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I. Introduction A. Case Method Common features of reported opinions (Rombauer) a) Case Name b) Name of receiving court and date the opinion was released c) Headnotes – numbered paragraphs that precede the opinion; written by reporters or by employees of publishers d) Name of the lower court whose decision is being received e) Concise statement of the case and of the appellate court’s judgement or order f) Names of the parties’ attorneys g) Name of the author of the opinion h) Names of other judges who joined in the opinion Case Law (Shapo) Briefing a Case: Parts of a Judicial Decision

a)

b)

c) d) e)

Facts - events between the parties that led to the litigation and tell how the case came before the court that is now deciding it - facts relevant to the issue the court must decise and to the reasons for its decision - relevant background, plaintiff and defendant, basis for plaintiff’s suit, relief the plaintiff is seeking, procedural history, dispositive motions, lower court’s decision, grounds for that decision, party who appealed Issues - questions that the court must decide to resolve the dispute between the parties - identify rule of law that governs dispute and ask how it should apply to the facts - often more than one Holdings - court’s decision on the question that was actually before it - dicta – legal statements not related to the actual question before it Reasoning - explains and supports the court’s decision - isolate the court’s reasoning from the facts and the holding of the case Policy - underlying legal decisions; goals that the decision-maker wishes to further

Using parts of a Judicial Decision

a) Reasoning by Analogy ANALOGIZING Doctrine of precedent Compare cases and make distinctions between them Decide how the decisions of previous cases apply to the new problem Analogous if cases resemble each other in important ways, such as relevant facts Same facts, issues and reasoning must apply equally well to the facts Offer probable proof for conclusions Assess all possible applications DISTINGUISHING If cases are different, distinguish differences in facts require court to apply different rule Able to predict probable outcome of case b)

Applying Precedent Determine the facts relevant to the issue in the case and the reasons for the court’s holding Determine if the facts in the two cases are basically analogous or distinguishable Applying precedent

Obiter Dicta (Reed) - Duty of court to expound and interpret – not make it - A judicial opinion is only binding in so far as it is relevant. When it wanders from the point at issue, it no longer has for as an official utterance - Obiter is a gratuitious opinion which binds none - Every statement in an opinion is not to be condemned as unsound merely because it may be classed as obiter  - It is an overflow of mind surcharged with knowledge on the general subject before the court - Do not condemn judges and protect them against their old obiter dicta

PACU v SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 97 PHIL 806 DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

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The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on several grounds, to wit: (1) they deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law, (2) they deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency, and (3) the provisions of the said Act conferring to the Secretary of Education unlimitied power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy, (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said Act, and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.

ISSUE/RULING/RATIO:

(1) WON the issue is justiciable. No. The issue only becomes  justiciable when the petition ers will suffer, or has suffered , an injury as a result of the statute. On that note, the petitioners already have permits and are actually operating by virtue of those permits. They did not show that the respondent threathened to revoke their permits. As such, they do not need relief in the form they are seeking to obtain.

institutions is provided for in the Constitution. Further, by virtue of a study and survey which reported that a great majority of the private educational institutions are money-making devices necessitates the exercise of the Government’s police power. (3) WON the statute constitutes unlawful delegation of power. No. The standards are left on the hands of the Secretary because he has the relevant expertise and experience to do so. Further, the standards have been in effect for 37 years without complaint. (4) WON the 1% levied on receipts for expenses in supervision is unconstitutional.The legality falls within the original jurisdiction of the CFI. (5) WON the power to regulate the textbooks to be used by the private schools constitutes censorship. The issue is not a justiciable controversy. Further, the petitioners have not shown that the any text has been prohibited, or that petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial priveleges or rights for refusing so. NOTES

The criterion for justiciability illustrated in this case is whether or not there is an actual controversy.

(2) WON the statute creating the Board of Educational Survey is unconstitutional. No. The power of the state to regulate educational PAMIL v TELERON 86 SCRA 413 DOCTRINE: To render a statute unconstitutional, 8 votes are needed to constitute a majority. FACTS: the 7 does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective Fr. Margarito R. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal •

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mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol in 1971 Petitioner Pamil, an aspirant for the office, filed a suit of quo warranto (a hearing to determine by what authority someone has an office) for Fr. Gonzaga’s disqualification based on Administrative Code (1917) Sec 2175: o “In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.” Respondent Judge sustained the right of Fr. Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor o He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971 o (Cited in J Teehankee’s separate opinion: All persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.) Petitioner elevated the matter to the SC o He argues that there was no such implied repeal; the statute is still in full force and effect

ISSUE: •

WoN Fr. Gonzaga can be disqualified by virtue of Sec 2175 of the Administrative Code

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7 Justices: the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed Reasons for constitutional objections: (1) The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. The 1935 Constitution explicitly declares: “ No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” The ban cannot survive. (2) The SC has had previous rulings invalidating Sections of the Revised Administrative Code on grounds of being against the 1935 Constitution (3) The challenged Administrative Code is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To declare as ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office is to impose a religious test.

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(4) It is never too late to re-establish constitutional rights, even if such statutes neglecting them had been accepted for a great length of time. 5 Justices: such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is not unconstitutional. The following are their separate opinions. o CJ Castro: Sec 23 of the Election Code of 1971 is of no relevance to Sec 2175 of the Administrative Code.

HOLDING: •

Yes.

o

RATIO: •

While 7 Justices seek to affirm Judge Teleron’s decision, the remaining 5 members of the SC disagree; the vote of

o

Moreover, the proscription in Sec 2175 does not prescribe a religious test For a later provision of law to be considered as having repealed a prior provision, there must

PACU v SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 97 PHIL 806 DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

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The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on several grounds, to wit: (1) they deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law, (2) they deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency, and (3) the provisions of the said Act conferring to the Secretary of Education unlimitied power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy, (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said Act, and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.

ISSUE/RULING/RATIO:

(1) WON the issue is justiciable. No. The issue only becomes  justiciable when the petition ers will suffer, or has suffered , an injury as a result of the statute. On that note, the petitioners already have permits and are actually operating by virtue of those permits. They did not show that the respondent threathened to revoke their permits. As such, they do not need relief in the form they are seeking to obtain.

institutions is provided for in the Constitution. Further, by virtue of a study and survey which reported that a great majority of the private educational institutions are money-making devices necessitates the exercise of the Government’s police power. (3) WON the statute constitutes unlawful delegation of power. No. The standards are left on the hands of the Secretary because he has the relevant expertise and experience to do so. Further, the standards have been in effect for 37 years without complaint. (4) WON the 1% levied on receipts for expenses in supervision is unconstitutional.The legality falls within the original jurisdiction of the CFI. (5) WON the power to regulate the textbooks to be used by the private schools constitutes censorship. The issue is not a justiciable controversy. Further, the petitioners have not shown that the any text has been prohibited, or that petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial priveleges or rights for refusing so. NOTES

The criterion for justiciability illustrated in this case is whether or not there is an actual controversy.

(2) WON the statute creating the Board of Educational Survey is unconstitutional. No. The power of the state to regulate educational PAMIL v TELERON 86 SCRA 413 DOCTRINE: To render a statute unconstitutional, 8 votes are needed to constitute a majority. FACTS: the 7 does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective Fr. Margarito R. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal •

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mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol in 1971 Petitioner Pamil, an aspirant for the office, filed a suit of quo warranto (a hearing to determine by what authority someone has an office) for Fr. Gonzaga’s disqualification based on Administrative Code (1917) Sec 2175: o “In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.” Respondent Judge sustained the right of Fr. Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor o He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971 o (Cited in J Teehankee’s separate opinion: All persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.) Petitioner elevated the matter to the SC o He argues that there was no such implied repeal; the statute is still in full force and effect

ISSUE: •

WoN Fr. Gonzaga can be disqualified by virtue of Sec 2175 of the Administrative Code

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7 Justices: the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed Reasons for constitutional objections: (1) The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. The 1935 Constitution explicitly declares: “ No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” The ban cannot survive. (2) The SC has had previous rulings invalidating Sections of the Revised Administrative Code on grounds of being against the 1935 Constitution (3) The challenged Administrative Code is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To declare as ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office is to impose a religious test.

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(4) It is never too late to re-establish constitutional rights, even if such statutes neglecting them had been accepted for a great length of time. 5 Justices: such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is not unconstitutional. The following are their separate opinions. o CJ Castro: Sec 23 of the Election Code of 1971 is of no relevance to Sec 2175 of the Administrative Code.

HOLDING: •

Yes.

o

RATIO: •

While 7 Justices seek to affirm Judge Teleron’s decision, the remaining 5 members of the SC disagree; the vote of

o

Moreover, the proscription in Sec 2175 does not prescribe a religious test For a later provision of law to be considered as having repealed a prior provision, there must

be such absolute repugnance between the two. There is none. o

Election of ecclesiastics may spawn small religious wars instead of promote the general community welfare and peace

The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed it must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application. Petition for certiorari granted. Respondent Gonzaga ordered to immediately vacate the mayoralty.

1935 Constitution, the supreme law, which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of political rights. Sec. 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. Also, legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute repugnance between the two. No such repugnance is discernible. Sec. 2175 has neither been repealed nor superseded. The section also admitted no exception, therefore there can be none. The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation.

Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the PARAS v COMELEC 264 SCRA 49 DOCTRINE: The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its

context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. FACTS: •

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Petitioner Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City. He won in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. COMELEC resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on Oct 14, 1995, and set the recall election on Nov 13, 1995. 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition (the law requires only 25%) Petitioner opposed the recall election; it was deferred by COMELEC Dec 6, 1995: COMELEC set anew the recall election on Dec 16, 1995 Petitioner filed before the Cabanatuan City RTC a petition for injunction, RTC issued a TRO TRO was lifted, petition dismissed; respondent and his counsel required to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall was without COMELEC approval Jan 5, 1996: COMELEC re-scheduled the recall election for the 3rd time on Jan 13, 1996, hence the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction

ISSUES: •

WoN the petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction has merit o Petitioner argues, citing Sec 74(b) of RA No. 7160 or the Local Government Code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.” o

Jan 13 election is now barred because the SK election was set by RA No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996 and every 3 years thereafter

In Labor Union vs. Letrondo-Montejo, the SC considered the SK election as a regular local election

HOLDING: •

No.

RATIO:

(1) Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context (i.e. that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment) •

The evident intent of Sec 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a)

merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. The provision is not with respect to any other election or term of office other than the office of the local elective official concerned (because recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses) (2) A statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution Sec 74 should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Sec 3, Art X of the Constitution: “enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum Petitioner’s reading is too literal. •

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Nevertheless, recall is no longer possible because the next Punong Barangay election is barely 7 months away (May 1997) Petition dismissed for having become moot and academic. TRO as •

issued by the SC on Jan 12, 1996 enjoining the recall election is made permanent.

VILLANUEVA v CA 379 SCRA 463 DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

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Petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties including IBC-13, which the labor arbiter ruled in favor of Villanueva. IBC-13 appealed to the NLRC, filing a surety bond supposedly issued by BF General Insurance Company and a confirmation letter from its President.-Both documents were found to be

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falsified, so that criminal informations for falsification of public documents against a number of accused including respondent Villadores were filed. After Villadores was arraigned, the fiscal’s office submitted a Motion to Admit Amended Informations with the following amendment: "to the prejudice of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr., and of public interest and in violation of public faith and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.” (granted). Villadores filed a Motion

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for Reconsideration(denied). Villadores then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to annul the Order admitting the amended informations as well as the Order denying his motion for reconsideration. Although the petition was dismissed, the CA pronounced that Villanueva is not the offended party in the cases and that he could not have sustained damages from the falsifications. Villadores then moved in the trial court to disqualify Rico & Associates as private prosecutor of Villanueva on the basis of the CA’s pronouncement. Villanueva opposed the motion on the ground that the pronouncement is mere obiter dictum. The trial court denied the motion for disqualification. Villadores sought reconsideration (denied). Villadores then filed petition for certiorari with the CA seeking annulment of the Order denying his motion for disqualification and the Order denying reconsideration. The CA reversed the Orders and directed that Villanueva’s name appearing as he offended party in the criminal cases be stricken.-Villanueva now comes to the Supreme Court on a

petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE:

w/n the pronouncement of the appellate court that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party in the criminal cases is obiter dictum (opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it, and as such is not binding as precedent). RATIO:

- The pronouncement touched upon a matter clearly raised by Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the amended informations. Among the issues therein was w/n Villanueva is the offended party. - An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum; this rule applies to all pertinent questions (even only incidentally involved) presented and decided in the regular course of considering the case, and led to its conclusion (or any statement on a matter on which the decision is based).

B. Philippine legal system The Legal System, Analytical Reasoning, and Legal Authorities by Dan Gatmaytan Philippine Legal system

- mixture of civil law and common law - most single importation is the introduction of a judicial system modelled in all its essential characteristics on the judicial system of the United States - Supreme Court initially respected the civil law tradition introduced by Spain - later held American Jurisprudence was of transcendental importance - Philippine common law composed of Anglo-American and Spanish principles and local complementary laws - Supreme Court interpreting laws and rendering decisions relying on the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions Stare decisis Judicial interpretation of a statute and is of greater weight than that of an executive or administrative officer in the construction of other statutes of similar import. It is an invaluable aid in the construction or interpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning. Stare decisis et non quieta movere – one should follow past precedents and should not disturb what has been settled. Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of interpreting and applying the law in accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting society from the improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless upheavals in such interpretations and applications In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare decisis, must be categorically stated on an issue expressly raised by the parties; it must be a direct ruling, not merely an obiter dictum Obiter dictum – opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it; not binding as a precedent The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are substantially the same. Where the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare decisis does not apply. The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. It does not apply when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty of the court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of law in force Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot abandon a precedent enunciated by the SC except by way of repeal or amendment of the law itself •

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Res Judicata Attempt to litigate issues anew despite the fact that these have already settled in a case involving the same parties For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must occur: 1) former judgement or order must be final; 2) the judgement or order must be on the merits; 3) must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and 4) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. • •

Law of the Case Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle or decision continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. In law of the case, the first judgement is generally not yet final. It relates entirely to questions of law and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case •

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Analytical Reasoning - two methods: deduction and analogy - Deduction has an established structure, consisting of a major premise, minor premise and a conclusion. The major premise states a rule of law applicable to a class of a situation while the minor premise describes the facts of the client’s situation, and the conclusion states whether the right or duty described in the rule of law has been demonstrated to exist under the facts of the client’s situation. - Analogy is a form of logic by which one reasons that because two items are alike in at least one respect, they are alike in at least one other respect. It involves three steps: 1) a lawyer identifies a rule or holding announced in a prior case, 2) the lawyer determines whether the facts are like those of a prior case 3) the characterization of the facts as like or unlike those of the precedent yields the conclusion that the client’s legal situation should or should not have the same legal consequence as the facts in the precedent. The Decision - must be concise, complete, correct and clear  - should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the rules of Court and circulars and orders of the Supreme court. - Article 8, Sec. 14 of the Constitution: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctively the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefore. - in Velarde v. Social Jusrice Society , the essential parts of a good decision include: 1) Statement of the case – consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. If in a criminal case, this part describes the specific charge and plea of the accused. If the case is being decided on appeal or on a petition for certoriari , the court of origin, the case number in the trial court and the dispositive portion of the assailed decision. 2) Statement of facts – synthesize, summarize and simplify. There are different ways of relying the facts: a) objective or reportorial method – the judge summarizes without comment the testimony of each witness and the contents of each exhibit; b) synthesis method – the factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant is summarized c) subjective method – version of the facts accepted by the judge is simply narrated without explaining the parties’ versions d) combination of objective and subjective means – testimony of each witness is reported and the judge formulates his or her own version of the facts 3) Issues or assignment of errors – factual and legal issues should be stated; all assigned errors 4) Court ruling - in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint or other issues the court deems essential to a just disposition. It is better to resolve procedural questions before substantive ones. 5) Dispositive portion – In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime committed, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed, the modifying circumstances, if any, and the civil liability and costs. In a civil case, the disposition should state whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted and the costs. - DISPOSITIVE > BODY. The dispositive portion cannot be found or inferred from the body of the decision. The portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution if that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part but there are exceptions- a) when there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgement because the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision’s ratio decidendi; b) where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision The Syllabus - prepared by the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision for the convenience of lawyers in reading reports - not part of the court’s decision - should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the court The Certification - Art 8, Sec 13 - meant to ensure the implementation of the requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts are reached after consultation with the members of the court sitting en banc  or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision writing - lack of certification does not invalidate decision but serves as evidence of failure to observe certification requirement and holds accountable official responsible for omission - Required to be certified: judicial cases, resolutions of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal - Not required to be certified: administrative cases, per curiam decision, minute resolution Memorandum Decision - those which adopt by reference the findings of facts and conclusions of law of inferior tribunals - must not be limited to the dispositive portion but to state nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to the record and contain a statement of applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal’s assessments and conclusions on the case Per Curiam Opinions

- opinion of the Court in which judges are all of one mind and the question involved is so clear that it is not necessary to elaborate it by an extended discussion

- unsigned and decided by the court - usually resorted to for cases involving the imposition of death penalty or administrative penalties Minute Resolutions - decreed by the court as final and executor where: 1) a cases is patently without merit, 2) issues raised are factual in nature, 3) the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, or 4) it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgement and for non-compliance with the rules - not constitutionally infirm because they are not “decisions” Obiter Dictum - not precedent; is a matter that was not raised expressly and therefore, it was not a prerequisite in disposing of the case - remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a case, incidentally or collaterally and not directly upon the question before the court, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause; lacks force of an adjudication and is not to be regarded as such - opinions entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case - not binding as precedent within the stare decisis rule but may be followed if sufficiently persuasive Authority - anything that a court can rely on in reaching its conclusion - Primary authority is any law that the court can rely on in reaching its conclusions. Ex. Statutes, regulations, constitutional provisions, executive orders, ordinances, treaties and other court opinions - Secondary authority is any non-law source that the court can rely in reaching its conclusion. Ex. Legal and nonlegal periodical literature, encyclopedias, dictionaries and treatises - Two types: mandatory and persuasive a) Mandatory Authority - whatever the court must rely on in reaching its conclusion - only primary authority cannot be secondary authority b) Persuasive Authority - whatever the court relies on when it is not required to do so - 2 kinds: prior court opinion which is persuasive, secondary authority which is persuasive See Legal System of the Philippines by Feliciano

II. Statutes and their Enactment A. Definition Laws, generally A whole body or system of law Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate power of the state Includes RA, PD, EO (president in the ex of legislative power), Presidential issuances (ordinance power) Jurisprudence, ordinances passed by sanggunians of local government units. • • •

Statutes, generally An act of legislature (Philippine Commission, Phil. Legislature, Batasang Pambansa, Congress) PD’s of Marcos during the period of martial law 1973 Constitution EO of Aquino revolutionary period Freedom Constitution • • •

Manner of referring to statutes Public Acts – Phil Commission and Phil Legislature 1901- 1935 Commonwealth Acts – 1936- 1946 Republic Acts – Congress 1946- 1972, 1987 ~ Batas Pambansa – Batasang Pambansa Identification of laws – serial number and/or title • • • • •

B. Classification of Statutes Public and Private ! Public – affects the public at large general – applies to the whole state and operates throughout the state alike upon all people or all of a class. Special – relates to particular person or things of a class or to a particular community, individual or thing. Local Law – operation is confined to a specific place or locality (e.g municipal ordinance) ! Private – applies only to a specific person or subject. • • •

Permanent and temporary statutes

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Permanent - one whose operation is not limited in duration but continues until repealed. Temporary - duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event. o E.g. statute answering to an emergency

Other classes of statutes Prospective or retroactive – according to application o RETROACTIVE LAW ! one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws ! creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty ! attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past o PROSPRECTIVE LAW ! operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statute takes effect ! looks and applies to the future. Declaratory, curative, mandatory, directory, substantive, remedial, penal – according to operation According to form o Affirmative ! does not impliedly repeal the prior law unless an intention to effect a repeal is manifest o Negative ! repeals all conflicting provisions unless the contrary intention is disclosed •

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C. Parts of a Statute 1. Title •

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Mandatory law - Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof (Art 6, Sec 26 (1) 1987 Constitution) 2 limitations upon legislation o To refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects o Title of the bill should be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject.

Purposes of requirement (on 1 subject) Principal purpose: to apprise the legislators of the object, nature, and scope of the provision of the bill and to prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators. o To prohibit duplicity in legislation In sum of the purpose o To prevent hodgepodge/ log-rolling legislation o To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature o To fairly apprise the people, through publication of the subjects of the legislation o Used as a guide in ascertaining legislative intent when the language of the act does not clearly express its purpose; may clarify doubt or ambiguity. •

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How requirement construed Liberally construed; It should not be given a technical interpretation If there is doubt, it should be resolved against the doubt and in favor of the constitutionality of the statute • •

When there is compliance with requirement Comprehensive enough - Include general object If all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title Title is valid where it indicates in broad but clear terms, the nature, scope and consequences of the law and its operations Title should not be a catalogue or index of the bill Principles apply to titles of amendatory acts. o Enough if it states “an act to amend a specific statute” Need not state the precise nature of the amendatory act. US Legislators have titles ending with the words “and for other purposes” ( US is not subject to the same Constitutional restriction as that embodied in the Philippine Constitution) • • • • •

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When requirement not applicable Apply only to bills which may thereafter be enacted into law Does not apply to laws in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. No application to municipal or city ordinances. • • •

Effect of insufficiency of title Statute is null and void •

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Where, the subject matter of a statute is not sufficiently expressed in its title, only so much of the subject matter as is not expressed therein is void, leaving the rest in force, unless the invalid provisions are inseparable from the others, in which case the nullity the former vitiates the latter

Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1)

Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof LIDASAN v COMELEC 21 SCRA 496 DOCTRINE: No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. FACTS:  purpose of the enactment or pu t on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in Republic Act 4790 ( An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton referring to or indicating one subject where in the Province of Lanao del Sur) is signed into law by the Chief another or different one is really embraced in the Executive on June 18, 1966. act, or in omitting any expression or indication of Section 1, RA 4790 enumerated the barrios that will the real subject or scope of the act, is bad constitute the new municipality of Dianaton, Province of 2. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance Lanao del Sur. However, it came light later that of the 21 rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose barrios, only 9 are located in the Province of Lanao del Sur of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all while 12 barrios are located in the Province of Cotabato.  persons interested, should b e kept in mind by the court August 15, 1967 – Comelec issued a resolution which states that •

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“for purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes” the new municipality of Dianaton shall comprise the 22 barrios enumerated in RA 4790 September 7, 1967 – Apprised by this development, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until “clarified by correcting legislation” September 20, 1967 – Comelec stood by its own interpretation and declared that the statute “should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court” This triggered the petition at bar by Bara Lidasan, a resident, taxpayer and voter of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato.

ISSUES and JUDGMENT: 1. Whether or not RA 4790 violates Section 26(1), Article 6, 1987 Constitution for including barrios in Cotabato in creating the Municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur? Yes

**Section 26(1), Article 6, 1987 Constitution " Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Dual limitations upon legislative power posed by the above provision 1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. 2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. ** Compliance is imperative because the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. **In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives where the bill, being of local application, originated. Rationale: To inform the Congress as to the full impact of the law and to apprise the people of the laws affecting them; To prohibit “rider” provision which is not germane to the subject matter of the bill Ruling: Yes. Guidelines in ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement 1. The test of the sufficiency of title is whether or not it is misleading a title which is so uncertain that the average  person reading it would not be informed of the

With the foregoing guidelines, the title of RA 4790 is considered misleading because not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new municipality of Lanao del Sur. Legislation has two-pronged purpose: 1. creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur 2. dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

Respondent: the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting

in "the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." SC: Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact. 2. Whether or not RA 4790 can remain valid if the 12 barrios from the province of Cotabato is removed from the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton? -> NO

Black Interpretation of Laws: When part of a statute is held unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated and the constitutional portion upheld. But when the parts are mutually dependent & not separable, the entire statute must be void. Twin functions of municipal corporations: 1. instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of government 2. agency of the community in the administration of local affairs Explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now RA 4790 " The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality. This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy. “Progressive community” refers to the 21 barrios and it cannot be ascertained if it is still true to the 9 barrios in Lanao del Sur

3. Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing?

Yes

Ruling : Yes. He is a qualified voter in a barrio in Cotabato which would be incorporated in the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur HELD: RA 4790 is declared unconstitutional. Comelec is prohibited from implementing the same for electoral purposes. Dissent: Fernando, J.

Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment.

The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. It is the duty of the court to give an Act of Congress a fairly susceptible construction that will make it not in conflict with the higher law.

TOBIAS v ABALOS 239 SCRA 106 DOCTRINE: The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or

catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It must be germane to the subject matter. FACTS: and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." (Sumulong v. Comelec) As taxpayers and residents of mandaluyong, petitioners assail b. WON it violates Sec 5 (1) Art 6 of the 1987 Consti? " No the constitutionality of RA No. 7675 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Petitioners:  The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong known as City of Mandaluyong). into separate congressional districts has resulted in Prior to the enactment of the statute, Mandaluyong and San increase in the composition of the House of Juan belonged to one legislative district Representatives beyond that provided in Sec 5(1), Art 6 of Pursuant to the Local Government Code, a plebiscite was held the Constitution. on April 10, 1994. The turnout of the plebiscite was only 14.41% Ruling : No. The 250 limit in Sec 5 (1), Art 6 of the of the voting population, but 18, 621 voted yes, while 7,911 voted Constitution is not absolute as evident in the phrase “unless no. Thus, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. otherwise provided by law” ISSUES (raised by the petitioners) and JUDGMENT: •

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1. Whether or not Art VIII Sec49, RA No 7675 which provides that the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district violates provisions in the Constitution? No

a.

