Media Transformations 10 2013 Full Issue

ISSN 2029-865X DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7220/2029-865X.10

MEDIA TRANSFORMATIONS Vol. 10 / 2013

UDK 316.77 Me-31

MEDIA TRANSFORMATIONS EDITORS: Auksė BALČYTIENĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Peter GROSS, University of Tennessee, USA ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Aušra VINCIŪNIENĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania EDITORIAL BOARD: Karen ARRIAZA IBARRA, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain Péter BAJOMI-LÁZÁR, University of Oxford, UK Rasa BALOČKAITĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Inta BRIKŠE, University of Latvia, Latvia Bogusława DOBEK-OSTROWSKA, University of Wroclaw, Poland Ilija TOMANIĆ TRIVUNDŽA, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia Mykolas DRUNGA, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Ari HEINONEN, University of Tampere, Finland Stig HJARVARD, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Irena CARPENTIER REIFOVÁ, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic Nico CARPENTIER, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium Kristina JURAITĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Epp LAUK, University of Jyvaskyla, Finland Nelija LOČMELE, “IR.lv”, Latvia Gintautas MAŽEIKIS, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Werner A. MEIER, Universität Zürich, Switzerland J. D. MININGER, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Tom MORING, University of Helsinki, Swedish School of Social Science, Finland Laima NEVINSKAITĖ, Vilnius University, Lithuania Hannu NIEMINEN, University of Helsinki, Finland Lars W. NORD, Mid Sweden University, Sweden Audronė NUGARAITĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Henrink ÖRNEBRING, University of Oxford, UK Yoram PERI, Tel Aviv University, Israel Karin RAEYMAECKERS, University of Ghent, Belgium Anda ROŽUKALNE, Riga Stradins University, Latvia Helena SOUSA, University of Minho, Portugal Jesper STRÖMBÄCK, Mid Sweden University, Sweden Miklós SÜKÖSD, The University of Hong Kong Burcu SUMMER, Ankara University, Turkey Václav ŠTĚTKA, University of Oxford, UK Artūras TEREŠKINAS, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Jaromír VOLEK, Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic Peeter VIHALEMM, Tartu University, Estonia 

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ISSUE EDITORS: Auksė BALČYTIENĖ | Aušra VINCIŪNIENĖ | Jaq GREENSPON LAYOUT AND DESIGN: Aušra VINCIŪNIENĖ | Alina BUTRIMĖ

© Vytautas Magnus University, 2013

CONTENTS Kristina JURAITĖ Introduction: Mediated participation in a digital age

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Liepa V. BOBERIENĖ Digital worlds and civic opportunities: Connecting online and offline

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activism in Lithuania Inesa BIRBILAITĖ (Dis-)respectful public discussions online: insights on audience polarization

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and formation of radical hate or support groups Stacey May KOOSEL

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Artists and digital culture: (The strain of) self-promotion in social media Stanisław JĘDRZEJEWSKI and Urszula DOLIWA

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Local radio – an endangered species? The Polish case Dzmitry YURAN The point of no return: Belarusian audience refusal to use Western broadcast media after exposure to their content

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Tatsiana KARALIOVA Two realities of one revolution: Coverage of mass protests of 2011 in staterun and independent Belarusian media

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INTRODUCTION: MEDIATED PARTICIPATION IN A DIGITAL AGE Kristina JURAITĖ [email protected] Associate Professor, PhD Department of Pubic Communications Vytautas Magnus University Kaunas, Lithuania

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The role of the Internet, digital communications and mobile technologies have changed our understanding of the world, politics, religion, culture, science and many other spheres of societal life. Today’s world, once defined as a mediapolis (Silverstone, 2007), is a mediated public space where media reinforce and reshape everyday life experiences. However, the main changes penetrating different layers and structures of society are not technological or institutional per se, but rather cultural and social, embodied in individual practices and interactions (Castells, 2009). Therefore, while addressing the changes in relationship to the public and politics, not only technological, institutional, structural, but also social and cultural implications have to be considered. Communication processes, at some point having been rather homogeneous and dominated by the national media, have transformed into a diversified media system with an abundance of different channels, modes, platforms, publics, etc. In this new media ecology, the way media penetrates social structures and our lives is also changing; audience loyalty for a single channel is disappearing, while engagement in a more active, selective, creative and critical media use is growing. What is emerging nowadays is a completely new communication infrastructure of everyday life, which provides people, as well as institutions, with new incentives for interaction, communication and participation (Livingstone, 2004, 2009). The changing role of media is also transforming and challenging the political field, democratic processes and public participation practices. On one hand, new media is seen as an important pledge of deliberative democracy, while promoting the public sphere and providing a platform for citizens’ participation, which is one of the key dimensions and theoretical conceptions of contemporary democracy (Carpentier, 2011). On the other hand, media have always played an important watchdog function in democracy, while overseeing the performance of official representatives and authorities. However, media coverage of political issues has often been criticized for one-sided, scandalous, populist and superficial reporting, which makes the public disappointed with the current political situation and skeptical about the political world (Cardoso, 2008). The more citizens are aware of political scandals, crises and malfunctions, the more they become intolerant of many things taking place inside and

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around politics, such as corruption, political party scandals, conflicts between public and private interests or other ways of abusing authority. The idea of modern politics being shaped by professional information and communication management, political PR, and marketing techniques has been disputed by political science and communication researchers (Curran, 2002; Putnam, 2004; De Vreese et al., 2008; Castells, 2009; Norris, 2011). In mediated politics, a crucial role is played by the professional advisers, political campaign managers and public relations consultants who shape the media, public and political agendas, predetermine the news content and induce public support or disappointment. Rather than informing and supplying citizens with quality information, constructive and thorough coverage of political and social issues and, what is more important, stimulating citizens’ interest in public affairs, the news media have been more successful in entertaining the public and increasing its disengagement and cynicism. Indeed, the late modern democracies have been characterized by civic apathy, public skepticism, disillusionment with politics, and general disinterest in the conventional political process, and yet, public interest in blogging, online news, web-based activism, collaborative news filtering, and online networking reveal an electorate that is not disinterested, but rather, fatigued with the political conventions of the mainstream (Papacharissi, 2013). Even though the media have been always seen as a vital democratic institution, the advent of new technologies, different approaches and considerations towards new media roles and functions in political processes evolved. The proponents promised a rapid democratization of society, as information and tools provided by the new media would encourage public engagement in social and political life, and promote public activism. For instance, we can witness a certain invigoration of political action groups and online community movements in social networks, as well as online polling, e-referenda, and Internet voting. Moreover, it has become fast, easy, cheap, and convenient to use political information online (Papacharissi, 2002). On the other hand, critics of the virtual public sphere have emphasized fragmentation and political and social divisions, as well as the lack of substantial reforms of political thought and action. Indeed, recent technological revolution has created a new public space, facilitated mainly by online and mobile communications. However, if such a public space can transform political Introduction: Mediated participation in a digital age

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culture and stimulate a qualitatively new public sphere, meaning an alternative way and forum for political deliberation, still remains an open question for experts and researchers (Papacharissi, 2013). The shifting relationship between the public and politics can also be approached and analyzed as institutional and structural transformations, which have been explicitly demonstrated by changing power relationships of traditional institutions, like politics, religion, family, and media (Bauman, 2005; Deuze, 2008; Hjarvard, 2013; Hepp, 2013). In the global, and increasingly individualized, society, also marked by precipitating mediatization, the media as modus operandi affects public institutions and practices, and encourages them to endorse and follow the new media and communication principles. Therefore, in a mediated cyberspace, the normatives and practices of politics, religion, culture, education, and other social and cultural structures are also changing. People receive more opportunities to choose between the different alternatives available for them, which doesn’t necessarily mean they are disengaged from political life: This individualized act of citizenship can be compared to the act of the consumer, browsing stores of a shopping mall for that perfect pair of jeans, comparing prices and sizes with online offerings. Monitoring is indeed the act of the citizen-consumer, participating in society (whether that “society” equals virtual, topical or geographical community, one’s role within a democratic nation-state, or within a translocal network) conditionally, unpredictably, and voluntarily (Deuze, 2008: 852). In the turbulent times of change, the relationship between the public and politics becomes more and more individualized, based on our personal likes, wants, and needs, rather than institutional commitments, responsibilities and loyalties (Deuze, 2008). Instead of voting, joining a political party or trade union, or demonstrating, people look for more meaningful, self-expressive, less hierarchical and more engaging activities. The new conditions that new communication technologies have created, while penetrating into very different spheres of life including politics, science, religion, and culture, require researchers to rethink many issues related to social and political development, interaction, participation, identity formation, etc.

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No coincidence, then, that this current issue of Media Transformations is also addressing the changing media role and its implications for democratic political culture, citizens’ participation and public mobilization. The first article in this volume, “Digital Worlds and Civic Opportunities: Connecting Online and Offline Activism in Lithuania” by Liepa V. Boberienė, examines how the new media environment is promoting the digital generation and changing the way people experience citizenship through more active, selective and creative engagement. The author argues that these changes can be addressed while comparing the online and offline practices in which young citizens of Lithuania are engaged. Even more, online participation can provide favorable conditions and some kind of springboard for offline citizenship practices, community action and political discourse. It is true that over the past two decades of liberal democracy, market economy, and free media, the democratic transition in Lithuania was faced with the difficulties of developing a strong political and civic culture and overcoming public fatigue and alienation. The study shows that the most common online activities among Lithuanian youth is information exchange, followed by social networking and eventually political expression, which is the least common type of engagement among the students. Those who are more active online as organizers or content generators were also more empowered offline. They expressed more confidence in public institutions, had more positive perceptions of government responsiveness, and engaged in different organizations, community activism and political discourse. In general, multiple online activities, including networking, learning, and expressing oneself, provided new opportunities for decentralized and individualized participation outside traditional power structures. The idea of new communication and information technologies creating a new virtual environment is also at the center of Inesa Birbilaitė’s article “(Dis-)respectful Public Discussions Online: Insights on Audience Polarization and Formation of Radical Hate or Support Groups”. The author is focusing on the quality of online public spaces and political discussions that are taking place on the social network site Facebook with regard to climate change issues. Following the Habermasian conception of the public sphere, as well as the empirical measurement of discourse quality index, the author approaches

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respect as an underlying value and category indicating the quality of online public deliberation. Even though there have been more respectful rather than offensive language expressions on Facebook, discussions on climate change provided certain patterns of indirect offensive language. One of the conclusions the author comes up with is audience polarization, meaning that particular support or hate group formations can be observed and characterized by narrow, one-sided and dogmatic discourse often involving confrontational and offensive behavior. For instance, people are more likely to offend outsiders rather than direct participants of the discussions. Also, public figures, such as politicians, government representatives, and local and national institutions, as well as experts, scientists and the media are most often being referred to in an offensive way in the online discussions. Thus, apart from the technological innovations and facilities available for citizens’ more active engagement into deterritorialized online communities, the quality of deliberated content depends on other factors like online culture and civic values. While communication technologies are creating new cultural and social environments, bridging geographical locations and time barriers, individuals are exposed to new opportunities to observe, experience and engage with the society, politics and community life through more active self-expression and participation in the mediated public sphere. The media have become one of the most important means of representing our social reality, while mediated communication definitely affects our daily lives, identities, self-presentations and interactions. In her contribution, Stacey May Koosel questions the role of social media networks, namely Facebook, in affecting Estonian artists’ professional and social reputations. Trying to identify the ways social media are used for self-presentation and personal information communication, on the basis of mediated identity narratives of the Estonian artists, the author disputes fundamental cultural transformations in a new era of digital dependence. The paradigmatic shift, the author is underlining, refers to the virtual reality which is gaining more and more relevance and diminishing the importance of the offline world. On one hand, the new social and cultural environment reinforces changing interactions, blurring lines between professional and personal information. On the other hand, it recreates and demonstrates social and professional alliances, and restructures the sense of self.

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The discourse of democratic media and sociopolitical change require one to consider other forms of mediated participation as a key category and condition for democracy. In the joint contribution “Local Radio – an Endangered Species? The Polish Case” by Stanislaw Jędrzejewski and Urszula Doliwa, a community media concept is examined conceptually and practically, on the basis of international, as well as Polish, experience of local radio management. Following the authors, community radio is usually operating on a voluntary and non-profit basis. Even more, it is built on the belief that community radio has to promote democratic processes, pluralism, diversity, tolerance and media autonomy, while focusing more on community development and identity building. However, local radio stations are also going through fundamental changes and are experiencing challenges related to commercialization, competition, and funding that makes their mission hardly reachable. In the second part of the paper, the authors discuss practical challenges and controversies local radio stations in Poland are facing from the legislative, organizational, technological and financial sustainability perspectives. The last two papers shed light on even more controversial and complex media challenges in the post-communist and authoritarian Belarus. Despite promising transformations that penetrated major political, economic, social and cultural structures in the beginning of 1990s, the democratization period was too short in the country. After two decades of Aleksandr Lukashenko’s presidency, the national media have been under state censorship and control, while the regime practices have remained antidemocratic, authoritarian and repressive with regard to journalists and the public. In her article “Two Realities of One Revolution: Coverage of Mass Protests of 2011 in State-Run and Independent Belarusian Media”, Tatsiana Karaliova compares media representations and discourses of the 2011 mass protests organized through social networks and covered in major Belarusian state-run and independent media. Despite a huge expansion of the Belarusian media market in the post-communist years, the challenges for democratic media market still persist. With significant state support, state-run media is much stronger and more influential in the country, while independent media is playing quite a marginal role as an alternative information source. The author identifies clear ideological cuts and contradictory realities in terms of news framing, diversity of voices, discursive strategies, language and rhetoric in the Introduction: Mediated participation in a digital age

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state-run and independent media in Belarus. Taking into account limited freedom of information in Belarus, Dzmitry Yuran’s research on audience choices and rationalities is particularly relevant. In his article “The Point of No Return: Belarusian Audience Refusal to Use Western Broadcast Media after Exposure to the Content”, the author argues that though media users are aware of the state control over the local media, they do not trust the Western media channels, either. People are critical about the Belarusian media, however, they are even more skeptic about the foreign media discourse, which is often regarded as irrelevant, misleading, opinionated and biased. In other words, while applying normative criteria towards Western media, research participants are less critical about the Belarusian media, which have become quite a sensitive, strategic and tactical mean in public opinion formation. The main research question raised by the author explores why alternative media sources, mainly Western media channels, do not gain public attention and are lacking legitimation in the Belarusian population. Even though access to different media channels and content are useful tools the democratizing potential of the new media depends on additional factors, namely social, political and economic structures that have been developing for centuries. On the other hand, no doubt that the precipitating processes of mediatization induce changes on the structural and individual levels that need to be addressed and negotiated from different conceptual and methodological outlooks. On behalf of the editorial board, we hope the critical issues approached, reasoned and deliberated in the contributions of this issue will enrich and stimulate academic discourse of media(ted) transformations with regard to political communication, public participation, democratic engagement, and the democratizing role of media in a political culture.

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REFERENCES Bauman, Z. (2005). Liquid Life. Cambridge: Polity Press. Cardoso, P. (2008). From Mass to Networked Communication: Communicational Models and the Informational Society. International Journal of Communication, Vol. 2, 587–630. Carpentier, N. (2011). Media and Participation: A Site of Ideological-Democratic Struggle. Bristol: Intellect. Castells, M. (2009). Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Vreese, C., M. Elenbaas (2008). Media in the Game of Politics: Effects of Strategic Metacoverage on Political Cynicism. The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 13, 285-309. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.1177/1940161208319650. Deuze, M. (2008). The Changing Context of News Work: Liquid Journalism and Monitorial Citizenship. International Journal of Communication, Vol. 2, 848-865. Hepp, A. (2013). Cultures of Mediatization. Polity Press. Hjarvard, S. (2013). The Mediatization of Culture and Society. Routledge. Livingstone, S. (2004). The Challenge of Changing Audiences: Or, What is the Audience Researcher to Do in the Age of the Internet? European Journal of Communication. Vol. 19 (1), 75-86. DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.1177/0267323104040695. Livingstone, S. (2009). On the Mediation of Everything: ICA Presidential Address 2008. Journal of Communication, Vol. 59 (1), 1-18. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01401.x. Norris, P. (2011). Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press. Papacharissi, Z. (2002). The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere. New Media & Society, Vol. 4, 9-27. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.1177/14614440222226244.

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Papacharissi, Z. (2013). A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age. Polity Press. Silverstone, R. (2007). Media and Morality: On the Rise of Mediapolis. Cambridge: Polity Press.

