McKee v. IAC Digest

McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS: It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as well as Kim’s babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City (northward) in a Ford Escort. Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was headed in the opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as it was carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons. As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right side of the road into the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights on, applied his brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck. The collision occurred on the bridge. The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. Loida was seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort, received physical injuries from the collision. An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. The conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial by the SC of his Petition for Review. Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually consolidated. The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it was Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident. However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck and the collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent. ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing their original decision? HELD: NO. The petition has merit. Procedural (not important): Given the circumstances, the cases (civil and criminal) should have been consolidated to prevent separate appreciation of the evidence. To be fair, the petitioners did move to adopt the testimonies of the witnesses in the criminal case but the motion was denied. The non-consolidation resulted in two conflicting decisions. In any case, the guilty verdict of Galang was deemed by the Court as irrelevant to the case at bar. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck’s lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. Araceli’s testimony was pretty much what was stated in the facts plus the fact that when Jose swerved to the left, the truck was immediately noticed. This is why he switched his headlights on – to warn the truck’s driver to slow down and let the Escort return to its lane. When asked as to how she could tell that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the truck just kept on coming, indicating that it didn’t reduce its speed. She posited that if it did, there wouldn’t have been a collision. Her testimony remained intact, even upon cross-examination – that Jose’s entry into Galang’s lane was necessary to avoid what was, in his mind at the time, a greater peril – death or injury to the two idiots. This is hardly negligent behavior. Her testimony was corroborated by one Eugenio Tanhueco1, who was an impartial eyewitness. He said that the truck, moving at 50 to 60kph, only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police investigated the scene of the collision, they found skidmarks under the truck instead of behind it. This indicated that Galang only applied the brakes moments before the collision. While Galang claimed that he had stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters of the truck but this only served to substantiate Tanhueco’s statement that he stopped only upon collision, considering the speed at which he was going2.

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The court said he could not be an “accommodation witness” (WUT) because he was the first to arrive at the scene and, in fact, brought one of the injured passengers to the hospital, as opposed to a witness presented by the respondents (Roman Dayrit – who allegedly lived across the street – but it happened on a bridge tho…. :/) who didn’t even help and said he wanted to call the police but his phone hadn’t a dial tone. NOTE: None of the respondents’ witness testimonies were given credence simply because one was the passenger of Galang (who the court expects would naturally take the side of the person she is associated with) and the other one was an accommodation witness 2 He said he was going only “30” (unclear whether he meant miles or kilometers per hour) as opposed to the 50-60kph – speed limit was 30kph

On the basis of the definition3 and the test4 of negligence, no negligence can be imputed to Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.

THE EMERGENCY RULE: “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.” Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation. This means he cannot be considered negligent. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT JOSE WAS NEGLIGENT, THE COLLISION STILL WOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO HIM BECAUSE: 1. Proximate Cause: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. • Galang’s negligent act of not slowing down or stopping and allowing the Escort to return to the right lane was the sufficient intervening cause and the actual cause of the tragedy (failure to take the necessary measures and the degree of care necessary to avoid the collision) o “The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver’s negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.” o Negligence of Galang apparent in the records: “He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.” 2. Last Clear Chance Doctrine: A doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. • Basically, the last clear chance was with Galang, as can be gleaned from the evidence presented Therefore, respondents are found, under Article 2180, directly and primarily responsible for the acts of their employee. Their negligence flows from the negligence of their employee. Such presumption is juris tantum (rebuttable) and not juris et de jure (conclusive). They did not present evidence that showed that the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee5, Galang. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED.

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Layugan v. IAC: The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Corliss v. Manila Railroad: Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. 4 Picart v. Smith: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence. 5 Their only possible defense