolad P, and Sussel A. Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 3rd ed., Durham, Duke University Press, 2012, p. 402 43 Eberle, Eduard J., "Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law," Utah Law Review, 1997, p. 979. 44 Díez-Picazo, op. cit., p. 69.

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In the Mexican system, the Supreme Court has understood  that the free development of personality is a fundamental right derived from the right to dignity, which in turn is provided for in Article 1 of the Constitution and It is implicit in international human rights treaties signed by our country.45 In this regard, in the judgment that decided the direct protection 6/2008 46 a plenary of the High Court held that "[t] he individual, whoever he is , has the right to choose freely and autonomously, their life plan,  how it will achieve the goals and objectives that, for him, are relevant.” That precedent explained that the right to free development  of personality allows “the achievement of a life project  for himself, the human being, as an autonomous entity," so that there exists "state recognition of the natural ability of every person to be individual, without coercion or  undue controls or impediments by others, in order to meet the goals and objectives it has set, ie, it is the human person who decides the meaning of his own existence, according to his or her own values, ideas, expectations, tastes, etc." This criterion was subsequently reflected in the separate opinion of category "right to free development of personality.” 47

45 In

this regard, see the thesis category "human dignity.LEGAL ORDER MEXICANRECOGNIZED AS THE BASIS OF CONDITION AND OTHERRIGHTS FUNDAMENTAL"[Ninth Period; Register 165813; Instance: plenary; Type of Thesis: Isolated; Source: Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette; Volume XXX, December 2009 Subject (s): Constitutional; Thesis: P. LXV / 2009; Page: 8] 46 Judgment of January 6, 2009, resolved by the full Supreme CourtRegister:.. 47 Ninth Period, 165 822, Instance: Full, type Thesis: Isolated, Source: Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette, Volume XXX, December 2009 Subject (s): Civil, Constitutional, Thesis: P. LXVI / 2009, Page:7.

33

In line with the statement made by the German Constitutional Court in the Eppler case,48 it can be said that the "indefinite" freedom which is supervised by the right to free development  of personality complements the more specific freedoms such as freedom of conscience or freedom of expression, since its function is to protect the "personal sphere" is not   protected by traditional and more concrete liberties. In this  sense, this right is especially important against the new threats to individual freedom presented today. However, the specialized doctrine states that the free development of personality has an external and an internal dimension. 49 From an external point of view, the law provides coverage for  a generic "freedom of action" that allows any activity that the individual considers necessary for the development of his personality.50 However, from an internal perspective, the law protects a "sphere of privacy" of the individual against external incursions that limit the ability to make certain  decisions through which personal autonomy is exercised.51 As shown below, although at a conceptual level  this distinction can be drawn between external and internal aspects,  it is difficult to assign the cases to exercise this right to one of these dimensions. This is because the

actions performed by individuals in the exercise of personal autonomy   involve the decision to carry out that action, while decisions on issues that 48 BVerfGE

54, 148, judgment of June 3, 1980. Cited by the translation contained in Kommers and Miller, op. cit., p. . 406-407 49 Eberle, Eduard J., "Observations on the Development of Human Dignity and Personality in German Constitutional Law: An Overview", Liverpool Law Review Journal. of Contemporary Legal and Social Policy, vol. 33, no. 3, 2012, p.211. 50 According to the German Constitutional Court, the free development of personality is an independent fundamental right that guarantees a general freedom of action. In this regard,Case BVerfGE 6 36 51 Eberle, "Observations ...", op. cit., p. 211.

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in principle concern only the individual normally require certain actions to materialize. In any case, it seems that it is a matter of emphasis. So  while there are situations in which the most important aspect of  personal autonomy is seen in the action taken, there are other situations in which the exercise of autonomy is seen most clearly through the decision taken by the person. Moreover, it is worth noting that in comparative law there are other fundamental rights that serve a similar free development of personality function. In American law, for example, from the right to due process in  its substantive aspect it has developed what is known as  "decisional privacy."52 This aspect of the right to privacy is directly related to personal autonomy, since it not only guarantees an area of freedom in making decisions that only concern the individual, but also provides coverage for a   generic freedom of action, which includes aspects such as how to  behave in public or the lifestyle of the individual. 53 According to what has been

presented, it seems clear that the right to free development of personality is a right whose contours should leave jurisprudential needs. In comparative law, the form in which it has carried out the specification process  is to ask from specific cases whether a particular action or individual choice is protected under this law. 52 It

is worth noting that in American law the "decisional privacy "it distinguisheswhat is known as the" privacy physical "and" informational privacy ". While the right to privacy entails physical protection for the home and personal integrity against unjustified interventions by third parties, the right to informational privacy givesthe individual control information related to himself. In this regard, see Mayer-Schönberger, Viktor, "Strands of Privacy: Informational Databases and DNA and thePrivacy OECDGuidelines" (ed.), David Lazer, The Technology of Justice: DNA and the Criminal Justice System, Cambridge, MIT Press 2004. 53, Rossler Beate, The Value of Privacy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005 p.89

35

For example, the German Constitutional Court  has held that the free development of personality provides coverage for  "recreational" activities like traveling abroad, hunting and horse riding54 while in cases involving  transsexuals the right protected the decision regarding  the sex and gender with which an individual wishes to be identified. 55 In a similar vein, the US Supreme Court held that the right to privacy in the aspect aforementioned protects a variety of personal decisions from external interference,56 such as those related to contraception,57 education,58 the care of children,59. and family relations. 60 Thus, these decisions are covered by the right to privacy specifically because they belong to the sphere of personal autonomy . As noted above, the protection afforded by the right not only includes those decisions, but also the  actions necessary to realize those decision. 54 Kommers

and Miller, op. cit., pp. 400- 404. 55 Kommers and Miller, op. cit., p. 413. 56 Brashear, Bruce, "Marijuana Prohibition and The Constitutional Right of Privacy: An Examination of Ravin v. State "Tulsa Law Review, vol. 11 1975, p. 571.

57 The

US Supreme Court has recognized in several cases the right of individuals to decide on the use of contraceptive methods. In this regard, see among others Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965), which declared unconstitutional a state law prohibitingthe distribution of information about birth control to married persons; and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US 438 (1972), which held that the right to privacy protects thedecisions individual on contraception. 58 With regard to educational issues, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 US 183 (1952), the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy gave coverage to the freedom of research, thought and education; Martin v. Struthers, 319 US 141 (1943) noted that the right to privacy also included the right to distribute, receive and read information, and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) established that the right to privacy also included the right to access the full spectrum of available knowledge based on theFirst Amendment. 59 On this issue, the US Supreme Court ruled in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925), that the right to privacy protected in turn the right to educate one's children as one chooses. 60 In this regard, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158 (1944) recognized that the right to privacy protects state interference private sphere of family life, and in Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) held that the right to privacyincluded alsothe right to decide who you want to marry a person.

36

Now this way of specifying the content of the right to  free development of personality, consisting of cases that specifically recognize  that certain types of conduct or decisions are protected by law, which in turn results in the recognition of a right to make those behaviors or make  those decisions without State interference, is consistent with the manner in which this Supreme Court has approached the problems related to the scope of the right in question. In fact, in the judgment of that direct relief 8/2008  the Supreme Court held that in the matter of "'sexual reassignment,”  for a person to decide to have surgery for that purpose, in order to adapt their psychosocial and physical state, hence, live in the sex with which the person identifies fully, is undeniably a decision that is part of the free  development of personality, as an expression of the individuality of the person. It is part of their sexual perception of themselves, which strongly influences their life project. It is a decision that is part of the Rights to the free development of the personality.61

Subsequently, the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that the decision to stay married or not is covered by the right to free development of personality. So, at the judgment of the direct amparo 917/2009 61 Ninth

Period, Register: 165 698, Instance: Full, type Thesis: Isolated, Source: Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette, Volume XXX, December 2009 Subject (s): Civil, Thesis: P. LXIX / 2009, page 17.

37

review,62 when analyzing the constitutionality of no-fault divorce in the civil legislation of the Federal District, the First Chamber held that "respect for the free development of personality justifies recognizing greater  importance to the individual's will when you no longer wish to remain  connected with your spouse, therefore, the right to process the dissolution  of marriage, can not be made dependent on the demonstration of cause some, for that determinant is simply the end of that will expressed in demand, resulting   inadmissible that the State is endeavoring to maintain in force the  marriage of those seeking divorce to consider its particular situation becomes irreconcilable.” In similar terms, in the direct protection under review 1819/2014,63 the First Chamber explained that "with the expression of the decision to not continue the marriage, the right to the  free development of personality is exercised, for deciding to not to continue to remain married,  a change of marital status, is the way the individual wants  to live his life project; the way the individual chooses his freely autonomous life project", which was

subsequently the criteria set out in the separate opinion: "DIVORCE without explanation is a form of exercising the right to free development of  the personality.”64 62 Judgement

of September 23, 2009, resolved unanimously votes of the four Ministers Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, Juan N. Silva Meza, Olga Sanchez Cordero of Garcia Villegas (Rapporteur) President Sergio A. Valls Hernández. Absent Minister José de Jesús Gudiño Pelayo. 63 Judgment of 22 October 2014, decided by a majority of four votes of the Ministers Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea, Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo, Olga Sánchez Cordero GarciaVillegas (Rapporteur) and Alfredo Gutierrez Ortiz Mena. Dissident: Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, who reserved its right to formulate dissentingRegistration. 64, Tenth Season 2,008,492, Instance: First Chamber, Thesis Type: Isolated, Source: Gaceta Judicial Weekly of the Federation, Book 15, February 2015, Volume II, Matter (s): Constitutional, Thesis: 1a. LIX / 2015 (10a.), Page: 1392

38

In the same vein, in the analysis of the free development of the  personality, the constitutionality of the divorce system through  which accreditation is required grounds to dissolve the marriage, the First Chamber again reiterated in the contradictory argument 73/201365 that "the decision of a spouse not to stay married, regardless of the reasons, is also part of a life plan chosen independently, which should not be hindered by the state or by a third party, such as when the other spouse refuses to grant a divorce,   which means that the decision is also covered at least prima facie by this right.” Moreover, it is worth noting that in solving the aforementioned  direct protection, 8/2008 the plenary Supreme Court also  noted in obiter dictum that "the right to free development of personality, comprising, among others, the freedom to marry or not; to bear children and how many and at what point in your life, or decide not to have them; to choose one’s  personal appearance; profession or work activity; and, of course,  freedom of sexual

choice, as all these aspects are obviously part of the way the individual wants to project and live his life and therefore he alone can decide for himself.” As shown, the precedents cited show a line of cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to free development of personality gives 65 Judgment

of February 25, 2015, determined by a majority of four votes of the Ministers Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea (Rapporteur), Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo, Olga Sánchez Cordero Garcia Villegas and President Alfredo Gutiérrez Ortiz Mena against issued by the Minister Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, with regard to competition and by a majority of three votes Ministers Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea (Reporter ), Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz (who reservesthe right to make concurring) and Olga Sanchez Cordero Garcia Villegas, contraryto those issued by the Ministers Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo and President Alfredo Gutiérrez Ortiz Mena (who reserved the right to formulate dissenting), which refersto the background.