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DIGITAL WORLDS AND CIVIC OPPORTUNITIES: CONNECTING ONLINE AND OFFLINE ACTIVISM IN LITHUANIA Liepa V. BOBERIENĖ [email protected] PhD, Postdoctoral Fellow American Orthopsychiatric Association Washington DC, USA ABSTRACT: Although democratization via new media technologies has received considerable attention in recent years, empirical research is lacking. The opportunities offered by Internet engagement must be studied at the user-level, looking at individuals’ own grassroots participation. Lithuania serves as an interesting case study, as civic culture is developing simultaneously with the spread of new technologies. The purpose of this study was to examine the types of Internet participation and the civic attitudes that contribute to offline engagement in organizations, local community activities, and political discussions among Lithuanian university students. A 2012 web-based survey of 580 18- to 30-year-olds from five major Lithuanian universities provided evidence that strong associations exist between Internet engagement and structural features of society, civic attitudes, and civic activism offline. Internet activities, centred on social networking, information exchange, and political expression, provide opportunities for creative construction of communities and involvement in civil society. Such online experiences play an important role in shaping young adults’ social environments, where they experiment with interests and identities. By choosing the ways that they engage online, youth are active agents in their civic development. KEYWORDS: youth development, media technologies, civic participation, social networking, and political expression

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INTRODUCTION The information and communications technology (ICT) revolution calls for a re-examination of the nature of youth civic engagement, especially in young democracies such as Lithuania. Cyber-optimists hope new technologies will create an abundance of social networks that allow for decentralized democratization, while pessimists warn of the dangers of virtual sociality for real world activism (Ray, 2007). Civic literacies and behaviours are embedded in young people’s technology practices, which shape peer communities and social lives (Alvermann, 2002). Over the past few decades, opposing paradigms of civic culture have emerged, portraying youth as either passive and disengaged or active and engaged (Bennett, 2008). Some find that youth engage in new ways that are rapidly replacing old models of traditional political participation (e.g., Stolle, Hooghe, & Micheletti, 2005), and others have begun to investigate the use of new media for civic purposes, which foster new forms of citizenship, online and offline (e.g., Boyd, 2008; Coleman, 2008). ONLINE ENGAGEMENT AND OFFLINE ACTIVISM The Internet allows for interest-based communities that foster social capital—the norms, trust, and resources that lead to increased social involvement essential to democracy (Putnam, 2000; Scott & Johnson, 2005). As people network online, they can strengthen bonds as well as create new bridges (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007). For example, research indicates that Facebook users are three times more likely than others to feel that most people can be trusted (Hampton, Goulet, Rainie, & Purcell, 2011). Valenzuela and colleagues (2009) found that intensity of Facebook use correlated with students’ social trust, civic engagement, and political participation. Online communities can create a culture of participation, as individuals achieve goals while asserting personal values and social identities (Dahlgren, 2005). They have empowered youth to mobilize offline: students used MySpace profiles to organize nation-wide protests of U.S. immigration reform in 2006 (Boyd, 2008). People can access an abundance of information online, which supports the growth of large networks of activists who lead social action campaigns. Online political information access has been associated with greater political efficacy and participation (Kenski & Stroud,

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2006). Diani (2000) argued that as ICTs increase opportunities for communication and information-sharing, they broaden the support base for activism, help people identify with issues, and make transnational advocacy effective through coordination. For example, new technologies allow for increased transparency and political consumerism, as people incorporate social goals into their brand identity and support particular companies’ policies based on political or ethical considerations (Micheletti & Stolle, 2008). As youth interact online based on personal interests, such civic involvement becomes embedded in everyday life. The Internet also leads to an improved public space for debate, where young people discover political interest for themselves and practice civic skills, such as identifying issues, motivating others, and taking action. As Benkler (2006) argued, the digital generation is changing how people experience citizenship: “they no longer need to be consumers and passive spectators. They can become creators and primary subjects” (p. 272). Research indicates that youth participation has been enabled through new technologies, as 44% of young Internet users who joined discussion groups and read political blogs had not been politically engaged in the past (Graf & Darr, 2004). Gagnier (2008) found that the youth-created Mobilize.org has reduced feelings of political exclusion: as youth become engaged online, they bring attention to issues and implement their own solutions. Each of the Internet engagement pathways outlined above contributes to the civic socialization of youth. First, the Internet can lead to the emergence of wider participation in organizations. Those who use the Internet daily are more socially engaged offline than those who use it rarely or not at all (Lopez, Levine, Both, Kiesa, & Kirby, 2006). Second, studies show the Internet improves access to resources, which leads to greater activism locally (Valaitis, 2005). Shah, Kwak, and Holbert (2001) found that youth who use the Internet for information are more likely to get involved in local community activism. Third, through political expression online, youth may become interested in more significant community action and political discourse. In East Asia, those who used the Internet to express their views also displayed higher rates of community participation (Lin, Kim, Jung, & Cheong, 2005). Research in Finland indicated that those who were active in online politics increased their awareness

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and activity in a self-perpetuating cycle of knowledge and involvement (Grönlund, 2007). The research literature regarding Internet use and its effects on civic engagement is inconsistent. It is important to distinguish the specific ways in which individuals use the Internet when investigating effects on civic activism. There are differences in how researchers operationalize Internet use and civic engagement, as well as differences in approach to analysis. Studies have examined Internet access and hours of use (Jennings & Zeitner, 2003; Lopez, et al., 2006), different purposes of Internet use (Shah et al., 2005), or intensity of use (Valenzuela, Park, & Kee, 2009). Some scholars believe that the Internet will only activate citizens who are already interested in politics, by reducing costs of accessing information and offering convenient ways of engaging. Different motivations for Internet use affected engagement outcomes in Shah and colleagues’ (2001) study, in which Internet use for information exchange had a positive impact on local civic engagement and trust, but recreational Internet use did not. On the other hand, specific Internet activities, such as blogging and social networking, may alter the traditional patterns of political interest (Smith et al., 2009). CIVIC ATTITUDES AND ACTIVISM IN LITHUANIA Although Lithuania has had democratic institutions for over two decades, positive civic values are still developing as a societal norm (Degutis, Ramonaitė, & Žiliukaitė, 2008). A majority of Lithuanians believe government is unresponsive and national institutions cannot be trusted (Adomėnas et al., 2007; Mačiulytė & Ragauskas, 2007), and research suggests that about a third of the population refrain completely from civic initiatives (Romanchuk & Dambrauskaitė, 2010). According to Zimmerman (2000), empowerment requires individuals to practice their capacities to effect change. Conversely, inactivity reinforces negative civic attitudes, so that Lithuanians continue to avoid opportunities to experience their power as citizens (Žiliukaitė et al., 2006). However, youth may acquire positive civic values if they practice civic action. Internet engagement may provide opportunities for activism that are absent offline, and therefore lead to civic socialization and the development of trust and political efficacy.

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Online opportunities might encourage a more positive civic culture, breaking the cycle of powerlessness and apathy that currently exists in Lithuania. In Estonia, citizens are increasingly participating online to complement traditional practices, even though the population is generally politically passive (Reinsalu, 2009). This finding is particularly relevant for Lithuania, as both countries’ transitions to democracy were characterized by gaps between democratic institutions and civic culture, so that citizens remained alienated from politics after democratization. Areas of research inquiry include the relationships between Internet engagement and structural features, civic attitudes, and civic behaviours offline, as online action may either substitute for offline activities or support their development. Research questions include: Q1. How are government responsiveness and trust in institutions related to engagement in social networking, information exchange, and political expression online? Q2. How are social networking, information exchange, and political expression online related to values of interpersonal trust and political efficacy? Q3. To what extent does frequency of Internet engagement in social networking, information exchange, and political expression predict offline participation in organizations, community action, and political discourse? METHODOLOGY The purpose of this study was to examine the nature of Lithuanian youth Internet use and the types of online activities and civic norms that contribute to offline participation in organizations, community action, and political discourse. The study used a cross-sectional design to target 18- to 30-year-old college students at five universities in Lithuania: Vilnius University (VU), Vytautas Magnus University (VDU), Lithuanian University of Education (LEU), Klaipeda State College (KVK), and Vilnius Gediminas Technical University (VGTU). These students are at a critical stage for identity formation, as the increasing complexity of life in a globalized world lengthens adolescence and emerging adulthood (Larson, 2002).

