Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars

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Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict Author(s): Andrew Mack Source: World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jan., 1975), pp. 175-200 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880 . Accessed: 05/04/2011 11:50 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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WHY BIG NATIONS LOSE SMALL WARS: THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT By ANDREW MACK*

A

cursory examination in of thehistory of imperialist expansion

thelatenineteenth and earlytwentieth centuryrevealsone thing veryclearly:Third-Worldresistance, where it existed,was crushed withspeedyefficiency. In termsof conventional militarythinkingsuch successeswerenotunexpected. withtheAllied experiIndeed,together and ence in thefirstand secondWorld Wars,theyservedto reinforce in militarycapability to rigidify the pervasivenotionthatsuperiority (conventionally defined)will mean victoryin war. However,the hisin the periodfollowingWorld War II toryof a numberof conflicts showedthatmilitaryand technologicalsuperiority may be a highly unreliableguide to the outcomeof wars. In Indochina (1946-54), Indonesia (0947-49), Algeria,Cyprus,Aden, Morocco,and Tunisia, forcesgainedtheirobjectivesin armedconfrontations local nationalist withindustrialpowerswhichpossessedan overwhelming superiority in conventional a militarycapability.These wars werenot exclusively colonial phenomenon,as was demonstrated by the failure of the UnitedStatesto defeatits opponentsin Vietnam. For some idea of the degreeto which the outcomeof thesewars to examinethe presentsa radicalbreakwiththe past,it is instructive case of Indochina.The Frenchsuccessfully subjugatedthe peoplesof Indochinaformorethan sixtyyearswith a locallybased armyonly fifteenthousandstrong.The situationchanged dramaticallyafter I946, when the Vietnamesetook up arms in guerrillastruggle.By forcesof the Vietminhhad forcedthe FrenchI954 the nationalist who by thistimehad deployedan expeditionary forceof nearlytwo hundredthousandmen-to concededefeatand withdrawtheirforces in ignominy.Withintwentyyears,a vastU.S. militarymachinewith an expeditionary forcefivehundredthousandstronghad also been forcedto withdraw. The purposeof thispaperis to attemptto providea "pre-theoretical * Researchfor this articlewas supportedby the BritishSocial Science Research Council.An ongoingprojectexamininga numberof case historiesof "asymmetric conflicts" is currently beingsupportedby the Rockefeller Foundation.

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perspective" withinwhichthe outcomeof such "asymmetric conflicts" maybe explained. In thefieldofconflict research, thestudyof theoutcome andtheconduct ofwars,as againstthatoftheiretiology, hasreceived remarkably littleattention.' The outcome of"asymmetric conflicts" as described in thispaperhasbeenalmosttotally neglected.2 it is easierto explainwhytheinsurgents Arguably, werenotdefeatedthanitis toexplaintherelatedbutmoreinteresting questionnamely,how and whytheexternal powerwas forcedto withdraw. Sincetheformer problem hasbeenthesubjectofintense investigation bothby specialists in counter-insurgency and strategists of guerrilla thegreater warfare, partofthispaperwilldealwiththelatter problem. a fewfairly However, obvious pointsneedtobe madebefore goingon. In analyzing thesuccesses of theBritish at Omdurman againstthe Sudaneseand the Italiansin theirwar againstlocal insurgents in Mao Tse-tung has notedthatdefeatis theinvariable outAbyssinia, comewherenativeforcesfightwithinferior weaponsagainstmodon thelatter's terms. Katzenbach ernizedforces writesin thiscontext: "Byandlarge,itwouldseemthatwhatmadethemachinery ofEurowas thatnativetroopssaw fitto die,with pean troopsso successful withhonor,en masse,andin vain."3Second,it shouldbe noted glory, in that generalthistypeof war metwithlittledomestic opposition; successonlyservedtoincrease publicsupport.4 Two interesting exceptionswere the Boer War and the IrishRebellion(i9i6-22);

it is sig-

nificant thatin theseconflicts theresistance to the British was both and bitterand,in themetropolis, protracted generated domestic optothewar.5Thus,thefirst condition foravoidingdefeatis to position theenemy onhisownterms. toconfront refuse To avoidbeingcrushed, 1See BereniceA. Carroll,"War Terminationand ConflictTheory,"and William T. R. Fox, "The Causes of Peace and the Conditionsof War," both in How Wars End, Annals of the AmericanAcademyof Politicaland Social Science,Vol. 392 (November1970); and ElizabethConverse,"The War of All AgainstAll: A Review of the Journalof ConflictResolution,1957-68,"journal of ConflictResolution,xii (December i968).

2Exceptionsare foundin E. L. Katzenbach,"Time, Space and Will: The Politicoof Mao Tse-tung," in Lt. Col. T. N. Greene,ed., The Guerrillaand MilitaryStrategy How To FightHim (New York i962); RobertTaber, The War of the Flea (New York i965); and JosephS. Kraemer,"Revolutionary GuerrillaWarfareand the DecolonizationMovement," Polity,iv (Winter1971). 3 Katzenbach(fn.2), i5. 4 See, forexample,H. Wehler,"Industrial Growthand EarlyGermanImperialism" in RobertOwen and RobertSutcliffe, eds., Theoriesof Imperialism(London i972). 5Two excellentrecentstudiesdealing directlywith domesticoppositionto these wars are: StephenKoss, The Pro-Boers:The Anatomyof an Anti-WarMovement (Chicago 1973), and D. G. Boyce,Englishmenand Irish Troubles:BritishPublic Opinionand theMakingof IrishPolicyi9i8-22 (London 1972).

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theinsurgent forcesmustretaina degreeof invulnerability, but the defensive meanstothisendwilldependon theconditions ofthewar. In guerrilla in theclassicalsense,the "peoplesea" formsa warfare sanctuary ofpopularsupport forthe"guerrilla fish";in urbanguerrillawarfare theanonymity ofthecityprovides protection. Operating in uninhabited areasand suppliedfromwithout(e.g.,thepost-i968 NorthVietnamese operations alongtheHo Chi MinhTrail in the Vietnam War),theinsurgents maysimply and relyon themountains to concealand protect forests them. ofstrategy Forstudents theimportance ofthesewarsliesin thefact thatthesimplistic butonceprevalent assumption-that conventional military superiority necessarily prevailsin war-has beendestroyed. Whatis alsointeresting is thatalthough themetropolitan powersdid notwinmilitarily, neither weretheydefeated militarily. Indeedthe military defeatof themetropolis itselfwas impossible sincethe insurgents lackedan invasioncapability. In everycase,successforthe insurgents arosenotfroma military on theground-though victory successes military may have been a contributory cause-butrather fromtheprogressive oftheiropponents' attrition to politicalcapability wagewar.In suchasymmetric conflicts, insurgents maygainpolitical froma situation ofmilitary victory or evendefeat. stalemate The mostrecentand obviousexampleofthistypeof conflict is the warin Vietnam, American whichhasbrought homeseveral important lessons.First,it has provided themostobviousdemonstration of the oftheassumptions falsity thatunderlie the"capability" conception of power.6Not onlydoes superiority in military force(conventionally defined)notguarantee it may,undercertaincircumstances, victory; be positively counter-productive.' Second,the Vietnamconflict has demonstrated how,undercertainconditions, thetheatre of war extendswell beyondthebattlefield to encompass thepolityand social institutions of theexternal power.The Vietnamwar maybe seenas havingbeenfoughton twofronts-one bloodyand indecisive in the forests andmountains ofIndochina, theotheressentially nonviolentbutultimately moredecisive-within thepolityand socialinstitutions oftheUnitedStates. The natureoftherelationship between thesetwo 6Problemswith different conceptionsof power in this contextare examinedin AndrewMack, "The Conceptof Power and its Uses in ExplainingAsymmetric Conflict,"RichardsonInstitutefor Conflictand Peace Research(London i974). 7 The leastambiguousdemonstrations of thisapparently paradoxicalassertionare to be foundin the relatively rare cases of successful nonviolentresistance to armedaggression. See AndersBoserupand AndrewMack,War WithoutWeapons:Non-Violence in NationalDefence (London i974).