39

cover in principle to a variety of actions and decisions connected  directly with the exercise of individual autonomy. However, in this case the first question to be answered is whether the decisions and actions thus described are protected by the law in question. The complainants claimed that Health unlawfully refused to grant them permission to "use marijuana regularly, personally and for purely recreational purposes." They claimed that they  recognized "correlative rights to the consumption of marijuana, such as planting, growing, harvesting, preparing, possession, transport in any form, employment,   consumption and use, in general, any act related to the recreational use of marijuana," on the understanding that his request  expressly excluded “commercial transactions, such as distribution, sale and transfer of the same.”

The appellants argue that the free development of personality gives cover to the decision to consume marijuana for recreational purposes and, consequently, also all the necessary tools to be able carry out their own consumption (planting, growing, harvesting, preparation,  preparation, possession, transportation, etc.) In this regard, the  First Chamber understands that the fundamental right in  question allows prima facie that seniors may decide without state interference decide what type of recreational or leisure activities they want to enjoy.

40

The choice of a recreational or leisure activity  is a decision that undoubtedly belongs to the sphere of personal autonomy protected by the Constitution. That choice may include, as in this case, the intake or consumption of substances that produce experiences that in some  way "affect" the thoughts, emotions and / or feelings  of the person.66 In this line, the decision to smoke marijuana can have different purposes, including  "the relief of stress, the intensification of perceptions or include  the desire for new personal and spiritual experiences."67 So, being "mental experiences", they are among the most personal and intimate that anyone can experience, so that the decision of an individual of senior age to "affect" his personality in this way for recreational or entertainment purposes  is covered under for the right to free development of personality.68 Now, discussed in the regulatory framework  for the control of narcotic and psychotropic substances in the General Health Law and the premium

content of the facie right to free development of personality, this First Chamber is in a position to conclude that the articles of that system   identified by the District Judge acts claimed as effectively influencing the premium content of the facie fundamental right, because they constitute a legal obstacle preventing the plaintiffs from exercising the right to decide what recreational or leisure activities they want to perform, while also 66 In

this regard, see the dissenting opinion of Judge Levinson to the judgment of theCourt Supremeof Hawaii in the Hawaii case State v. Kantner, 53 H.327,493 P.2d 306 (1972). 67 Id. 68 Id.

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preventing them from lawfully carrying out all necessary actions and activities to realize that choice through the consumption of marijuana. That being said, the free development of personality is not an absolute valid right valid, so you may be limited in order to pursue some constitutionally valid goal. In this regard, it is important to identify  the limits to this right that have been recognized by the High Court. Under this theme, in that direct protection of the 6/2008 plenary Supreme Court she explained that this right "is not absolute, as is its limits in the rights of others  and public order". As can be seen, these outer limits to the right to work as provisions   authorizing the legislature to intervene in the free development of the   personality to pursue those aims.69 In this vein, the specialized doctrine has stated  that fundamental rights and their outer limits operate as principles, so that relations between the  law

and its limits enclose a collision that must be resolved  using the test of proportionality.70 Thus, for our  constitutional interventions carried out under the law that limit the free development of personality must meet  certain characteristics: the legislative measure must be appropriate to  protect the rights of others and / or public order; and should not  restrict unnecessarily and disproportionately this fundamental right. 69 On

this understanding the way in which the outer limits of theoperate, rights see Prieto Sanchis, Luis, constitutional justice and fundamental rights, Madrid, Trotta, 2003, p. 222 70 Idem.

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In other words, the measure in question has to  pass a test of proportionality in the broad sense. According to this, the fact that the Supreme Court  has established that the free development of personality gives facie premium coverage to a specific duty to decide and implement whatever recreational or leisure activity you want to perform, which may include the use of certain substances for leisure or entertainment, does not mean that this right is final. In this sense, the fundamental right adopts double face:  the proportionality test presents a basis and only after it has completed the scrutiny acquires a definitive character, so that if the legislative measure  limiting the right fails the test of proportionality, the final content  of the right will coincide with the attributed prima facie; however, if the law is justified in light of the

proportionality test the contents of the right will be smaller than the   apparent or prima facie.71 III. Analysis of proportionality in the broad sense of the measure challenged As explained above, in a second stage of analysis must be determined: whether the rule involved in the initially area protected by the fundamental law is constitutional. So, at this stage of the analysis we should consider whether in there is justification from the point of view of the constitutional case that the legislative measure limits the raw content  of the facie right. This exercise involves establishing whether the legislative action pursues a constitutionally valid purpose and examines whether the measure exceeds 71 Ibid,

p. 221.

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an analysis of strict suitability, necessity and proportionality. In the case, remember the measure whose  constitutionality is analyzed is the "system of administrative bans" set by the contested articles, which form part of the regulatory framework established by the General Health Law on the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. In this regard, it should be clarified that the "punitive system" under the General Health Law and the Federal Penal Code in relation to this issue will not be subject to any ruling of constitutionality. In this line, it also reiterates that neither the request of the complainants before the  administrative authority or the request for defense included request for a "commercial market" for marijuana, hence the First Chamber deems appropriate to clarify that there will be no pronouncement on this activity.

1. The constitutionality of the aims pursued by the measure First, we must identify the aims pursued by the contested measure to determine whether they are constitutionally valid. This stage of the analysis presupposes the idea that there is any purpose can  justify limiting a fundamental right.72. In effect, we are considering whether the ends can justify the legislative intervention on the exercise of  fundamental rights. 72 Barak,

op. cit., p.245.

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In this vein, fundamental rights, property collective and legal rights as guaranteed constitutional principles constitute legitimate purposes underlying the intervention of the legislature in the exercise of other rights. 73 However, it should be clarified that the state can not require people to act in accordance with a particular model of virtue.74 In the case of the precepts that make up the "system of administrative bans" it appears that the legislature considered it necessary to prohibit the   administrative authorization to perform all activities  related to marijuana, with special attention paid to the harmful effects associated with that product in the "health" and "public order."  Indeed, the General Health Law was to intended to regulate the right to health protection. 75 In this regard, among the goals envisaged in the law itself was  to “promote the physical and mental well-being of man, to contribute the full exercise of their abilities." (Section I of Article 2) Thus, in order to achieve that level of  

welfare, the legislature considered it necessary to implement a "health check" of psychotropic and narcotics, under the premise that their use is a 73 Bernal

Pulido, op cit., p. 697. 74 Nino, op. cit., pp. 425-426. 75 This law replaced the former Health Code and was promulgated on February 7, 1984. From that date have not been renovated Articles 235 and 237, which were challenged by the complainants.

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problem for public health in that both generate dependency in the consumer.76 Later reforms to various provisions were made in order to better clarify which substances can be considered narcotics or psychotropic substances77 So the legislature understood that such details are moved in "to progressive realization of the right to health protection, contained  in article 4. of our Constitution substances:."78 In this regard, in the preamble to the latest amendment to Article 245 of the  General Health Law, in which were added as psychotropic substances mephedrone, piperazine, TFMPP, midazolam and K2,79 it was noted that "one of the most serious problems of public health serious at the international level is relative to consumption and marketing of drugs, a phenomenon that in recent years has experienced  

increasing complexity due to the internationalization of  illegal building activities, production and smuggling of precursor chemicals."80 In this vein, the preamble also stated that "[t]hese  behaviors represent an increase in illicit activities and have allowed criminal groups amass great resources and income; the problem should be analyzed from the perspective of the impact that causes on public health, as this phenomenon 76 So

warns of the preamble to the Act, and their corresponding legal opinions. In this regard, see: Preamble, Chamber of Chamber of Deputies, Mexico, Federal District November 15, 1983 on the initiative of the GeneralLaw Origin:.Health 77 In this respect, the December 23, 1987 was enacted an amendment to the Articles 245, 247 and 248 of the General Law of Health. This last item has not been modified since. 78 Opinion of the chamber of origin of the Joint Commissions and General Health First Section of the Legislative Studies of the Senate of 26 November1987. 79 This reform he issued the January 7, 2014 and was the last to be made to article 245. 80 Reason of January 23, 2012 by Federal Executive in the draft reform of sections I and III of Article 245 of the General Law Health.

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causes the increase of diseases, disorders and even death,  all a result of their addictive use, making its effects felt in the social, economic, and political fields.”81 Moreover, it is noteworthy that the current Article 1 of the  General Health Act provides that this law aims to regulate the right to the protection of the health of any person in the terms of Article 4 of the Constitution, and  to establish the basis and methods for access to health services  and the participation of the Federation and the states in  terms of "general health". According to the law itself, this concept includes, among other things, both the prevention of drug and psychotropic substances as the existence of a program against drug abuse (section XXI of article 3).  

In accordance with the foregoing, we conclude that the purpose of the   regulatory framework for the control of narcotic and substances   psychotropic referred to in the General Health Act is to protect  the "health" and "public order", since under a systematic interpretation  of the system as well as the different processes to amend the law, it can appear that the legislature intended to ensure the health of drug users and  protect society from the harmful consequences of drug use, since it was considered that this activity has harmful effects both for the consumer and for  society in general. 81 Reason

for January 23, 2012 by the Federal Executive, in the draft reform of sections I and III of Article 245 of the General Health Law.

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In this regard, the First Chamber understands that both purposes  are constitutionally valid. On the one hand, it is clear that the  protection of health is a goal that can legitimately pursue the state, since it is fundamentally recognized in Article 4 of the Constitution, which provides   expressly that everyone is entitled to the protection of  health.82 In this regard, we must not forget that this right has both personal and individual projection and a public or social component. Regarding the protection of health of people  as individuals,the Supreme Court of Justice has established many precedents that the right to health results in obtaining a particular general welfare composed of the physical,

mental, emotional and social status of the person, which derives another   fundamental right, consisting of the right to integrity.83 Hence it is evident that the State has a constitutional interest in people procuring individually adequate health and welfare. On the other hand, involved in the social or public face of the right to health   is the duty of the state to address the health problems that  affect society in general and to establish the necessary mechanisms to ensure that all Article 4 [...]. [...] Everyone has the right the protection of health. The Act defines theand rulesforms for access to health services and establish the concurrence of the Federation and the states in matters of public health, as available to the fraction XVI of Article 73 of the Constitution. [...] 83 P.LXVIII / 2009, supported by the Full Court, available on the Ninth Period JudicialWeekly of the Federation and its Gazette, Volume XXX, December two thousand nine, Page Six, under the heading: "RIGHT TO HEALTH. Not limited to the physical aspect, but that translatesinto OBTAINING A PARTICULAR GENERAL WELFARE. 82

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people have access to health services.84 In the direct protection under review 4321/2014,85 the First Chamber acknowledged that in order to safeguard and protect the human right to health, the State must undertake the actions necessary to achieve that purpose, such as policy development, quality control of health services, identifying the main problems affecting the public health, etc.  In this sense, we can say that the General Health Act identifies marijuana as a public health problem. Closely related to the protection of public health  is protecting public order.

While it is difficult to define what this constitutional principle is,86 it is a concept that refers to the welfare of society in general. If  so understood, there is no doubt that public policy is the pursuit of collective social goals through legislative or public policy decisions. Moreover, it should be noted that the Constitution recognizes as a legitimate state interest the protection of society as a whole. In contrast, the prohibition of marijuana by mere  moral self-degradation involves not pursue a legitimate purpose. The Constitution does not impose an ideal of human excellence; it allows each individual to choose his own life plan and adopt the model each person considers valid, while not 84 P.

/ J. 136/2008, based on the Ninth Period Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette, Volume XXVIII, October two thousand eight, sixty-one page, under the heading: "HEALTH. THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION UNDER YOUR ARTICLE on the 4th., THIRD PARAGRAPH, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES, is a socialresponsibility. "85 Judgment of June 10, 2015, determined by a majority of a majority of four votes of the Honourable Ministers Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo (Rapporteur), Olga Sánchez Cordero Garcia Villegas, and President Alfredo Gutiérrez Ortiz Mena, contrary issued by the Minister Arturo Zaldivar Lelo de Larrea, who said that it reserves the right to formulate an individual opinion. 86 The principle of public order is recognized in the Constitution in Articles 6, first paragraph, 16, eighth paragraph, 115, section VII, 122, FIFTH BASE, first paragraph, 94 paragraphF)and 130 second paragraph.

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affecting others.87 Thus, the supposed effects of marijuana that cause social performance ,88 for example, decreased labor productivity, and "amotivational syndrome" 89can not be considered valid reasons to act upon the right to free   development of personality. Moreover, examining the law under consideration, and the rule making processes that have reformed it, it is not the legislature's intention to

promote a particular clear model of personal virtue. As explained, the law seeks to protect the health and public order. Once it has been established that the regulatory framework for the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances provided for in the General Health Law is a constitutionally valid purpose, we must now analyze whether the prohibition of marijuana for recreational purposes and therefore the ban on all  the necessary tools to be able to carry actions out their own consumption (planting, growing, harvesting, preparation, possession, transportation, etc.), is a measure appropriate to protect the health and public order. 87 Nino,

op. cit., p.423. to some studies, the effects of marijuana on school andlife professionalof the average consumer are unclear. Although it has been associatedpoor withschoolperformance frequency of use, it has also been suggested that this may be due to other causes, such socioecómicos and cultural conditioning of those who consume it. In this regard,see Caulkins, Jonathan P, Hawken, Angela Kilmer, Beau, and Kleiman, Mark, Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 77. In this vein, in a survey conducted in Mexico City found that 70% of marijuana users are working, 43% study and 20% study and work. Cf. Zamudio Angles, Carlos Alberto and Castillo Ortega, Rain, First survey of users of illegal drugs inCity, Mexico Mexico, Collective for an Integrated Drug Policy to the AC, 2012. 89 "amotivational syndrome" ("syndrome amotivational ') is defined as a pattern of behavior characterized by a lack of motivation, energy and initiative. Cf. Hall, Wayne, Degenhardt, Louisa, and Lynskey, Michael, The Health and Psychological Effects of Cannabis Use, 2nded., Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 2001, p. ix. 88 According

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2. Suitability of the measure At this stage of scrutiny we should examine whether the measure is an appropriate means to achieve the ends sought  by the legislature. In this regard, consideration of suitability presupposes an empirical relationship between the right intervention and the intended purpose of such involvement, it is sufficient that the measure contributes in some way and to some degree to achieve the purpose sought by the  legislator.90 Thus, the

suitability of a legislative measure must be shown from scientific knowledge or social convictions generally accepted.91 However, in this case we must determine whether the "system of administrative bans" set by the items   contested is an appropriate measure to protect health and  public order. Before carrying out such scrutiny it is essential to make some methodological considerations about how to conduct the examination of the suitability of the measure. First, the legal literature that addresses the  issue of the adequacy the of prohibition of consumption of drugs, it is sometimes often noted that this analysis is to determine whether  the measure effectively reduces the consumption. Supporters of  the analysis of adequacy onsider that a ban which in fact proves to be  ineffective in 90 Although

in American law the proportionality test is not used whenanalyzes the constitutionality of a measure usually done a similar analysis to test suitability. In this regard, see for all Bates v. Little Rock 361 US 516; Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, US 379 184 (1964). In connection with the ban on the consumption of marijuana, American literature also agrees on the need for such restrictions outweigh intense scrutiny. On this point, see Weber, Tim, "Would Government of Marijuana Prohibition Pass Strict Scrutiny?" Indiana Law Review, vol. 46, 2013, pp. 529-556; and Carcieri, Martin D., "Obama, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Drug Warm" Akron Law Review, vol. 44, 2011, pp. 303, 307-308, 311-312. 91 Bernal Pulido, op.cit., P. 733.

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reducing consumption.92 On this point, there are indeed many studies showing that the ban does not deter consumption.93 Thus, in the present case it could be argued that the "system of administrative prohibitions" set by the articles contested has failed to reduce marijuana use. 94 In this line, for example, data from the National Addiction Survey indicate that between 2002 and 2008 the consumption of illegal drugs  increased from 4.6% to 5.2% among the population ages 12 to 65, 95 which could be interpreted as meaning that the system of prohibition is ineffective in reducing

consumption.However, the First Chamber considers that the methodology   set out above is inadequate to determine the suitability of the  contested measure . In this vein, we accept that the analysis performed in this manner would lead to declare unconstitutional any prohibition or obligation that was   ineffective in achieving the mandates established by those rules. In this 92 Uprimny,

Rodrigo Guzman, Esther and Diana Parra, Jorge Alberto, "Des-ratio in the prosecution of drug offenses? The Colombian case "in Catalina Pérez Correa (ed.), Excessive Justice. Proportionality and drug offenses in Latin America, Mexico, Fontamara, 2012, pp. 111-113Study"., 93 In all, see Pedersen, Willy and Skardhamar, Torbjorn, "Cannabis and Crime: Findings From a Longitudinal Addiction. Society for the Study of Addiction, vol. 105, no. 1, 2010, pp. 109-118; Fergusson, David., Swain-Campbell, Nicola., And Horwood, John, "Arrests and Convictions for Cannabis Related Offences in a New Zealand Birth Cohort," Drug and Alcohol Depend, vol. 70, no. 1 pp. 53-63. 94 In this regard, there is an extensive literature showing that prohibitionist policiesnot havebeen effective in reducing consistent and permanent supply and demand for drugs. For all, see Blackwell, Michael J., "The Costs and Consequences of US Drug Prohibition for the Peoples of Developing Nations" Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 24, no. 3, 2014, p. 666; Christiansen, Matthew, "A Great Schism: Social Norms and Marijuana ProhibitionEssay.", A Short Harvard Law and Policy Review, vol.4, No. 1, 2010, pp.. 241-244; Camacho, Adriana Gaviria, Alejandro, and Rodriguez, Catherine, "drug consumption in Colombia,"Alejandro Uribe Gaviria and Daniel Mejía Londoño (coomp.), Anti-drug policies in Colombia. Successes, failures and deviations; Bogotá, Ediciones Uniandes, 2011; Kisley Stephen, "The Case forPolicy", Reforming Cannabis Control The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 53, no. 12, 2008, pp. 795796 ;. Beckett, Katherine, and Herbert, Steve, The Consequences and Costs of Marijuana Prohibition, Seattle,ACLU / University of Washington, 2009, pp. 11-26; van het Loo, Mirjam, Hoorens, Stijn van 't Hof, Christian, and Kahan, James P., Cannabis Policy. Implementation and Santa Outcomes,Monica,RAND Corporation, 2003. In the same vein, see the following reports: Open Society Institute, War on Drugs. Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011, pp. 2-4 .; and Report by the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, London, Home Office, 1969. 95 Perez Correa, Catalina, "Crimes against health and (dis) proportionality in Mexican law"in Pérez Correa, op. cit., p. 196.

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sense, this Supreme Court finds that the prohibitory rules cannot  be considered unconstitutional simply for being ineffective in motivating the   behavior of people. The reduction in consumption  can not be considered an end in itself of the measure itself, but in any  case a state of affairs which is a means or an intermediate in order to achieve further purpose, such as the protection of public health or public order.96

An alternative way to analyze the suitability is to  argue that the "system of administrative bans" set by the contested items will be suitable to achieve the aims pursued by the legislature, consisting of the protection of health and public order, to the extent that an empirical relationship exists between the consumption of marijuana and certain damages  to health and public order. In other words, if marijuana does not cause injury or damages to health or as society a whole, the ban will not be a suitable measure to protect these constitutional objectives. The examination of fitness then requires corroboration of the existence of an empirical relationship between use marijuana and certain states of affairs that can be characterized  as damages to health or society. Now, if you examine the literature that has analyzed the effects of the recreational use of marijuana, it is possible to identify at least the following states of things normally considered to be associated with the recreational use of marijuana: damages to health; propensity to use "harder" drugs; and incitement to commit other crimes. So, in the next section marijuana will 96 In

the literature the "primary problem" caused by thediffer. abuse of a psychoactive substance, of the "secondary problems" arising from policies controlthat States adopt against substance Cf. Uprimny, Guzman and Vine, op. cit., p. 108.

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be evaluated regarding the causes of the above damages to health and public order. It should also be pointed out that to pass the test of  suitability it will be enough that such damages exist, regardless of  grade. In other words, to find constitutional justification for the  prohibition of marijuana from the point of view of the adequacy of the measure, it is  necessary to show that it affects the health and public order, even  if that involvement is

minimal.97 Thus, an intervention may be considered suitable if the correlation between means and end is positive,  regardless of their level of efficiency. According to the above, then the court will analyze whether there is   empirical evidence to support the belief that  marijuana causes the damage or damages identified above. To corroborate the existence of such a relationship, the First Chamber  will rely on the scientific literature that has addressed this issue, as well  as several empirical studies available on the subject.  As a preliminary observation, it is worth noting that the available evidence shows that indeed marijuana causes harm or damages of various kinds. However, as shown below, some of these damages have been confirmed conclusively, while others are unlikely or that are mere speculations. It is worth noting that the uncertainty largely explains the fact that it is difficult to determine whether marijuana use causes adverse effects on health and public order or if 97 According

to the Global Commission on Drug Policy, public drug policies should be based on evidence showing that indeed these will help reduce damage to the health, safety of people and society in general. Open Society Institute, op. cit., p. 5.

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this is just a simple correlation98 A.Impact on Health In general, the studies agree that from  the evidence that exists, marijuana use in adults does not pose a significant risk to health,  except when it is

used chronically and excessively.99 In relation to the effects caused by marijuana on the health of people, the  literature distinguishes overrides chronic. So while the first place persists only for duration of  the poisoning in the body, the second persist even if  the consumer does not feel intoxicated.100 Temporary alterations occur in the immediate aftermath  of marijuana use. Some of the effects produced are panic, anxiety reduction,  alertness, stress, increased sociability, gradual reduction of  cognitive and motor functions, enhanced perceptions of reality--colors, flavors, sensations--or visual and/or hearing hallucinations. 101 So, being dependent 98 On

this subject, see, among others Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op. cit., p. 54; Room, Robin Fischer, Benedikt, Hall, Wayne Lenton, Simon, and Reuter, Peter, Cannabis Policy: Moving Beyond Stalemate, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010; D 'Souza, Deepak Cyril, Sewell, Richard Andrew, and Ranganathan, Mohini, "Cannabis and Psychosis / Schizophrenia: Human Studies" European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, vol. . 259, No. 2009, pp 413-431.;and Hall, Wayne, and Liccardo Paccula, Rosalie, Cannabis Use and Dependence: Public Health and Public Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 99 Fischer, Benedikt, Jeffries, Victoria, Hall, Wayne, Room, Robin, Goldner Elliot , Rehm J., "Lower Risk Cannabis Use Guidelines for Canada (LRCUG): A Narrative Review of Evidence and Recommendations", Canadian Journal of Public Health, vol. 102, no. 5, 2011, pp. 324-327; and Hall, Wayne,"The Adverse Effects of Cannabis Use: What Are They, and What Are Their Implications for Policy", International Journal of Drug Policy, 2009, vol. 20, pp. 458-466. 100 In this regard, see for all Hall, Wayne, and Degenhardt, Louisa, "TheAdverse Effects of Chronic HealthCannabis Use" Drug Testing and Analysis. Special Issue: Cannabinoids part II: The Current Situation With Cannabinoids, vol. 6 Nos. 1-2, 2013, pp. 39-45; and Hall and Degenhardt Lynskey, op. cit. 101 In this vein, it has even indicated that negative effects on the state of intoxication, such as anxiety, panic, paranoia and / or psychosis, are usually associated with subjects

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So as regards temporary marijuana intoxication, research indicates that these effects are reversible and do not represent a proven health risk.102 The alleged existence of chronic disorders as a result of consumption is controversial in the literature. Studies indicate that permanent implications   are unlikely or minimal, their persistence is uncertain and may even have

originated from a plurality of different factors consumption.103 An example of the latter situation is the association found between smoking marijuana and respiratory cancers,104 which could be explained because many marijuana users also smoke tobacco, implying that the existence of a causal link between marijuana use and cancer is not proven. 105 psychologically vulnerable, such as people with schizophrenia. In this regard, see Ashton, Heather, "Pharmacology and Effects of Cannabis: A Brief Review", The British Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 178, no. 2, 2001, pp. 101-106. 102 Douaihy, Antoine, "Cannabis Revisited" UPMC Synergie, 2013, pp. 1-9. 103 Ashton, op. cit., pp. 101-106. As an example, a study shows, among other things, that there is uncertainty about whether the adverse effects associated with marijuana are causally related to its consumption, which is not clearly address the relationship between consumptionand depressive disorders or emotional damages that cognitive orintellectual intensity and reversibility of the impact is uncertain, and consequences psychoticare subject to the consumer suffers any special susceptibility to psychiatric disorders. In this regard, see Hall and Degenhardt, op.citMathieu.; 104 In this regard, see Mehra, Berthiller, Julien, Straif, Kurt, Boniol, Voirin, Nicolas; Benhaïm-Luzon, Veronique; Ayoub Ben Wided, Dari, Iman, Laouamri, Slimane, HamdiCherif, Mokhtar, Bartal, Mohamed Ayed Ben Fahrat and Sasco, Annie, "Cannabis Smoking and Risk of Lung Cancer in Men: A Pooled Analysis of Three Studies in Maghreb ", Journal of Thoracic Oncology, 2008, vol. 3 no. 12, p. 1398; Reena, Moore, Brent A., Crothers, Kristina, Tetrault, Jeanette; Fiellin, David A., "The Association Between Smoking and Lung Cancer Marijuana. A Systematic Review ", Archives of Internal Medicine, vol. 166, 2006, pp. 1359-1367; and Hashibe, Mia, Morgenstern, Hal, Cui Yan, Tashkin, Donald P., Zhang Zuo-Feng, Cozen, Wendy, Mack, Thomas M., and Greenland, Sander, "Marijuana Use and the Risk of Lung and Upper aerodigestive Tract Cancers: Results of a Population-Based Case-Control Study, "Cancer, Epidemiology, Biomarkers & Prevention, Vol. 15, no. 10, 2006, pp. 1829-1834. 105 on this discussion, see Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer and Kleiman, op. cit .; Hashibe, Morgenstern, Cui, Tashkin, Zhang, Cozen, Mack, and Greenland, op. cit .; Hall and Degenhardt, op.cit; Hall, Wayne, and Taylor, D. Robin, "Respiratory Health Effects of Cannabis: Position Statement of The Thoracic Society of Australia and New Zealand", Internal Medicine Journal, Vol. 33, 2003, pp. 310313; Hall, Wayne, "What you Research over the Past Two Decades Revealed About The Adverse Health Effects of Recreational Cannabis Use?" Addiction, vol. 110, no. 1, 2015, pp. 19-35.

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Moreover, there are studies that argue that  marijuana produces the same respiratory damage as any other smoked substance,106 and that it is less harmful than other substances such as opium, amphetamines, alcohol or barbiturates.107 In this vein, several reports conclude that the danger of marijuana has been "overexposed"108 and generally emphasize that this substance has a very low level of toxicity.109 Moreover, there are also

studies that said the effects normally considered "chronic" are essentially reversible after consumption is suspended for a variable period of  time.110 Similarly, studies agree that the relationship between marijuana and psychotic or mental disorders is unclear,111 except in consumers who are susceptible to mental illness. In this line, it has not been shown conclusively that consumption produce damage in the reproductive systems of the consumer,112 nor is there evidence that marijuana generates a permanent impairment in the cardiovascular system,113 nor has it been 106 Al

respect, see Royal College of Physicians of London, Cannabis and Cannabis-BasedMedicines. Potential Benefits and Risks to Health, London, 2005; Joy, Janet E, Watson, Stanley, and Benson, John A (eds.), Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base, Washington,DC, National Academy Press, 1999. 107 Ballotta, Danilo, Bergeron, Henri, and Hughes, Brendan, "Cannabis Control in Europe," SharonRodner Sznitman, Börje Olsson, Robin Room (eds.), A Cannabis Reader: Global Issues and Local Experiences, Perspectives on Cannabis Controversies, Treatment and Regulation in Europe; Lisbon, EMCDDA, 2008; and Report by the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, op. cit. 108 Ballotta, Bergeron, and Hughes, op. cit. 109 Ashton, op. cit., pp. . 101-106 110 As an example, see Solowij, Nadia, Cannabis and Cognitive Functioning, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006; and Pope, Harrison G., Gruber, Amanda J., Hudson, James I., Huestis, and Marilyn A. Yurgelun-Todd, Deborah, "Neuropsychological Performance in Long-term Cannabis Users", Archives of General Psychiatry of 2001, vol. 58, no. 10 pp. Number 909 915. 111 Zammit, Stanley Moore, Theresa HM, Lingford-Hughes, Anne Barnes, Thomas R. E., Jones, Peter B. Burke, Margaret, and Lewis Glyn, "Effects of Cannabis Use on Outcomes of Psychotic Disorders: Systematic Review, "The British Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 193, no. 5. 2008, pp. 357-363; Hall and Degenhardt Lynskey, op. cit., p.75. 112 Hall, Degenhardt and Lynskey, op. cit., p.56. 113 Hall, Degenhardt and Lynskey, op. cit, p. 64.

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proven that prolonged severe cognitive damages occur similar to those   observed after chronic alcohol consumption.114 Under such conditions, the First Chamber notes that while the  medical evidence shows that marijuana can cause damage to the health of consumers, it is less than or similar to those damages produced by other

substances not prohibited such as alcohol or tobacco. So it can be   concluded that the damage to health from the consumption of  marijuana is not serious. B. Development In the scientific literature, experts usually distinguish between abuse and substance dependence. While considering abuse from the continuous use of drugs, the agency requires that consumption meet  additional criteria, such as development of drug tolerance, withdrawal and consumption interference with the development of other consumer activities.115 In this regard, regular marijuana users do not necessarily qualify  as drug addicts. However, there are clear differences in the literature regarding the frequency with which the drug is presented in marijuana users. Additionally, there are discrepancies in the period and intensity of consumption that are necessary for marijuana to cause some degree of addiction.  In this regard, there are studies that suggest that there is a low degree of  probability that marijuana produces dependence. Indeed, according to this research not 114, Hall

Degenhardt and Lynskey, op. cit, p.86. Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-5, 5th ed., Washington, DC :, New School Library, 2013, p. 483. 115 American

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only do few users marijuana develop addiction, but also there exists the possibility that the consumption of marijuana that triggers the dependence is subject to various factors such as preexisting behavioral and personality disorders.116

Thus, some studies have found that 9% of those who use marijuana dependence develop it at some point in their lives,117 while other research suggest that 10% of people who have used marijuana ever  developed habit-forming problem.118 In the same vein, other reports estimate there is enough evidence to conclude that some  chronic marijuana users develop effectively.119 However, numerous studies agree that the implications for health and social consequences reported by those who seek to control their consumption are much less severe than those reported by addicted to other substances, such as opium or alcohol. For example, a report showed that only 3% of the adult population of the United States would meet the  clinical diagnosis of dependence, compared with about 14% of  those suffering from alcoholism. Such research findings also occurred in Australia and New Zealand.120 116, Joy

