Lockheed Martin -The Complete Beasley II

ete easley

Table Of Contents Apr ‘97 . Mr. P-3, a biography of Jay Beasley.. ............................................................................... i Jun ‘66 - Too Much Too Soon ( Last letter mailed from Mr. Beasley ) ................................................... ii Aug ‘68 - P-3 Pilot Training....................................................................................................... .l - Landing The P-3 or whatever.. ....................................................................................... .4 1974 1974 - On the Ground, Rudder is the Primary Directional Flight Control .............................................. 6 Jul ‘75 - Flight Idle at 2000 Feet................................................................................................ .7 May ‘76- Short Field Landing..................................................................................................... 8 Jan ‘79 - Minimum Control Speed Training..................................................................................... 9 Jan ‘80 - Multi-Engine Training.. ................................................................................................ .ll Jan ‘80 - About Vmc Air.. ........................................................................................................ .13 Sep ‘80 - High Efficiency Engines.. .............................................................................................. 14 1980 - Engine Discussion.. ..................................................................................................... -15 Jul ‘81 - Inflight Engine Trends, Country Style.. ............................................................................ ..16 Aug ‘81 - Turbine Inlet Temperature vs Horsepower and Fuel Flow.. ..................................................... -18 Feb ‘82 - Landmarks in the Traffic Pattern...................................................................................... .19 Feb ‘82 - Discussion, Mostly Con.. ............................................................................................... 20 - Trim ....................................................................................................................... .21 1982 1982 - Touch and Go Pattern.. ................................................................................................ .22 1982 - Stalls ....................................................................................................................... 23 1983 - Log Book 463 ............................................................................................................ 23 Apr ‘84 - Safety.. ................................................................................................................... -25 Apr ‘84 - Give Yourself a Few Brakes.. ......................................................................................... 26 Nov ‘84 - Hints to Instructors.. ................................................................................................... .28 1984 - Landing Gear Extensions.. ............................................................................................ .36 Jan ‘86 - Narrow Runways And Their Effects on Aircraft Durability ...................................................... 38 Feb ‘86 - To Steer or Knot to Steer, Static/Loose Propeller Blade Check.. .............................................. .40 Aug ‘86 - Filter Lights.. ............................................................................................................ .41 Jan ‘87 - Prop Internal Flow Check ............................................................................................ -42 Jan ‘87 - Propeller Procedures.. ................................................................................................. .43 Jan ‘87 - Maintenance Checkflights............................................................................................. .44 Mar ‘87 - Operation With a Pitchlocked Propeller............................................................................. .45 Ott ‘87 - K-13.. ..................................................................................................................... .46 Feb ‘89 - No-Flap Landings ....................................................................................................... .47 Apr ‘89 - Why No-Flap Landings Should be Practiced. ....................................................................... 48 Ott ‘89 - P-3 Operations History.. ............................................................................................... .50 Ott ‘89 - Turbine Life ............................................................................................................. .52 Ott ‘89 - NT’S Check................................................................................................................ 53 Nov ‘89 - Instructions ............................................................................................................... .54 1989 - operations ............................................................................................................... ..5 6 Feb ‘90 - Computer In-Flight Engine Check History.......................................................................... .57 Ott ‘90 - Anti-Icing Lights.. ...................................................................................................... .58 1990 - The Ragged Edge....................................................................................................... .59 1990 - Why Some of the Numbers and Procedures ........................................................................ .61 Jan ‘91 - Short Field Landing Practice .......................................................................................... .67 Jan ‘91 - Flight Demonstrations .................................................................................................. .67 1991 - What To Do When....................................................................................................... 68 1991 - Backup Checks For Lights, Horns, Whistles---. ................................................................... .71 Jan ‘93 - Reduced Power Takeoffs................ .;. ........................................................................... .74

Jay Rivers Beasley 1914-1996

Jay Beasley is an aviation legend. Born in Waxahachie, Texas; he first soloed in 1932; has flown over 50 difherent models of aircraft; has tested over 25 different military aircraft including the P-38, C60, Hudson Bomber, PV-1, B-37, B-17, P2V-5F, and P-3; has twice been decorated with the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, and has been selected as Honorary Naval Aviator #l 1 . . . all as a “civilian pilot.” His logbook, if you can read the bent and curled pages, reveals over 20,097 hours total flight time, around 9,479 of which are in the P-3. He has kissed the runway in excess of 3 1,479 times in the P-3 alone. But Jay will tell you, or anyone else that will listen, that his greatest passion lies with being an tiuence on piloting - and one would be hard pressed to fjnd a P-3 aviator today, from Ensign to Admiral, who has not read of heard of; or flown with Jay. These pages are an attempt to compile all his written guidance on operating the Orion. Marked with adherence to sound aviation principles, and written with home-spun humor, they contain the wisdom of one who’s done it alL Each of these articles submit to one common aviation paradigm: common-sense. We believe they will improve every aviator who reads and absorbs their insight. The application of Jay Beasley’s common sense approach to aviation continues to apply as our technological improvements in Maritime Patrol Aviation expand. For this reason, we have reprinted the sage and entertaining advice of Jay which was published by Patrol Squadron Thirty One. Since Jay’s unfortunate passing May 15, 1996 it is important that all P-3 aviators young and old learn and heed the wisdom of our community’s greatest pilot. M. L. Holmes Patrol Squadron Thirty 1

TOO MUCH TOO SOON- 28 A number of years ago the three Natops Evaluators and I re-wrote the P-3 Ditching procedures. There had been two 9 for sure,and probably some more airplanes lost during the ridiculous low airspeeds some people were flying. They ditched a number of P-2's without loss of life by just plain landing on the water at the lowest comfortable speed with adequate control. No mention of numbers. So when we came to the four engine ditching instructions we said to go land on the water. No practice needed,because it is a normal landing; ' Wellsir,I ran into a problem the first trip after the-re;vision hit the streets. A number of idiots said they would not accept a procedure ti:ey coulc"nt practice. Normal four engine ditching,that is. .So I had to explain that someone will stall the airplane because they might flare at 10 or so feet above the target altitude. A perfect landing is a stall about six inches above the ground. A stall at six inches above a chosen simulated altitude could b.e hazardous. So sometimes a lot of forethought is behind some of the procedures. YOU cannot practice all potential emergencies,but some folks try. If a P-3 is as unreliable as they make out,1 would not even come to work. Most of the time everything works better than your car. The following is a list of emergencies not practiced for one reason or another. Sird strikes: Near misses: Actual ditching: Bail out: Actual fires and smoke removal: Actual engine and APU fires: Boost out landings: Landing on unprepared runways: Landing with nose gear retracted: Landing with only one main gear extended; Landing with flat tires: Emergency brake operation: Propeller auto-featrer on takeoff: Propeller overspeed on takeoff: Propeller pitchlock on landing: Propeller de-couple: Engine bog-down on aborts: Actual brake fires: Locked flight controls: Loss of all airsreed indications: Actual two engine landings with the props feathered: HP antenna retrieval+ using- overw&ng,hakch: P-3 instability at 19 knots above VNX: Blowing birds out of oil scoop during flight: I know how to set up most of this,but I'm not telling!

Jay Beasley

ii

I I

,

C

P-3 Pilot Training

to stable, perceptive students. Unfortunately, pilots vary in ability and temperament, which places greater unappreciated responsibilities on the instructor. Each pilot’s potential must be fully developed, but always with due regard to safety. It must be considered that he will not only perform all of the maneuvers accomplished during training, but may add a few of his own after he is checked out in the squadron.

onsiderable progress has been made in overcoming the subtitled problem in the P-3 program. For instance, boost-out landing practice has been reduced to the necessary minimum. It has, however, been revealed on occasion that dangerous situations are still being induced by instructors usually during their first few months in the new bird.

Sensible Amounts of Emergency Procedures Practice Can Be Valuable

Use Horse Sense Common sense and judgment must prevail at all times during training and squadron operations. How far to go in training is always questionable, as it is obvious that all potential emergencies cannot be practiced. There are aviators with 15 years experience who have never lost an engine in flight, while others have had more than their share. Lack of training has no doubt caused a i r c r a f t damage, whereas overtraining has also been costly. In almost every case, though, sound judgment would have reduced the hazards. A good example in training was the hot and cold attitude toward single-enginereverse practice in the P-2 Neptune. In the past, some commanding officers refused to allow this practice in the squadron but sane

The average training emergency in the P-3 is very easily handled, since the aircraft has an abundance of power, is easily controlled, and has considerable system redundancy. The fact that the pilot under instruction can usually do a good job of handling the situation from the beginning may later lead him into a state of overconfidence. It may also influence the instructor to pile on more problems in order to get the student’s attention. A situation of this sort can, and has, caused aircraft accidents.

Every Pilot Is Different An instructor certainly should not be bound so tightly by the syllabus that he is restricted in imparting valuable techniques 1

tioned its use under actual conditions “if needed.” Without previous practice this “last resort” could produce striking results, pun intended.

Windmill Starts On occasion engine starts have failed at a base without spare parts. This situation may be demanding enough to continue the trip without a lengthy delay. The decision to windmill start the engine or make a threeengine takeoff with subsequent airstart will depend on several factors. First of all, an inspection should be conducted to determine that the starter cannot be engaged to the engine by troubleshooting the associated systems. Inoperative engine position (i.e. No. 1 or No. 4) and pilot experience, as well as gross weight and runway length, are only some of the other considerations. The recommended maximum weight for a threeengine takeoff is 100,000 lbs under ideal conditions. Neither procedure is difficult provided proper techniques are used. However, on numerous occasions tires have been blown resulting from brake application for directional control. Probably in every occasion the pilot had not been trained for the maneuver. During a windmill start the pilot has but one responsibility, to accelerate to a maximum of 90 kts and stop on the runway, whether or not the engine starts. On a threeengine takeoff he must become airborne and clear existing obstacles before performing an airstart. Engine failure during this period would create the situation that a single-engine pilot faces on every takeoff. Since the acceleration and stopping distances will generally be less than that required for a three-engine takeoff, it would seem more practical to start the engine on the ground. The NATOPS windmill start procedure is very complete and concise, but a few helpful hints may be in order. Each crew member must clearly understand his duties and functions, which can only be accomplished by reading the procedures and streamlining them into a concise briefing. The pilot in command must not concern himself with anything but directional control and stopping the aircraft. Instrument scan at this time could allow a swerve to progress requiring immediate action. Oddly enough, the natural reaction is to stomp on the brakes rather than decrease asymmetrical power when rudder and aileron are no longer adequate. In summary, the pilot must keep his

NATOPS Is In The Act NATOPS is the development, by many very competent pilots and assorted people, of the best known ways to handle a particular aircraft under normal and emergency conditions. It is inevitable that some people will be dissatisfied with the procedures, since they had no part in their creation. Some feel that they are hamstrung with trivial numbers and words. Others feel content to regard NATOPS as a book of law to be used, if necessary, in defense of their own poor judgment. The NATOPS officers, evaluators, and model managers are always in search of improved procedures and welcome suggestions by all crew members. Today’s state-of-the-art toward standardization is a far cry from only a few years ago when each VP squadron had its own SOP. It was frightening to observe conflicting procedures at each base, and sometimes in the same hangar, in the operation of identical aircraft. It is the obligation of all pilots to interpret NATOPS as it is designed. “It provides the best available operating instructions for most circumstances, but no manual is a substitute for sound judgment. Multiple emergencies, adverse weather, or terrain may require modification of the procedures herein.” Certain remote potential emergency procedures should be practiced if they are intended to be used in squadron operation. Judgment must be exercised in determining which to practice and how often. Generally, one or two satisfactory demonstrations are sufficient. Among the maneuvers which are possiblypracticed too often are two-engineout, no-flap, and ultra-short-field landings. The P-3 NATOPS manual forbids multiple emergencies in the pattern and emergencies of any kind at night. Such ridiculous things as shutting off all hydraulic boost pumps just after takeoff, pulling on power lever cables, and practicing boost out stalls should never be done. Taxiing down an 11,000’ runway to within 3000’ of the end, then practicing short field takeoffs might be hard to explain to the accident board. 2

l7w m

eyes on the runway, the flight engineer unfeathers and monitors the start, and the copilot is the program director. He also has the responsibility of assisting the pilot with the ailerons. Aileron positioning is very important during acceleration, particularly if No. 1 engine is inoperative. When the abort is commenced, and as power is being developed on No. 1, the aileron should be applied in the opposite direction upon command of the pilot. Remember that it is no disgrace to abort the takeoff roll should a rapid swerve occur. Taxi back and try again. It would be embarrassing to blow a main mount or grind the nose tires to shreds.

sive airspeed prevails on short final. Floating halfway down the runway with excessive power is poor practice under any condition. This habit-forming ultrasmooth landing technique has created the need for full reverse and maximum braking at places like Norfolk and Burbank. Add a tailwind and possible hydroplaning and the roll out could be extremely marginal. Fly the airplane and make it work for you to fit all varying conditions. The loss of two engines on one side of a four-engine airplane has been a rare, actual occurrence. However, since the possibility exists, the procedure of approach and landing should be performed during pilot checkout. The need for repeated two-engine landing practice is usually exaggerated during training creating unnecessary hazards and robbing the transitioning pilot of flight time needed to improve normal techniques. Once the student has satisfactorily demonstrated this procedure, repetition should be discontinued. A concise briefing and practice at altitude can, no doubt, save valuable flight time and possible hazards in the traffit pattern. This is particularly true for twoengine waveoffs. Power settings are the determining factor for a good approach to a landing. Regardless of the number of engines being used, a normal approach can be made providing the total SHP is that required. For instance, at normal pattern weights, approximately 1000 SHP for each of the four engines (i.e. 4000 SHP) is required for downwind, tapering to a nominal value at touchdown. Using two symmetrical engines, the downwind leg should require each to be set at approximately 2000 SHP. Using two engines on one side, the SHP required should be about 2200 each to counteract the yaw factor. At the go-degree position about 700 SHP is required on each of the four engines. For two symmetrical engines the requirement would be about 1400 SHP and for two on one side about 1500 each. In all cases, the total SHP required on short final should total approximately 2000. Since power settings are all important in performing this maneuver, the first landing should be made using symmetrical engines. This will allow the student to concentrate on power settings and a normal pattern without the worry of directional control and rudder trim adjustments. The