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PARTICIPANTS

In total, 590 students filled out the questionnaire, and the sample was predominately young and female. 31%1 of respondents were 18 to 19, 40% were 20 to 21, 24% were 22 to 24, and 5% were 25 to 30. Respondents who were over 30 (n = 10) were excluded from analyses. A variety of faculties were represented: political science or international relations (19%), education or communication (13%), social sciences (12%), philosophy (11%), economics or business (9%), humanities (7%), natural sciences (7%), medicine (6%), mathematics or informatics (5%), philology (4%), creative industries (3%), law (2%), and fine arts (2%). Most respondents reported having completed some college education (58%) or having received a high school diploma (20%). Smaller proportions reported having received a Bachelor’s degree (8%), having some graduate education (11%), or having received a Master’s degree (3%). The sample represented moderate socioeconomic status (SES), based on the number of books present at home during childhood, which has been an effective indicator of SES in international studies of educational achievement, interpreted as a proxy for resources available to support literacy (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Almost half of respondents (46%) reported that they had more than 100 books at home. About 32% reported 51 to 100 books, 20% reported 11 to 50 books, and only 3% reported 0 to 10 books. At the same time, virtually the entire sample (99%) reported having Internet service at home currently. The majority of respondents had been using the Internet for 5 to 10 years. PROCEDURES

A professor from each of the five Lithuanian universities partnered with the researcher to disseminate the survey in the spring of 2012. The professors were sent informational letters, detailing the purpose of the research, potential risks and benefits of participation, the protection of confidentiality, the voluntary nature of the study, as well as contact information for questions. They were asked to forward the invitation to their students. A follow-up email was sent two weeks later to remind students about the opportunity. Respondents were invited to participate in a raffle for seven iPod shuffles upon com-

All percentages represent valid data, excluding missing cases. 1

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pleting the questionnaire. To enter, they emailed the researcher with a code displayed on the last page of the questionnaire, which ensured confidentiality of survey responses. MEASURES

The survey instrument contained 110 items. The study’s major contructs drew on the International Educational Achievement’s (IEA) Civic Education Study (Torney-Purta et al., 2001), the World Values Survey (2005), the European Values Study (2008), and the National Election Studies (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). The survey and invitations to participate were translated into Lithuanian by the researcher. These documents were then back-translated by a professional translator, and discrepancies were resolved by adjusting the Lithuanian version. Government Responsiveness. Government responsiveness was assessed using three political system items developed by Torney-Purta and colleagues (2001) and two external political efficacy items used by Niemi and colleagues (1991). Statements exploring attitudes toward government were rated on a five-point Likert scale. Items were tested for internal consistency reliability and found acceptable (α = .70). Trust in Institutions. Trust in national institutions was assessed using items developed by Torney-Purta and colleagues (2001) and items from the European Values Survey (2008). Response categories for how much participants can trust institutions ranged from 1 (do not trust at all) to 5 (trust completely). The eight items formed a reliable scale (α = .78) Internet Engagement. Although previous studies have examined Internet use for various purposes, no scale has been published that measures the range of new opportunities online. Therefore, an Internet engagement scale was developed to include activities related to social capital development, information exchange, and self-expression. Response categories included 1 (never), 2 (less than once a month), 3 (about once a month), 4 (a few times a month), 5 (about once a week), 6 (a few times a week), 7 (about once a day), and 8 (more than once a day).

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The study’s sample size (n= 580) allowed for factor analyses to investigate the latent structure of the data and establish factorial validity. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, indicating the amount of variance, revealed excellent factorability, KMO = .87, and, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, χ2 (276, n = 570) = 4021.25, p < .001. Principal axis factor analyses revealed that the majority of items loaded on three factors, which explained 36% of the total variance. Factors were grouped according to magnitude of beta loadings and logic (See Table 1). The three factors formed reliable scales related to social networking, (α = .80), information exchange (α = .83), and political expression, (α = .73). Table 1. Selected Factor Loadings for Internet Engagement Items.

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Convergent validity of Internet engagement scales was established through correlation analyses with civic attitudes and behaviours. As found in previous studies, Internet use for social networking, information exchange, and political expression was strongly associated (p < .001) with all civic activism measures: organizational participation (Jennings & Zeitner, 2003; Moy et al., 2005), civic engagement (Lin et al., 2005; Pasek et al., 2006; Valenzuela, Park, & Kee, 2009), and political discourse (Shah et al., 2005; Wellman et al., 2001; Xenos & Moy, 2007). Trust in Groups and Interpersonal Trust. Trust in groups was assessed using the items developed by Welzel (2010) for the World Values Survey. Response categories indicated degree of trust in various groups (e.g., dissimilar in belief or origin) from 1 (do not trust at all) to 5 (trust completely). The researcher applied a formative index logic to create an index of trust in groups. In addition, interpersonal trust investigated whether respondents thought that most people would try to take advantage of them if given the chance, or whether they would try to be fair, based on the European Values Study (2008). Response categories ranged from 1 (most people would try to take advantage of me) to 10 (most people would try to be fair to me). Political Efficacy. Feelings of personal competence to understand and participate in politics were assessed following the National Election Studies (Morrell, 2003; Niemi et al., 1991) and the IEA Civic Education Study (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Respondents were asked to rate agreement regarding four statements of confidence in political abilities on a Likert scale. The six items formed a reliable scale (α = .82). Organizational Participation. Organizational participation was assessed using items from Torney-Purta and colleagues’ (2001) membership items and the European Values Study’s (2008) voluntary organizations items. Respondents were asked whether they had participated in voluntary organizations and with what frequency: 0 (not a member), 1 (not very active member), or 2 (active member). Respondents also had the opportunity to write in other organizations that were not listed, which included: youth civic NGOs, organizations for people with disabilities, health organizations, academic and career groups, and an underground press. Scores on items were

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summed to create a scale where 0 was no participation and 26 was active participation in all types of organizations. Community Action. Frequency of participation in community activities, groups, and charities was measured using items from Torney-Purta and colleagues’ (2001) political action measure. Response categories included 1 (never), 2 (less than once a month), 3 (about once a month), 4 (a few times a month), 5 (about once a week), 6 (a few times a week), 7 (about once a day), and 8 (more than once a day). The six items formed a reliable scale (α = .73). Political Discourse. Face-to-face discussions about politics with peers, parents, teachers, and others were assessed using items from the IEA Civic Education study (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Answer categories included 1 (never), 2 (less than once a month), 3 (about once a month), 4 (a few times a month), 5 (about once a week), 6 (a few times a week), 7 (about once a day), and 8 (more than once a day). The scale proved reliable (α = .85). Socioeconomic Status. SES measures explored participants’ levels of education, the number of books in respondents’ homes when they were growing up (Torney-Purta et al., 2001), as well as whether their parents read books, discussed politics at home, followed the news, and whether they had problems making ends meet (reverse-coded) (European Values Study, 2008). Response categories were on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). APPROACH TO ANALYSIS

Response distributions were assessed for outliers, missing values, and skewness. Political expression online, organizational participation, and community action were positively skewed, indicating that most of the responses fell on the lower end of the frequency continuum. Non-linear transformations were conducted to improve their distributions for use in analyses that assume normality. Chi-square and correlation analyses were conducted to examine the effects of demographic and SES variables on Internet engagement in social networking, information exchange, and political expression. Pearson correlation analyses were also used to investigate the relationships between structural features (government responsiveness,

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trust in institutions) and civic attitudes (trust in groups, interpersonal trust, political efficacy) and Internet engagement. The effects of Internet engagement on offline activism were addressed through hierarchical multiple regression analyses predicting organizational participation, community action, and political discourse. The analyses investigated the unique contributions of SES, structural features, Internet engagement, and civic values on activism. Variables were selected based on correlations, and those that did not contribute significantly to each model’s explained variance were removed in order to create parsimonious models. Collinearity diagnostics and tolerance were examined to ensure that predictor variables were not overly correlated. RESULTS Descriptive statistics indicated that engagement in Internet activities was not a daily occurrence. Of the three types of Internet engagement, information exchange was the most common, with an average frequency of a couple times a week (M = 5.58). Respondents engaged in social networking only a few times a month, on average (M = 4.06). The least common type of engagement was political expression, with a rating of less than once a month (M = 1.49). Engagement in social networking, information exchange, and political expression did not differ significantly by age, gender, city, university, faculty, time using the Internet, or education level. However, significant differences were found in information exchange by number of books at home, χ2 (168, n = 532) = 211.64, p = .01, and respondents whose homes had the most books scored the highest on information exchange. All SES items were significantly correlated with at least one Internet engagement scale, suggesting that family upbringing is strongly associated with participation online (see Table 2).

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STRUCTURAL FEATURES AND CIVIC ATTITUDES

Research Questions 1 and 2, regarding structural features and civic attitudes, were addressed through Pearson correlation analyses. Greater perceptions of government responsiveness and confidence in public institutions were both associated with more frequent engagement online. Internet activities, especially information exchange, were also positively correlated with trust in groups, interpersonal trust, and political efficacy, as detailed in Table 2. Table 2. Correlation Coefficients between Internet Engagement and SES, Structural Features, and Civic Attitudes.