WON it violates Sec 26(1), Art 6, 1987 Consti? " No Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Ruling: No.The creation of a separate congressional

district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Because Sec 5(3), Art 6, 1987 Consti provides that “…Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” Liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule has been adopted – “…It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject

c.

WON it violates Sec 5 (4) Art 6 of the 1987 Consti?

Petitioner: The assailed provision preempts the right of

Congress to reapportion legislative districts as provided in Sec 5(4), Art 6 of the Constitution Ruling : No. It was the Congress itself which drafted,

deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. 2. Whether or not the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on RA 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district? No Ruling: No. The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the

conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city—the inhabitants of SanJuan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of Mandaluyong. 3. Whether or not RA 7675 has resulted to “gerrymandering”? No

Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party Ruling: Not Worthy of credence. Rep Ronald Zamora, author of the law, is the incumbent of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district. He has been consistently winning in both localities. By dividing the district, his constituency has in fact been diminished and not favorable to him HELD: Contentions are devoid of merit. The petition is DISMISED for lack of merit.

2. Enacting Clause • • • •

" No

Written immediately after the title States the authority by which the act is enacted # #1 - Phil Commission – “ By authority of the President of the US, be it enacted by the US Philippine Commission” #2 - Philippine Legislature- “ by authority of the US, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature”

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#3 - When #2 became bicameral: “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in legislature assembled and by authority of the same” #4 - Commonwealth- “Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines #5 – when #4 became bicameral: “be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in congress assembled” – same 19461972/1987-present. #6 – Batasang Pambansa: “Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled” #7 – PD “ NOW THEREFORE, I ______ President of the Philippines, by the powers vested in me by the Constitution do hereby decree as follows” #8 – EO “Now, therefore, I, ____ hereby order”

3. Preamble •

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Defined – prefatory statement or explanation or a finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or occasion for making the law to which it is prefixed” Found after enacting clause and before the body of the law. Usually not used by legislations because content of the preamble is written in the explanatory note. But PDs and EOs have preambles. It is a part of the statute written immediately after its title, which states the purpose, reason for the enactment of the law. Usually express in whereas clauses. Generally omitted in statutes passed by: Phil. Commission Phil. Legislature National Assembly Congress of the Phil Batasang Pambansa These legislative bodies used the explanatory note to explain the reasons for the enactment of statutes. Extensively used if Presidential decrees issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power. When the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. Nor can be used as basis for giving a statute a meaning. When the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be resorted to clarify the ambiguity. Preamble is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the lawmakers as to the purpose is achieved, the mischief to be remedied, and the object to be accomplished, by the provisions of the legislature. May decide the proper construction to be given to the statute. May restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of law. It may express the legislative intent to make the law apply retroactively in which case the law has to be given retroactive effect. Ex. "WHEREAS, under the 1973 Constitution the incumbent President as Head of Government and Chief of State at the time of its ratification is vested with extraordinary powers during the transition period and can continue as incumbent President even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions;” • • • • •

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4. Purview • •

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that part which tells what the law is about body of statute should embrace only one subject should only one subject matter, even there provisions should be allied and germane to the subject and purpose of the bill. Statue is usually divided into sections which contain a single proposition. Parts o short title – EX. “Section 1. Short Title - This Act shall be known as the "National Service Training Program (NSTP) Act of 2001".” o policy section – EX. “Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby affirmed the prime duty of the government to serve and protect its citizens.“ o definition section – EX. “Section 3. Definition of Terms - For purposes of this Act, the following are hereby defined as follows:” o administrative section o sections prescribing standards of conduct o sections imposing sanctions for violation of its provisions o transitory provision o separability clause o effectivity clause

5. Other Clauses

Separability clause it states that if any provision of the act is declared invalid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby. It is not controlling and the courts may invalidate the whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is not complete and workable Presumption – statute is effective as a whole its effect: to create in the place of such presumption the opposite of separability. “If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and effect.” Effectivity Clause • • • • •

“This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” Amendatory Clause “Sec. ___, Art. ___ of RA/PD/EO_____, as well as all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations and other issuances inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby deemed amended and modified accordingly.” Repealing Clause “All other laws, decrees, orders, issuances, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.” •

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PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES AND ORDINANCES

Presidential issuances are those which the president issues in the exercise of ordinance power. i.e. EO, AO (administrative orders), proclamations, MO (memorandum orders), MC (memorandum circulars), and general or special orders. Have force and effect of laws. EO o acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of constitutional/ statutory powers. o do not have the force and effect of laws enacted by congress o different from EO issued by the President in the ex of her legislative power during the revolution Presidential decree under the freedom constitution AO o acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head Proclamations o acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a statute or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend MO o acts of the President on matters of administrative details or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of government MC o acts of the president on matters relating to internal administration which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or offices of the government, for information of compliance General or Specific Order o Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP • • • •

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Supreme Court circulars; rules and regulations See Art 8, Sec. 5(5) 1987 Constitution See Art. 6, Sec. 30 1987 Constitution It has been held that a law which provides that a decision of a quasi-judicial body be appealable directly to the SC, if enacted without the advice and concurrence of the SC, ineffective o Remedy or applicable procedure – go to CA Rules of Court – product of the rule-making power of the SC o Power to repeal procedural rules o No power to promulgate rules substantive in nature (unlike the legislative department) Substantive rules – if it affects or takes away vested rights; right to appeal Procedural rules – means of implementing existing right; where to file an appeal for transferring the venue Rules and regulations issued by the administrative or executive officers in accordance with and authorized by law, have the force and effect of law o Requisites for validity ! Rules should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law ! Regulations be not in contradiction with, but conform to, the standards that the law prescribes ! The be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of the law o Law cannot be restricted or extended o Law prevails over regulations, if there are discrepancies Rule-making power of public administrative agency is a delegated legislative power – if it enlarges or restricts such statute is invalid Requisites for delegating a statute by legislative branch to another branch of government to fill in details, execution, enforcement, or administration of law…. the law must be: o Complete in itself o Fix a standard which may be express or implied ! Example of “standard” – simplicity and dignity; public interest; public welfare; interest of law and order; justice and equity and substantial merit of the case; adequate and efficient instruction Example: o Change of “and/or” to “or” – invalid o Change of “may”(permissive) to “shall” (mandatory) – invalid (Grego v COMELEC pp 22) • • •

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Administrative rule and interpretation distinguished Rule – “makes” new law with the force and effect of a valid law; binding on the courts even if they are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or with its innate wisdom Interpretation – merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts; it may be set aside by judicial department (if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or GAD – grave abuse of discretion) •

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Barangay ordinance Sangguniang barangay – smallest legislative body; may pass an ordinance by majority of all its members; subject to review by Sangguniang bayan/ panglungsod Sangguniang bayan/ panglungsod – take action on the ordinance within 30 days from submission; if there’s inaction, it is presumed to be consistent with the municipal or city ordinance; if inconsistency is found, it will remand to the Sangguniang barangay Municipal ordinance Lodged in the Sangguniang bayan Majority of the quorum voting, ordinance is passed Ordinance sent to Mayor within 10 days for approval or veto; if there’s mayor’s inaction, ordinance is presumed approved; if vetoed and overridden by 2/3 of all members, ordinance is approved Approved ordinance is passed to Sangguniang panlalawigan for review o Within 30 days may invalidate in whole or in part and its action is final; if there’s inaction within 30 days, it is deemed valid •

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City ordinance Vested in Sangguniang panglungsod Majority of the quorum voting, ordinance is passed Submitted to Mayor within 10 days o Approve o Veto – 2/3 of all members – approved o Inaction – deemed approved If city or component city – submit to Sangguniang panlalawigan for review which shall take action within 30 days, otherwise, it will be deemed valid • • •

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Provincial ordinance Sangguniang panlalawigan – majority of quorum voting, passage of ordinance Forwarded to the Governor who within 15 days from receipt shall o Approve o Veto – 2/3 of all members – approved o Inaction – deemed approved • •

D. Steps in the enactment Constitution, Art. VI, Section 26 (2)

No bill passed by either House shall become law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. Constitution, Art. VI, Section 27

(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. Legislative power, generally Power to make, alter and repeal laws Vested in congress – 1987 Constitution President – 1973 & Freedom (PD and EO respectively) Sangguniang barangay, bayan, panglungsod, panlalawigan – only within respective jurisdiction – ordinances Administrative or executive officer • • • • •

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Delegated power Issue rules and regulations to implement a specific law

Congress legislative power The determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct. Legislative power - plenary except only to such limitations as are found in the constitution • •

Procedural requirements, generally Provided in the constitution (for Bills, RA) Provided by congress – enactment of laws ! Rules of both houses of congress (provided also by the Constitution) • •

Passage of bill Proposed legislative measure introduced by a member of congress for enactment into law Shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title Signed by authors File with the Secretary of the House Bills may originate from either lower or upper House Exclusive to lower house ! Appropriation ! Revenue/ tariff bills ! Bills authorizing increase of public debt ! Bills of local application ! Private bills After 3 readings, approval of either house (see Art 6 Sec 26 (1)) Secretary reports the bill for first reading First reading – reading the number and title, referral to the appropriate committee for study and recommendation Committee – hold public hearings and submits report and recommendation for calendar for second reading Second reading – bill is read in full (with amendments proposed by the committee) – unless copies are distributed and such reading is dispensed with o Bill will be subject to debates, motions and amendments o Bill will be voted on o A bill approved shall be included in the calendar of bills for 3 rd reading Third reading – bill approved on 2nd reading will be submitted for final vote by yeas and nays, Bill approved on the 3rd reading will be transmitted to the “Other House” for concurrence (same process as the first passage) o If the “Other House” approves without amendment it is passed to the President o If the “Other House” introduces amendments, and disagreement arises, differences will be settled by the Conference Committees of both houses o Report and recommendation of the 2 Conference Committees will have to be approved by both houses in order to be considered pass President o Approves and signs o Vetoes (within 30 days after receipt) o Inaction If the President vetoes – send back to the House where it originated with recommendation o 2/3 of all members approves, it will be sent to the other house for approval o 2/3 of the other house approves – it shall become a law o If president did not act on the bill within 30 days after receipt, bill becomes a law Summary : 3 ways of how a bill becomes a law. ! President signs ! inaction of president within 30 days after receipt ! vetoed bill is repassed by congress by 2/3 votes of all its members, each house voting separately. • • • • • •

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How a Bill Becomes a Law: Excerpt

* House Rule X: Bills, Resolutions, Messages, Memorials and Petitions * Flowchart: Legislative Process 1. Preparation of the bill 2. First reading 3. Committee consideration / action 4. Second reading 5. Third reading 6. Transmittal of the approved bill to the Senate 7. Senate action on approved bill of the House

8. Conference committee 9. Transmittal of the bill to the President 10. Presidential action on the bill 11. Action on approved bill 12. Action on vetoed bill PREPARATION OF THE BILL The Member or the Bill Drafting Division of the Reference and Research Bureau prepares and drafts the bill upon the Member's request. FIRST READING 1. The bill is filed with the Bills and Index Service and the same is numbered and reproduced. 2. Three days after its filing, the same is included in the Order of Business for First Reading. 3. On First Reading, the Secretary General reads the title and number of the bill. The Speaker refers the bill to the appropriate Committee/s. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION/ACTION 1. The Committee where the bill was referred to evaluates it to determine the necessity of conducting public hearings. If the Committee finds it necessary to conduct public hearings, it schedules the time thereof, issues public notice and invites resource persons from the public and private sectors, the academe and experts on the proposed legislation. If the Committee finds that no public hearing is needed, it schedules the bill for Committee discussion/s. 2. Based on the result of the public hearings or Committee discussions, the Committee may introduce amendments, consolidate bills on the same subject matter, or propose a substitute bill. It then prepares the corresponding committee report. 3. The Committee approves the Committee Report and formally transmits the same to the Plenary Affairs Bureau. SECOND READING 1. The Committee Report is registered and numbered by the Bills and Index Service. It is included in the Order of Business and referred to the Committee on Rules. 2. The Committee on Rules schedules the bill for consideration on Second Reading. 3. On Second Reading, the Secretary General reads the number, title and text of the bill and the following takes place: a. Period of Sponsorship and Debate b. Period of Amendments c. Voting which may be by: i. viva voce ii. count by tellers iii. division of the House; or iv. nominal voting THIRD READING 1. The amendments, if any, are engrossed and printed copies of the bill are reproduced for Third Reading. 2. The engrossed bill is included in the Calendar of Bills for Third Reading and copies of the same are distributed to all the Members three days before its Third Reading. 3. On Third Reading, the Secretary General reads only the number and title of the bill. 4. A roll call or nominal voting is called and a Member, if he desires, is given three minutes to explain his vote. No amendment on the bill is allowed at this stage. a. The bill is approved by an affirmative vote of a majority of the Members present. b. If the bill is disapproved, the same is transmitted to the Archives. TRANSMITTAL OF THE APPROVED BILL TO THE SENATE The approved bill is transmitted to the Senate for its concurrence. SENATE ACTION ON APPROVED BILL OF THE HOUSE The bill undergoes the same legislative process in the Senate. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 1. A Conference Committee is constituted and is composed of Members from each House of Congress to settle, reconcile or thresh out differences or disagreements on any provision of the bill. 2. The conferees are not limited to reconciling the differences in the bill but may introduce new provisions germane to the subject matter or may report out an entirely new bill on the subject. 3. The Conference Committee prepares a report to be signed by all the conferees and the Chairman. 4. The Conference Committee Report is submitted for consideration/approval of both Houses. No amendment is allowed. TRANSMITTAL OF THE BILL TO THE PRESIDENT Copies of the bill, signed by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and certified by both the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House, are transmitted to the President. PRESIDENTIAL ACTION ON THE BILL

1. If the bill is approved the President, the same is assigned an RA number and transmitted to the House where it originated. 2. If the bill is vetoed, the same, together with a message citing the reason for the veto, is transmitted to the House where the bill originated. ACTION ON APPROVED BILL The bill is reproduced and copies are sent to the Official Gazette Office for publication and distribution to the implementing agencies. It is then included in the annual compilation of Acts and Resolutions. ACTION ON VETOED BILL The message is included in the Order of Business. If the Congress decides to override the veto, the House and the Senate shall proceed separately to reconsider the bill or the vetoed items of the bill. If the bill or its vetoed items is passed by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of each House, such bill or items shall become a law. Note: A joint resolution having the force and effect of a law goes through the same process. Appropriations and revenue bills Same as procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills Only difference is that they can only originate from the Lower House but the Senate may propose/ concur with the amendments Limitations of passage (as per Constitution) Art 6 Sec. 27 (2) o congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the President XXX o particular appropriation limited o procedure for Congress is the same to all other department/ agencies (procedure for approving appropriations ) o special appropriations – national treasurer/ revenue proposal o no transfer of appropriations xxx authority to augment o discretionary funds – for public purposes o general appropriations bills – when re-enacted o President my veto any particular item/s in an appropriation revenue, or tariff bill. • • •

Authentication of bills Before passed to the President Indispensable By signing of Speaker and Senate President: Attestation • • •

Unimpeachability of legislative journals Journal of proceedings Conclusive with respect to other matters that are required by the Constitution Disputable with respect to all other matters By reason of public policy, authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character Should be public • • • • •

Matters Required to be Entered in the Journal The Constitution requires that the following matters be contained in the journal: (a) The yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill [Art. VI, Sec. 26(2)]; (b) Veto message of the President (i.e., his objection to a bill when he vetoes it) [Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)]; (c) The yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President (Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)]; (d) The yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of the members present [Art. VI, Sec. 16(4)] In addition, the journal contains the summary of the proceedings. CIR v CTA 185 SCRA 329 DOCTRINE: An “item” that the President can veto in a revenue bill shall mean the subject of a particular kind of tax and tax rate. in which the club protested claiming the assessment to be FACTS: •

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Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar & dining room exclusively for its members & guests claims that they should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No. 6110, otherwise known as "Omnibus Tax Law". By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and Country Club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurant, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96

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without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos. CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotel, motels, resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipt of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a

hotel, motel or resthouses. DECISION: •

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The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. It was then agreed by the SC with then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and

enforceable, hence the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc is liable for the amount assessed against it. “Item” cannot refer to an entire section, as it would create absurd situations where the President either approves an entire section that includes a provision he or she finds unacceptable, or vetoing an entire section at the expense of foregoing the collection of that kind of tax altogether. Even if Pres. Marcos’ veto had referred to an entire section, it would then be an ineffectual veto, making the entire Sec. 191-A in full force and effect.

TOLENTINO v SEC. OF FINANCE 235 SCRA 630 DOCTRINE: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is

required to exclusively originate from the HOR. Presidential certification of a bill‘s necessity dispenses the requirement of the bill‘s printing and distribution and separate days for readings. It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision. speech) Facts: • On various dates between July 22, 1992, and August 31, 1993, 7) RA 7716 violates Sec. 5, Art. III, of the Constitution (free exercise of several House Bills, a Senate Resolution, and a Senate Bill were religion) introduced, seeking to amend certain provisions of the National 8) RA 7716 violates Sec. 10, Art. III, of the Constitution (nonInternal Revenue Code (NIRC) relative to the Value-Added Tax (VAT.) impairment of the obligation of contracts) Among these bills was House Bill Number 11197 (in substitution of 9) RA 7716 violates Sec. 28(1), Art. VI, of the Constitution (uniform HBs 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012, and and equitable taxation) 10100). 10) RA 7716 violates Sec. 28(3), Art. VI, of the Constitution • HB 11197 was approved on its second (November 11, 1993) and (exemption from taxation of religions) third (Nov. 17, 1993) readings, and was transmitted to the Senate (Nov. 18, 1993.) Decision: LOST petitions DISMISSED • February 7, 1994: The Senate Committee on Ways and means Ratio Decidendi: reported that it recommended for approval Senate Bill Number 1630 in 1) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 24, Art. VI, of the 1987 substitution of SB 1129, taking into consideration PSR 734 and HB Constitution (i.e. bills of revenue shall originate exclusively 11197. from the HOR?)  A) Petitioners: Yes. • March 22, 1994: President Fidel V. Ramos certified SB 1630 for immediate enactment “to meet a public emergency.” 1) It is the result of the consolidation of • March 24 1994: SB 1630 was approved by the Senate on its 2nd and two distinct bills HB 11197 and SB 3rd readings, and transmitted to the House of Representatives (HOR) 1630. The Constitution qualifies the along with the request for a conference regarding the disagreeing verb “shall originate” with the word provisions of SB 1630 and HB 11197. “exclusively,” and the phrase “as on • On April 13, 19, 20, 21, and 25 1994, the Bicameral Conference other bills” found in the American Committee (BCC) conducted various meetings to reconcile the Federal Constitution is omitted. proposals on the VAT. 2) The Constitution limits the Senate’s • The HOR (April 27, 1994) and Senate (May 2, 1994) agreed on the power to produce revenue bills Conference Committee Report, and the President signed Republic Act compensates for its power to ratify Number 7716 (The Expanded VAT Law) on May 5, 1994. Said RA was treaties. published in 2 newspapers of general circulation on May 12, 1994 and 3) SB 1630 was passed not in became effective on May 28, 1994. substitution of HB 11197 but of • Various suits for certiorari and prohibition challenging the another SB (1129), the Senate constitutionality of RA 7716 were undertaken. merely took said HB into consideration in enacting said SB. Issues: Whether or not... 1) RA 7716 violates Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution B) Supreme Court: No. (i.e. bills of revenue shall originate exclusively from the HOR.) 1) It is not the law but the revenue bill 2) RA 7716 violates Sec. 26(2), Art. VI, of the Constitution (i.e. “no bill which is required to exclusively shall be passed unless it has passed three readings on separate days, originate from the HOR. A bill and printed copies x x x have been distributed x x x except when the originating from it may undergo President certifies to the necessity x x x [and] [u]pon the last reading of extensive changes in the Senate that a bill no amendment thereto shall be allowed.”) it might be entirely rewritten. 3) The BCC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack 2) The powers being compared are of or excess of jurisdiction when it “reconciled” SB 1630 and HB 11197 different. Legislative power is vested 4) RA 7716 violates Sec. 26(1), Art. VI, of the Constitution (“Every bill in the Congress, comprised of the passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject x x x expressed Senate and the HOR. in the title thereof.”) 3) The result would be two bills on the 5) RA 7716 violates Sec. 1, Art. III (Bill of Rights), of the Constitution same subject. (due process and equal protection) a) The Constitution simply means that 6) RA 7716 violates Sec. 4, Art. III, of the Constitution (freedom of the initiative for filing such a bill must

2)

3)

come from the HOR as they can be expected to be more sensitive of local needs. Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 26(2), Art. VI, of the Constitution (i.e. “no bill shall be passed unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies x x x have been distributed x x x except when the President certifies to the necessity x x x [and] [u]pon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereto shall be allowed?”)  A) Petitioners: Yes. 1) Presidential certification of a bill’s necessity only dispenses the requirement of the bill’s printing and distribution, 2) Certification was invalid because there was no emergency. 3) The President certified SB 1630 and not HB 11197. B) SC: No. 1) “Unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except clause. Construing one “requirement” and alienating the other would negate the premise of the “except” clause, which is the need to secure the immediate enactment of a certified-urgent bill. 2) No member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. 3) The Senate was considering SB 1630, not HB 11197. The President certified HB 9210 which was also pending in the HOR anyway. Did the BCC commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it “reconciled” SB 1630 and HB 11197?  A) Petitioners: Yes. 1) BCC included provisions found in neither HB nor SB, surreptitiously inserting them. 2) The BCC, especially during the last two days of its session, met behind closed doors. 3) Under the rules of the Senate and the HOR, a conference committee can only act on differing provisions of SBs and HBs. B) SC: No. 1) It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision. a)

Phil. Judges Association v. Prado (1993)

b)

According to Keefe and Ogul, the American system permits conference committee members to draft essentially a new bill. If the committee can propose one or two amended provisions, then it can propose several.

c)

The report was not final but needed the approval of both houses. 2) Often, the only way to reach an agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors with only the conferees present. 3) Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and the courts have no  jurisdiction over them. The courts are concerned with the procedural requirements of the Constitution. SC: Whatever doubts as to the formal validity of RA 7716 must be resolved in its favor. It is an enrolled bill. This rule is not absolute, as seen in  Astorga v. Villegas  (1974). Disregarding the enrolled status of the bill disrespects the other two departments of government. RA 7716 violates Sec. 26(1), Art. VI, of the Constitution (“Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject x x x expressed in the title thereof.”)  A) Petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL): Yes. Neither HB 11197 nor SB 1630 provided for the removal of PAL’s exemption (granted through Presidential Declaration Number 1590) from paying VAT. Said removal was only done in the BCC bill. B) SC: No. 1) The title states the purpose of the statute, and one way of achieving the statute’s objectives is to withdraw some exemptions granted before. 2) Purpose of Congress embracing only one subject to be expressed in the title is to prevent surprise upon members of the Congress and to inform the people of the pending legislation. 3) Sec. 24 of PD 1590 provides that the franchise may be amended through special law. Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 1, Art. III (Bill of Rights), of the Constitution (due process and equal protection?) SC: No. There is a hierarchy of values within the due process clause. The lack of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident, rendering any discussion on the merits of the law academic. Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 4, Art. III, of the Constitution (freedom of speech?)  A) Petitioner Philippine Press Institute (PPI): Yes. 1) PPI: It has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to the press under Sec. 103 of the NIRC. 2) PPI: Even though the exemption was subsequently restored by administrative regulation with respect to the circulation income, PPI claims the exemption may be removed by mere revocation of the Secretary of Finance. d)

•

4)

•

5)

•

6)

3)  American Bible Society v. City of Manila  (1957), also cited by PBS:

license fee on those engaged in the business of general merchandise

7) 8)

9)

cannot apply to appellant’s sale of bibles and religious literature. B) Petitioner Philippine Bible Society (PBS): Yes. Sec. of Fin.’s power to grant exemptions is questionable 1) Power to grant tax exemption is vested in Congress and requires majority vote to do so. 2) Sec.’s duty is to execute the law. C) SC: No. 1) v. PPI: Publishers of newspapers have no immunity from the application of general laws. They cannot invade rights and liberties of others, must answer for libel, may be punished for contempt, and must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes. 2) v. PPI: Exemptions are merely being removed. 3) v. PPI: Cases cited by the PPI show overt discrimination of the press. RA 7716 applies to a wide range of goods and services. 4) v. PPI and PBI: In this case, the fee is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for defraying part of the cost of registration. It is an administrative fee. Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 5, Art. III, of the Constitution (free exercise of religion?): (subsumed by Issue #6.) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 10, Art. III, of the Constitution (non-impairment of the obligation of contracts?)  A) Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA): Yes. Imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate affects contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law. B) SC: No. Parties cannot restrain the taxing power of the state. Protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 28(1), Art. VI, of the Constitution (uniform and equitable taxation?):  A) Petitioners: Yes. It is regressive. 1) Tait: “VAT payment by low-income households will be a higher proportion of their income than payments by higher-income households.” 2) As a result of the 10% VAT, tax on consumption goods of those who are in the higher-income bracket, which were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic commodities which used to be taxed from 3 to 5% are now taxed at a higher rate. 3) Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP): Poor and middleincome group will be hit harder than the rich. B) Respondents: No.

It distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible, particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income groups. 2) The law exempts basic goods and services. 3) Goods and properties subject to the VAT such as real properties, industrial/commercial/scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants, tourist buses, etc., are used/consumed primarily by higherincome groups. 4) Lack of empirical data, especially by CREBA and PPI makes discussion on the VAT’s progressivity academic. 10) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 28(3), Art. VI, of the Constitution (exemption from taxation of religions?): (subsumed by Issue #6.) 1)

Dissent Regalado, J .: 1) How it was legislated into its present statutory existence is not in serious dispute. 2) The President’s certification of SB 1630 was invalid as it was a tax bill, ergo, it not validly originate from the Senate. 3) SB 1630 was approved “in substitution of SB 1129,” while merely “taking into consideration PSR 734 and HB 11197.” SB 1630 was never filed   in substitution of either PSR 734 or HB 11197.  A) Solicitor General’s (OSG) invocation of Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.  (1911) that “the power to concur in or propose amendments includes an amendment by substitution” is untenable. Said case had an amendment of only one item in the statute. The OSG repeatedly cited Flint without  justifying it despite the obvious difference in circumstance. B) Amendment by substitution when approved takes the place of the principal bill, which is supplanted and goes out of actuality, according to a publication authorized by the Senate and quoted by the OSG. C) To consolidate two bills is to unite them into one. In this case, this assumes that HB 11197 never became legally inexistent, however, the OSG’s theory of amendment by substitution eliminates the legal existence of HB 11197. D) SB 1630’s legislative journey is wrought with defects: it was a tax bill that originated from the Senate. Its certification caused its consideration by the BCC. E) Respondents’ dependence on Phil. Judges  Assoc.  is the same as their reliance on Flint . Both cases deal with the amendment of only one legislative item. Following such precedents would amount to blind adherence. F) The enrolled bill doctrine is no longer seen as absolute. In the United States, cases such as Gwynn v. Hardee and D & W Auto Supply, et al. v. Department of Revenue, et al.   show the moving away from absolute obedience to the enrolled-bill doctrine.

It assumed SB 1630 could validly originate in the Senate. B) It assumed SB 1630 and HB 11197 had properly passed both chambers. C) Even though Representative Javier wanted SB 1630 to be the frame of reference, said bill was never transmitted to the HOR for its concurrence. The approval of the proposed bill by both chambers did not cure its infirmities.  A) Doctrine of ratification may cure minor procedural flaws but not in violation of the Constitution. 1) Neither SB (1629 and 1630) could originate from the Senate as they are tax measures, nor were they submitted to the HOR for its concurrence. 2) HB 11197 was not passed by the Senate on its second and third readings. 3) Invoking the enrolled-bill doctrine is misplaced. a) Its origins render it void ab initio: the certification itself stated RA 7716 was a consolidation of HB 11197 and SB 1630. It did not originate exclusively from the HOR. b) The enrolled-bill doctrine is of American origin, and is no longer absolute as the Court’s expanded  jurisdiction includes determining whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government. c) Even in the US, the enrolled-bill doctrine is under fire.  A)

Davide, JR., J .: 1) RA 7716 is a revenue measure, as such, it must originate exclusively in the HOR.  A) Petitioner Tolentino correctly asserts that on the face of the enrolled copy of RA 7716, it is a “Consolidation of HB 11197 and SB 1630.” It is an illicit marriage of a bill that originated from the HOR and a bill that originated from the Senate. B) Only bill that could serve as a valid basis for RA 7716 is HB 11197, which is the substitute bill recommended by the House Committee on Ways and Means in substitution of the other HBs. It is interesting to note that HB 11197 was not certified, unlike HB 9210, which it substituted. After it passed the first reading in the Senate, their Committee on Ways and Means did not deliberate on it. Said committee only acted on SB 1129, which in turn prepared and proposed SB 1630. It was SB 1630 which was proposed and submitted for approval, in substitution of SB 1129, not HB 11197. C) OSG’s citation of Flint   is erroneous, as the statement that substitution can be supported as an amendment was merely the summary of the arguments of counsel on one of the companion cases. D) Citing flint   is not tenable as it only dealt with one amendment. E) I disagree with the view of the majority that the Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. SB 1129 was filed on March 1, 1993, while HB 11197 was approved after its third reading on November 17, 1993. F) SB 1129 is a revenue measure, which cannot even be validly introduced/initiated in the Senate, nor can it be substituted. 2) RA 7716 did not pass the requirement of being approved on its second and third readings which are to be on different days.  A) The certification is void ab initio because it addressed to the Senate a bill which is prohibited from originating from it. B) Requesting a bicameral conference to reconcile HB 11197 and SB 1630 is erroneous as HB 11197 was not submitted for or acted on its second and third readings in the Senate, and SB 1630 was not sent to the HOR for its concurrence. 3) Both chambers’ actions amounted to a grave abuse of discretion by requesting for a BCC.  A) As SB 1630 was not a substitute bill for HB 11197 but for SB 1629, it had to be transmitted to the HOR to undergo three readings. B) HB 11197 was never acted upon by the Senate on its second and third readings. 4) The BCC itself acted with a grave abuse of discretion. •

5)

Romero, J .: 1) By defining both “originate” and “exclusively,” and  juxtaposing these with the legislative history of RA 7716, it is without doubt that RA 7716, indisputably a revenue measure, originated in the HOR in the form of HB 253, the first Expanded VAT bill. 2) Whether or not the bills originated exclusively in the HOR is a different matter. There were other amendatory bills to the VAT that did not originate solely in the HOR, such as PSR 734 and SB 1129. 3) SB 1630’s failure to go through the motions in the HOR is fatal. The Constitution provides for a Congress with two chambers. 4) Even though RA 7716 is an enrolled bill, the changes introduced to it by the BCC are substantial. The BCC exceeded its power and authority. Even the approval of the BCC’s output does not cure RA 7716 as it is void ab initio.

The enrolled-bill doctrine only applies to questions of procedural enactment of non-substantial alterations.

This may apply to provisions which actually reconcile conflicts between HB 11197 and SB 1630. 2) This does not apply to additions and deletions entirely new and not made to reconcile inconsistencies between the aforementioned bills. C) It was practice in the past Congresses for conference committees to insert new provisions in bills. 1) Customs and usages, according to Mason, are merely subordinate to higher sources of rules such as the Constitution. D) The enrolled-bill doctrine precludes inquiry as to the regularity of the proceedings leading up to the enactment of RA 7716. 1) Beginning from the 1940s, American courts have veered away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolledbill doctrine. 2) American courts have diverged as to the application of such a doctrine. 3) Mabanag v. Lopez Vito  (1947): The SC chose to follow Sec. 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, which has long been repealed by the Rules of Court. The jurisprudence and authorities it relies on, particularly American ones, are under severe criticism. 1)

Bellosillo, J .: The Constitution clearly mandates that bills of this type exclusively emanate from the HOR. There is no getting around it. Referring to American authorities is erroneous as the US Constitution differs on the matter. 1) Flint   has no importance to this case as the bill in it originated from the Lower House, not from the Senate, and the amendment contested merely covered a single provision. 2) Amendment by substitution is only valid in the US. •

Puno, J .: The BCC added new provisions. The respondents justify this incident thusly:  A) Respondents: BCC has an ex post veto power (veto after approval of the bill by both Houses.) respondents cite no 1) The constitutional provision, law, not even rules or regulations. 2) The rules of both Houses themselves do now support such a theory. 3) The Constitution only provides for a Congress with two chambers, not three. Giving BCCs veto power in effect creates another chamber, even though they do not represent the people. B) Bill prepared by BCC was approved anyway. ARROYO v DE VENECIA 277 SCRA 268

DOCTRINE: Court may not inquire into allegations of non-compliance of Congress with its internal rules if there is no showing that a constitutional

requirement was violated. Facts:

-The petitioners assail the validity of RA 8240 which imposes “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale beer and cigarettes. -Said law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. -The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House of Representatives (HOR) regarding H. No. 7198 on November 21, 1996. During the sponsorship speech of Rep. Javier, Rep. Joker Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. -After a roll call, the Chair, Deputy Speaker Daza, declared the presence of a quorum -Rep. Arroyo registered to interpellate. During his interpellation, he announced that he will question the presence of a quorum which he never did. -After that, Rep. Albano moved to approve the committee report. The Chairman asked for objections but Rep. Arroyo did not hear it at first. When the Chairman declared the committee report approved, Rep. Arroyo simultaneously raised his objection. -Then Rep. Albano moved to adjourn until 4:00 next Wednesday. The Chairman approved the motion. -The bill was signed by the Speaker of HOR, the Senate President and the respective secretary of each House on the same day. It was signed by the President on November 21, 1996. -Petitioners claim that there were 4 versions of the transcript of Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation but to expedite the resolution of the petition, they concede to the correctness of the transcript relied upon by the respondents. -Petitioners claim that RA 8240 is void because it was enacted in violation of Art. VI, 16(3) of the Constitution which grants Congress the

power to determine the rules of its proceedings. According to them, House rules were violated when the Chairman refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo when he raised his objection to the adoption of the committee report. They also alleged that the session was hastily adjourned to prevent Rep. Arroyo from questioning the quorum and ask for reconsideration. -Respondents argue that by virtue of separation of powers, the Supreme Court must not interfere with the internal rules of Congress. ISSUE: WON RA 8240 WAS VALIDLY ENACTED Yes. The Congress did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its enactment. 1. The Rules allegedly violated were mere internal rules of HOR instead of constitutional requirements. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum. They only claim that they were prevented from questioning it. Cases here and abroad show that the Court may not inquire into allegations of non-compliance of Congress with its internal rules if there is no showing that a constitutional requirement was violated. 2. The expanded judicial power under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution did not completely do away with the political question doctrine. This case involves political questions. 3. There was no showing that the passage of the law was railroaded. -The Supreme Court accepted the explanation that Rep. Arroyo and the Chairman were talking simultaneously that is why the Chairman failed to recognize Rep. Arroyo. -They also noted the comment of the Solicitor General that the manner of approval of said committee report was the same as the manner of approval of committee reports of other famous bills such as the one

which eventually the Local Government Code. -The Constitution also does not required that yeas and nays of members be taken every time the House has to vote. 4. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of HOR and Senate President and the certification of the respective secretaries of each House was conclusive of its due enactment. -The due enactment of RA 8240 was also confirmed by the journal of the House of Representatives. Held: Petition dismissed. Separate Opinion: Romero, J: Clarified that his opinion in Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance

cannot be applied to the present case because there is no breach of Constitutional provisions. Only internal rules are involved. In Tolentino, there was a violation of Constituional provision against amendments introduced upon the last reading of a bill. Puno, J : Concurring and dissenting opinion

-Concur in the result but: a) Did not agree that the issue was non-justiciable. He based his opinion on US decisions where the Supreme Court imposed its authority over the Congress for alleged violation of rules of procedures of the legislators. In the Philippine setting, the Court has more reason to reject the political question doctrine because of the expanded judicial power granted by Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution. b) He also objected to the reliance on the enrolled bill doctrine because: 1) It is appropriate only in England where it originated, and where there is no written Constitution and the legislative is supreme. 2) Many courts in the US also have broken away with the rigidity of the enrolled bill doctrine in light of contemporary developments in lawmaking. 3) Uncritical reliance to the enrolled bill doctrine is inconsistent with our Constitution and laws.

E. Evidence of due enactment 1. Enrolled Bill Theory Enrolled bill Bills passed by congress authenticated by the Speaker and the Senate President and approved by the President Importing absolute verity and is binding on the courts o It carries on its face a solemn assurance that it was passed by the assembly by the legislative and executive departments. Courts cannot go behind the enrolled act to discover what really happened o If only for respect to the legislative and executive departments Thus, if there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and approved by the Chief Executive, the remedy is by amendment by enacting a curative legislation not by judicial decree. Enrolled bill and legislative journals - Conclusive upon the courts If there is discrepancy between enrolled bill and journal, enrolled bill prevails. • •

•

•

• •

Withdrawal of authentication, effect of Speaker and Senate President may withdraw if there is discrepancy between the text of the bill as deliberated and the enrolled bill. Effect: o Nullifies the bill as enrolled o Losses absolute verity o Courts may consult journals • •

MABANAG v LOPEZ VITO 78 PHIL 1 DOCTRINE: Enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts. FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The

three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ! vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at

bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both

the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies

certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.” The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

CASCO PHIL. CHEMICAL CO. v GIMENEZ 7 SCRA 347 DOCTRINE: Upon mistake in printing, curative statute by amendment of Congress is needed not judicial declaration, imposed upon urea formaldehyde Facts:

1. RA 2609 “Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law” - issued by Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP) - Circular No. 95 = fixes uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange (forex) transactions - to supplement, memorandum was passed establish some exemptions 2. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc. (Casco) - engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers - brought forex for importation of urea and formaldehyde (main raw materials) - paid margin fee twice (Php33,765.42 and Php6,345.72) for two separate transactions 3. Casco sought refund of the sums paid for margin fee - Ground: separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from margin fee 4. Auditor of BSP refused - Ground: exemption granted by BSP Monetary Board for separate importations of urea and formaldehyde not in accord with provision of Sec. 2, Par. XVIII of RA 2609 5. Auditor General affirmed upon appeal 6. Hence, this petition for review Issue:

WON “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from payment of margin fee. Held: NO. Ratio:

Petitioner: “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as urea AND formaldehyde Court: urea formaldehyde is a finished product which is patently distinct from urea and formaldehyde which are separate articles and are raw materials (source: National Institute of Science and Technology) (2). Petitioner: Bill approved in congress uses the conjunction AND between terms and urea and formaldehyde, as such it is the intention of congress to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately Ground: individual statements made on the floor of the Senate Court: individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate much less indicate intent (3). Enrolled bill which uses urea formaldehyde instead of urea AND formaldehyde is conclusive - this has been passed by Congress and approved by the President after all - if there has been any mistake in printing before it was certified by Congress and approved by Executive, remedy should be amendment or curative legislation and not judicial decree since this would violate separation of powers Ruling: Decision by Auditor General affirmed Notes: Rule on Ejusdem Generies (of the same kinds, class, or nature") - When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them. - rule applies only where there is uncertainty - not controlling when purpose and intent would be hindered and defeated

(1). Sec. 2, Par. XVIII, RA 2609 = margin established shall not be MORALES v SUBIDO 26 SCRA 150 DOCTRINE: In cases not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the Enrolled Bill Theory prevails in the event of any discrepancy. 1. WON the court can look into the matter and discover what really Facts:

- The House submitted HB 6951 to the Senate. Sen. Rodrigo made an amendment in the Sec. 10 of the HB. However, somewhere in the legislative process the phrase “who has served the police department of a city or” was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained. Petitioner argues that the version approved by the Senate was the one containing those phrases and not the one that was submitted as the Enrolled Bill that was signed by the President and became the Police Act of 1966. If the phrase were there the Petitioner could be appointed as Chief of Police. Petitioner also said that the change was only made in the proofreading of the bill, made by an employee and not by the Congress. Issue:

happened. Held:

- Under the enrolled bill theory the court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the court act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. -Marshall Field & Co. V Clark – the signing by the Speaker of the HOR and by the President of the Senate of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses that such bill is the one that has passed Congress. And when the bill thus attested is signed by the President and deposited in the archives, its authentication as a bill that has

passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. -US v Pons rule does not apply because this case does not involve a discrepancy between an enrolled bill and the journal. -Enrolled Bill Theory was now controlling and in force in the Philippines supported by the unanimous decision in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. V Gimenez. -But court did not say that in all cases the Journal Entry Rule must yield to the Enrolled Bill Theory. There are certain matters that the

Constitution requires to be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question the court did not decide. -Rule: In cases not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the Enrolled Bill Theory prevails in the event of any discrepancy. Decision: Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

FARINAS v EXEC SEC GR NO. 147387 DOCTRINE: Facts:

Two petitions were filed seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 which repealed Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) , which provides: “Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office. -- Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA No. 9006 is entitled “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.” The petitioners argue that: o (a) The bill violates of Section 26 (I), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject, which should be expressed in its title therefore constituting a rider. o (b) The bill violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it left intact Section 66 thereof, which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials ( Sec. 66.

the fact itself) resigned from his elective office because all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for any office. o (e) RA No. 9006 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because a substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials.

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Candidates holding appointive office or positions. - Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.).

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o (c) The bill violates the due process clause of the constitution due to Sec. 16 of the law, which provides that “this Act shall take effect upon its approval”. The respondents argued that: o (a) the petitioners have not shown they have legal standing to institute the present suit because they have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of passage of RA No. 9006. o (b) the bill was duly enacted by invoking the “enrolled bill” doctrine with proof through the signatures of the Senate President, Speaker of the House and respective Secretaries of both houses of congress. o (c) Sec. 67 is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26 (I) of Article VI of the Constitution because the title is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise. o (d) The repeal of Section 67 is deemed fit in order to remove the “unfairness” of considering an elective official ipso facto (by

Issues: •

Whether or not Section 14 of RA No. 9006 is unconstitutional

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No. Section 14 of RA No. 9006 is not unconstitutional because it does not transcend constitutional limitation/ legislative power. Section 14 of RA 9006 is not a rider. The court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. According to Sec 26 (I), “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject, which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” The court laid down the rule that titles of statues should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation… It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably pressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object.” Section 14 of RA 9006 is not a violation of the equal protection clause of the constitution. The court explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee that it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities forced. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The Enrolled Bill Doctrine is applicable in the case. The necessary signatures are conclusive of its due enactment. The Effective Clause is defective. In Tañada v. Tuvera, the court ruled: “… the clause ‘unless it is otherwise provided’ refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.”

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v EXEC SEC + CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OF PUNO IN ARROYO AND HERE SEE SEPARATE FACTS

Republic Act No. 9337 was enacted for reasons of fixing budget, generation of revenue, inadequacy in fiscal allocation for education, compensation for health workers, and a wider range of coverage for full value-added tax benefits. The petitioners, however, questioned, not only the wisdom of the law, but also the perceived flaws in its

passage. RA 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Because of its provisions being in conflict with each other, the Senate agreed to request the House of Representatives for a committee conference, in which the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the approval of its report. In due to that, the

Senate and the House of Representatives did. On May 24, 2005, the President signed in to law the consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act 9337. Before its effectivity on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law, in response to a series of petitions for certiorari and prohibition, questioning the constitutionality of the said Republic Act. ISSUES

1) Can amendment proposals to revenue bills originate from the Senate without violating Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution? 2) Did the EVAT law violate the "no-amendment rule" under Section 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution? 3) What are the powers and extent of authority of the Bicameral Conference Committee? 4) Did the EVAT law, RA 9337, violate the constitutional mandate on uniformity of taxation? 5) Is the EVAT law, RA 9337, regressive? HELD

1) Yes. Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution states, "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." Thus, Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. 2) No. The "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of the aforementioned respective houses, regarding its transmission to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Section 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution does not mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills is prohibited.

3) The power of the Bicameral Conference Committee is to reconcile or settle the differences in the two Houses’ respective bills, but it is not limited to the conflicting provisions of the bills. It may include matters not found in the original bills but germane to the purpose thereof. If both Houses viewed the pronouncement made by this Court in such cases as extreme or beyond what they intended, they had the power to amend their respective Rules to clarify or limit even further the scope of the authority which they grant to the Bicameral Conference Committee. Petitioners’ grievance that, unfortunately, they cannot bring about such an amendment of the Rules on the Bicameral Conference Committee because they are members of the minority, deserves scant consideration. That the majority of the members of both Houses refuse to amend the Rules on the Bicameral Conference Committee is an indication that it is still satisfied therewith. At any rate, this is how democracy works - the will of the majority shall be controlling. 4) No. Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads: "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation." Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all people at all times. The EVAT law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and services. Uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class. 5) Yes, by its nature it is regressive. But the principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. Hence, the petitions were DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court was lifted upon finality of the decision.

2. Journal Entry Rule ASTORGA v VILLEGAS 56 SCRA 714 DOCTRINE: Facts:

- In March 1964 HB 9266 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of Manila etc.) was filed in the House. It was passed in the House on third reading w/o amendments. When referred to the Senate for approval, upon second reading, substantial amendments were introduced by Sen. Tolentino, and approved by the Senate. When sent back to the House by the Secretary of the Senate, the Senate-approved amendments were not included, but only Sen. Roxas‘ minor amendment on succession which was made by his committee. The House approved this version. Copies were printed and attested by presiding officers including Senate President et al. The President also signed it in June, and the bill became RA 4065. The President and Senate President would later withdraw their signatures upon learning the circumstances. Vice-Mayor filed a petition for Mandamus and Prohibitory Injunction to compel respondents to comply with RA 4065. Issue:

1. WON RA 4065 is valid (since the Senate President already withdrew his signature on the enrolled bill and said that it is not the version passed by the senate) and WON the journal entry rule and not the enrolled bill theory should be adhered to, to prove the validity of RA 4065. Held:

- RA 4065 is not duly enacted.

- The only statutory basis of the enrolled bill theory is Sec. 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 of the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure which says that a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of the Philippine Legislature shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof. - But the procedure of signing such acts is merely a mode of authentication/attestation. It’s not an approval because a bill is considered approve after it has passed both Houses. - Arguing that the signatures are mandatory would be in effect giving the presiding officers veto power (veto power is only given to the President), which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary. The Constitution doesn’t even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President. - Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding officer of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. - Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill has been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

- The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. - In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the Senate President and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to

perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. Decision: RA 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law.

F. Validity 1. Presumption of constitutionality Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 4

(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. Presumption of constitutionality Every statute is presumed valid o Lies on how a law is enacted o Due respect to the legislative who passed and executive who approved o Responsibility of upholding the constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislative and executive branches as well Courts cannot inquire into the wisdom or propriety of laws To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of the law to the constitution must be clear and unequivocal All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of law; to doubt is to sustain Final arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the Supreme Court EN BANC (majority who took part and voted thereon) Nonetheless, trial courts have jurisdiction to initially decide the issue of constitutionality of a law in appropriate cases •

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Requisites for exercise of judicial power The existence of an appropriate case Interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question Plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity Necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case • • • •

Appropriate case Bona fide case – one which raises a justiciable controversy Judicial power is limited only to real, actual, earnest, and vital controversy Controversy is justiciable when it refers to matter which is appropriate for court review; pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law Courts cannot rule on “political questions” – questions which are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom (v. legality) of a particular act or measure being assailed o “separation of powers” o However, Constitution expands the concept of judicial review – judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the branch or the part of any branch/ instrumentality of the Government • • •

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Standing to sue Legal standing or locus standi – personal/ substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of governmental act that is being challenged “interest” – an interest in issue affected by the decree Citizen – acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened concrete injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government o E.g. taxpayer – when it is shown that public funds have been illegally disbursed Member of the Senate or of the House has legal standing to question the validity of the Presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriations bills SC may, in its discretion, take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing o E.g. calling by the President for the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metro •

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When to raise constitutionality

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xxx at the earliest possible opportunity – i.e. in the pleading it may be raised in a motion for reconsideration / new trial in the lower court; or in criminal cases – at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal in civil cases, where it appears clearly that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision, and in cases where it involves the  jurisdiction of the court be low

Necessity of deciding constitutionality where the constitutional question is of paramount public interest and time is of the essence in the resolution of such question, adherence to the strict procedural standard may be relaxed and the court, in its discretion, may squarely decide the case where the question of validity, though apparently has become moot, has become of paramount interest and there is undeniable necessity for a ruling, strong reasons of public policy may demand that its constitutionality be resolved •

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Test of constitutionality … is what the Constitution provides in relation to what can or may be done under the statute, and not by what it has been done under it. o If not within the legislative power to enact o If vague – unconstitutional in 2 respects ! Violates due process ! Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions o Where there’s a change of circumstances – i.e. emergency laws Ordinances (test of validity are): o It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute o It must not be unfair or oppressive o It must not be partial or discriminatory o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade o It must be general and consistent with public policy o It must not be unreasonable •

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Effects of unconstitutionality It confers no rights Imposes no duties Affords no protection Creates no office In general, inoperative as if it had never been passed 2 views: o Orthodox view – unconstitutional act is not a law; decision affect ALL o Modern view – less stringent; the court in passing upon the question of unconstitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution; decisions affects parties ONLY and no judgment against the statute; opinion of court may operate as a precedent; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute • • • • • •

Invalidity due to change of conditions Emergency laws It is deemed valid at the time of its enactment as an exercise of police power It becomes invalid only because the change of conditions makes its continued operation violative of the Constitution, and accordingly, the declaration of its nullity should only affect the parties involved in the case and its effects applied prospectively • • •

Partial invalidity General rule: that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced Exception – that when parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest – such as in the case of Tatad v Sec of Department of Energy and Antonio v. COMELEC  •

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ALBA v EVANGELISTA 100 PHIL 683 DOCTRINE: It must be shown that the statute violates the constitution clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in

the mind of the court. The court presumes that every statute is valid. FACTS:

- President appoints Alajar as Vice-- Mayor of City of Roxas, but later designates Alba in his stead as Vice-- Mayor. Alajar institutes quo warranto in CFI that (a) He was appointed as Vice, (b) That there existed no vacancy, (c) No legal cause for removal • CFI claims that the petitioner was entitled to remain in office. - Alba appealed but in the meantime Alajar prays for immediate ‐

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execution of judgement and is granted. Writ though was not executed because Alba brought the matter to the superior courts. • Writ then is ordered null and void because CFI lost  jurisdiction. - In the exercise of the power, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 603 on April 11, 1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the

President (section 8, article II, Republic Act No. 603).

- Alba argued that section 2545 of the RAC w/c provides: “Appointment of City Officials. – The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . .”, be declared incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law”, because the two provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconciliable. RULING:

- The replacement of Alajar is not removal but an expiration of his tenure. Under Sec. 8, no fixity of tenure is provided. Hence, officer when the office is held at the pleasure of President, power of removal is exercisable by his discretion as well. - A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign function of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. - The legislative intent of Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. - It is an established rule that when the law authorizes a superior

officer to remove a subordinate at pleasure his discretion in the exercise of the power of removal is absolute. As long as the removal is effected in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, it may not be declared invalid by the courts, no matter how reprehensible and unjust the motives of the removal might be - This presumption is based upon the theory of separation of powers which makes the enactment and repeal of laws exclusively a legislative function. - As Chief Justice Marshall said: “It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. -It should be remembered in this connection that before a legislature passes a bill, it is presumed that it has decided the measure to be constitutional; and when the executive approves that bill it is also presumed that he has been convinced of its validity. - Under these conditions, therefore, if a statute is reasonably suspectible of two interpretations, one making it unconstitutional and other valid, it is the duty of the court to adopt the second construction in order to save the measure. - WHEREFORE: Alba has no right to continue office. Concepcion J, Concurring Term - time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right Tenure - Represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office

MORFE v MUTUC 22 SCRA 424 DOCTRINE: In the absence of a factual foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely "on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the

presumption of validity must prevail. Courts can review on legality not wisdom of the act. Facts: - The required periodical submission does not violate due process as it - The Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is not an oppressive exercise of police power. which aimed to prevent public officials and employees from committing - Due process is freedom from arbitrariness. acts of dishonesty and foster morality in public service. - To prevent a public office inherently decorated with the temptations - The Act provides for certain procedures in the pursuit of its goal, one to heed the call of greed and avarice from abuse is not arbitrariness. of which is the declaration of the official’s or employee’s assets and - Police power is the power to promote general welfare and public liabilities through a “true detailed and sworn statement” upon interest, in the course of which a curtailment of liberty is entailed. assumption of office and “within the month of January of every other - In this case, the police power is to promote morality in public service. year thereafter.” Curtailment of liberty is allowable in view of this end, and for as long - Herein petitioner, as a government official, filed a petition challenging as due process is observed (investigation, hearings, etc.) the constitutionality of the said provision. The lower court ruled in favor - Ermita-Malate Hotel Case: The permissible scope of regulatory of the petitioner, declaring the provision unconstitutional. measure is wider when the liberty curtailed affects the right to - Herein defendant appealed. property, rather than freedom of mind and of person. * Right to privacy, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizure, Arguments: - Plaintiff: The provision as a requirement is oppressive and and prohibition against self-incrimination are not invaded. unconstitutional.Corruption among officials and employees is *Right to privacy presumed and cannot be trusted to desist from committing corrupt - Rational Relationship: the end sought and the means employed have practices. rational relationship. - Defendant: Upon assumption of public office and until such time as Right to privacy is NOT unconstitutionally intruded upon. he continues to discharge public trust, a government official is deemed *Right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give the information “Every man is under obligation to give testimony…only under judicial about his personal affair. The public life of an employee cannot be sanctions.” segregated from his private life. *Prohibition from self-incrimination Issues: - No constitutional provision shall protect a man’s conduct from judicial - WON the periodical submission “within the month of January of every inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice. other year thereafter” of sworn statements of assets and liabilities of - An insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public an official or employee violates due process being an oppressive officials? THIS IS AN INQUIRY INTO THE WISDOM OF THE LAW, exercise of police power; which the Court is not in the position to decide. - WON this requirement unlawfully invades the constitutional right to - Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the privacy, unreasonable searches and seizure, and prohibition against action taken may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as self-incrimination it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and Ruling/Ratio: - The provision is CONSTITUTIONAL. The decision of the lower court confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. is thus reversed. -There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if - Statutes enjoy the presumption of validity. on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary

would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions.

-The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.

2. When statutes, regulations and ordinances take effect Civil Code, Art. 2

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a) 1987 Admin Code, Book I, Chapter 5, Sec. 18

When Laws Take Effect.  Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided. ‐

1987 Admin Code, Book VII, Section 2-9 Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book:

(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. (2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. (3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person. (4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. (5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing. (6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any character other than an agency. (7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes. (8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges. (9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. (10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. (11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license. (12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. (13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. (14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing. 1. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof. Section 3. Filing. -

(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective

fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.

Section 5. Publication and Recording . - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:

(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. -

(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of

the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified

rules. Section 9. Public Participation. -

(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. RA 7160, Sec 54-59 Section 54. Approval of Ordinances. -

(a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. (b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it. (c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the punong barangay. Section 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. -

(a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sanggunian panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing. (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted. (c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned. Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils. (b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision.

(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken. (d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. Section 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. -

(a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances. (b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved. (c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected. Section 58. Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances or Resolutions. - Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or any resolution approving the local

development plan and public investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee concerned. Section 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. -

(a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned. (b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof. The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting. (c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated. (d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation. When laws take effect Art 2 CC - “xxx laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country” o The effectivity provision refers to all statutes, including those local and private, unless there are special laws providing a different effectivity mechanism for particular statutes Sec 18 Chapter 5 Book 1 of Administrative Code Effectivity of laws o default rule – 15-day period o must be published either in the OG or newspaper of general circulation in the country; publication must be full The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” – solely refers to the 15-day period and not to the requirement of publication •

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When Presidential issuances, rules and regulations take effect The President’s ordinance power includes the authority to issue EO, AO, Proclamations, MO, MC and general or specific orders Requirement of publication applies except if it is merely interpretative or internal in nature not concerning the public 2 types: o Those whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation or to fill in the details of a statute; requires publication o Those which are merely interpretative in nature or internal; does not require publication Requirements of filing (1987 Administrative Code): o Every agency shall file with the UP Law Center 3 certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within 3 months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party/ persons • • •

•

When local ordinance takes effect Unless otherwise stated, the same shall take effect 10 days from the date a copy is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipality or barangay hall, AND in at least 2 other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned The secretary to the Sangguinian concerned shall cause the posting not later than 5 days after approval; text will be disseminated in English or Tagalog; the secretary to the Sangguinian concerned shall record such fact in a book kept for that purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting Gist of ordinance with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the respective province concerned; if NO newspaper of general circulation in the province, POSTING shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the Sanggunian of origin is situated For highly urbanized and independent component cities, main features of the ordinance, in addition to the posting requirement shall be published once in a local newspaper. In the absence of local newspaper, in any newspaper of general circulation o Highly urbanized city – minimum population of 200,000 and with latest annual income of at least 50M Php •

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Statutes continue in force until repealed Permanent/ indefinite – law once established continues until changed by competent legislative power. It is not changed by the change of sovereignty, except that of political nature Temporary – in force only for a limited period, and they terminate upon expiration of the term stated or upon occurrence of certain events; no repealing statute is needed •

•

Territorial and personal effect of statutes All people within the jurisdiction of the Philippines •

TANADA v TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 DOCTRINE: Facts:

- Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. - Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause “unless otherwise provided” Ruling:

1. The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. 2. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. 3. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the

legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to "ill in the details of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Rationale:

1. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code

 YAOKASIN v COMMISSIO NER OF CUSTOMS 180 SCRA 591 DOCTRINE: Administrative rules not needed to be published if applied for particular persons or internal administration. petitioner presented a sales invoice from the Jordan Trading of Iloilo to FACTS:

On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. The

prove that the sugar was purchased locally. The District Collector of Customs, however, proceeded with the seizure of the bags of sugar. Furthermore, petitioner objected to the enforcement of Customs

Memorandum Order No. 20-87, upon which the automatic review of decisions by the Commissioner of Customs was based. Accordingly, such issuance was not published in the Official Gazette ISSUE: Whether or not administrative issuances are considered laws which require publication in the Official Gazette for their effectivity. RULING: It depends. Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the Official Gazette, does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 which is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the customs collectors. Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and

Distribution of the Official Gazette) enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette besides legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines. Executive and administrative orders and proclamations, shall also be published in the Official Gazette, except such as have no general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors). It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK UNION v VEGA GR No. 105364 DOCTRINE: For effectivity clauses provided with specific dates, it will take effect immediately upon approval. proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became FACTS:

- In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits. - On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. - Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. - In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation

effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992. HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.

REPUBLIC v PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. GR No. 173918 DOCTRINE: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid

delegation. FACTS:

On October 10, 1984 the government created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF).The Office of Energy Affairs (now DOE), informed Pilipinas Shell that their foreign exchange risk charge was insufficient: 1.) On December 4, 1991 – for the period December 1989 to March 1990:P14, 414, 860. 75; 2.) On December 9, 1991 – for the period April 1991 – October 1991: P10, 139, 526. 56.They also charged surcharges of:1)P11, 654, 782.31,2)P 2, 806, 656. 65 pursuant to MOF CIRCULAR No. 1-85, as amended by DOF 2-94:2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under SECTION 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 made not later than the 20th  of the month following the month of remittance of the foreign exchange payment of the import or themonth of payment to thte domestic producers in case of locally produced crude. Period after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of 15% of theamount, id paid within 30 days from due date, plus 2% per month if paidafter 30 days.Pilipinas Shell justified its calculations pursuant to a valid interpretation of theMOFs but nonetheless paid the principal amount of its underpayment: P24,554, 387. 31 but not the surcharges.DOE required Shell to pay the surcharges subject to proceeding againstShell’s Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit.Shell appealed to the Office of the President.The Office of the President affirmed DOE.CA reversed the Office of the President, MOF CIRCULAR 1-85 as amended wasineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. 3) Even if the Circular was issued before the effectivity of The AdministrativeCode of 1987, Book 7, Chapter 2, SECTION 3 specifies that rules already inforce at the date of effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 must befiled within 3 months from the effectivity of the code. ISSUE: WON the MOF CIRC 1-85 was effective?

HELD: No RATIO: Shell did not waive the requisite publication and filing of MOF

CIRC 1-85 by paying the principal amount of its underpayment. Citing Tanada V. Tuvera (1986) , SC enunciated that publication isindispensible in order that statures, including administrative rules that areintended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force andeffect:We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local applicationand private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a differenteffectivity date is fixed by the legislature.Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orderspromulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powerswhenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, atpresent, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuantalso to a valid delegation. (Emphasis provided.)Publication and filing are safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakersand as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and toinformation on matters of public concern, and therefore, require compliance. Citing: National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms V.Energy Regulatory Board (2006), SC emphasized that both publicationand filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws aremandatory for the effectivity of said issuances:Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the GRAMImplementing Rules was published in the Official Gazette or in anewspaper of general circulation.Significantly, the effectivity clauses of both the GRAM and ICERAImplementing Rules uniformly provide that they shall take effectimmediately.These clauses made no mention of their publication in either the OfficialGazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.Moreover, per the Certification dated January 11,

2006 of the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), the said implementingrules and regulations were not likewise filed with the said office incontravention of the Administrative Code of 1987.Applying the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v. Tuvera , the Court haspreviously declared as having no force and effect the followingadministrative issuances: (1.) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of HealthMinistry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding theaccreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; (2.) Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to thenational government; (3.) Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration regulating the recruitment of domestic helpersto Hong Kong; (4.) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by thePhilippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications forimportation from the Peopleâ #™s Republic of China; (5.) Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by theDepartment of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials andemployees; and (6.) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which providedfor the schedule of placement and documentation fees for privateemployment agencies or authority holders.In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned thereinwere uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with theNational Administrative Register.On the other hand, in

Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc ,the Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of the NationalTelecommunications Commission had not become effective despite thefact that it was filed with the National Administrative Register becausethe same had not been published at the time.The Court emphasized therein that publication in the Official Gazette ora newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non beforestatutes, rules or regulations can take effect.In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declaredineffective as the same was never published or filed with the NationalAdministrative Register.To show that there was compliance with the publication requirement,respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact thatparties, particularly the distribution utilities and consumer groups, wereduly notified of the public consultation on the ERC’s proposedimplementing rules.These parties participated in the said public consultation and evensubmitted their comments thereon. However, the fact that the parties participated in the publicconsultation and submitted their respective comments is notcompliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAMImplementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose purposeis to enforce or implement existing law, must be published inthe Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes ismandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in thiscase, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments. (Emphasis provided.) DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED. CA is AFFIRMED

3. Manner of computing time Civil Code, Art. 13

When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a) •

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Where a statute requires the doing of an act within a specified number of days, such as ten days from notice, it means ten calendar days and NOT ten working days E.g. 1 year from Oct. 4, 1946 is Oct. 4, 1947 If last day falls on a Sunday or holiday, the act can still be done the following day Principle of “exclude the first, include the last” DOES NOT APPLY to the computation of the period of prescription of a crime, in which rule, is that if the last day in the period of prescription of a felony falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the information concerning said felony cannot be filed on the next working day, as the offense has by then already prescribed PNB v CA 222 SCRA 134

WEEK 7 DAYS Note:

1) Notices of sale under Section 3 Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118 on extra judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage are required to be posted for not less that twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated 2) If property is worth more than 400, such notices shall be published once a week for atleast three consecutive weeks in a news paper of general circulation in the municipality or city Facts:

1) Epifanio dela Cruz mortgaged to PNB 2 parcels of land and PNB allegedly unlawfully foreclosed the property 2) PND consolidated ownership unto himself and sold the parcels to third party 3) PNB claims that the foreclosure, consolidation of ownership and sale to third party were all valid

4) PNB counterclaims for damages and other equitable remedies 5) 3 promissory notes were signed in exchange for the 2 parcels located at Bunlo, Bocaue Bulacan with Torrens titles (no. 16743 area of 3,109 sqm.; no. 5787 around 610 sqm.)—stood a residential commercial building 6) Lots were under the common names of the Epifanio dela Cruz, his brother Delfin and his sister Maria 7) Promissory notes were as follows: a) For P12,000 dated September 2, 1958 payable within 69 days (date of maturity—Nov. 10, 1958) b) For P4000,dated Sept. 22, 1958 payable within 49 days (date of maturity—Nov. 10, 1958) c) For P4000 dated June 30, 1958 and payable within 120 days (date of maturity—Nov, 10, 1958)

8) Sept 6, 1961-Atty Ramon delos Reyes (PNB) presented under ACT NO. 3135 a foreclosure petition (sheriff‘s office, malolos Bulacan) 9) October 20, 1961—two lots were sold or auctioned off with PNB as the highest bidder for P28,908.46 10) March 7, 1963—sheriff leopoldo Palad executed Final Deed of Sale 11) January 15, 1963—certificate of sale in favor of PNB executed by Palad 12) March 19, 1963—final Deed of Sale registered in the Bulacan Registry of Property 13) Plaintiff did not buy back the land—June 4, 1970—land was sold to Conrado de Vera and Marina de Vera in a !deed of conditional sale" LOWER COURT: dismissed instant complaint against PNB. Counterclaim against Epifanio dela cruz was also dismissed for the Court does not believe that the complaint had been made in bad faith. $  Not satisfied with judgment plaintiff appealed the case presenting alleged errors in the decision of the lower court Decision of CA: construed the publication of the notices on March 28, April 11 and 12, 1969 as a fatal announcement—reversed the  judgment appealed from— dec lared void, inter alia, the auction sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the final deed of sale and the consolidation of ownership Reasons:

1) The notices of sale requirements were not met—published on March 28 (Friday) , april 11 (Friday) and April 12, 1969(Saturday) (requirement: notice of auction sale be !published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks") 2) Rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure must be strictly complied with, and that even the slight deviations from therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale atleast null and void 3) It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a  jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a

notice of sale will render the notice insufficient and vitiate the sale 4) Therefore, the court had no choice but to declare the auction sale as absolutely void in view of the fact that the highest bidder and purchaser in said auction sale was defendant-appellee bank. 5) The Certificate of Sale, the Final deed of sale and affidavit of consolidation are likewise of no legal effect COMPUTATION OF TIME ACCORDING TO PNB:  There was no breach of the proviso since after the first publication on March 28, 1969, the second notice was published on April 11, 1969 (last day of the second week) while the third publication on April 12, 1969 (announced as first of next week) - It is enough that the second publication be made on the day within the second week and the third publication, on any day within the third week - This refers only to the dates of publication and not that there was non-compliance with the publication requirement PRIVATE RESPONDENT:

- Believes that the period between each publication must never be less than seven consecutive days COURT:

- Erroneous impression that the day on which the first publication was made, or on MArch 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code - Conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what a !week" is - Term was interpreted to mean a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days (Moreno, Philippine Law dictionary) - A WEEK MEANS SEVEN DAYS INLCUSIVE OF DAY OF PUBLICATION - Therefore first week must cover March 28-April 3, second week april 4-april 10 and third week from april 11-16.—cannot be equated with compliance with law DECISION OF SC: The petition for certiorari and intervention are hereby dismissed and the decision of the CA dated April 17, 1991 is hereby affirmed

VIR-JEN v NLRC 15 SCRA 347

Where a statute requires the doing of an act within a specified number of days, such as ten days from notice, it means ten calendar days and NOT ten working days solution to NSB DECISION: VirJen shipping and Marine Services Inc, to pay the following complainant seamen who have not withdrawn the case: solve ITF problems (while in Australia, ITF controlled port) a) Earned wages from 16 to 19 April 1979 5) Due to !threat and intimidation" petitioner replied on March 24, b) Wages corresponding to unexpired portion of their contract as 1979 proposing an increase of 25% on basic pay plus special adjusted by the company on 1 mar 1979 compensation for the particular voyage c) Adjusted representation allowances 6) March 26, 1979: petitioner wrote to NSB denouncing the conduct of d) Vacation pay- % month‘s pay after 6 months of service and % private respondents—demands amounting to $3,096.50/ month month‘s pay after completion of 1 year contract 7) Because of conduct and breach of contract Kyoei Tanker Co Ltd.; e) Tanker service bonus—1/2 month‘s pay Terminated the manning contract in a letter dated April 4, 1979 f) Earned overtime pay for 1 to 19 april 1979 effective April 17, 1979 $  Secretariat of NSB directed to issue within 5 days from receipt of 8) April 6, 1979: petitioner wrote to NSB to ask permission to cancel decision the necessary clearances to the suspended seamen. manning contract with petitioner on April 17, 1979 9) April 10, 1979: NSB through Exec Dir. Cresencio C. Dayao, wrote Facts: 1) Private respondents have a manning contract for 1 year with petitioner authorizing it to cancel the manning contract petitioner (representing principal Kyoei Tanker Co Ltd.) 10) Seamen disembarked in Japan and repatriated to the Phils 2) Manning contract approved by NSB 11) Seamen filed complaint with NSB for illegal dismissal and non3) Petitioner and respondents executed side contract to pay ITF rates payment of wages when it calls on any ITF controlled foreign port , private respondents 12) NSB found the termination justified would return to petitioners the amount paid to them (just to satisfy TF 13) Seamen appealed to NLRC and it reversed the decision of NSB requirements) and required payments demanded by seamen—termination without 4) March 23, 1979: one of private respondents sent a cable to valid cause petitioner demanding 50% increase in wages as the best and only Thus this petition:

Issues:

1) Respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion in said NSB case nos. 2250-79 and 225279 in the following reasons: a) When it adjudged the petitioner Vir-jen liable to the respondentsseamen for terminating its employment contracts despite authority from NSB b) When it concluded that there is nothing on record to show that seaman made any threat that they would complain or report to ITF their low wage rates if their demand or proposal was not met c) When it concluded that the respondent-seamen acted within their rights when they imposed upon their employer their demands for salary and wage increase in disregard of existing manning contracts d) When it failed and refused to admit and take into account the Addendum agreement dated December 27, 1978-to enlighten NLRC on the ITF problem e) When it ordered the petitioner to pay the respondents their wages and other bonuses f) In still including ROMEO ACOSTA as beneficiary when in fact he already signed statement of satisfaction of judgment g) Because the NSB decision became final and executor for failure of aid respondents to serve on the petitioner a copy of their APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL within ten (10) days reglementary period for appeal and even after the expiration of said period SOLICITOR GENERAL’s CLAIMS

1) Private respondents‘ conduct was uncalled for, while workers are free to ask for wage increase, they should not use threat or such nature and in such situation as to put the employer at their complete mercy and with no choice but to accede to their demands 2) There was a valid justification of the part of the petitioner and or its principal to terminate the manning contract SC RULINGS

July 9, 1980: said decision received by respondents July 23, 1980- filed memorandum of appeal (14 days after) $  Article 223 of Labor Code: appeals should be made within 10 days

from receipt of decision—this meaning calendar days and not working days $  The law has commanded that labor cases be promptly if not preemptorily dispose of $  Verily, the Minister of Labor has no legal power to amend or alter in any material sense whatever the law itself unequivocally specifies or fixes $  Acosta should not have been included as beneficiary since he already signed satisfaction of judgment $  Article 12 of Labor code- duty of the state to protect the good name of the Philippines abroad and duty of the NSB to secure the best possible terms and conditions of employment for seamen $  All manning contracts should be approved by the NSB and it cannot be altered without approval of NSB $  recognizes rights of seamen to seek high wages but it could not however use threat and intimidation or force $  Powers of NLRC in relation to the works and actuations of the NSB is only appellate according to Article 20 read in relation to Article 223, over questions of law, since as to factual matters, it may exercise such appellate jurisdiction only !if errors in the findings of fact are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. $  General practice is to have side contracts(issue of bad faith)—the said contracts are not meant at all to alter or modify the contracts approved by the NSB—they are purported to enforce them to the letter, making it clearer that even if the ships have to call at ITF controlled ports, the same shall remain to be the real and binding agreement between the parties in intentional disregard of whatever the ITF may extract. WHEREFORE: petition herein is GRANTED. Decision of the NLRC complained hereby is SET ASIDE, the decision of the NSB should STAND. No costs.

CIR v AICHI GR No. 184823 DOCTRINE:

- The CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents within which to grant or deny the claim for refund/credit of input vat. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. - A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process. - As between the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. - The phrase “within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund” under Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.

Facts:

Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially granted respondent’s claim for refund/credit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a “condition precedent” before a judicial claim can be filed. The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section

112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In support thereof, respondent cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that “if the CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the CIR.” Issues: 1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period 2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the  judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior filing of an administrative claim, and violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies Held: 1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc (G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,

2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s administrative claim was timely filed. 2. Yes. We find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature. Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has “120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit],” within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR . However, if after the

120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days . Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that “any VATregistered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales.” The phrase “within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund” refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc. is inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of input VAT. The premature filing of respondent’s claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.

G. Application of Statutes Constitution, Article III, Section 22 : No ex post facto law  or bill of attainder  shall be enacted. Ex post facto law – After the fact; an act or fact occurring after some previous related act Bill of Attainder – A bill of attainder is a legisla tive act which inflicts punishment w ithout trial. Its essence is th e substitution of a legislative for

a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bill of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. Civil Code, Article 4 – Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. 1987 Administrative Code, Section 19 - Prospectivity. Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided Revised Penal Code, Article 22 – Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a

felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Art 62 of this code, although at the time of publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Prospective and retroactive statutes, defined Prospective – o operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statute takes effect o looks and applies to the future. Retroactive – o Law which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past. o A statute is not made retroactive because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage. •

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Laws operate prospectively, generally It is a settled rule in statutory construction that statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the intendment of the legislature is to give them a retroactive effect, expressly declare or necessarily implied from the language used. •

Presumption against retroactivity

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Presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. In case of doubt: resolved against the retroactive operation of laws If statute is susceptible of construction other than that of retroactivity or will render it unconstitutional- the statute will be given prospective effect and operation. Presumption is strong against substantive laws affecting pending actions or proceedings. No substantive statute shall be so construed retroactively as to affect pending litigations.

Words or phrases indicating prospectivity Indicating prospective operation: o A statute is to apply “hereafter” or “thereafter” o “from and after the passing of this Act” o “shall have been made” o “from and after” a designated date “Shall” implies that the law makes intend the enactment to be effective only in future. Statutes have no retroactive but prospective effect: o “It shall take effect upon its approval” o Shall take effect on the date the President shall have issued a proclamation or E.O., as provided in the statute •

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Retroactive statutes, generally The Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of retroactive statutes which do not impair the obligation of contract, deprive persons of property without due process of law, or divest rights which have become vested, or which are not in the nature of ex post facto laws. Statutes by nature which are retroactive: o Remedial or curative statutes o Statutes which create new rights o Statute expressly provides that it shall apply retroactively o Where it uses words which clearly indicate its intent •

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STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT

Penal statutes, generally Penal laws operate prospectively. Art. 21 of the RPC provides that “no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. Provision is recognition to the universally accepted principle that no penal law can have a retroactive effect, no act or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed. Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis – there is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law. • • •

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Ex post facto law

Constitution provides that no ex post facto law shall be enacted. It also prohibits the retroactive application of penal laws which are in the nature of ex post facto laws. Ex post facto laws are any of the following: o Law makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such act o Law which aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was, when committed o Law which changes the punishment & inflicts a greater punishment than that annexed to the crime when committed o Law which alters the legal rules of evidence, authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense o Law which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful o Law which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or proclamation of amnesty. Test if ex post facto clause is violated: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take from an accused any right vital for protection of life and liberty? Scope: applies only to criminal or penal matters It does NOT apply to laws concerning civil proceedings generally, or which affect or regulate civil or private rights or political privilege Bill of attainder Constitution provides that no bill of attainder shall be enacted. Bill of attainder – legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial Essence: substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt Serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining the legislature to rule-making & thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of judicial functions. History: Bill of Attainder was employed to suppress unpopular causes & political minorities, and this is the evil sought to be suppressed by the Constitution. How to spot a Bill of Attainder: o Singling out of a definite minority •

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Imposition of a burden on it A legislative intent o retroactive application to past conduct suffice to stigmatize Bill of Attainder is objectionable because of its ex post facto features. Accordingly, if a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is also an ex post facto law. o o

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When penal laws applied retroactively Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused. Art.22 of RPC “penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 Art 62 of the Code , although at the time of the application of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. This is not an ex post facto law. Exception to the general rule that all laws operate prospectively. Rule is founded on the principle that: the right of the state to punish and impose penalty is based on the principles of justice. Favorabilia sunt amplianda, adiiosa restrigenda – Conscience and good law justify this exception. Exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity and accepted by science. 2 laws affecting the liability of accused: o In force at the time of the commission of the crime – during the pendency of the criminal action, a statute is passed ! reducing the degree of penalty ! eliminating the offense itself ! removing subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the civil liability ! prescription of the offense such statute will be applied retroactively and the trial court before the finality of judgment or the appellate court on appeal from such judgment should take such statute in consideration. o Enacted during or after the trial of the criminal action Exceptions to the rule: o When accused is habitual delinquent o When statute provides that it shall not apply to existing actions or pending cases General rule: An amendatory statute rendering an illegal act prior to its enactment no longer illegal is given retroactive effect does not apply when amendatory act specifically provides that it shall only apply prospectively. • •

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Statutes substantive in nature Substantive law o creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for administration of public affairs. o that part of law which creates, defines & regulates rights, or which regulates rights or duties which give rise to a cause of action o that part of law which courts are established to administer o when applied to criminal law: that which declares which acts are crimes and prescribe the punishment for committing them o Cannot be construed retroactively as it might affect previous or past rights or obligations Substantive rights o One which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Cases with substantive statutes: •

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Effects on pending actions Statutes affecting substantive rights may not be given retroactive operation so as to govern pending proceedings. •

Qualification of rule A substantive law will be construed as applicable to pending actions if such is the clear intent of the law. To promote social justice or in the exercise of police power, is intended to apply to pending actions As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the law as it exists at the time of the decision of the appellate court, where the statute changing the law is intended to be retroactive and to apply to pending litigations or is retroactive in effect This rule is true though it may result in the reversal of a judgment which as correct at the time it was rendered by the trial court. The rule is subject to the limitation concerning constitutional restrictions against impairment of vested rights • • •

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Statutes affecting vested rights A vested right or interest may be said to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons, as a present interest The right must be absolute, complete and unconditional, independent of a contingency A mere expectancy of future benefit or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws does not constitute a vested right Inchoate rights which have not been acted on are not vested •

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A statute may not be construed and applied retroactively under the following circumstances: o if it impairs substantive right that has become vested; o as disturbing or destroying existing right embodied in a judgment; o creating new substantive right to fundamental cause of action where none existed before and making such right retroactive; o by arbitrarily creating a new right or liability already extinguished by operation of law Law creating a new right in favor of a class of persons may not be so applied if the new right collides with or impairs any vested right acquired before the establishment of the new right nor, by the terms of which is retroactive, be so applied if: o it adversely affects vested rights o unsettles matter already done as required by existing law o works injustice to those affected thereby

Statutes affecting obligations of contract Any contract entered into must be in accordance with, and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of execution. Such law forms part of, and is read into, the contract even without the parties expressly saying so. Laws existing at the time of the execution of contracts are the ones applicable to such transactions and not later statutes, unless the latter provide that they shall have retroactive effect. Later statutes will not, however, be given retroactive effect if to do so will impair the obligation of contracts, for the Constitution prohibits the enactment of a law impairing the obligations of contracts. Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties necessarily impairs the contract itself A statute which authorizes any deviation from the terms of the contract by postponing or accelerating the period of performance which it prescribes, imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or dispensing with those which are however minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon the contract, impairs the obligation, and such statute should not therefore be applied retroactively. As between two feasible interpretations of a statute, the court should adopt that which will avoid the impairment of the contract. If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by a subsequent legislation. A law by the terms of which a transaction or agreement would be illegal cannot be given retroactive effect so as to nullify such transactions or agreement executed before said law took effect. •

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Repealing and amendatory acts Statutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate prospectively, unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect clearly appears. Although a repealing state is intended to be retroactive, it will not be so construed if it will impair vested rights or the obligations of contracts, or unsettle matters that had been legally done under the old law. Repealing statutes which are penal in nature are generally applied retroactively if favorable to the accused, unless the contrary appears or the accused is otherwise not entitled to the benefits of the repealing act. While an amendment is generally construed as becoming a part of the original act as if it had always been contained therein , it may not be given a retroactive effect unless it is so provided expressly or by necessary implication and no vested right or obligations of contract are thereby impaired. The general rule on the prospective operation of statutes also applies to amendatory acts • •

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STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT

Procedural laws The general law is that the law has no retroactive effect. Exceptions: o procedural laws o curative laws, which are given retroactive operation Procedural laws o adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion o they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer injustice o they include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence o Applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. o Remedial statutes or statutes relating to modes of procedure- which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of the rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. o A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions – those which have accrued or are pending. o Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not: o violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected; o nor constitutionally objectionable. Rationale:  no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. • •

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A person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure Curative statutes curative remedial statutes are healing acts they are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations the rule to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with Limitations of rule remedial statutes will not be given retroactive effect if to do so would impair the obligations of contract or disturb vested rights only administrative or curative features of the statute as will not adversely affect existing rights will be given retroactive operation the exception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is a remedial or curative statute which is enacted as a police power measure Statutes of this type may be given retroactive effect even though they impair vested rights or the obligations of contract, if the legislative intent is to give them retrospective operation Rationale: The constitutional restriction against impairment against obligations of contract or vested rights does not preclude the legislature from enacting statutes in the exercise of its police power •

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Police power legislations as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate certain activities, are applicable not only to those activities or transactions coming into being after their passage, but also to those already in existence Rationale: the non-impairment of the obligations of contract or of vested rights must yield to the legitimate exercise of power, by the legislature, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people Any right acquired under a statute or under a contract is subject to the condition that it may be impaired by the state in the legitimate exercise of its police power, since the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereign power is deemed read into every statute or contract as a postulate of the legal order •

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Statutes relating to prescription General rule: a statute relating to prescription of action, being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after its effectivity. In other words, such a statute is both: o prospective in the sense that it applies to causes that accrued and will accrue after it took effect, and o retroactive in the sense that it applies to causes that accrued before its passage However, a statute of limitations will not be given retroactive operation to causes of action that accrued prior to its enactment if to do so will remove a bar of limitation which has become complete or disturb existing claims without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon Statutes relating to appeals The right to appeal from an adverse judgment, other than that which the Constitution grants, is statutory and may be restricted or taken away A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural in nature and applies to pending actions in which no judgment has yet been promulgated at the time the statute took effect. Such statute, like other statutes, may not however be construed retroactively so as to impair vested rights. Hence, a statute which eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment rendered in a case final and unappealable, destroys the right to appeal a decision rendered after the statute went into effect, but NOT the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected before the passage of the law, for in the latter case, the right of the appellant to appeal has become vested under the old law and may not therefore be impaired. Stature shortening the period for taking appeals is to be given prospective effect and may not be applied to pending proceedings in which  judgment has already bee n rendered at the time of its enactm ent except if there’s clear legisla tive intent. •

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PEOPLE v SUMILANG

G.R. No. L-49187 (December 18, 1946) DOCTRINE: Procedural laws are retrospective if pending. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions

pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings guerilla. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner.

FACTS: •

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The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, both the CA and the SC affirmed the sentence of the lower court. Based on the records, a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner’s attorney. However, the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he was already hiding in the

ISSUE:

W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted. HELD: •

No. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of

their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that

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extent. TIU SAN v REPUBLIC

DOCTRINE: Expressed intent to take effect in pending cases. FACTS: •

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Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of naturalization on June 3, 1953 by the court dueto his conviction on April 25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of Lucena, Quezon that occurredduring the intervening two years from promulgation of the decision for naturalization dated July 13, 1950pursuant to R.A. No. 530. The petitioner alleged that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1 clause (3), thisprovision is not applicable to the case at bar since the violation of the aforementioned ordinance occurredprior to the enactment of the said R.A. No. 530. ISSUE:Should R.A. 530 be given retrospective effect? OR whether the conviction of an applicant for naturalization for violation of a municipal ordinance would disqualify him from taking his oath as a citizen. DECISION:Yes. By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with reference to the date of the hearing of the petition fornaturalization, the said Act was meant to have a retrospective operation. This section of the Act provides: This

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Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the oath of citizenship.. Statute: An applicant may be allowed to take his oath as a citizen after 2 years from the promulgation of the decision granting his petition for naturalization if he can show that during the intervening period “he has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government rules” Held: law did not make any distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita. Conviction of the applicant from violation of municipal ordinance is comprehended within the statute and precludes applicant from taking his oath. The illegal timberyard is still present up to time of promulgation.

CHAVEZ v COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS 9 SCRA 412 (1963) DOCTRINE: Amendment does not give successional right especially if it impairs a substantive right. Facts: Aquilino de los Reyes bought of a parcel of Riceland with the cultivate the land himself personally …”. Issue: Can R.A. No. 2263 be applied retroactively? intention of working it himself but he could not take possession of the Decision: NO. Republic Act 2263 cannot be applied retroactively. land because the then incumbent tenant, Pablo Chavez, did not want

to surrender the land to its new owner. According to Pablo Chavez his son Eugenio Chavez was working the land for him, he was 74 years of age already. - Aquilino de los Reyes filed a petition with this Court against Pablo Chavez asking for authority to dispossess said tenant but suit was dismissed. - Then, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility) on October 21, 1958. When he died the law governing tenant and landowner relation is Republic Act No. 1199. Under this statute the tenancy relationship between the petitioner Chavez and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death. - On April 8, 1959 Eugenio Chavez filed a petition, this time R.A. No. 1199 was amended by R.A. No. 2263. Unlike R.A. No. 1199, he amendment provides for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant’s death or incapacity “between the landholder and one member of the tenant’s immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall

- Since the law in force on October 21, 1958, when the tenant Pablo Chavez died, was Republic Act 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act 2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner any successional right to continue as tenant. - In Ulpiendo v. CAR the Court ruled that “The amendment to section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263 providing for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant’s death or incapacity “between the landholder and one member of the tenant’s immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally …” which took effect on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied retroactively.” To hold otherwise would lay open this particular provision of the law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already become vested.

CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT CO. v COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 20563 (October 29, 1968) DOCTRINE: A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the

express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. Tax laws operate prospectively, whether they enact, amend, or repeal. taxes. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the FACTS: Court of Tax Appeals. The case involves petitioner's claim for refund of sales tax paid Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by from November 1954 to March 1955, and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to September 1956 from the sale of APO respondent are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June Portland cement produced by petitioner. 1955), producers of cement are exempt from the payment of said tax. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise. Since 1952, however, petitioner had been protesting the ISSUE: imposition of the sales tax on its APO Portland cement, and on Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively. January 1953, it also protested the payment of the ad valorem •

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HELD: •

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A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.

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While the purpose of the amendment, as mentioned in the explanatory note to the bill, was not only to "accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt of the tax-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms,". It certainly could not have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated transactions between the taxpayer and the Government.

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A statute operates prospectively and never retroactively, unless contrary is made manifest by the legislative intent either expressly or by necessary implication. Doubt must be resolved against retroactivity. Nothing in the statute shows the legislative intent for retroactive effect. The use of the word “shall” shows that it was intended for future effect. Congress discussions made no mention of the taxes previously collected Tax laws operate prospectively, whether they enact, amend, or repeal

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-28774 (February 28, 1980) DOCTRINE: Curative statutes apply retroactively. FACTS: •

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The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing project for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20 years. However, the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of Lands, the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for registration by the DBP. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light of the then Sec. 13 of RA 85. However, without the knowledge of the DBP, a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP, were segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation

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whatsoever to the title. Then, RA 3147 was enacted, amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85), among which was Sec. 13.

ISSUE:

W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. 13 of RA 85, by RA 3147. HELD: •

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Yes. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147, by amending Sec. 13 of RA 85, was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. It is, therefore, a curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC.

TAC’AN v COURT OF APPEALS DOCTRINE: Contracts are construed at the time they were entered into. A repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect when substantive statute

was existing at the time the contract was entered into. FACTS: •

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March 1960: Atty. Felipe G. Tac-An represented brothers Eleuterio and Maximino Acopiado, accused of frustrated murder and theft of large cattle in Mun. Court of New Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte April 4, 1960: a “Deed of Quitclaim” was created by Tac-An, which states that the borthers were to convey to him a parcel of land (3 hectares) as his fees for representing them; it was acknowledged before a notary public 2 days after: the brothers told Tac-An that they were terminating his services because their wives and parents did not agree with the conveyance of the land; but he continued to represent them Acquitted and dismissed for frustrated murder and theft, respectively April 2, 1961: Eleuterio sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-An to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario, who did not take possession of the same June 1964: Tac-An appointed Irineo Villejo as his overseer in the land July 2, 1964: Tac-An secured approval of Governor of Zamboaga del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim o Approval revoked on April 12, 1965

Oct. 7, 1964: filed a complaint against the brothers, Paghasian, and Libetario (CFI of ZDN) for him to be declared owner of the land and the subsequent sale be annulled CFI decided in favor of Tac-An CA voided the transfer of land to Tac-An o It applied Sec 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu (because the brothers were Non-Christians but Subanons) o States that no contract shall be made with non-Christian tribes for the payment or delivery of money or any real property, unless it is executed before a judge of a court of record, justice or auxiliary justice of the peace, or notary public, and it must bear the approval of the provincial governor o Contracts made in violation are null and void Hence, present petition Petitioner argues that since the revocation was made after the complaint was filed, it cannot affect his right to the land which has already vested He also argues that Admin Code of Mindanao and Sulu was repealed by RA No. 4252 on June 19, 1965, hence the approval was not even necessary ISSUE: W/N RA No. 4252 has retroactive effect HELD: No. RATIO: •

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During the material times of the case, 1) when the deed was executed, 2) when the approval of the governor was given and revoked, the Administrative Code of the Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect

•

The said Admin Code was substantive in nature; the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect

EUGENIO v DRILON

G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) DOCTRINE: If there is expressed intent for a law to have retroactive effect, it will apply even in contracts. The intent of the statute is the law. FACTS: Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 •

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Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree", the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondent's purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses.

saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations. ISSUE:

W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD:

No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. "The intent of the statute is the law."

ALUNAN III v MIRASOL FACTS: •

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Sec 423 of the LGC of 1991 ( took effect Jan. 1, 1992) provides for an SK in every barangay (chairman, 7 members, secretary, treasurer) Sec 532(a): first election shall be held 30 days after the next local election 1st local election under the code: May 11, 1992 SK elections scheduled for Sept 30, 1992 (postponed), then Dec. 4, 1992 through a COMELEC resolution (which also placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG) Sept. 18, 1991: DILG, through then Sec. Alunan III issued a letter-resolution exempting City of Manila from holding elections for SK on the ground that the elections held on May 26, 1990 for Kabataang Barangay (precursor of SK) were to be considered the first under the code (conducted bet. Jan 1, 1988 and Jan 1, 1992 under BP 337) Private respondents, claiming to represent members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a paetition in the RTC of Manila to set aside the DILG decision

•

RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents, ordered petitioners to desist from implementing the DILG order and to perform the specified pre-election activities Petitioners went to the SC, insisting that because the City of Manila already had an election on May 26, 1990, it was exempted from holding elections on Dec. 4, 1992, citing LGC, Sec. 532(d) o Stated that elections held for the kabataang barangay conducted under BP 337 bet. Jan 1, 1988 and Jan 1, 1992 shall be considered as the 1st election under the Code

Petitioners argue: said provision should apply to elections conducted before the effectivity of the code ISSUE: W/N Sec. 532(d) has retroactive effect HELD: Yes. RATIO: o

Sec 532(d) is a curative law. It was enacted to validate an act done in the past  which otherwise would be invalid under existing laws. Thus, it has retroactive effect

SUBIDO, JR v SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: •

• •

o

Filed July 28, 1995 (but dated July 17, 1995) : petitioners Bayani Subido, Jr. (then a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation BID) and Rene Parina (then a BID Special Agent) were charged with Arbitrary Detention o They allegedly issued and implemented a warrant of arrest for one James J. Maksimuk on June 25, 1992, even as the BID decision requiring Maksimuk’s deportation has not yet become final and executory o He was detained for 43 days Aug. 28, 1995: arraignment was scheduled Aug. 28, 1995: petitioners filed a Motion to Quash because according to them, in view of the effectivity of RA 7975

o

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offense and the accused.

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At the time the case was filed, Subido was already a private person, having been separated from the service on Feb. 28, 1995 and because Parina does not have a salary grade of “27” (i.e. none of them fall under the categories in Sec. 4 of RA 7975)

They also argued that Arbitrary Detention did not fall under “Crimes Committed by Public Officers” of the RPC but under “Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State,” hence not covered by RA 7975 o The case should have been filed with the RTC of Manila o They also contend that penal laws should not be given retroactive application if they are unfavorable to the accused (RPC 22) Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash. 2 nd motion for reconsideration denied. Hence, present petition o

(provided for the reorganization of the Sandiganbayan; amended PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan) on May 16, 1995, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over both the

Said RA should be given prospective application

ISSUE: W/N RA 7975 should be applied retroactively to the case HELD: Yes. RATIO: •

•

The alleged commission of the crime happened 1 year, 10 months, and 21 days before RA 7975 took effect Thus, Sec 4 of PD 1606, prior to the amendment, contains the applicable provisions o states that offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for 6 years are within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction

prescribed penalty for their case is prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) o plus, it was committed while they were in performance of their official functions RA 7975 is not a penal law but a procedural law o Penal laws: laws that prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation Procedural laws: prescribes rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice o

•

ZULUETA v AIA BREWERY

prescribed in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,

FACTS: •

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Zulueta is a dealer and operator of an outlet selling Asia Brewery’s beer Mar. 30, 1992: Zulueta filed before the Iloilo RTC a complaint against AB for breach of contract, specific performance and damages July 7, 1994: AB filed with Makati RTCa complaint for the collection of a sum of money (P463,107.75) corresponding Zulueta’s debt to AB Jan. 3, 1997: Zulueta moved for the consolidation of the cases Feb. 13, 1997: Makati RTC, through Judge Parentala, granted the motion May 19, 1997: AB’s motion for recon was denied Aug. 18, 1997: AB filed before the CA a petition for certiorari

CA set aside the RTC’s rulings, on the ground that the two cases do not have a common issue of law (Iloilo case deals with W/N AB breached its dealership contract while the Makati case deals with Zulueta’s indebtedness) Hence, present petition Petitioner argues that the Makati RTC’s orders consolidating the cases could no longer be assailed because the CA petition for certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary 60-day period

which took effect on July 1, 1997

May 23, 1997: AB received the order denying the motion for recon (60 days after = July 22, 1997, but filed CA petition on Aug 18) Reglementary period before the 1997 Rules was 90 days (90 days after = Aug. 21) ISSUE: W/N 1997 Revised Rules should apply retroactively to the case HELD: Yes. Petition for certiorari was filed late; RTC decision reinstated. •

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RATIO:

General rule: laws have no retroactive effect Remedial or procedural laws are exceptions because they don’t create new or take away vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights They may apply to cases pending at the time of their passage Although the period for filing the petition was shortened, AB was not deprived of that right o There are no vested rights to rules of procedure o 90-day limit was not a vested right; it was merely a discretionary prerogative of the courts Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Rules, AB’s lawyers still had 21 days to file • •

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REPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: •

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April 19, 1995: A 3,497 sq. m. property of respondent Fe Manuel located in Tejeros, Rosario, Cavite was declared by the National Historical Institute as a historical landmark (Resolution No. 2) o This is in line with the Centennial Celebration of Phil. Independence; gov’t embarked on several commemorative Centennial Freedom Trail projects Dec. 4, 1997: government (thru National Centennial Commission) filed a complaint for expropriation against Fe Manuel and Metrobank (bec. the land was mortgaged by Fe to Metrobank and was extrajudicially foreclosed by Metrobank on Nov. 20, 1997) May 27, 1998: Cavite RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action (1) No prior determination by the Pres. As to the necessity/wisdom of the exercise of the right of eminent domain (2) No prior written authority for the Solicitor General to institute the expropriation case June 3, 1998: petitioner received a copy of the RTC decision June 17, 1998: republic filed a motion for recon

• •

•

•

Oct. 6, 1998: motion for recon denied Oct. 12, 1998: copy of the order denying the motion received by republic Dec. 11, 1998 : republic filed petition for certiorari before the CA

Mar. 15, 1999: CA dismissed petition for having been filed out of time o CA applied Sec 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on Sept 1, 1998 o

Provides that the 60-day period shall be counted from the receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution;

60-day period will be interrupted if motion for recon is filed. If denied, the respondent may file certiorari within the remaining  period ! 60 days from June 3, 1998: Aug. 2 ! But since motion for recon was filed on June 17, 1998 (after 14 days), respondent has 46 days left (after Oct. 12, 1998) or until Nov. 27, 1998 o

•

Before: 60-day period shall be counted from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration

! 60 days from Oct. 12, 1998: Dec. 11, 1998 Jan 13, 2000: CA denied motion for recon

• •

Hence, present petition Republic argues that the CA should not have applied the

amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on Sept. 1, 1998 ISSUE: W/N the amendment should be given retroactive affect HELD: Yes. But the said rule reverted to its original on Sept. 11,

2001.

from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration

Under this rule, the petitioner filed the certiorari on the 60th day from receipt of the order denying its motion for recon Since the amending rule is procedural or remedial in character, it does not create new or remove vested rights and can therefore be applied retroactively •

RATIO: Sept. 11, 2001: A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC took effect, which again provided that the 60-day period shall be counted •

H. Amendment, Revision, Codification and Repeal Civil Code, Article 7

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. When the laws declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. 1987 Administrative Code, Sections 21 and 22 Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not

be thereby revived unless expressly so provided. Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed . - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise. AMENDMENT !

Power to Amend $ The legislature has the authority to amend, subject to constitutional requirements, any existing law. $ Authority to amend is part of the legislative power to enact, alter and repeal laws. $ The SC in the exercise of its rule-making power or of its power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend or change the law, such authority being the exclusive to the legislature.

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How amendment effected $ Amendment – the change or modification, by deletion, alteration, of a statute which survives in its amended form. $ The amendment of a statute is effected by the enactment of an amendatory act modifying or altering some provisions of a statute either expressly or impliedly. $ Express amendment – done by providing in the amendatory act that specific sections or provisions of a statute be amended as recited therein or as common indicated, “to read as follows.”

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Amendment by implication $ Every statute should be harmonized with other laws on the same subject, in the absence of a clear inconsistency. $ Legislative intent to amend a prior law on the same subject is shown by a statement in the later act that any provision of law that is inconsistent therewith is modified accordingly. $ Implied Amendment- when a part of a prior statute embracing the same subject as the later may not be enforced without nullifying the pertinent provision of the latter in which event, the prior act is deemed amended or modified to the extent of repugnancy. When amendment takes effect $ 15 days following its publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation, unless a date is specified therein after such publication.

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How amendment is construed, generally $ Statute and amendment – read as a whole $ Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the original statute has been repealed and a new independent act in the amended form had been adopted. $ Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originally enacted in it amended form. $ Read in a connection with other sections as if all had been enacted in the same statute, as if all had been enacted in the same statute. $ Where an amendment leaves certain portions of an act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they have before the amendment. $ Where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained either literally or substantially Meaning of law changed by amendment

An amended act should be given a construction different from the law prior to its amendment, for its is presumed that the legislature would not have amended it had not it not wanted to change its meaning. $ Prior to the introduction of the amendment, the statute had a different meaning which the amendment changed in all the particulars touching which a material change in the language of the later act exists. $ Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory act different from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law or in its meaning. Amendment Operates Prospectively $ An amendment will not be construed as having a retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided or the legislative intent to give it a retroactive effect is necessarily implied from the language used and only if no vested right is impaired. Effect of Amendment on Vested Rights $ After a statute is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to the amendment or to obligations that were contracted under the prior act and such rights and obligations will continue to be governed by the law before its amendment. $ Not applied retroactively so as to nullify such rights. $

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Effect of amendment on jurisdiction $ Jurisdiction of a court to try cases is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted. $ Jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally decided therein.

REVISION AND CODIFICATION !

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Generally $ Purpose: to restate the existing laws into one statute and simplify complicated provisions, and make the laws on the subject easily found. Construction to harmonize different provisions $ Presumption: author has maintained a consisted philosophy or position. $ The different provisions of a revised statute or code should be read and construed together. $ Rule: a code enacted as a single, comprehensive statute, and is to be considered as such and not as a series of disconnected articles or provisions. What is omitted is deemed repealed $ all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise $ Reason: revision or codification is, by its very nature and purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on the subject and an expression of the whole law thereon, which thereby indicates intent on the part of the legislature to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are not reproduced in the revised statute or code. $ Possible only if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject to is a complete and perfect system in itself. $ Rule: a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute. $ When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provision of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. Change in phraseology $ It is a well settled rule that in the revision or codification of statutes, neither an alteration in phraseology nor the admission or addition of words in the later statute shall be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts. $ Words which do not materially affect the sense will be omitted from the statute as incorporated in the revise statute or code, or that some general idea will be expressed in brief phrases. $ If there has been a material change or omission, which clearly indicates an intent to depart from the previous construction of the old laws, then such construction as will effectuate such intent will be adopted. Continuation of existing laws. $ A codification should be construed as the continuation of the existing statutes. $ The codifiers did not intend to change the law as it formerly existed. $ The rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or the placing of portions of what formerly was a single section in seprate sections, does not operate to change the operation, effect of meaning of the statute, unless the changes are of such nature as to manifest clearly and unmistakably a legislative intent to change the former laws.

REPEAL !

Power to repeal $ Power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to enact one. $ The legislature cannot in and of itself enact irrepealable laws or limit its future legislative acts.

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Repeal, generally $ Repeal: total or partial, express or implied $ Total repeal – revoked completely $ Partial repeal – leaves the unaffected portions of the statute in force. $ A particular or specific law, identified by its number of title, is repealed is an express repeal. $ All other repeals are implied repeals. $ Failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws, latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal. $ Repealed only by the enactment of subsequent laws. $ The change in the condition and circumstances after the passage of a law which is necessitated the enactment of a statute to overcome the difficulties brought about by such change does not operate to repeal the prior law, nor make the later statute so inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it.

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Repeal by implication $ Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. $ There must be a sufficient revelation of the legislative intent to repeal. $ Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest $ General rule: the latter act is to be construed as a continuation not a substitute for the first act so far as the two acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment. $ Two categories of repeals by implication % Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict and the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier. % If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.

Irreconcilable inconsistency $ Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable repugnancy between two laws takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized and both cannot be given effect, once cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. $ Implied repeal – earlier and later statutes should embrace the same subject and have the same object. $ In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. $ It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to exist that is be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. $ the fact that the terms of an earlier and later provisions of law differ is not sufficient to create repugnance as to constitute the later an implied repeal of the former. ! Implied repeal by revision or codification $ Revised statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail and whatever is excluded there from shall be discarded. Must be intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself in order that the prior statutes or part thereof which are not repeated in the new statute will be deemed impliedly repealed !

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Other forms of implied repeal $ The most powerful implication of repeal is that which arises when the later of two laws is expressed in the form of a universal negative. $ There is a clear distinction between affirmative and negative statutes in regard to their repealing effects upon prior legislation. % Affirmative statute does not impliedly repeal the prior law unless an intention to effect a repeal is manifest, % A negative statute repeals all conflicting provisions unless the contrary intention is disclosed. $ Legislative intent to repeal is also shown where it enacts something in general term and afterwards it passes another on the same subject, which though expressed in affirmative language introduces special conditions or restrictions % The subsequent statute will usually be considered as repealing by implication the former regarding the matter covered by the subsequent act. $ The express repeal of a provision of law from which an executive official derives his authority to enforce another provision of the same law operates to repeal by implication the latter and to deprive the official of the authority to enforce it. $ The enactment of a statute on a subject, whose purpose or object is diametrically opposed to that of an earlier law on the same subject which thereby deprives it of its reason for being, operates to repeal by implication the prior law, even though the provisions of both laws are not inconsistent.

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“All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly,” construed. $ Nature of repealing clause % Not express repealing clauses because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. % A clause, which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter. % The presumption against implied repeal and the rule on strict construction regarding implied repeal apply ex proprio vigore. % Legislature is presumed to know the existing law so that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it.

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Repeal by implication not favored $ Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and, accordingly, against implied repeal $ Legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. $ A construction which in effect will repeal a statute altogether should, if possible, be rejected. $ In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has impliedly repealed a prior law on the same subject, the doubt should be resolved against implied repeal.

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As between two laws, one passed later prevails $

Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later statute repeals prior ones which are not repugnant thereto.)

Applies even if the later act is made to take effect ahead of the earlier law. As between two acts, the one passed later and going into effect earlier will prevail over one passed earlier and going into effect later. General law does not repeal special law, generally $ A general law on a subject does not operate to repeal a prior special law on the same subject, unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the later general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law. $ Presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws, one is special and the other general and this applies even though the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter covered by the special statute. $ Generalia specialibus non derogant – a general law does not nullify a specific or special law $ The legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of the particular case. $ Reason why a special law prevails over a general law: the legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of the particular case. $ General and special laws are read and construed together, and that repugnancy between them is reconciled by constituting the special law as an exception to the general law. $ General law yields to the special law in the specific law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter. $ Applies irrespective of the date of passage of the special law. When special or general law repeals the other. $ There is always a partial repeal where the later act is a special law. Effects of repeal, generally $ Appeal of a statute renders it inoperative as of the date the repealing act takes effect. $ Repeal is by no means equivalent to a declaration that the repealed statute is invalid from the date of its enactment. $ The repeal of a law does not undo the consequences of the operation of the statute while in force, unless such result is directed by express language or by necessary implication, except as it may affect rights which become vested when the repealed act was in force. On jurisdiction, generally $ Neither the repeal nor the explanation of the law deprives the court or administrative tribunal of the authority to act on the pending action and to finally decide it. $ General rule: where a court or tribunal has already acquired and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation repealing the statute which originally conferred  jurisidiction. $ Rule: once the court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction until the final determination of the case and it is not affected by subsequent legislation vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal admits of exceptions. $ Repeal or expiration of a statute under which a court or tribunal originally acquired jurisdiction to try and decide a case, does not make its decision subsequently rendered thereon null and void for want of authority, unless otherwise provided. $ In the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, the expiration or repeal of a statute does not render legal what, under the old law, is an illegal transaction, so as to deprive the court or tribunal the court or tribunal of the authority to act on a case involving such illegal transaction. $ Where a law declares certain importations to be illegal, subject to forfeiture by the Commissioner of Customs pursuant to what the latter initiated forfeiture proceedings, the expiration of the law during the pendency of the proceedings does not divest the Commissioner of Customs of the jurisdiction to continue to resolve the case, nor does it have the effect of making the illegal importation legal or of setting aside the decision of the commissioner on the matter. %

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On jurisdiction to try criminal case

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Once a jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally determined. A subsequent statute amending or repealing a prior act under which the court acquired jurisdiction over the case with the effect of removing the courts’ jurisdiction may not operate to oust jurisdiction that has already attached.

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On actions, pending or otherwise $ Rule: repeal of a statute defeats all actions and proceedings, including those, which are still pending, which arose out of or are based on said statute. $ The court must conform its decision to the law then existing and may, therefore, reverse a judgment which was correct when pronounced in the subordinate tribunal, if it appears that pending appeal a statute which was necessary to support the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal.

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On vested rights $ repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that accrued and became vested under the statute before its repeal. $ The statute should not be construed so as to affect the rights which have vested under the old law then in force, or as requiring the abatement of actions instituted for the enforcement of such rights. $ Rights accrued and vested while a statute is in force ordinarily survive its repeal. $ The constitution forbids the state from impairing, by enactment or repeal of a law, vested rights or the obligations of contract, except in the legitimate exercise of police power. On contracts $ Where a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said law will not affect the terms of the contract nor impair the right of the parties thereunder.

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Effect of repeal of tax laws $ Rule favoring a prospective construction of statutes is applicable to statutes which repeal tax laws. $ Such statute is not made retroactive, a tax assessed before the repeal is collectible afterwards according to the law in force when the assessment or levy was made.

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Effect of repeal and reenactment $ Simultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does not affect the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption. $ The repeal of a penal law, under which a person is charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same act done by him under the old law, will not preclude the accused’s prosecution, nor deprive the court of the jurisdiction to try and convict him. Effect of repeal of penal laws $ Where the repeal is absolute, so that the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed. $ Where the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated. $ That a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence, persons, charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal. $ Repeal of a statute which provides an indispensable element in the commission of a crime as defined in the RPC likewise operates to deprive the court of the authority to decide the case, rule rests on the same principle as that concerning the effect of a repeal of a penal law without qualification. $ Reason: the repeal of a penal law without disqualification is a legislative act of rendering legal what is previously decreed as illegal, so that the person who committed it is as if he never committed an offence $ Exception: % where the repealing act reenacts the statute and penalizes the same act previously penalized under the repealed law, the act committed before reenactment continues to be a crime, and pending cases are not thereby affected. % Where the repealing act contains a saving clause providing that pending actions shall not be affected, the latter will continue to be prosecuted in accordance with the old law.

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Distinction as to effect of repeal and expiration of law $ In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and the stigma of conviction of an accused for violation of the penal law before its repeal is erased.

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Effect of repeal of municipal charter  $ The repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and puts an end to the functions of the incumbents. $ The conversation of a municipality into a city by the passage of a charter or a statute to that effect has the effect of abolishing all municipal offices then existing under the old municipality offices then the existing under the old municipality, save those excepted in the charter itself.

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Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of 

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When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby revived unless expressly so provided Where a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will have no effect of repealing the former statute, the former or old statute continues to remain in force. SARCOS v. CASTILLO

G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969) This case explains why legislative purpose to determine legislative intent Frankfurter o Legislative words are not inert but derived vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed o Legislation – working instrument of government and not merely as a collection of English words Benjamin Natham Cardozo o Legislation is more than a composition o It is an active instrument of government which means that laws have ends to be achieved Holmes o Words are flexible o The general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down o Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law where those words import a policy that goes beyond them DOCTRINE: The deliberate selection of language other than that used in an earlier act is indicative that a change in the law was intended. When dealing with elective posts, the necessity for restricted construction is greater. We must look at the legislative intent of the whole law. suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967. FACTS: HELD: Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, No. Sec. 2188 provides that the provincial governor can was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. order preventie suspension if the charge against a municipal official was one affecting his official integrity. Under RA The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct 5185, it is the provincial board which has been granted the in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner power. with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension timber or logs for their own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. was vested on the Provincial Board. Petitioner answered that he merely used the money for the The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations sale of police uniforms. by vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. It also grants And on the basis of such administrative complaint, Petitioner local governments greater freedom. was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the Decentralization Act of l967. preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor. Mayor of Barobo is therefore reinstated and Provincial Board is Sec. 2188 of RAC provides for the power of the provincial enjoined in the disposition of peitioner’s administrative governor to investigate complaints and inflict punishment complaint. against municipal officers for maladministration of office and final judgement of any crime involving moral turpitude. RA 5185 repeals previous law • •

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ISSUE:

W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive MECANO v COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992) DOCTRINE: Repeal of statute by implication is not favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably

inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. FACTS: June 22, 1990 – Director Lim forwarded Mecano’s claim Antonio Mecano is a Director II of NBI who was hospitalized (thru 1st Endorsement) to the Secretary of Justice together for cholecystitis in less than two weeks from which he with the comment and recommendation of Chief, LED of the incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total NBI. Finding Mecano’s illness to be service-connected, the amount of which he is claiming from COA. Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of Mecano’s May 11, 1990 – thru a memo to Director Lim of NBI, Mecano claim. requested for reimbursement for his expenses on the November 21, 1990 – in a 4 th Endorsement, the then Usec ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Sec. 699 of RAC: “In case of sickness caused by or connected directly Bello of Justice Department returned Mecano’s claim to with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Director Lim having considered the statements of COA Department head may in his discretion authorize the Chairman that the RAC 1917 being relied upon by payment of the necessary hospital fees.” Mecano was repealed by the Administrative Code of •

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1987.

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In response, Mecano re-submitted his claim to Director Lim with the copy of Opinion No. 73 of then Sec. of Justice Franklin Drilon stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code of 1987 aid not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the RAC, the particular Sec. 699 of RAC. May 10, 1991 – Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Usec Bello for favorable consideration. July 2, 1991 – Sec. Drilon forwarded Mecano’s claim to the COA Chairman. January 16, 1992 – COA Chair Domingo denied Mecano’s claim on the ground that Sec. 699 of RAC has been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not re-stated nor reenacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He

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commented that the claim may be filed with ECC considering that the illness of Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987. February 7, 1992 – Usec Montenegro returned Mecano’s claim to Director Lim with the advice that Mecano may elevate the matter to Supreme Court if he so desires.

RULING:  No. The enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987

did not operate to repeal the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The Repealing Clause indicated in Sec. 27 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal. Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the Old Code. There are several matters treated in the Old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Sec. 699 and still others. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. *PETITION GRANTED AND COA WAS ORDERED TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR BENEFITS. •

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CONTENTIONS: Petitioner:  Sec. 699 of RAC was not repealed by the

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Administrative Code of 1987 based on Opinion No. 73 of Sec. Drilon. In the event that his claim is filed in ECC, as suggested by COA, he would still not be barred from filing a claim under Sec. 699 of RAC. Respondent:

(2) The enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC of 1917. From the “whereas clauses” of the new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. (2) Employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by ECC’s Program under PD 626 such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government. ISSUE: Whether or not the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operates to repeal the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

Additional Info:

Two Categories of Implied Repeal: (1)Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. (2) If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.

US v SOLIMAN DOCTRINE: When a law which repeals a prior law by implication is itself repealed, the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law. Administrative Code which became effective on July 1, 1916. FACTS: •

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Soliman was charged with estafa; however, he filed sworn statement as evidence in support of the estafa case against him which was in effect and extrajudicial confession of guilt. He, however, contends that he was merely coerced by the police to submit the false testimony to certain material allegations of fact. He was acquitted for estafa on the ground that there was reasonable doubt whether the extrajuidicial confessions was made voluntarily but was still made liable for perjury. The trial court convicted him for the crime of perjury in accordance with Act No. 1697 and sentenced him to 6 months imprisonment and P300 fine. He contends that since his  judgement was rendered on No vember 23, 1915, section 3 of A ct 1697 has been expressly repealed by the enactment of the

Thus, the repeal of said law criminalizing his actions extinguishes his criminal responsibility. ISSUE: Whether or not the express repeal of Act No. 1697 by the Administrative Code extinguishes the criminal responsibillity of the accused? HELD: No. Provisions on perjury in Act. 2142 or Penal Code impliedly repealed by section 3 of Act No. 1697 are revived by the express repeal of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657). However, the penalty which should be imposed is that one which is more favorable to the convict. Thus, the penalty is reduced from six months imprisonment and P300 fine to a penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and a fine of P75.

LAGMAN v CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-23305 (June 30, 1966)

DOCTRINE: A special law and later enactment prevails. FACTS: •

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March 20, 1962 - Petitioner was granted a license of public convenience to operate 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers (Bocaue Bulacan to Paranaque) and freight under firm name “Marco Transit” and began operating 12 passenger buses along his authorized line. June 17, 1964 - The Municipal Board of Manila pursuant to Sec 18, RA 409 which authorizes the municipal board to regulate public vehicles within the city, establish bus terminals and regulate entrance of provincial utility vehicles into the city, enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled "An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and For Other Purposes." August 17, 1964 – Enforcement of ordinance and prevented petitioner from operating his buses except for 2 shuttle buses. Petitioner contends that ordinance is illegal as the roads which he was authorized to operate are national roads which according to CA No. 548 are subject to the regulation of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and not the municipal board.

Also, the power conferred by RA 409 does not include right to enact ordinance which amended or modified the certificate of public convenience granted by Public Service Commission. ISSUE:

W/N the enactment and enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. HELD: •

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CA No. 548 has already been repealed by Sec. 27 of RA 917. More importantly, RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. No. 548 and the Public Service Law, so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts. Moreover, the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic.

HAGAD v GOZODADOLE DOCTRINE: Repeals by implication are not favoured – every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform

system of jurisprudence. and were granted.

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Administrative complaints were filed to the Ombudsman against the Mayor, Vice Mayor and other officials of Mandaue City. The respondents contended that the Ombudsman do not have primary jurisdiction because the later enactment of the Local Government Code - which vests the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against local officials as well as to effect their preventive suspension with the Office of the President – and thus shifting the power to sanction investigations and preventive suspensions from the Ombudsman as provided in the Ombudsman Act. The respondents filed a preliminary writ of injunction in the RTC of Mandaue to prevent further investigation of the Ombudsman

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 is divested of

his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue of subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code HELD: No. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. They are not inconsistent or irreconcilable. The presumption is that the legislature have known the existing laws on the subject and not enacted conflicting statutes. The Local Government Code merely shifted the power from the Minister of Local Government to the Office of the President.

PEOPLE v PIMENTEL DOCTRINE: Where the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new

law, the previous offense is obliterated as this is favourable to the accused. FACTS: •

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1983: Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law) before the RTC of Manila o June 5, 1990: Arrested 7 years later June 14, 1990: he was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866 before the RTC of Makati July 16, 1990: his counsel filed a motion to quash the information filed in Makati RTC on the ground of double jeopardy o Contends that illegal possession of firearms and ammunition should be absorbed in the crime of Subversion Oct. 12, 1990: RTC granted motion to quash May 27, 1991: CA affirmed the RTC ruling Present petition: Petitioner contends double jeopardy

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not 1st and 2nd Information are for Subversion 2. Whether or not private respondent was placed in double jeopardy

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with the filing of Second Information for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion. HELD: •

Under PD 1866, Section 1 (1), the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm is the crime itself; subversion only increases

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the imposable penalty; therefore, it’s different from the act punishable under RA 1700, which is subversion itself He has not even been arraigned in the first criminal action for subversion The Information filed against Pimentel in violation of PD 1886 (Illegal Possession)does not charge him with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the same Information but simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation of Sec. 1 of PD 1866 was committed so as to qualify the penalty to death. There is only one offense charged in the information and it is clear from the title of the law. Previous charge of subversion is different and based on RA 1700. Subversion and illegal information can co-exist. Therefore, he could be charged under both laws No double jeopardy as requisites not complete. First case not yet convicted. HOWEVER, RA 1700 is totally repealed by RA 7636 on September 22, 1992. The latter governs as this action is still pending. The sentence no longer exists. Total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal. Offense of illegal possession is now bailable and has reduced

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penalty under RA 8294 enacted on 1997. The repealing law is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent; it should be given retroactive effect The repeal was categorical, definite, and absolute; there was no saving clause The legislative intent of totally abrogating the old anti-subversion law is clear

It would be illogical to try and sentence the accused for an offense that no longer exist; subversion is no longer a crime Punishable 6 yrs. Maximum; detained for more than 7 yrs; immediate release is in order  •

REPUBLIC v MARCOPPER MINING CORP. MAXIM: Interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi . Every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to

form a uniform system of jurisprudence. DOCTRINE: Repeal of laws by implication is not favoured and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. FACTS: Jan. 7, 1998: CA set aside the PAB order MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea o CA applied RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Mining disposal system for the period Oct. 31, 1985 to Oct. 21, 1986 Act), approved on Mar. 3, 1995) o Sec. 67: grants the mines regional director the power to issue MMC filed for extension before permit expired orders or to take appropriate measures to remedy any practice Sept. 20, 1986: National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) connected with mining or quarrying operations; Sec. 115: general ordered MMC to cease and desist from discharging mine tailings repealing clause into Calancan Bay o Prior to the passage of said Act, the PAC had jurisdiction to act But NPCC issued a new temporary permit dated Nov. 11, 1986, to on pollution-related matters in the mining business expire on Feb.10, 1987 o OSG argues that the Mining Act did not amend or repeal RA Feb. 5, 1987: MMC requested for extension of its temporary permit 3931 (June 18, 1964) as amended by PD 984 of 1976 June 10, 1987: NPCC was abolished and its powers were (National Pollution Control Decree of 1976) – where PAB has integrated into the Environmental Management Bureau and into the authority vested by EO 192 Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) o (EO 192 of 1987 created the PAB giving it adjudication powers April 11, 1988: DENR Secretary, as Chairman of PAB, directed over pollution cases under RA 3931 and PD 984) MMC to cease and desist from discharging mine tailings into Has the PAB under RA 3931 been divested of authority to try ISSUE: Calancan Bay and hear pollution cases connected with mining operations by virtue of Apr. 15, 1988: a telegraphic order was issued by the DENR USEC subsequent enactment of RA 7942? enjoining immediate compliance by MMC of the cease and desist HELD: order of Apr. 11 Provisions of RA 7492 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) do not MMC appealed the cease and desist orders to the Office of the repeal RA 3931 (National Pollution Control Decree of 1976) as President amended by PD 984 and EO 192. RA 7492 does not contain any May 2, 1988: Office of the Pres denied requests provision which categorically and expressly repeals the May 6, 1988: Partial Motion for Recon provisions of Pollution Control Law. There is also no implied May 13, 1988: granted repeal. PAB has power to issue, renew or deny permits for o With said order, the Office of the Pres ordered MMC to remit discharge of mine tailings. P30,000 a day starting May 13, 1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund Mines regional director in 7492 is complementary to Pollution (ETF) for the rehabilitation of the Calancan Bay; issued a TRO Adjudication Board in RA 3931. He has express administrative June 30, 1991: MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay and regulatory powers over mining operations and installations July 9, 1991: MMC filed a motion manifesting that it would but no adjudicative powers over complaints for violations of discontinue its deposits to the ETF pollution control statutes and regulations. Feb. 5, 1993: Office of the Pres dismissed MMC’s initial appeal, PAB has jurisdiction to act and rule on complaints on violation of affirmed the cease and desist order and lifted its TRO pollution laws. However, MMC must be declared not to have Jan. 22, 1997: Sta. Cruz, Marinduque Mayor Wilfredo Red informed arrears in deposits as ETF has sufficient funds to undertake the PAB that MMC stopped remitting rehabilitation. Apr. 23, 1997: PAB ruled that MMC’s obligation to remit subsists and since the order was lifted only on Feb. 5, 1993, its obligation stopped only then •

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CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO v REYES MAXIM: Expressio unius est esclusio alterius . Express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Franchise tax: RA 7160 – lgc repeal RA 3648, 2340 and pd 551(50% of 1% not 2% exempted) Implied repeal FACTS: Jan 1, 1992: RA 7160 or the LGC of 1991 took effect •

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Act No. 3648 granted the Escudero Electric Service Company legislative franchise to maintain and operate and electric light and power system in San Pablo and nearby municipalities o Sec 10 provides that the grantee shall pay unto the municipal treasury a tax equal to 2% of the gross earnings IN LIEU of any and all taxes of any kind Franchise transferred to MERALCO under RA 2340 Sept. 11, 1974: PD 551 was enacted; reiterated the tax provisions above, payable now to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Authorizes provinces and cities to impose a tax on business franchises at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts of the preceding calendar year Oct. 5, 1992: the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City enacted Ordinance No. 56 or the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo o Sec. 2.09 imposed a tax on business franchises of 50% of 1% of gross annual receipts o

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City Treasurer demanded from MERALCO (priv. resp.) payment of said franchise tax MERALCO paid “under protest” from 1994-1996 (P1,857,711.67) MERALCO filed before the RTC to declare Ordinance No. 56 null and void insofar as it imposes franchise tax and to claim for a refund Court ruled in favor of MERALCO o LGC did not expressly or impliedly repeal the tax exemption of MERALCO under its charter ISSUE: W/N the LGC repealed the provision on MERALCO’s charter regarding its tax exemption HELD: YES. o

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Sec. 151: Scope of taxing powers (rates) Sec. 193: Tax exemptions are hereby withdrawn Sec. 534 repeals city charters, among others, which are inconsistent with it It was an implied repeal (because it did not expressly state repealing RA 3648) Moreover, LGC expressly provides for those given the tax exemption: 1)local water districts, 2) cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, 3) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges • • •

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LGC Sec 137: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose tax… JUAN v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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Brgy. Talipapa, Novaliches, QC Brgy. Chairman Juan, and Kagawads de Jesus, Carreon, and Galguerra were charged with violation of Sec 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code o Juan and de Jesus allegedly used a VHF radio transreceiver owned by the Brgy. gov’t of Talipapa for their election campaigns o Carreon and Galguerra allegedly used a tricycle owned by the Brgy. gov’t of Talipapa for their political campaigns Apr. 3, 1997: RTC of QC issued an Order suspending all accused for 60 days CA upheld RTC order o Preventive suspension authorized under Sec. 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) Hence, present petition Petitioners insist that the RTC didn’t have jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases filed because the imposable penalty for the charges does not exceed 6 years

Under Sec. 2 of RA 7691, which amended BP 129, the first-level courts are the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the cases HELD: YES. o

RATIO:

Under Sec. 268 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) states that the RTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any criminal action for violation of the said Code, regardless of the penalty prescribed, except those relating to failure to register or vote (MTC or MeTC) Since the Omnibus Election Code is a special law, it must be construed as an exception to the general law (BP 129 as amended by RA 7691) Substantive: W/N their offense falls under RA 3019, and therefore would warrant suspension. Yes, because the Om. Election Code is a complement to RA 3019 •

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LAMBINO v COMELEC DOCTRINE: If a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. There is logrolling when the initiative petition incorporates

an unrelated subject matter in the same petition and this invalidates whole petition. Amendment changes a part of the Constitution without altering basic principles while revision constitutes an overhaul of the Constitution. FACTS: Petitioners appealed to the SC, opposed by various groups and Feb. 15, 2006: Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado (Lambino people Group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in change the 1987 Consti denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition HELD: NO. Aug. 25, 2006: filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to RATIO: ratify their petition under RA 6735 (Initiative and Referendum Act) The initiative petition does not comply with Sec 2 of Art. XVII of the o They alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with Consti on Direct Proposal by the People each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its o The draft of the proposed amendment should be ready and show registered voters; claimed that COMELEC had verified the to the people before they sign the proposal; the proposal must be signatures embodied in the petition; the people must know what they are signing Proposed changes will shift the Bicameral-Presidential system to a o There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of the text of the Unicameral-Parliamentary form of gov’t Lambino group’s proposed changes in the signature sheet that Proposed question: “DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF they passed around. ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, o Neither does the sheet say that the proposed changes are CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE attached to it. PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A o They never alleged in their petitions that they circulated printed UNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING copies of the draft petition with the signature sheets; only in their ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE reply to the interventions ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?” o Even if they did circulate it, they admitted that they printed only Aug. 31, 2006: COMELEC denied the petition due course for lack of 100,000 copies (10 signatures per signature sheet), nowhere an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the near the 6.3 M signatories Constitution o Those who signed could not have known the following changes: 1) Term limits on members of legislature will be lifted •

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2) Members of the interim parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office 3) The interim parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Consti The initiative violates Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Consti disallowing revision through initiatives o People’s initiative to change the Consti applies only to an amendment of the Consti and not to its revision o Amendment : change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved; piecemeal changes (like changing the voting age, adding a qualification for Constitutional offices, etc.) o Revision: a total overhaul of the Constitution; change that alters a basic principle in the Constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances; alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution o Quantiative test: asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous provisions

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reaching changes in the nature of the basic governmental plan Only Congress or a Constitutional Convention can propose both amendments and revisions (Three modes of amending (i.e. changing) the Constitution: 1) Through Congress, upon a 3/4 vote of all its Members 2) Through and ConCon 3) People’s intiative) Under both tests, the intiative is a revision 1) QUANTI: Art VI (Legislature) and Art VII (Executive), 105 provisions 2) QUALI: alters the basic plan of the government, from presidential to parliamentary, from bicameral to unicameral legislature; 3 co-equal branches reduced to 2; leg and exec merged; abolition of the Office of the President and one chamber of Congress Radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers People’s iniatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, are allowed to undertake only amendments and not revisions PETITION DENIED