Stanley, Watson, and Betson, op cit. Hawken, Kilmer and Kleiman, op. cit., p. 66 118 Hall and Degenhardt, op.cit; Hall and Degenhardt Lynskey, op. cit .; Ashton, op cit., Pp. 101106. 119 Hall, Degenhardt and Lynskey, op. cit. 120 Hall and Degenhardt, op.cit .; Hall and Liccardo Paccula op. cit .; Hall, Wayne, and Degenhardt, Louisa "Extent of Illicit Drug Use and Dependence, and Their Contribution to the Global Burden of Disease," Lancet, vol. 379, no. 9810, pp. 55-70. 117 Caulkins,

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C. Propensity to use "harder"drugs. In general it can be said that available studies  show that marijuana has a low level of incidence in the consumption of other riskier drugs riskier.121 However, it is true that they have identified associations between

marijuana use and consumption of more intense drugs like heroin or cocaine.122 In this regard, some studies have tried to explain these correlations from a pharmacological perspective, arguing that the chemical effects of marijuana are conducive to the consumption of other narcotics.123 However, this approach has been contrasted with various  social and contextual explanations that understand the phenomenon  from the socioeconomic, cultural and biological conditioning  of the consumer.124 Thus, it can be said that these approaches to the problem which are based essentially on the hypothesis that there are a number of reasons beyond their own marijuana consumption for the use of other drugs are more empirically supported.125 121 Hall

and Degenhardt, op.cit. Denise B., Examining the Gateway Hypothesis: Stages and Pathways of Drug Involvement in Kandel, Denise B. (ed.), Stages and Pathways of Drug Involvement. Examining the Gateway Hypothesis. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 3-18. 123 Yet studies have supported this explanation, say their results should be examined carefully, recognizing that there are different explanations that could make sense of a probable causal relationship, as genetic or social factors. As an example, see Emmet, David and Nice, Graeme, What You Need to Know About Cannabis: Understanding the Facts, London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2009. 124 Hall, Degenhardt, and Lynskey, op. cit. In this regard, it may be noted that the relationship has been explained from the fact that marijuana users usually have greater opportunity to get other illicit drugs on the black market. 125 In this regard, see, inter alia Hall and Degenhardt, op.cit .; Wagner, Fernando A, and Anthony, James C., "Into the World of Illegal Drug Use: Exposure Opportunity and Other Mechanisms Linking the Use of Alcohol, Tobacco, Marijuana, Cocaine and" American Journal of Epidemiology, vol. 155, no. 10, 2002, p. 918; Fergusson, David M, Boden, Joseph, Horwood, John, "The Developmental Antecedents of Illicit Drug Use: Evidence From a 25-year Longitudinal Study", Drug Alcohol Depend, vol. 96, Nos. 1-2, 2008, p.165; Backpack, Andrew, McCaffrey, Daniel, Paddock, Susan ,. "Reassessing the Marijuana Gateway Effect" Addiction, vol. 97, No. 12, 2002, p. 1493; Lessem, Jeff, Hopfer, Christian, Haberstick, Brett, Timberlake, David, Ehringer, Marissa, and Smolen, Andy, "Relationship Between Adolescent and Young Adult Marijuana Use Illicit Drug Use", Behavior Genetics, vol. 36, no. 4, 2006, p.498. 122 Kandel,

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In this sense, some studies rule out completely the theory that  marijuana causes subsequent use of other drugs. Note that marijuana could rather be just a variable that has to be analyzed together with other factors of  social, psychological and physiological risk.126 However, other studies qualify this

conclusion by noting that there is no conclusive evidence  to show that marijuana leads to the use of other drugs.127 Thus it can be said that the reports agree that marijuana has a low degree of impact on the consumption of riskier drugs. In any case, it appears that the consumption of subsequent drugs is the result of several factors  acting together, but not simply the consumption of marijuana  itself.128 In this regard, for example, sociological studies show that peer pressure or the continued use of marijuana increases the likelihood that someone consumed first,129 which of course does not mean consumption will  grow continuously.130 D. Incitement to commit other crimes The evidence that marijuana use leads to an incitement to commit other crimes is highly speculative. Indeed, several studies have concluded that 126 Joy,

Watson and Benson, op. cit .; Ballotta, Bergeron, and Hughes, op. cit .; Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer and Kleiman, op. cit. For example, in a recent report it states that even if there is a causal relationship between marijuana use and the use of moredrugs, harmful this could be explained by sociological factors more than by pharmacological factors of marijuana.To respect, cfr. Hall, Degenhardt, and Lynskey, op. cit. 127 Ballotta, Bergeron, and Hughes, op. cit .; other Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op. cit .; National Institute on Drug Abuse, Marijuana and Health. Fourth Report to the United States Congress from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 1974, p. 6. 128 Hall, Degenhardt, and Lynskey, op. cit. 129 Joy, Stanley, Watson, and Betson, op. cit., p. 61 ;. Ali, Mir M, Amialchuk, Aliaksandr, Dwyer, Debra S., "The Social Contagion Effect of Marijuana Use Among Adolescents", PLoS ONE, vol. 6,no. 1, 2011, p. 5. 130, Joy Stanley, Watson, and Betson, op. cit., p. 61.

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marijuana is not a determining factor in the commission of  crimes.131 First, the correlation is too statistically small to be considered significant.132 Furthermore, it is noted that the commission of crimes and marijuana use may originate in the same social causes.

In fact, the available evidence suggests that  marijuana itself does not induce violent crime, quite the contrary.133 In this regard, several studies indicate that marijuana inhibits impulses of aggression  in the user because it usually produces states of lethargy, drowsiness and shyness.134 According to the information available, in  Mexico only 10% of people who committed a crime they did under the influence of drugs, and of these only 11% had used marijuana.135 Although the rate of marijuana use is higher among  people who have committed crimes than among those who do not, this probably  is due to the fact that the commission of crimes and the consumption of marijuana  may arise from the same social causes.136 Moreover, it is clear that some consumers facing criminal charges are doing so precisely because marijuana is also criminalized. E. Marijuana use and motor vehicle accidents However, regarding the association between marijuana use and motor vehicle accidents, the most recent studies show that actual consumption of the substance decreases necessary driving skills and therefore increases 131, Pedersen

and Skardhamar op. cit., pp. 109-118. Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op. cit., p. 75. 133 Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op. cit., p.74. 134 National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Marijuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, 1972, pp. 70-71; and Report by the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, op. cit. 135 Zamudio Angles and Castillo Ortega, op. cit. 136 Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op. cit., p. 74. 132 Caulkins,

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the chances of causing road accidents.137 In fact, the effect is increased when marijuana is combined with alcohol.138 It is important to note that the decline in driving skills when marijuana is consumed  is more variable than when alcohol is ingested, since its effects are subject to factors such as

dose and tolerance developed by frequent consumption, among several others.139 Thus, of the analyzed evidence it shows that  marijuana does not encourage the commission of other crimes. Although consumption and crime are usually associated situations, this may be due to various social and contextual explanations, as both may have the same courses causes. On the other hand, many addicts face the punitive system  of the state precisely because of the existence of prohibitions on marijuana. It was also found that marijuana use itself adversely affects the ability to drive motor vehicles and may increase the likelihood of causing accidents. 137 Hartman,

Rebecca, and Huestis, Marilyn A., "Cannabis Effects on Driving Skills", Clin Chem, vol. 59, no. 3, 2013; Li Mu-Chen, Brady, Joanne E., DiMaggio, Charles J., Lusardi, Arielle R., Tzong, Keane Y., Li Guohua, "Marijuana Use and Motor Vehicle Crashes" Epidemiologic Review, vol. 34, no. 1 2012; Bergeron, Jacques Langlois, Julie, and Cheang, Henry S., "An Examination of the Relationships Between Cannabis Use, Driving Under the Influence of Cannabis and Risk-Taking on the Road", European Review of Applied Psychology, Vol. 64, no. 3 2014 Asbridge, Mark Hayden, Jill A., Cartwright, Jennifer L., "Acute Cannabis Consumption and Motor Vehicle Collision Risk: Systematic Review of Observational Studies and Meta-Analysis", British Medical Journal, vol. 344,2012. 138 Hartman and Huestis, op. cit .; Downey, Luke Andrew King, Rebecca, Papafotiou, Katherine, Swann, Phillip, Ogden, Edward, Boorman, Martin, and Stough, Con, "The Effects of Cannabis and Alcohol on Simulated Driving: Influences of Dose and Experience" Accident, Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 50, 2013; Li, Brady, DiMaggio, Lusardi, Tzong, and Li, op. cit .; Sewell, Andrew, Poling, James, Sofuoglu, Mehmet, "The Effect of Cannabis Compared With Alcohol on Driving", American Journal on Addictions, vol. 18, no. 3, 2009 139 Li, Brady, DiMaggio, Lusardi, Tzong, and Li, op. cit .; Sewell, Poling and Sofuoglu, op. cit.