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conflicts-which are in factdifferent facetsof the sameconflict-is toan understanding oftheoutcome the critical ofthewar.However, American was in no senseunique,exceptto Americans. experience In I954 theVietminh destroyed theFrenchforces whichweremustered atDien BienPhuin a classicsetpiecebattle.The directmilitary costs to theFrenchhavebeenmuchexaggerated; only3 per centof the totalFrenchforcesin Indochinawereinvolved.The psychological thoseof the Tet offensive somefourteen effects-like yearslaterwere shattering, however.The Vietminhdid not of coursedefeat Francemilitarily. Theylackednot onlythecapability butalso any in attempting interest sucha move.Dien BienPhu,however, had the effect ofdestroying thepoliticalcapability ("will"in thelanguageof classical oftheFrenchGovernment tomobilize further strategy) troops andtocontinue thestruggle-this despite thefactthatthegreater part of the financialcostsof the war werebeingborneby the United States.Third,theVietnamwar,whichfortheVietnamese revolutionarieshas nowlastedovera quarterof a century, has emphasized the which enormous on importance guerrilla strategists place "protracted mostclearlyin Mao Tse-tung's This is articulated warfare." works, of GeneralGiap and but it is also foundin the military writings TruongChinhand in the worksof the leadingAfricanguerrilla Cabraland Mondlane.The certainty of eventualvictory strategists, whichis theresultofintensive politicalmobilization bytheguerrilla is thekeyto whatRosenseesas a criticalfactorin such leadership to absorbcosts.8Katzenbachhas the willingness conflicts-namely, thatit is basedon thepremisethat notedof Mao's strategic theory ofthepopulation "ifthetotality can be madeto resistsurrender, this can be turnedintoa warof attrition resistance whichwill eventually be victorious."' andinevitably moresuccinctly Or,as HenryKissinger in i969: "The guerrilla winsifhe doesnotlose."'0 observed thatin war theultimate Aboveall, Vietnamhas beena reminder thewill of theenemy.Moststrategic aim mustbe to affect theorists wouldofcourseconcurwiththisview.Butin practice, and at therisk it maybe notedthatit is a prevalent of oversimplification, military beliefthatif an opponent's to wage war can be military capability his "will"to continue the struggle is irrelevant destroyed, sincethe meanstothatendareno longeravailable.It is notsurprising thatthis 8 StevenRosen,"War Power and the Willingnessto Suffer," in Bruce M. Russett, ed., Peace, War,and Numbers(London I972). 9 Katzenbach(fn.2), i8. ForeignAffairs,XLVII (Jan'OHenry A. Kissinger,"The VietnamNegotiations," uary i969), 2I4.

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societies: shouldbe a prevalent beliefin modernindustrial strategic as criticsof tendsto mold itselfto availabletechnology, doctrine strategic weaponsdeployment haveforcefully pointedout.Neitheris in verydifferthatguerrilla shouldseestrategy itsurprising strategists or thebasicresources entterms. Lackingthetechnological capability theexternal todestroy enemy's military capability, theymustofneceshispolitical Iftheexternal sityaimtodestroy capability. power's"will" thestruggle is destroyed, thenitsmilitary to continue capability-no howpowerful-is One aimofthispaperis to matter irrelevant. totally showhowandwhy,in certain conventional typesofconflict, military superiority is notmerely useless, butmayactually be counter-productive.The implications forthosemilitary whichrelyalmost systems needhardlybe whollyon industrial powerand advancedtechnology spelledout. did the As I havenotedabove,in noneoftheasymmetric conflicts localinsurgents havethecapability to invadetheirmetropolitan opcan only ponents'homeland.It necessarily followsthatinsurgents to wagewar achievetheirendsiftheiropponents' politicalcapability is destroyed. This is truewhether the insurgents are revolutionaries urorright-wing nationalists, whether theyrelyon guerrilla warfare, ban terrorism, or evennonviolence. The destruction of the external power'sforcesin the fieldplacesno materialobstaclein its path whichwill prevent it fromsimplymobilizing moreforcesat home and dispatching themto thebattlefront. The constraints on mobilizationarepolitical, notmaterial. In noneoftheconflicts notedwasmore thana fraction of thetotalpotential military resources of themetropolitanpowerin factmobilized. The U.S. warin Vietnamhasbyany measurehad thegreatest impacton international and Americandomestic of anyconflict politics sinceWorldWar II, butthemaximum ofU.S. troopsin Vietnamat thepeakof thegroundwarin number to lessthanone quarter i968 amounted ofonepercentoftheAmericanpopulation. The politicalconstraints operating againstfullmobilizationof themetropolitan forcesariseas a consequence of theconin themetropolis-both flicts withinthepolitical eliteandin thewider the war,by its verynature,will inevitably society-which tendto To paraphrase generate. Clausewitz, politics maybecomethecontinuationof war by othermeans.Therefore themilitary struggle on the notin termsofthenarrowcalculusofmiligroundmustbe evaluated but in termsof its politicalimpactin the metropolis: tarytactics, "Battlesand campaigns are amenableto analysisas ratherself-conofmilitary tainedcontests power.... Bycontrast, thefinaloutcome of

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manyofthemhighly warsdependson a muchwiderrangeoffactors, politics.. . ."' The elusive-suchas the war'simpacton domestic battles doesnotlie in theiroutcomeas "selfofparticular significance theUnitedStates power."Thus,although ofmilitary contests contained for defeat markeda dramatic thatthei968 Tetoffensive couldcontend calculusof forcesin termsof themacabremilitary therevolutionary defeatfor was in facta majorstrategic theoffensive "bodycounts," pointin thewar.The impactofTet on theturning theU.S.,marking President's to theincumbent politicsled directly Americandomestic time, And,forthefirst decision notto standforanother termofoffice. 200,000 men) werere(a further formoreresources requests military had worsened. situation fuseddespitethefactthatthemilitary is unambiguousthe insurgents victory over Evenwheremilitary in the of theFLN infrastructure as in GeneralMassu'sdestruction is stillno sureguideto theoutcome BattleofAlgiers-this notorious themiliDespitethefactthattheFLN neverregained oftheconflict. withinfouryears. theirstruggle theFrenchabandoned taryinitiative, usedbyMassuto achievethatvictory, methods Indeed,thebarbarous in catalyzwereinstrumental useoftorture, thewidespread including France. in metropolitan to the war opposition ing exampleof ourthesis.Between The Algerianwaris an instructive forces in thebalanceofpolitical wasa radicalshift I954 and i962 there classofAlgeriawas in metropolitan France.The colon(whitesettler) brokeout,theleftist fighting A fewdaysafter thechiefpolitical victim. toa suggestion responded oftheInterior, Mitterand, Francois Minister thatin the flatly thatParisshouldnegotiate withtherebelsbystating is war."Yet sevenand "theonlynegotiation Algeriandepartements therebelsall their a-halfyearslater,De Gaullehad notonlygranted when sometheyhad notevenconsidered initialdemands(including supportfromthe brokeout), but receivedoverwhelming fighting thelast oftheFrenchpopulation in doingso. Significantly, majority a coupagainst taskoftheFrenchArmy(whichhad itselfattempted oftheOAStheGaullist wastohuntdowntheterrorists government) themilitary thediehardremnants ofthecolonclassin whoseinterests in thefirst had intervened place. thisconflict-asmetropolitan policyin Frenchpolicythroughout besetby whatMao Tse-tungcalls otherasymmetric conflicts-was directed againstthe repression "contradictions." The initialmilitary whattheyhadbeenunableto achieve forthemilitants rebelsachieved 1 Fred CharlesIkle,EveryWar MustEnd (London I97I),

I-2.

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thepolitical forthemselves-namely, mobilization ofthemassesagainst theFrench. As therebellion becamemorebroadly based,morenumerous forces methods andevermoreextreme wereusedto attempt to quellit.The Frenchalsotriedtobuyoffnationalist togrant aspirations byoffering someof thepoliticaldemandswhichhad initially beenmadeby the insurgents-only to findthatthesehadbeenradically escalated. Offers ofconcessions were-as is frequently thecasein suchconflicts-both too smalland too late.The moreforcestheFrenchdeployed(ultifourhundred mately thousand wastheimpact men),thegreater which thewarhad in themetropolis. It was notso muchtheinhumanity of thewar perse thatgenerated in France;themajority opposition of Frenchmenandwomenwereno moresympathetic to theFLN than of Americans werethemajority to theNLF in Vietnam.The major causeof opposition costsof thewar to the laynotin theenormous Algerians (thoughthiswasa factor), butin thecostsofthewartothe Frenchthemselves. The progressively greater human,economic, and costsgaveriseto thephenomenon political of"warweariness" which withoutanalyzing, havedescribed manywriters and to the"lossof politicalwill" of the government to whichthe military invariably ascribed thedefeat. Thusitcanbe seenthattheshiftin thebalanceof Francewas of criticalimportance politicalforcesin metropolitan in theoutcome ofthewar.Politicalleadersin suchconflicts determining do notgrantinsurgent demands becausetheyundergo a suddenchange ofheart.Theyconcedebecausetheyhaveno choice. in structure and whatdo we in Whyare asymmetries important, in thiscontext? factmeanby"asymmetry" We mustfirst notethatthe thebelligerents isasymmetric. between relationship The insurgents can no to thesurvival oftheexternal pose directthreat powerbecause,as already noted,theylackan invasion On theotherhand,the capability. metropolitan powerposesnotsimplythethreatof invasion, butthe reality ofoccupation. Thisfactis so obviousthatitsimplications have beenignored. It means,crudely thatfortheinsurgents speaking, the waris "total,"whilefortheexternal powerit is necessarily "limited." Full mobilization ofthetotalmilitary oftheexternal resources power is simply notpolitically possible.(One mightconceive ofcaseswhere thisisnotthecase-as in a popularly backed"holywar"forexamplebutsuchpossibilities are of no relevance to thepresentdiscussion.) Notonlyis fullmobilization itis notthought impossible politically, to be intheleastnecessary. The asymmetry in conventional military capathatmilitary bilityis so greatand theconfidence mightwill prevail

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is one of thehallmarks of thatexpectation of victory is so pervasive theinitialendeavor. an invasioncapability and The factthatone belligerent possesses in levelofindustrial ofthedifferences theotherdoesnotis a function of thetwo sides.The asymmetric relaand technological capability oftheasymmetry in "resource is thusa function tionship power." of symmetric and asymmetric conflict Somestrategic implications relations maynowbespelledout.Theinsurgents, facedwithoccupation by a hostileexternal power,are able to capitalizeon thosepowerful to whichpoliticalscientists havegiventhelabel"nationalism." forces is thatdisparate andsometimes Whatthismeansessentially conflicting nationalgroupsmay finda commonunity-a nationalinterest-in In thatcasethecohesion is only a common opposing enemy. generated oftheasymmetry in resource a consequence indirectly power:itssocial bondsareto be foundin thecommonhostility andpsychological felt towardtheexternal enemy. to its "pureform" Clausewitznotedthatwar onlyapproximates is at whena "grandandpowerful stake.'2 purpose" Onlythenwillthe of nationalresources fullmobilization becomea possibility, and only thenwillthediverseand sometimes conflicting goalsthatvariousnationalgroups pursueintimeofpeacebedisplaced bya singleoverriding of theenemy."In a symmetric, aim-"theoverthrow "total strategic ofbothsidesis at stake,bothhavea wherethesurvival war"situation "grandand powerful purpose"to defend.Thus,otherthingsbeing forinternal ineither divisions equal,thepotential arising campis small in thehomelandof the fordomestic conflict relative to thepotential in an asymmetric conflict. In symmetric metropolitan powerinvolved theabsenceofconstraints ceteris on themobilization conflicts, paribus, forcemaximize andtheuseofconventional military thestrategic utility of conventional warfare. "totalwars"arethe Examplesofsymmetric first andsecondWorldWarsandcivilwarsin whichthestruggle can be seenin zero-sum terms-asoneofsurvival. However, although the thesis ofsociologists external-enemy/internal-cohesion likeSimmeland Coserhasbeenwidelyaccepted, therelationship isnotas simpleas some writers Williamsin agreeing appearto think.Coserfollows thatthere hasto be a minimalconsensus thatthegroup(or nation)is a "going concern," andthattheremustbe recognition ofan outside threat which isthought tomenacethegroupas a whole,notjustsomepartofit.Coser notesofthesecondWorldWarthat"attempts at centralization bythe 12The finalchapterof Boserupand Mack (fn. 7) discussesClausewitzianstrategic theoryand its applicationto "asymmetric conflicts."

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FrenchGovernment and couldnotmendthebasic wereunavailing cleavages norremedy thelackof socialsolidarity."'3 We mayadd to thistwomoreconditions nationalunityin theface whichwill affect ofexternal threat. as a viablealterFirst,resistance mustbe perceived nativetosurrender. It is noteworthy thatafter thecollapseoftheNaziSovietPactin thesecondWorldWar,resistance to theNazis in occupiedEuropewas veryoftenled by Communists forwhomsurrender meantextermination. A majority of thepopulation of theoccupied countries perceived surrender as a moreviablealternative thanresistance-at leastuntilit appearedthatthetideof thewar had turned against theNazis.Resistance movements sharea revowhosemembers lutionary ideology whichhas as one of itsbasictenetsthebeliefthat "protracted war"willultimately be victorious, will,bydefinition, see resistance as an obviousalternative to surrender. Second,sinceoccupationis likelyto haveadverseconsequences butmuch forall groups, worseforsomethanforothers, suchnationalunityas doesoccurwill notbe unshakable. Butitwillbe enormously reinforced bywhatmay be calledthe"bandwagon effect."'4 Dissentwillbe heavilyproscribed and sanctioned sociallyas well as by theleadership. Eventhough itisnotpossible abouttheconditions which tobeprecise generate necessarily national solidarity inthefaceofan external threat, we maynotethefollowing toasymmetric contwopointswithrespect flicts: ifnotsufficient (a) An external threatis a necessary condition for theemergence ofa popularfront. (b) Occupation and military repression bythemetropolitan power hasin factproduced thenationalist unitypredicted bytheCoser-Simmelthesis.(One interesting is theconfrontation in Malaysia, exception wheretherewasa deepcleavagedividing theChineseinsurgents from theMalays.)Indeed,it is possibleto arguethatin somecasestherepression a pre-existing did notso muchintensify basicconsensus as createone. therewas no comparable (c) Moreimportantly, external unifying forcein thecaseofthemetropolitan in every power.On thecontrary, case wherethe insurgents won,thewar was a profoundly divisive issue.

Thosescholars whoareexpounding the"paradox" thatexternal conflictwillbothincrease and decrease domestic conflict (see below) are ofcreating a falsedichotomy. Contrast intheUnited thesituation guilty A. Coser, The Functionsof Social Conflict(New York '4Boserupand Mack (fn.7), chap. i.

13Lewis

I956),

87-IIO.

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States,as thewar escalatedin Vietnam,withthatof Britainfacingthe Nazis in thesecondWorldWar. In theformercase we see theprogressiveescalationofdomesticoppositionto thewar creatingdeep divisions withinU.S. society.In the latter,"The Nazi attackappreciablyincreasedthe internalcohesionof the Britishsocial system,temporarily narrowingthe variouspolitical,social and economicfissuresthatexistedin Britishsociety."'5 In Britaintheelectoralprocesswas suspended forthe durationof the conflictin orderto forma coalition"national government." In the various"wars of nationalliberation"we see preof "popularfronts."Indeed, ciselythe same processin the formation thelabel "NationalLiberationFront"is foundin someguisein nearly all theseconflicts, thoughrarelyin civilwars.16 It is mycontention ofthemetrothattheprocessofpoliticalattrition politanpower'scapabilityto continueto wage war is not the consequenceoferrorsofgeneralship, thoughthesemaywell occur.Rather,it is a functionof thestructure of the conflict, of the natureof the conflictualrelationship betweenthe belligerents. Where the war is perceivedas "limited"-becausethe opponentis "weak" and can pose no directthreat-theprosecution of thewar does not take automaticprior macyoverothergoals pursuedby factionswithinthe government, or othergroupspursuinginterests bureaucracies whichcompeteforstate resources.In a situationof totalwar, the prosecution of the war does takeautomaticprimacyaboveall othergoals.Controversies over"guns or butter"are not onlyconceivablein a Vietnam-type but inconflict, evitable.In a total-warsituationtheywould be inconceivable:guns would getautomaticpriority. In contrast to thetotal-war the situation, of a limitedwar have to competeforresources-human, protagonists of otherinterests-governeconomic,and political-withprotagonists "interest mental,bureaucratic, groups,"and so forth.Clearly,ifthewar is terminated quicklyand certainbenefitsare believedto be accruing fromvictory(as in the case of the mini-warsof colonialexpansion) thepotentialfordivisivedomesticconflict on thewar issuewill notbe realized.Butthisis simplyanotherway of statingthatiftheinsurgents areto win,theymustnotlose. In hishighlyprophetic paperpublishedin i969, HenryKissingerobservedof America'swar in Vietnam:"We foughta militarywar; our opponentsfoughta politicalone. We soughtphysicalattrition;our opponentsaimed forour psychological exhaustion.In the process,we 15 Coser (fn. I3),

87-IIO;

quotationfromp. 95.

16The obviouspointhere is that "nationalism" is normallya meaninglessconcept

exceptin relationto an externalenvironment. "Nationalism"may be significant in civilwarsthatare basedon an ethnicconflict but not on class conflict.

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lostsightof one of the cardinalmaximsof guerrillawarfare:the winsifhedoesnotlose.The conventional guerrilla armylosesifitdoes notwin.""7 Mao Tse-tung's In a similar in i962 described vein,E. L. Katzenbach to all else,Mao generalstrategic approachas follows:"Fundamental bodiessimplycannot says,is thebeliefthatcountries withlegislative takea warofattrition, eitherfinancially or,in thelongrun,psychomakescomstructure logically. Indeed,theveryfactof a multi-party mitment toa longwarsopolitically as tobequiteimpossible.... suicidal frommonthtomonth, theoutcry burdenincreases Whenthefinancial tofight. against thewarwillitself weakentheability ofthetroops The warthatMao'stheory is thecheapest forhimtofight and contemplates themostexpensive fortheenemy.""18 mustretaina minimum In orderto avoiddefeat, detheinsurgents greeofinvulnerability. In orderto win,theymustbe ableto impose a steady accumulation of"costs"ontheiropponent. Theymustnotonly be undefeated; theymustbe seento be undefeated. the Strategically, aimmustbe toprovoke insurgents' theexternal powerintoescalating itsforces ontheground. Thisinitself andpolitical willincureconomic didinfactmarkthe costsinthemetropolis. ofescalation Sucha process oftheconflicts in Indochina, Viethistory Algeria, Portuguese Africa, nam,andthecurrent conflict in Ulster.The directcoststheinsurgents imposeon theexternal powerwillbe thenormalcostsofwar-troops is notthe killedandmateriel Buttheaimoftheinsurgents destroyed. of themilitary destruction of theiropponents as an endin capability To attempt sucha strategy wouldbe lunaticfora smallThirditself. Worldpowerfacinga majorindustrial power.Directcostsbecome ofstrategic importance when,andonlywhen,theyaretranslated into indirect costs.These are psychological and political:theirobjective is to amplify the"contradictions in theenemy's camp." In themetropolis, a warwithno visiblepayoff againstan opponent who posesno directthreatwill comeunderincreasing criticism as battlecasualties riseand economic costsescalate.Obviously therewill stillbe groupsin themetropolis whoseideological commitments will leadthemto continue to support thegovernment's warpolicy;others (munitions manufacturers, forexample)maysupport thewarbecause at stake.But if thewar escalates theyhavemorematerialinterests as itdidin AlgeriaandVietnam, itmakesa definite dramatically, imwhichmightotherwise pacton theeconomicand politicalresources havebeenallocated Tax increases to,say,publicwelfare projects. maybe 17

Kissinger(fn.x0),

2I4.

18

Katzenbach(fn.2), i8.

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to coverthe costsof thewar,a draftsystemmay have to be necessary introduced, and inflationwill be an almostcertainby-product. Such costsare seenas partof the"necessary price"whenthe security of the nationis directlythreatened. When thisis not the case, the basis for consensusdisappears.In a limitedwar, it is not at all clear to those groupswhose interests are adverselyaffectedwhy such sacrificesare necessary."9

is thefactthatthe Butthatis onlypartof thestory.Justas important necessity forthe sacrifices involvedin fightingand riskingdeathwill appearlessobviousto the conscripts and even theprofessional soldiers the of nation is not at stake. when survival the Americansoldirectly diersfoughtwell in thesecondWorldWar, but thelastyearsin Vietnam weremarkedby troopmutinies, widespreaddrugaddiction,high and eventhemurdersof over-zealous levelsof desertion, officers intent on sendingtheirmen out on dangerouspatrols.This in factled to a thatit was necesstrongfeelingamongsomeseniorU.S. Armyofficers saryto get out of Vietnambeforemoralecollapsedcompletely.It is of moralewithin impossibleto explainsuch a dramaticdeterioration thearmyand the massiveoppositionto the draftwithoutreference to thetypeof war beingfought. Thereis also thequestionof themoralityof thewar. When thesurand when the obvious vival of the nationis not directlythreatened, in conventional asymmetry military powerbestowsan underdogstatus ofthewar is moreeasilyquestioned. on theinsurgent side,themorality to notethatduringWorldWar II thedeliberateAllied It is instructive attemptto terrorizethe working-class populationsof Dresden and otherGermancitiesgeneratedno moral outragein Britain.This deraidswere designedto create spitethefactthatthe thousand-bomber in that more so effect firestorms devastating peopledied in one night of bombingoverDresdenthanperishedin the Hiroshimaholocaust. of civilianlocalitiesin On the otherhand, the aerial bombardment Vietnam,the use of herbicidesand defoliants, napalm,and anti-personnelweapons have been all met with widespreadcontroversy and protest.One shouldnot deducefromthisthatthe Britishpublicwas of humansuffering thanwas theAmerican. morecallousto theeffects 19 Some interesting work in the "issue area" literatureis and recenttheoretical relevantto thisdiscussion;see in particularTheodoreJ. Lowi, "MakingDemocracy Safe for the World: NationalPolitics,"in JamesRosenau,ed., DomesticSourcesof "IssueArea and Foreign ForeignPolicy(New York i967); and WilliamZimmerman, Policy Process,"AmericanPolitical Science Review, LXVII (December I973). The on "bureaucratic politics"and "linkagepolitics"is also relevant. literature

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to is in largeparta function oftheinterests Moraloutrage perceived is theissue,thepropensity Wheresurvival be at stakein theconflict. themorality of themeansusedto defeatthe to question and protest attenuated. enemyis markedly As thewardragson andthecostssteadily without the"light escalate generated becoming morevisible, thedivisions attheendofthetunnel" becomein themselves one of thepoliticalcosts withinthemetropolis thatfactionof the moreprecisely, of thewar.The government-or, to argue to thewar-will continue government whichis committed thatvitalsecurity thatprosecuting thewaris in thenationalinterest, ofthe andprestige thattheinternational credibility interests areatstake, Whether or nottheseclaimsbearany nationis at issue,and so forth. theyarewhollytrueorwhollyfalserelationship toreality-whether isquiteimmaterial. Whatcountsinthelongruniswhattheopponents ofthewarbelieveto be at stakeand howmuchpoliticalcapitalthey canmuster. Mao and Giap have Finally,anotherwordabout"contradiction." whichthe repeatedly emphasizedthatthe principalcontradiction on thegroundderivesfromthefact imperialist armymustconfront to control becomespreadso thinlythat thatforces territory dispersed to attack.If forcesare concentrated to overcome theyarevulnerable For theexternal otherareasareleftunguarded. thisweakness, power thiscontradiction to overcome requiresa massiveincreasein metrothedomestic costsofthe butthisimmediately increases politanforces; wishtopacify theopposition war.On theotherhand,iftheimperialists someoftheirforces, thecontradiction on the athomebywithdrawing toresolve onecontradiction is sharpened. will battlefronts Anyattempt understand that theother.The guerrilla perfectly strategists magnify and theconflict mustbe thewartheyfighttakesplaceon twofronts as an integrated whole.Fromthisperspective, thosewhoopperceived actobjectively-regardless oftheirsubposethewarin themetropolis a resource for the insurgents. jectivepolitical philosophies-asstrategic Governments arewellawareofthis,sinceit is theywhohaveto conYet government accusations thatthose frontthepoliticalconstraints. reopposedto thewar are "aidingtheenemy"are contemptuously correct. this From perspective objectively jected.Theyarenevertheless is a papertiger"is byno we canalsoseewhytheslogan"imperialism resources of themetroIt is notthatthematerial meansinaccurate. underestimated bytherevolutionaries; politanpowerarein themselves thatthepolitical constraints on their thereis an acuteawareness rather,