OFFLINE CIVIC ACTIVISM

A significant regression model predicting respondents’ levels of organizational participation explained 20% of the total variance in the scale, as shown in Table 3. Respondents’ perceptions of government responsiveness accounted for 4% of the variance, while social networking and political expression online accounted for about 16% above and beyond that. Standardized beta values showed that online social networking had the greatest impact on organizational participation. Although other variables (e.g., information exchange, civic attitudes) correlated with the criterion, they did not contribute to the model and were omitted.

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Table 3. Multivariate Regression Coefficients Predicting Organizational Participation.

A significant model of community action explained 41% of the total variance in the measure, as displayed in Table 4. The largest predictors of the criterion were social networking and political expression online. In this case, the unique contribution of these two variables was about 32%, above and beyond the effects of parents discussing politics and perceived government responsiveness. The effects of these variables may have overshadowed the effects of other variables correlated with community action (e.g., trust in institutions, political efficacy). Finally, a significant model of political discourse explained about 45% of the total variance in political discourse, as shown in Table 5. In this analysis, parents discussing politics explained about 16% of the variance, and information exchange and political expression online explained about 17% above and beyond background and structural variables. Feelings of political efficacy had the largest effect on political discourse. Although trust in institutions, social networking, and trust in groups correlated with political discourse, they did not contribute significantly to the model and were omitted.

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Table 4. Multivariate Regression Coefficients Predicting Community Action.

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Table 5. Multivariate Regression Coefficients Predicting Political Discourse.

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DISCUSSION This study examined the opportunities offered by Internet engagement at the user-level, looking at an individual’s own grassroots participation, within the political and cultural contexts of society. Several important findings emerged. First, the study supports a more comprehensive, multi-dimensional conceptualization of Internet engagement based on a variety of interpersonal and interactive activities which provide a myriad of opportunities to connect with others, learn and share, and creatively contribute to discourse. Results highlight the need to examine diverse types of Internet use for effects on civic engagement, as networking, learning, and expressing opinions online create opportunities for decentralized and individualized participation. Although some of the activities may not seem political, they increase social support (Hampton et al., 2011) and expand users’ knowledge of dissonant views (Garrett, 2006), which can lead to activism. The boundaries between political and social or personal activities online are porous, and strengthening values, sharing knowledge, and developing identities online may all fit into an expanded definition of civic or political engagement, as young people become active players in defining what politics means for their lives (Coleman, 2008; Collin, 2008). Creative and social uses of the Internet often represent new forms of activism in participatory communities that are missing from conventional channels of political communication (Harris, 2008). Unregulated public spaces provide opportunities for youth to communicate with others and express interests and concerns outside of traditional political mechanisms. Such activities contribute to civic socialization and offline activism despite a rejection of traditional power structures. POSITIVE STRUCTURAL FEATURES SUPPORT ENGAGEMENT

A second contribution of this study was the inclusion of perceived structural features of society, including government responsiveness and trust in institutions, in analyses predicting engagement. Results indicated that those who perceived more supportive governments and institutions were also more likely to engage frequently online. Furthermore, the relationship between government responsiveness

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and offline activism was robust across analyses, as perceived government responsiveness accounted for significant proportions of the variance in organizational participation, community action, and political discourse. These findings have important implications for power imbalances and youth engagement. Young adults from lower socioeconomic backgrounds did not take advantage of opportunities to engage in Internet social networking, information exchange, and political expression as often as did others—SES variables and structural features were significantly correlated with online engagement. Thus, youth who are more alienated from government and national institutions, and those coming from lower SES environments may remain marginalized, despite physical access to the Internet. Barriers to online participation may include low digital literacy, anxieties about the risks of new media, or fear of surveillance (Banaji, 2011). As producers of civic websites have pointed out, it is difficult to reach those on the fringes of society, and online social networks may actually deepen “the participation divide by giving the already active more access to public space and more practice at developing institutional, intercultural civic skills” (p. 138). These issues challenge the notion that the spread of new technologies have a universal democratizing effect. CONNECTING ONLINE AND OFFLINE ACTIVISM

A third contribution of this study was the large effect sizes found for offline activism: hierarchical multiple regression analyses using structural features, Internet engagement, and civic attitudes as predictors explained 20% of the variance in respondents’ organizational participation, 41% of the variance in community action, and 45% of the variance in political discourse. Internet engagement displayed powerful relationships with real-world participation, consistent with recent literature (e.g., Hampton et al., 2011; Valenzuela et al., 2009). Scholars have been concerned that face-to-face contact can decline as the Internet allows people to socialize, work, and be entertained online, and reduced social contact might lead to a decrease in trust and activism (see Ray, 2007). However, young adults in this study were active online and offline simultaneously. As found by Kittilson and Dalton (2011), virtual social activity can be as conducive for strengthening citizenship values as participation in face-to-face

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groups. Engagement in social networking, information exchange, and political expression online were significantly associated with respondents’ political efficacy. As suggested by other scholars, Internet features such as interactivity, personalization, and one-to-many communication may be uniquely empowering for users (Bimber & Davis, 2003). New media allow and require an active rather than a passive audience, and numerous opportunities to practice skills can have powerful effects on beliefs of self. This is especially meaningful for youth, who may otherwise feel a sense of powerlessness concerning communication with leaders and access to resources (Valaitis, 2005). Research suggests that these psychological effects can lead to concrete acts of civic engagement (Xenos & Moy, 2007). Although engagement in expressive activities online was the least common Internet dimension, it was meaningful for all measures of offline activism. This supports the framework developed by Bennett, Wells, and Freelon (2011), regarding youth preferences for expressive styles of citizenship over earlier models of dutiful citizenship. Bennett (2008) suggested the rise of “actualizing citizenship,” involving personal engagement with causes through individual expression and peer networks that organize civic action. The segment of Lithuanian young adults who used the Internet for expressive activities may have developed stronger feelings of competence to mobilize offline. Indeed, political efficacy emerged as the strongest predictor of political discourse. Individuals who gained experience creating content and sharing opinions online may have been prepared to overcome challenges offline. Interestingly, trust was not a significant predictor across offline participation variables. Traditional theories of civil society development point to interpersonal trust as a prerequisite for civic activities (Putnam, 2000); however, these attitudes may be slow to develop among Lithuanian young adults, who have grown up in a time of uncertainty regarding civic action (Degutis et al., 2008). Research indicates that experiences with political corruption can lead to decreases in generalized trust (Uslaner, 2001). Because youth internalize values through existing socialization processes, value change does not come about easily (Welzel & Inglehart, 2010). Still, the spread of civic en-

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gagement may bring about more positive civic attitudes, as meaningful civic experiences increase feelings of interpersonal trust. CIVIC SOCIALIZATION AND IDENTITY FORMATION ONLINE

Although online interactions are often impersonal, they are rooted in real-world social networks, shared systems of meaning, and tacit knowledge. Thus, the Internet remains embedded in local cultures that may have powerful effects, and civic values may be slow to mature. Still, online communities play an important role in shaping young adults’ peer environments as youth overcome the limits of their particular locations by establishing meaningful social experiences online. The Internet enlarges the scope of interactions, opens new paths of communication, and provides opportunities for more individualized involvement with information. All of these opportunities allow young adults to consider identity alternatives, experiment with interests, and evaluate their abilities. By choosing the ways that they engage online, individuals are active agents in their own civic development. Such personalization allows young adults to actively construct new systems of meaning and new roles for citizenship, and such creative engagement can increase feelings of agency (Collin, 2008). As youth discover self-defining activities through a wide range of online tools that provide a good fit between their talents and their sense of purpose, they may take on new identities (Waterman, 2004). This study found that the Lithuanian youth that actively engaged online as organizers or producers of civic content were also more empowered offline, engaging in organizations, community activism, and political discourse. As increasing volumes of information and tools move online, the ability not only to access them but also to creatively contribute to them may become crucial to civic socialization and participation in community life. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Although this study established knowledge regarding the nature and extent of Internet engagement and civic attitudes and behaviours among self-selected students in Lithuania, several important limitations must be considered. Given the cross-sectional nature of the study, the causal directions between constructs remained unclear. Young adults who are already interested in civic life may use the In-

