LTD Digests 2

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals International Hardwood & Veneer Co. v UP Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Lands Director of Forestry v. Villareal Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v. CA Republic v. Vda. De Castillo Hilario v. City of Manila Maneclang v. IAC Republic v. Reyes Director of Lands v. CA Republic v. CA Lahora v. Dayanghirang Laburada v. LRA Republic v.CA Republic v. Heirs of Abrille Grande v. Court of Appeals Cureg v. IAC Fernandez v. Tanada International Hardwood & Veneer Co. vs. UP, supra Palawan Agri. & Industrial Co., Inc. v. Director of Lands Director of Land Management v. CA Kidpalos v. Baguio Mining Co., Divina v. CA Fewkes v. Vasquez Benin v. Tuason Director of Lands v. Benitez, et al.,

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DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS, 178 SCRA 708 (1989) Facts: On July 20, 1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint application for the registration of two parcels of land, located in the province of Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz. They claimed that they inherited those parcels of land. The Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the ground that said parcels of land were part of a timberland, a public dominion, so it cannot be the subject of the registration proceedings. After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private respondents after finding that the applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than 80 years. The CA affirmed the CFI’s decision, holding that the classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). Issue: Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for 80 years can ripen to private ownership. Ruling: No. The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It emphasized that a positive act of the government, particularly the Executive Department is needed to declassify land, which is classified as forest, and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes before registration of which may proceed. The Court, citing various cases, stated that a parcel of forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest the Bureau of Forestry, an office under the Executive Department, and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. In the present case, the two parcels of land were not declared by the Executive Department to be alienable and disposable, thus it cannot be registered under private ownership. INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD & VENEER CO. v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, 200 SCRA 554 (1991) Facts: IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of plywood. It renewed its timber license, which was granted by the government and shall be valid for 25 years, in early 1960. Said license authorizes the company to cut, collect and remove timber from the portion of timber land located in certain municipalities of Laguna, including Paete.

2 to the areas covered by the timber license of IHVCP, the said Act removed and segregated it from being a public forest. The Court further cited Sec. 3 of R.A. 3990, which provides that, "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.” The provision of the Act is clear that UP, being the owner of the land, has the right to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of IHVCP insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 126 SCRA 69 (1983) Facts: There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons, Borre and Amunategui.

In 1964, the Congress enacted R.A. 3990, an Act establishing an experiment station for UP. The said experiment station covers a portion of the timberland in Paete, occupied by IHVCP so UP, who claims ownership of said portion of timberland, demanded the latter to pay the forest charges to it, instead of the BIR. IHVCP rejected the demand and it filed a suit against UP, claiming that R.A. 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by it within the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the BIR.

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.

Issue: Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in Paete.

Issue: W/N the lot in question can be subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of the private person.

Ruling: Yes.

Held: No.

The Court ruled that R.A. 3990 ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP the area, which means that the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain. In respect

The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court's finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest”. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Therefore, the lot in question never ceased to be classified as forest land of public domain. The classification is not lost even if it had been stripped off forest cover unless in an official proclamation as disposable lands. The rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v. VILLAREAL, 200 SCRA 551 (1991) Facts: Respondent Ruperto Villareal applied for the registration of various mangrove swamps located in Sapian, Capiz on January 25, 1949. He alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of these lands for more than forty years. Petitioner, on the other hand, questioned the validity of such an application. It was claimed that mangrove swamps are part of our public forest land and are therefore inalienable under the Constitution. Issue: W/N the land is inalienable public forest land Ruling: Yes

3 C.A. No. 141 delegated to the President the function of making periodic classifications of public land. One category of such public land is timber. The swamps, as noted in earlier cases, were sometimes cultivated merely for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove. Since the swamps are used for timber and lands of such purpose are considered public lands, the swamps in the instant case must be recognized as inalienable public forest land. ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, 193 SCRA 71 (1991) Facts: The Fredia Mineral claim of 9 hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet was located sometime between December 25 and 31, 1930 by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of Congress’ Act known as Philippine Bill of 1902 in a so-called Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of the mineral claim has been duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Co., which was the earlier name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. in a Deed of Sale executed November 2, 1931. Ever since, Atok has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to present. Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim as well as other mineral claims owned by them as declared under Tax Declaration 9535. In view of Presidential Decree 1214, Atok filed an application for lease covering the Fredia mineral claim. Liwan Consi, respondent, owns a lot below the land of Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet, where he constructed a house thereon in 1964. Said lot is covered by Tax Declaration 9462. When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay, he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut and no one prohibited him from entering the land as well as constructing a house thereon. In January 1984, Consi had the house repaired and people came to take pictures and told him that the lot

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest belongs to Atok. However, Consi has been paying taxes on the said land, which his father before him had occupied. Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi on March 1, 1984. The Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by Judge Irving rendered a decision on January 29, 1987 dismissing the case against Consi. ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet, presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson and on December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered decision stating that the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon is reversed and set aside. Liwan Consi is ordered to vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet immediately, demolish the house, and to restore possession to Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint regarding forcible entry action.  The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral land or agricultural awaits the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources in a proceeding called for that purpose.  There is a chance that the subject property may be classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a "squatter" he also has possessory rights over the property.  Such rights may mature into ownership on the basis of longterm possession under the Public Land Law, thus, both Consi and ATOK are of equal legal footing with regards the subject lot. Both hold possessory titles to the land in question — the petitioner through his long term occupancy of the same; the respondent mining firm by virtue of its being the claim locator and applicant for a lease on the mineral claim within which the subject lot is found.  But it was established that the petitioner has been in actual and beneficial possession of the subject lot since before the Second World War in the concept of owner and in good faith.

4 Issue: Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim? Held: YES. The Court enunciated that the petitioner, Atok, has the exclusive right to the property in question. The court grants the petition. The decision of the RTC is upheld and the decision of CA is reversed and set aside. Ratio: As held in the case of Gold Creek Mining Corporation, it is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent. The evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The record shows that the lot in question was acquired through a Deed of Sale. The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public and the property of the locator.

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It is evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. On the issue of possession, Atok has been in continuous and exclusive possession since 1931. Consi started only sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon. Atok has, indeed, superior possessory rights than Consi. Atok has the right to sue for ejectment being in actual possession of the land and for the deprivation of his rights. REPUBLIC v. VDA. DE CASTILLO, 163 SCRA 286 (1988) FACTS: Sometime in 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land located in Batangas with an area of 39, 755 sq.m. On August 31, 1951, Modesto Castillo married to Amanda Lat was declared the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements. The OCT 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds at Batangas on February 7, 1952. By virtue of an instrument dated March 18, 1960, the two parcels of land covered by OCT 0-665 together with two other lots were consolidated and subdivided into Lots 1-9. After Modesto’s death on August 31, 1920, Amanda Lat Vda. De Castillo executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio Castillo. As a result, Original Certificate of Title No. D-665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer cerfificates of title were issued to Florencio Castillo. The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by

5 the waters thereof, and being of public ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as private property. Appellants herein, defendants below, alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already barred by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that the government was estopped from questioning the ownership and possession of appellants. The Court of First Instance of Batangas, presided over by Honorable Benjamin Relova, ruled in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. The decision orders the Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 in the name of Modesto Castillo and the subsequent Transfer of Certificates of Title issued over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and 2 are declared public lands belonging to the state. The Court of Appeals in a decision reversed and set aside the appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicate? HELD: Long possession of a land is not available as a defense for this case because the Court has already ruled that mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character. The Supreme Court held that the decision of then Intermediate Appellate Court is set aside and reversed. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas is affirmed and reinstated. Ratio: One of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable. It has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant (Republic v. Ayala y Cia).

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest But an important bone of contention is the nature of the lands involved in this case. The petitioner contends that Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the same were not subject to registration, being outside the commerce of men; and that since the lots in litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private property, hence, res judicata does not apply. The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence through the testimonies of witnesses. All the Government’s exhibits show the original shoreline of the disputed areas and the fact that the properties in question were under water at the time and are still under water especially during the rainy season proves that they are indeed a part of the washed and inundated waters. Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose) while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use (Ignacio v. Director of Lands). But said distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.

6 HILARIO v. CITY OF MANILA, 19 SCRA 931 (1967) Facts:  Appeal form a decision of the CFI of Rizal  A long time ago in a far away majestic land of honey and dew, Dr. jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land located at Barrio Guinayang, in San Mateo, Rizal. Upon his death this property was inherited by his son, plaintiffappellant, Jose Hilario Jr., to whom a new certificate of title was issued.  The Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River. To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stone wall.  However, a great flood occurred which inundated the place, which destroyed the dike on the northwest and meandered into the Hilario estate. The disputed area is on the eastern side of a lenticular strip, which stands between the old riverbed site and the new course of the riverbed created naturally by the flood.  In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises and started excavating soil, gravel, and sand. The operations eventually extended to the disputed area. A claim for damages was filed which was paid by the US Army. In 1947, the plant was turned over to the respondent who continued its operations  Plaintiff filed an injunction against defendants City Engineer of Manila, praying for the restraint of the operations of the plant. Defendants answered that the operations were made from the riverbed.  As joining intervenors, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Calalang complained that the disputed area was within the bed of the river and that they should be enjoined from continuing the operations. The defendants claimed that they were authorized by plaintiff to continue its operations  Defendants filed a petition for injunction as well against plaintiff and intervenor Atty. Calalang, alleging that the latter

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have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of the agreement had between the latter and the Director of Public Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. The other side filed a counter-injuction. The court issued an order maintaining the status quo and allowing defendants to continue. Manila City denied ownership of the plant and claimed that City Engineer acted merely as a deputy of the Public Works Director The lower court rendered a decision against defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works Not being satisfied with the decision, plaintiffs filed several motions for reconsideration Hence, this appeal

 Issue:  When a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course and opens a new one through private property, would the new riverbanks lining said course be of public ownership? Held:  Yes Ratio:

All riverbanks are of public ownership—including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the Old Civil Code (Since this was decided before the promulgation of the New Civil Code) Property of public ownership is— 1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of similar character” Art. 73 of the Law of Waters defines “banks of a river”

7 By the phrase “banks of a river” is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. The intent of the law is to consider banks—for all legal purposes—as part of the riverbed. Since all beds of rivers are of public ownership, it follows that the banks, shich form part of them, are also of public ownership. Art. 70 of the Law of Waters defines beds of rivers and creeks The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods “Natural” is not made synonymous with “Original” or “Prior condition”. On the contrary, even if a river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the definition provided. A river is but one compound concept consisting of 3 elements: 1) the running waters, 2) the bed and 3) the banks. All these constitute a river. MANECLANG v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 161 SCRA 469 (1985) Facts: Adriano Maneclang, et.al., petitioners, filed before the then CFI Pangasinan (Branch XI) a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within 4 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions 38 and 95 of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan. On 15 August 1975, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River (therefore public in nature and not subject to private appropriation); and held that Resolution 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries were passed by the

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of their legislative powers. Manaclang appealed said decision to the IAC, which affirmed the same on 29 April 1983. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Before the respondents were able to comment on the petition, the petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding of the fishpond, as the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the Court a Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership of the petitioners over the land the body of water found within their titled properties. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and set aside the Compromise Agreement and declare the same null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. 1. Stipulations null and void for being contrary to law and public policy The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership of the fishpond in dispute, which was originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription (Mercado vs. Municipal President of Macabebe), and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual (Diego v. CA; Mangaldan v. Manaoag) and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. The Compromise Agreement, thus, is null and void and of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy. 2. Municipal council authorized to pass laws dealing with its municipal waters The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted

8 municipal council is clothed with authority to pass, as it did the two resolutions dealing with its municipal waters. 3. Publication a constructive notice to the whole world; due process followed Petitioners were not deprived of their right to due process as mere publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world. REPUBLIC v. REYES, 155 SCRA 313 (1987) Facts:  This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal  Once a upon a time on April 17, 1956 respondents Urbano Lara and Godofredo Eusebio filed with the Bureau of Lands their Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land, situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal  After the favorable recommendation of a representative of the Bureau o Lands, said free patent applications were approved; they were issued to respondents Eusebio and Lara, which patents were transcribed and registered by the Register of Deeds of Rizal  In a subsequent investigation by the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands, it was discovered that the said lands were actually under water and form part of the Laguna de Bay.  Eusebio and Lara executed separate affidavits, admitting that they have not complied with certain requirements of the Public Land Act and expressly agreed to have their patents and certificate of title cancelled.  The Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands filed separate complaints against Eusebio, Lara, and the Register of Deeds of Rizal, before the Court of First of Instance of Rizal (Branch II)  Summons together with copies of the complaints were served to all defendants. However, notwithstanding the receipt of the

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summons, defendants (Eusebio and Lara) failed to file their answers. The CFI of Rizal declared that the defendants were in default; also, the CFI of Rizal rendered separate decisions declaring the Free Patent and corresponding Certificates as null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel said patents and titles. The Register of Deeds addressed letters to respondents, informing them of the said decision and adbising them to surrender their owner’s duplicate copy of Original Certificates of Titles. Respondents sent a letter that they have long surrendered such to Atty. Javier of the investigating section of the Ani-graft and Corruption of the bureau of Lands Respondents filed a case at the CFI of Rizal (Branch VI) against the Director of Lands for the annulment of the decision by the CFI of Rizal (Branch II) The CFI of Rizal (Branch VI) declared the judgment of the CFI of Rizal (Branch II) null and void A motion to admit petition to reopen proceedings was filed by the Director of Lands in the CFI of Rizal (Branch VI); it averred that Eusebio and Lara executed a deed of absolute sale (in consideration for 10K) in favor of respondents Venzuela, Cenidoza, and Orosa at the same time when Eusebio and Lara secured the decision of the CFI of Rizal (Branch II) being final and executory, causing the cancellation of Original Certificates of Titles and the issuance in lieu thereof of Transfer Certificates of Title, in the names of Venzuela, Cenidoza, and Orosa. In consideration of 25K, Venzuela and Cenidoza executed separate deeds of transfer of rights in favor of Orosa, who in turn executed a deed of mortgage in consideration of a loan in favor PCI Bank The motion to reopen proceedings was granted. The court ruled that the petition is not the proper course of action available to the Director of Lands and has consequently lost his personality when he was declared in default, and the Court, its jurisdiction to entertain the aforementioned petition to reopen.

9 Issues:  W/O/N a decision which has long become final and executed can be annulled on the grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and that the decision was procured through fraud  W/O/N respondent Orosa, Venzuela, and Cenidoza are buyers in good faith. Held:  No  No Ratio: There is no question that the Court acquired jurisdiction over the respondents (Eusebio and Lara) as adduced from the evidence that personal service was made on them. Jurisdiction over a person of a defendant is acquired when he actually receives the summons (Fuentes vs. Bautista) A judgment whether correct or not becomes final when the plaintiff did not appeal said judgment (which respondents did not avail of any remedies until five years after) (Malia vs IAC) and courts are without jurisdiction over the case once judgment has become final (Vda. De Emmas vs Emmas) Doctrine of non-interference: judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened,modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser shall be cancelled. The disputed area forms part of Laguna de Bay, neither agricultural nor disposable. Any false statement in an application for public land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted.

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud, and the documents of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud.

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Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its ownership of the land nor operate to change the public character of the land to private DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS, 179 SCRA 522 (1989) Facts:  Lot No. 1736 is a large tract of agricultural land situated in Barrio Kapok, Orion, Bataan, containing 233.6883 hectares, alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the grandfather of applicant Arturo Rodriguez, the late Vicente Rodriguez, who, during his lifetime filed Lease Application with the Bureau of Lands, but which application was rejected upon investigation and ascertainment that the land was classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation (Mariveles) under Executive Order of the President of the United States of America  Upon the death of Vicente Rodriguez in 1924, possession of the property was taken over by his sons, Victorino Rodriguez (the father of applicant Arturo Rodriguez) and Pablo Rodriguez.  both Victorino and Pablo Rodriguez waived their rights as heirs of the late Vicente Rodriguez over the subject property ceding all their participation, ownership and possession thereon in favor of Arturo Rodriguez, who (thereafter) sold two-thirds (2/3) undivided portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara  In 1953, the land in question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement  Arturo Rodriguez together with Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara filed a verified petition for registration of their title, alleging that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession thereof in the concept of

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owners for more than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of their application Arturo Rodriguez and Guillermo Reyes, filed an amended application incorporating an allegation that the heirs of Vicente Rodriguez, the original possessor, namely Victorino Rodriguez and Pablo Rodriguez, had relinquished their rights and participation in favor of Arturo Rodriguez. Thirty-nine (39) persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed their Opposition to the petition for registration contending, among others, that they have been in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years and have introduced improvements thereon consisting of fruit-bearing trees; that the applicants have never been in possession of the property; and that applicant Arturo Rodriguez could not have inherited the land from his grandfather, because the children of Vicente Rodriguez are still living The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants confirming their title to the land, Orion Cadastre, Bataan and ordering its registration in the names of said applicants in the following proportion: 2/3 undivided portion to Arturo Rodriguez and 1/3 undivided portion to Guillermo Reyes the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the lower court on the ground that the land in question had been decreed in 1938 to be part of the public domain by the cadastral court, which had become final thereby constituting a bar to the subsequent application for registration on the principle of res judicata Applicants-appellees filed a motion for the reconsideration Court of Appeals thru a division of five and by a vote of four to one reversed its decision and ruled that the prior decision of the cadastral court declaring the lot in question as public land way back in 1930 does not bar the present application for registration of title or confirmation of imperfect title under Act 496 of the same parcel of land citing the case of Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, 4 and that the applicants had registrable title over the land subject of the application. Hence, this appeal by certiorari

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Issue: W/O/N the land was declared public domain and would, thus, be registrable Held: Registrable even though the cadastral court declared the land as public domain Ratio:

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Admittedly, the land in question had been declared public land in a decision rendered by the cadastral court Factually, however, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of because, as we explained in the case of Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 7 a decision in a cadastral proceedings declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act

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Thus, a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS, 73 SCRA 146 (1976) -

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Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a 33hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Davao City The Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to

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participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held where Eugenio was the lone bidder o The Director of Lands issued to him the Order of Award the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes o the excluded land The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2 On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes However, on Oct 9 reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital Whereupon, Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 and claimed “fee simple” title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 350 Respondent Alejandro de Jesus opposed the registration arguing that his father had acquired a vested right on the subject property The CFI ruled in favor of the Medical Center Raised to the CA which granted the lot to respondents Hence this appeal Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area Proclamation No. 350 legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center o Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center o Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines are

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

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alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands Petition is GRANTED

LAHORA v. DAYANGHIRANG, 37 SCRA 346 (1971) FACTS: On November 26, 1965 appellant Francisco Lahora and Toribia Moralizon petitioned the cpurt for registration of 9 parcels of land in Davao. Registration of one of the parcels of land identified as lot no. 2228 was opposed by appellee Emilio Dayanghirang who alleged that said lot was already registered in the name of his wife. Director of Lands also filed opposition to the petition arguing that appellants never had sufficient title over such land sought to be registered nor were they been in open, continuous or notorious possession of said lot. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the original registration of lot no. 2228 is valid? RULING: No. the registration of lot no. 2228 is invalid as the lot has already been registered under the name of oppositor’s wife. It was not denied by the appellants that said land was a public land grant in favor of oppositor’s wife, because when the Government grants land to a private individual a patent thereof is recorded and a certificate of title is issued to the grantee then it comes within the land registration act that after 1 year of issuance said title becomes indefeasible, incontrovertible and irrevocable. And as the court ruled in Pamintuan vs. San Agustin that a cadastral court cannot decree a registration over a land which has already been registered in an earlier case, and a second decree for said land is null and void.

12 LABURADA v. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, 287 SCRA 333 (1998) Facts: Spouses Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which was approved by the trial court. Upon motion of the petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, the petitioner filed an action for mandamus. The LRA revealed that based on the records, Lot 3-A which sought to be registered by spouses Laburada is part of Lot No. 3 over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. On the other hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Vda. De Buenaflor, which was issued as a transfer from TCT No. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thud contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrents Title Registration System and destroy the integrity of the same. Issue: W/N the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrents Certificate of Title? Held: No. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of a land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same and would be null and void, since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land which the petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to Spouses Laburada will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a s decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not mere ministerial act which may be compelled through

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

13

mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration.

 

The Petition is DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6569.

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REPUBLIC v. CA, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) SUPRA Facts:  A lot with an area of 17,311 sq.m. situated in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna and 20 meters from the shore of Laguna de Bay; was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on 19 April 1909.  The Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.  The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918, and the realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948.  When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance.  Santos del Rio filed his application for registration of said parcel on 9 May 1966.  The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.  Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although there was no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file an ejectment suit against the former in 1966.  Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rio's application for registration.

The CFI Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals, setting aside that of the trial court. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.

 Issue: W/N there is a claim of ownership by Santos del Rio Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment affirmed from, and ordered the registration of the land described in the application in favor of Santos del Rio, applicant private respondent; with costs against private petitioners. Ratio: Classification of property as either of public dominion or of private ownership; Public lands / public dominion Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. The New Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. Article 402 includes “those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;; and “those which belong to the State without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" as property belonging to public dominion. Article 502 adds "rivers and their natural beds;;” “continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;;” “waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;;” and “ lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds;;” to the enumeration. Extent of a lake bed The extent of a lake bed is defined in Artcile 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as “the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth." Highest Ordinary Depth in a lake; Determinant is rainfall and not gravitational pull (tides) The phrase "highest ordinary depth" has been interpreted in the case of Government. vs. Colegio de San Jose to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year; or thus rain "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources." While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. The alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed 4-5 months a year during the rainy season; rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. The land sought to be registered, therefore, is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Foreshore land defined; Definition does not apply to land adjacent to lake Foreshore land is that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides; or the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. In the present case, since the inundation of a portion of the land near the lake is not due to “flux and reflux of tides,” it thus cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning cited by the Director of Lands. Purpose of land registration under Torrens System The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant

14 already possesses over the land. Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale in favor of his father from whom he inherited said land. Tax declaration strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription; also Open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the land Applicant presents tax declarations covering the land since 1918 and also tax receipts dating back to 1948. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Further, applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than 30 years, counted from 19 April 1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by purchase. Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in good faith, his possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title Even if the land sought to be registered is public land, applicant would be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (CA 141 as amended by RA 1942). Section 48 of the Act enumerates as among the persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, such as “those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title."

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest Reclamation requires proper permission; reclaimed land does not automatically belong to party reclaiming the same Private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the public domain without proper permission from government authorities. And even if such reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. In the present case, private oppositorspetitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall. Tolerance of possession cannot ripen into ownership As the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio; the fact that some of them at one time or another did not pay rent. Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these could not have affected the character of the latter's possession which has already ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription. REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF ABRILLE, 71 SCRA 57 Facts: June 28, 1916 Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille. Upon the death of the original owner, the said property was inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille, said lot was 525,652 sq m under the TCT. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots under subdivision plan which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on March 17,1967. Lot 1 contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot 2 contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original area covered in TCT in the name of said

15 defendant Luisa Villa Abrille. March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of First Instance of Davao directing the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and thereafter to cancel the same and issue new TCT’s for the 2 lots. The registration of Lot 2, which includes the aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law. The excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the approval of the subdivision survey was formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public domain. Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of TCT’s which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127 square meters. SC = No. We are of the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of TCT’s which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters. Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval of their Subdivision Plan to include the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular. In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan. In the instant case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision Plans was without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites should all be satisfied:

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest 1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor; 2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant; 3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court; 4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission; 5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette; 6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have interests in the property by the sheriff; 7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not; 8. Hearing of the case by the Court; 9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court; 10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration; 11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission; 12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds, and 13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees. Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.

16 GRANDE v. COURT OF APPEALS, 5 SCRA 524 (1962) FACTS: The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early 1930’s, the Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration purposes. The land was described to have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in the title. By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes filed an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful and continuous possession of the land created by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs, however, stated that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933. The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the premises and pay for damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the riparian owners? HELD: Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that said land have become imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the Grande’s single witness who claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is because the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950. CUREG v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 177 SCRA 313 (1989) Facts: On 5 November 1982, Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with preliminary injunction against Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio Carniyan with the RTC Isabela (Civil Case Br. 111-373). A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court on 12 November 1982. The complaint alleged that the Gerardos and Maquinad are the legal and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the latter being the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before the outbreak of WWII; that since time immemorial and/or before 26 July 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-ininterest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all other claimants, of a parcel of land, situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, containing an area of 2.5 hectares [N: Cagayan River; E: Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa Cureg); S: Antonio Carniyan; and W: Sabina Mola]. Said land was declared for taxation purposes under TD 08-3023 in the name of Francisco Gerardo, which cancelled TD C-9669, in the name of Francisco; that upon the death of Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and possession of the land was succeeded by his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who, together with 3 legal or forced heirs, namely Soledad Gerardo, Primo Gerardo(+) and Salud Gerardo(+) have also been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the same. Primo Gerardo was survived by Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza Gerardo; while Salud Gerardo was survived by Lilia Maquinad. In 1979, Soledad, Rosa, Nieves, and Flordeliza Gerardo along with Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the land to Domingo Apostol. On 10 September 1982, the verbal sale and conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who executed

17 an "Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance.” About the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition, the land already manifested signs of accretion of about 3 hectares on the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan River; that Domingo Apostol declared the land and its accretion for tax purposes under TD 08-13281 on 15 September 1982. Sometime about the last week of September and or the first week of October 1982, when the Gerardos, Maquinad and Apostol were about to cultivate their land together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by the Carniyans (Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio: surviving spouse and children of Antonio Carniyan) from continuing to do so. The late Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land (acquired from his father-in-law Marcos Cureg on 5 October 1956 as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale) situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela which contained an area of 2,790 sq. m.(N: Domingo Gerardo; E: Domingo Guingab; S: Pelagio Camayo; and W: Marcos Cureg), and which was declared for taxation purposes under TD 13131, with an assessed value of P70.00. Carniyan revised on 28 November 1968 his TD 13131 dated 24 July 1961 to conform with the correct area and boundaries of his OCT P-19093 issued on 25 November 1968 pursuant to Free Patent 399431 dated 21 May 1968; that the area under the new TD 15663 was increased from 2,790 sq.ms. to 4,584 sq.ms. and the boundary on the north became Cagayan River, purposely eliminating completely the original boundary on the north which is Domingo Gerardo. The heirs of Antonio Carniyan (Cureg, et.al.) alleged in their answer that the land claimed by the Gerardos and Apostol is nonexistent; that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco Gerardo; that the "subject land" is an accretion to their registered land and that they have been in possession and cultivation of the "accretion" for many years. The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on 28 July 1983 on the ground that the Carniyans (Cureg) were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to September 1982. In a decision rendered on 6 July 1984, the trial court rendered

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest judgment declaring Domingo Apostol the absolute owner of the parcel of land containing an area of 5.5000 hectares (N: Cagayan River; E: Domingo Guingab; S: Antonio Carniyan; and W: by Sabina Mola) and with an assessed value of P3,520; ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Cureg, et.al.; ordering that the writ be made permanent; and ordering Cureg, et.al. to pay Apostol, et.al. a reasonable attorney's fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of P1,500.00 and costs. On 17 July 1984, Cureg appealed to the then IAC Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court on 15 October 1985 (CA-GR CV 03852). Cureg's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 8 January 1986. Hence, the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rule of Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision appealed from, and rendered judgment dismissing Civil Case Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages; with costs against Apostol, et.al. 1. Tax Declaration not sufficient evidence to prove ownership; OCT indicates true and legal ownership Gerardos' and Maquinad’s (therefore Apostol’s) claim of ownership of their alleged 2 & 1/2 hectare land is anchored mainly on 4 tax declarations. The declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437, 444). On the other hand, Cureg et.al. relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their OCT P-19093. In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals (GR 50420, 29 May 1987, 150 SCRA 393, 401-402), it was ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises. Cureg's OCT P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations offered by Apostol, et.al. in support of their claim, which declarations are all in the name of the

18 latters’ predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have been subscribed by him after the last war, when it was established during the trial that Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war. 2. Decree of registration bars all claims and rights arising or existing prior to decree A decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act 496 (now Section 44 of PD 1529). Since Cureg's original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River, Apostol's claim over the land allegedly existing between Cureg's land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the original certificate of title. 3. Tax Declaration of earlier date cannot defeat OCT of later date; Cureg not estopped as Tax Declarations subsequent to issuance of OCT states northern boundary is Cagayan river A tax declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is of a later date. The appellate court erred in considering Tax Declaration 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan, as an admission by him that his land is bounded on the north by the land of Domingo Gerardo and thus is estopped from claiming otherwise. The tax declarations of the late Antonio Carniyan subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093 already states that its northern boundary is Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused the accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT P-19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land. 4. Cureg, et.al. in actual possession; Evidence Evidence on record proves that Cureg, et.al. are in actual possession of the land. First, the trial court in its Decision stated the reason for denying private respondents' petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, is that Cureg, et.al. were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to September 1982. Second, witness for

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest Apostol, et.al., Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the east of the land in question and whose own land is bounded on the north of Cagayan River, on cross-examination, revealed that when his property was only more than 1 hectare in 1958, (now more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the west is the land of Antonio Carniyan. Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic engineer, on direct examination stated that in 1974, the late Antonio Carniyan requested him to survey the land covered by his title and the accretion attached to it, but he did not pursue the same because he learned from the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion is the subject of an application for homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila, contrary to the statement of the trial court and the appellate court that Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not continue to survey because persons other than defendants were in possession of the land," which statement appears only to be a conclusion. Fourth, an order by the Director of Lands dated 14 August 1980 in connection with the Homestead Application of Democrata Aguila of an accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela, such application was disapproved because in an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands of the area applied for which is an accretion, the same was found to be occupied and cultivated by, among others, Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an accretion to his land. Apostol, et.al. nor their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of those found occupying and cultivating said accretion. 5. Accretion belongs to riparian owners The land in question is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code, it is said that "to the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." 6. Accretion does not automatically become registered land The area covered by OCT P-19093 is only 4,584 sq. ms. The accretion attached to said land is approximately 5.5 hectares. The increase in the area of Cureg's land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which

19 receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System." FERNANDEZ v. TANADA, 39 SCRA 662 (1971) Facts:  In an application for registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Juan Borromeo prayed that he be declared as the real and absolute owner of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Pook, Talisay, Cebu,  Described as follows: N — Lot No. 7191 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant); E — by a lot belonging to Claudio Baller; S — Bohol Strait or Seashore; and W — lot No. 2586 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant). Respondent bases his claim of ownership on Article 457 of the New Civil Code, 1 alleging that the land sought to be registered was formed by accretion having been deposited therein gradually by currents of a Register bordering lot Nos. 7191 and 2586 owned by him. Respondent further prayed that the Register of Deeds be ordered to issue an original certificate of title in his name.  Petitioners herein opposed the above said application that (a) Article 457 of the New Civil Code could not be invoked, the disputed area having been fanned by action of the sea and not by river currents, there being no river in the vicinity; (b) that it was the oppositors who occupied the said land openly and public and not respondent; and (c) respondent Juan Borromeo is an alien, not qualified to own real properties in the Philippines.  The Land Registration Court (LRC for short) ruled that the petitioners-oppositors have no interest over the subject land  The said order was set aside after a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by said petitioners-oppositors but was again reversed having the original decision revived (ordering the demolition of 11 huts over the disputed land)

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest 

Petitioners-oppositors tried to appeal but the LRC denied such. Hence, the petition

Issue: I) W/N the lot sought to be registered was formed by accretion which it gradually received from the effects of the current of the waters flowing on the river bordering the said Lots No. 7191 and 2586 of the herein applicant (now private respondent Juan Borromeo) II) W/N the oppositors had personality to oppose the registration of respondent III) W/N the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the demolition of the huts over the land Held: The jurisdictional issue raised by applicants herein is without merit If it be true that the lot sought to be registered was formed by accretion which it gradually received from the effects of the current of the waters flowing on the river bordering the said Lots No. 7191 and 2586 of the herein applicant (now private respondent Juan Borromeo) then title to the lot vested in said applicant under Article 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippine from the time the alluvial deposit was formed. Borromeo's petition to the Registration Court "to declare him the owner" of the lot is in effect a request for confirmation of the title already vested in him by the law, and the court plainly had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application. It is true that the oppositors averred below that the deposit was not aluvial but a result of the action of the sea. This issue, however, is dependent on the result of the evidence to be produced at the trial on the merits that was still to be held. The same thing can be said of the allegation that the applicant for registration was disqualified to acquire agricultural land. Neither of these claim can now be inquired into at this stage of the proceedings. The respondent court ordered the option of herein petitioners to be dismissed as improper, for lack of personality to oppose the registration independently of that of the national government Oppositors were mere sales applicants to the Bureau of Land and that they had been warned that they should not enter nor improve the land object of their sales applications, prior to the approval thereof by the land authorities; and in fact paragraph 6 of their sales applications explicitly provided that the same conveyed no right to occupy the

20 land prior to approval. Under the circumstances, We can not say that the action of the court below was in abuse of discretion IHVC v. UP, 200 SCRA 554 (1991), SUPRA PALAWAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CO., INC. v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 44 SCRA 15 (1972) Facts:  Appellant applied for application and confirmation of title over a parcel of land.  Application relies upon the ground that through its predecessor in interest, it had been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and lawful possession of the land since 1912, under a bonafide claim of acquisition and ownership.  Director of Lands opposed said application alleging that: - That it involves public land - That the land was not awarded to appellant, it having refuse to pay the value of said land - That appellant has no valid title to be confirmed, its possession being, not that of an owner, but, merely, that of a (sales) applicant of a portion of the public domain.  CFI sustained opposition of Director of Lands. Hence this appeal  Antecedent Facts: - Palawan filed sales application over a parcel of land which was given course by the Bureau of Lands. - Palawan requested for the area applied for to be reduced. - Director of Lands informed Palawan of the appraisal of the Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce of the land applied for. (P 18 per hectare) - When Palawan failed to act on the appraisal, a Notice of Auction Sale over the land applied for was issued by DL. Twice it asked for its postponement, asking the Bureau of Lands to reconsider its appraisal of the land. Bureau of Lands stood pat.

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest -

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Since the time the applicant had applied for the land, it took possession thereof partially and improved portion thereof planting coconuts and other crops. On a later date, in reply to a subpoena issued by the DL Office of Palawan, Palawan advised the DL office for the first time that he will not submit to an investigation because they want to wait for the result of their application involving the present case (confirmation of title).

21

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Issue: W/N Palawan has valid title over land for confirmation.

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Held: No. Palawan’s possession of the land in question was merely that of a sales applicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded because of its refusal to pay the price fixed therefor by the Bureau of Lands. As such sales applicant, Palawan manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands.

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DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT v. COURT OF APPEALS, 205 SCRA 486 Facts:  Feliciano Juco and his predecessors-in-interest was adjudged of having an open, exclusive, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the parcel of land in question in the concept of owners for twenty years. Juco built a house in Lot 3 while his brother-in-law lived in Lot 4.  Nieves de Roldan caused the whole tract of land to be resurveyed. Her children, then, filed an application to purchase the property through the Bureau of Lands. Lot 4 was place in the name of Desiderio while a sales application was filed by Mariano for Lot 3.  Having no money, he failed to participate in the bidding hence Lot 3 was sold.  Juco was able to obtain financial assistance from Sps Lina to protest against Mariano Roldan’s acquisition of Lot 3. He

 

promised to sell the lot to Lina later, hence the “Condiitional Sale and Transfer of Right to Land” which was executed by Juco in favor of the Lina Sps. The Lina sps made improvements on Lots 3 and 4. Subsequently, an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued. Juco lost his protest, but upon appeal, he was adjudged to have the preferential right to buy the property. He then filed his own application to buy said but shortly thereafter, Juco died. His wife and children then offered to sell the property to Pompeyo Maliwat who was told about the proceeding over the land but not the sale to the Lina sps. Maliwats bought said land and subsequently filed an application of registration of land under the Torrens system. 4 oppositors arose including the Director of Lands on the ground that the land is public land. RTC – in favor of Maliwat. CA affirmed RTC decision.

Issue: W/N land in question is private land Held: Yes. Lot 3 became private land by virtue of Juco’s open, continuous and exclusive occupation and cultivation thereof since 1939, which when tacked to Maliwat’s possession far exceeds the statutory 30 yr period for conversion of alienable public land into private property. Being a private land, it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. KIDPALOS v. BAGUIO MINING CO., 14 SCRA 913 (1965) Facts: On August 31, 1954, the petitioners sued Baguio Gold Mining Co. and the Director of Mines in the CFI of Baguio City seeking judgment: 1) declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels of land situated in sitio Binanga Barrio of Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Benguet, Mountain Province.

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest 2) to annul the declarations of location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs; and 3) to recover damages from the Company After due trial, the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa, et al., had failed to substantiate their claims of ownership and dismissed the suits. Court of Appeals held that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson, and that it formed part of the Public domain. That from 1927 to 1933, one George Icard and his son, Joseph, had entered and located therein certain mining claims, subsequently sold and transferred to the Baguio Gold Mining Company; That the latter had occupied the land, worked the claims, and performed the acts required by the mining laws to entitle it to mineral patents therefor until the recent World War II; That after the war the claims were validated by Act No. 4268 of the Philippine Legislature; That the Mining Company had acquired beneficial title to the claims by its locations, although the corresponding patents were still in process at the Bureau of Mines; That "the appellee mining company has acquired a superior title to that of the plaintiffs-appellants over the mineral claims under litigation" While the cases were still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs had filed in Court the present registration cases. Baguio Gold opposed the registration, and moved to dismiss the applications. Proceedings were originally held in abeyance until the appeals in the preceeding, cases were decided.

22 The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become final, the oppositor Baguio Gold Mining Company reiterated its motions to dismiss the registration cases in the Court of First Instance. The latter dismissed the applications, and the applicants then directly appealed to this Supreme Court. Held: In consonance with the foregoing principles, we hold that the findings in the former judgment (that the mining claims were validly located and that the title of the mining company is superior to that of appellants), being the basis of the sentence of dismissal, conclude the applicants in the present case, the previous adjudication being final and rendered on the merits, and there being identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action in all the cases. Hence, the dismissal of these land registration proceeding, by the Court of First Instance of Baguio was in order and conformable to law. That at present the law permits registration applicants to proceed on the basis of 30 years' open, adverse, and uninterrupted possession as owner, instead of requiring, as of yore continuous adverse possession as owner since 1894, does not help appellants at all. The vesting of title to the lands in question in the appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company has effectively interrupted and rendered discontinuous the possession claimed by applicants. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal of these proceedings on the ground of res judicata is affirmed. Appellants shall pay the costs. DIVINA v. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 11734, FEB. 22, 2001 Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio Berosa. On July 22, 1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa. On March 23, 1961, the Berosa spouses sold the same Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos.

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest On April 26, 1960, Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary owner of Lot 1893, a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. On March 28, 1961, Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax Declaration No. 13237 and declared it had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. He also had the property resurveyed by private land surveyor Antonio Tiotangco. In 1967, Tax Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9032 in Gamos’ name. The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893 conducted on June 16, 1961 for Gamos, showed that the consolidated properties contained a total area of 100,034 sq. m. This plan was approved on July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of Lands. On November 23, 1968, Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 9032 was secured by Gamos and declared therein that the area of the consolidated property was 10.0034 hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for rice planting and 5.9347 were thickets. On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente G. Divina, herein petitioner, a portion of Lot 1893 referred to as Lot 1893-B. On November 28, 1968, two years from the date of said sale and five (5) days after November 23, 1968, when Gamos secured Tax Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated property as containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An undated “Subdivision PLAN” of Lot 1893, was prepared for petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands approval, showed that Lot 1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B. On July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy, for P20,000.00. On August 28, 1972, she filed an application for registration of title to the property at the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. The application was amended on March 8, 1973, on order of Branch II of

23 the said court “to include therein the postal address of Inocencio Erpe, adjoining owner of Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-9021”. The land registration court, by Decision of July 29, 1975, ordered the registration of private respondent’s title over Lots Nos. 1466 and 1893. On July 13, 1977, pending issuance of the final decree of registration petitioner filed before the same court a Petition for Review. He alleged that he is the owner of a portion of Lot 1893 consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by Teotimo Berosa on January 19, 1967; that he was unaware of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due to private respondent’s failure to give him notice and post any notice in the subject lot; and that private respondent fraudulently misrepresented herself as the owner of the disputed portion despite her knowledge that another person had acquired the same. Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration case had long become final and the court no longer had any jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal notice to the petitioner of the registration proceedings did not constitute actual fraud. CA: In the case at bar, petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the survey plan as an adjoining owner of the subject property. Neither was he a known claimant or possessor of the questioned portion of Lot 1893 which was found by the court a quo to be untouched and thickly planted with bigaho. A fortiori, there was no need to mention in the application for registration the apprehension or claim of “at least” petitioner-appellee’s cousin Evelyn (sic) Domalaon in the application for registration, nor to personally notify Elena about registration proceeding. ISSUE: whether or not, there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on private respondent’s part when she failed to give or post notice to petitioner of her application for registration of the contested land, such that it was error for the trial court to declare private respondent owner of the disputed land.

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest HELD: Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner’s name did not appear in the survey plan as an adjacent owner, nor claimant nor possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts differed in their conclusion on whether or not there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud in private respondent’s part when it failed to give notice or post notice to potential claimant and include their names in the application for registration. The trial court said there was, but the appellate court disagreed. Section 15 of P.D. 1529 is explicit in requiring that in the application for registration of land titles, the application “shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find them.” As early as Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 22 [1980] we emphasized that a mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners is not sufficient but “what search has been made to find them is necessary.” The trial court was correct when it took notice that respondent’s sister Lydia Gajo-Anonuevo admitted that she had a conversation with petitioner’s cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latter’s apprehension that their land may have been included in respondent’s application for registration of the disputed land. Respondent’s omission of this material information prevented petitioner from having his day in court. The trial court in its decision more than amply supported its conclusion with jurisprudence to the effect that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. Such omission cannot but be deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud, a basis for allowing a petition for review of judgment under Section 38 of Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act. Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner acquired the bigger portion of Lot 1893 long after the initial survey of Barrio San Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold it to respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records, petitioner’s name would not be found on the said survey plan

24 approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his purchase of the portion of Lot 1893. Petitioner’s claim is clearly meritorious. FEWKES v. VASQUEZ, 39 SCRA 514 (1971) Fewkes v. Vasquez (FORMS AND CONTENTS OF APPLICATION) - March 2, 1967 - Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen, commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay a proceeding for the registration of 2 lots and the improvements thereon o Fewkes acquired by purchase from Velasco 2 parcels of land - Applicant was in actual possession of the lots, and that said properties were free from any encumbrance - Attached to the application were: o The tracing cloth and blue print of plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical descriptions of Lots 21-A and 21-B of Psu-61470 o The certified copies of the tax declarations on said land o The two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967, executed by the Velascos in favor of applicant - March 31, 1967 - The court required the applicant to submit the plans and technical description of the parcels of land sought to be registered and the surveyor's certificate o Applicant filed a motion praying the court that the Director of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission be directed to approve subdivision plan Psu61470, wherein it appeared that the lots sought to be registered are parts of a bigger lot identified in said subdivision plan as Lot No. 21 - Court denied the motion in that the application being a registration of land, had nothing to do with the approval of the subdivision plan - The court issued another order, this time for amendment of the application in order to include the respective postal addresses of the adjoining owners named therein - February 23, 1968 - The court issued an order dismissing the application for warrant of jurisdiction, based on the finding

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

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that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of a bigger tract, of land and that the notice of initial hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the registration proceeding Hence this appeal Fewkes contends that since the published description includes the motions being registered, then the court below erred in declaring itself without jurisdiction over the proceeding o No need for further publication to vest jurisdiction o Petitioner’s argument: the publication of the bigger tract of land, jurisdiction over the said property, that was part of the bigger land, was acquired by the court below Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required to contain: o A description of the land subject of the proceeding o The name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them o When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times  An essential basis for jurisdiction  It is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court It is the technical description of these 2 smaller lots, therefore, that must be published in order that the persons who may be affected by their registration may be notified thereof Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED

25 BENIN v. TUASON, 53 SCRA 531 (1974) Facts: *** My aplologies to all. This is a long case which consolidated 3 civil cases. The facts in the original case are very confusing as well. What is important is to take note of the flow of the facts with regard to the instance of application, which is the core issue of the case*** Plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, ; that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom.a During the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. While they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs,

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to

26 parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and technical description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries and technical description appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void. 3 The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other parcels of land, docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette. Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default against the whole world except the Insular Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). November 11,

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest 1913 the applicants and the Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed "that the issuance, of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in the event that the new plans did not include new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing the adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the registration proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion

27 the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act, the court may at anytime order an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in application or in the survey plan, or in both since the application and survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration an area or parcel of land not previously included in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication, the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court is not affected by the failure of a new application. DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. BENITEZ, ET AL., 16 SCRA 557 (1966)

Ratio:

In a cadastral proceeding, Benitez and Brillo were declared owners of a parcel of land situated in Tacloban City. However, 26 years after the adjudication, Benitez and Brillo filed a petition before the same cadastral court for reopening of the cadastral proceedings claiming that through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect, a portion of the said lot containing 1,805 sq.m has not been included in the original survey.

Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to

The proceeding was commenced pursuant to R.A. 931. The court a quo issued an order granting to Benitez and Brillo the right to claim

Issue: W/N the amendment in the application was proper Held:

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest the portion which allegedly was not included in their original title while authorizing at the same time a licensed surveyor to make a survey of the portion that was then being claimed and submit a report thereon to the Director of Lands for his approval. Accordingly, the surveyor submitted on July 20, 1960 his report, and on April 14, 1962 the court a quo rendered judgment declaring Benitez and his wife owners of the additional portion which they claimed to be their own in their petition which this time was declared to contain an area of 3,745 sq.m. This decision having become final, the spouses moved on June 7, 1962 for a writ of execution of the judgment and of possession of the additional portion of land that had been adjudicated to them. On the other hand, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Director of Lands, filed a motion to set aside the same judgment on the ground, that said decision was a nullity for the reason that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to act on the petition of Emilio Benitez and his wife for the reopening of the cadastral proceedings for lack of the requisite publication and notice as required by law. Held: There is no question that respondents Benitez and his wife may file a petition for reopening of the said Cadastral Case pursuant to Republic Act No. 931. The petition for reopening should be filed in the same cadastral proceedings where the original lands were surveyed and adjudicated and in pursuance of the procedure laid down in the Cadastral Act. Thus, besides filing the petition for reopening, it is necessary that notice thereof be given to those persons who claim an adverse interest in the land sought to be registered, as well as the general public, by publishing such notice in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, which shall likewise be posted in a conspicuous place on the new land to be surveyed, as well as in the municipal building of the city or municipality in which the same is situated, as required in Section 1 of the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259).

28 Another factor that should be considered is the reservation which the very Republic Act No. 931 makes insofar as the right of a claimant to have an additional portion of land registered in his name is concerned in the sense that it can only be entertained if it does not refer "to such parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or authorized provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." Here it appears that the additional portion of land claimed by respondents is actually occupied by persons who claim to be entitled to it by virtue of lease applications or permits granted to them by the Bureau of Lands, as may be gleaned from the following portions of the report submitted by the surveyor appointed by the court: Lot 1, is an integral part of the property of Attorney Emilio Benitez which was not included in the cadastral survey of Tacloban, but now occupied by squatters, who claimed that they have applied under lease applications and some under Revocable Permits which they have been paying for many years to the Bureau of Lands. The survey of Lot 1 as ordered by the Honorable Court was not finished, due to the fact that in surveying same it will result to not less than twenty lots, whose occupants and claimants are holders of permits to occupy their respective areas issued by the Bureau of Lands, and paid rentals to the government for many years. The squatters have introduced improvements (buildings) covering the total area shown as Lot 1 in the attached sketch. Because of these adverse claimants there is need that the matter be threshed out in an appropriate action with due notice to said claimants and to the Director of Lands from whom their title thereto is said to have emanated under the Public Land Act. Such matter, certainly, cannot be looked into in the present proceeding because of the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court. Wherefore, petition is hereby granted.