KIDA v SENATE DOCTRINE: FACTS:

June 30, 2011: RA 10153 was enacted; it reset the ARMM elections from Aug. 8, 2011 to 2 nd Monday of May 2013, and every 3 yrs thereafter (to synchronize it with regular national and local elections) o Also granted the Pres the power to appoint OICs as Regional Gov, Regional Vice Gov, and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who will sit until the May 2013 elections Aug. 1, 1989: RA 6734 was enacted; An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the ARMM; plebiscite held on Nov. 6, 1990 (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi became ARMM) st o Scheduled the 1  regular elections between 60 and 90 days from the date of ratification Mar. 31, 2001: RA 9054 reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the 2nd Monday of Sept. 2001 o Ratified in a plebiscite on Aug. 14, 2001; Basilan and Marawi vited to join ARMM June 22, 2001: RA 9140 was passed, resetting the 1st regular elections from 2nd Monday of Sept. to Nov. 26, 2001 Sept. 21, 2004: RA 9333 was passed to reset the ARMM regional elections to 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same day every 3 years thereafter o Not ratified in a plebiscite Next elections, pursuant to RA 9333 should have been held on Aug. 8, 2011, but on June 30, 2011, RA 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013 Various petitioners filed various petitions against RA 10153’s constitutionality Sept. 13, 2011: SC issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of RA 10153, ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should the cases not be decided by the end of their term on Sept. 30, 2011 ISSUE: W/N RA 10153 is unconstitutional Petitioners contend that RAs 9140, 9333, and 10153 amend RA 9054 and should have complied with the supermajority vote (2/3) and plebiscite requirements under Sec. 1 & 3, Art. XVII of RA 9054 •

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House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately. Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision. - They also allege that 10153 failed to comply with the 3-reading

requirement - They also allege that 10153 violated the right of suffrage of the

people of ARMM - Challenge the President’s power to appoint OICs HELD: NO. RATIO: •

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Synchronization is a recognized constitutional mandate (as shown by Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution) President certified RA 10153 as urgent; exempted from 3 readings on 3 separate days Neither RA 9333 nor RA 10153 amends RA 9054; 9054 only provided for the schedule of the first ARMM elections; a need existed for the Congress to fix the date of subsequent elections; 9333 and 10153 did not change or revise any provision in 9054

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Even assuming that they did amend 9054, the supermajority vote requirement has to be struck down for giving 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the constitution demands o

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Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the

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The consti only requires that as long as majority of the members of the HOR or Senate are present, a quorum exists and with quorum, a majority vote is sufficient to enact laws The current Congress cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws; cannot bind the future legislature/generation to its present will Limits the repealing power of the Congress

The Plebiscite requirement of Sec. 3 of RA 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement of Sec. 18, Art. X of the Consti o

Consti states that plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces will be included

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Thus, only amendments or revisions constitutionally-essential to the organic act need a plebiscite (assuming the supermajority and plebiscite requirements are valid) a) Basic structure of the regional government b) Judicial system c) Legislative powers of the regional government Date of elections does NOT fall under these

With regard to the President’s power to appoint OICs o It was the best option considering that the other options are (1) holdover of current officials (will extend their terms 3-year terms; terms are specified in the Consti) and (2) special elections (COMELEC cannot simply hold special elections without an enabling law) Appointment is okay, since the appointing power is inherently •

III. The Constitution Constitution defined fundamental law which sets up a form of government and defines and delimits the powers thereof and those of its officers, reserving to the people themselves plenary sovereignty written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which a government for them is established permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to existing conditions but also to future needs basically it is the fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation absolute and unalterable except by amendments all other laws are expected to conform to it •

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Origin and history of the Philippine Constitutions 1935 Constitution •

People v. Linsangan – explained as to how this Constitution came about: •

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Tydings-Mcduffie Law- allowed the Filipinos to adopt a constitutions but subject to the conditions prescribed in the Act. o Required 3 steps: ! drafting and approval of the constitution must be authorized ! it must be certified by the President of the US ! it must be ratified by the people of the Philippines at a plebiscite 1973 Constitution o adopted in response to popular clamor to meat the problems of the country o March 16, 1967: Congress passed Resolution No.2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4, calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution 1987 Constitution o after EDSA Revolution o also known as the 1987 Charter

A. Purpose, Objective Primary purpose of constitutional construction primary task of constitutional construction is to ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of the constitution as expressed in its language purpose of our Constitution: to protect and enhance the people’s interests • •

Constitution construed as enduring for ages Constitution is not merely for a few years but it also needs to endure through a long lapse of ages WHY? Because it governs the life of the people not only at the time of its framing but far into the indefinite future it must be adaptable to various crisis of human affairs but it must also be solid permanent and substantial Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of the people (rich or poor) It must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time to be progressive and not static What it is NOT: o It should NOT change with emergencies or conditions o It should NOT be inflexible o It should NOT be interpreted narrowly Words employed should not be construed to yield fixed and rigid answers because its meaning is applied to meet new or changed conditions as they arise Courts should construe the constitution so that it would be consistent with reason, justice and the public interest • • • • • •

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NITAFAN v CIR 152 SCRA 284 (1987) DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

3 RTC-NCR judges are seeking to have the Court prohibit the respondents CIR and the FO of the SC from making any deductions in their salaries with withholding/income taxes

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They contend that pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, their salaries could not be decreased during their continuance in office and a tax corresponds to a decrease in income

Because in the 1973 Constitution, there was a particular provision that stated that: “No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.” (Sec. 6, Art. XV) This provision was removed from the 1987 Constitution ISSUE: W/N the taxing of their incomes are the decrease in income envisioned by the constitution HELD: YES. RATIO: The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. Deliberations: it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to Fr. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers Somehow, this clear intent was not clearly set forth by the provision Draft proposal of Sec. 10: “…their salary shall not be diminished nor •

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subjected to income tax”  •

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But the deliberations show that the Commissioners saw this as a violation of the principle of uniform taxation and equal protection Commissioner Rigos proposed to remove “nor subjected to income tax” (and change diminished to decreased)

Fr. Bernas proposed to add “but may be subject to general income tax” so as not to revert to the rulings in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia and Jugo vs. David, which upheld the tax exemption But after the suspension of the session, Fr. Bernas again announced that the provision will now read “During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.” but with the understanding that the 1973 provision on the non-granting of tax exemption will be replicated in the 1987 Constitution At any rate, it was finally approved, with the understanding that the Perfection and Endencia rulings will not apply The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution fundamental principle of constitutional construction: the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers

It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

GOLD CREEK MINING v RODRIGUEZ 66 PHIL 259 (1938) DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

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W/N the respondents can be compelled by the court to issue the patent license to the petitioner HELD: NO. •

Prior to Nov. 15, 1935 (when the 1935 Constitution took effect), GC applied for patent or title to a mining claim in Benguet, Mountain Province However, because the 1935 Constitution took effect on Nov. 15, 1935, the respondents Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce and Director of Bureau of Mines, refused to approve the application, issue the patent or title for the mining claim, and to prepare the necessary documents to be approved by the President, invoking Sec 1, Art. XII of the Constitution which states in part: o Natural resources, with the exception public agriculture land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years.

ISSUE:

RATIO: •

It should be borne in mind that constitutional provisions must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them

The location of the mining claim was perfected before the 1935 Constitution took effect Thus, as ruled in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia, a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from public domain The taking effect of the 1935 Constitution should not affect rights already fixed under it Thus, the mining claim does not fall under the prohibition of Sec 1 of Art 12 •

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CIR v GUERRERO 21 SCRA 180 (1967) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, B. Fernando for respondents. vs. ANTONIO G. GUERRERO, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS,

respondents.

L-19089

----------------------------G.R. No. L-19089

January 31, 1967

ANTONIO G. GUERRERO,  petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent. L-19074. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Atty. A. B. Afurong for petitioner. Venancio

Venancio B. Fernando for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General  Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant So licitor General F. R. Rosete and Atty. A. B. Afurong for respondent. CONCEPCION, C.J.:

These are two (2) appeals from the same decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. One (L-19074) was taken by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and the other (L-19089) by Antonio G. Guerrero. The dispositive part of said decision reads:

In line with the foregoing opinion, the decision appealed from is hereby modified. Petitioner (Antonio G. Guerrero) is ordered to pay the sum of P3,775.66 within thirty days from the date this decision becomes final. No pronouncement as to costs. (Emphasis ours.) Said Antonio G. Guerrero was, during the years 1949 and 1950, a dealer in logs, which he used to sell to the Aparri Lumber Company, hereinafter referred to as the company. On April 2, 1954, the then Collector of Internal Revenue made an assessment and demand requiring Guerrero to pay the sum of P4,014.91, representing fixed and percentage taxes and forest charges, as well as surcharges and penalties, in connection with his aforementioned business transactions with the company. Upon Guerrero's request, the matter was submitted to the Conference Staff of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which, in due course, thereafter, or on January 11, 1956, recommended that the assessment be increased to P5,139.17, computed as follows: C-14 producer's fixed tax for 1949 and 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5% sales tax on P18,760.20 (P14,377.92 & P4,382.28) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25% surcharge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vol. of timber, July 4, 1949 to May 21, 1950 (41,880 & 13,892) . . . Add: 40% for squaring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regular forest charges on 184.15 cu. m. at P3.50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300% surcharge for cutting without license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50% (x) surcharge for transporting without invoice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50% surcharge for discharging without permit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50% surcharge for late payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regular forest charges on 13.94 cu. m. at P3.50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300% surcharge for cutting without license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25% surcharge for transporting without invoice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25% surcharge for discharging without permit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25% surcharge for late payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In addition to the above amount, the sums of P20.00 and P100.00 as compromise penalties in extrajudicial settlement of his penal liabilities under sections 208 and 209 of the N.I.R.C. should be reiterated. That another sum of P50.00 as compromise penalty for his violation of the Bookkeeping Regulations should be imposed against the taxpayer, he having admitted during the hearing of this case that he did not keep books of accounts for his timber business. This recommendation was approved by the Collector of Internal Revenue, who, accordingly, made the corresponding reassessment upon receipt of notice of which Guerrero requested, on February 10, 1956, a rehearing before the Conference Staff. Instead of acting on this request, on April 20, 1956, the corresponding Internal Revenue Regional Director issued a warrant of distraint and levy against the properties of Guerrero, in order to effect the collection of his tax liabilities under said reassessment. Hence, on June 8, 1956, Guerrero filed with the Court of Tax Appeals the corresponding petition for review. Subsequently, said court rendered the decision appealed from. Hence, these appeals. There is no dispute as to the volume of sales of logs made by

Guerrero during the years 1949 and 1950, upon which the disputed reassessment is based. The only issues in these appeals are whether or not he is liable for the payment of: (1) P3,775.66, by way of forest charges and surcharges on the logs sold to the company, which the Court of Tax Appeals answered in the affirmative; (2) P1,192.51, by way of fixed and percentage taxes and surcharges as producer of said logs, which said court decided in the negative; (3) P668.36, as additional forest charges and sales taxes, as well as surcharges, which was decided by the trial court in favor of the taxpayer; and (4) P120.00 and P50.00 as compromise penalties for violation of Sections 208 and 209 of the Revised Internal Revenue Code and of the bookkeeping regulations, respectively, likewise, decided by the Court of Tax Appeals against the Government. With respect to the first item, Guerrero maintains that, he is not liable therefor because he bought the logs in question for the company, as agent thereof and with money belonging thereto. However, before the Conference Staff of the then Bureau of Internal Revenue, Guerero had: claimed that he financed his business with his own  money and sold the logs to the company on a commission basis. Moreover, he 20.00 admitted having sold some lumber to other   enterprises inP Manila, although he had previously asserted that he dealt exclusively with the 938.01 company. 234.50 Total for fixed and sales taxes and surcharges . . . . . . . . Upon the other hand, the auxiliary invoices presented before 55,772 Bd.the ft Bureau of Internal Revenue were either spurious, or referred to 22,309 "logs " involved Total other volumethan to bethose assessed . . . .in. . the . . . .disputed . . . . . . . .reassessment. . . . . . 78,081Thus," for " instance, record), or . . . .in. .exhibit . . . . . 8-AA . . . . . (O.R. . . . . . No. . . . .6578049, . . . . . . . .p.. . 82, . . BIR 184.15 cu.the m. word "June" was superimposed over the word "May" and, atPthe back 644.53 of Exhibit 8-AA-1 (p. 81, BIR record), which is the corresponding 1,933.59 invoice, two similar alterations were made. In the auxiliary invoices 322.26 Exhibits 00-3 and 00-4 (PP. 28-29, BIR record), submitted by Guerrero 322.26 to the Conference Staff, as Exhibits C-3 and C-4, his name is322.26 written on the space However, Forest(script), chargesin&ink, surcharges . . . . . opposite . . . . . . . .the . . .word . . . . .consignee". .. in the copies of said auxiliary invoices (Exhibits 8-R-2 and 8-S pp. 117 48.79 and 119, BIR record), taken from the company, the corresponding 146.37 space is blank . Again, the taxpayer's name on said Exhibits 00-3 and 12.20 00-4 is handwritten with a penmanship that is markedly different12.20 from that of Segundo Agustin, the signatory of said invoices, who had 12.20 supposedly accomplished Forest charges & surcharges . . . . .the . . . same, . . . . . .thus . . . . indicating . . . . . . that said name could not have been written by Segundo Agustin, and rendering the authenticity of the documents highly doubtful. Furthermore, said asDUE well .as TOTALinvoices, AMOUNT . . .the . . .other . . . . .invoices . . . . . . . submitted . . . . . . . . .by Guerrero to the Conference Staff (Exhibits C-1 to C-14, also, marked as Exhibits 00-1 to 00-14, pp. 18-31, BIR record), referred to logs other   than those involved in the questioned reassessment. The foregoing circumstances clearly indicate that the logs involved in said reassessment were obtained from illegal sources, and that the forest charges due thereon had not been paid. Since these charges "are liens on the products and collectible from whomsoever is in possession" thereof, "unless he can show that he has the required auxiliary and official invoice and discharge permit" (Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Pio Barretto and Sons, L-11805, May 31, 1960) — which Guerrero has not shown — it follows that he is bound to pay the aforementioned forest charges and surcharges, in the sum of P3,775.66. As regards the second item of P1,192.51, representing fixed and percentage taxes and surcharges, as producer of the logs involved in the reassessment, the Court of Tax Appeals held that Guerrero is not liable therefor, upon the theory that said logs were sold by the Government   to the one who had cut, and removed the products from the forest; that the original sale of said logs was, therefore, made by

the Government, not by the concessionaire or cutter of the forest products; and that, accordingly, Guerrero is not liable for the payment of the corresponding fixed and percentage taxes thereon. This theory is based upon the premise that, whereas in Collector of Internal Revenue vs. M.R. Lacson, L-12945 (April 29, 1960), we held that forest charges are internal revenue taxes, this ruling was reversed in Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Pio Barretto Sons, L-11805 (May 31, 1960). It is true that the dispositive portion of our decision in the first case expressly sustained the concurring and dissenting opinion of a member of the Court of Tax Appeals in the appealed decision thereof and that the writer of the opinion maintained that forest charges are internal revenue taxes. A careful perusal of the text of the decision of the Supreme Court therein shows, however, that said dissenting opinion is not the ratio decidendi of the aforementioned decision. It should be noted that the Collector of Internal Revenue contested the  jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals to entertain the appeal taken by Lacson from the assessment made by said officer involving forest charges, and that the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the tax court to hear and decide said appeal, because the issue therein was the validity of said assessment . From the viewpoint of the Supreme Court, this issue was decisive on the question of jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals, regardless of whether forest charges were taxes or not . At this juncture, it may not be amiss to advert to a problem of semantics arising from the operation of Section 1588 of the Revised Administrative Code, the counterpart of which is now Section 315 of the National Internal Revenue Code, pursuant to which: Every internal revenue tax on property or on any business or occupation, and every tax on resources and receipts, and any increment to any of them incident to delinquency, shall constitute a lien superior to all other charges or liens not only on the property itself upon which such tax may be imposed but also upon the property used in any business or occupation upon which the tax is imposed and upon all property rights therein. xxx

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The enforcement of this lien by the Commissioner (formerly Collector) of Internal Revenue, has often induced the parties adversely affected thereby to raise the question whether a given charge is a tax or not, on the theory that there would be no lien if said question were decided in the negative. In connection therewith, said parties had tended to distinguish between taxes, on the one hand — as burdens imposed upon persons and/or properties, by way of contributions to the support of the Government, in consideration of general benefits derived from its operation — and license fees — charged in the exercise of the regulatory authority of the state, under its police power — and other charges — for specific things or special or   particular benefits received from the Government — on the other hand. It is high time to stress that the term "tax," as it appears in said Section 1588 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 315 of the National Internal Revenue Code, is used in these provisions, not in the limited sense adverted to above, but, in a broad sense encompassing all Government revenues collectible by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under said Code , whether involving taxes, in the strict technical sense thereof, or not . Thus, under the heading "injunction not available to restrain collection of tax ", Section 305 of said Code —

which is the first provision of Title IX (entitled "General Administrative

Provisions"), Chapter I (entitled " Remedies in General) thereof — provides: No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal-revenue tax, fee, or charge imposed by this Code. Similarly, under the heading "Civil remedies for the collection of delinquent taxes," Section 316 of the same Code ordains; The civil remedies for the collection of internal revenue taxes, fees, or charges, and any increment thereto resulting from delinquency shall be (a) by distraint of goods, chattels, or effects, and other personal property of whatever character, including stocks and other securities, debts, credits, bank accounts, and interest in and rights to personal property, and by levy upon real property and interest in or rights to real property; and (b) by judicial action. Either of these remedies or both simultaneously may be pursued in the discretion of the authorities charged with the collection of such taxes. No exemption shall be allowed against the internal revenue taxes in any case. (Emphasis supplied.) In other words, the National Internal Revenue Code makes a distinction between taxes, on the one hand, and  fees or charges, on the other; but as used in Title IX of said Code, the term "tax" includes "any national internal revenue tax,  fee or charge imposed by" the Code. And it is in this sense only that we sustained the view taken in the aforementioned concurring dissenting opinion in Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Lacson (supra). Hence, in the Barretto case, it was held that the Government does not sell forest products, but merely collects charges on the privilege granted by it "for the exploitation of forest concessions, i.e., charges for the right to exercise the privilege granted by the Government to the licensee of cutting timber from a public forest or forest reserve". In line with this view, we stressed in Cordero vs. Gonda,  L-22369 (October 15, 1966), the declaration made in Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-18649 (February 27, 1965), that a mining ad valorem tax "is a tax not on the minerals, but upon the privilege of severing or extracting the same from the earth," although strictly a fee for something received is not a tax. As a consequence, the original sale, as contemplated in Section 186 of the Internal Revenue Code, is made by the concessionaire or whoever cuts or removes forest products from public forests or forest reserves — in the case at bar, Guerrero, who is accordingly, bound to pay said sum of P1,192.51. While this case was being heard in the Court of Tax Appeals, certain documents were discovered, tending to show that Guerrero had evaded the payment of forest charges on certain logs (other than those heretofore mentioned), which had been shipped and sold by him to the company. Said documents, which were found in the possession of the latter, covered logs shipped and sold thereto as follows: Exhibit

Date

Volume

Invoice

8-I-2 May 9, 1949 4.966 Cu. m. 1227226 8-I-3 May 9, 1949 2.151 Cu. m. 1227226 8-BB-1 May 20, 1949 5.20 Cu. m. 6578041 8-AA-1 May 21, 1949 4.63 Cu. m. A-657804 The aforementioned documents consist of auxiliary invoices — purporting to have been issued by Concessionaire Segundo Agustin to Guerrero as consignee of the logs therein mentioned — which are not included in Agustin's certificate (Exhibit 00, p. 32 BIR record) of the invoices covering logs sold by him to Guerrero, thus showing that the

said invoices (Exhibits 8-I-2, 8-I-3, 8-BB-1 and 8-AA-1) are spurious; that the logs therein described must have been obtained by Guerrero from illegal sources; and that the forest charges and the sale and percentage taxes thereon have not been paid. Although these charges and taxes are not included in the original and revised assessments made in this case, petitioner herein maintains that Guerrero may nevertheless be held liable therefor, inasmuch as: Where plaintiffs themselves show facts upon which they should not recover, whether defendant pleaded such fact as a defense or not, their claim should be dismissed. Evidence introduced without objection becomes property of the case and all the parties are amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.

(Emphasis ours; Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30.) Petitioner's contention is untenable. The foregoing doctrine deals with plaintiff's right to recover, when his own evidence proves the contrary. In short, it refers to a point in issue. In the case at bar, the additional  logs under consideration were not included   in the contested assessments. Since the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals is purely appellate, said Court correctly declined to make an award

thereon, for lack of jurisdiction over the same. With reference to the last two (2) items of P120.00 and P50.00, the Court of Tax Appeals did not sentence Guerrero to pay the same upon the ground that he had not entered into a compromise agreement with the Government. The record shows, however, that Guerrero had expressed his willingness to pay "any compromise penalty which may be imposed by the Honorable Court." In short we find that the Court of Tax Appeals has erred in not sentencing Antonio G. Guerrero to pay, besides the sum of P3,775.66 awarded in the decision appealed from, the aforementioned additional sums of P1,192.51, P120.00 and P50.00. Thus modified, with the addition of these sums in the award in favor of the Government and against Antonio G. Guerrero, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respect, with costs against the latter. It is so ordered. Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

B. Language How language of constitution construed primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is the LANGUAGE itself The words that are used are broad because it aims to cover all contingencies Words must be understood in their common or ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employee o WHY? Because the fundamental law if essentially a document of the people Do not construe the constitution in such a way that its meaning would change What if the words used have both general and restricted meaning? Rule: general prevails over the restricted unless the contrary is indicated. • • •

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JM TUASON v LTA 31 SCRA 413 (1970) DOCTRINE: FACTS:

Art. XIII, Sec. 4 provides: "The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals." In looking at the relevant Constitutional provisions: it is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed – constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document; it should be easily understood by the people o Based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say It is obvious that the Congress has the power to expropriate, under the Art 13 provision. The Congress has a broad grant of expropriation, which is very apparent in the Constitutional provision o

Aug. 3, 1959: RA No. 2616 took effect without executive approval It provides for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in QC jointly owned by JM Tuason, Gregorio Araneta and Co., and Florencio Deudor, et. al. (Lands constitute a certain portion of the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision Nov. 17, 1960: JM Tuason filed a petition for prohibition before the RTC to enjoin the LTA from implementing the expropriation Jan. 10, 1963: RTC held RA 2616 as unconstitutional and granted petition ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional HELD: NO. RATIO: The SC looked into the constitutional power of Congress to authorize the expropriation of lands • •

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CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v EXEC SEC 194 SCRA 317 (1991) DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

July 25, 1987, Pres. Corazon Aquino issued EO No. 284 providing that o Sec. 1: “A member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government

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corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.” Petitioners assailed the said EO, alleging that it is unconstitutional for being contrary to Sec 13 of Art VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides o Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless

otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. ISSUE: W/N EO 284 is unconstitutional HELD: YES. RATIO:

The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. Still, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office •

C. Rules of Construction SARMIENTO v MISON 156 SCRA 549 (1987) DOCTRINE: FACTS:

Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors, seeking to enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground that his appointment, w/o confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional. ISSUE: W/N Salvador Mison was validly appointed as Commissioner of Customs HELD: YES. •

RATIO: •

Art. VII, Sec. 16, as originally proposed by the Committee on Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com read: o Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for

by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in the text of the provision. o (1) to delete the phrase "and bureaus," o (2) to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitute the phrase "and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." Thus, as it currently stands, and following the accepted rule on •

constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated , it would

follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments

IBP v ZAMORA 338 SCRA 81 (2000) DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

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Then President Estrada ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Superintendent Edgar Aglipay, formulated a Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the “LOI”) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. This Task Force Tulungan is placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. The President confirmed his verbal directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum dated 24 January 2000 wherein he expresses his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the “IBP”) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void, and unconstitutional, arguing that: o MAIN ARGUMENT # 1: The deployment of the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution, in that:

o

A) No emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would  justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said deployment is in derogation of Article II, section 3 of the Constitution; B) Said deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the Military in a civilian function of government (law enforcement) in derogation of Article XVI, section 5(4) of the Constitution; C) Said deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the Military to perform the civilian functions of government. MAIN ARGUMENT # 2: In militarizing law enforcement in Metro Manila, the administration is unwittingly making the Military

more powerful than what it should really be under the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N LOI 02/2000 is unconstitutional. HELD: NO. RATIO: •

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On the “No emergency” argument: o the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare o The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of

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such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part: o The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.

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However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification . Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to

certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters Moreover, Fr. Bernas comments: But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody

MARCELINO v CRUZ 121 SCRA 51 (1983) DOCTRINE: FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with rape before the CFI of Rizal Rested his case on August 4, 1975 Attorneys for both parties (Marcelino and People), moved for time to submit their memoranda CFI granted the motion, giving them 30 days to submit Petitioner submitted on time, but the People did not Sept. 4, 1975: case was submitted for decision On the date set for the promulgation of the decision (Nov. 28, 1975 or 85 days from Sept. 4), counsel for the accused raised the issue of loss of jurisdiction because the case for failure of the CFI to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision A certification dated January 26, 1976 was for the complaining witness, and the counsel for the accused, respectively, were posted in Grace Park Post Office on December 4, 1975. These notices were received by the respective addressees on December 8 and 9, 1975. Jan. 19, 1976: petitioner filed present petition before SC Petitioner alleges that the three-month period prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case. o SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen months for the Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all other inferior courts. ISSUE: W/N the CFI lost its jurisdiction over petitioner. HELD: NO. •

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The rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of  judgment and not to the promulgation thereof.

