Malabanan Case Digest

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 179987

April 29, 2009

The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons –the sons –the fourth being Aristedes’s Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application. Malabanan presented evidence during trial a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property was “verified to be w ithin the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan o

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had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. CA held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.

CA noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be facto red in the computation of the period of possession. (Interpretation of CA of Section 14(1) was based on the Court’s ruling in Republic v. Herbieto) Malabanan died while the case was pending with the CA; it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court Petitioners rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit  (handed down just 4 months prior to Herbieto) - with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree. With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in  Naguit  is the correct interpretation of the provision. The OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jur e   converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). o

According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been “converted” into private property through prescription.

The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to “patrimonial property,” while Section 14(2) speaks of “private lands.” The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable. DISCUSSION:

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of “by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles” through “judicial legalization.”

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title  except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall

 be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First , the term “agricultural lands” was changed to “alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.” o

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The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, “agricultural lands” are a mere subset of “lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition.” Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only “agricultural lands.”

Second , the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for “thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application” to possession “since  June 12, 1945 or earlier.” It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

SECTION 14. Who may apply. —   The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide  claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

 Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who “have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison: Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed , may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. —   The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land , whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

It is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in  possession of the property since 12 June 1945. Section 14(a) of the Property Registration  Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act (amended by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002) limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48.

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter : Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not  be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any ti me prior to the period fixed by the President.

The substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020. The OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona  fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG’s approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended.

Discussed in Naguit .  –  “adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. “ “[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title i s filed .”

Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from  Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948 , thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2) Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, [31] continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. [ ] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of “private lands” under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, t hen the  possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Secti on 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

The obiter   in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads: All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years.

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: “[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.” The identification what c onsists of patrimonial  property is provided by Articles 420 and 421 Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Art. 421. All other proper ty of the State, which is not of the character stated i n the preceding article, is  patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Article 422 of the Civil Code states that “[p] roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for  public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.” Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly  promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be We rule in the negative. reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

Whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of  public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. SYNTHESIS OF DOCTRINES APPLIED:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1)  of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)  of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject [51] to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act . (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b)  of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. (2) In complying with Section 14(2)  of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,  prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands  become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of  patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial  property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adver se possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

APPLICATION OF DOCTRINES:

Evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject  property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.  Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject

 property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED .