Mecano v. COA, GR No. 103982 11 December 1992, Campos, JR., J

 

Mecano v. COA, GR No. 103982 11 December 1992, Campos, Jr., J.

Facts:   Facts: Antonio Mecano, petitioner, a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation, filed a petition for certoriari to nullify the decision of Commission of Audit (COA) in the 7th  Indorsement denying him of reimbursement anchored on the provisions of Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) in the amount of Php 40,831.00. Earlier, the petitioner was hospitalized because of cholecystitis and incurred the abovementioned amount. Under Sec. 699 of RAC, he is entitled to allowances in case of injury, sickness, death incurred in the performance of duty. Hence, the petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses to NBI Director Alfredo Lim forwarding the request to the Secretary of Justice. The request was returned due to the comments of the COA Chairman stating that the RAC being relied upon was already repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. The petitioner resubmitted the request asserting that the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the RAC, including Section 699. Director Lim transmitted the request to the Justice Secretary who recommended the payment to the COA Chairman. The COA Chairman again denied the request asserting the same reason and furthered that Section 699 was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. According to the COA Chairman, the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987. Eventually, the request was again returned to Director Lim with an advice of elevating the matter in the Supreme Court if he so desires. Issue:   Issue: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Ruling: No. The legislature did not intend, in enacting the new Code, to repeal Sec. 699 of the old code. The new Code did not expressly repeal the old as the new Code fails to identify or designate the act to be repealed. Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read re ad in pari materia.

DOCTRINE:

General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where two

 

statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore specially should prevail.

PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO & ANTONIO C. VASCO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES & CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, respondents. [G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988 ] FACTS:  The Republic of the Philippines (RP) through the Civil A FACTS:  Aeronautics eronautics Administration (CAA) entered into a lease contract (Contract A) on April 2, 1965 with Rosario Rosar io C. Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years. On May 21, 1965, another lease contract (Contract B and in effect e ffect a sublease) was entered into by and between Rosario C. Leveriza and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. (MOPI) over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years. On June 1, 1968, a new lease contract (Contract C) was entered into, by and between CAA and MOPI over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years, without the approval of the secretary of the t he Public Works and Communications (PWC). Due to the overlapped term of the lease contracts between CAA, Leveriza and MOPI, the CAA seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground tthat hat Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the CAA and maintains that Contract C with the CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned. On the other hand, Leverizas' claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally le gally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between MOPI and CAA which should be declared void. The lower court and Intermediate Appellate Court ruled in favor of CAA, hence, tthis his present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the administrator of CAA had the statutory authority, without the approval of the then secretary of the PWC, to enter into or cancel a lease contract over a real property owned by the RP. HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court upheld CAA’s authority to enter into and cancel a contract of lease over a property owned by the RP without the approval of the secretary of the PWC. Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), such contract of lease must be executed: (1) by the President of the Philippines, or (2) by an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an officer expressly e xpressly vested by law. It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under the third category. As provided in Section 32 of Republic R epublic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation and existence, administers properties belonging to the t he Republic of the Philippines and it is on these properties that the Administrator must exercise exer cise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary.

 

The basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally gene rally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of equal e qual theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore specially should prevail.

Luzon Development Bank vs Association vs Association

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995 Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion. At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same. Issue: Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities Held: Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise: (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

 

  The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein. This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected. correcte d. In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED. IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS 249 SCRA 538October 25 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 272 dated August 9, 1973 in order, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years, and when ISA s original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation, which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSCs. Since certain portions of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated 16 November 1982, was issued d directing irecting the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation compensation of MCFC s present occupancy occupancy rights on the su subject bject land. LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private respondent respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of 60 days from the date of the LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC. Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term. HELD: Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical personality but did not possess general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Government of the t he Republic of the Philippines. ISA may thus be properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. When the statutory term of a nonincorporated expires, powers, duties and functions as the assets and liabilities of that agency revertagency back to, and arethe re-assumed by, the Republic of as thewell Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic. In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272.From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings. CRISOSTOMO vs COURT OF APPEALS APP EALS 258 SCRA 134 Status and Characteristics Creation, Reorganization, and Abolition of Administrative Agencies FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of the Philippines on July 17, 1974. During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two administrative cases were filed against petitioner, which were filed with the Office of the President, and were subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, as amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976, and then as Acting President on May 13, 1977. On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS. Mateo continued as the head of the t he new University. On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of six (6)years. On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of the charges against him. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Prac tices Act, and under which the accused has been suspended by