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Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether or not respondent judge had resolved the case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date, considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge.  As pointed out in People v . Court of Appeals, the promulga tion of a  judgment in the trial cour t does not necessarily coincid e with the date of its delivery by the judge of the clerk of court .

Moreover, the provision cited is merely directory, not mandatory The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless by express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest." "The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law." The phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts ... " And there can be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of procedure.  Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris, declares that constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.

CO v ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 199 SCRA 692 DOCTRINE: FACTS:

Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern Samar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987 Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935 Constitution was operative), is

not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao. ISSUE:

1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens.

2. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively. HELD:

Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution, children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. They need not perform any act of “election” granted that his

father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957, when he was only 9 years old. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not

PERFECTO v MEER GR. No. L-2348 (1950) DOCTRINE: FACTS:

Applying various US cases, the logical conclusion may be reached that although Congress may validly declare by law that salaries of  judges appointed thereafter shall be taxed as income (O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax the salaries of those judges already in office at the time of such declaration because such taxation would diminish their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). The next sentence reads: "Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of P16,000, and each associate Justice, P15,000." Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant, i.e. the salaries of judges cannot be taxed as it corresponds to a decrease in their salaries And even then, the taxes cannot apply to those judges currently in office •

In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila CFI contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. o Article 8, section 9 provides that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." CFI upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount collected. The defendant Collector of IR appealed. ISSUE: W/N taxes to salaries of members of the Judiciary correspond to diminution thereof HELD: YES. •

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RATIO: ENDENCIA v DAVID GR No. L-6355-56 (1953) DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

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CFI of Manila declared section 13 of RA No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordered David as Collector of IR to refund to Justice Endencia P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the CA in 1951, and to Justice Jugo P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the CA, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the SC CFI held that under the doctrine laid down in Perfecto vs. Meer, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes Immediately after the promulgation of the Perfecto ruling, Congress enacted RA 590 o SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, RA. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of

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compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary

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If the Congress be allowed to interpret laws, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide for its own interpretation, tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, esp. when such interpretation runs counter to a previous Court interpretation

MAGTOTO v MANGUERA 63 SCRA 4 (1975) DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. o No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense

shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

In the 3 criminal cases (G.R. Nos. L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929), the respondent judges declared certain confessions of the accused as admissible as evidence even if they were obtained even if the said accused were not informed of their right to remain silent and their right to be informed of such right ISSUE: W/N the said confessions are admissible as evidence HELD: YES. •

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The constitutional provision has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. A confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973.

Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. Because the confessions of the accused in G.R. Nos. L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because.

No such right existed at the time. Constitutional provisions as a rule should be given prospective effect •

CALDERON v CARALE GR No 91636 (1992) DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. From the cases Sarmiento vs. Mison, Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, and Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constitutional Commissions, et al., the following doctrines were established: 1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election). 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. In March 1989, RA6715 was passed, amending PD442 or the Labor Code •

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The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by thePresident, subject to confirmation by the Commission on

 Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from

the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. President Cory Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. The present petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments, without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation ISSUE: W/N Congress may, by law, add to the Constitutional list of officials appointed by the President that are subject to confirmation by the CA HELD: NO. •

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The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, or under "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Therefore it is unconstitutional for the Congress to enact a law requiring CA confirmation for additional officials because 1. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and 2. it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function. The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have interpreted Art. VII, Sec. 16 consistently in one manner. Legislation cannot expand it after it has been interpreted by the SC. Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided: The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain

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or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; . . . (Expanded powers, as compared to the 1987 version) The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not  judicial or legislative but co nstitutional. A future constitu tional convention or Congress sitting as a constituent (constitutional)

assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987 constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want it interpreted

D. Aids in construction/interpretation Aids to construction, generally apart from its language courts may refer to the following in construing the constitution: o history o proceedings of the convention o prior laws and judicial decisions o contemporaneous constructions o consequences of alternative interpret-tations these aids are called extraneous aids because though their effect is not in precise rules their influence describes the essentials of the process (remember preamble? # ganito lang din yun) •

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Realities existing at time of adoption; object to be accomplished History basically helps in making one understand as to how and why certain laws were incorporated into the constitution. In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken into consideration because there are certain considerations rooted in the historical background of the environment at the time of its adoption (Legaspi v. Minister of Finance) Proceedings of the convention RULE: If the language of the constitutional provision is plain it is not necessary to resort to extrinsic aids EXCEPTION: when the intent of the framer doesn’t appear in the text or it has more than one construction. Intent of a constitutional convention member doesn’t necessarily mean it is also the people’s intent The proceedings of the convention are usually inquired into because it sheds light into what the framers of the constitution had in mind at that time. (refers to the debates, interpretations and opinions concerning particular provisions) • •

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Contemporaneous construction and writings may be used to resolve but not to create ambiguities In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction are entitled to great weight however when it comes to the constitution it has no weight and will not be allowed to change in any way its meaning. Writings of delegates – has persuasive force but it depends on two things: o if opinions are based on fact known to them and not established it is immaterial o on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may not be a shade better in the eyes of the law. • •

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Previous laws and judicial rulings framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware of prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions. THUS when courts adopt principles different from prior decisions it is presumed that they did so to overrule said principle •

Changes in phraseology Before a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of revisions and changes in phraseology (ex. deletion of words) and these changes may be inquired into to ascertain the intent or purpose of the provision as approved HOWEVER mere deletion, as negative guides, cannot prevail over the positive provisions nor is it determinative of any conclusion. Certain provisions in our constitution (from 1935 to the present) are mere reenactments of prior constitutions thus these changes may indicate an intent to modify or change the meaning of the old provisions. •

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Consequences of alternative constructions consequences that may follow from alternative construction of doubtful constitutional provisions constitute an important factor to consider in construing them. if a provision has more than one interpretation, that construction which would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences must be rejected. e.g. directory and mandatory interpretation: Art. 8 Sec 15(1) requires judges to render decision within specific periods from date of submission for decision of cases (construed as directory because if otherwise it will cause greater injury to the public) •

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Constitution construed as a whole provision should not be construed separately from the rest it should be interpreted as a whole and be harmonized with conflicting provisions so as to give them all force and effect. sections in the constitution with a particular subject should be interpreted together to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution. Mandatory or directory •

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RULE: constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory unless a different intention is manifested. Why? Because in a constitution, the sovereign itself speaks and is laying down rules which for the time being at least are to control alike the government and the governed. failure of the legislature to enact the necessary required by the constitution does not make the legislature is illegal.

Prospective or retroactive RULE: constitution operates prospectively only unless the words employed are clear that it applies retroactively •

Applicability of rules of statutory construction Doctrines used in Sarmiento v. Mison is a good example in which the SC applied a number of rules of statutory construction. Issue: whether or not the appointment of a Commissioner of Customs is subject to confirmation by the Commission on appointments • •

LEGASPI v MINISTER OF FINANCE 115 SCRA 418 (1982) DOCTRINE: FACTS:

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It then follows that its legislative authority cannot be more exclusive now after 1981 amendments than when it was originally created in 1976 Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the Charter. The ancient and familiar rule of constitutional construction that the meaning conveyed by its language, albeit plain, do not only portray current events and developments but must likewise consider its historical roots and the environment at the time of its adoption This is to perceive the law as being written as part and parcel thereof. Historical precedents: It is to be recalled that the said amendment was formulated in October 1976, more than fully four years after the whole Philippines was first placed under martial law pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972. Purpose: (1) the quelling of nationwide subversive activities characteristic not only of a rebellion but of a state of war fanned by a foreign power of a different Ideology from ours, and not excluding the stopping effectively of a brewing, if not a strong separatist movement in Mindanao, and (2) the establishment of a New Society by the institution of disciplinary measures The purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest extreme situations should ever demand it. to make the proclamation of martial law remotest, but nevertheless enable the government to meet emergencies effectively, they conceived the Idea of granting to the President (Prime Minister) the power endowed to him by Amendment No 6 •

Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, prayed for the SC to declare PD 1840 "granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes" unconstitutional Pres. Marcos issued the PD pursuant to Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution proclaimed in full force and effect as of October 27, 1976 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595, which granted him legislative powers Legaspi contends: under the 1973 Constitution "(T)he legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa" (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 11, Art. VII); Further, Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the President by the Constitution as amended on April 7, 1981 There is also the question of whether the President retained his legislative power after the temporary lifting of Martial Law and after the Constitution was amended on April 7, 1981 ISSUE: W/N the Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution as approved in 1976 was repealed by omission by the April 7, 1981 amendment HELD: NO. •

Examining closely how the 1981 amendments altered Amendment No. 2 (amendment creating the BP), it will be readily seen that the only change consisted of the non-inclusion of the "incumbent President" as member of the assembly in pursuance of the fundamental objective to separate the Presidency from the regular legislative body and thereby establish in our country a modified form of parliamentary government Therefore, what we have now is still the interim Batasang Pambansa created in 1976.

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MONTEJO v COMELEC 142 SCRA 415 (1995) DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

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December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District of Leyte and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth District were not disturbed. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.

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He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa (from his district) with 7,7000 registered voters be transferred from the First to the Second District. he argues that COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district.

paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The

Issue involves the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment. ISSUE: W/N COMELEC has the constitutional power to transfer municipalities from one district to another HELD: NO. •

number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

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traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws •

Said Ordinance provides: o Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as o Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made. o

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in

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The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 of President Corazon C. Aquino, ordaining the provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa. She then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. From the deliberations: The Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made." Meaning of minor clarified by Comm. Davide: meaning to say, for instance, that we may have forgotten an intervening municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be included in one district . That we shall consider a minor amendment .

Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created. . . ." Sec. 1 of the ordinance was annulled by the SC •

VERA v AVELINO 77 PHIL 192 (1946) Facts:

- In May 25, 1946, the Philippine Senate passed a resolution excluding Senators-elect Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero from taking their seats in the Senate while the election protest against them was still pending. The protest involved alleged electoral fraud due to “certain specified acts of terrorism and violence” in Pampanga, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Tarlac. - Petitioners are now filing this action against the Senate resolution, praying for its annulment and compelling respondents to let them take their seats. Issues:

- WON the Court had jurisdiction over the case - WON the Senate has exceeded its powers - WON it was respondents’ legally inescapable duty to permit petitioners to take their seats - WON respondents can be called to account for their votes regarding the assailed resolution Held:

- Due to the separation of powers, the Court has no actual jurisdiction over the case. It had already established this in Alejandrino vs. Quezon. It is however alleged that the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission modified this doctrine; this is not true as the Court specifically cited Alejandrino in Angara to justify their lack of

 jurisdiction over that case, as well as this one. - The Senate did not exceed its powers. Independent of any constitutional or statutory grant, it still has the power to inquire into the credentials of any member and that member’s right to participate in its deliberations. O The assignment of contests regarding elections to the Electoral Tribunal does not negate this power. - It may also be approached in the viewpoint of the Senate exercising its powers under Art. VI, Sec. 10 (3) of the 1935 Constitution to set its own rules for its proceedings, and it exercises this power to promulgate orders to maintain its prestige and dignity. It could be said to have done this in this case in order to make sure that these Senators really were elected properly. - Section 12 of Commonwealth Act 725 provides that those who are elected are to come to Manila and assume office, but it does not imply that the House could not deny admission in the case of disqualification. - The Constitution provides, under Art. VI, Sec. 15, that Senators and Congressmen cannot be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate made in Congress. Therefore, the Court cannot question or permit respondents to question the votes made regarding the resolution before it.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v EXEC SEC FACTS:

employment during their tenure.

Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. This runs counter to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or

ISSUE:

W/N the prohibition in Art. 7, Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2. HELD:

No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the

government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment, particularly during the Marcos era. The qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” of Sec. 13, Art. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices

applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. E.O. 284 is therefore declared null and void.

LA BUGAL-B’LAAN v RAMOS GR No. 127882 (2004) DOCTRINE: Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial

and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA). the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 control over the EDU of our natural resources. March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for coequal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, their official functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of Justice George Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own of the Filipino nation. sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; all the aspirations and hopes of all the people. control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an Reconsideration. otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of Issue: Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of control over the EDU of our natural resources? such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology Held: needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter State’s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On the Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of “every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA). development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of DE CASTRO v JBC GR No 191002 (2010) + Majority Opinion and Carpio Morales Dissent

DOCTRINE: Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional construction d. Peralta:Mandamus FACTS: •

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This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution stating that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re

can compel the JBC to immediately transmit to the President, within a reasonable time its list of nominees in the event the Court decides that the President can appoint a CJ even during the election ban.

B.

OSG: a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

 Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively , shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by

which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. Arguments: A. Petitioners: a. De Castro: The JBC, in not submitting the list of

b.

c.

nominees, is arrogating unto itself “the judicial function that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution,” which has limited it to the task of recommending appointees to the judiciary. Soriano: JBC committed a grave abuse of discretion in unanimously deciding to open the searc, nomination and selection process for the position of CJ, because the appointing authority for the said position is the Supreme Court itself, the President’s authority being limited to the appointment of the Members of the SC. PHILCONSA: Perfunctory understanding of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution is affecting the JBC’s proper exercise of its “principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary by submitting only to the President (not the next) “a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every vacancy” from which members of the SC and judges of the lower courts may be appointed. Also, the ruling in Valenzuela should be reviewed.

f.

Writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees. JBC’s function to recommend is a “continuing process,” which does not begin with each vacancy or end with each nomination because the goal is “to submit the list of nominees to Malacañang on the very day the vacancy arises.” Petitioner Soriano’s theory that it is the Supreme Court, not the President, who has the power to appoint the Chief Justice, is incorrect, and proceeds from his misinterpretation of the phrase “members of the Supreme Court” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution as referring only to the Associate Justices, to the exclusion of the Chief Justice. A writ of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least three nominees is unqualified, and the submission of the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to perform under the Constitution; as such, the JBC, the nature of whose principal function is executive, is not vested with the power to resolve who has the authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore, has no discretion to withhold the list from the President. Writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the JBC to include or exclude particular candidates as nominees, considering that there is no imperative duty on its part to include in or exclude from the list particular individuals, but, on the contrary, the JBC’s determination of who it nominates to the President is an exercise of a discretionary duty. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution i. in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice versa ii. Had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); iii. the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes”

g.

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and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. Although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC Judges, the situation now refers to the appointment of the next Chief Justice to which the prohibition does not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even recognized that there might be “the imperative need for an appointment during the period of the ban,” like when the membership of the Supreme Court should be “so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particular important question requiring expeditious resolution be divided” i. Valenzuela  also recognized that the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, most especially if there is any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the prohibition. there are now undeniably compelling reasons for the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice: i. a deluge of cases involving sensitive political issues is “quite expected” ii. the Court acts as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice President and, as such, has “the power to correct manifest errors on the statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC)” iii. if history has shown that during ordinary times the Chief Justice was appointed immediately upon the occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of the Constitution, there is now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno iv. should the next Chief Justice come from among the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to start the selection process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the constitutional mandate.

Intervenors: a. Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera, IBP Davao del Sur, and NUPL  take the position that

De Castro’s petition was bereft of any basis, because under Section 15, Article VII, the outgoing President is constitutionally banned from making any appointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010, including the appointment of the successor of Chief Justice Puno. Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the outgoing President if the constitutional prohibition is already in effect. Tan adds that the prohibition against midnight appointments was applied by the Court to the appointments to the Judiciary made by then President Ramos, with the Court holding that the duty of the President to fill the vacancies within 90 days

from occurrence of the vacancies (for the Supreme Court) or from the submission of the list (for all other courts) was not an excuse to violate the constitutional prohibition. b.

Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al., and Bello et al. oppose the insistence that Valenzuela recognizes the possibility that the

President may appoint the next Chief Justice if exigent circumstances warrant the appointment, because that recognition is obiter dictum; and aver that the absence of a Chief Justice or even an Associate Justice does not cause epic damage or absolute disruption or paralysis in the operations of the Judiciary. c.

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f.

g.

IntervenorsUbano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and Lim  maintain that the Omnibus Election Code

penalizes as an election offense the act of any government official who appoints, promotes, or gives any increase in salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee during the period of 45 days before a regular election; that the provision covers all appointing heads, officials, and officers of a government office, agency or instrumentality, including the President; that for the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno, or during the period of the ban under the Omnibus Election Code, constitutes an election offense; that even an appointment of the next Chief Justice prior to the election ban is fundamentally invalid and without effect because there can be no appointment until a vacancy occurs; and that the vacancy for the position can occur only by May 17, 2010. IntervenorBoiser   adds that De Castro’s prayer to compel the submission of nominees by the JBC to the incumbent President is off-tangent because the position of Chief Justice is still not vacant; that to speak of a list, much more a submission of such list, before a vacancy occurs is glaringly premature; that the proposed advance appointment by the incumbent President of the next Chief Justice will be unconstitutional; and that no list of nominees can be submitted by the JBC if there is no vacancy. All the intervenors-oppositors  submit that Section 15, Article VII makes no distinction between the kinds of appointments made by the President; and that the Court, in Valenzuela, ruled that the appointments by the President of the two judges during the prohibition period were void. Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply only to the appointments in the Executive Department, but also to  judicial appointments, contrary to the submission of PHILCONSA; that Section 15 does not distinguish; and that Valenzuela already interpreted the prohibition as applicable to judicial appointments. Intervenor WTLOP  further posits that petitioner Soriano’s contention that the power to appoint the Chief Justice is vested, not in the President, but in the Supreme Court, is utterly baseless, because the Chief Justice is also a Member of the Supreme Court as contemplated under Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at any rate, the term “members” was interpreted in Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate

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Justices of the Supreme Court; that PHILCONSA’s prayer that the Court pass a resolution declaring that persons who manifest their interest as nominees, but with conditions, shall not be considered nominees by the JBC is diametrically opposed to the arguments in the body of its petition; that such glaring inconsistency between the allegations in the body and the relief prayed for highlights the lack of merit of PHILCONSA’s petition; that the role of the JBC cannot be separated from the constitutional prohibition on the President; and that the Court must direct the JBC to follow the rule of law, that is, to submit the list of nominees only to the next duly elected President after the period of the constitutional ban against midnight appointments has expired. Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur   opines that the JBC – because it is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial body – has no duty under the Constitution to resolve the question of whether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the period of prohibition; that even if the JBC has already come up with a short list, it still has to bow to the strict limitations under Section 15, Article VII; that should the JBC defer submission of the list, it is not arrogating unto itself a judicial function, but simply respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution; and that the application of the general rule in Section 15, Article VII to the Judiciary does not violate the principle of separation of powers, because said provision is an exception. Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al.

state that the JBC’s act of nominating appointees to the Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does not involve the exercise of judgment; that there can be no default on the part of the JBC in submitting the list of nominees to the President, considering that the call for applications only begins from the occurrence of the vacancy in the Supreme Court; and that the commencement of the process of screening of applicants to fill the vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice only begins from the retirement on May 17, 2010, for, prior to this date, there is no definite legal basis for any party to claim that the submission or non-submission of the list of nominees to the President by the JBC is a matter of right under law.

still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.” 2.

 Yes. There is a justiciable is sue

We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.” The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. 3.

 Yes. a.

Prohibition under section 15, article vii does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the  judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict: The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next  presidential electionsand up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Issues:

1. 2. 3. 4.

WON the petitioners have legal standing? WON there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination? WON the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice? WON mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?

Held/Ratio: 1.

 Yes. Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court.

Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners “are not covered by the definition, it is

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice andfourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. First .  The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily   and surely   written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. Although Valenzuela  came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela  dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall  – an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced  – should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperativeduty   to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere  judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.” Second.  Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other 

appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnightappointments   from being made by an outgoing   Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate  prior  process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was  precisely   intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII

to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the “constitutionality of xxx appointments” to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that “on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission’s records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals.” This confirmation was accepted   by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals. Fourth.  Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three ( i.e., Section 14,

Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to

appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context , i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends

to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no

need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Puno’s retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every  situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least   19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period   of the ban of 109 days and   the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a

doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President – any President – to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9, Article VIII says:  xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

xxx The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC. 4.

No. Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus  shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board,

officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act

that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus  is not available to direct the exercise of a  judgment or discretion in a partic ular way.

among the three Departments in recognition of the principle of separation of powers. 2.

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c ) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d ) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 5.

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No. Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC •

The conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint the Chief Justice. Hence, Soriano’s petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the JBC from intervening in the process of nominating the successor of Chief Justice Puno, lacks merit. On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex officio members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, thereby prejudicing the chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the petitioners’ actual interest, because they have not alleged in their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi  on that issue.

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Dissenting Opinion: Carpio Morales, J. •

Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional construction. It is a precept, that inferences drawn from title, chapter or section headings are entitled to very little weight. And so must reliance on subheadings, or the lack thereof, to support a strained deduction be given the weight of helium. 1. Concededly, the allocation of three Articles in the Constitution devoted to the respective dynamics of the three Departments was deliberately adopted by the framers to allocate the vast powers of government

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The equation, however, does not end there. Such kind of formulation detaches itself from the concomitant system of checks and balances. Section sequencing alone of Sections 14, 15 and 16 of Article VII, as explained in the fourth ratiocination, does not suffice to signify functional structuring. The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the evils of midnight appointments in the judiciary The Constitutional Commission (ConCom) saw it fit to provide for a comprehensive ban on midnight appointments, finding that the establishment of the JBC is not enough to safeguard or insulate judicial appointments from politicization. To hold that the ban on midnight appointments applies only to executive positions, and not to vacancies in the judiciary and independent constitutional bodies, is to make the prohibition practically useless. It bears noting that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution already allows the President, by way of exception, to make temporary appointments in the Executive Department during the prohibited period. Under this view, there is virtually no restriction on the President’s power of appointment during the prohibited period. o The general rule is clear since the prohibition applies to ALL kinds of midnight appointments. The Constitution made no distinction. It bears noting that the Court had spoken in one voice in Valenzuela . The ponencia should not hastily reverse, on the sole basis of Justice Regalado’s opinion, the Court’s unanimous en banc decision penned by Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, and concurred in by, inter alia, Associate Justices who later became Chief Justices – HilarioDavide, Jr., ArtemioPanganiban and Reynato Puno. The Supreme Court can function effectively during the midnight appointments ban without an appointed Chief Justice. To begin with, judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and not in its individual members, much less in the Chief Justice alone. Notably, after Chief Justice Puno retires, the Court will have 14 members left, which is more than sufficient to constitute a quorum.

E. Self-Executing Provisions Generally, constitutional provisions are self-executing RULE: constitutional provisions are self executing except when provisions themselves expressly require legislations to implement them. SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS- provisions which are complete by themselves and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary legislation. Just because legislation may supplement and add or prescribe a penalty does not render such provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. In case of Doubt? Construe such provision as self executing rather than non-self executing. • •

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TANADA v ANGARA 272 SCRA 18 (1997) DOCTRINE: FACTS: •

April 15 1994: Secretary for Department of Trade and Industry Rizalino Navarro, representing the gov’t of the Phils, signs the final act of approval of the WTO agreement

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December 9 1994: President Ramos seeks concurrence regarding PS 1083 (“Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization”) December 14 1994: Senate adopts Resolution 97 (“Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby

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concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization”) December 16 1994: President Ramos ratifies WTO agreement December 29 1994: Tanada et al file petition declaring WTO agreement unconstitutional

ISSUES: •

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Whether or not the WTO agreement goes against Art. II Sec. 19, and Art. XII Sec 10 and 12 of the Constitution. Whether or not the WTO agreement impairs Philippine sovereignty by imposing limits on its legislative and judicial power.

No.

RATIO:

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(re: Art. II) State principles are not self-executing. (re: Art. XII) Purpose is protection from unfair exchanges with the rest of the world, not isolationism (note “competitive” in Sec. 12) Philippine sovereignty is actually subject to limitations the State agrees to, as a member of the family of nations. The Constitution does not envision a hermit-like isolationism for the Philippines. Philippines joining the UN -> adopting the concept of sovereignty as “auto-limitation”

HELD: •

No. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v GSIS 267 SCRA 408

DOCTRINE: Facts:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell throughpublic bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a closebidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, aFilipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the samenumber of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending thedeclaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of thenecessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered byRenong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’scheck to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995,perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila PrinceHotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus. Issue(s):

• Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing. • Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony. Held:

- A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. - Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. - The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express

provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. -The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. - As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. - If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. - When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. - In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former. The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

OPOSA v FACTORAN 224 SCRA 792 (1993) DOCTRINE: Facts:

file complaint.

- The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. - The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." - Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to — (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." Issue:

- Whether or not minor petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to

Ruling:

- Yes, minor petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to file complaint. This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. - Supreme Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. - Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the  judicious disposition, utiliza tion, management, renewal a nd conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. - Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

GAMBOA v TEVES GR No. 176573 (2011) DOCTRINE: Facts:

Petition to nullify sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation by government through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council, to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc., an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited, a Hong Kong-based investment management company and a shareholder of PLDT. Petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it involved an indirect sale of 12M shares (6.3% of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. The sale caused First Pacific’s common shareholding in PLDT to increase from 30.7 to 37, increasing its total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Issue:

Does “capital” in Sec11, ArtXII refer to the total common shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility? Held:

“Capital” refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public utility, or, in the instant case, to the total common shares of PLDT. Sec11, ArtXII: “Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations

or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens xxx” Capital does not refer to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares [of PLDT]. One of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation, exercised through voting in the election of directors that control or manages the corporation. In absence of articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, the same have voting rights as common shares. But preferred shares are often excluded from control, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. xxx. Capital only refers to common shares. If preferred shares have right to vote, then “capital” will include the preferred shares. In short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned “capital” required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is “considered as non-Philippine national[s].” To consture capital as both common and non-voting contravenes constitution where State “shall develop a national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

F. The Preamble AGLIPAY v RUIZ GR No. 45459 (1937) DOCTRINE: Preamble shows the drive to uplift the government and