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ternet according to their motivations. Online and offline activities seem to be mutually beneficial. There is a need for long-term analyses or experiments that use random sampling or random assignment in order to investigate the nature and magnitude of these effects as they change over time or across conditions. Another limitation was the use of an online survey that targeted university students. The sample was not nationally representative, so results could not be generalized to Lithuanian young adults as a whole. The use of an online survey also created self-selection bias, as those who had access to the Internet came from higher SES backgrounds and may have had more time and resources to engage in civic activities. Thus, using an online survey methodology produced results that characterized the tendencies of youth who use the Internet, not average youth. However, because the study’s purpose was to investigate relationships between online engagement and civic participation, it made sense to target Internet-users. Furthermore, Internet use did not guarantee engagement in social networking, information exchange, or political expression, and the sample included a range of students who exhibited low and high engagement. Future research could apply the Internet engagement scales to more diverse populations, both in Lithuania and in other countries. Given that greater numbers of youth are embedded in multiple contexts online and offline, civic research must reach diverse participants using diverse methods. Qualitative research may be useful in re-conceptualizing important indicators of civic health. Content analyses of popular websites may be able to provide a more detailed picture of the types of websites that young adults engage in and the kinds of networking, information exchange, and public discourse that provide meaningful contributions to civic socialization. Such analyses could target neighbourhood forums, public policy debates, or users’ own creative websites and blogs. Both the technological capabilities of the Internet and the actual content accessed may influence students’ attitudes and behaviours. CONCLUSION The Internet exists within different social, political, and cultural contexts, and fostering a healthy media culture for youth depends on research on how digital technologies can best serve the goals of free-

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dom and democracy in different cultures. Civic socialization will not occur simply by connecting every citizen to the Internet, unless individuals take advantage of opportunities to participate. Marginalized groups still face barriers; however, for those who do engage, online public spheres may improve civic activism and involve more actors. Online, youth can find others who share their interests, contribute knowledge to others around the world, and creatively participate in discourse and self-governance. As individuals’ choices contribute to larger societal trends, youth participation may act as a catalyst to broader civic reform. REFERENCES Adomėnas, M., Augustinaitis, A., Janeliūnas, T., Kuolys, D., Motieka, E. (2007). Lithuanian Society: Analysis of the Situation and Development Prospects. Civil Society Institute. Retrieved July 1, 2013, from http://www.civitas.lt/en/?pid=24&id=44. Alvermann, D. E. (ed.) (2002). Adolescents and Literacies in a Digital World. New York, NY: Peter Lang. Banaji, S. (2011). Framing Young Citizens: Explicit Invitation and Implicit Exclusion on Youth Civic Websites. Language & Intercultural Communication, Vol. 11, 126–141. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080 /14708477.2011.556738. Benkler, Y. (2006). The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Bennett, W. L. (2008). Changing Citizenship in the Digital Age. In W. L. Bennett (ed.), Civic Life Online: Learning How Digital Media Can Engage Youth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1–24. Bennett, W., Wells, C., Freelon, D. (2011). Communicating Civic Engagement: Contrasting Models of Citizenship in the Youth Web Sphere. Journal of Communication, Vol. 61, 835–856. DOI: http://dx. doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01588.x. Bimber, B. A., Davis, R. (2003). Campaigning Online: The Internet in U.S. elections. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Boyd, D. (2008). Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Digital worlds and civic opportunities: Connecting online and offline activism in Lithuania

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Publics in Teenage Social Life. In D. Buckingham (ed.), Youth, Identity, and Digital Media. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 119–142. Coleman, S. (2008). Doing IT for Themselves: Management Versus Autonomy in Youth E-Citizenship. In W. L. Bennett (ed.), Civic Life Online: Learning How Digital Media Can Engage Youth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 189–206. Collin, P. (2008). The Internet, Youth Participation Policies, and the Development of Young People’s Political Identities in Australia. Journal of Youth Studies, Vol. 11, 527–542. Dahlgren, P. (2005). The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation. Political Communication, Vol. 22, 147–162. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.1080/10584600590933160. Degutis, M., Ramonaitė, A., Žiliukaitė, R. (2008). Civic Empowerment Index: 2007. Civil Society Institute. Retrieved July 1, 2013, from http://www.civitas.lt/en/?pid=24&id=81. Diani, M. (2000). Social Movement Networks Virtual and Real. Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 3, 386–401. DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691180051033333. Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., Lampe, C. (2007). The Benefits of Facebook “Friends”: Social Capital and College Students Use of Online Social Network Sites. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 12, 1143–1168. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.10836101.2007.00367.x. European Values Study (2008). Master Questionnaire. Retrieved July 1, 2013, from http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu. Gagnier, C. (2008). Democracy 2.0: Millennial-Generated Change to American Governance. National Civic Review, Vol. 97, 32–36. Garrett, R. (2006). Protest in an Information Society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements and New ICTs. Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 9, 202–224. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.1080/13691180600630773.

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Graf, J., Darr, C. (2004). Political Influentials Online in the 2004 Presidential Campaign. Institute for Politics, Democracy, and the Internet. Retrieved July 1, 2013, from http://www.ipdi.org/UploadedFiles/political%20influentials.pdf. Grönlund, K. (2007). Knowing and Not Knowing: The Internet and Political Information. Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 30, 397– 418. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00186.x. Hampton, K., N., Goulet, L., S., Rainie, L., Purcell, K. (2011). Social Networking Sites and Our Lives. Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project. Retrieved July 1, 2013, from http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Technology-and-social-networks.aspx. Harris, A. (2008). Young Women, Late Modern Politics, and the Participatory Possibilities of Online Cultures. Journal of Youth Studies, Vol. 11, 481–495. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13676260802282950. Jennings, M., Zeitner, V. (2003). Internet Use and Civic Engagement. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 67, 311–334. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.1086/376947. Kenski, K., Stroud, N. J. (2006). Connections Between Internet Use and Political Efficacy, Knowledge, and Participation. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, Vol. 50, 173–192. Kittilson, M., Dalton, R. (2011). Virtual Civil Society: The New Frontier of Social Capital? Political Behavior, Vol. 33, 625–644. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9143-8. Larson, R. (2002). Globalization, Societal Change, and New Technologies: What They Mean for the Future of Adolescence. Journal of Research on Adolescence, Vol. 12, 1–30. Lin, W., Kim, Y., Jung, J., Cheong, P. (2005). Growing Up Digital: Exploring Youth’s Civic Uses of the Internet in Digital Cities of East Asia. Presentation at the International Communication Association Conference. Lopez, M. H., Levine, P., Both, D., Kiesa, A., Kirby, E., Marcelo, K. (2006). The 2006 Civic and Political Health of the Nation: A Detailed Look at How Youth Participate in Politics and Communities. College

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Shah, D., Cho, J., Eveland, J., Kwak, N. (2005). Information and Expression in a Digital Age: Modeling Internet Effects on Civic Participation. Communication Research, Vol. 32, 531–565. DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.1177/0093650205279209. Shah, D., Kwak, N. R., Holbert, L. (2001). “Connecting” and “Disconnecting” with Civic Life: Patterns of Internet Use and the Production of Social Capital. Political Communication, Vol. 18, 141–162. Smith, A., Schlozman, K. L., Verba, S., Brady, H. (2009). The Internet and Civic Engagement. Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project. Retrieved July 1, 2013, from http://www.pewinternet. org/Reports/2009/15--The-Internet-and-Civic-Engagement.aspx. Stolle, D., Hooghe, M., Micheletti, M. (2005). Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism As a Form of Political Participation. International Political Science Review, Vol. 26, 245–269. DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512105053784. Torney-Purta, J., Lehmann, R., Oswald, H., Schulz, W. (2001). Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen. Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement. Uslaner, E. M. (2001). Producing and Consuming Trust. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, 569–590. Valaitis, R. (2005). Computers and the Internet: Tools for Youth Empowerment. Journal of Medical Internet Research, Vol. 7, 1–17. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/jmir.7.5.e51. Valenzuela, S., Park, N., Kee, K. (2009). Is There Social Capital in a Social Network Site?: Facebook Use and College Students’ Life Satisfaction, Trust, and Participation. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 14, 875–901. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ j.1083-6101.2009.01474.x. Waterman, A. S. (2004). Finding Someone to Be: Studies on the Role of Intrinsic Motivation in Identity Formation. Identity: International Journal of Theory and Research, Vol. 4, 209–228. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.1207/s1532706xid0403_1.

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ISSN 2029-865X doi://10.7220/2029-865X.10.03

(DIS-)RESPECTFUL PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS ONLINE: INSIGHTS ON AUDIENCE POLARIZATION AND FORMATION OF RADICAL HATE OR SUPPORT GROUPS Inesa BIRBILAITĖ [email protected] PhD, Lecturer Department of Public Communications Vytautas Magnus University Kaunas, Lithuania

ABSTRACT: Debates related to the quality of online discussions are quickly engaging scholars from different fields, but still, there is no single answer if we can expect online discussions to be deliberative enough for the establishment and maintenance of a well-functioning public sphere online. In this paper, I presume that respect is an essential category determining overall quality of online public discussions. Therefore, I assess if discussions from a preselected Facebook page on climate change are respectful. I find that in comparison to similar face-to-face settings, members of preselected discussions are quite respectful to each other. On the other hand, foul language is often used to address outside actors or groups. In turn, I link these results to the phenomenon of audience polarization online and conclude that in my sample, discussions cannot be of good quality because they are dominated by similarly thinking members, which possibly leads to polarization and generation of support and/or hate groups. KEYWORDS: audience polarization, hate and support groups online, respectful discourse, deliberation

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INTRODUCTION Respect is a crucial category in determining the quality of public discussions as well as an important indicator revealing the existence of a well-functioning public sphere1 online. If the discussions between citizens and policy makers are based on disrespectful and offensive language, it cannot be expected that rational deliberation will be reached and a well-functioning public sphere will be established. Therefore, in this paper I measure the level of respect in pre-selected Web 2.0 based online communication environments in order to assess and define the quality of public discussions online and evaluate potentials for a well-functioning public sphere to emerge and develop in Web 2.0 based online communication environments. But first, why it is important to discuss the quality of virtual public discussions and the formation of a well-functioning public sphere online? In this paper, I consider a number of reasons, which are closely interconnected and condition each other; and which explain the possible importance of public online discussions. First of all, emerging new global risk-related problems, such as climate change, virtual wildfires, and health crises, among others, require crucial changes in global and local political and social systems, including changing relations between citizens and policy makers, which in turn raises the question of shifting democratic traditions (i.e. deliberative turn). In this sense, discussions online could possibly constitute a core of deliberations where major issues could be discussed between citizens and preliminary decisions reached. Secondly, a deliberative turn in policy making is determined also by the recognition of limitations and uncertainties of traditional political and scientific practices (especially related to the emergence of phenomenon of post-normal science or the politics of uncertainty) indicating that any scientific or political decision can be questionable and is not absolute. This means that there is no single and correct answer; therefore, we ourselves (in consultations with experts) have to decide which way to take it. Such a situation requires reassessment of traditional forms of policy and science making, preferably by increasing the level of democratization (e.g., democratization of science and deliberative democracy). Hence, the third point deals with democratization, which is

In this paper, I perceive the concept of a well-functioning public sphere following Habermasian tradition. Specifically, I assume that a public sphere is well-functioning when it corresponds to the main criteria listed by Habermas – participation, respect, listening, justification, force of better argument, and truthfulness; however, here I limit my analysis to the category of respect, as I believe it is the most essential in defining level of audience polarization, which is the major obstacle for quality deliberation to occur. 1

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perceived as a stronger and closer connection between citizens and policy makers. It is important because if the citizens’ positions are not properly considered by policy makers, the gap between the citizens’ aspirations and satisfaction with democratic politics increases, in turn causing democratic deficit and leading to declining public trust and support for political actors (Norris, 2011). The public’s trust and support for political decisions are indeed important when dealing with new global risks, because they require global solutions, which are based on local or even personal initiatives and actions. In other words, there is no global effect if actions are not taken at a personal level. To foster and maintain the quality of recent democracies, communication between society and policy-makers are crucial. Fortunately, new information and communication technologies provide current democracies with unprecedented virtual environments, where two-way communication between citizens and their representatives becomes possible. New discursive spaces are being established, enabling new and possibly more democratic relations between citizens and policy makers. Some scholars express huge hopes for the Internet as a new type of public sphere, (Kenix, 2008; Dutton, 2009; Armstrong and Zúniga, 2006; Reynolds and Ball, 2006; Benkler, 2006; Xenos and Bennett, 2007; Dahlgren, 2005) arguing that online communication environments help to improve communication practices (e.g., enable multi-directional communicational modes) and serve in democratizing the ways in which news can be generated and disseminated (Cox, 2013). Few go even further, suggesting that online communication environments also provide citizens with unprecedented communicative power. Meanwhile, others remain skeptical and point to different obstacles, including increasing individualization, audience fragmentation, and polarization (Sunstein, 2001; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010; Putnam, 2000; Bennett, 1998, 2012; Habermas, 2006) that prevent the formation of a well-functioning public-sphere online. Hence, the major goal of this paper is to bring some clarity into these theoretical discussions by generating some empirical evidence.

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METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY Data for the empirical research was collected from the Facebook page UN Climate Change Conference, 2009 created for the 15th Conference of Parties also known as COP15 meeting. This annual global conference was organized in Copenhagen in 2009 with the major hope to establish a new climate change document, which would replace the Kyoto Protocol. However, the outcomes of the meeting were not as expected and led to public disappointment and dissatisfaction. This conference, in general, is a good example, demonstrating that traditional democratic ways of policy-making are no longer sufficient in effectively dealing with recent global risks and uncertainties (Birbilaitė, 2013). In particular, no global-binding agreements were reached at the COP15 and in turn, while some countries took independent actions to fight climate change on their own, others still wait. Besides, during the conference, another important trend was noticed – surprisingly intense global public discussions occurring online on climate change. I assessed the level of respect of each comment posted on the Facebook page UN Climate Change Conference, 2009. The final sample constituted 156 wall-posts published by the page moderator(s) and 2788 comments made by 1424 active participants. Data analysis was performed in two stages. Following them, I provide the results in this paper. First, I discuss descriptive analysis of my data. In addition, I compare results to other similar investigations where the same instrument was used to measure discourse quality in face-toface discussions. Namely, I selected two PhD studies performed by Ugarriza (2011) and Caluwaerts (2012)2. While the discussions between ex-combatants of Columbia analysed in the first dissertation by Ugarriza demonstrated a low-level of deliberation, the second study reported rather high-quality discussions between linguistically divided citizens of Belgium. Hence, I aimed to identify where, in comparison with these different studies, my discussions, in terms of respect, stands. Further, I proceed to a more in-depth analysis of empirical data, aiming to identify significant internal and external factors, which might influence variations of quality level.

Both studies were performed as a part of a larger research project on deliberation in deeply divided societies, coordinated by Jürg Steiner, professor at the University of Bern (Switzerland) and University of North Carolina (the USA). The project had an explicit comparative aim of determining the favorable conditions for deliberation in deeply divided societies. 2

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HOW TO MEASURE LEVEL OF RESPECT? – A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE DISCOURSE QUALITY INDEX Discourse quality index (DQI) was the main instrument used to collect and analyse empirical data. Although, this instrument was created to primarily analyse the quality of official face-to-face discussions (e.g., parliamentary debates) my research proves that with minor changes it can easily be adapted to study online content. The core of this index lies in the Habermasian theory of Communication action. In particular, it closely follows six normative discourse conditions discussed by Habermas: participation, respect, justification, common good, force of better argument, and truthfulness. Although some scholars criticize the DQI for being too focused on discourse itself while ignoring the broader context in which discourse takes place (O’Brien, 2009) or for distorting Habermasian ideals because it reduces them to observable phenomena and fails to measure discourse accurately and objectively (King, 2009), Habermas himself applauds the instrument and notices that the DQI captures ‘essential features of proper deliberation’ (Habermas in Bächtinger et al., 2010). Inventors of the DQI agree that coding following the DQI can be subjective and, therefore, requires broader interpretations (Steiner, 2012). For the purpose of the present paper, I applied the DQI to measure the category of respect in chosen online discussions. Category of respect in the updated version of the DQI is measured in two stages. First, the researcher examines if foul language is used towards participants of the discourse (at a personal level) or towards their arguments. If yes, such contributions are coded under the group of foul language type I (FL I). Contributions that contain foul language at a personal level are considered to be least deliberative. Second, all contributions are assessed for the existence of respectful language towards other participants (at a personal level) and/or their arguments – respectful language type I (RL I). As noticed by Talpin (2011), for ordinary citizens public expression of disagreement is a difficult move, agreement (arising as respectful language) might be a more favourable way to express positions and also oppositions. Hence, comments containing respectful language towards discourse participants (at a personal level) or towards their comments are perceived as most deliberative, because the participant

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expresses his/her position (positive, negative or neutral) in a respectful way without any offensiveness. In addition to the traditional DQI measurements of the category of respect, in my analysis I also considered respect towards participants who did not directly participate (i.e. politicians, experts, scientists, and others) in the discussions but were important actors of the discourse. I called these indicators foul language type II (FL II) and respectful language type II (RL II). I assumed that when dealing with the quality of online discussions these indicators might be significant, especially considering scholarly literature stressing that online discussions encourage public polarization, formation of hate groups, and might greatly determine low quality of the discourse. Before turning to the analysis of the empirical data, it is important to ascertain that the coding process was reliable. Since the entire empirical data of this research project was collected and coded by only one coder, I also performed an inter-coder reliability test. Hence, after the main researcher coded the data, the DQI was introduced and explained to four other coders, who were third year bachelor students. One discussion was coded together with students and afterwards they were asked to analyse four separate, randomly selected discussions following the DQI. In total, 192 comments were re-coded. In general, results indicated that the coding process was reliable, as the overall ratio of coding agreement (RCA) was 0.9353, which means that coders agreed on 93.5 per cent of the cases. Category of respect demonstrated very high level of inter-coder reliability. Coders agreed on all cases of category RL II, there was a perfect inter-coder agreement (1.000). RCA for RL I was 0.990 and for FL I – 0.974. Yet, a quite low level of reliability was achieved while coding category of FL II (0.828). This can be explained by the fact that sometimes, for additional coders, it was difficult to distinguish between slight foul languages pointed to outside actors or their thoughts, i.e. what was considered to be slight foul language by the main coder to others seemed to be simply strong contra-argument. In other words, the main coder was, in general, stricter. However, Cohen’s kappa indicated that the level of agreement was moderate but acceptable (Landis and Koch, 1977).

Here I refer to overall ration of coding agreement (RCA), which is an average measure of RCA of all categories, including participation, respect, listening, justification, common good, force of better arguments and additional measurements (type of communication, consistency, and sourcing). 3

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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Foul and respectful language type I: One can expect that in Web 2.0 based online communication environments, foul language is used more frequently and more freely (Steiner, 2012); however, the level of respect in my sample did not actually differ a lot compared to previous face-to-face studies. Namely, comparing frequencies of foul language in three research works, it was noticed that discussions under consideration were somewhere in between. Specifically, foul language (FL I) in my sample was less frequent when compared to the case of linguistically divided Belgians, but more frequent than reported by Ugarriza (2011) in his research on discussions by ex-combatants of Columbia (see Table 1). On the other hand, comments from my sample more often contained foul language towards individuals at a personal level than towards arguments (1.4 versus 0.3 respectively), which was similar to the Columbian discourse between ex-combatants. This implied a lower level of respect, because in qualitative discussions disagreements based on a personal level cannot be prioritized; instead personal matters should be silent in the name of common good. Table 1. Absolute and relative frequency distributions of foul and respectful language towards participants of the discourse.

In contrast to previous researches, where severe foul language was not recorded at all, I did find some examples of strong foul expressions, especially in those cases where offensive language was pointed towards discourse participants at a personal level. Participants were called idiots, freaks, fools, etc. For instance, in one comment a participant criticized the performance of the UN and named those who supported the UN – “dupes”: “Seriously, does anyone with any intel-

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ligence want the UN in charge of anything? You are all dupes”. Foul language was also used towards arguments. Participants were attacked for their positions or opinions. In the following example, the participant was assaulted for his/her comment about the magnitude of US pollution, claiming that the US was responsible for only five per cent of the world’s pollution. The argument was demolished in a disrespectful way: “WTF?!!??!!”. Capital letters, exclamation and question marks emphasized the level of outrage and made this comment even more offensive. Respectful expressions in the sample in general were more frequent than offensive ones. This might be a good sign, suggesting a higher quality of public discussions. Respectful language in many cases was used in order to support previous arguments and included such phrases as very well said, I fully agree, happy to hear that, brilliant, etc. For instance, to the comment criticizing US president Obama, a participant replied: “Thanks, XXX. We're on the same page. Obama is doing lots of talking, but taking no action”. Results are somehow close to the findings reported by Caluwaerts (2012). The author elaborated that probably participants were looking for more respectful ways to express their disagreements: instead of using foul language they more frequently tended to explicitly and respectfully agree with one group in such a way, demonstrating their opposition and disagreement with other groups and avoiding conflict. On the other hand, the discussions between ex-combatants demonstrated much lower levels of respect. Although participants did not offend each other very often (0.9%), surprisingly they were even less engaged in a respectful manner (0.8%). It is likely that painful events of the past determined a closed manner of discussions between past enemies, where participants did not want to either start a fight nor make friends with the other side. Meanwhile, my example also contributes to the idea that people in general are more likely to agree than disagree. However, in my case, this data might be explained in different terms of online cultures and instead of indicating a higher level of respect, might be an important sign of audience polarization and hate/support group formation online. Overall, the results in this section were rather surprising. I expected the discourse to be much more offensive because of well known char-

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acteristics of online discursive spaces (e.g., anonymity), global origin of the discourse (leading to more diverse attitudes, experiences, and positions), and contradicting origin of the topics under discussion. However, relying on our data, it seems that, probably, direct offensiveness towards participants is not a major problem for a well-functioning public sphere to exist, instead, there are other concerns. Foul and respectful language type II: Already, in the initial phase of study, I observed that strong, angry, or offensive language was more often pointed towards outside individuals than towards direct participants of the discussions. Later on, this remark was supported by empirical evidence. I counted comments expressing foul language towards outside actors and their ideas and found that in 118 comments (4.2%) participants spoke about outside individuals using foul language and in 118 comments (4.2%) foul language was used towards their ideas or thoughts (see Table 2). Caluwaerts (2012) and Ugarriza (2011) did not measured FL II and RL II. Table 2. Absolute and relative frequency distributions of foul language towards outsiders.

Politicians, governments, local and global institutions, experts, media, and scientists were the most frequently offended actors. For instance, during the conference, one participant expressed his/her dissatisfaction about the performance of the governments of the world in the Summit. S/he posted: “Stupid governments of the World: Use the money you are wasting on talks and begin building shelter cities, detention camps and food reserves .” On the other hand, respectful language towards outside individuals or groups was used similarly, compared to respectful language towards discourse participants. In those cases, politicians, media, investors and others were supported in a respectful way. In many examples the president of the US, Barack Obama, was respectfully supported and encouraged for major steps. For instance, one participant replied to the wall-post under the headline “Obama putting 3.4 billion US dollars toward a 'smart' power grid”. The participant

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expressed his/her excitement and support for Obama – “Nice Job Obama!” The exclamation mark indicates that the participant was highly excited. Although rare, I found some examples where investors were also applauded. In the following comment, a participant expressed his/her support for the US investor George Soros who announced that he would invest one billion US dollars in clean energy technology: “It's a great investment from Soros for longevity of life on earth. Hope and wish Like XXX, there are stringent watchdogs to oversee the framing of right policies and subsequently their powerful implementation with the strong will of top politicians in every nation to aggressively drive this drive to its logical conclusion”. Following findings in this section, my assumptions about audience polarization and hate/support group formation might be supported: participants tended to treat each other in a more respectful way which is characteristic for polarized audiences, and at the same time fostered each other’s (positive and negative) emotions about outside actors (by referring to them using foul or respectful language) in turn forming and maintaining radical support or hate groups. EXPLAINING VARIATIONS OF THE DELIBERATIVE QUALITY: TIMING AS AN EXPLANATORY FACTOR Now that we know the basic characteristics of the sample, we may proceed to more comprehensive explanations of the data and explore what effects different factors might have on the category of respect. In particular, let me explain how the level of respect was influenced by the external factor of time. In light of the general context of the conference, I explain the variation of respect in three time periods: pre-conference (20 April, 2009 – 7 December, 2009 or 223 days), during-conference (8 December, 2009 – 18 December, 2009 or 11 days), and post-conference (19 December, 2009 – 27 September, 2010 or 283 days) (see Table 3). Data indicated that the majority of the wall-posts were generated before the Summit. That was not surprising because the pre-conference period was long (yet not the longest). It started on 20th April, 2009 and lasted for 226 days. On average, every second day the modera-

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tor(s) introduced new wall-posts, which were followed by a total of 1553 comments. Moderator(s) actively stimulated discussions with new wall-posts likely aiming to inform, engage publics, and retain the pace of discussions. The rather low level of the public’s participation might be explained by the fact that it took some time to attract the public’s attention, gather Facebook users around the discussions, and engage them into the discourse before the event started. Table 3. Wall-posts and comments within three time-periods..

Categorical variables were compared using Pearson’s Chi-Squared test. Significant differences were followed by post-hoc analysis using Pearson’s Chi-Squared test or Fisher’s exact test when appropriate. Value of p