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maximum are as realas if thoseresources deployment did notexist, and thattheseconstraints becomemoreratherthanlesspowerful as thewarescalates. Few attempts havebeenmadetoanalyzetheoutcome ofasymmetric conflicts systematically. Amongthosefew,evenfewerhaveseenthe the conflict asymmetries whichcharacterize as beingcriticalto an the of outcome.However,some aspectshave been understanding touched on.Rosenconsiders theasymmetry in powerand"willingness to suffer in "tangible" costs";Katzenbachexaminesthe asymmetry and "intangible between"social" resources"; Galtungdistinguishes defense"(asymmetry in goals); Kissinger, and "territorial as already in overallstrategy noted, mentions asymmetry versus (physical psychoand Kraemerdistinguishes logicalattrition); "colonial"versus"nonAn examination oftheconflict wars.20 colonial"guerrilla in thelight ofanyoftheseasymmetries certain intoparticular provides asinsights pectsof thewar,butmissestheoverallpicture. The asymmetries describedin thispaper-in the interests perceived to be at stake,in in intervention in mobilization, capability, "resource power,"and so forth-areabstracted fromtheircontextforthe sake of analytical clarity. Butthewholeremains thanthesumof itsparts,and greater it is theconflict as a wholewhichmustbe studiedin orderto understanditsevolution and outcome. in theetiology Somewriters interested ofconflict havearguedthat thenatureof thestatepolitymediates thelinkbetweeninternal and The samequestionis of relevance external conflict.2" withrespect to ofunderstanding therelatively neglected problem theoutcomeofinconflicts. Is theprocess ofattrition ternational ofthepolitical capability so clearly in theVietnam towagewar,whichwe observe andAlgerian a function of thenatureof thepolityof themetropolitan conflicts, powersinvolved? Somewriters believethatit is. Withrespect clearly toVietnam, EdmundIonsnotes:"Whilstthefreedom to demonstrate in foreign -even fordefeatism one ofthestrengths policy-isclearly it is also one of itsweaknessesso faras powerpolitics of a freesociety,

isconcerned."22 Theargument ofIonsandother writers isroughly as In contrast follows. to "open"societies, wheredissent is permitted, in "closed"or "totalitarian" is repressed dissent societies. Therefore 20 Rosen (fn. 8); Katzenbach(fn. 2); Kissinger(fn. io); Kraemer(fn. 2); see also JohanGaltung,"Mot et NyttForsvarsbegrep," Pax, No. i (Oslo i965). 21 E.g., Jonathan "Modelsforthe Analysisof ForeignConflict Wilkenfeld, Behavior of States,"in Russett(fn. 8). 22EdmundIons, "Dissentin America:The Constraints on ForeignPolicy,"ConflictStudies,No. i8 (London I971); emphasisin original.

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will notbe troubled societies constraints totalitarian by thedomestic on Vietnam,forinstance. whichhavebedeviledU.S. policy-makers in which ofasymmetric conflict In someofthebest-known examples the insurgents gainedtheirobjectives-Indochina, Algeria,Cyprus, and Indonesia-themetropolitan Aden,Palestine, powerwhichconin whichthe conflicts cededdefeatwas a "democracy." Asymmetric external crushedtheopposition powersuccessfully (or has yetto be beaten)includeHungary(i956), Czechoslovakia (i968), and Portugal'songoingwarin Africa.In thesecases,themetropolitan regime maybe described as "closed,""centrist," "totalitarian," or whatever; in anycase,populardomestic In addition opposition is nottolerated. into thegovernment it maybe withholding proscribing opposition, inflicted on civiliansmaygo unreported, formation. The brutalities thecostsof thewar to theeconomy concealed, and thenumberof Ions in thepaperquoted,and othersuptroopskilledminimized. oftheU.S. warin Indochina, havecomecloseto recommendporters ingcensorship forprecisely thesereasons. The Frenchmilitary strategistTrinquier, withgreater concern forlogicthanforpolitical reality, arguesthatin orderto prevent therotof"defeatism" or "lackofpothetroopsin thefield,theentirestrucliticalwill" frombetraying mustbe altered.23 The generalpoint tureof themetropolitan society In Laos,a greater numberof civilianrefugees was hassomevalidity. thanin Vietnam,yetthe"secret createdby U.S. bombingmissions farlessattention and controversy war"in Laos attracted becausethe excludedfromthebattlezones.Despitethese presswas specifically limitedwarsby theirvery obviouspoints, mymaincontention-that if the war continues-is naturewill generatedomesticconstraints not disproved.In termsof the argumentput forwardhere,"politics"

involves underanypoliticalsystem conflict overtheallocation of reIn closedor centrist theseconflicts willbyand large sources. polities, be confined to therulingelite-butnotnecessarily so. The argument thecaseofPortugal.* maybe exemplified byexamining Clearly, popularopposition to thewarin Angola,Mozambique, andGuineaBissau in Portugal itself as did opposition couldnotmanifest to theVietnam warin theUnitedStates.But therewerenevertheless majorcontroversies withintherulingPortuguese eliteconcerning thedesirability -the costsand benefits-ofcontinuingwar in Africa:"[T]here seem 23 P. Trinquier, Modern Warfare(New York * This articlewas beforethe

i964).

completed Spinolacoup in Portugalin the springof 1974.A briefdiscussion of theimplications of thecoup,and thoseof therecentdevelopmentsin the Ulstercrisis,has been added to the conclusion.

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of whenit comesto themajordirection to be threemaincurrents in variousversions tradition orientation forPortugal:thecolonialist Africa,'theold 'Lucitaniantradiwhichstillbelievein 'Portuguese future axis, on thePortugal/Brazil tion'thatwouldbasePortuguese mustapforwhomtheEuropeanCommunity and the'Europeans'

of The youngergeneration havenof escape."24 pearas a veryattractive as allied with clearlysee Portugal'sfuture "modernizingtechnocrats" and realizeequallyclearlythatthepriceof theEuropeanCommunity a closerassociationwiththeEEC is thecessationof thewar in Africa. case in the sense that,in additionto Portugalis also an interesting constraints, thereare also powerfulinternational domesticconstraints, Portugalbeing criticallydependenton the NATO countriesfor the armsneededto fightthewar in Africa.This supportis,needlessto say, not onlybecauseit has alreadycome undersushighlyundependable, NATO powers,but tainedattackfromsome of the north-European more obviouslybecause Portugalhas a far greaterdependenceon NATO thanNATO has on Portugal.Finally,populardomesticoppoas thousandsof sition has in the past manifesteditselfindirectly, to theEuropeanComPortuguese"votedwiththefeet"by emigrating munity. It remainsto be explainedwhyPortugal,the oldestand weakestof imperialpowers,shouldhaveclungto hercolonieslong afterhermore to theircolonial by grantingindependence powerfulrivalssurrendered The usual explanationis thatit is a matterof an ideodependencies. with "manifestdestiny." irrational-obsession logical-and essentially However,withoutdenyingthattheremay be a powerfulcontingent of genuineideologueswithinthe Portuguesepolitywho supportthe war forthesereasons,thisdoes not providethe whole answer.Those mostloyal to the "Portugueseconnection"are the Portuguesesettlers in the territories themselves-loyalin the senseof totaloppositionto theloyaltyofUlsterProtestants, white blackrule.Butthisloyalty--like The Rhodesiansor white colons in Algeria-is highlyunreliable.25 resistany attemptto hand overcontrolto the settlerclasswill bitterly A Superpowerin the Making (Lon24JohanGaltung,The EuropeanCommunity: don I973), i66. 25As Emmanuelnotesof the "settlerclass" in "colonial"situations:"They benepromotedit, withoutreserveor contradictionfittedfromcolonialismand therefore howeverparadoxicalthat and forthatveryreasontheywerebasicallyanti-imperialist, withtheirparentcountries may seem.From theverybeginningtheywere in conflict so at timesof crisis,goingso faras to take so at all times,subjectively . . . objectively up arms againstit." ArgirihiEmmanuel,"WhiteSettlerColonialismand the Myth New Left Review,No. 73 (May/JuneI972), 38-39. Imperialism," of Investment

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provides a powerful brakeon any indigenous population; it thereby movetowards independence. For thesettler class,thegranting ofindependence class,qua settler to theindigenous population posesa directthreatto localEuropean inthe inboththepolitical Ifpressures andeconomic spheres. hegemony fromthecoloniesappearslikely metropolis aresuchthatwithdrawal theSpinolacoupofthespringof -as seemshighlypossible following a typeofgo-ittoattempt i974-theremaywellbemovesbythesettlers Declaration of Independence strategy alongRhodealone,Unilateral sianlines.The colonsin Algeriatriedthisstrategy whenit became obviousthatDe Gaullewas goingto givein to Moslemdemandsfor succeeded. In independence. Theyfailed,but thewhiteRhodesians thecurrent Ulstercrisisthereis littledoubtthatsucha strategy would be attempted-and wouldmostlikelysucceedifitbecameclearto the Protestant weregoingtowithdraw-asseems thattheBritish majority towards exhibit"ultra-loyalism" increasingly possible.The "settlers" at whichtheyappeartohave the"mother country" up tothemoment beendeserted. If thebreakdoessucceed, thestructure of theconflict powerdoes not intervene changescompletely. If the metropolitan rebellion(Algeria) but insteadsimplymakes againstthe settlers' (Britain benonmilitary protests againstRhodesia)thentheconflict a civil forascendancy, a zero-sum comessymmetric: struggle essentially classhasa survival stakein theoutcome. The warin whichthesettler willin manywaysprovetobe a moreformidable settlers enemythan was thevastlymorepowerful metropolitan power,becausetheconabsentin straints againsttheuse of forcewill be almostcompletely movements tobringdown theircase.Thusthetaskofnationalist trying in Israel,Rhodesia, and SouthAfricais extremely thesettler regimes is notwhether to fightthe onerous.The questionfortheseregimes buthow.In otherwords,despitesuperficial in similarities insurgents and in descriptive "national tactics guerrillas," language-"Palestinian conflicts liberation are fundamentally "settler-regime" struggle,"-the conflicts. fromasymmetric different reasonwhythePortuThereis another, perhapsequallypowerful sobitterly. It is extremely difficult tocalcugueseresisted independence costsandbenefits whichPortugal derivesfromher latetheeconomic in partbecauseexchangecontrols overseas are artificially territories, evenifitcouldbe unequivocally demonstrated manipulated. However, a of war exceed costs the wide the thatthe economic by margin present whichPortugalderivesfromhercolonies-most benefits particularly

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thata major PortuAngola-it would not invalidatethe hypothesis gueseinterest in maintainingthecolonialpossessionsis economic.Oil in large quantitieshas alreadybeen discoveredin the overseasterritories,and thereare also extensiveand as yetbarelyexploitedmineral reserves.Portugaltherefore has a considerableeconomicinterestin tryingto maintaincontrolin theseareas.26 When France and Britain relinquished theirAfricancolonies,theyrelinquished also theeconomic costsof administration while retainingwhateverbenefitstheyderived fromtheirinvestments and fromspecialtraderelationships. Portugalis in a verydifferent position.SincePortugalis relatively underdeveloped are economically, thebenefitsshe derivesfromher overseasterritories basedon politicalratherthaneconomiccontrol.The keyeconomicenin the overseasterritories terprises are increasingly dominatedby nonPortuguesecapital (in contrastto the situationin Frenchand British Africancoloniesbeforeindependence).If Portugalwere to relinquish politicalcontrolin Africa,shewouldlosenotonlythepresenteconomic benefits butalso themoreimportant futurebenefits. The so-calledneocolonialsolutionis nota possibility forthePortuguese. of my argument, In discussingPortugalby way of exemplification I have raisedthreepossiblehypotheses, whichmightbe formulated as follows: caThe politicalattrition ofthemetropolitan power'swar-making correlated withthedegreeof"openpabilityappearstobe positively ness" of the politicalsystemand negativelycorrelatedwith the degree of "closeness"of the politicalsystem.Democraticpolyarchiesare apparentlymost susceptibleto internaloppositionto externalwars,whiletotalitarian "centrist" statesare lesssusceptible to suchopposition. This argumentis subjectto severequalification (see below). (2) Where a metropolitan homesettlerclass existsin the insurgents' land, it will have a survivalinterestin the conflictand will thus actas a powerfulcountervailing "brake"to forcesin themetropolis whichfavora pull-out.If the latterforcesprevail,therewill be a strongpushfromthesettlerclassfora U.D.I.-typebreakwiththe metropolis alongRhodesianlines.If thissucceeds,theconflict ceases tobe asymmetric as definedhere. (3) In a limitedwar,despitethe factthatthereis no directthreatto theremaywell be otherpowerphysicalsurvivalofthemetropolis,

(i)

26For a detailedargument of thispointsee Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira,Portuguese ColonialismfromSouth Africato Europe (Freiburgi972).

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fulinterests to be protected. The greater thesalienceof theseinwill be in the terests, thegreaterthe resistance to withdrawal metropolis. The lastpointbringsus to thetwootherexamplesnotedabovethe Russianinterventions in Hungary(i956) and Czechoslovakia (i968). It is obvious thatoneofthenecessary conditions notedearlier fortheprocess ofpolitical In both attrition tomanifest itself wasabsent. casesthelocalresistance waseffectively andrapidly crushed.27 FromtheSovietpointof view,thesecurity whilenotone interest, ofa directthreat ofinvasion, was nevertheless highlysalient.For example,Russianinterests in maintaining Czechoslovakia underSoviet controlweretwo-fold. As Zemannotes,Czechoslovakia had a key in theSovietsystem: position "It is a workshop wherea lotofRussian and East-European raw material is processed; thecountry's territory formsa tunnelleadingfromwestern Europedirectly to theSoviet Union."28 Second,fortheU.S.S.R.,twiceinvadedthiscentury from theWestat a costofmillions inoflives,a certain fixation on security terests wasunderstandable. Butthestrategic costsofrelinquishing controloverCzechoslovakia werenotsimply thedirectcostsofcreating a physical gap in thechainofsatellite buffer states. The realriskfrom of national theSovietpointofviewwas thatthesubversive ideology

of "socialismwith a human-i.e., non-Russian-face" determination, mightspreadfirstto the othersatellitestatesof EasternEurope and to the SovietUnion itself.The Sovietintervention in Hunultimately garyin i956 is a similarcase in point. toproducea model Theseexamplesshowthatitis virtually impossible conflict of asymmetric whichwould be sufficiently flexibleto account fortheoutcomeof the casesof conflictthatmightbe includedunder thatrubric.Neitheris it evidentthatthiswould be desirable.The probis thatthereis a natural lem with using models to explainconflicts of the tendencyto attemptto forcethe data to fitthe requirements The riskslie in ignoringotherfactorswhichmightfallwithin theory. but whichmay thecategorysometimeslabeled"accidentsof history," nevertheless be of criticalimportancein determining the outcomeof a particularconflict. Mostofthediscussion thusfarhas dealtwiththedomesticconstraints whichwill be generatedin the metropolisas a consequenceof asymoftheconflict. metriesin thestructure We can quiteeasilypointto the 27 For an analysis in the Czech case see Boserup of thebreakdownof the resistance and Mack (fn. 7), chap. VI. 28Z. A. B. Zeman,PragueSpring(London i969).

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mechanisms thatgenerate theformtheywill suchconstraints-though to be at to theinterests perceived willvaryaccording takein practice power. to thenatureofthepolityoftheexternal stakeandaccording constraints. Butlittleor nothing can be saidwithrespect to external For example,therewerefewexternal constraints bearingdownon inKenya,yetinthecaseofthe British policyintheMau Maurebellion was in IndonesiaagainsttheDutchthesituation nationalist struggle The critical factorherewas theU.S. threatto cutoff verydifferent. MarshallPlan aid to theDutchif theyfailedto makea settlement A completely different setofpotential nationalists. withtheIndonesian to bearagainstPortugalvis-a'-vis external couldbe brought pressures warsin Africa, and so on. thePortuguese In an asymmetric forthegeneration ofinternal conflict, thepotential of thehistorical in themetropolitan powerexistsregardless divisions perpower,theinterests epoch,thenatureofthepolityoftheexternal in whichtheconcontext ceivedto be at stake,and theinternational theformand flicttakesplace.Thoughthesefactors mayinfluence in divisions takenby theseinternal conflict, anyparticular intensity is independent fromall ofthem.It arises thecauseofthesedivisions relationships whichexistbetween fromthenatureof theasymmetric canbe saidin theabstract On theotherhand,nothing thebelligerents. to bearon the constraints whichmaybe brought aboutanyexternal on theconditions ofa particular external power.Thesearedependent historical epoch. SUMMARY

was oneofexplaining howthemilitarily The initialproblem powin armed confrontation with defeated the could be erful militarily in a number ofcritically imweak.Thiswasnotjustidlespeculation; in thepost-World conflicts War II epoch,industrial powers portant inwarsfought onforeign soilagainst havefailedtogaintheirobjectives in convenforces. In all ofthesecasesthesuperiority localnationalist of the external tionalmilitary powerwas overwhelming. capability of In a sense,thesewarsmaybe seenas a replayof themini-wars and early colonialconquestwhichtookplacein thelatenineteenth In theearlier difference. butwitha critical era,the twentieth centuries, forcetoachieverapidsuccess, industrial whereas powersusedminimal thesameindustrial War II conflicts, in thepost-World powersconcountries with forces massive the same Third-World and lost. fronted ofthe"weaker"party, I pointedoutthat thesuccesses In explaining

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an obviousminimalrequirement forvictory was thattheinsurgents theindusthisbyrefusing to confront shouldnotlose.Theyachieved trialpowerson theirowntermsand byresorting insteadto "unconor even ventional" formsof warfare-guerrilla war,urbanterrorism, nonviolent action.However, I didnotexaminethisaspectoftheprobdid notloseas a lemin anydetail.I tookthefactthattheinsurgents "given"whenI inquiredintothemoreinteresting problem-namely, howdidtheywin?I notedthatoneofthekeyasymmetries whichcharacterized therelationships ofthebelligerents wasthat,as a consequence oftheasymmetry in wealthand economic and technological developtheinsurgents ment, lackedthephysical toattackthemetrocapability politanpower.It thusfollowed logically thatthemetropolitan power couldnotbe defeated militarily. In turn,victory fortheinsurgents couldonlycomeaboutas a consequence of thedestruction of theexternal towagewar.The historical power'spolitical evidence capability of theoutcome of thepost-World War II conflicts confirms thelogic oftheargument. As a nextstep,I examined of theprocessofpolitical thedynamics attrition, arguing thattheasymmetries whichcharacterized theconflict provided thebasis,notonlyfortheinitialrestraints on mobilization of ofinternal butalsofortheemergence divisions military forces, as the The factthatthewarwasby wardraggedon andcostsaccumulated. "limited"also providedthe basisfor a sustainedmoral definition meansemployed-from torture critiqueof themilitary to napalmoftroopsto risktheirlivesin combat whilereducing thewillingness andofthedomestic tomakeeconomic sacrifices. population However, wasnotseenas arising theprocess ofattrition froma steady primarily across-the-board increment of "warweariness," as somewriters have stilllesswas it seenas a processof conversion suggested; at thetop thepoliticalleadership was gradually of theimwhereby persuaded or undesirability ofitspolicies.The controversies morality themselves becameoneofthecostsofthewar.Timeis a resource in politics, and thebitter hostilities suchwarsgenerate maycometodominate political ofotherobjectives. debatetothedetriment ofthepursuit Provided the canmaintain a steadyimposition insurgents of"costs"on theirmetrothebalanceofpolitical in theexternal forces politanopponent, power willinevitably shiftin favoroftheanti-war factions. dealtessentially Althoughthemaindiscussion withdomestic conI alsorecognized thatinternational constraints straints, wereoftenof in asymmetric conflicts. greatimportance However, whereas themech-

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anismsgivingrise to internalconstraints could be identified, it was impossibleto say anythingin the abstractabout externalconstraints. Having outlinedin fairlygeneraltermstheconditionsunderwhich theprocessofpoliticalattrition mightbe expectedto manifestitselfin practice, I thenbriefly examinedthecountervailing forces.I notedthat thenatureof thepolityof the externalpowermighteitherinhibitor facilitate thegenerationof domesticconflict. But I also arguedthatinternaldivisionswere primarilya functionof the conflictrelationship and not of differences in the politicalstructure of the metropolis. Finally,I notedthatthesalienceof theinterest whichtheexternalpower -or ratherfactionswithinit-had in pursuingthe war would also affectthe processof politicalattrition. NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Examplesof the typesof hypotheses whichthisanalysismightsuggestweregivenearlierin thepaper.It wouldbe easyto thinkofothers, forinstance: The greatertheinterest a particular factionhas in the metropolitan prosecution ofthewarand thewiderthebasisofitsdomesticsupport, thegreaterwill be thesupportforcontinuingthewar. Anotherexamplewould be: The weakerand moredependenttheexternalpoweris on external supportin orderto prosecutethe war,the moreimportant external constraints will be in determining theoutcome. The objectionsto thesealternativeapproaches-otherthan for the purposeof illustrating pointsin the argument-areseveral.First,they would slice the conflict or spatially) up intoparts(eithertemporally whichare thenexaminedin relativeisolation.I have arguedthata full can onlycomefroman analysisoftheconflict understanding as a whole. Second,thereis the technicalproblemof operationalizing such vague conceptsas "interest"or "faction."Third, even if operationalization werepossible,thehypotheses wouldremainuntestable bythetraditional statistical tests.That is a problemwhichhas been largely significance studiesin conflictresearchwhere ignoredin mostof the quantitative conflicts tendto get lumpedtogether-symmetric and asymmetric and acrossperiodsof up to a hundredyearsor more-in orderto obtaina sufficiently largesampleforstatistical manipulation.Thus the quantitativestudiesundertakenby Rummeland Tanterwith the objectof betweenexternaland internalconflicts testingthe relationship arrive

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therelaat theconclusion thatno suchrelationship exists.29 However, well exist but be hidden the tionships may byprecisely methodological intended to writers methods to revealthem.Contrary likeStohland thereis no "paradox"in theapparently Wilkenfeld, contradictory ascauseinternal sertions that,on theonehand,external conflicts conflict ornot and,on theother, thattheycreateinternal solidarity.30 Whether ofthenatureoftheconflict. Butsincethe thisis thecaseis a function isnotidentified, typeofconflict therelationships arelostintheaggregationofdata.It is notpossibleto consider asymmetric conflicts (as definedhere)on theirown,sincethesizeofthesampleis fartoosmall. Theonlywayoutofthisdilemma istoattempt a "timeseries" analysis.3' Here,insteadofmanyconflicts beingexamined once,thedatamatrix is filledbyexamining oneconflict (or a few)overmanytimeintervals. The methodological and epistemological withthistypeof problems analysis areenormous, andtheresults thusfarare however, produced modest. extremely If we moveawayfromthequantitative literature to examineother attempts at explaining theoutcomeof asymmetric different conflicts, arise.The literature oncounter-insurgency, forexample, conproblems centrates almostexclusively on thedevelopment of thewar on the groundand ignoresitsimpacton themetropolis. Ikle notes:"When it comesto actualfighting, thescoresthatcountare,forinstance, the number ofenemy unitsdestroyed, squaremilesofterritory gained,and othersuccesses or failures in battle.Wheresuchan attitude prevails, professional military menwouldconsider it unusual,ifnotsomewhat to askwhether improper, these'mid-game' successes will improve the ending."32 Counter-insurgency theorists can thusprovidea partialexplanation ofwhyinsurgents maylose,buttheycannot, almost bydefinition,grasphowitis thattheymaywin.Awareness thatinsurgent successesarea consequence of "lackofpoliticalwill"or "defeatism" on thepartofthemetropolitan is ofcoursethere, governments butthisis seenas a contingent phenomenon almostwhollyunrelated to thecon29 R. J. Rummel,"Dimensionsof Conflict BehaviorWithinand BetweenNations," GeneralSystemsYearbook,viii (i963), I-50; and RaymondTanter,"Dimensionsof Conflict BehaviorWithinand BetweenNations,I958-60," Journalof ConflictResolution,x (March i966), 4i-64. Michael Stohl,"LinkagesbetweenWar and DomesticPoliticalViolence in the UnitedStates,i89o-i923" in J. Caporasoand L. Roos, eds., Quasi-Experimental Approaches(EvanstonI973); and JonathanWilkenfeld,"Introduction" to Wilkenfeld, ed., ConflictBehaviorand LinkagePolitics(New York I973). 31 See RobertBurrowesand BertramSpector,"The Strengthand Directionof BetweenDomesticand ExternalConflictand Cooperation:Syria,i96iRelationships 67" in Wilkenfeld, ibid.; also Stohl (fn. 30). 32Ikle(fn. ii).

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worksin thecounter-insurgency ductofthewar.Moresophisticated fielddo consider in theinsurgents' political factors homeland-namely, ofsocialandeconomic thepayoffs reform as a meansofreducing popua sustained larsupport fortheinsurgents. ButonlyTrinquier provides in themetropolis analysis ofthepolitical andsocialchangesnecessary ifsuchwarsareto succeed-andin thiscasethedemandsoflogicare followed withno regardforpolitical reality. dealswithevents onconflict Although muchoftheresearch literature renewalof leadingup to theoutbreak ofwar,therehasbeena recent on interest in "war-termination studies."33 However, theseconcentrate thefinalphasesofthewar,in particular thoseleadingtonegotiations ofthe oroffering possibilities forthird-party mediation. The evolution waranditswidersociopolitical dimensions arelargely ignored. A numberof excellent historical case studiesof thevariousasymmetric conflicts in thispaper.Manyofthemhave havebeenmentioned a virtue manifestly lackingin otherworks, namelythatoftreating the conflict as a wholeratherthanexamining "technical" diparticular canproor temporal casestudies mensions slices.However, individual videno conceptual basisfordistinguishing betweenwhatmightin thiscontext be called"structural fromhistorically necessity" unique factors. Sincenarrative betweenthe history is unableto discriminate universal andtheparticular whenanalyzing conflicts, it is a mostunreliableguideto thefuture. Military history is repletewith"Maginot thedangersofrelying on historical lines,"illustrating precedents. Specific problems raisedbythesedifferent methodological approaches to asymmetric conflicts and thedifferent fociof interest whichhave beenemployed willbe dealtwithin depthin a forthcoming study.34 In particular, thatstudywillexaminethewritings oftheleadingrevolutionary strategists. In the presentpaper,I have dealtessentially withtheprocessof attrition as a function of theasymmetries which characterize theconflict. An asymmetric strategy wouldbe onewhich soughttoamplify thisprocess ofattrition indirectly. An outlineofthe basicrequirements of suchan "asymmetric strategy" (derivedfrom thestrategic writings of Clausewitz, Glucksman, and Mao Tse-tung) is provided in thefinalchapter of War Without Weapons.35 itshouldbe obviousthatmyaimin thispaperhas notbeen Finally, to providea "model"whichmaythenbe "tested"by applyingit 33Carroll (fn. i); Fox (fn. i); Ikle (fn. ii); and R. F. Randle,The Originsof Peace (New York I973). 34AndrewMack, "WorkingPaperson Asymmetric Conflict," Nos. i-vi,Richardson Institute(London I974). 35BoserupandMack (fn.7).

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and ahistorically mechanically to a widerangeof conflicts. it Rather, has beento construct a conceptual framework whichwill providea focusforempirical studies. Like the"paradigm" of thephysical scienceswhichThomasKuhnhas described, thisconceptual framework functions essentially to directthe researcher's attention towardparticularaspectsof the real world-to distinctions and relationships which"common sense"oftendoesnottakeintoaccount. The frameworkdefines thenecessary questions whichmustbe asked;it does notseekto provideautomatic answers. CONCLUSION

Recentdevelopments in two ongoingasymmetric conflicts have tobearoutthemainthrust tended ofmyargument. The mostdramatic hasbeentheSpinolacoupin Portugal development whichclearly has forthewarsofnational far-reaching implications in Angola, liberation andGuineaBissau.*The secondis theconflict Mozambique, inUlster. The springof i974 sawtheemergence, in England,ofsignificant domesticopposition to thewar,withseveralcampaigns fortroopwithdrawalattracting fromverydifferent growingsupport politicalconstituencies. SincetheBritish Government hasexhausted all theobvious "initiatives" (jugglingthe local Ulsterleadership, directrule,the Northern IrelandAssembly, and theCouncilof Ireland)to no avail, andsincetheI.R.A.remains notonlyundefeated butcapableof escawherenecessary, latingits offensive it seemscertainthatthe camwillgatherstrength. paignforwithdrawal One ofthemostsignificant ofcurrent aspects I.R.A.activity is itsrolein maintaining andsolidifyingProtestant "extremism." The bombing functions to preessentially ventthe "moderate" favoredby the Westminster politicalsolution, and the Catholicand Protestant government centergroupswhich dominate theAssembly, fromcomingtofruition. The Spinolagovernfacesa similar mentinPortugal problem. Havingexplicitly abandoned thebeliefthatthewaris winnable, theregime's current is to strategy seeka "political" solution. GeneralSpinolaadvocates greatly increased but"theoverseas mustbe an integral autonomy, territories partofthe nation."It is alreadyobviousthatsucha solutionis acPortuguese * Since this conclusionwas written, thenew PortugueseGovernment has abandoned the earlierinsistencethat the "overseasterritories must be an integralpart of the Portuguesenation."The threatof a possiblesettlerbid fora unilateraldeclaration of independence was briefly raisedin Mozambique,but evaporatedwiththe considerable exodusof whitesto Portugaland SouthAfrica.In Angola,witha largersettlerpopulation,fargreatermineralresources, and deep divisionsbetweencompetingliberation the situationremainsunclear. movements,

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norto theliberation moveto theEuropeansettlers ceptable neither is now clearlya seriouspoliticaloptionforboth ments.Withdrawal thatthe colonialwars are unpowers.In admitting metropolitan defeat:"theconvenGeneralSpinolahas in factadmitted winnable, thekeyquestionalarmylosesifit doesnotwin."In bothcountries to withdraw butratherwhenand how. tionis no longerwhether To conclude,it hardlyneedspointingout that-if correct-the powerswhich analysisforindustrial of the foregoing implications in longdrawn-out warsin theThirdWorldarefarbecomeembroiled to suchwarsfor whichbecomecommitted reaching. Governments reasonshouldrealizethat,overtime,thecostsof thewar whatever at home.The causes opposition will inevitably generate widespread ofdissent lie beyondthecontrolof thepoliticalelite;theylie in the andin itself-inthetypeofwarbeingpursued structure oftheconflict Anti-war movecharacter. whichformitsdistinctive theasymmetries theirpolitical on theotherhand,havetendedto underestimate ments, conTheyhavefailedtorealizethatin everyasymmetric effectiveness. it has powerhas beenforcedto withdraw, flictwheretheexternal of internal dissent. Thus,anyanalysisof the beenas a consequence and ofasymmetric conflicts mustofnecessity takeintoaccount outcome ofthenationalist and endurance forces, explainnotonlythetenacity in thehomelandoftheir butalsothegeneration ofinternal divisions anti-war movementsenemy.In thistypeof conflict, metropolitan thatopposethewar-have,despite andthisincludes all thesocialforces failuresand frustrations, provento be remarkably theirshort-term in thelongrun. successful