Flight-Idle Approach from 1000’ This maneuver could possibly be the most hazardous of all training maneuvers, and its value is questionable. The only practical value of the maneuver would be an approach over extremely high terrain to a short runway. Conditions of this nature exist at only a few remote airports and then only on certain runways. Several airplanes including a fourengine prop jet transport, have been demolished during training because the pilots inexpertly performed this maneuver. Proper airspeed must be maintained all the way down to the beginning of the roundout to flare. Too slow an approach can, of course, result in rapid decay of airspeed during the flare resulting in an unexpected sink rate even though the aircraft is rotated nose high. Due to the hazards involved and questionable practical use of the technique, it may be well to consider its removal from the training syllabus. Many instructors no longer require students to perform this item but prefer to demonstrate one per customer. This may backfire, as the student is most likely to perform for the crew soon after being designated as a plane commander. Perhaps a more realistic training maneuver would be to simulate a normal glide slope approach, “breaking-out” and going contact at 100-1.50’ with 140 kts or greater close into the threshold of an imaginary short runway. At this point the power could be reduced to flight idle and a safe landing executed. This may impress the student that a smooth landing can be made near the normal touchdown point when exces3

fuel controls are adjusted to meet starting limitations, it is common for the horsepowers to be negative at flight idle at slow airspeeds. Should a “cut” be made at the proper flare speed, the resulting negative thrust could cause rapid deceleration to a hard landing. Therefore, power control during the flare and touchdown, as well as throughout the approach, becomes highly important. An ideal approach to a landing is one during which the speed and power are gradually reduced so that at time of touchdown the thrust is zero. However, since flight idle power is usually negative and may vary from engine to engine, it would be virtually impossible to select power lever positions producing zero thrust while looking at the runway. This problem can be alleviated by making gradual power reductions to definite desired settings producing the proper deceleration and flare speed. Generally the last observed horsepower will be about 500 SHP across the board just prior to entering the flare. As the flare is established, ease off the power. Naturally the speed will diminish as the flare is established and the power is reduced. To arrest the resulting sink rate it will be necessary to tilt the wing to a higher angle to create some new lift. Detection of the sink rate is commonly known as ‘seat of the pants’, which is controlled solely by visual reference to some moving portion of the runway ahead of the aircraft. The preceding method of landing conventional airplanes on runways has been the accepted practice since the beginning of aviation. However, other methods are being taught by some instructors. To eliminate the possibility of an abrupt power reduction at the flare, students are being prompted to never land with less than 500 SHP across the board. With a total of 2,000 horsepower the aircraft will float for a considerable distance should an effort be made to “hold it off”, especially as the weight decreases. Remarks are often made that the airplane is difficult to land when it is light. This means that the pilot is incapable of reducing power with one hand while easing back pressure with the other without “ballooning” or “dropping it in.” Perhaps his instructor couldn’t do it either. To make the airplane land at the intended touchdown point many pilots will actually push the nose down until contact is made with the runway. The next action is to “nail” the nose wheel to the deck to prevent

any possibility of subsequent flight, then remove the 500 horsepower by snapping the power levers to flight idle. This is not. a landing, it’s an arrival. An ASW aircraft is an expensive platform for sophisticated electronic gear and not a vehicle to plumber around in and walk away contented. A smooth landing is always the desirable way to end a flight, but not if it requires the entire length of the runway. Perhaps if the basic rules of flying are reviewed from time to time, smooth landings can be made with a lot of runway remaining. Some pilots can consistently make fairly smooth landings by touching down in a flat attitude with considerable power, and much too fast. Fast touchdown speeds do not usually present any problem on a normal runway. However, once a pilot develops this habit, problems could arise on short runways and on those covered with ice. From observation, the pilots who land fast are usually the ones who approach too slow having to add power to make the threshold. Some pilots worry about jockeying the power levers back and forth. Usually the power is reduced in order to slow up to 1.35 in order to extend land flaps. The nose must be pushed over to avoid a rapid airspeed decrease, and the proverbial “three hands full of trim” must be applied at once, because the hand is now needed on the power levers to add thrust for the landing. It would seem that many of the basic rules of flying have been discarded for the new state of the art. The “new state of the art” does not exist, but new people appear from time to time. It still takes more power to maintain airspeed in a turn than is required in level flight. Flaps are installed on airplanes so that they may be flown slower. Landing flaps are normally extended to reduce speed but not right at the last minute. It is still easier to put the flaps out to slow the airplane than it is to slow the airplane to put the flaps out. When landing the objective is to stop and this becomes more difficult when power is being added instead of reduced. If it is consistently necessary to add power to get to the runway, it would seem logical that too much power was reduced someplace in the approach. Perhaps too much emphasis is sometimes placed on airspeeds and altitude at certain positions in the pattern and not enough on power settings and glide slope. The airplane flies on thrust which produces 5

IW

Y

speed. By setting the horsepower correctly and pointing the nose to the end of the runway the correct airspeed is usually attained for the respective position, in the pattern. If the horsepower indicators can be included in the scan pattern they become flight instruments and the best of all backup for the airspeed indicators. On occasion the airspeed indicators do malfunction and the horsepower indications can be somewhat comforting.

Quote from the NATOPS book. “At the base leg position, complete the landing checklist and commence a visual descending/decelerating approach so that the airspeed slowly tapers to 1.35 Vs (APPROACH flaps) or 1.3Vs (LAND flaps) as the flare is established. It is not desirable to arrive at these speeds early on final approach. Ease off power as flare is established.” Be that as it may.

On the Ground” Rudder is the Primary Directional Flight Control uring the early stages of P-3 pilot transition the instructor usually demonstrates the advantageous effect of aileron deflection during the ground roll. The purpose of this demonstration is a build up to the realization that rudder alone may not be sufficient to correct for a yaw during adverse conditions. These conditions would be power loss of an outboard engine at a critical speed on takeoff and inoperative engines during reversing. The technique of using aileron to aid marginal rudder control is not confined to the P-3, as many pilots have assumed. Ailerons are effective for steering on the ground due to the up travel being greater

into the wind in order to attempt to equalize the wind drag. The windward wing has an effective higher angle of attack and a slight amount of up aileron will somewhat relieve it. At this time the rudder will effectively be in the opposite direction to prevent weather cocking. Identical action should be taken during crosswind landing roll out. The use of ailerons only to maintain heading on touch and go landings is poor practice. Here again, the rudder is the primary control and ailerons are not needed. In fact, any aileron deflection changes the airfoil and causes loss of lift. Pilots who steer primarily with the ailerons are one step behind the airplane. Should a yaw suddenly

tion. The wing with up aileron will have the greater drag creating a yaw In that direction. In addition, aileron deflection will affeet the footprint pressure and area of the tires creating a difference in frictional drag. The combined forces can be used to a great advantage, but sometimes to a disadvantage. Rudder is the primary directional flight control. during ground roll, ailerons, should be used as an aid only when the rudder is inadequate. It is a natural tendency for a pilot to attempt to steer the aircraft with his hands when a wheel is available. Handle bars would no doubt produce the same results. Since childhood these two controls have been available as a means of maintaining or changing direction. There is little or no tendency to steer with a control stick even though it would produce the same results. It is recommended during crosswind takeoffs to hold a slight amount of aileron

aileron followed by rudder and sometimes brake. During normal full stop landings the rudder should be used as the primary control for maintaining direction. With power set evenly any place in the Beta range the rudder is very effective down to a comfortable low speed. Over controlling with ailerons followed by out of phase footwork and random asymmetric reversing with an individual brake application or two are the main causes of ground incident on the runway. A contributing factor to the incident rate in two engine landing practice is the incorrect use of ailerons. Objectively the ailerons should be used to counteract the yaw created by reversing two on one side. They should be held in the full deflected position until their effectiveness is minimal. In the case of an actual two-engine landing, it would be highly desirable to spoil the lift on the wing with the inoperable

D

than the down travel in degrees of deflec-

develop, the first action would be to apply

The &@Jf&&dt?v

engines. Since no reverse flow of air is available, this can only be done with up aileron, which in addition creates frictional drag on the footprint. Directional adjustments should be made primarily with the rudder. The ideal amount of reverse applied would be that sufficient to maintain heading with full

opposite aileron and approximately threefourths full opposite rudder. A slight amount of rudder travel is retained for changes in the wind. Should less rudder be required, more reverse thrust can be applied. Random aileron movement is apt to set up a chain of events leading to incidents.

Flight Idle Check at 2000 Feet

he HamilE Standard propeller was ins talled on twelve Electra aircraft in 195 9. The normal procedure for NTS checks was :hen the same as it is now. During tests of the First airplane, I landed with the number one crop feathered the first twelve flights. The -eason was that during the NTS check on :limbout the NTS would continue to decay until the 5 th and 10th stage bleeds would Ipen, requiring engine shutdown. On subsequent restart the prop would again feather is soon as NTS occurred. Some of you in the :lee t have experienced this malfunction and nust realize why a normal NTS check should ,e obtained to ascertain the probability of a normal restart. A stabilized RPM during NTS Lc tion is all important. Why did it take so many flights to find :he problem to be a simple misalignment of :he NTS bracket? The state-of-the-art had lot yet reached this level. Once this problem yas corrected, the number one propeller lroduced a normal NTS check, but the same :ondition existed on two more props on this ;ame airplane. I began thinking about what :ould have happened should I have, for some ‘eason, selected flight idle on a short final. f NTS had occurred on these engines, they :ould have all failed at a crucial time. I lecided to perform another check on the NTS system in addition to the normal check durng climbout. The Electra test profile called for a :limb to altitude, performing various checks ts required, ending with an autopilot coupled LS approach. The logical time to perform a light idle check would be at approach speed it a safe but fairly low altitude. Since the ILS approach at Burbank requires 2,800 feet over he outer marker, a good place to perform he idle check is in between the marker and .he runway. Most of the time the altitude was tbout 2,000 feet and the airspeed about 140 mots. To stay on the glideslope approach, Tower had to be maintained regardless of the lumber of engines being used. To prevent

T

overworking the autopilot the power was reduced to flight idle on two symmetrical engines and advanced on the other two. After a lengthy observation of perhaps 10 seconds the engine power settings would be reversed. Had the Electra profile required level flight at about 2,000 feet at any time, this check might have been made then. The desired condition for the engine/prop combination is a true airspeed which corresponds to about 140 knots IAS at about 2,000 feet of altitude. It really doesn’t make any difference where the check is made as long as this condition is met. For instance, a check can be made at 1,000 feet at about 143 knots or at 3,000 feet at 137 knots to get the same true airspeed which results at 2,000 feet at 140 knots. An inflight evaluation check can be made about 143 knots in just one round of the field. If NTS action is experienced, a thorough investigation should be made. Ascertain that air is not being bled off by leaks in the plumbing or an anti-icing valve being stuck open. NTS action at flight idle should not be a downing gripe after these inspections are made. However, if the RPM continues to decay with NTS action, it definitely should be a down gripe. The most common cause of an NTS at flight idle is a lean fuel control. It is most prevalent on number two engine. The reason is that number two is started first day after day from an APU with marginal air supply. Due to poor acceleration the engine may start hot unless the mixture is leaned. When this adjustment is made to prevent hot starts, which are not tolerated, NTS will usually occur at flight idle. NTS is, by far, the lesser of the two evils. The NATOPS Functional Checkflight Procedures are based on a flight profile for a complete check of the aircraft and its components. It originated at Lockheed and is based on the maiden flight of each new airplane. The same procedure would be used after a rework. With the current squadron

7

r

maintenance program, it is seldom that a complete profile is required. Thus, it is permissible to alter altitudes and so forth as long as comparable conditions are met. Terrain clearance during initial runs and restricted areas played a major role in the design of the complete profile. For instance, at the time the propellers are first feathered at Burbank we are over terrain which required at least 9,500 feet. The true airspeed is sometimes performed while crossing Los Angeles enroute to the next inertial mark. Regulations require altitude greater than 10,000 feet when exceeding 2 50 knots IAS. And so on. There is no substitute for good judgment in performing checks. With a simple propeller change there is no real necessity to climb to 11,000 feet for a feather check, especially when IFR conditions prevail. In turn, there is no necessity in checking flight idle horsepower at exactly 2,000 feet as long as the true airspeed required is obtained. Let’s apply judgment and common sense to the Flight Idle check as it is written on page 3-50 in the A/B manual and 3-56 in the c manual.

say “retard each power lever to flight idle.” I am quite sure that most people would not dream of making an NTS check on all four engines at the same time for fear of malfunction on more than one prop. With more than one misaligned NTS system the same thing could happen while descending at flight idle. It has been mentioned that some folks are descending with full flaps at a very high rate! Why, why? The book says LEVEL, and you can’t stay level very long at a constant airspeed with no power. The restriction regarding the 200 horsepower spread is simply. I found that directional control is greatly reduced at flight idle after touchdown if, for instance, number one had minus 200 HP and number four had positive 100 HP. It takes full rudder to hold the airplane straight while cleaning up for a touch and go. Add a crosswind and the situation becomes worse. (Brakes somehow get into the act about here.) A horsepower spread between the inboard engines is not so critical.

LEVEL (2000 ft.) a. Altitude 2000 ft. maximum; 130 to 140 knots b. Retard power to flight idle LIMIT: (1) No NTS shall occur (2) All engines within 200 horsepower of each other

Patron Umptyump has been ordered to be home based at Las Vegas to patrol Lake Head for the next decade. The field elevation there is 1,868 feet! Should we perform the Flight Idle check at 2,000 feet, or fly over to Death Valley to perform it? Why not make use of the first page in the NATOPS book where it says, “use your head” and make the check at about pattern altitude at 130 to 140 knots.

The reasoning person making this check should first of all allow time for a stabilized condition at a constant airspeed. This cannot be accomplished if all four throttles are pulled to flight idle, and the procedure does not say that. Perhaps it should

V

Dern It.

Short Field Landing difficulty in gradually reducing power and are prone to land with the proverbial 500 horsepower. To prevent floating on the ground cushion they may push the nose down slightly to force the airplane on the deck. This is better than landing long, but it results in higher than desired speed and sink rate. The average Navy runway is about 8,000 feet long. The old adage is to land in the first one-third in order to make a passing

ery few are made on short runways, but a great many are performed on average and even long runways. Reasons for landing too far down the runway are numerous, but they all add up to improper deceleration after crossing the threshold. Touchdown at the proper airspeed without floating off the runway requires a reduction in thrust combined with increased lift to offset the sink rate. Many pilots have

1

A REAL PROBLEM

8

lt would seem that a good pilot would larrassed to land 2,700 feet down the I. This wide tolerance, if accepted, be habit forming and be cause for vhen landing at Norfolk or Burbank, lly coupled with not uncommon tail snd water on the surface. Spectators et many thrills. Perhaps the worst exhibitions occur he pilot elects to give the Admiral a nooth landing. He is prone to leave rer on, and maybe add some, to reduce k rate to minimum. Many times the t will be on the heavy side to prevent .ays in taking on fuel for the next leg. suit of this combination is obvious. [ding will be long and the touchdown vi11 be fast, perhaps so fast that the .ll hesitate in selecting the Beta range. lly the airplane will stop before run‘f the runway.

Certain airports tend to promote long landing habits. Navy Jacksonville is one of the worst even though the obstacles on approach are nonexistent. The arresting gear on runway 9 is about 1,100 feet from the approach end, right at the desired touchdown spot. If the wire is knocked down a lengthy delay occurs before the next landing is made. The wire now becomes the barrier, and, to ensure missing it, the pilot tends to land 2,000 feet down the runway. The wire on runway 27 is placed 2,000 feet from the approach end and frequently gets knocked down because of the habit of touching down long on runway 9. Now the habit pattern develops to land about 3,000 feet down the runway and pilots easily fall prey to the disadvantages. The young ambitious type, in giving the Admiral the nice ride he deserves, is apt to land in the last half, or maybe the last third of the runway. It happens. But it shouldn’t. (there are no long runways)

bairnurn Control Speed Training ; of training pilots in P-3’s and other zhines resulted in more and more : approaches to flying. Not to seek out ate emergency situations, but to face in determining where to draw the tiinimum control is an area in flight g which is frequently violated. The ms in realism have caused a few accind numerous incidents. A simple ap-

preach to the necessary training could be this. If symmetric power is lost on takeoff roll, and you cannot go straight, stop. In flight under the same conditions reduce symmetric power in order to go straight if ground contact is imminent. If altitude can be traded to airspeed, perform this transaction to regain control, clean up the airplane, and go home.

9

Obviously the most critical time for power loss is on takeoff. It is mandatory that a pilot must demonstrate his ability to execute a takeoff with an engine failure at the critical speed. The odds against engine failure at this point are no doubt astronomical but the requirement is valid. The odds against a second failure within seconds of the first engine malfunction are even greater, and this type training by fearless instructors would seem to be invalid. With an engine chop after refusal speed the P-3 still accelerates rapidly to liftoff speed, and 140 knots is attained shortly thereafter. It is almost inconceivable that another engine would fail in this short time span, and a true professional would not use such a weapon to get the student’s attention. There are other ways to create humility, should this be necessary. The practice of mandatory flap retraction at 140 knots on climbout with engine failure is not only amateurish but is not in compliance with NATOPS. If the airplane is climbing and accelerating on three engines, leave the flaps set and re-enter the pattern. If unable to return, retract the flaps and proceed elsewhere at three engine climb and cruise speed. Historically the most critical time for slow flight with engine failure is during Vmc Air demonstrations and waveoff practice after ditching drills, and not on takeoff. This tragedy has not been confined to the P3 community. The airlines took a heavy toll during the early years of the jet transports. They now perform most of these maneuvers in simulators and have all but eliminated accidents during related training. It is safe to assume that the first 140 knots are the most difficult to attain and that subsequent flight will be faster unless deliberate action is taken for training maneuvers and landing approaches. At 140 knots on critical climbout, aircraft configuration would be gear up and flaps at takeoff position. This speed would seem ideal for Vmc practice for a number of reasons. Takeoff should be the most critical portion of the flight, configuration should be for that environment, and the worst conditions could be simulated with a good safety margin. The speed is well above stall and well above Vmc with two on one side since the power will be limited by practicing at a safe altitude of 8000 feet. In addition to power limitations caused by altitude it should be further limited by using 925 TIT, resulting 10

in about 3200 SHP, standard day. In order to get any valuable Vmc training at 140 knots it will be necessary to use only two engines. To get the same effect with three engines a much lower speed would be necessary causing the margin of safety to diminish. Since this is a training exercise and not a test of aircraft performance, much is to be gained in the atmosphere of safety by a good margin. Control can be simulated to be marginal by not using full rudder and aileron deflection. If the pilot can expertly conduct the maneuvers and corrections under these conditions, he can also do them under more stringent circumstances. The concept that the airplane will go straight only if the favorable bank angle is maintained can be made indelibly in the mind of the student, just as if higher power and lower speeds were used. Waveoff practice can be accomplished with perfect safety. The student can relax and learn to fly rather than be in a state of panic most of the time. Simulate feather engines one and two with gear up and flaps set at approach at about 8000 feet, airspeed 140 knots, power 925 TIT on engines three and four. Position rudder and aileron to fly straight with 5 degrees right wing down. The ball will be slightly out of center, otherwise the airplane would turn to the right. In the beginning, prime concern should be given to airspeed control and constant wing attitude. Later, altitude retention must be included. It is very important that the student be able to look out the window at least part of the time and maintain heading, bank angle, and nose attitude. With concentration he will be able to conduct a double scan as would be necessary during flight close to the terrain. While holding a constant rudder deflection ease off aileron a slight bit and note the airplane starts to turn when the bank angle departs the optimum. Reapply aileron slowly and note the turn stops when 5 degree wing down is regained. The demo can only be accomplished with constant rudder position to simulate full travel of the surface. Ease off aileron again until wings are level and hold this attitude to simulate that aileron increase is not available for recapture of bank angle. Slowly reduce power on number four engine to induce bank angle return to 5 degrees right wing down then slowly reapply power. Repeat these maneuvers until the student can perform them using pri-

nary visual scan with frequent reference to nstruments. In most cases students will fly nstruments at altitude and disregard visual .eferences. When something unusual hap>ens he has to see it on the instrument panel, lecide what it is, then decide what to do about t, and do it. This all takes time. To be able to *eat t instinctively from visual references hen check the details on the instrument )anel is the answer. If you can see outside, ook for the big picture then add finesse rom inside. Two engine waveoff practice can be ccomplished by reducing power on engine hree and four to 1000-1200 SHP in a descent t 140 knots, wings level and ball centered. ipply 925 TIT gradually while rolling in 5 .egrees right wing down and sufficient ruder to prevent yaw. This maneuver should be one with primary visual reference, using a loud or object on the horizon, and frequent ut secondary instrument scan. Repeat the raveoff until the student can use power, ileron, and rudder simultaneously and intinctively, then add elevator for altitude djustments. The common tendency is to start climb before directional control is estabshed, and on instruments at that. Rememer that there are no instruments depicting angars, towers, and other hazards to low !vel flying. Conversely, airspeed cannot be :ad looking only at these objects. Once the above procedure is inrained, a two-engine waveoff is easy. Pilots ill be able to apply more and more power, nd more rapidly, as they become profient. The same procedures apply to three agine waveoffs. Directional control must I established before a climb is attempted. rom a landing approach, with respectable .rspeed, a three engine waveoff is an easy maneuver. From a ditching drill, with much ss respectable airspeed, it is most likely tat symmetric power application must be

3

favored in order to maintain directional control. A slight loss in altitude with directional control is more desirable than a possible greater loss caused by improper action. In summary, the purpose of this paper is to add safety to some of the training maneuvers. The reason for using two engines on one side for Vmc practice is to be able to fly with marginal control at airspeeds which are not marginal. The suggested speed is about 40 knots above stall and about 20 knots above Vmc, two on one side with full power available at 8,000 feet. Yet marginal control techniques can be perfected and used when the occasion arises where control really is marginal. Waveoff practice is also safe in this environment and can be perfected in preparation for the time it is really needed. As for the need of an actual two-engine waveoff on landing, perhaps it is over-emphasized. The time you would go around is when the approach is too high and too fast. Only an incompetent would attempt one when too low and too slow. If this situation presented itself, add some power and try to make the runway. If you can do that, you don’t need to go around. As far as the runway getting fouled, when you are in the flare on two engines, this is adding far, far too much romance by an amateurish instructor. A word of caution: When the student is on a two engine waveoff he will have full rudder tab and a lot of leg muscles pushing on the rudder. Be prepared when you elect to bring in the power on the simulated engines. Some of them keep on kicking the same rudder with superhuman strength, particularly if they are on instrument scan, and you have to return to two engines. Really. You have to be ready. Keep ‘em flying.

Multi-Engine Training

asic concern in flying seems to e the problem of staying airborne with power .ilure. At this time gravity has no opponent rd the ability to cope and think about it does It exist. Obviously it is necessary to plan lead for such emergencies should they ler happen.

Power failure in a single engine airplane can cause considerable inconvenience, since the escape routes are limited to bailout or to a hazardous forced landing. During the early years of aviation the powerplant was the most unreliable part of the airplane. Forced landings were an ev-

11

eryday occurrence, and pilots quickly side at or near Vmc is more unlikely. learned to always have a landing site sePast records reveal that engine-out lected when at all possible. training has caused far more mishaps than The first multi-engine airplanes were in actual operation, when almost everything actually built in order to carry more pay- functions correctly most of the time. After load, since there were few engines powerful the loss of a number of jet airliners the enough to handle the requirements. Safety airlines now do the two-on-one-side bit in in numbers was not the prime concern, al- the simulator - because of the danger as well though an added engine could certainly be as the cost. Obviously some training must be useful in prolonging flight even if altitude done in all areas of operations for reasons of could not be maintained. In order to take safety. If nothing else, the pilot must be advantage of the remaining engine, the pi- mentally satisfied that he can handle the lot had to be able to fly straight with asym- airplane under reasonable but adverse conmetric power. Otherwise he would have to ditions. Many, many incidents have occurred throttle the remaining engine and glide to a practicing engine-out takeoffs and landlanding as in a single engine airplane. Obvi- ings when the student wasn’t actually ready ously, some training is necessary so that the and the instructor didn’t realize it. How do pilot can take advantage of the extra power you know when he is actually ready to peravailable. form? Only after he has demonstrated time Now we are off and running. Instruc- after time that he can hold the airplane tors can make it very exciting with all the straight without thinking when an engine new goodies to play with. Decision, Refusal, is throttled. In order to ascertain that he can Vmc ground, Vmc air, engine out ditching indeed do this, he must display his ability to practice, two engine go- arounds, and other go straight at all times with primary refer: maneuvers too scary to repeat. ence to scenery outside the cockpit. With In primary training the single primary reference to the instruments his powerplant seems to function perfectly ex- first effort is to keep the wings level on the cept on rare occasions when over auxiliary attitude indicator, and a yaw will develop. fields. On two engine airplanes you can al- Remember that he learned to fly in a singlemost bet that one of the powerplants will fail engine airplane where wings level meant on every training flight. It is against the fairly straight flight. With asymmetric power rules, however, for both engines to fail. On this is not always true. four engine airplanes two of them will fail, During visual flight at altitude have and, more than likely, they are on the same the student practice straight and level lookside. It almost seems that multi-engine air- ing out the window primarily, with freplanes, are more dangerous than single- quent reference ‘to the instruments. In a engine jobs, since the more engines you short time he will be able to maintain attihave exposed to possible failure, the more tude and altitude with minimum scan. At this chances they will fail. Or something. It has time explain that directional control must be always been a mystery how four Spads could maintained when an engine is throttled by fly day after day without engine problems, the use of the primary directional control, when four similar engines installed in one rudder. Continue this exercise until it is secairplane have multiple failures. It is com- ond nature to go straight by visual refermon knowledge that five-out-on-one-side ence, if available, then check for details on landings were made in the ten engine vin- the instrument panel. tage B-36 -just to separate the men from the After he has performed well at altiboys. tude, slowly reduce power on one engine at When and how often should engine about 140 knots after liftoff to see if the failures be simulated in training. This seems student will inherently fly straight and not to be a direct function of the instructor’s let a yaw develop. Repeat this action someimmaturity. For obvious reasons the student time during the approach. In both cases must demonstrate that he can handle the restore the power as soon as an observation situation with failure of the critical engine is made. The objective is to ensure that the at the critical time. One good performance in student will not ever quit flying the airthis area should be enough, considering the plane while barking out commands for reunlikelihood of number one engine failing medial action. (This has been one of the at one knot past Vmc. Failure of two on one chief causes of incidents related to loss of 12

control). Once the altitude and pattern training is satisfactory there should be no problem connected with simulating engine loss on the runway. Remember one thing - you can’t blow a tire unless it is touching the runway. Proper ins true tion can certainly lessen this menace of stomping on brakes when the rudder would have done the job if used early enough.

A

One other thing - the most important thing about flying is to make the airplane go in its intended path - whether it be straight, in a turn, inverted, or whatever. Command barkers and skeptics often will focus on the malfunction and forget where they are going. It only takes a second to get behind the airplane, sometimes. Keep ‘em flying!

About Vmc Air

lmost fifteen years ago a Commanding Officer told me that during their deployment to Adak almost all takeoffs were made downwind, even in VFR conditions, the reason given was that a takeoff on a certain runway required a left turn using 30 degrees of bank for terrain clearance during initial climbout They elected to takeoff in the opposite direction, even with tailwinds as high as 17 knots, to avoid a possible Vmc problem! Someone had spread the word that if number one engine failed in a 30 degree left bank, Vmc would be 201 knots and they usually had only 160 during the initial turn, When I recovered from shock we sat down and talked things over before making a demo flight to clear up this misconception. During the flight all doubt regarding controllability was eliminated by flying a coordinated 30 degree banked turn to the left with both left engines at flight idle. Many times since I have been confronted with this same bit of nonsense. The most recent was in 1979, when several pilots were apprehensive about losing number one engine while making a left turn out of Cubi. Someplace along the line there are classroom ins true tors feeding misinformation to the students about Vmc air, This should be carefully monitored. By definition, Vmc is the lowest speed at which the airplane can be flown straight with asymmetric power, The higher the power, the higher the minimum speed will be. The ideal airplane attitude is wings level, but lower speeds can be flown using a favorable bank angle when the chips are down. Over thirty years ago the FM ran extensive tests on cargo airplanes to find that a 5 degree favorable wing down attitude was the optimum for the lowest speed to maintain

heading. Bank angles greater than the optimum caused intolerable loss of lift, while flatter angles requires greater airspeed. In any case fly with wings level when possible. During the Electra/P-3 testing it was found that 5 degree wing down away from the failed engine produced the lowest speed at which heading could be maintained - Vmc. Conditions were with number one engine feathered and 5 degree right wing down using full right rudder and varying amounts of asymmetric power, it was noted that, under the same conditions, the airspeed had to be increased by 26 knots with 5 degrees of left wing down. To be specific, each degree of bank angle less than the optimum needs a 2.6 knot increase to fly straight, obviously this formula works only in bank angles near level attitude. Now we are off and running for some good old NATOPS questions. It is a pity that the question makers sometimes have not used common sense, causing misconceptions, to say the least. To say the most, accidents could happen taking off downwind, as in the first paragraph, when it is not necessary. A typical question might be as follows: Find Vmc air in a 30 degree left bank with number one feathered and the other three at 4,600 SHP. The answer expected could be 201 knots! Solution: Vmc with 5 degrees right wing down would be 110 knots. 30 degrees left wing down is 35 degrees away from optimum multiplied by 2.6 gives 91 knots which must be added to 110 resulting in Vmc of 201 knots!!! This means that 201 knots would be required to fly straight with 30 degrees left wing down and number one engine out. A P-3 flies very well on downwind leg with two out on one side and 160 knots with the wings level. Why would any-

13

one attempt to fly straight with 30 degrees wing down. That can’t even be accomplished on four engines without losing altitude in the horrible sideslip, probable flameout of two engines with anything other than full tanks, and possibly a little dorsal fin bending. To fly straight the wings have to be somewhere near level. During the turn out of Cubi, Adak, Burbank, or wherever, should an engine quit, continue the turn in balanced flight to the desired heading, then roll the wings level and proceed elsewhere - just like you would do on Saturday when nobody is watching! Basic training is to drop a wing when a turn is desired. When the turnis no longer desired, level the wings. With low airspeeds and asymmetric power a few tricks may be useful in prolonging flight. If the wrong wing gets down it may be necessary to reduce power long enough to get the.good wing down, then re-apply the power. One thing is certain, if you can’t prevent the airplane from turning when straight flight is necessary, the power must be reduced and altitude loss accepted. With the P-3 you have to work at it to get in this position. Poor training has also caused another obstacle in the art of VP flying. People have been known to fly MAD traps at speeds of 2 20 knots and more to stay above the deadly 201 knot Vmc in a 30 degree left bank should number one fail. Egad! You can lose number one, two, and three in a left bank at 150

knots, apply normal rated power on number four, roll the wings level and hunt for a place to land on the water. Naturally the power would have to be reduced to fly straight with diminishing airspeed. Here’s one for you. What is Vmc with number one failed and the rest at 4,600 while in a 30 degree right bank? since 30 degrees is 25 past optimum, multiply this by 2.6 knots and get 65 knots. Subtract 65 from the normal 110 knots and the new Vmc is 45 knots! Even if stall hasn’t occurred nobody in their right mind would believe this. Nobody should believe the 201 bit either. When an engine fails in flight the airplane wants to roll as well as yaw. Allowing the wing on the failed engine to remain low will penalize the performance because the airplane is in a forward slip - a maneuver designed to lose altitude without gaining airspeed. Over-reaction, in this case, would be desirable so that the good wing would be down from the start. If the airspeed is ample for directional control, the wings can be leveled for best performance. After all, downwind and final approaches are flown wings level, since there is no need for other techniques with normal power and speeds. If you need to, hold the good wing down. If you dQ!ft, dQl'ft, Wh&WX YQU 618, dQdt kt tie bad wing get down. Keep ‘em straight.

High E$iciency Engines I

t is highly unlikely that older overhauled engines will produce much more than 100% power. For certain, the efficiency will not improve after the normal break-in period. Invariably, the computed 104-106% engines turn out to be mere 100% efficient. This is an easy detection by noting high fuel flow along with high power for a given TIT. One or more bad thermocouples can cause the fuel control system to by-pass less fuel resulting in higher powers and higher fuel flows. The source of the trouble is apparently the ground run data. At best the 1050/ 4300 check is sort of tongue-in-cheek for extreme accuracy, with so many variables

present. It should still be used until something else is devised, but fuel flow readings must be observed more closely. It must be assumed that older engines are more apt to be 100% or less than they are to be 105%. A careful observation and recording of fuel flow readings along with horsepower output may reveal bad thermocouples. For instance, if #l and #4 engines produce 4100 horsepower at the same fuel flow, but #4 TIT is cooler by 20 degrees, then something is wrong with #4 TIT indication. If the TIT is the starting point, #4 would appear to be more efficient unless fuel flow is taken into consideration. The more power you have, the more fuel you burn. The following is an example that I see 14

When conditions similar to those above are observed pull the power back to 100% after a stabilized reading is taken. At normal rated it is unlikely that a severe overtemp would occur, but it certainly could at max power. Turbine life can probably be extended if power is limited to 100%. Should the engine efficiency actually be 105% there is no valid reason to use more than lOO%, since aircraft performance is based on 100%. Should the engine be only 100% but computes to he 105% due to false TIT readings, then there is a good reason not to accept the extra power. Perhaps a good operating technique would be to set desired takeoff power to as near 100% as predictable. On weaker engines the limiting factor would be TIT. Horsepower would be the limiting factor on stronger engines.

frequently in flying with the Fleet. All numbers are approximate and horsepower and fuel flow gauges are calibrated. !&-plane OErend an2ysis . #4 99% * 105% 105% 100% Predicted power at 1010 TIT: 4300 4100 4060 4300 Actual power Observed: 4300 4100 4060 4300 Fuel flow observed: 2200 2200 2100 2100 When the power was reduced on #l and #4 to 4100 the fuel flows all read the same! All of the engines are actually lOO%, or at least they all produce the same power and are comparable in efficiency.

F

Engine Discussion much higher than indicated. Engine performance is of particular importance in two areas, takeoff and cruise. All charts are based on 100% engines, both in thrust and specific fuel consumption. If the aircraft takes off in the specified distance using 100% power, and if MAX range and loiter airspeeds are maintained with the specified fuel flow, there should be little cause for further concern. Engine performance can be measured on every takeoff by comparing the SHP produced at a given TIT with that forecast. If the SHP is low there is a problem. If it is higher than forecast there is usually a problem with thermocouples and the power should be reduced to 100% value. Years ago, each squadron had its own rules on determining when to takeoff or to abort. In general most crews would go providing the SHP was no more than 200 low, which closely compares to our present 95%. During this era engine performance was measured by forecast power at 1010 or 1077 and not by the latest 1050 check. Further evaluations were made by comparing actual fuel flows to those in the loiter and MAX range tables. The 1050 trend got into the system, with good intent, only a few years ago. In

orecast power is that to be expected at either 80 knots or zero airspeed when a selected TIT is set. The resulting SHP will be affected by OAT and pressure altitude. For instance, figure 11-19 indicates that 4120 SHP can be expected at 80 knots on a standard sea level day. Under the same conditions 4110 SHP is forecast at zero airspeed. Since all performance is based on 100% forecast power it would seem logical to use only 100% for takeoff and climb. On weak engines the power would be limited by TIT. On so-called high power engines the thrust should be limited by SHP, usually attained at a lower TIT. Predicted power is a bootleg term for SHP to be expected as a result of the latest 1050 ground run. Since the hingepoint of the evaluation is primarily TIT, a malfunction in this system can result in a false SHP reading greater than actual. Inoperative thermocouples can cause a normal engine to produce excess SHP, since the TD system will not bypass the normal amount of fuel. The added fuel to the combustion can greatly increase the output at a selected TIT creating a false evaluation of the engine. Continued use of this condition, particularly at MAX power, can result in turbine blade failure - since the TIT can be 15

is? comn[ete many cases it has been valuable in the fix for tired engines. In many cases it has caused good engines to become tired before their time because of malfunctioning TIT systems creating over-temps at high power and accepted by the crews unknowingly. During climb and cruise the SHP, and not TIT, should be set evenly across the board. The aircraft flies on thrust (SHP) and not TIT. When the SHP is even and the fuel flows are even all of the engines are of the same fuel efficiency - providing there are no gauge errors. Fuel efficiency determines range and endurance and is of prime con-

tern along with engine performance at takeoff. The performance can be increased by a malfunctioning TIT sys tern, but the fuel flow will also be greater when a given TIT is maintained. If a SHP is maintained the fuel flow will remain normal with a lower Indicated TIT. Troubleshooting is easier and more accurate in flight than on the ground for a number of reasons. For instance, the aircraft is always into the wind. Average variations in OAT are of little consequence when fuel flows and SHP are the hingepoints instead of the seemingly variable TIT indications.

Inflight Engine Trends Country Style

S

ince the airplane flies on thrust, and not TIT, it seems logical that horsepower settings should be of prime concern during takeoff, climb, and cruise. To climb at 950 across the board or to cruise at 925 when the horsepowers and fuel flows are uneven does not conform with maximum performance for the situation. In many cases, due to faulty TIT indications, the turbine is being exposed to higher than suspected temperatures resulting in premature removal, if not destruction. The following procedures are offered as operational tips: TAKEOFF Determine predicted power of 100 percent for normal rated or desired power. For example, at 1010 TIT, 4100 SHP can be expetted on a sea level standard day, whereas only 3 600 would be produced on an 86” F day. Should these indications be exceeded by any significant amount, the power should be reduced to 100 percent. It is not uncommon to see horsepowers exceeding 100 percent by as much as 300 SHP with corresponding high fuel flows. Invariably these engines are computed to 104-106 percent on the proverbia128 day 1050 check. Invariably when horsepowers are matched across the board, the fuel flows also match, but the TIT on the

high powered engines reads lower. Obviously the TIT indicating system is at fault giving false horsepower readings - a common everyday condition. It has been noticed that the flight engineers will reduce power to 4600 SHP when it is exceeded on cold days at 1010 TIT. They do not, however, reduce power from 4300 to 4100 on a standard day at 1010. Most aborted takeoffs occur when the horsepower does not come up to the predieted on engines rated at 104-106 percent. In almost every case the engine is a mere 100 percent but made to look better by inoperative thermocouples. Should one or more of these thermocouples start to work the horsepower will indicate less than predicted and create an abort situation under the present rules. Most of the time the airplane is taxied to the highpower area and a new 1050 check usually resulting in a new engine efficiency of less than before. On the next takeoff the engine meets the predicted and everyone is happy to go. Aborts are wasteful of fuel, time consuming, and sometimes hazardous. Consideration should be given to using 100 percent power for takeoff. The limiting factor would be TIT on weak engines and horsepower for so-called high power engines. CLIMB The 950 TIT setting for climb is an arbitrary figure which is less than 1010 but

.

to near 100 percent and many times the socalled 96 percent engines come up in performance. Although engine efficiency cannot be computed to be 99.9 or 100.1, one-half percent is easily identified. TIT indications may vary only a few degrees at loiter power whereas they may have a wide spread at high power. The thermocouples appear to be variable, inconsistent, and unpredictable. The loiter charts eliminate the most unreliable indication - TIT. There is no better way to detect a change in engine efficiency than to make a comparison check of all four engines. If the horsepowers and fuel flows match each other, the engine performance is the same. Should an engine suddenly, or gradually begin using more fuel with matched horsepower across the board, then that engine should be inspected for the common ailments. These checks can be made on every flight without special effort and the advantages are countless. The 28 day 1050 check was designed with good intent to detect changes in efficiency/performance. Instead it became a weapon causing many unnecessary aborts usually because an unrealistic high power was not attained as predicted. To make it worse this high powered engine may have improved with old age, which should arouse suspicion of bad TIT indications. Certain ground runs are necessary but they can be minimized if comparative trends are conducted in flight.

more than 925. It is suggested that a comparative check of horsepower be made across the board when 950 is set. The high powered engines should be reduced to conform with the engine producing the lowest horsepower at 950. If the fuel flows at this point also match across the board the engines are all of the same efficiency. The TIT on the high powered engines will invariably read lower and the engines are obviously running hotter than indicated. At training weights there is no reason to use 950 for climb. It is suggested that the first power reduction for climbout be made to 3000 across the board. In most cases the fuel flows will match closely, but the TIT may vary. Symmetrical power should be maintained for all subsequent flight. CRUISE

For a great many years all cruise control settings were determined from the Operating Tables, and with great success. Flight engineers kept fuel logs using fuel flow indications and frequently predicted arrival fuel to within a few hundred pounds after lengthy flight. From observation fuel flow gauges are either very, very accurate or obviously malfunctioning. It’s as easy to read ten pounds of fuel flow as it is to read a tenth of a percent rpm - or easier. Then along came Jet Plan and other forms of cruise control and a lot of people forgot, or never knew how to use the Operating Tables. It is suggested that the Loiter Tables be used periodically enroute to the training area or whenever convenient. Select the chart for the aircraft configuration, usually “B”, and set up loiter for the weight and altitude. To save time use the autopilot for maximum stability. Adjust fuel flow/horsepower until airspeed is stable. At this time compare actual fuel flow with chart fuel flow. If they are the same, the engines are 100 percent efficient. Note that there is no mention of TIT on the charts. Note also that a delta T only affects horsepower, requiring more on hot days to get the required indicated airspeed resulting in a higher true airspeed and greater distance traveled. Indicated airspeed and fuel flow are the constants while horsepower and true airspeed are the variables. Using this method the so-called 105 106 percent engines invariably come down

ADVANTAGES

a.

b. C.

d e. f.

17

The airplane is always into the wind (IAS) for which there is a fuel flow on the chart. There are no fuel flows for ground operation and a wind change can affect power output. Unreliable TIT indications are eliminated. Errors in OAT are minimizes since a delta T only affects SHP and TAS, whereas a ground one degree error could mean about 40 SHP. Turbine life should increase since false reading high powered engines will be exposed by erroneous TIT indications. An enormous amount of fuel is not wasted every 28 days. Airlines do it in flight.

Turbine Inlet Temperature Horsepower &d Fuel Flow I

t has been observed that high engine performance is blindly accepted on 28 day trend checks. As long as it is 100 percent or above little concern is given unless the performance increased several percent from the previous evaluation. It is inconceivable that the check results in performance as high as 108 percent month after month without arousing curiosity regarding the TIT indicating system. This is only possible since fuel flow is not one of the inputs in the calculation. When the SHP and fuel flow are higher than those of the opposite engine a good procedure would be to reduce the higher to match the lower and compare fuel flow. Should they be the same the engines have the same performance and the TIT indicating system is in error. The following was taken from squadron records:

a. SHP F/F %

1050 4100 2100 100.5

SHP 4300 F/F 2200 % 100

Summertime

#2

1050 4100 2100 100.5

#3

1050 4300

#4 1050 4100

106

100.5

2200

Wintertime #2 #3 3x30 1012 4300 4300 2200

100

2200

106

2100

#4 1032 4300 2200

100

It is obvious that number three engine has the same performance since the power and fuel flow matches across the board, but the TIT is 20 degrees colder on that engine. This squadron is blessed with expert mechanics who exhausted every possibility of malfunctions in the TIT system and have been forced to live with it. They now have an engine that jumped from 102% to 111% and

18

holding. Every component in the TIT system has been tested, replaced, swapped, and spit on without finding the problem. According to the trend analysis they are blessed with a 111 percent engine. However, when the horsepower is matched with the opposite engine the fuel flow also matches but the TIT reads 50 degrees lower!!!! The flight crews have come to the rescue by using 100 percent forecast power using SHP instead of TIT. Otherwise the turbine would be subjected to very high actual temperatures. Due to heavy workloads and the extremely difficult and time consuming task of pulling thermocouples, maintenance departments are reluctant to work on engines producing more than 105-106 percent on the 1050 run, although most agree that a few thermocouples may be inoperative. This is understandable, but turbine pro tee tion should be afforded. The horsepower gauge could be placarded to use 100% NATOPS forecast power chart instead of 100 percent of a predicted 108 percent engine - for example. The universal use of reduced power for takeoff is the saving factor in life of the turbine. Even so, the 111 percent engine described above would be running at 1060 instead of 1010 degrees at normal rated, it also would be near 1000 at climb TIT. Flight crews can prevent this by setting horsepower from the forecast power charts for takeoff and by matching power with the engine producing the lowest SHP at 950 TIT for climb. Until the thermocouple/TIT indicating system is improved back to where it was about twenty years ago it may be better to use the horsepower gauges as the primary indicators. For engines rated at 100 percent and above, use the forecast power from the NATOPS book and not all of the predictedsuch as 108 percent. Weaker engines should be limited by TIT.

Landmarks in the Tra$ic Pattern T

he runway is a landmark. Pilots are encouraged to look at it frequently especially after turning off the 180, yet they are discouraged in looking at other objects on the ground for reference. Perhaps the logic behind this is that there are no landmarks in the carrier Navy other than the deck. There is no question that proper spacing abeam the runway and a properly banked turn will result in the proper line-up for a centerline landing in normal conditions. In perfectly calm conditions the published downwind heading will maintain the proper spacing and a constant angle of about 20 to 2.5 degrees will result in good line-up. This is certainly not true when abnormal wind conditions exist, which is most of the time. It should be permissible to fly a path over the ground at all times in order to always be in position. When fly-to points around the pattern are available they can be used to advantage in getting to the final flyto point, the runway. Experienced pilots use this procedure, although some are reluctant to admit it, for whatever reason. The more experience you have, the more you look out the window to compensate for abnormal conditions before you get out of position. Wouldn’t it be nice if all P-3’s flew the same path over the ground as well as the same speed so that a perfect interval could be maintained in the touch and go pattern! It is rather hard to fly the same path over the ground unless you look at the ground. It is not uncommon to have to alter the downwind heading as much as 15 degrees to maintain proper spacing abeam the runway. Should the crosswind cause the airplane to drift toward the runway a good lineup may be impossible causing a missed approach. An experienced pilot will detect and compensate to maintain the pattern, whereas a student may need some help. This “help” is the fly-to point at the 180, which has been determined as Ua pretty good place to be.” At this point he can be taught to anticipate a rate of turn which will intersect the extended centerline. Wouldn’t it be nice if a centerline could be painted on the ground as far as a couple of miles from the approach end! Crosswinds are not the only menace

at downwind attitude. It is not uncommon to be flying into a brisk headwind, even though the tower is reporting calm conditions on the runway. This happens frequently at Brunswick when the duty is runway 01. The gear is lowered abeam the approach end and, after the normal time to check extension and brakes, the turn off the 180 is initiated. After turning final you find yourself almost on top of the runway with too much altitude. Why not fly downwind far enough to be over the bridge during the turn, since that is the place where you usually are. In the case of a brisk tailwind it may be necessary to initiate the turn off the 180 before the gear is down to keep from getting too deep in the pattern. To accomplish all this reference must be made to landmarks other than the runway, since it is a right hand pattern. Here, also, is where a knowledge of the extended centerline is handy, and it is relative to the red barn. A similar condition frequently exists at Moffett in the pattern for 32 when the wind at 1500 is brisk out of San Francisco Gap. Flying the downwind heading of 140 degrees will put you in too close abeam and perhaps cause an overshoot of the centerline. Noise abatement at Moffett has in the past been a strong issue, mainly because pilots were careless about flying over a huge apartment complex. To remedy this it was agreed to fly a pattern over the terrain that was least objectionable. The fly-to point is the mobile home park to the right of the freeway opposite the Emporium department store. Just south of the Emporium are the apartments to be avoided if practicable, so you turn just outside of them. This places you about 1000 feet at the 90, which is about right for a 1500 foot pattern. Then, sure enough, here comes the Libby’s Can at about 700 feet, which is right on glide slope. Speaking of the Libby Can. It should only be referred to if the student is inconsistent in his glide slope. Everyone does not see the same and what looks good to one may not look the same to another. Radar glide slope altitude at the Libby Can is about 700 feet, and if pilots keep observing this angle time after time they will develop three degree eyeballs to the extent that no terrain reference is

19

I “Pm

needed at any time or place. If a pilot already has three degree eyeballs he should not be bothered. The same goes for downwind leg. If he consistently keeps the airplane spaced properly abeam and rolls out on the centerline on glide slope he should not be bothered. There are some who come out of the training command who have excellent perception. Others need help. Barbers Point is an innocent looking airport with unexpected traps. The approach to runway 4, the most frequently used, is over water, which seems to induce flat

glideSlOges. To make it worse there is a pre-

vailing windshear line paralleling the coast sometimes causing a “sinkhole” on short final. In the bounce pattern the tower usually clears you downwind outside of Navy housing. You had better turn anyway, because if you continue up wind too far ILS traffic into Honolulu can he a hazard. The requested fly-to point for the 180 is just outside of the refinery and Campbell’s office building. This is what sets up the low appreach, since you end up deeper than desired at the 90. To remedy this, descent should not commence until the coastline is reached. If the gear is extended abeam the approach end of the runway, power will have to be added to maintain speed and altitude, so why not consider dropping the gear further downwind on this runway. Continued flat approaches on runway 4 can develop 2 degree eyeballs for all runways, and that seems to be the way it is in Barber’s Point.

The pattern at Jacksonville presents no particular problems except flatter than desired approaches over the river to runway 27 and longer than desired touchdowns on runway 9 in order to clear the arresting gear. Here again the winds at pattern altitude can be stronger than expected requiring modified downwind headings and almost square base legs to roll out on the centerline early. Why worry about being on the centerline until you get on very short final? Because if you do it that way you won’t really knowaboutthecrosswindunti~yougetthere. When there is only one runway to land on it doesn’t make sense to worry yourself into a dither about a few knots. On a normal big airplane approach you always have at least a mile straight in, providing you are on the centerline when the wings are first leveled. Put in as little crosswind correction as necessary to stay on the centerline all the way down to the runway. This correction normally changes as the altitude diminishes. By all means don’t automatically set up wing down opposite rudder just because somebody, like the tower, says there is a crosswind. Prove it to yourself first. People have been known to mis-read the wind. The wind may differ in direction and velocity from where you are and where the reading is taken. It is not uncommon to have a tailwind on both ends of the runway at Brunswick - and calm at midfield.

Discussion Mostly Con 1. Landmarks should not be used, since they are different on each airport. Answer: No kidding. 2.

You may confuse one for another. A lot of street intersections look alike. Answer: That’s what airlines say about luggage at the claim area.

3. Sometimes you can’t see the so called fly-to point in bad visibility. Answer: Then you shouldn’t be in the VFR bounce pattern.

20

4.

They may tear down the Libby’s Can just when you have learned to depend on it. Answer: Watch and see what they erect in it’s place.

5.

The airport was here a long time before the apartments were built, so there. Answer: If you can win this one you can be a real hero.

6.

What is wrong with flying over the hospita1 repeatedly all day long? Answer:You might be unlucky enough to have a surgeon allergic to noise.

7.

8.

for details.

I don’t even know where the hospital is located. Answer: you’ve got me on that one.

11. Would good knowledge of landmarks keep people from landing at the wrong airport? Answer: It surely would help.

Most approaches to strange airports are made straight-in and under control. Answer: True, but that doesn’t keep someone in the cockpit from observing +errain for obstructions and check-

12. Looking out the window too much might make you land short unless you really do have the so-called three degree eyeballs. Answer : This is very true, particularly approaching over water with every one in the cockpit looking at or for the runway and no one with the necessary partial instrument scan. Three degree eyeballs can dwindle to a much flatter angle causing contact with a flat surface. This has been done several times in commercial and in military airplanes. The scan must be outside, inside, inside, outside, and so on.

say we entered the VFR bounce rn after the first straight-in landNould we be expected to establish landmarks during the first round e field? Ner:Absolutely. If the first pattern awkward, adjust the next to new narks or an adjustment relative to xisting ones. do we have to look out and down so L in the pattern when we could profit by flying instruments and adjusthe approach on short final? Ner: It is a lot easier and a lot safer )k down and ahead to keep the air: in position at all times while still taining sufficient instrument scan

Over the years most good pilots acquire the ability to fly precision VFR almost by accident. Why wait for this to happen when the opportunity is readily available from the ground up and from day one.

to the ground. Excessive wind on one side of the face meant either a slip or a skid. Increased engine noise at the same throttle setting meant increased airspeed. History reveals that the Wright brothers tied a length of yarn to the canard assembly which served as a slip and skid indicator. A high string meant slow flight while one aligned with the belt buckle might have meant best cruise speed. So what else is new! As aviation progressed, adjustable horizontal stabilizers were developed for airplanes with tandem seating causing variable changes in the center of gravity. At first the adjustments were made on the ground at the stabilizer, then later they could be made from the cockpit. In almost all cases the vertical stabilizers were adjustable only on the ground. Wing heaviness was remedied by adjusting flying wires for wash-in or wash-out. If the airplane could not be flown in balanced flight hands-and-feet-

beginning there were no trim tabs lanes. Straight and level flight was ed by manual pressure on the conthe Wright Brothers’ machine the re warped by means of a shoulder vorn by the pilot. No doubt a wing *plane called for constant pressure in a sore shoulder. Ground adjustere made until the airplane flew s-off. le first ailerons were patented by .rtiss. Control wheel operated, they greater maneuverability and com)ugh hands off conditions required .s adjustments to the wing trailing his time Curtiss is reported to have adjustable springs to apply preshe controls for pilot relief. Elevator ressure could be adjusted in a simi.er, but the rudder always required jotwork regardless of such devices. trns were made by visual reference 21

It%? sf?v

that airplanes had cockpit adjusted trim devices on all three controls. Prior to this the pilot kept the airplane In trim with the controls but now he could use the trim tabs for that purpose.

off, it was flown holding necessary pressures which were sometimes fatiguing. Helpful devices such as springs or bungee cords were some times ins talled for comfort on long flights. It was not until the early “thirties”

Touch and Go Pattern C

is more appropriate. NATOPS says the rudder tab may be adjusted with a change in power if desired. It is not in the least difficult to land two on one side with 10 degrees into the good engines and that is about neutral trim on short final. Tab adjustments as the flare is entered may create more problems than if footwork is applied. Some instructors say that zero tab is important for full rudder application during two-engine reversing. It is not at all difficult to kick full rudder at this time and more rudder surface is available with tab application. For instance, if engines three and four are reversed, left rudder is required. Full right tab, meaning the tab is actually to the left, would give additional left rudder surface. This would be impractical and should not become a procedure. Why not set the tab to something reasonable and comfortable then go ahead and make the airplane behave as you wish. The proverbial three hands of elevator trim as soon as the flaps are selected to land position came from delaying flap extension until very short final, which is the hard way to fly. It is much easier to extend the flaps at a higher airspeed and altitude and trim in a relaxed atmosphere and only as needed. Many pilots get all the trim in before it is needed and allow the nose to come up and airspeed to diminish requiring a new appreach to be started. A more professional way would be to trim only as needed but as often as needed, except during or just prior to the flare. Fly the airplane in its intended path with the flight controls then use the trim tabs for comfort. Naturally some predetermined trim tab positions are set prior to takeoff.

ontrol pressures on the P-3 are very light making temporary out-of trim conditions intolerable. For instance, at lift-off speeds the normal setting of 5 degrees right is insufficient for feet-off flying. If more tab is wound in it will have to be wound out as the power is reduced for downwind. A good procedure is to trim the rudder for downwind power and speed and leave it alone from then on. It usually required about two degrees of right trim at 160 knots, gear up, flaps at approach, and power at 1,100 even across the board at 90,000 pounds. If the power is kept even during all the adjustments the airplane will stay in trim without additional rudder pressure. Should the urge to trim be felt, look at the horsepower gauges. If they are uneven do not use the trim tab, as it was set for even power. This procedure will make the pilot include the horsepower gauges in his scan pattern and keep them married-up during the approach. The airplane flies on thrust and knowing what it is at all times is an input to the brain transmitted to hands and feet. Pilots who have the rudder tab moving throughout the approach with even power applied always appear to be going for a ride rather than flying the airplane. A sudden gust during the flare can cause them to lose the center line because they’re flying with the tab rather than with their feet. A remedy for this is to make them land on center line with the tab mis-set, which will require good footwork. There are many thoughts on the subject of rudder tab settings for engine-out landings. Since the rudder tab is not set zero on four engine landings, then it should not be at zero at any other time. To get the tab neutral for a three or two-engine approach

22

E

Stalls

very pilot should be able to recognize the warning of an impending stall. This warning is known as buffeting and it occurs several knots prior to the actual stall. With flaps fully retracted there is considerable warning but it diminishes with flap extension. At full flaps there is little spread between buffet and actual stall. Pilots should begin buffet stalls with flaps up and minimum positive power then progress with flap extension. Buffet stalls with more than a few hundred horsepower set are not recommended and repeated demons trations are unnecessary and undesirable. Since full stalls can shake the electronics unnecessarily, they are not recommended. On occasion aircraft are reported to stall faster than the chart speeds. This is usually caused by improper pilot technique but could be for other reasons. The following have been found to be the reasons - in order.

per second decrease in airspeed as stall is approached. If the deceleration is only onehalf knot per second the airplane may be descending too fast, causing the wind line to be increasing its angle to the wing (angle of attack) and accelerating the stall. Decelerating too fast: A rapid decrease in airspeed will increase the angle of attack to the point of stall at a higher than normal speed. (Accelerated stall). Airspeed indicator calibration: On occasion one or both indicators may read a few knots faster than the master. When the test equipment is installed the static sys tern should be closely monitored for minute leaks. Leading edge tape and butt seals:

Power settings at flight idle:

An extruding wrinkle in the tape parallel to the leading edge can have the effect of a stall strip, increasing stall speed. The seals between the leading edge sections can wear away, leaving a deep gap which could divert normal airflow over the wing.

Minimal power should be set so that there is no possibility that it will be negative at time of buffet. Negative power will increase stall speed by several knots. A good technique is to set 300 SHP about 30 to 40 knots ahead of stall. It will drop to about 200 as buffet is encountered. Trim the elevators for the last time about 20 knots ahead of expected buffet. From this point on hand and foot fly the airplane so that the desirable stick forces increase as the speed decreases.

Summary: The purpose of this paper is to minimize the discrepancies sometimes generated on maintenance check flights, none of which create downing gripes. In repetition, the prime causes are power settings and pilot technique in airspeed deceleration. Keep the nose down.

Decelerating too slowly: All test procedures call for a one-knot

I

Log Book 463 fly high for extended range in some areas. flying above 30,000’ requires high TIT to get there and to stay there, The Allison engine will undoubtedly perform as advertised providing the operator does not exceed the limits. We must be wary that 1010 may not be

f 1010 climb and cruise above 92 5 are ever to be legally reinstated we are going to have to use judgment and not blindly set the TIT and take what we get. For some time the East Coast has been flying above 30,000’. The West Coast needs to 23

1010 but a lot hotter. This can be determined by observing the SHP obtained by setting a desired TIT on takeoff roll. Use of the FORECAST power charts in the NATOPS book should be used instead of the PREDICTED power obtained from the latest 1050 run. Due to thermocouple behavior the latter can vary from day to day and can give false readings on the high side. It is inconceivable that the two 108% engines and the two 100% engines on the same airplane burn the same amount of fuel at the same horsepower. It almost dictates that all four engines are either 108 or 100%. During tests conducted last year at lO,OOO’, 240 knots, 3300 SHP it was noticed that the fuel flows averaged 1620 pounds on all engines whether they were rated at 108 or 100 percent on the 1050 run. Tests were conducted on newly delivered airplanes and flown on consecutive days with identical weights and atmospheres. The higher rated engines, without exception, ran cooler in TIT than ones rated at 100%. Sometimes 2.5 to 30 degrees. Prolonged operation at 1010 on these engines could affect turbine life. Now it has been pretty well accepted that the airplane flies on thrust rather than TIT. Crews are setting the horsepower even across the board on climbout at 950 by adjusting them to the engine with the lowest SHP at that TIT. If 950 is set on all engines the so-called 108 percenters would pull more power and use more fuel and the airplane would fly funny. The real reason for matching powers to the 100% engine is to prevent higher than indicated TIT on the other engines. Why can’t this concept be applied to takeoff??? Years ago no one worried about whether the engines were 108% or 100%. They were happy to see at least 100% of FORECAST power and most had a NO-GO limit they used for aborts. This number varied but was generally about 200 SHP less than that expected at 100%. At 4000 SHP that equates to 95 percent. So what else is new? Why must Normal Rated be set for the first takeoff of the day during the winter when a lower power setting could be used for evaluation of 100% using the zero airspeed chart? Examples: RP-01 has number one engine rated at 108% and the rest at 100% Using max 24

power at max gross weight on a Moffett standard day the SHPs read. 1. 2. 3. 4. Why?

4900 $g 4600

TlT 1077 “ ‘L “

FF-off scale “ .’ light will ) :I. not come :: .‘..:.. on and : y 0 u ;;.:y. s h o u 1 d ?!,,“’ m o n i t o r CT::.. for ice : :~Y.:. . ;” buildmup ;.j& ‘+.3 on the scoop. If ii:” 1 no ice is ;.+:....,,: t h e r e ..: monitor ,:,A5 e n g i n e ;. opera_ ,., ‘:“Y 1 _ . I : . :.%W t i o n f o r :+., ti ..,.

g,:

is not uncommon to see a half drop for a few seconds, then a full drop. This is a sticking valve and should be squawked. Just as important, if not more so, is to observe horsepower rise when turning off anti-ice. Here again have the horsepowers even across the board and make sure none moves the throttles during this observation. If the horsepowers all rise the same amount you can justly assume all of the valves closed. If a light stays on it should be of little consequence, because you saw the valves close with the horsepower rise. There exists some confusion about anti-ice lights. If an anti-ice light comes on

S

without selecting anti-ice there could be a problem. If horsepower drop occurs when the switch is placed to Anti-Ice then there is a serious m a 1 function and the Blue B o o k says to s h u t d o w n t h e engine. If no drop occurs, t h e valves -~~ are open t o FailSafe for ‘e s o m e reason. .ti!Y= Cont i n u e operation and expect to see a weak engine indication on the InFlight Trend Check. The Blue Book does not address the situation where the light stays on after turning off the switches. Remember - you saw all the valves open and close with even horsepower drops and rises. This should ease your mind. Use your head. I must have discussed this in the classroom and demonstrated this in the airplane and simulator a thousand times. Doesn’t anyone ever listen? If so, why not pass it on to someone else. Next to Airplane Flying, Hangar Flying is the best thing since sliced bread. l

l%e Ragged Edge

ditching practice followed by a wave-off. Sudden application of asymme tric power and improper control manipulation resulted in an unexpected stall occurring at higher than normal speed. The reaction at this point may prompt the pilot to pull back on the yoke as the nose falls through instead of easing it forward. This is a common tendency known as “clutch”, and it usually is the result of

low flight is sometimes over-emphasized in flight training. Except for ditching practice there is little reason to fly a P-3 slower than thirty percent above stall. To fly that slow requires deliberate planning and is rarely accidental. Most reported instances when control was impaired with subsequent severe loss of altitude resulted from. engine-out

59

some thing happening when it shouldn’t. Abrupt elevator deflection in an effort to prevent altitude loss can, of course, accelerate a stall. A yaw at this time will also increase the stall speed on a portion of the wing causing a severe rolling action and probable loss of control. If the airspeed is above Vmc, and the approach to stall is recognized, a safe recovery should be possible providing a yaw is avoided. Loss of altitude is to be expected. T h e only person in the cockpit who knows how much asymm e t r i c power the airplane can tolerate is the pilot at the controls. He should make the power application, not the flight engineer. Symmetric p o w e r should be applied first then the remaining applied at a rate compatible with control. The flight engineer should monitor power settings and limitations. The following is an example of incidents which are remarkably similar in preparation and execution. A ditching drill is given at 8000 feet density altitude. Weight is 100,000 pounds. Number one engine simulated feather. Maximum power available, standard day, is approximately 3900 SHP. Vmc 60

with max power is 100 knots with 5 degrees right wing down, and 113 knots with wings level. Ditch speed with full flaps is 11 knots. Stall buffet speed is 104 knots at zero thrust and something less with power - in balanced flight. At the end of the ditching approach a wave-off is executed from wings level attitude. A command for max power is issued and carried out with vigor by the flight engineer. At this point the best of pilots are apt to yaw and roll in the wrong direction. The roll increases Vmc and the yaw increases stall speed, both of which contribute to unusual maneuvers. There is no reason for control to be lost if symmetric power is applied first. Some altiIoss tude must be accepted. In this case a little power is better than a lot. At lighter weight asymmetric power is adequate for waveoff without loss of altitude. Keep ‘em flying! P.S. The edge becomes more ragged at 80,000 pounds when ditch speed is 103 knots and Vmc is still 113, wings level. Use symmetric power first then bring in the outboard.

Why Some of the Numbers

and Procedures

never see it, but something more. I fear that too much emphasis is placed on speeds and not enough on being in position on the glideslope on very short final. If you are “in the tube” you can always tidy up the speed with power adjustment. Almost all long landings are made because the flare speed was too slow requiring power to be left on and creating float. One Jax squadron had an airplane with both airspeeds 11 knots too fast at 160 knots. “What are my speeds” apparently meant nothing as no one complained until the airplane was transferred to another squadron. “What are my speeds” must be like pass the salt to some people. They will accept anything you tell them. Once a Captain got in the left seat over New York and asked me what the speeds were in preparation to landing at Brunswick. Am I saying to not check the speeds? No, but make them mean something and don’t just make conversation. The P-2 was in the Fleet 30 years without 1.3 or 1.35 or 1.52 etc.

80 Knots Historically , piston engines at idle rpm while taxiing or holding for takeoff would foul the spark plugs causing uneven firing and roughness when takeoff power is applied. Usually they would start operating normally after a short period at high power. If they didn’t you aborted the takeoff. At Lockheed we concluded that we could stop a P-2 abeam the Fire House but any distance beyond was critical for aborts. At this time the airspeed was usually about 80 knots. This became a useful number which is now industry wide. Since it did become a number it was elected to adapt it to the P-3, although a jet engine is not at all like a piston engine. What makes it important is that someone observes the power output and determines whether to continue or stop. “Call 80 knots for a power check” is sometimes mis-understood that you don’t check the power until 80 knots. Check the power output with the initial application. If it’s bad at 60 knots, stop the aircraft. It won’t get any better at 80 knots like the P-2 engine might. A P-3 will stop on any Navy runway from an 80 knot speed. Ram effect is minimal at 80 knots compared with static power output. It’s just a number. If you want to be devilish you can use 78 knots. This number came into recognized existence with the advent of the Transport Category established by the CM about 1947. The old “guess we can make this or guess we can stop” gave way to engineered calculations. Vl and V2 became the norm. 1.3 was to be the minimum approach speed at the flare. Prior to this time this speed was determined by actually bringing the airplane to buffet stall then adding about 30% to that speed. Since everyone did it this way in flying an unfamiliar airplane the CM made it legal as 1.3. There has always been some confusion about where 1.3 should be obtained. The Book says be 1.3 as the flare is established. One Lockheed pilot said in an article to always be 1.3 at 50 feet and you can’t go wrong, even if you “take a cut”. Don’t try that unless you want to make a very hard landing! Obviously if this speed is to be obtained as the flare is established you will

145 Knots minimum for two engine landings. This is adequate for a high power go-around with two on one side. The book says to maintain at least this speed until the landing is assured. When is the landing assured? Since the airplane does not know how many engines are running the approach should be normal in all respects. The landing should be assured before the gear is extended and for certain when full flaps are put out. From then on the speed diminishes to the flare speed, and normal landing is made. But this isn’t the way some of our former immature instructors taught it. If you got below 145 any place during the approach they made you take it around, sometimes over the end of the runway! In case a truck ran across the runway! Egad. Now, nobody with an ounce of brains would go around and start all over when he could add a little power and make the runway. The only time you would go around would be when you are too high and too fast. I have witnessed near misses of Hangars 1 & 2 at Moffett a number of times because this pip-squeak instructor said “You 61

ml? c&@&g&&m

are too slow-take it around.” For crying out loud, how are you going to land unless you slow down from 145? While we are on the subject: Since we never know when we may lose a bunch of engines, why don’t we fly all approaches as if we are on two engines. Then the day you have to make one you won’t have to change a thing. Why fly around on four engines slower than you do on two? Why not barrel around the pattern and get in a lot of landings in a short period? I couldn’t have ridden through 3 1,497 P-3 landings in 25 years if we hadn’t flown a fast pattern. Besides that you can go to Happy Hour earlier. 135 Knots minimum for no-flap landings: So you don’t dust the tail. Originally there was no speed restriction and the tail was dragged frequently, especially on the early models, which were tail heavy. By flying the approach to touchdown at a higher speed you have to be a lot flatter, lessening the chances of tail contact. Some of our engineering people and some of your technical minded instructors will try to snow you with coefficient of lift or some rot, but it’s just plain “Land flatter so you don’t hit the tail.” To land flat you have to fly faster. Most things are simple and logical. 170 Knots maxim urn for pulling overwing hatch: The technical pitch is that higher speeds might collapse the aft bulkhead, which probably has some merit. One saving grace is that you probably couldn’t pull it out anyway at a critical structural speed. The simple answer is that 170 is maximum for full flaps. with smoke in the airplane coming from a cabin fire you would want to get down to the ground and land or else to bail out. At 170 you can extend full flaps or anything you want to do. Makes sense. 2 75 Knots maximum for extending maneuver flaps: Originally the speed was 225, which it still is in my book. During the early operating days shipping surveillance runs were made at 250 knots indicated. Somebody at the Test Center taught them to go to Flight Idle and Maneuver Flaps at first radar contact. It seemed an impossible task to get them out of 62

the habit so Lockheed raised the speed. A poor solution. Anybody with an once of brains would not overstress the flaps when it isn’t necessary in the slightest. 300 Knots for gear extension: This was instigated to keep pilots from making emergency descents at Vne where you had better think about starting to round it out at about 8,000 feet. It is almost always unnecessary to sling the gear out at 300 knots. It is terribly hard on the nose nacelle cover plates should they have missing fasteners. Once a plate came loose and cut the wires to the micro switch giving an unsafe gear indication. And it is terribly noisy with a lot of buffeting which must be hard on door hinges etc. If you need to do it, do it. In 9400 P-3 hours I never found the need to do it except for tests. 135 Knots maximum for going in to Beta: When you come over the ramp you effectively cut a lot of fuel to the engine. The prop now says to the engine you have been turning me all day and now I will turn you, since I now have a lot of windmilling energy. The engine says “You try it and I’ll slip a little NTS to you.” But NTS has been blocked out mechanically at 24 degrees coordinator. So if the windmilling force is great enough and the decoupler is weak enough, the prop could decouple. A Lockheed pilot got both inboards to decouple during tests at a high altitude field on a hot day at 162 Knots true airspeed, and about 140 indicated. So it was agreed to say 13 5 knots maximum is a safe speed at most Navy airports. 135 knots indicated is 135 knots true on a standard day. On a 95 degree day at Denver 135 KIAS is about 155 KTAS. Since you never know the value of the decoupler, don’t do practice no-flappers at Denver. On the other hand don’t run out of runway waiting for 135 knots on high speed touchdowns at sea level airports. This has been done several times. Remember - most of the time everything works as advertised. Don’t lose the airplane while saving the decoupler. I have never had a decouple and you most likely won’t either. 115 Knots rotation speed: This speed must obviously be above Vmc Air as well as Vmcgr. It varies with gross weight

in order to reach 50 feet at the proper climb speed. The FM terms our 5 0 foot speed as V2, which is best angle of climb. We found during repeated tests that if the rotation was made properly this speed was just about automatic. Over rotation, as some people like to do, is not a good maneuver, likewise under rotation. Since Vmc is a function of power we use 115 knots in training regardless of weight. Then you can use max power if necessary. When hot days and. high altitude fields prevail the power will not be available, So Vmc is less. You are allowed to use an alternate schedule in this case which calls for a lower rotate speed to get the airplane into the air for best acceleration. As the airplane gets lighter in the bounce pattern the nose seems to “dig in” requiring a lot of rotation. Actually the wing starts to fly giving this impression. How can the wing fly at a nose down attitude? Flap setting forms a wing camber to create lift at this nose attitude. One of my pet peeves was for the pilot to hold the yoke forward during takeoff roll then jerk it into the air. When you hear the nose strut bottom out when you rotate then you know you are a plumber. Some people have all sorts of excuses for over rotation. Anything from getting a clean unstick, even when there is no crosswind, to fear of hitting a prop on the runway should a roll occur!

345 Knots maximum for airstarts: You have to have some sort of limit for everything. Allison said the engine would start at this speed. Hamilton Standard said the prop would function normally, and Lockheed said the tail would stay on with a prop malfunction. How can you get 345 true airspeed with a prop feathered without diving the airplane? That would be stupid, wouldn’t it. We actually used 404 IAS for some tests of unfeathering. Didn’t much want to, but the profile called for it. That was before the 45 degree switch was installed. You might get an NTS inop light with today’s procedures. Nobody knows why this is either. Originally, and still on the Electra, airstarts were made with the fuel and ignition on. You merely positioned the throttle then pulled on the unfeather button until about 16% then released it and let the speed sensing system take over. For a long time the airspeed for airstarts were 170 to 210 to be a limit. Loiter speedat80,OOOpoundsis 17Oand21Oat 120,000. We encouraged starts at the higher speed from the beginning, so that the blade angle would be higher should the prop malfunction. It took over twenty years to get this approved. Time passes on, but slowly. A situation such as the following could exist following a malfunction of an engine and followed immediately by amateurism and pandemonium. You are at minimum altitude for two engine loiter and have been flying at 20 knots below loiter speed. (Real Hot-Dog) An engine fire occurs requiring shutdown. Trying to stay above the minimum altitude you let the airspeed bleed off to, say 140 knots, while starting another engine. And it won’t light off. Since you are holding out on the feather button the blade angle will stay at 45 degrees and the rpm won’t come up high enough for a lightoff. In this case release the button with the fuel and ignition switch on and the rpm will increase to lightoff values. Sometimes you have to improve NATOPS procedures to save your neck. When you get time read the first page and don’t hot-dog yourself into such a situation to cause remedial action. NATOPS is the best thing since indoor plumbing. About all you have to do is use common sense. They say common sense can’t be taught. Yes it can. But the teacher must have some of his own and not be selfish and wait for the student to develop his own. That takes too long

150 degree maximum TIT for airstarts: Originally air and ground starts were made at 200 degrees max. We were getting a lot of hung starts in the air and found by trial and error that the same engine would start normally at 150 degrees. We asked Allison and they had no answer. You don’t need an answer if it works. We asked Allison to give us a limit of 125 degrees, hoping they would not give us 125 which we asked for, but 1.50. Darn if they didn’t give us 125 which we were stuck with for over a year. Finally they gave us 150. No one knows why engines don’t like 200 degrees for airstarts when they start well on the ground. I don’t care, either. It works that way. Speaking of airstarts we originally placed the throttle one inch ahead of flight idle because Allison recommended that position. It worked very well except not everyone had the same conception of an inch. So they made a mark on the squadron for uniformity and called it 48 degrees. Nothing like getting technical with a simple fix! 63

IlaP cm

sometimes. Preach, preach, preach.

Engine out airwork restricted to no fewer than two engines.

Starting Number Two First: I started this in 1962 and have been sorry ever since. The first P-3’s had a two speed gear box on number four engine so you could supply the whole airplane with electrical in low rpm. Just like the APU does today. It was designed for airline operation where you started engines 4,3,2,1. At times it was necessary to finish loading with the right hand engines running, just as you sometimes do today. All taxiing was done in low rpm as quiet as a mouse. Prior to takeoff you shifted to normal. If you didn’t the coordinator switches would for you, so you can’t take off in low rpm! There was one side effect. The APN-14 1 inertial was powered by Bus A alone. If Bus A was transferred to another source during the alignment cycle the system would go to “tilt” and you spent another 20 minutes getting another alignment. This happened a lot in the winter time when pilots needed more power to taxi through snow and they shifted without getting an OK from the Tacco. So I suggested we start number two first then Bus A will be at home and we can save a lot of time, although it would be non standard. The CO remarked that now we can’t load people and equipment while starting engines. Well, you either have to find subs or run an airline. So it became normal to start in this manner even though it was not NATOPS. (NATOPS was just getting started at the time) About a year later they installed an invertor to back up Bus A during power transients. Now you could run Bus A back and forth without losing alignment. I tried to get a NATOPS change back to where it was, but nobody would listen. In fact some Lieutenant told me I knew nothing of NATOPS and would not believe that I had started the procedure. Once some thing gets engraved in the NATOPS headstone it is hard to change. Time marches on. Now wouldn’t it be nice to start the right-hand engines first when no ground carts are involved? Occasionally you get to do that on VIP runs. But you can’t get in a definite groove unless the APU works every day. You certainly wouldn’t start the right-hand motors first using power carts and huffers. I think everybody is smart enough to handle this if they are allowed to.

64

To keep Hot-Dogs from practicing one engine landings. In the past there were people doing this for fun. Actually, it’s very easy as the airplane needs only 4000 horsepower to go downwind. But people sometimes goofed a little and landed short. There is no record of damage, but it was just a matter of time. One way to stop something is to make it illegal and then you have to watch it.

130 Knot minimum for fuel chopping a pitchlocked prop on final: This is a number we stuck with in the book before NATOPS came along. Should the blade angle be high, say forty degrees, the engine would be pulling quite a lot of horsepower to stay above 95% rpm. When the fuel was chopped there would be an abrupt power loss. To give the pilot a break we chose 130 knots as something he should be able to handle. Some of our technical minded instructors have been saying it’s to ensure decouple. Not so. It’s merely for airplane control.

Pulling the handle to shut down an engine for loiter: Originally this was the procedure and was used for about the first year. Pulling the handle had one bad feature. It also shut off the oil to the engine and gearbox. If the prop did not feather (they never do on practice engine fires) you had to push in the handle, pull the circuit breaker, pull the handle again. Barnyard engineering at best. New crews sometimes messed up the circuit breaker Sequence and wrecked the engine. Several times the oil tank shutoff valve burned out in the closed position. Most of the crews recognized this on restart, but some didn’t. At any rate an engine out landing was necessary. Due to this possibility I was able to convince the navy to feather with the button with the intent to restart. Then the oil valves were always open. About 1978 Navy engineering got suckered into changing the propeller hydraulic fluid to that used in the F- 14. The F- 14 had a lot of hydraulic leaks and subsequent fires, so they used a fire retardant fluid. I don’t ever recall seeing a

leave the prop NTSing all the way to on station. Now the punch line. We couldn’t use the handle for loiter shutdown in the old days for fear of losing the oil tank valve. Now we can pull the handle because the oil tank valve is always open. Seems like a good simple procedure to me.

P-3 prop fire, but it was forced down our throats anyway. Immediately we started having all sorts of prop troubles since the new fluid loosened up carbon which stopped up passages, since it was more detergent. It also caused babbit wipeout in the transfer sleeves, which looks like what happened to the Adak P-3 which lost control of a prop on restart. The crew did not react for sometime in restoring oil to the gearbox as per NATOPS and had to ditch. They, of course, shut down the engine with the handle and it shut off the oil. It took only a little prodding to get the Navy to fly with the oil tank circuit breakers out until a fix was made. Immediately some of our hard headed crew members said they did not like using circuit breakers for switches. The same folks think nothing of pulling Start Essential every time the airplane is shut down. Or the APN-141 on the Super B airplane. The fix has not been made because the money is needed elsewhere. I can see nothing wrong with the present procedures. There are still people who like to loiter engines at high altitudes even though the saving is nominal. In super cold air the prop will not always go to complete feather. Sometimes the rpm increases to NTS and sometimes you can drive it to feather by pulling the handle and hitting the PCO, since the feather valve is now mechanically positioned to feather. Engineers came up with formulas about a yard long as to why the prop didn’t go to full feather. Now we had none of this with the old oil. So you can assume the new oil is slightly thicker when it is very cold and the pressure switch on the flux pump cutout gets fooled into thinking the prop is feathered. The fix is to pull the handle and use the PCO. Why don’t we just do that in the first place? After pushing this through the NATOPS conference four years ago I got all sorts of criticism. One Mission Commander said if he came to the cockpit and saw number one handle out he would be mad that the pilots did not tell him there was an emergency. So I told him we would push in the handle as soon as the prop feathered and then use the restart checklist to PC0 and he wouldn’t know how we got the prop feathered. Others complained that you wouldn’t know if the feather jlenoid worked and would on the next reart. There are some things that almost never lil unless boys make it happen with circuit reaker pulling (which they don’t like to se as switches). How do you know NTS will ork next time you try it? I suppose we could

Checking brakes after the gear is down: The real reason is to make sure they are not parked. It is easy to take off on ice with the brakes parked. Landing on dry runways is hard on tires if the brakes are on. In the old days the pilot eased the brakes on after the wheels were up and locked. This was to prevent wearing of the tire tread by the snubbers mounted in the nacelles to prevent rotation. On airplanes such as DC-~‘S about half of the wheels stuck out of the nacelles. Sometimes they might turn backward in flight except for the snubbers. If the pilot stomped on the brakes during the retraction cycle a. severe oscillation could occur. In fact, the entire landing gear was slung out of a C-46 twice because the pilot stomped on the brakes about mid-polnt in retraction. About 1956 the FM demanded an automatic inflight brake be designed into new airplanes. Without this feature about 500 pounds would have to be added to the structure of the P-3 landing gear. Just to protect the airplane from plumber brake stompers. Sometimes during landing practice the gear is left down to cool the tires. In this case they are turning at a high rotation speed when the checklist is read. Stomping on the brakes at this time sometimes makes the airplane shudder. It is possible to slip the tires on the rims. if the rotation is high enough and the stomper is a real plumber. You may have seen the align marks on the tires and rims on your preflight. So you don’t stomp on the brakes on the ground and you don’t stomp on them in the air. Little things like this make a real pilot out of a pretty good one. It amazes me that this seems to be an insignificant item in training. Not only do most people stomp but sometimes several times. Check them good I suppose. A few have checked each brake individually. I suppose that’s alright, but don’t turn the airplane while doing it. Elevator force link tabs: Originally the Electra did not have this feature. We found that the airplane was very 65

ThP c&q&&&&m

unstable in pitch. On approach you could go from 140 to 110 knots without any change in stick pressure. So they added a spring loaded tab that would blow up or down with a change of airspeed requiring more up elevator force as the speed diminished. The P-3 is not the only airplane with this feature. Flight idle stops: During the Electra testing the FM pilot went into Beta about 20 feet above the runway, blew out all four tires and cracked the wing skin. He was trying to set a minimum stopping distance from 50 feet and got a little carried away trying to beat Lockheed pilots. So they fixed it so you have to pull a total of about 50 pounds to get over the ramp in flight. Rudder boost cutout: TPS graduates, mostly fighter pilots, are responsible for this system. They said you VP pilots were apt to kick full rudder at 405. They won and you are blessed with K-l 3 and all that. One of the worst things about it is that you can’t take off with less than Takeoff flaps set. The Electra is certified to take off either with Takeoff flaps or Maneuver. The lesser setting is used at high altitude fields where power is limited. Airlines call it overspeed and it is used by about all the modern equipment. Performance is enhanced by a good margin. You also are blessed with an unnecessary NATOPS procedure of pulling K-13 at times. If K-13 is that important you should leave it out all the time, takeoff and landing. Some more barnyard engineering. Use of inboard brake in turns This is not critical in any way except in fully deflected turns, most likely encountered when directed by linemen who seem to know nothing but square turns. In this case the mainmount strut is the pivot point with one wheel rolling forward and one backward. Any braking action would create a severe twisting moment on the gear mounting attachment to the wing. Repeated action would most likely loosen the bolts causing fuel leaks. There are plenty of times when use of the inboard brake is not only desirable but necessary when expediting clearing the runway or following gentle turn taxi lines. 66

RAG training, mostly by necessity, sometimes goes to overkill to prevent some novice from doing bad things. If you are taught to never use inboard brake you won’t do it during fully deflected turns, although there are times when it would be useful. RAG time is at a premium, so they have to make fast rules. Use your head. Cutting off numbers 1 and 2 hydraulic pumps clearing the runway: For a while a group of flight engineers were teaching this procedure saying you would be saving the life of the pumps. Bosh! Poor Hydraulic pump 1A runs a great deal during the life of the airplane and doesn’t seem to have a high failure rate. What is dangerous about cutting off the pumps clearing the runway as a habit is that you may decide to taxi back and take off again, perhaps you didn’t notice the engineer shutting off the pumps- it’s not on the Takeoff checklist. So when you raise the gear all sorts of lights come on and the controls get very stiff. Engine failure at this time could be nasty. Why don’t we just go by the checklist, putting the pumps on after start and off on engine shutdown. The above situation has happened a number of times, both in P-3’s and airline Electra’s. Moving throttle on engine being bled for start: Bleed air from an engine is a function of rpm. If the rpm doesn’t change the bleed output will not be affected. There are times when a third engine is being started from the bleed of number two which may be a tad ahead of Start for taxi thrust requirements. With a tailwind the airplane picks up an undesirable speed causing the new pilot to ride the brakes. Here we are going too fast with too much thrust and riding the brakes. In this case the throttle on the engines being bled could be retarded as long as the rpm didn’t dwindle, which would indeed affect the start. Some people can’t seem to move anything a little bit, so that’s why they say don’t move the throttle on the engine used for start. Have you ever seen a plumber who puts his hand on the throttles and they move - every time? I have. Here again, use your head. Don’t exceed taxi speed and ride the brakes when a genteel touch will remedy the situation.

Short Field Landing Practice T

be written to make a normal approach and touchdown instead of dragging it in and trying to spot it on the very end of the runway. Tire marks short of the runway indicate people try to hard sometimes. Only a few runways are shorter than 5000’ at Navy airports. If the landing is made 1200-1500’ from the approach end there is still ample room to stop well in the confines. But you have to know how to stop. Get into Beta before the nosewheel is on the deck and use up elevator to prevent it from pranging down. As soon as all wheels are on the ground use all the reverse you want. Stand up on the brakes to stop where you desire. Then get off them for cooling. Since power lever action is all mechanical during this action there is no danger -of some of the props not going into reverse. I always came over the ramp before the nosewheel touched the runway, even on engine out landings, and never had an unexpected swerve. There are two kinds of short field landings. One with a short runway and the other with a long touchdown on a normal one. Sometimes, when trying for a grease job, a pilot will land long then have a hard time stopping, such as the incident at Norfolk some years ago. When you need to stop during rollout get in reverse before you apply brakes and you can do wonders. Maybe SHORT STOP practice should be given some thought.

he Blue Book says to make a flat approach at 1.3 speed. This is a carry-over from the old days when a Soft Field Landing had to be demonstrated for a Transport license from the Department of Commerce. (Before CM and FM) In those days most airports did not have paved runways and it was easy to nose over when the field was muddy. The technique was to come in flatter than usual with a nose high attitude and lots of power. We used to call it “hanging on the prop.” This is not necessary in a P-3 or similar airplane. In fact, it has caused a large number of blown tires when the pilot paid more attention to the airspeed than the touchdown, causing a slight bounce. During the time weight was supported by the wing instead of footprint a brake application, however slight, would blow the tires. This happened four years in a row at the Patuxent Airshow. One of the VP-30 instructors, who later was Wing Commander, asked me to demonstrate a short field landing. I, in turn, asked him to make a normal approach tapering the airspeed to 1.3 as the flare is established then ease off power to touchdown, and I would do the reversing. He made a perfect touchdown and I immediately came over the ramp to about Start position easing the nosewheel to the deck with the elevators. Then I asked John to apply the brakes. We stopped very short and still had four inflated tires to taxi to the line. Now, that is written in Natops under Short Field Landings. There-after nobody blew the tires at Patuxent Airshows. Perhaps the Natops procedure should

Keep ‘em on the runway.

Flight Demonstrations S

ome of us have vast experience in demonstrating performance of airplanes whether they be new or old. There are three basic groups of spectators. The potential customers, the dissatisfied customer, and the airshow attendees. The flight profiles are all different, or should be. When an aircraft builder is trying to sell a new design its expert pilots do all sorts 67

of things until they establish an envelope of performance which is operationally safe for everyday pilots to accomplish the mission for which it is built. On occasion the customer becomes disenchanted with the airplane’s performance and more d e m o n strations are required by factory and Test Center pilots. In any case the people doing the flying have been trained for the job

L

either recently or with long-standing experience. Even then it is easy to get out of bounds and do something unnecessary. This takes care of the first two categories. The airshow for the public has been the most dangerous, both in military and civilian performance. It is almost a certainty that someone will step out of bounds unless they are strongly supervised. Take it from me. I’ve been there. Oldsters and youngsters viewing the pageant are usually laymen and are not called upon to evaluate performance. They like a lot of graceful flying with a lot of noise. They can’t tell the difference between 300 and 350 knots, nor 1.1 from 1.3 speeds. They can’t tell 2 G’s from 2.5 G’s, but they are sure to notice a 45 degree pitch attitude. So will every undertaker in town. I am absolutely astonished that grown men would go this far in an airplane like a P3. And to put it down on paper as a guide. Why not do a few rolls and a big lazy loop? The spectators don’t need to know about missile launch and mad maneuvers as the commentator may explain. Years ago during the yearly airshow P-3’s blew a lot of tires demonstrating short field landings. They then finally realized that you must get into reverse before you use the brakes and that debacle has all but disappeared. But since they did not blow the tires they now backed down the runway then took off with full flaps inadvertently. Goes up like an elevator!!! Airshow Mentality is a new popular term. I would say lack of mentality would be closer.

l

l

l

l

l

l

Suggested Profile l

l

Put 12,000 lbs of fuel aboard, bringing the takeoff weight to 85,000 lbs. Use military Power for takeoff and climb to the field boundary.

Rotate at normal speed and insure liftoff at 121 kts. Retract gear and leave flaps at takeoff setting. Climb at 13 1 kts, which is the 4 engine 50’ speed and also best angle of climb - the FM V2. This speed has to be at least 115% above stall and 110% above Vmc. 13 1 kts is far above both. This will put the airplane about 1000’ above the ground at the end of an 8000’ runway. Take off into the wind as always. Enter the pattern for a low and slow pass down the runway with gear down and Land flaps. Minimum altitude 300’ at 1.3 speed, but not less than 130 knots. Make the next pass clean at 300 knots. Smoothly roll into a 30 degree banked climbing turn with not more than a 15 degree pitch angle. Use Military Rated throughout the turn. This will usually bring the airplane around near 180 degrees for a poor man’s chandelle. Extend flaps as desired beginning recovery to wings level. Minimum airspeed 140 knots. When done gracefully and smoothly this is a crowd pleaser. It’s a big airplane and should be flown like one. Make a normal approach so as to be 1.3 as the flare is established. Ease off power for a normal grease job. Immediately upon touchdown enter the Beta range using up elevator to keep the nosewheel from pranging down. Use full reverse and brakes as desired for a “Short Field Stop.” Demo back-up capability. Remember, you are not Bob Hoover.

What To Do When . . .

1.

Number two engine starts very slowly every day from an APU which barely puts out 25 lbs at 16 percent.

2.

Number one starts very slowly every day even though good air is being bled from number two. I..

3.

At a hot deployment site just about every APU in the squadron puts out only about 20 lbs at 16 percent but the first engine accelerates to low rpm within the recommended time limit.

4.

The fuel pressure low light does not go

The I.~wv

than 1000 pounds of fuel and you have beentoldthatittakesatleast1000pounds to keep number one hydraulic system cool enough to operate.

out in low rpm. 5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

You are taking the commodore some place and plan to start number one engine while taxiing. Then you notice number one TIT gauge is inoperative. You are already running late. At about 50 knots on takeoff roll you notice number three TIT about 830 and the horsepower about 2500 at full throttle. You are not yet at 80 knots so you can’t do much about it. Just as you have about 900 TIT on the original power application the rpm goes to more than 104 percent and the horsepower drops off. This indicates a pitchlock and it must be dealt with by the book.

13.

Due to a real bad situation all four tanks are down below 1000 pounds but a place to land is just 30 minutes away. Someone said it takes at least 1000 pounds in 2 and 3 tanks to keep the hydraulic system cool enough to function properly.

14.

You would like to know the OAT but the gauge is inoperative.

15.

During a practice engine fire the prop feathered and the fire went out with the first bottle discharge.

16. You are on two engine loiter at 190 knots at 1000 feet and a chips light shows up on one of the operating engines. Range is not critical.

The prop overspeeds and the power drops off a lot as the gear is coming up. Neither pump light is on.

17. You are on two engine loiter at 190 knots and 1000 feet and there is a power * loss, roughness, and high TIT on an engine. Range is critical this time.

The engineer has been synching up the props. When he finishes and lets go of the switch, number three rpm drops to about 80 percent and the TIT bingo’s then settles at about 830. Turning off number three synch switch did not help. Then number four did almost the same as number three. Both engines are stalled out but still running. You are demonstrating rpm excursion synch on and synch off. During a series of rather violent throttle movements the rpm dropped to 82 percent and the TIT settled at 828. Subsequent throttle movement had no effect until the TD was placed to null. Just as the gear was selected down all of the annunciator lights came on and stayed on. You are an hour away from the nearest airport and it is below minimums, but another airport is CAVU about another hour away.

18.

During the preceding debacle the airspeed dropped to about 140 knots, since you can’t be below 1000 feet on two or less engines. The engine does not light off at the low rpm held by the 45 degree switch.

19.

During normal airstart of number one there is a loud noise and rapid drop in rpm on number two.

20.

Someone has shut off the fuel tank selector during crossfeed and the engine quits. You had not run an NTS check on climbout.

21. The start valve light comes on on an engine in flight. Shortly after the engine is shut down another start valve light comes on on the other side of the airplane.

Due to a real debacle in flight planning, weather going to worms, cockpit confusion, and fuel management (someone had run the APU for a long time from number two tank, and the engineer did not crossfeed properly), you notice that number two tank has less

22. During an NTS check the rpm keeps decreasing with each bump of the feather valve. 23.

69

An engine acts like it would like to NTS but just won’t quite make it.

It%? r,omruere

24.

It is very inconvenient to fly at 2000 feet for a flight idle check but 1000 or 3000 levels are available.

downwind with a brisk headwind on downwind leg to boot. It’s VFR with no GCA practice going on. Fight back.

25. Number two engine has NTS’d for months on the flight idle check and maintenance has exhausted all probable fixes.

35.

You have knocked down the arresting gear twice and the tower says you will have to leave the pattern if you do it once more.

26. On the flight idle check number one horsepower was minus 200 and number four was plus 200.

36.

You are in a left-hand pattern on runway four at Barbers Point and the tower gets busy and forgets to clear you downwind.

37.

The tower tells you you are clear for a touch and go before you get to the 180, much less report the gear down.

38.

You get suckered into an approach side by side with another airplane on dual runways that are the minimum distance apart.

39.

You get suckered into a touch and go under the same conditions because the launch airplane fooled around too long after being cleared for takeoff - probably a last minute brief.

40.

You are released from approach to the tower at 1500 feet. The tower says to enter downwind. Pattern altitude is 1000 feet.

41.

You wonder why your interval elected to fly much wider and deeper all of a sudden and ask the tower about it. Your interval says he is simulating two out and it’s the same guy who told you that morning that you should always fly a normal pattern regardless.

42.

The next day the same clown flies wide and deep again. This time he is doing a no-flapper simulating a boost out pattern.

43.

The bar doesn’t open until 1700 and you finish at 1500.

27.

You are aware that the synch box has been removed from the rack and reinstalled during the preflight.

28.

Due to the propeller test box shortage a phase angle check has not been made although the rpm had been checked OK on a previous flight. They want you to take the airplane on patrol.

29.

They need somebody to sit on a contact that is only 100 miles out for a couple of hours until the ready alert can be launched. It had not been able to get airborne. So you go and then have a flap asymmetry on liftoff with takeoff flaps set.

30.

You have been on station two hours of a planned four and there is a flap asymmetry with the flaps fully retracted.

31. After liftoff the copilot’s airspeed, altimeter, and vertical speed indication do not agree with the pilot’s. Then you recall that the yellow sheet said that the navigator’s altimeter had been replaced. 32. You are shooting landings at a field which is thirty miles from home plate and you have a flap asymmetry after the flaps are extended to land at about 300 foot altitude. 33. You suddenly realize that you are an instructor pilot making multiple landings and that is when most gear up landings are made. 34.

44. As soon as you clear the active after landing the flight engineer shuts off both number one and number two hydraulic pumps.

The tower won’t change the active runway into the wind because of no good reason except they are in charge. Here you are with a student trying to land

45.

70

Your pilot uses increased power from number two to make a tight left turn

into the fuel pits or birdbath. 46.

You wonder what you are doing in this business after so many years.

47.

During cockpit preflight you notice that the pilot’s ball is out of the cage to the left and the copilot’s is to the right.

48. During flight with the left ball centered the rudder trim is near zero, the copilot’s ball is really to the right and the autopilot trim indicator isn’t centered. 49. Airplane number 01 always trims up with the usual 2 degrees right rudder and l/2 degree left wing down. Today it takes 2 degrees right wing down. The autopilot agrees with your trim.

56.

After landing at Andrews the left main showed barber pole. You find that the gear is indeed down and locked but the arm which operates the micro switch is missing. The Commodore needs to return to Jacksonville as soon as possible. The weather is CAVU.

57.

During Unitas you RON at a field which is 7000’ in elevation. NATOPS says the APU is capable of starting a single engine up to 6000’ altitude. This is a good liberty town.

58.

You are at 23,000’ and somebody shut off all tank selectors because the safety wires were at the bottom of the switches instead of at the top. All four engines quit and are NTSing away. NATOPS says 20,000’ is maximum for starting the APU.

50.

During a maintenance check flight you find it very difficult to move the rudder during boost out at 250 knots.

59.

The pressurization is completely lost at flight level 270. ATC will not give you a lower altitude.

51.

The elevator trim wheel has no effect on nose up trim but works normally for nose down.

60.

You are in VFR conditions on your last assigned heading to the approach fix. Dead ahead is a vertical cylinder of cloud the shape of which indicates very unusual air currents. ATC says to maintain heading when you ask for a change.

61.

The approach to runway 11 has a moderate windshear at about 500’. There is a miniature tornado, commonly called a Devil Dog rising up several hundred feet from the dirt race track. You report all this to the tower, but they don’t seem to be alarmed and keep clearing people for touch and go’s.

62.

You are in the pattern at Patuxent and the tower says, “Turn left, turn left now! ”

52. The copilot’s aileron control has an abnormal amount of play before it moves the ailerons. 53. When on short final an engine fire warning occurs. 54. When on short final the pilot’s head slumps forward and the airplane appears to be out of control. 55.

All of the airports in Hawaii have been destroyed except the one at Dillingham, and its runways are not stressed for P3’s.

Backup Checks For Lights, Horns, Whistles 1-1

a-days there are so many gauges, warning lights and aural devices that we sometimes get confused. Particularly when a warning light bulb burns out, a pressure transmitter fails, or a temperature sensor malfunctions.

hen I was a little boy engine instruments required were a tach, oil pressure, and oil temperature gauges. An altimeter and wet compass were needed if you planned to stray away from the airport. Now71

Many times an engine is shut down unnecessarily causing unscheduled landings in less than favorable conditions. In a lot of cases a little trouble-shooting would remedy the situation. EXAMPLE Prior to the time when sensitive altimeters were obtainable precise altitude retention was wishful thinking when flying through clouds without an airspeed indicator. The backup was the tachometer. With a constant throttle setting and a fixed pitch prop a decrease in rpm meant a climb, whereas an increase meant a descent. The best of pilots got caught once in a while. Complacency is not new. During the late thirties a number of improvements appeared on transport airplanes. One such machine had a panel of lights to be used in place of a checklist. Before takeoff, for instance, you kept moving things in the cockpit until each and every light went out. That wasn’t too bad until a bulb burned out. So they went back to the best, a checklist. In 1939 chips liphts were installed on DC3 engines. A whisker would barely illuminate whereas a chunk would make the bulb burn bright. Naturally most indications were reported “dim”, especially over Tucson in the good old hot summertime. Mind you, the same pilots had been flying DC-~‘S over this route for years without losing an engine, and now they realized how dangerous it had been. So most of them would cuss and take the bulb out of its socket until they landed. A mechanic would check the magnetic sump plug and remove the fuzz, in most cases. So they removed the troublesome chips light and went back to the old way. Watch the gauges in flight and periodically check the sump plugs for lumps. Time changes everything. Chips lights in P-3’s are controversial. I must have had a couple of hundred. Only once were there chips (a whole hand full) but we also noticed gear box oil pressure fluctuations. Secondary indications should be monitored and locale and weather conditions should be considered before blindly pulling the handle. C-l 30’s do not have chips lights.

Beta Lights are something to watch for and 72

talk about, but the best indicators are your ears and eyeballs on landing rollout. ,When you come over the ramp toward ground idle, and you hear a noise change, and you continue to go straight, you are in good shape. Several times both bulbs have burned out during my career. The best preventative, of course, is the light check prior to landing. Well prior, and not on final. Fuel filter lights were installed at the request of Navy Engineering. Jet transports use the warning to detect failure of fuel line heaters allowing ice to accumulate in the system at very high altitudes. This hasn’t been a problem in P-3’s. The filters in the system are bypassed with any restriction. Twice P-3’s have made unscheduled landings for a fuel filter light. One at a remote sight without a tower or runway lights in operation, and with the engine shut down to boot. The other was at Cubi at 114,000 pounds and approach flaps. Engines 2,3, and 4 bogged down when Ground Idle was smoothly selected at 134 knots! In both cases the sensor switches were out of tolerance, being very sensitive to adjustment. The Blue Book says if the engine is running normally and there is no visible fuel leak, keep going with a filter light. Here’s a suggestion: Push the throttles on the suspect engine and its opposite to 10 10. If the power matches there is no filter clog. C130’s and Electra’s do not have fuel filter lights. Engine anti-ice lights have been the cause of a number of hazardous unscheduled landings, because the light did not go out when the system was turned off. There is a very lame excuse for this caused by poor training. When flying along and the antiice light comes on without anti-ice being selected there could be a problem. Open the valves. If a horsepower drop occurs, the Book says to feather the prop. If no drop is noticed it means the valves went to Fail-Safe open due to electrical problems. Check the electrical panel and keep going. By using the following procedure you can eliminate all doubt about the valves positions. During flight the horsepowers should always be even across the board. Not the proverbial TIT, such as 925. When selecting anti-ice open all four valves simultaneously - not one at a time - and note comparative horsepower drop. If they all drop the same

.

amount, the valves are all open. Should one engine indicate only half as much drop it means that one of the two valves did not open or was already open. In the latter case the light would come on earlier than the rest. Sometimes a valve will stick closed for a period of time then open. That’s a squawk and should be remedied. Now lets say that all four horsepowers dropped 200 and all four lights came on near the same time. Good. You may wish to reset the power to the original value, so do so. Now you are out of icing and ready to turn off the heat. Again, have the horsepowers even across the board and use four fingers to simultaneously shut off the valves. If the SHP is even then all the valves closed. If a light remains on longer than you like it means the sensor switch is out of adjustment. Remember, you saw the valves open and close by observing horsepower. It takes cockpit coordination to make this procedure work. The flight engineer should tell the pilot not to be moving the cottenpicking throttles while he is observing the SHP action, otherwise it’s useless. A frequent check for antiice valves is desirable not only for antiicing but for power loss. There have-been chronic gripes on engines for having a slight power loss on takeoff when the cause was a mere anti-ice valve stuck open. This can be noticed on any climbout or in preparation for NTS checks. It’s not a sin to open all anti-ice valves when you plan to only NTS one or two. Preventative troubleshooting saves money and time. Be a pro.

.

,

that sort of thing. Read the checklist and go home and land. And cuss a little. Propeller lightshavescared thedaylights out of a lot of people. During the last couple of years new procedures have been developed to remedy the situation. In fact we are back where we were in the beginning, over thirty years ago. Finally. Real bad prop problems have all but been eliminated by good training, keeping your cotton picking hands away from the shutdown handle, and good operator understanding. Number one prop pump light has lost its authority to cause panic. Twelve Electra’s were built with Hamilton Standard props. There was only one prop pump light for each prop. It was labeled as low level light. In the middle of the Atlantic on the first delivery to KLM the light came on number two. I carefully moved the throttle back and forth and the rpm was steady. After a spell I dared to cut the synch switch off. The rpm was steady at 100 percent and did not follow throttle movement. The synch switch was turned on. I kept staring at the light and it went out after about five minutes. When we got to Holland the prop oil level was normal. The light never came back on during thirty days of flight training. Sounds like a tall tale, but it isn’t. Bleed valve lights sometimes stay on after closing the valves. Here again a little troubleshooting can help. Open the wing valves anti-ice valves, and cross ship valves. At about 3000 SHP open the bleed valves and not horsepower drop - usually about 2.5 percent or 750 SHP. Do not move the throttle during the check. Close bleed valve and note recovery of horsepower. If the light stays on don’t worry. You saw the light come on, you noted the horsepower drop and recovery. Sometimes you can blow the valve a “little more closed” by use of another bleed valve.

Oil pressure warning lights have caused concern at times. The light is an alert to check the gauge and not the primary indication. You pay extra to buy an auto with gauges as well as idiot lights. The light is set off by a sensor switch which is usually pretty accurate. The gauge is the receiver for the oil pressure transmitter mounted on the engine and is most accurate. Let’s say that you were flying along and the oil pressure warning light came on. Both pressure gauges and the oil temp gauge are normal. Circuit breakers are all in. I guess if you are still worried you could shut down the engine and watch the gauges go down and come back up when you restart the engine. Use your head. Three times I had a diode fail in flight allowing all warning lights on the panel to come on, like a Christmas tree. So you don’t worry about Beta lights because they are already on and

The P-3 was flown about 14 years before the Start Valve lights were installed. After we blew up several starters we learned to watch for a pressure rise on the manifold when the start button popped out. A slow rise meant a sticking valve. A snappy rise was desirable. Even after the Start Valve lights were in operation we still watched for a pressure rise, until some small group detided it wasn’t necessary. I could never make myself not watch the rise as well as the light. 73

At Moffett one day the pressure rise walked its way up by increments, yet the light appeared to be normal. I insis ted on a shutdown and inspection. Sure enough the valve chattered when opened and closed and was apt to malfunction at a later date. Those who like a double check should not be discouraged. Some years ago a pilot made a training hop his first flight as a PPC. In the Warning Area number two Start Valve light came on. As per NATOPS the engine was shut down. Shortly after the prop was feathered number four Start Valve light came on. The en-

gine was shut down. There was no APU in the rack. They were down to one generator and one and three engines. The CO advised by radio to unfeather the engines and return to base. The PPC did not head the instructions and made a two engine, one generator landing. Why? They had not performed an NTS check prior to shutting down the engines!!! You wonder if he would have shut down the other engines had the lights come on. You also wonder why the Skipper didn’t give him a good spanking.

Reduced Power Takeo$s T

wenty-five years ago I tried to get someone interested in using the power needed for takeoff instead of blindly setting Normal Rated for the first takeoff of the day, even at light weights. But, in order to evaluate the engine performance, it was necessary to refer to Zero Airspeed Charts. This was time consuming and cumbersome, so most neglected to do it. Now NATOPS has made it easy with three new power charts - 920 TIT, 950, 980, as well as 1010 and 1077. At Brunswick, on an average winter day, 920 TIT would be adequate for obtaining about 4000 SHP for training weights. This is about the only condition warranting such a low TIT. Yet we are hearing that 920 is being used on standard temperature days at various sites. Boys will be boys. So what is the power needed for takeoff! Almost any day at Barbers Point the OAT is 30 degrees centigrade. Normal Rated is 3 600 SHP and Max Power is 4100. So if it is safe enough at Barbers Point it should be safe elsewhere. Perhaps an agreement can be made to use a reasonable minimum of 3500 SHP for the first takeoff of the day, if you can get it. Consideration must be given to gross weight. A P-3 with a light fuel load could take off with less power than one with the usual 100,000 pound training weight and be just as safe. This gets into the judgment factor arena, which any PPC should be able to handle. Some years ago the thermocouples were redesigned making a normal 100 percent engine look like a 110 percenter. A new engine with these thermocouples might pro-

duce much more horsepower than the others at the same TIT, but the fuel flow would also be higher. When the horsepowers were matched the fuel flows would also match but the TIT would be lower on the new engine. So we can assume the TIT was telling a lie. This condition can happen on all four engines with the same thermocouples installed. Now you can assume that the engines are being overtemped although 1010 is carefully set. This is why one of the new charts is based on 980 TIT. A TIT setting should produce so much horsepower based on air temperature and altitude. If it doesn’t, the engine is weak for any number of reasons. If it produces more than 100 percent pull the throttles back to 100 percent and save turbines. All performance is based on 100 percent power, but don’t be the first one to hit the trees at 100 percent when 110 percent would have cleared them. Once I was given an airplane with one of the engines rated at 119 percent. It had nine bad thermocouples. When the horsepowers were matched the TIT was 51 degrees colder than the others. Someone told me that a crew had used 920 for takeoff then set 950 for climb. How does that grab you? If you get enough power at 920 for takeoff then climb at 920 or less. Egad. In summary I think the use of the new charts is a giant step forward and will save a lot of money if good judgment is applied. All airlines use the power needed for each condition. We can do it too. Jay Beasley 74

PATROL SQUADRON THIRTY 20 n/MY 1997 COMMANDING OJ?F’ICER - CAPT M. L. HOLMES

Commissioned in June 1960, the “Pro’s Nest”, is the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Patrol Fleet Replacement Squadron. VP30’s mission is to safely and efficiently provide quality P-3 replacement and international training and fleet support through teamwork. The staff of the Navy’s largest aviation squadron train approximately 650 officer and enlisted personnel annually, utilizing more than 29 P-3 aircraft of various models. Foreign military personnel from Korea, Thailand, Germany, Netherlands, Chile, and Norway have all received specific aircrew and maintenance training on P-3 operating systems. Revised by Awl R. C. Presler Compiled by LT T. P. Sheridan Inspired by LCDR R. D. Suttie and of course Mr. Jay Beasley