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Conclusion on suitability analysis

According to the above, the First Chamber  concludes that there is evidence to believe that marijuana does cause various effects on the health of   people. In this regard, although in general it can  be said that this damage is only minor, this does not preclude the conclusion that in this particular case the "system of bans" formed by the challenged laws is indeed a suitable measure to protect the health of people. The analyzed evidence failed to show that  marijuana influenced the increase in crime, because although consumption is associated with antisocial consequences, they can be explained by other factors such as the context of the consumer’s social system or the punitive laws against the drug itself. Other studies analyzed lead to the conclusion that marijuana use  among drivers is a factor that increases the likelihood of causing traffic accidents, which means that the contested measure only in this appearance is also a suitable measure to protect public order. Necessity of the measure Once passed a test of suitability, an analysis of  whether the "system of administrative bans" contested is necessary to protect the health and public order or if, on the other hand, there are equally suitable alternative measures affecting to a lesser extent the right to free development of personality. Before examining the measure, the  First Chamber deems it appropriate to make some methodological details of the way in which they should perform the analysis of comparative alternative measures in this

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proportionality test. The test of necessity implies, first, whether there are other means equal or superior to achieve the aims pursued and,  second, whether these alternatives involve with lower  intensity the fundamental right affected. The first aspect of the necessity test is very complex, since it involves making a catalog of alternative measures and determining the degree of suitability of these, ie, assess their level of efficiency, speed, likelihood and the material impairment of its object. 140 Thus, the search for alternative means could be  endless and require the constitutional court to imagine and analyze  all possible alternatives.141 However, such scrutiny can be bounded by weighing measures that the legislature considered appropriate to similar situations or alternatives in comparative law that are designed to regulate the same phenomenon. In this vein, we will then examine whether the  measures used to regulate substances which cause similar damage, such as tobacco or alcohol, are equally or more suitable to protect health and public order, and if they limit 140 141

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Bernal Pulido, op. cit., p.750. Bernal Pulido, op.cit., P. 742.

to a lesser degree the right to free development of personality. Moreover, a comparative analysis was also performed with the alternatives to  prohibition of marijuana that have been implemented in  comparative law. A. Regulating marijuana-like substances As shown in the examination of suitability of the  measure, marijuana produces adverse health effects similar in their intensity to those caused by tobacco or alcohol, although very different from those produced by other narcotics and psychotropic substances. Marijuana produces the same respiratory problems as other smoked substances,142 is less harmful than other substances such as opium, amphetamines and barbiturates,143 and the implications for health and social consequences reported by those who seek to control their consumption are much less severe than those reported by people addicted to other substances, such as opium or alcohol.144 However, despite the similarities to tobacco and alcohol in terms of the damage that marijuana produces, legislators designed  a "regime of enabling controlled” for the consumption of the two former substances. Below are the most features are set important of the scheme prohibited.; According to the General Law for the Control of Tobacco, the prohibition of the sale, distribution and possession of tobacco by minors extends Royal College of Physicians, op. cit. Ballotta, Bergeron, and Hughes, op. cit; and Report by the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, op. cit. 144 Report by the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, op. cit. 142 143

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to public and private educational institutions. 145 Consumption of tobacco is also prohibited in 100% smoke-free spaces; in public and private elementary and secondary schools; and indoor areas of work whether public or private.146 The production of and trade in tobacco are subject to various administrative provisions.147 Finally, advertising of tobacco products is allowed only when it is directed to  adults through adult magazines, mail and within facilities whose access is exclusively restricted to adults.148 Similarly, the General Health Law establishes prohibitions to sell or supply 145 General

Law for the Control of Snuff: Article 17. The following activities are prohibited: I. Trade, distribution, donation, gift, sale and supply of products snuff to minors; II. Trade, distribution, donation, gift, sale and supply of snuff products in public and private educational institutions of basic and secondary education, and III. Employ minors in commerce, production, distribution, supply and sale of these productsControl. 146 General Act Snuff Article 26. It is prohibited for any person using or have to have on any product of snuff in the spaces 100 % smoke-free snuff, as well as in schools publicand private elementary and secondaryand higher education. In such places be set inside and outside signs, logos and emblems established by the Secretariat. Article 27. In places with public access, or indoor work areas, public or private, including universities and colleges, there may be areas exclusively for smoking, which should in accordance with the regulations: I. Be located in open spaces or II. In isolated interior spaces that have mechanisms that prevent the transfer of particles into the spaces 100% smoke-free snuff and is not liable for nonsmokers step. 147 These laws provide that the companies producing snuff should have a health license and report the content of snuff products, the ingredients used and emissions and their effects on health at the Ministry of Health and the public in general. While those who trade, sell, distribute or supply products of snuff, should within their businesses have announced the ban on the sale and supply to minors, require buyers accreditation of age and display legends warningabout the consumption of snuff. 148 General Control Act the Snuff:

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alcohol to minors.149 As a control measure, the Ministry of Health sets limits for alcohol in the blood and expired air of the drivers of motor vehicles. 150 With respect to product advertising, the law states that all alcoholic beverages shall display on the packaging the words "abuse in the consumption of this product is harmful to health," written in easily legible type and contrasting colors without invoking or making reference to any legal provision.151 B. Setting in comparative law: Examples of Colorado, Washington State, the Netherlands, Uruguay Regarding marijuana, in comparative law comparative there may be alternative methods of regulation.This section briefly explains some of the   regulations that are alternatives to a ban on the total consuption of marijuana. The state of Colorado, in the United States, allows the  use of marijuana and marketing in certain conditions. 149 General

Health Article 220. In no case and in no way may sell or supply alcohol to minors. The violation of this provision shall be equivalent to the crime of corruption of Persons minorsof eighteen years of age or persons who lack the capacity to understandthe Meaning ofact or persons who are unable to resistLaw. 150 General Health Article 187 bis. powers of the Ministry of Health under the protection of the health of others and of society from the harmful use of alcohol: I. Set blood alcohol limits and expired air to drivevehicles, motor which must be taken into account by the federal authorities and those of the states, in their respective areas of competence. For vehicles that provide a public service, people who make use of mechanisms, instruments, devices or dangerous substances by themselves, develop speed, by their explosivenature, or flammable by the energy of the electric current or lead other similar causes, as well as professional, technical and auxiliary health involved in the medical and surgical care of a user, the blood alcohol limits and expired air will be zero;

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Permission is limited to consumption by persons over twenty years and can only be sold in quantities limited to an ounce to each resident and a quarter ounce to nonresidents. Mass advertising is prohibited, especially if said advertising can reach children. Moreover, cultivation and the distribution of the product in shops is strictly controlled by the state uthority responsible for regulating alcohol and tobacco, which is achieved  through a system of licensing of growers, producers, transporters and stores.152 Washington State, also in the US, takes the process of authorizing the use of marijuana through the state agency that also regulates alcohol. Here also is the issuance of permits for trade and the strictly regulated amount of sale and consumption. For example, driving with more than five nanograms of marijuana concentration per milliliter of the blood is a crime. In addition, sales of the product have a high tax burden and the revenue collected is devoted to education, research and treatment of problems associated with this drug.153 In the Netherlands there is a different scheme for the regulation  of marijuana. Although this country has never formally legalized  production, this activity is not monitored or sanctioned effectively. The trade of the substance is restricted to coffee shops, distribution centers which are Room, Robin, "a market for Legalizing cannabis for pleasure: Colorado, Washington, Uruguay and Beyond" Addiction, vol. 109, no. 3, 2014, pp. 345-351. 153 Room, op. cit., loc. cit. 152

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subject to very specific rules, such as restrictions on the amounts  that can be stored and sold per person.154 In Uruguay, the State assumes full control and regulation of the marketing, production and distribution of marijuana.155 Authorizations are issued to producers who in turn sell marijuana to the government.156 With regard to acquisition, a person can buy up to 40 grams per month and a state institute sets the price of marijuana. The institute also carries a confidential record of registered consumers and producers. In this regard, it is clear that only Uruguayan citizens or permanent residents can buy marijuana. 157 Moreover, the cultivation, production and selling of marijuana by unauthorized persons or institutes is prohibited. 158 C. An alternative to the absolute prohibition The above examples set forth above constitute a number of  elements that could be an alternative to the measure in question,  the absolute prohibition of leisure and recreational use of marijuana  as is set by the "system of administrative bans" contested by the complainants: (i) limitations on the Reuter, Peter H., "Marijuana Legalization. What Can Be Learned from Other Countries ", Working paper. Drug Policy Research Center, 2010. 155 The second article of Law 19,172 on Marihuana and Derivatives establishes that "the state will assume control and regulation of the activities of import, export, planting,cultivation, harvesting, production, purchase any title, storage, marketing and distribution of cannabis and its derivatives, hemp or when appropriate, throughthe institutions which give legal mandateLaura." "156 Legalizing Marijuana in the shadows of International LawGraham, The Uruguay, Colorado , and Washington Models "Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol. 33, No.1, 2015, pp. 140-166. 157 Graham, op. cit. 158 Graham, op. citconsumption.; 154

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places of sale and consumption (ii) ban on driving or operating dangerous equipment or substances under the influence of the substance; (iii)   prohibitions on publicizing the product; and (iv) restrictions on the  age of those who can purchase and consume. As can be seen, there are   measures that viewed as a whole do not prohibit the consumption   absolutely and, in contrast, only limit the use of the substance in  very bounded regulations. It is important to note that where marijuana has been legalized in other countries, just as is done with the consumption of tobacco and alcohol in Mexico, these legalization regimes have been accompanied by educational and health policies. In this sense, we  have already implemented various information campaigns on the adverse health effects of the consumption of these substances (tobacco and alcohol), as well as social programs to address the damage to the health of people who have developed an addiction.159 In this regard, we can say such policies would also form part of an alternative measure to the ban now under consideration, which would in general terms be a regime that only limited marijuana use in certain circumstances and that could include the parallel implementation of educational and public health policies. In this regard, see for example the Health Sector Program 2013.2018, published in the Official Journal of the Federation on December 12, 2013, whose main objective is the improvement and protection of health, through public policies of prevention, protection and promotion of physical activity, diet, reduced consumption of alcohol, snuff,drugs. illicit and generally in all those situations that endanger the physical or mental integrity With regard to the topic addiction, the main lines of action are the strategy 1.4, entitled "Promoting comprehensive actions for the prevention and control of addiction", among which the promotion of information campaigns; the promotion of anetwork nationalfor the treatment and prevention of addictions; promote actions to reduce demand,availability and access; promote models of alternative justice for people with addictions in conflict with the law; and promote intersectoral actions promoting alife productivein adolescents. 159

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D. Evaluation of the need for the contested ban Now the court will consider whether this is an  appropriate measure to achieve the aims of the measure at legislative issue, which involves assessing whether it is causally adequate to prevent or combat the harms associated with marijuana use. As noted, these consist of damage to the health of the person, developing dependence on the substance, inducing the use of other more harmful drugs, spreading the use of drugs , and traffic accidents committed under the influence of the substance. It should be noted that the alternatives to the measure articulated and identified above are also suitable to prevent damage to health and   marijuana dependency. In fact, one can say that is more effective a policy that seeks to prevent directly those damages to health by attacking the social factors that cause marijuana use, rather than a  measure that combats this problem indirectly through the prohibition of consumption.160 In this regard, information campaigns and public strategies to conceive drug dependence as a public health problem, for example,  have proven more effective than prohibitionist policies. As already explained, the prohibition of marijuana has not reduced the number of consumers and, consequently,has not diminished the health  damage associated with consumption.161 Hamilton, Olavo, first gives proporcionalidade and war as drugs " Mossoró, Hamilton & Hamilton, 2014, p.158. 161 In this regard, see footnote no. 94. 160