 

this Court in an Order dated October 22, 1976, said accused was ordered reinstated to the position of President of the Philippine College of Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, from which he has been suspended. By virtue of said reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive receive during suspension, unless in the meantime meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional liberty in these cases are hereby cancelled cance lled and released. On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for execution of the  judgment, particularly the part ordering his reinstatement to the position of president of the PUP and the payment of his salaries and other benefits bene fits during the period of suspension. The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was issued by the trial court on March 6, 1992. On March 26, 1992, however, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of the five nominees considered by the President of the Philippines for the position. The sheriff stated that he had executed the writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines first. This led to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. Petitioner assumed the office of president of the PUP. On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the orders and the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked for a temporary restraining order. On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as president of the PUP pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the trial court. On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision to set aside the orders and writ of reinstatement issued by the trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing after the conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries and benefits was limited to those accruing from the time of petitioner’s suspension until the conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amounts due and payable to petitioner. Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was being "abolished" rather than "converted" and that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the law would have said it was being "created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former position as president. ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of the PCC into PUP abolished the PCC P CC RULING: No. In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the promulgation of P.D. No. 1437 by the President Pre sident of the Philippines on June 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life.

 

Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization. As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could not be ordered by the trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbents who were not reappointed. RATIO: When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. What took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization. Viola vs. Alunan III (1997) Facts: Cesar G. Viola, filed petition petition for prohibition challenging the validit validity y of Art. III, §§1-2 §§1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers in so far as they provide for the election of first, second and third vice presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters. The issue is whether or not Section 1-2 of the Implementing Rules are valid? Held: The creation of the additional positions is authorized by §493 of LGC which in fact requires —  and not merely authorizes — the board of directors to "create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter" and belies petitioner's claim that §493limits the officers of a chapter to the president, VP, 5 members of the board of directors, secretary, and treasurer. Also, the creation of these positions was actually made in the constitution and by-laws of the Liga ng mga Barangay adopted by the 1st Barangay National Assembly. Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as these. Section 493embodies a fairly intelligible standard “deemed necessary for the management of the chapters,". There is no undue delegation of powerofby Congress. SC decisions upheld the validity reorganization statutes authorizing the President the Philippines to create,have abolish or merge offices of in the executive department. BIRAOGO VS PTC March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO  vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 x – –  –  – – –  – –  –  – – –  – –  –  – –  – – –  –  – –  – –  – –  – –  – –  – –  – –  – –  – –  – –  – – -x G.R. No. 193036 REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. vs.

 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of accomplices graft and corruption committed public officersand and their and coprincipals, and accessories during by the third-level previous administration, to employees, submit its finding recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, 1 0, Section 31 of tthe he Administrative Code of 1987 cannot c annot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.” 

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987. (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those t hose of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies. 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress. 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction. 

 

  4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes. ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1; 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. WON WON E. E. O. O. No. No. 1 1 violates supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. the e qual equal protection clause. RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very ve ry lis mota of the case. 1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are ar e allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their the ir prerogatives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party e entitled ntitled to the avails of the suit.”  Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer. 

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction j urisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which w hich deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been

 

faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative re lative to the execution and enforcement of o f the laws of the land. 2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there t here is no impropriety in the funding. 3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the t he land. 4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality c onstitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members m embers of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness ar bitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

 

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection prote ction clause of the Constitution. Anak Mindanao v Executive Secretary Facts •  Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari Certior ari and Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief. •  EO. 364, as amended by EO. 379, among other things, orders that the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) placed under the supervision and control of the Department of Land Reform, and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the Department of Land Reform. •  Why is this important? o For AMIN: It alleges that by issuing Eos 364 and 379, the Executive has impaired the powers of Congress. AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders. o For MDOI: It alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of NCIP becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral domain claims. •  On the issue of Locus Standi o AMIN: YES. As a member of Congress, it has the standing to maintain the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the constitution in his office o MDOI: NO. No direct interest shown; Raises no issue of transcendental importance; Too abstract to be considered judicially cognizable Issue: WON the placing of the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under the supervision and control of the DAR, and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under the DAR as an attached agency is within the ambit of Executive Exec utive powers. HELD: YES The Constitution confers, by President express provision, the control on over executive •  departments, bureaus and offices in the alone. And it layspower down aoflimitation the legislative power. •  The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization reor ganization measures under a broad authority of law. •  Administrative Code of 1987 Sec. 31: “The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President”  o The consolidation of functions in E.O. 364 aims to attain the objectives of simplicity, economy and efficiency as gathered from the provision granting PCUP and NCIP access to the range of services provided by the DARs technical offices and support systems. •  In the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show how the reorganization by executive fiat would hamper the exercise of citizens’ rights and privileges. o A law is presumed constitutional unless proved otherwise •  On the issue of Sec 16 Art. 13 of the Constitution (The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation

 

mechanisms) being violated: the state merely facilitates this participation, and not necessarily create these mechanisms. The State provides the support, but eventually it is the people, properly organized in their associations, who can assert the right and pursue the objective. Topics sir may discuss: •  The Administrative Code of 1987 categorizes administrative relationships into o (1) supervision and control o (2) administrative supervision o (3) attachment: most independent form

Bagaoisan vs Nat'l Tobacco Administration. G.R. No. 152845 : August 5, 2003. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE. BY C Y. DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN, RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN DEMDEM, RODOLFO DAGA, EDGARDO BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN, HILARIO JEREZ, and MARIA CORAZON CUANANG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, represented by ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and PERLITA BAULA, respondents. VITUG, J.: FACTS: 1. The petitioner was terminated from her position in the national tobacco administration as a result of the executive order issued by President Estrada which mandates for the stream lining of the national tobacco administration, a government agency under the department of o f agriculture. 2. The petitioners filed a letter of o f appeal to the civil service ccommission ommission to recall the ossp. 3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with prohibition an mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining order with the regional trial court of Batak to prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice of termination and from ousting the petitioners in their respective offices. 4. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the national tobacco administration to appoint the petitioner to the ossp to position similar to the one that they hold before. 5. The national tobacco administration appealed to the court of appeals who reversed the decision of the RTC. 6. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tobacco administration is valid true issuance of executive order by the president. According to the supreme court, as the President hasexecutive the power to reorganized an office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency provided under order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which provides that activities of executive agencies may be scaled down if it is no longer essential for the delivery of public service. WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. No costs. G.R. No. 150974. June 29, 2007.  CARPIO, J.: KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER FE B. BARIN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS CARLOS R. ALINDADA, LETICIA V. IBAY, OLIVER B. BUTALID, and MARY ANNE B. COLAYCO, of the ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, respondents.   respondents.

 

Doctrine: If the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or powers, powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office o ffice different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is true if one o ne office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office. Facts: RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), was w as enacted on 8 June 2001 and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section Sect ion 38 of RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the existing Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and the creation of the (Energy Regulatory Commission) ERC. Kapisanan Ng Mga Kawani Ng Energy Regulatory Board (KERB) asserts that there was no valid abolition of the ERB but there was merely a reorganization done in bad faith, as expressed under in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 (RA 6656): The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: a.)  Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing  pattern of the department or agency concerned; concerned; b.)  Where an office is abolished and another a nother performing substantially the same functions is created; c.)  Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; d.)  Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices; e.)  Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.”   KERB claims that the present case c ase falls under the situation described in Section 2(b) 2 (b) of RA 6656. Issue: Whether or not Section Sec tion 38 of RA 9136 is a valid abolition of ERB Held: Yes.  Section 38 of RA 9136 is a valid abolition of ERB. Yes. ERB. A  A valid order of abolition must abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made m ade in good faith. An abolition is made in good faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. Abolition of an office may be brought about by reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or a clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment. Where one office is abolished and replaced with w ith another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have never ceased holding office. After comparing the functions of the ERB and the ERC, the Supreme Court found that the ERC indeed assumed the functions of the ERB. However, the overlap in the functions of the ERB and o off the ERC does not mean that there is no valid abolition of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded functions which are intended to meet the specific spec ific needs of a deregulated power industry.

 

**** The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent. There, if there is an explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself. Section 38 of RA 9136 9 136 explicitly abolished the ERB. However, abolition of an office and its related positions is different from removal of an incumbent from his office office.. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. office. Where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its related positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions. Petitioner: Nat’l Land Titles and Deeds Registration Admin (NALTDRA)  Respondent:: CSC; Violeta Garcia Respondent Ponente:: Campos, Jr. Ponente FACTS:: FACTS

 Garcia was an LLB grad and a first grade civil service. De eds VII.   She was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds   She was later appointed as Deputy Register Re gister of Deeds III, upon reclassification of the position.   She was designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.  Executive Order No. 649 was enacted. t he Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and   It authorized the restructuring of the

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Deeds Registration Administration, and it regionalized the offices of the registers therein.   The law imposed a new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy Register od Deeds II or o r higher. Dee ds II on temporary status for not being a  Garcia issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds member of the Philippine Bar.  Sec. of Justice notified Garcia of the termination of her services on the ground that she was receiving Bribe Money.   Garcia appealed, but the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dropped her appeal on the ground that the termination of her services se rvices was due to the ex expiration piration of her temporary appointment.

t hat Garcia be restored to her position.  The CSC issued a resolution, directing that   According to the CSC, under the vested right theory , the new requirement of the BAR

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membership will not apply to her but only to the t he filling up of vacant lawyer position on or after Feb 9, 1981, the date the order took effect.  NALTDRA assailed the validity of the CSC Resolution

ISSUE: WON membership in the bar, which is a qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to ISSUE: the position of Deputy Register of Deeds Dee ds under EO. No. 649, Section 4, should be applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at tthe he time of the issuance and implementation of the EO.

HELD: No. HELD:  No. The requirement shall also apply to those already in service.

 

RATIO:: RATIO

 EO No. 649, in express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions: 8. Abolition of Existing Positions. Positions. All structural units in the LRC and in the registries of   Section 8. Abolition

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deeds, and all positions therein shall cease to exist from the date specified in the implementing order to be issued by the t he president pursuant to the preceding par. The pertinent per tinent functions, applicable appropriations, records, equipment and property shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or offices therein created.   The law, therefore, mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the LRC is deemed non-existent. This is NOT removal. Removal implied post subsists and one is merely separated therefrom, there from, while here, there is no position at all. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of.  Abolition of office is valid if (1) carried out by a legitimate body and (2) done in good faith. (1) LEGITIMATE BODY  

In this case, it was by LEGITIMATE BODY. There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch/agency of gov’t under Sec 8, Article XVII of the 1973 Consti.  (2) GOOD FAITH

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Re: good faith, if the newly created cre ated office has substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may m ay be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office, it will be considered an abolition and creation of new one. The same is true if the office is abolished and

its duties, for reasons of economy, are given to an existing office. In this case, EO No. 649 was enacted e nacted to improve the services and better bette r systematize the LRC. The requirement of Bar membership was imposed to meet changing circumstances and new developments. It was imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.  Re: “Vested right theory,” no such thing as a vested interest or estate in an office, except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure.  

JUDGMENT:: Garcia has no vested property right to be re-employed in a reor JUDGMENT reorganized ganized office. She cannot be reinstated to her former position. CSC Resolution reinstating Garcia was set aside. EUGENIO vs. CSC et al

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995 FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director Direc tor of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the t he provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:

“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget,

 

properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”  Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.  resolution.  ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB CESB  

HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside  aside  NO   NO 1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation cr eation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, 1993 , the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the t he Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated e numerated in Section 16.. 2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the

government with a broad and positive outlook.”  The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent re spondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not not made  made to fall within the control of respondent re spondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally interrelated government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination .” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit: (3) Attachment  (3) Attachment . — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with o orr without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or o r its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, boar d, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

 

NOTES:   NOTES: Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of o f its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides: Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Structure. — Each office of the Commission C ommission shall be headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises. Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. Commission. — The Commission shall have the following offices: (1) The Office of the Executive (2) The Merit System Protection Board  composed  composed of a Chairman and two (2) members (3) The Office of Legal Affairs  Affairs  (4) The Office of Planning and Management   (5) The Central Administrative Office. Office. (6) The Office of Central Personnel Records (7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation (8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement (9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards  Standards  (10) The Office of Human Resource Development (11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit . (12) The Office of Personnel Relations  Relations  (13) The Office of Corporate Affairs (14) The Office of Retirement (15) The Regional and Field Offices. Offices .