LSO DeckLand AUTO SuperHornet F-35C & X47B Pp274 01jun2015

June 1, 2016 | Author: SpazSinbad2 | Category: Types, Presentations
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Aircraft Carrier Naval Aviation Precision Automatic Deck Landing Capabilities Now and Future with JPALS and 'Magic C...

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Excerpts from 4.4GB PDF (about the A4G Skyhawk and 'how to deck land 01 Jun 2015') here & here: -

https://onedrive.live.com/?cid=cbcd63d6340707e6&sa=822839791 & https:// drive.google.com/?authuser=0#folders/0BwBlvCQ7o4F_aDhIQ0szeVJFY0U) -

Emphasis is on AUTO Carrier Landings, which will be the future for the USN, with Super Hornet 'Magic Carpet' and F-35C 'IDLC' 'delta flight path' & UCLASS, as demonstrated by the X-47B with JPALS

http://carrierlandingconsultants.com/about.php http://carrierlandingconsultants.com/contact.php

“When I asked paddles how to improve my grades: LSO Answer: ‘Just fly a centred ball all the way to touchdown.’”

“...while moving to the US Navy's Landing Signal Officer School as an instructor. He taught glideslope geometry, Aircraft Recovery Bulletins, carrier landing safety and emergency and foul weather waving. While on staff there, Erik digitized the LSO School's extensive mishap recording library, and helped design and implement a $2 million instructor console and graphics upgrade to the world's only LSO Trainer. His roles included designing the custom touch-screen user interface and displays for the instructor/operator station, setting program requirements, software engineering, and troubleshooting.

F-35C Lightning II

In 2006, Erik was fortunate to represent the US Navy on the requirements staff. While there, he provided a fleet perspective on pilot vehicle interface designs, particularly the unique dual touchscreen cockpit displays which replace the traditional gauges and multifunction displays on older aircraft. He successfully operated in the ITAR-sensitive international acquisition environment, and rewrote the Joint F-35 International Training Center flight syllabus to more accurately reflect the requirements of future carrier and land-based tactical aviators in the US and abroad.

Erik ‘Burns’ Hess

founded Carrier Landing Consultants after leaving active duty as the Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic Force Landing Signal Officer - the senior Atlantic Fleet LSO in August 2010. During his ten years on the LSO platform, he waved over 20,000 mishap-free arrested landings, and has coached hundreds of pilots through their first night traps aboard ship. He has held nearly every LSO position in the US Navy & in early 2010 literally wrote the book on waving, as editor of the first revision to the

LSO Reference Manual in over a decade.”

http://carrierlandingconsultants.com/

BACKGROUND http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA419423

the range of aircraft attributes necessary for an unmanned aircraft to land safely. The referenced Heffley report attempted to perform this evaluation for the case of manned aircraft3.

Carrier landings define naval aviation. These landing requirements drive the design of both the aircraft and the ship, with the landing airspeed constituting one of the most significant attributes

Understanding the carrier-landing task requires some discussion of terminology. Angle of attack (AOA) is the angle between where the airplane is pointed and where it is going. This

of the problem. The correct determination of the approach speed is vital. It is the balance of

value along with the velocity determines the amount of lift generated. An aircraft’s pitch angle

landing safely and causing unnecessary wear, which results in higher maintenance requirements

is where the nose is pointed relative to the horizon and for manned aircraft strongly influences

and shorter service life. Higher landing speeds decrease the maximum landing weight. This

the over the nose visibility from the cockpit. Sink rate is the vertical component of the velocity.

means an aircraft must land with less ordnance and fuel. The determination of the approach speed for manned aircraft is the minimum speed that simultaneously satisfies several criteria. These criteria can be found in diverse military specifications and include the following2: a. Aerodynamic stall margin of 10%

Wires / CDPs replaced cycle

b. Field of view (over the nose visibility) c. Flight qualities (defined in MIL-STD-8785/1797)

The glide slope is the desired airplane trajectory, terminating at the desired touch-down point, nominally a straight line extending 3.5 degrees above the horizon as shown in Figure 1 below.4 Flight-path angle is the angle between the airplane’s velocity vector and the horizon. Because the ship (and touchdown point) is typically moving through the water at 10 to 20 knots, maintaining a 3.5 degree glide slope relative to the ship results in a flight-path angle of 3.0 degrees relative to the inertial frame. The four wires highlighted in Figure 1 are called cross-deck pendants. The cross-deck pendants are disposable and are replaced after 100 hits or sooner if damaged. They are attached to the purchase cable, which goes into the arresting engine under the

d. Compatibility with Wind Over the Deck (WOD)

deck. The maximum energy absorption capability of this system constitutes one of the most 2

e. Longitudinal Acceleration in level flight of 5 ft/sec within 2.5 seconds in full power

significant constraints to the landing problem. Additionally, the targeted hook touch down point

f. Pop-up, 50 ft. glide slope transfer with stick only in 5 seconds

is labeled. The ultimate objective of every carrier approach is a safe arrested landing, or trap. There

g. Minimum single engine rate of climb: 500 ft/min (tropical day) The goal of landing speed criteria is to facilitate the design of aircraft that can consistently make safe carrier landings. These historic requirements were recently reviewed for manned

are many constraints to the landing task. Structures and safety physically constrain carrier landings, while operational requirements demand a high boarding rate (the percentage of approaches that result in a trap). Off-centerline landings are dangerous due to the proximity of

aircraft. While Navy contractors have performed simulation trials of aircraft under design, no

personnel and equipment; short (low) approaches hazard striking the aft end of the ship. High

criteria exist for unmanned aircraft distinct from manned. No study has been done to determine

approaches will fail to catch a wire. The structural limits of the hook and cross-deck pendant 3

2

Rudowski et al, Review of Carrier Approach Criteria for Carrier-based Aircraft p.22

4

Heffley, Outer-Loop Control Factors For Carrier Aircraft. Waters, “Ship Landing Issues” PowerPoint.

determine the maximum landing velocity. Sink rate is limited by the landing gear structure. Additionally, hook geometry requires the aircraft to land with a positive pitch angle, optimally five degrees, because the main gear must touchdown first. The positive pitch angle is also

MANNED VS UNMANNED Historically, designing an airplane for the carrier-landing task has been constrained by the limitations of the pilot as an integral part of the control system. The full capabilities of

necessary for the hook to engage the wire. The target touchdown dispersions, developed from the automated control systems have never previously been explored. The human operator has desired boarding rates, are tabulated in feet in Table 1.5 Both desired performance and the

difficulty tracking multiple parameters at once. Part of the difficulty is focusing one’s vision on

maximum allowable performance are given.

the ship for line-up and glide slope then back to instruments in the cockpit to read airspeed and angle of attack. People also lack the precision and reaction time of computers. Consequently, if an airplane’s handling qualities satisfied a human pilot, the legacy automated systems (e.g. SPN42 Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS)) could easily handle the airplane. Moreover, ACLS was neither flight critical nor attempted at severe sea-states. The move to unmanned systems permits design liberties fully capitalizing on the capabilities of an automated system, yet raises the automated system to the status of “flight critical”. If the control system cannot successfully get the vehicle aboard, it is lost at sea.

Figure 1 : Carrier Landing Environment6 Table 1: Touchdown Dispersion Parameters7

Target Performance (ft Maximum Allowable (ft) Lateral Mean 2 4 Lateral Std Deviation 3 5 Longitudinal Mean 16 24 Longitudinal Std Deviation 40 60 5

Waters, Test Results of an F/A-18 Automatic Carrier Landing Using Shipboard Relative GPS. p10. Waters, “Ship Landing Issues” PowerPoint. 7 Waters, Test Results of an F/A-18 Automatic Carrier Landing Using Shipboard Relative GPS. p10. 6

HMAS Melbourne

ROLE OF LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER “The landing signal officer’s primary responsibility is the safe and expeditious recovery of non-V/STOL fixed-wing aircraft aboard ship. The employment of high-performance aircraft and the necessity for all weather operations have placed ever increasing demands on the LSO’s skill and judgment. Through training and experience, he is capable of correlating factors of wind, weather, aircraft capabilities, ship configuration, pilot experience, etc., in order to provide optimum control and assistance in aircraft landings. The LSO is also directly responsible for training pilots in carrier landing techniques. In this regard, he must constantly monitor pilot performance, schedule and conduct necessary ground training, counsel and debrief individual pilots, and certify their carrier readiness and qualification. The pilot and LSO form a professional and disciplined team, both ashore and afloat. The LSO strives to develop the pilot’s confidence, judgment, maximum effort, technical proficiency, and personal interest. The pilot must rely on the LSO’s experience and ability

to prepare him for optimum effectiveness as a carrier pilot.” -

NATOPS LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER MANUAL 15 Dec 2001 http://www.navyair.com/LSO_NATOPS_Manual.pdf

THOUGHTS FROM THE [LSO] DEAN... Aloha everyone out there in Naval Aviationland. I am CDR Matt “Potzo” Pothier; Hornet baby, former Japan, VMFAT 101, CAG 8, and LSO School Paddles. As I step into position leading the Landing Signal Officer business, I am pleased to find that Weeds left the platform fully manned, professionally trained and motivated to ensure carrier aviation continues to thrive. As OIC my intent is to continue our focus on supporting the fleet by providing the best training and standards to all those who attend our school or receive our instruction. As a schoolhouse we will continue to maintain a connection to carrier operations so that we can provide the latest and greatest techniques, procedures, and standardization to ensure we are prepared to respond in critical situations. http://www.hrana.org/documents/PaddlesMonthlySeptember2012.pdf It has been a few years since I manned the platform. Since then we have seen some changes and have had the chance to celebrate some major milestones in our profession. Although I was overseas during the 100th anniversary celebration of Naval Aviation, I observed the festivities from afar with great pride. If you had a chance to read our August Paddles Monthly, you saw an article written in 1980 by a former CAG Paddles. It was interesting to see that no matter how many things change, much remains the same. The pride and professionalism that exists within our small community of Naval Aviation, and especially as LSOs, persists. Let’s face it, without paddles manning the platform to recover aircraft on those dark and scary nights we wouldn’t be real Naval Aviators. In fact, if we weren’t motivated to do one of the most difficult things in aviation, landing aircraft on pitching decks in ugly weather, we might as well have joined the Air Force. This is no knock on the Air Force; heck I dig my Starbucks, 5 star hotels, per diem, and nice long easy going stationary runways as much as anyone. Take it from the famous musical Viper guys Dos Gringos, this carrier business is hard work. We celebrate our profession because it is hard work, because we defend those in need, and because we can make a difference. Trapping on a carrier is extremely difficult. The conditions are always changing and what worked well during the day could set someone up for failure the next night. Technological improvements in the carrier aviation business have helped, but they are not foolproof. Constant monitoring of those systems is required to ensure they are in the best possible working condition on our aircraft and on our ship. As paddles, we have to be aware of these continuously changing conditions as well as how these conditions are going to affect our airwing pilots. We need to understand how these changing conditions will affect every individual in conjunction with the tendencies that they have developed. As CAG Paddles, one has to be pilot, paddles and a psychologist all at once. The ability to read pilots within the current operating conditions, to know what they are going to do before they do it, will

lead to continued uneventful recoveries. Failure to do so could lead to yet another mishap. We all realize that each and every one of us will have that night in the barrel, when things aren’t going the way we want, and we just can’t seem to get aboard. The professional programs, the extended apprenticeship on the edge of the landing area, and the graduate level training and education that LSOs progress through are paramount to ensure the fleet is always ready to answer the nations call. Entrusted with a Staff Qual, CAG Paddles are the experts who will calmly recover the airwing during blue water operations regardless of the environmental or material conditions. Paddles must step up and coax pilots into the wires, because after all is said and done the boat is where the food is. Operating a Carrier Strike Group alone and unafraid on the high seas, without the need of permission from foreign nations, is the hallmark of power projection. Carrier operations ensure the freedom of navigation on 80% of the world’s surface. National interests are backed by our presence. The airwing provides combat proven and ready aircrews. As paddles, we get these crews back aboard to rearm, reload and launch back into the fray. We maintain a unique skill set that ensures this “Big Stick” is operationally viable. We take responsibility for the lives of our friends as we place our lives in the hands of our fellow paddles when we launch and recover. We owe it to each other to maintain the highest level of professional standards. We must strive for perfection. We will make mistakes. When we do, we owe it to each other to fess up so that the entire community can learn. We use our collective experience, the good and the bad, to facilitate safe and expeditious recoveries. It is through this experience that we learn that no matter how much we’ve seen we haven’t seen it all. As Dean of the LSO School, I will attempt to continue to carry the torch that Weeds lit. We will focus on supporting the fleet by providing the best possible advanced education and standardization for the paddles community. We will instill upon the community the highest level of respect for our coveted job. We will uphold our standards and ensure that only proven individuals who demonstrate the ability to wave in challenging conditions advance along through the LSO pipeline. We expect and value free flowing communication and will maintain an open door policy. We welcome all visitors, all those paddles that wish to continue their education utilizing our facilities, and we are always available to swap a few sea stories over a beverage around “the platform.” The LSO was born out of necessity; technology does not negate this need. Naval Aviation is dangerous and unforgiving. Top Gun is irrelevant without Top Hook. If you can’t land on a carrier, put on an ascot. Go catch’em Paddles… http://www.hrana.org/documents/PaddlesMonthlySeptember2012.pdf

‘Paddles Monthly’ June 2012 “TYCOM Corner” http://www.hrana.org/documents/PaddlesMonthlyJune2012.pdf Flying the pass: As we’ve always been told, and what I’ve just reinforced, is that the pass starts long before the air-plane is in the break. That said, when in the pattern, your utmost concentration is required to constantly correct for any deviation before it puts you out of parameters. My personal advice on correcting deviations is to put LINEUP first in your scan…. This is the hardest to correct…. Secondly, make sure your AOA is squared away. If your lineup & AOA aren’t on, then the information from the BALL will be inaccurate. A two unit fast or slow aircraft can change the hook position by several feet and often accounts for either bolters or 1 wires though there was a “centered ball”. Once you are receiving the good info by being on centerline and on-speed, you will be able to fly the ball corrections that you’ve been doing since the TRACOM. For high deviations, I submit that correcting for half the deviation works the best….Then, once the correction is complete and under your pro-active ball-flying control, start the process over again. Never correct a high ball to put it in the center. The lowest you should see it is cresting. If you continually work the half deviation corrections, you should never see it back to center. When on the low side, correct for half that deviation to the high side.... Remember, never lead a low! If you don’t lead a low, you will wind up high after correcting from the low. Once there, correct back by half. This is a gameplan that will get you aboard every time if it is played the whole pass & nothing less than whole pass (translation: FLY the BALL ALL the WAY to TOUCHDOWN). CDR George “Chum” Walborn, Former CVW-14 Paddles-

The Navy & Marine Corps Aviation Safety Magazine

LEVEL OF TRUST

By Lt. Matt Antel

APPROACH March/April 2010

was embarked with Carrier Air Wing 1 on USS Enterprise (CVN-65). We just had departed from Norfolk for a six-month deployment. While flying a routine, afternoon FA-18 training mission, the summer weather deteriorated to the point that all aircraft were recalled to the ship. I was part of a group that just had launched. Another wave from the previous event were airborne and in line to recover before me. As the air wing converged on the ship, every aircraft was shuffled into the marshal stack. While waiting overhead, large thunderclouds continued to develop, and I found it more and more difficult to keep from flying into zero-zero conditions. With the radios tuned to the approach frequencies, I heard the play-by-play as the first few aircraft approached the ship. The first call that was broadcast by paddles was “99, taxi lights on” for recovery. Normally, carrier-based aircraft recover with only their exterior and approach lights on at night, and with lights completely out during the day. A request for taxi-landing lights to be switched on for any recovery meant that visibility was low, and paddles couldn’t see an approaching aircraft until it was well inside three quarters of a mile from the ship. At times like this, pilots must rely on the skills they have built since day one of their carrier-aviation training, while also placing an enormous level of trust in the LSO cadre. Landing a jet on an aircraft carrier is never a routine event, but it becomes all the more harrowing with challenging environmental conditions. As more and more pilots struggled to get aboard because of high seas and reduced visibility, the approach controller would push further back everyone’s approach time. I faced the added challenge of closely

managing my fuel while waiting for what assuredly would prove to be a difficult approach. As my fuel slowly burned away, I knew if I did not get aboard on my first pass I would face a trip to the tanker, or an emergency divert to an unknown airfield in a foreign country. Finally, my turn to commence the approach arrived. Reaching my approach fix, I accelerated to 250 knots, extended my speed brakes, and began my descent on a standard Case III recovery profile. The whole time, I could hear paddles talking other pilots aboard as the deck pitched and rolled in the high seas. At the three-quarter-mile ball call, pilot after pilot reported “clara ship,” signifying their inability to see any part of the carrier. Once paddles could break out the bright approach light, they would call “paddles contact” to the pilot, and deliver power and line-up calls to get the aircraft in sync with the flight deck. Anytime paddles did not think the approach should continue, he would signal wave off. In conditions like these, an overall recovery rate of 50 percent is considered a success. I leveled off at 1,200 feet and turned to intercept the specific course to drive me toward the ship. Just inside 10 miles, I extended my landing gear, dropped the arresting hook, decelerated to approach speed, and completed my landing checklist. As I looked through the windscreen, the conditions were truly zero-zero. The conditions were so thick that my taxi light reflected off the clouds, making the possibility of breaking out even more remote.

About five seconds before touchdown, my jet descended out of the fog and the ship appeared in front of me.

ous three aircraft had recovered, mostly thanks to the skill of my colleagues on the LSO platform. At one mile, I glanced at the water, and barely made out the whitecaps. That’s usually a good sign that you’re about to break out, but my forward visibility still was zero. Three quarters of a mile from the ship, the approach controller directed me to “Call the ball,” implying that I should be able to see the landing area AT THREE MILES, I followed my instruments and tipped and the visual glide slope. I saw nothing, and replied over to intercept the 3.5-degree glide slope that would with, “Clara ship,” just like all the aircraft that came eventually lead me to the ship’s landing area. Visibility down before. Soon, the LSO responded, “Paddles conwas not improving, but I was encouraged that the previ- tact, you’re on glide slope.”

Paddles talked me down to a landing. At this point, my job consisted of listening to paddles and responding to his voice calls. Unlike a normal approach, I only was aware the ship was getting closer and closer. Failure to properly respond to LSO calls could have led to disaster. About five seconds before touchdown, my jet descended out of the fog and the ship appeared in front of me. Touchdown occurred so quickly I had no opportunity to do anything more than make a last-second check of lineup and advance my throttle to full power. I then felt my jet abruptly decelerate after catching a wire. Lt. Antel is with the LSO school, NAS Oceana, Va., and flew with VFA-211.

http://www.public.navy.mil/navsafecen/Documents/media/approach/Mar-Apr10-Approach.pdf Approach 6

Autothrottles

By lex, on January 2nd, 2012 F18 Hornet Timelapse & Super SloMo http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=MFMLAqDHsU

“A Youtube Video that almost – almost – makes the drudgery involved in preparing for sea during field carrier landing practice look interesting. It’s the music, mainly. Can’t think of anything else to explain it. LSOs these days, with actual shacks to sit in. Away from the bugs and the heat. Makes them soft, I should think. –------------------------------------There are three crucial factors the pilot must control in a carrier landing approach: glideslope, lineup and angle-of-attack. The ship may heave, pitch and roll, but that is only of incidental value. Entertainment by terror if you will, especially at night. “Quote Thoreau and simplify”, said Michael Stipe, and fortunately for your host – a simple man if

ever there was one – McDonnell Douglas engineers had the wisdom and foresight to emplace the Approach Power Compensation system aboard his steed. The APC (or autothrottles) essentially tied the aircraft power setting and angle of attack to the stick pitch position. In a manual approach, the proper response to being a little high, for example, would be to ease off a percent or two of thrust using your left hand on the throttles, and then carefully bunt the nose over to capture and maintain the correct angle-ofattack. If you didn’t bunt the nose, the aircraft would eventually seek the trimmed AOA, but not before flashing a slow, going further high, and causing paddles heartburn and distress. Which in turn might cause you to get waived off, adversely affecting your landing grade performance, self-esteem and special snowflake status. Coming back down on glideslope, the whole thing

had to be repeated again: Correction, counter-correction, re-counter-correction. But the APC allowed you to press a button on the throttle and, hey presto: All of that angle-ofattack stuff went away (assuming you were properly trimmed at APC engagement). Rather than manually move the throttles, you merely made the nose up or nose down correction required by your glideslope deviation and the throttles would creep up or back to maintain the proper speed. It basically reduced your workload from meatball, lineup, AoA to “meatball, lineup”. An efficiency of 33%! When you came aboard during CQ operations or at night (socalled “zip-lip” operations were standard during daylight, non-CQ operations), the auto flyer was required to report the fact that he was in fact flying, well: Auto. Due to some residual fear, uncertainty and doubt in the LSO community, which was ever a superstitious

lot what with their pickles, worry beads and chicken’s feet necklaces. I say that having been a member of the fraternity. They gave me a hat. I have the hat to this day. I have the hat. So on your ball call it’d be, “404, Hornet ball, 4.2, auto” and the reply would very often be, “Roger ball, auto.” I was very fond of autothrottles, they’d been very, very good to me over the years. Treated it as summat of an emergency when they weren’t operative. If only for the lack of familiarity that was in it, killing snakes in the cockpit with both stick and throttles. So it came to pass one day during fleet CQ that the ship had contrived to find herself in gusty conditions, with winds over the deck in excess of 35 knots. The senior LSO on station called on the Tower frequency, “99 Slapshot, winds are 35 knots, four-degree glideslope, all Hornets go manual.” Which it was good to know that

the winds were 35+ knots, for that would affect where you chose to turn from downwind to final – delay too long and you’d be deep in the groove and sent around to try it again – but the four-degree glideslope was one of those, “eh” statements. It was supposed to mean something to pilots, but I was a pilot for many years and I never quite figured out what. You fly the ball to touchdown, and glideslope be damned. As for that last bit about “going manual”, that must have gone into my bad ear, for I entirely missed it. My turn to come around and have a look at the deck eventually arrived, and I broke to downwind, configured the jet for landing and selected APC. Rolling out on final, I reported, “401, Hornet ball, 5.6″, primly omitting the fact that the APC was in fact engaged. For the LSO, she seemed busy. And I didn’t want to overload her. With too much data. She had her reasons, not to

mention her fears and superstitions, for asking the pilots to go manual. It was a little higher than normal workload in gusty conditions, and the APC could struggle to keep up with the larger stick deflections. I just felt like I knew my own capabilities and limitations better than that LSO, who was in any case rather bossy and not someone I would ordinarily invite into my cockpit, especially when it was getting cramped and crowded. So when the debrief time came along, she looked at me with a suspicious glare, and asked whether I was in fact flying auto, at all? “Who would fly auto in these conditions?” I replied sadly. Thus mollified, she read me my grades (quite good), theorizing that I had so long flown auto that even my manual corrections had the appearance of being made in autothrottles. And who was I to argue with the LSO?” http://www.neptunuslex. com/2012/01/02/autothrottles/

The Unbearable Lightness of Paddles by NeptunusLex

on the ship) from the longitudinal night (darker than a hat full of LSO’s in various stages of qualia@@holes), he hasn’t got much axis, the runway has the appearfication, and two enlisted phone to work with. With no visible horiance of side-stepping continually talkers, wearing sound-powered to the right as you approach. The zon he’ll ask for a destroyer to phones about their necks, the take plane guard station, but that ship is in her element, which headsets draped over their ears. can be disorienting as well, as the means that it is moving as well, They spend every day and night On being a landing signal plane guard is moving herself. An rolling, pitching and heaving. on the LSO platform, and are as officer in rough weather… optimal approach will have the Deck movement is somewhat familiar with aircraft landing as November 26th, 2003 tailhook point clearing the round correlated to sea states obviany paid-for-it junior officer LSO. down by 14 feet. The deck can ously, but less obviously it also They ensure that the arresting I was a Landing Signal Officer move plus or minus 15 feet on a corresponds to swell periodicity: gear and optical landing system as a lieutenant. A good job for a bad night, and if you’re out divert a rough cross sea may actually are set appropriately to the type junior officer: you got to meet range, the pilots are committed cause less movement than a of jet on final. and know all the other pilots to either landing aboard ship gentle sea at just the right As an LSO, the job is to help in the air wing (not just in your or going for a swim. Recovery intervals. the pilots “get aboard” by hawksquadron), you learned a lot rates drop from ~90 per cent to When the deck is moving, ing their line-up, glideslope and about landing well by watching less than 50 per cent on a bad others land poorly, and it got you angle of attack (AOA), the combi- especially at night, it gets night – every other pass will be “interesting” pretty quickly. Night nation of which has a direct corout of duty on fly days. either a waveoff (no chance, out landings will make you old in and relation to aircraft performance. The LSO stands with his of themselves, but throw in ramp of parameters) or a bolter. On the You also grade each landing, or teammates on the port side, aft, bolter, your hook misses all the movement and you can start “pass,” and every grade goes up usually about 30 feet or so aft wires, off you go for another try. on a board in the ready rooms for feeling rather old-fashioned right of the 1-wire. To his right (as Anyway, after that absurdly on check-in with approach. You all the other guys to see, point he faces aft) is “the net.” The long intro, here’s the tale of the might still be 20 miles away, but out and make antic gestures over. net is essentially a large basket worst night I ever saw as an LSO the guy four or five jets ahead of Being a naturally competitive hanging over the side to hurl – one of those few occasions when you in the landing queue is getgroup, everyone wants to do well yourself into if the guy flying the ting advice like, “the deck’s down, you’re happier with the idea of of course, but the real purpose jet decides to “land early.” You being on deck wishing you were you’re a little overpowered… of grading landings is to make don’t want to be in the net, it in the air, than in the air, wishing decks up, you’re slow, power… the pilots focus on doing it well means you haven’t done your you were on deck: decks down, don’t chase it! when it’s easy, so that they can job very well and someone has The night starts out with your Power… POWER!!!… Don’t climb!… do it all when it’s hard. And it probably died (maybe several bolter, bolter, bolter.” And back at humble scribe in his rack – not someones) – but it also gives you does get hard. LSO’s all have the my duty day to wave the paddles. 20 miles, your stomach starts to nickname of “paddles,” since in a fighting chance of escaping the The phone rings, and the senior turn over. the old days they used actual cartwheeling wreckage and fuel LSO on the air wing staff asks The guy generating those ping-pong paddles to help control fed conflagration which follows me to come up on the flight deck soothing utterances is the LSO. such a spectacularly poor landing the pilots on landing. to back him up. The other staff He’s doing the best he can, but Since the landing area is as a ramp strike. On the LSO LSO is having a hard time getting on a dark, moonless, no-horizon platform with you are four or five angled 11-13 degrees (depending

aboard, and the deck is really moving. I’m flattered really, garsh. I get up on the roof, grab my “pickle” (a corded handle that controls the wave-off lights, among other things) and radio handset and set to work. Now then, what’ll it be? First down the pike is a roommate of mine, flying an FA-18 Hornet. Great jet, but it settles down off glideslope like an attorney in court when underpowered. Goes from looking great to OH MY GOD in just about no time. He lands early, a “taxi 1-wire” that no kidding uses up all the available runway and a little more besides. The hook point (although we do not recognize it at the time) has struck the round down aft of the landing area, with the main mounts just clearing the ramp. That’ll focus you pretty quickly, and we powered the next two guys over the wires to compensate. The third guy, in an S-3, makes a huge correction to go from “no-chance high” to right there on the three wire with a landing so hard he hurt his back and had to be helped out of the aircraft. Roomie comes around again, and we’d like to see him a little higher too – a few power calls does the trick, but he adds a little more for mom and the kids and has a long bolter. Really long.

The main mounts touch the deck, but the nosewheel goes over the side. The nose falls through, he goes over the end on a downward vector and we lose sight of him as the bow rises again. Sixty feet before he’s wet, we’re all looking for the tell-tale splash. Someone keys the radio mike, but no one can think of just the right thing to say… what seems like an eternity later, he pops up in front of the bow, climbing at a 20 degree flight path angle with the afterburners lit. Keeps climbing that way for a bit, too. Everyone gets one more gray hair. Next up is the second staff LSO, the one that’s already had a hard time getting aboard. He’s been to the tanker to get some gas, and is willing to give it another shot. He really wants to get aboard, it’s considered bad form for an LSO to struggle in the landing pattern. He’s looking pretty good up until just inside a quarter of mile, when I see a green flash on his AOA indexers that tells me he’s a little slow, a little underpowered. I lean over to tell the other LSO that he might need a power call, when the deck drops out from underneath us. When it moves that rapidly, the gyros in the glideslope indicator on the ship can’t keep up – the pilot will think

that he low with the deck up and that the words that drip from vice-versa when it goes down. my lips to God’s ears are not of Our guy sees the meatball rise the quality likely to recommend and goes to idle power, dropping my soul to the good place. At the nose. that particular moment, my life Looked like a turd dropped didn’t flash before my eyes and I from a tall moose. My “little didn’t whisper “momma.” My only underpowered” comment dies thoughts were, “I’m farked,” or on my lips, transforming to a words to that effect. screaming “WAVEOFF, WAVEOFF” Somehow, miraculously, the call. The pilot cobs the throtdeck, which had been rising, tles, but jet engines take a fell away tentatively. As though while to spool up from flight unsure that this was the right thing to do. The Prowler’s engines idle. Unsatisfied with his engine response, he pulls the nose up to caught up, and he danced by us in wing-rock, almost fully stalled. stall, which doesn’t help matters When I regained my personal all that much. To make things motor control, I looked over to worse, the deck starts to rise “the net,” where by rights I ought again, and I’m treated to the to have cast myself. Two or three sight of a Prowler (EA-6B, four of my teammates stood there souls aboard) in full stall, a hundred feet away, partially obscured transfixed, holding on to each other at the very deck edge, by the deck – I can only see the unable to make the leap. Of the top half of his jet, mid fuselage two enlisted phone talkers, who on the belly up to the cocked didn’t get paid for that kind of up nose. The rest is below flight sh!t, there was no sign, except deck level. that of their sound-powered Ever wonder what thoughts phone cords dangling over the go through your mind in that last side, swinging slowly from left to instant when you know you’re right. They’d seen enough. They going to die? What words will be bailed. on your lips when you meet your Much smarter than their officmaker? Hope it will maybe be a brief prayer, squaring away all the ers, those fellas. black deeds that color your soul? http://www.neptunuslex.com I’ve had a couple of opportuni/2003/11/26/ ties to get as close as I ever want the-unbearableto get to that point, and found lightness-of-paddles/

VX-23 Strike Test News 02 Sep 2014

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