72 Concerning the effects of consumption on third parties,  either through inducing the use of other more harmful drugs and  the spread of its use to other people, it can be said that both on advertising the product as well as educational and health policies are also suitable measures to  prevent such damages from occurring. Finally, regulations that prohibit driving or operating dangerous tools when under the influence of substances like marijuana are also effective measures to prevent accidents and protect the   health of consumers.162 The second aspect of the test of need is in determining whether alternative measures involved a lesser infringement of the right to free development of personality than the "system of administrative bans" set by the contested articles. The First Chamber understands that the examined alternatives are not only suitable to prevent damage to health or public order as outlined above, it is also a measure less restrictive of the  free development of personality. Thus, while the system of administrative prohibitions  set by the contested items prohibits a "generic class act (any act of consumption), the alternative Article 171 of the Federal Penal Code punishes with imprisonment of up to six months, a fine up to one hundred pesos and suspension or loss of the right to use the license management, the person intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics drugs commits any violationof traffic regulations and circulation. In the same vein, Article 93 of Regulation Federal Transit prohibits driving while impaired psychophysical or suspected ingestion of alcohol, psychotropicsubstances, narcotics, including drugs with this effect and all those drugs whose use affects the ability to drive, doing stressed that the prescription does not exempt from this prohibition. The fines set by the regulated are tougher to increase to 100 to 200 times the minimum wage, and the withdrawal from circulationof the vehicle. On the other hand, Article 135 of the Criminal Code of the Federal District provides for the case of injury, murder or damage to property caused culpably to mark the passage of vehicles, where the agent was driving while intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics or psychotropic drugs or other substances having similar effects, benefitsdo not apply theof settingsculpable.crimes 162

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measures actually prohibit only “a more specific subclass" of such acts   (acts of consumption in very specific circumstances).163 In this order of ideas, it can be said that the legislative measure at issue  prevents the use of marijuana in any circumstances where,  for the purposes intended, such prevention could be limited to discourage certain behavior or establish prohibitions on more specific situations, such as driving under the effects of the substance, consuming in public places or inducing others to also consume it. In other words, the "system of administrative bans"  set by the contested articles is highly suprainclusivo. As is known, a standard is suprainclusiva when it comprises or regulates circumstances that have no basis in justification of this standard.164 In this case, as already explained, the state chooses to perform an absolute prohibition of marijuana  although it is possible to ban its use only in cases that  are justified by the protection of health and public order. In this way, it can be said that regulations that allow marijuana use, limiting the age to consume  and / or the place where you can make such consumption, are measures which  identify better the assumptions where actual damage to health and public order are produced. These regulations only limit consumption in these cases, which involve less intervention to free development of the staff. In contrast, the contested measure is longer than necessary, because it prohibits marijuana use in any situation. In a similar vein, see the discussion in Nino, op. cit., p.444. Schauer, Frederick, Playing by The Rules. A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 31-34. 163 164

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This results in an interference with the right in  question to a greater degree. Consequently, we can say that alternative regulations are more benign for the right to free development of personality. In accordance with the above, the "administrative system of bans"  set by the contested items is an unnecessary measure, since there are alternative measures equally suitable to protect health and public order  which infringe upon the fundamental right to a lesser extent. Thus, the First Chamber considers that the ban on personal use of   marijuana for recreational purposes is unconstitutional as it does not stand the test of proportionality. Strict proportionality of the measure Throughout this constitutional scrutiny it has been shown  that although the measure in question is suitable for protecting health and  public order, there exist suitable alternative measures involved the right affected to a lesser degree. In this section the proportionality test will be held  strictly to highlight the imbalance between the intense involvement of the  right to free development of personality against the minimum  degree to which legislative purposes are met by prohibiting the consumption of marijuana. The proportionality test in the strict sense is to make a balance or weight between two competing principles. In the present case we should compare the effectiveness with which the "system of administrative prohibitions" challenged by the plaintiffs satisfies the health protection of people and the public order with the level of infringement upon the right to free development of personality. In the section where the suitability of the measure was examined, it was enough to show that it contributes positively

75 to the realization of the end pursued, regardless  of its effectiveness. Arguments about the degree will also be exhibited as to whether the "system of administrative prohibitions" contributes to the  protection of health and public order. In fact, in this part of the study showed that marijuana use  does not pose a significant risk to health, since its permanent consequences are unlikely, minimal or reversible. It was noted that marijuana  generates a dependence less than other substances, which is located in about 9% of people who consume it. In the same vein, it is also argued that marijuana has a very

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low level of incidence or questionable use of other , riskier drugs. Similarly, it was acknowledged that to drive and operate hazardous tools under the influence of marijuana itself poses a risk to public order. Finally, it was stated that there is uncertainty about the claim that marijuana encourages the commission of other crimes or does it in some degree. In contrast to the limited effects on the health and  public order protecting the "system of administrative prohibitions" about marijuana regulated by the General Health Law, infringement upon the right to free development of personality is intense. As noted in analyzing the scope of the contested articles, they impose an obstacle in law that prevents plaintiffs  from consuming marijuana legally and from carrying out all actions correlative to consumption (planting, growing, harvesting, preparing, possession, transportation, etc.). The measure analyzed constitutes an intervention in the free development of the personality because it involves interference with personal autonomy. As explained above, the way in which  an individual wishes to recreate belongs to his most intimate and private sphere,  as only he can decide how he wants to live his life. In this vein, the measure in question has a very significant effect on the right to free development of personality, since it prevents the plaintiffs from deciding which  recreational or leisure activities they wish to perform.

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Indeed, an intervention in a fundamental right  which totally prohibits performing a behavior covered by this law will be more intense than an intervention that is realized to regulate or prohibit certain conditions in the exercise of that right. From this point of view, the allocation to the free development of the personality that carries the "system of  administrative bans" regulated by the General Health Law can be described as very intense; it is a virtually absolute prohibition  to consume marijuana and perform activities related to the consumption of this, 167 such that it suppresses all legal positions on the right exercised. The measure in question is not confined to regulate how and where these activities can be done, but directly prohibits all such conduct. So from an analysis of strict proportionality, the state would be justified in enacting such a severe limitation on the right to free development of personality only if there were serious harm associated with marijuana use. Conversely, if the legislative measure were only able to avoid or prevent minor damage, then the absolute ban would represent a disproportionate As explained by exposing the regulatory framework on the control of narcotics and psychotropic substances in the General Health Law, the possibility of having up to five grams of marijuana in terms of the provisions of Article 478 and 479 of the General Health Law, not isan authorization or a right to personal consumption, but an exclusion of liability only makes sense in the context of "punitive system" under theLaw General Healthand the Federal Penal Code, but that is irrelevant to the "system of administrative bans" contested by the complainants. Moreover, of these items are limited to decriminalize consumption in a very small amount and do not allow in any way the performance of the other corollaries to subsistence activities such as planting, growing, harvesting, preparation, transportation, etc. 167

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legislative action that severely affects the free development of personality168 Once we have analyzed the benefits and costs of the  measure, the First Chamber considers that the "system of administrative bans" on marijuana contained in the Articles of the General Health Act  challenged by the plaintiffs, cause an intense infringement upon the right to free development of personality, compared with the minimum level of protection of health and public order. Although the Supreme Court recognizes that the legislature may limit the exercise of activities involving damages to the rights protected by our Constitution, in the case of the restriction to the free development of  the personality that underlies the measure, the First Chamber does  not find that the damages were of such gravity as to warrant an absolute ban on consumption. In addition, it is worth noting that throughout this  constitutional scrutiny it has been shown that there are alternative measures that infringe to a lesser degree the right to free development of personality, consisting of regulatory regimes subject to conditions that the legislature deems relevant. These regulations may be accompanied by public education policies and health protection. Moreover, although these alternatives represent economic costs for the state and society in general, they are comparable to those arising through the system of prohibition  for personal consumption. Uprimny, Guzman and Vine, op. cit., p.107. According to some scholars, in addition to its limitations in effectiveness, the system of prohibition on marijuana and activities related to it have high costs for the state and society, both direct and derivativeseradication 169,168 169

cropThe prosecution of trafficking networks and the prosecution and imprisonment of

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Even though the "system of administrative bans"  formed by the articles of the General Health Act challenged by the plaintiffs exceeds the first two steps of the proportionality test, having been established that it is a move intended to protect health and public order, the First Chamber considers that it is a measure not only unnecessary, but is also disproportionate in the strict sense, since it generates minimal protection  of health and public order while producing intense intervention into the right of people to decide what recreational activities they want to perform. It must be emphasized that the First Chamber does not minimize  the damage that can result from the consumption of marijuana. It is a decision, however, that is rightfully made by each individual. The High Court   considers that it belongs within the strict scope of individual autonomy   protected by the right to free development of personality: the  possibility to responsibly decide whether to experience the  effects of this substance despite the harm that this activity can generate to a person. peoplerelated thereto; and indirect, more difficult to estimate, derived from other factors such as casualties of the war on drugs and the loads they must support hundreds of people losing their freedom during it. In this regard, see for all Camacho, Adriana Gaviria, Alejandro, and Rodriguez, Catherine, op. cit.; Uprimny, Guzman and Vine, op. cit., p. 106; TNI and WOLA, 2010

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IV. The unconstitutionality of the challenged articles Based on the foregoing, the First Chamber  reaches the conclusion that Articles 235, 237, 245, 247 and 248, all of the General  Health Law, in the specific sections introducing a prohibition of acts related to personal use of marijuana for recreational purposes (that is, to plant, cultivate, harvest, prepare, possess, transport, etc.), are unconstitutional. This decision rests only and exclusively in connection with the  drug "cannabis" (sativa, indica and American or marijuana  resin, prepared and seeds) and psychotropic "THC" (Tetrahydrocannabinol, the following isomers: Δ6A (10a), Δ6A (7), Δ7 Δ8, Δ9, Δ10 Δ9 (11) and their stereochemical variants) collectively known as "marijuana." This declaration of unconstitutionality does not in any way authorize any persons to carry out business activities, or any other provision that refers to the sale and / or distribution of substances referred to above. It should be noted that, as has been reiterated in the present  resolution, no statement is made regarding the constitutionality of the criminal provisions that penalize consumption and other marijuana-related events. The truth is that this declaration by the High Court regarding the constitutionality of the provisions of the General Health Act outlined above , shall allow the appellants to receive authorization from the Ministry of Health to perform all activities necessary for the use of recreational marijuana, to make them recurring and not crimes against health provided  by both the General Health Law itself and by the Federal Penal Code.

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This is because the crimes contained in the Articles 194,  section I, 195, 195 bis and 196 ter of the Federal Penal Code170 and Articles 475, 476 and 477 of the General Health Law,171 related acts sought by the appellants, have atypical normative elements which stipulate that the conduct must take place "without authorization.” In this sense, one of the  purposes of granting of this protection consists of 170 Federal

Penal Code: Article 194. Imprisonment for ten to twenty-five and one hundred to five hundredbe imposed penaltythat day: I. Produce, transport, traffic, trades, even provide free or prescribe any narcotics mentioned in the previous article, without authorizationtherefers; by General Health Law [...] Article 195. Be imposed from five to fifteen years in prison andone hundred to three hundred and finedfifty days, which possesses any of the narcotics listed in Article 193, without authorization by the General Health Law refers to, provided that possession either in order to perform any of the acts referred to in Article 194, both of this Code. Article 195 bis. When the circumstances of the possession of any of the narcotics listed in Article 193, without authorization by the General Law refers Healthto,can not be regarded as intended to perform any of the acts that refers Article194to,four penalty applies to seven years six months in prison and fifty to one hundred and fifty days fine. Article 196b. They are imposed from five to fifteen years in prison andof one hundred to three hundred a finedays, and confiscation of instrumentalities, objects and proceeds of crime, to divert or by any means contribute to divert chemical precursors, essential chemicals or machines, to cultivation, extraction, production, preparation or conditioning of narcotics in any manner prohibited by law. The same prison term and a fine and disqualification to hold any job, position or commission for up to five years shall be imposed on public servants that, in exercisingits functions, permitting or authorizing any conduct covered in this article are chemical precursors, essential chemicals and machines as defined in the relevant lawLaw.. 171 General Health Article 475 shall be imposed prison four to eight years andof two hundred to four finedays, whose unauthorized trades or supplies, still free, narcotics under the table, on the lower amount obtained by multiplying the per thousand of theamount plannedin the table. [...] Article 476 shall be imposed for three to six years in prison andthree hundred eighty

fineddays,which possesses any narcotic than those indicated in the table, on the lower amountbythe obtained multiplyingper thousand amounts provided in the table, without authorization thereferred to in this Law, provided that such possession isthe purpose forof marketing them or supply them, even for free. Article 477 penalty applies ten months to three years in prison and up to eighty day ticket to any of possessing narcotics indicated in the table below the amountby obtained multiplying by a thousand those provided in the table, without the authorization referred to in this Law, if the circumstances of such possession can not be done considered intended market or supply them, even for free. We did not proceed criminally for this crime against the person possessing medicines containingany of the narcotic under the table, whose retail be subject to special procurement requirements, when his nature and quantity of such medications are needed to treat the person who owns or other persons under the custody or care who has them in his possession.

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an obligation on the Ministry of Health to issue the  authorization referred to in Articles 235 and 247 of the General Health Law, and it is obvious that the complainants may not commit the crimes in question. The Federal Penal Code contains certain offenses relating to narcotics that do not have this typical element (in particular, those  contained in Article 194, Sections II, III and IV; 196 Ter; 197 and  198); however, it warns that they are not aimed at punishing behavior sought by the complainants in terms of the above in the present application for Code review.172 172 Federal

Penal Article 194. imprisonment for ten to twenty five years will be imposed and one hundred to five hundred days fine that: [...] II. Into or out of any country of the narcotics included in thearticle, previous although it may momentarily or in transit. If the input or output to which this section shall not have been consummated is concerned, but to acts performed clearly follows that It was the purpose of the agent, the penaltywill be up to two-thirds of the under this Article. III. Financial contribution or any kind resources or cooperate in any way to financing, supervision or encouragement to enable the execution of any of the offenses tochapter; referredin this and IV. Perform acts of publicity or propaganda, for any of theconsumed substancesin the previous article. The same penalties provided in this article and also deprivation fee or commission and disqualification to hold another up to five years, be placed on the public servant who, in the exercise of their duties or taking advantage of his position, allow, authorize or tolerate any of acts thementioned in this article. Article 197. Whoever, without a prescription medicine legally authorized, give to another person, whether by injection inhalation, ingestion or by any other means, a narcotic that Article 193 refers, shall be liable to three to nine years in prison and sixty to one hundred and eighty days fine, whatever the amount given. Penalties increase to a half more if the victim is a minor or unable to understand the relevance of the conduct or resist the officer. At that provide free or improperly prescribing to a third adult, anarcotic mentioned in Article 193, for personal and immediate use, shall be liable to two to six years in prison and fined forty to one hundred twenty days. If the acquirer is a minoror incompetent, penalties increase to a half. The same penalties will be imposed from above which induces or assists another

toconsume any of the narcotics listed in Article 193. Article 198. who dedicated as main activity own field work,plant, cultivate or harvest marijuana plants, poppies, hallucinogenic mushrooms, peyote or any other plant that produces similar effects on their own, orfinancing third partywhen it attend poorly educated and extreme financial need, be willimposed imprisonment of one to six years. The same penalty shall be imposed on a property in his ownership, possession or possession, consents planting, cultivating or harvesting these plants in similar circumstances to previous assumptions.

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Finally, it is also important to note that the situation described above is being updated in the same way regarding administrative penalties provided in Articles 421 and 421 bis of the General Health Law, thereto providing for fines arising from a violation of Articles 237, 238, 247, 248,  375, 376, 235 and 289 of the same law, concerning the  authorization of the Ministry of Health to perform acts related to narcotics and psychotropic substances,173 for forwarding those provisions made to items that have been declared unconstitutional. However, there could not be  imposition of an administrative penalty to the complainants in the light of  the provisions this judgment performed. In connection with the foregoing, the First Chamber  notes that in his seventh offense, related to the sixth concept  of violation raised in the petition for relief, the plaintiffs  argued that the District Judge improperly attended his argument to the effect that Articles 234, 235, 237, 245, 247, 248, 368 and 479 of the General Health Act, are unconstitutional by   transgressing Article 73, Sections XVI and XXI of the Constitution,  based on the power to legislate in matters of public health and  establish the crimes and offenses against the Federation, because this power  "is an implicit limit on individual relationships that do not  interfere the sphere of action of another person or persons". In this regard, complainants 173 General

Health Law Article421. punishable by a fine equivalent to 6000-12000 times the daily force in the economic area concerned minimum wage, violation of the provisions of Articles 67 , 101, 125, 127, 149, 193, 210, 212, 213, 218, 220, 230, 232, 233, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243, 247, 248, 251, 252, 255, 256, 258 , 266, 306, 308, 309, 315, 317, 330, 331, 332, 334, 335, 336, 338, last paragraph, 342, 348, first paragraph, 350 bis 1 365, 367, 375, 376, 400 , 411 and 413 of this Act. Section 421 bis. Is punishable by a fine of 12,000 to 16,000

times the daily minimum overall force in the economic area concerned wages, the violation of the provisions contained in Articles 100, 122, 126, 146, 166 Bis 19, 166 Bis 20, 205, 235, 254, 264, 281, 289, 293, 298, 325, 327 and 333 of this Act.

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presented several arguments about the ethical limits  of criminal law regarding the consumption of marijuana. Even though it is observed that the District Judge described as unfounded and ineffective that concept of violation, the First Chamber considers that the grievance becomes inoperative, while as stated in preceding paragraphs, the items identified by the complainants as claimed acts  do not refer to offenses relating to drug crimes, but merely administrative regulations on authorization for studies and acts related to narcotic and psychotropic drugs. Thus, it is clear that the First Chamber is unable to rule on the constitutionality of the criminalization of marijuana, as claimed by the appellants, for articles containing the offenses in  question were not challenged in the appeal for protection or  applied in administrative decision claimed. Moreover, as the appellants stated above, it does not cause harm the existence of the mentioned offenses, while in  obtaining authorization from the Ministry of Health their behavior under this ruling would not shape crimes against health provided by the General Health Law and the Federal Penal Code. In connection with the above argument, it is also  the argument irrelevant injured third party consisting of Article 478 of the General Health Law in relation to the table of guidance on maximum dosage for consumption set out Article 479, which allows the use of marijuana, while as explained these

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provisions were not applied to the complainants above.  In addition, as noted at the time, the possibility of possessing  five grams of marijuana is not a right to personal consumption, but an exclusion of liability.  In another vein, it is unnecessary to examine the other  grievances having been granted constitutional protection to the  plaintiffs in the above specified terms, while no practical purpose to lead the implementation of the relevant study. V. Effects of the judgment of amparo So, as noted above, this Supreme Court of Justice declares as unconstitutional Articles 235, last paragraph, 237, 245, section I, 247, last paragraph, and 248, all General Health Act, for the reasons stated throughout this judgment. It should be taken in consideration that  the declaration of unconstitutionality is limited to  regulations which refer to only the narcotic "cannabis" (sativa, indica and American, resin,  prepared and seeds) and psychotropic "THC" (Tetrahydrocannabinol,  the following isomers: Δ6A (10a), Δ6A (7), Δ7 Δ8, Δ9, Δ10 Δ9 (11) and its stereochemical variants), together known as "pot"; on the understanding that the declaration of unconstitutionality has no scope to allow the issuance of an authorization for recurring use involving  commercial transactions,supply or any other that relates to the  sale and / or distribution of the substances above-mentioned .

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Accordingly, the High Court then revoked the contested judgment and granted the injunction to the effect that the  Executive Director of Regulation Narcotics, Psychotropic and Chemical Substances of the Federal Commission for Protection Against Risk health, identified as responsible in the injunction as the authority with power to grant the plaintiffs the authorization referred to in Articles 235 and 247 of the General Health Act, with respect to the substances and effects to those  referred to above, on the understanding that the authority may not use the regulatory portions which has been declared unconstitutional in the terms outlined  above as a basis for issuing the corresponding resolution. Due to the above, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court  of Justice of the Nation, is RESOLVED FIRST. In the matter of the review, the judgment under appeal is revoked. SECOND EU Justice covers and protects *****, *****, ***** and *****, against the issuance and enactment of Article 235, last paragraph, 237, 245, section I, 247, last paragraph, and 248, all of the General Health Act and its application, consisting of the office of *****, issued by the Executive Director of Regulation of Narcotics and Psychotropic Chemicals  of the Federal Commission for the Protection against Sanitary Risk,  for the reasons stated in this judgment.

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THIRD The justice of the Union does not cover or protect *****,  against the authorities and procedures specified in the first paragraph  of this judgment. FOURTH. The adhesive resource review filed by the  responsible authorities is notified that with testimony of this resolution, return  cars to their place of origin and, in due course filed the Ministers, as decided by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court Justice of of the Nation, by _________ votes of _______ Firman President of the Chamber and the Minister Rapporteur with the Secretary of Agreements, which authorizes and certifies the BOARD: PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST Minister Alfredo Gutiérrez Ortiz Mena SPEAKER: Minister Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea