Loanzon 2016 Political Law Material

Pointers in Political Law 2016 BAR EXAMS By Professor Victoria V. Loanzon With the assistance of Atty. Clemente L. Reyes IV (Admitted to the Bar on 24 April 2015) PART I: The Velasco Cases SEPARATION OF POWERS AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Bayan Muna v. Sec. Romulo et. al.) Nature of Executive Agreement Question: Was the Non-Surrender Agreement validly contracted between the Philippines and the United States of America considering that Philippines signed the Rome Statute? Answer: Yes, the agreement was validly contracted between the Philippines and the United States of America. At the time the petition was filed the Senate has not ratified the Rome Statute and the same is therefore considered an executive agreement. The President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the Senate. An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great respect. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of legislators is provided by the inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government. Thus, absent any clear contravention of the law, the courts should exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid. Customary Practice in Public International Law Question: In Public International Law, will “Exchange of Notes” be a valid basis to conclude an agreement between two independent states? Answer: Yes. An exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement.  Hence, the Non-Surrender Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and the U.S. in the exchange note is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.  Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. On the domestic sphere, an AGREEMENT cannot be held valid if it violates the Constitution. Question: Does the Philippines adhere to the doctrine of incorporation in its dealings with other independent states? Answer: Yes, the Doctrine of Incorporation is enshrined under Section 2, Article II of the Constitution wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The country also adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. Question: Being a signatory to the Rome Statute, will the Philippines substantially impair the value of the government’s undertaking on jurisdictional conflict of the domestic courts and the International Criminal Court under the Non-Surrender Bilateral Agreement with the U.S. government? Answer: No. The Philippines will not violate its obligations under of the provisions of the Rome Statute because the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). Jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” Of particular note is the application of the principle of ne bis in idem under par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-à-vis that of the ICC. As far as relevant, the provision states that “no person who has been tried by another court for conduct x x x [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by 1 | Page

the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct.” (elements of double jeopardy) Distinction between State Party and State Signatory Question: At the inception of the case, the Philippine Senate has not ratified the Rome Statute. Is there any distinction between the obligation of a state party and a state signatory under the facts of the case? Answer: Yes. There is a distinction. At the time of the filing of the case, the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. (doctrine of transformation) Question: With the ratification of the Rome Statute by the Senate, discuss the obligation of the Philippines as a state party? Answer: Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty; whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith. Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90 are only legally binding upon State-Parties, not signatories. (principle of pacta sund servanda) DELEGATION OF POWERS (S.M. Land, Inc. v. BCDA) Question: Can an administrative agency pursuant to its charter formulate rules to implement the mandated objectives of the agency? Answer: Yes, under the doctrine of delegation of powers, administrative agencies have the authority to promulgate issuances provided they conform with the congressional act vesting in them such power. To bind third parties, the promulgated rules must be published. (Tanada v. Tuvera, factors to consider when one is a publication of general circulation) The administrative agency must likewise comply with the twin tests of valid delegation, to wit: 1. Completeness Test; and 2. Sufficient Standard Test Question: Can SMLI assail the decision of the BCDA to ignore its submitted proposal under its Competitive Challenge despite compliance with the rules for the disposal of the property in question? Answer: Yes. SMLI has the right to a completed competitive challenge pursuant to the NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines and the Certification issued by the BCDA. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in Executive Orders. The NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines and the Competitive Challenge are incorporated in presidential issuances and officers of NEDA and BCDA were likewise authorized by the President to undertake steps to carry out the tasks. Question: Can SMLI invoke the application of the alter ego doctrine when the BCDA recommended to the Office of the President that the SMLI submitted bid proposal under BCDA’s Competitive Challenge be totally ignored? Answer : Yes. In this particular case the executive power to issue rules and regulations on procurement has been delegated to the President’s alter egos, partcularly to NEDA and BCDA. BCDA can no longer renege on submitted proposal of SMLI under its Competitive Challenge. By allowing SMLI, to submit “voluntary and unconditional proposal” to improve the original offer, BCDA is now precluded from changing the rules it earlier promulgated. SMLI was led to believe that BCDA has been duly authorized to act on behalf of the Office of the President. DELEGATION OF POWERS AND LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS ( Dr. Gobenciong v. Ombudsman) Question: Is the Ombudsman empowered to investigate, conduct the prosecution and implement disciplinary actions against public officers? 2 | Page

Answer: Yes. The provisions of R.A.No. 6770 granting investigative, prosecutorial and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman are constitutional. The Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate as protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt public officers in the Government. Question: Was there a valid delegation of power under R.A. No. 6770 provisos granting investigative, prosecutorial and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman? Answer: Yes. It is the 1987 Constitution no less which granted and allowed the grant by Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman. The framers of the Constitution, however, left it to Congress to invest the office with more broad powers to enforce its own action. Thus, R.A. No. 6770 was enacted empowering, under Sec. 15(1) thereof, the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of cases of which the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction. N.B. The Ombudsman may delegate to DOJ the prosecution of cases involving public officers. Read Ombudsman v. C.A. and Mayor Binay on the abandonment of the Aguinaldo Doctrine which allowed condonation of acts of elective public officers. STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay) Question: Do the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (P.D. No. 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning of pollution (effluence) in general? Answer: No. The policy statements and the provisions of P.D. No. 1152 do not in any manner limit the state’s responsibility for incidents related to clean-up. In fact, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. (Relate to Oposa v. Factoran and Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Straits v. DENR Sec. Reyes)  Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them. (Refer to Article XI – Public Accountability: Public Office is a public trust.) Question: Can the task of cleaning up of the Manila be compelled by mandamus? Answer: Yes. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.  The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 creating the MMDA which states that solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal.  It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (P.D. No. 1152) and R.A. No. 9003, but in its own charter as well (R.A. 7924). The enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 creating the MMDA charged it with the task of solid waste disposal and management. 3 | Page

LEGISLATURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND ELECTION LAW (SJS v. COMELEC) Question: Whether Sec. 36(g) of R.A. No. 9165 and COMELEC Res. No. 6486 are unconstitutional for imposing an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Answer: Yes. The assailed provision of R.A. No. 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 are unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. Sec.3 of Art.VI of the Constitution provides that: “No person shall be a senator unless he is natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.” Drug testing is not one of the constitutional requirements to become a senator. Thus, COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. Sec. 36(g) cannot be imposed by Congress and if it cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of R.A. No. 9165 effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. LEGISLATURE AND THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURES (SJS v. COMELEC) Question: Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional on the grounds of violation of right against unreasonable searches and right to privacy? Answer: Paragraphs (c), (d), and (g) of Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 are constitutional . Firstly, on the grounds of right against unreasonable searches , it should be highlighted that what the Sec. 2 of Article II of the Constitution, requires a reasonable showing of probable cause to be personally determined by the judge. The factor considered here is the nature of privacy interest upon drug testing. The factor considered in the assailed provisions is the nature of privacy interest upon drug testing. There could be no unconstitutionality to the search (in this case the random drug testing) because as it might be deemed mandatory, it is randomly done, thus not specifying the people subjected to be tested, the place and the schedule. Plus, the testing would be conducted by trained professionals in controlled locations of Department of Health to ensure the trustworthiness of results and to safeguard against tampering of the results and accurate chain of custody.  (Please take note of the purpose of chain of custody; requisites) LEGISLATURE AND THE POWER TO TAX Question: Whether P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No. 1468 are unconstitutional for declaring the funds which the Philippine Coconut Authority has been authorized to collect are funds which can be used to purchase shares of stocks for private individuals? Answer: Yes, both presidential decrees are unconstitutional. The mandate of the assailed presidential decrees are unconstitutional. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Take note of the purpose of imposing taxes and the constitutional provisions related to enactment of laws on taxes: The coco levy funds were exactions with the end goal of developing the entire coconut industry, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their 4 | Page

private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies. Furthermore, Article VI, Section 29 (3) provides that all money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. The conversion of public funds into private assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by the assailed presidential issuances. Clearly therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating Section 29 (3) of Article VI of the Constitution. In this context, the distribution by Philippine Coconut Authority of the United Coconut Planters Bank shares purchased by means of the coconut levy fund a special fund of the government to the coconut farmers, is therefore void. Article VI, Section 29 (3) provides that all money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. The conversion of public funds into private assets was illegally allowed under the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468. These provisions are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution. PARTY LIST SYSTEM AND THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (CIBAC v. COMELEC) Question: Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners’ prayer for their additional seats in the House of Representatives under the party-list system? Answer: Yes, COMELEC’s application simplified formula or of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna is incorrect. The simplified formula having already been abandoned, the COMELEC should have used and adhered to the Veterans formula. The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least 2% of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. There should be no rounding off to the nearest whole number. Question: Is petitioner CIBAC after obtaining a result of 0.82304986 entitled to an additional seat? Answer: No. Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, the Court reached the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one, then it did not obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from the Court’s ruling in Veterans that in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat. PRESIDENCY AND IMMUNITY FROM SUIT (Rubrico v. Pres. Arroyo) Question: Did the Court of Appeals commit irreversible error when it dropped President as respondent in the instant case? Answer: No. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under the country’s system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. The President may not be sued during his or her tenure. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.

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THE JUDICIARY AND ITS POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW Question: Is the legal contention of the Oppositor-intervenors tenable? Answer: NO. The conversion may be viewed as a sound business strategy to preserve and conserve the value of the government’s interests in CIIF SMC shares. The choice to convert the SMC common shares into Preferred Shares is a prerogative of the executive branch which hold these sequestered shares. POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE RESIDUAL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT Question: May the court look into the prerogative of the executive branch in the disposition of the SMC shares representing the interest of the government in San Miguel Corporation? Answer: It is the executive branch, either pursuant to the residual power of the President or by force of her enumerated powers under the laws, that has control over all matters pertaining to the disposition of government property or, in this case, sequestered assets under the administration of the PCGG. Surely, such control is neither legislative nor judicial. Well settled is the rule that the courts cannot inquire into the wisdom of an executive act but must respect the decision of the executive department, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. The conversion may be viewed as a sound business strategy to preserve and conserve the value of the government’s interests in CIIF SMC shares. AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE Question: Will the action of an administrative agency like the Presidential Agrarian Reform Commissionan over the Stock Distribution Plan covering the shares of Hacienda Land, Inc. be covered the operative fact doctrine? Answer: Yes. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this. The doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI enjoys the full respect accorded to a law. The farmer-tenants as members of a juridical entity were allowed to retain the benefits and home lots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not. Question: Can beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program cover juridical persons? Answer: Yes. The farmers and regular farm workers have a right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers. Article XIII Sec. 4 expressly authorizes collective ownership by farmers. CONGRESS AND THE POWER OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY (Romero v. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada) Question: Can one invoke the sub judice rule to enjoin the conduct of a congressional inquiry? Answer: No. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the 6 | Page

administration of justice. In this case, the subject matter of the senate inquiry is no longer sub judice for the reason that the Court has denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of its decision filed by Chavez. Even assuming that Chavez v. NHA is still pending final adjudication by the Court, still, such circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS Question: Is there a distinction between a congressional inquiry and a judicial proceeding? Answer: Yes. A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. Upon the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. POWERS OF THE COMELEC (Roque v. COMELEC) Question: Did the award to Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract constitute abandonment the constitutional mandate that the COMELEC shall be responsible for election law enforcement? Answer: No. The COMELEC did not violate its constitutional mandate when it awarded the contract to Smartmatic. Smarmatic-TIM joint venture is merely a service provider and lessor of goods and services to the COMELEC, which shall have exclusive supervision and control of the electoral process. There is a “continuity and back-up plan” that is in place and there is also an overall back up strategy and options to address even the worst case scenario of all the machines breaking down. Source Code review can be conducted to ensure that the COMELEC’s constitutional mandate to ensure the integrity and sanctity of the election is adequately protected. FINALITY OF DECISION OF COMELEC DECISIONS (Legaspi v. COMELEC) Question: Can a decision of a Division of COMELEC reach its finality? Answer: YES. A decision of the COMELEC division can attain finality. Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution bestows on the COMELEC divisions the authority to decide election cases. Their decisions are capable of attaining finality, without need of any affirmative or confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC en banc. While the Constitution requires that the motions for reconsideration be resolved by the COMELEC en banc, it likewise requires that four votes must be reached for it to render a valid ruling to grant the motion for reconsideration of private respondents. Hence, when the private respondents failed to get the four-vote requirement on their motion for reconsideration, their motion is defeated. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS (Funa v. Villar) Question: Was the appointment of Villar valid? Answer: Yes. Villar’s appointment is valid. Villar’s appointment is not prohibited under the Constitution. The Constitutional provision provides: The Chairman and Commissioners [on 7 | Page

Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. Question: Is promotional appointment in any of the Constitutional Commissions valid? Answer: No. The provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. Question: What rule will apply to promotional appointment in a constitutional commission? Answer: The promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). ELECTION LAW: THREE TERM RULE (Abundo v. COMELEC) Question: Was Abundo precluded to enjoy his seat as Mayor for having served for three consecutive terms? Answer: No. Abundo’s term was interrupted due to the earlier election contest between him and Torres. The almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. In Socrates v. COMELEC(G.R. No. 154512, 2002), the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. After the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY and ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Question: Can Congress delegate the power to grant franchise to administrative agencies? Answer: Yes. The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to operate the toll facility/system. By explicit provisions of various laws, the TRB was given power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 12, Section 11 of the Constitution on the grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to operate public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years. Question: Were the Toll Regulatory Board’s grant of concession to private parties valid? Answer: Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to authorized administrative agencies. TRB has been authorized by Congress to exercise this power. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE (SJS v. COMELEC) Question: Will a provision of law imposing a mandatory drug test on the accused violate his right to privacy and right to self-incrimination? 8 | Page

Answer: Yes, paragraph (f) of Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 is unconstitutional. SC finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicion less." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion less. The ideas of randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. REASON; Accused are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. DUE PROCESS (Go v. DBM) Question: Was the downgrading of the salary grade of Go proper considering his promotion which required a greater responsibility? Answer: No. Go has established a clear, equitable vested right to the emoluments of his position as Attorney VI, SG-26. And being an incumbent to that position, he has, at the very least, an equitable right to receive the corresponding salary and emoluments attached thereto. The summary demotion to a lower salary grade, with the corresponding decrease in salary and emoluments after he has occupied his current rank and position, goes against his right to continue enjoying the benefits accorded the position and which his predecessors must have been receiving. (Take note that this matter was decided on equitable grounds.) Go was denied due process. His right to a higher position and corresponding salary pay grade has ripened into a vested right, of which he could be deprived only by due process of law, but which we believe he was denied through the summary reallocation. Go was neither apprised nor given the opportunity to contest the reallocation before the same was unjustly implemented. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (League Cities of Philippines v. COMELEC) Question: Were all the 16 cityhood bills validly enacted without violating nthe equal protection clause considering that there was no clear distinction in the upgrading of status of municipalities into cities? Answer: Yes, all the 16 city hood bills were validly enacted. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify, necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause. Question: Did the 16 cityhood bills violate the new requirement of P100M income for a municipality to be upgraded into a city? Answer: No. Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 which amended the Local Government Code, it was the intention of Congress that municipalities covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP100 million income criterion. 9 | Page

 The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE (Vivares v. STCCebu) Question: Did the respondents violate the right to privacy of the concerned students? Answer: No. As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, STC did not violate the minors’ right to privacy, as it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Question: Are petitioners entitled to issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data for alleged violation of the right of informational privacy of the concerned students? Answer: No. Respondent STC is not in the business of information gathering.  The right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.  The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive: “A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.” FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Soriano v. Laguardia) Question: Was the action of respondent Laguardia issuing the 20-day suspension on Petitioner’s program tantamount to abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible prior restraint? Answer: No. The Court rules that the government's interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner's prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period.  Petitioner's offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986. REASON: There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers.  It is the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent should such action served and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or offensive words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language and vulgar language. 10 | P a g e

Question: Were the words uttered by Petitioner Soriano protected by the free exercise of religious speech? Answer: No. There is nothing in petitioner's statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (Ouanos v. MICAA) Questions: Was the claim of the Ouanos and Inocians barred by the Statute of Frauds considering that the agreement to reconvey the litigated parcels of land was made verbally by the government and lot owners? Answer: The claim of the Petitioners was not barred by Statute of Frauds.. Equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation. (PLEASE TAKE NOTE AGAIN THIS WAS DECIDED BASED ON EQUITY.) Question: Do they have the right to repurchase their properties pursuant to the verbal agreement with the government’s negotiating team assuring them of its reacquisition should the respondent agencies abandon the intended public purpose? Answer: MICAA is under obligation to reconvey the expropriated properties to the Petitioners. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF LGUs (Barangay Sindalan v. Magtoto III) Question: Can a barangay exercise the power of eminent domain? Answer: Yes. Being a political subdivision under Article X of the Constitution, it can exercise the power of eminent. (The ruling in Moday v. Court of Appeals will help you appreciate this principle.) Question: Was public purpose met by the barangay when it sought to expropriate the property of Spouses Sindalan? Answer: No. The facts of the case reveal that the intended use of respondents’ lot is confined solely to the Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not for the general public. Worse, the expropriation will actually benefit the subdivision’s owner who will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in conjunction with his development permit and license to sell from the HLURB, and also be relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-way. The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher good which is public use and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right to property as well. 11 | P a g e

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND JUST COMPENSATION (Hacienda Luisita) Question: When is just compensation pegged, is at the time of taking or at time judgment is rendered? Answer: Just compensation for the property should be based at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. The “time of taking” does not only mean the time when the landowner was deprived of the use of his property, or when the title was issued to the Republic or the beneficiaries. Question: Is there “taking” under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program when its beneficiaries are private individuals? Answer: Yes. “Taking” in eminent domain cases also occurs when agricultural lands voluntarily offered by a landowner are approved for CARP coverage. The power of eminent domain has been broadened through the years as government implements various programs to improve the living conditions of the people. “Taking” can now also be done in meeting the housing needs of informal settlers under the Community Mortgagage Program of the government. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE Question: Did PARC have the power to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP without violating the non-impairment of contract clause? Answer: Yes, PARC has the power to revoke the Stock Distribution Option of the farm workers of HLI. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. Such power or authority is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, to deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it. A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual relations between and among parties is deemed read into the contract and its implementation cannot successfully be resisted by force of the non-impairment guarantee. Question: What is the guarantee of the non-impairment clause under the Constitution? Answer: Impairment obtains if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws existing remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. Necessarily, the constitutional proscription would not apply to laws already in effect at the time of the contract execution. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (MIAA and Gana v. C.A.) Question: Was MIAA barred from entering into negotiated contracts after the expiration of the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI within the context of the public bidding requirements? Answer: Yes. The contention of MIAA and Gana that the exceptions to the public bidding rule in Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 301 cover both contracts for public services and for supplies, material and equipment is not tenable. Their reliance on Sec. 1(e) of E.O. No. 301 for the award of a service contract for janitorial and maintenance services without public bidding is misplaced. The general rule is that all government contracts must be subject to bidding. The matter of negotiated bidding is restricted only in specific cases. In this particular case, the transaction should undergo public bidding. 12 | P a g e

The Court said: “Executive Order No. 301 explicitly permits negotiated contracts in particular identified instances. In its preamble, it adverted to the then existing set-up of a centralized administrative system . . . for reviewing and approving negotiated contracts . . ., and to the unsatisfactory character thereof in that such centralized administrative system is not at all facilitative particularly in emergency situations, characterized as it is by red tape and too much delay in the processing and final approval of the required transaction or activity; hence, the need to decentralize the processing and final approval of negotiated contracts . . . It then laid down, in its Section 1, guidelines for negotiated contracts thenceforth to be followed. While affirming the general policy that contracts shall not be entered into or renewed without public bidding.” CITIZENSHIP AND REPATRIATION (Tabasa v. Court of Appeals) Question: Did Tabasa validly reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and thus cannot be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien? Answer: No. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a.) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b.) Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Tabasa does not fall in either category. PUBLIC OFFICERS: DISCIPLINE OF JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES (In Re: Siwa) Question: What is the liability of a stenographer who engages in lending money during office hours but fails to transcribe her stenographic notes within the prescribed period? Answer: The stenographer is liable for gross neglect of duty. Quoting Absin v. Montalla, the Court held: “The failure to submit the TSNs within the period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty. Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As a stenographer, he should realize that the performance of his duty is essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice, and his inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes public faith in the judiciary. Public office is a public trust, and he has without a doubt violated this trust by his failure to execute his duty as a court stenographer.” ELECTION LAW: NATURE OF ELECTORAL PROTEST (Batalla v. COMELEC) Question: What standards must COMELEC observe in appreciating evidence in an electoral protest? Answer: The Court summarized the standards to be observed in an election contest predicated on the theory that the election returns do not accurately reflect the will of the voters due to alleged irregularities in the appreciation and counting of ballots. These guiding standards are: (1) The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been preserved with a care (2) The burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a manner is on the protestant; (3) Where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would provide assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode of achieving that end; (4) It is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee; and (5) Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the Court that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in 13 | P a g e

the election returns. In the same case, the Court referred to various provisions in the Omnibus Election Code providing for the safe-keeping and preservation of the ballots, more specifically Sections 160, 217, 219, and 220 of the Code. ELECTION LAW: APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS Question: Did the MCTC correctly appreciate the five (5) protested ballots as votes for Bataller, resulting into a tie between the contenders? Answer: No. Only three ballots should have been credited to Bataller. After a scrutiny of the five (5) contested ballots subject of Batalla’s instant position, the Court ruled that three (3) ballots marked as Exhibits A, E, and G were properly appreciated and credited in favor of Bataller under the neighborhood rule and intent rule. On the other hand, the ballots marked as Exhibits B and C are stray ballots. Question: What is the “intent rule” in appreciating ballots in an election contest? Answer: The intent rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that in the appreciation of the ballot, the objective should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty. Hence, the intention of the voter to vote for a particular candidate must be unequivocal from the face of a ballot. A ballot in question should be liberally appreciated to effectuate the choice of the voters. Question: What is the ”neighborhood rule” in the appreciation of ballots in an election contest? Answer: The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that where the name of a candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for said candidate. Such rule is usually applied in consonance with the intent rule which stems from the principle that in the appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty. ELECTION LAW: PERIOD TO FILE ELECTION PROTEST (Garcia v. COMELEC) Question: When is the reckoning date to ensure the timely filing of an election protest? Answer: The reckoning date for the timely filing of an election protest is counted from the date of the proclamation of the winner. Jurisprudence have established that the rule prescribing the 10-day reglamentary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of this rule should neither be taken lightly nor brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the non-compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case. ELECTION LAW:JURISDICTION OF A COMELEC DIVISION (Hipe v. COMELEC) Question: Is the injunction order of a specially-constituted COMELEC Division valid? Answer: Yes. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the case between the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both of its Divisions. The additional term "special," in this case, merely indicates that the commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution. ELECTION LAW: NATURE OF COMELEC’S POWERS Question: Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion when it dismissed Hipe’s appeal questioning the MBOC ruling? Answer: No. Even if the Court would entertain petitioner Hipe’s appeal from the decision of the MBOC on the questioned election returns, the Court still rules in favor of respondent Vicencio. The COMELEC, after a judicious evaluation of the documents on record, upheld 14 | P a g e

the findings of the MBOC to exclude the subject election returns on the basis of the affidavits of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. ELECTION LAW AND JURISDICTION OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL Question: When does the HRET acquire jurisdiction over an election protest? Answer: Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS: POWER TO RECLASSIFY LANDS Question: Does the local government unit have the power to classify agricultural land to nonagricultural land? Answer: Yes. It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. In this case, since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an "agricultural land,” and is therefore outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS: QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF A MAYOR (Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan) Question: Can the Mayor order the demolition of the hotel for operating without a business permit? Answer: Yes. In the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. The LGC authorizes LGU’s, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC empowers the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. Therefore, the Mayor can order the demolition. (Please take time to review nuisance per se and when the court intervention is necessary to remove the alleged nuisance.) Question: Is the Mayor vested with quasi-judicial power when he ordered the demolition of illegal structures without any court order? Answer: Yes. While a city mayor is an executive official, the matter of issuing demolition notices or orders is not a ministerial one. In determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. Therefore, he can order the demolition of the illegal structure of Aquino.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT: CONVERSION/ RECLASSIFICATION (Gov. Umali v. COMELEC) Question: In the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City should the same be limited only to the registered voters of the city or should it include all the registered voters of Nueva Ecija? Answer: The qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija must participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an Highly Urbanized City. GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS: POWER TO REORGANIZE (LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS) Question: Did the NEA Board have the power to reorganize NEA to a point of declaring all its plantilla positions vacant? Answer: Yes. Under of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress. Petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize does not include the power to terminate employees but only to reduce NEA’s manpower complement. Such contention is erroneous. PART II: Concepts, Principles and Landmark Decisions I. The Philippine Constitution A.1.What is the accepted definition of a constitution? A constitution is the body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the power of sovereignty are habitually exercised. (Cooley) A.2.What are the purposes of a constitution? A constitution provides for a framework of government; identifies basic structures of government and assign their respective powers and duties; and establishes principles upon which the government is founded and its relationship to its constituents. A. 3. What is the nature of the Philippine Constitution? Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA: The 1987 Constitution just like the 1935 Constitution is rigid. Both Constitutions require the ratification of the Senate of any treaty executed by the President but Executive Agreements need not be ratified. Supplemental instruments or agreements which seek to implement a treaty need not be ratified. A.4. How should the Constitution be interpreted? Francisco v. House of Representatives (2003): The Court gave the following rules in the interpretation of the Constitution: Verba legis: whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed. Ratio legis et anima: the words in the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers. Ut magis valeat quam pereat: the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole. A.5.What is the concept of the supremacy of the Constitution? In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, the Court held: ”A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of 16 | P a g e

constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.” B. What are the three basic parts of the 1987 Constitution? The 1987 Constitution has the following parts: Constitution of Liberty: Bill of Rights Constitution of Government: Government Organization and Functions Constitution of Sovereignty: Method of Amendment C. Amending the Constitution C.1. A majority of the incumbent members of the Senate and the House of Representatives want to introduce changes in the Constitution. What are the available options by which the Philippine Constitution can be amended? Answer: Under Section 1, ArtXVII, the following methods may be employed to amend the Constitution: a. By Congress as a constituent assembly upon a vote of ¾ of all its members. The constituent assembly may introduce revisions to the constitution. Gonzales v. COMELEC (1967): The congress has legislative power which is plenary in nature but the power to amend the Constitution is not included. It is within the constituent power of the people which has been duly delegated to Congress when it convenes itself as a constituent assembly. Congress continues to exercise its legislative body even it has already been convened as a constituent assembly. b. Constitutional Convention, Art. XVII, Sec. 3: By 2/3 vote of all members of Congress call a constitutional convention or by a majority vote of all its members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such convention. The constitutional convention may likewise introduce revisions to the constitution. Imbong v. COMELEC (1970): The Court upheld the power of Congress to enact the implementing details of the constitutional convention provided the same do not clash with any specific provision of the Constitution sought to be amended. c. By People’s Initiative C.2 Disgruntled by the persistent scheme of the members of Congress to insert pork barrel funds in the General Appropriations Act, a number of civic minded citizens rallied the electorate to introduce amendment to the Constitution to address this concern. What is appropriate method to introduce such amendment? Answer: The people through initiative, Art. XVII, Sec. 2: Upon petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every district must be represented by at least 3% of the voters therein. This may only be done once every 5 years (Sec. 2, Art. XVII). C.3. How are amendments and revisions to the Constitution ratified? Answer: In case of amendments proposed by Congress or a Convention, Art. XVII, Sec. 4, paragraph 1: Ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite conducted by COMELEC which shall be held not earlier than 60 days nor 90 days after the approval of the amendment or revision. In case of amendments proposed through initiative, Art. XVII, Sec. 4, paragraph 2: Ratification by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than 60 days nor later than 90 days after certification by COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition.

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C.4. Is judicial review available in the amending process? Answer: Yes. Lambino v. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160: The S.C. may exercise judicial review over any matter relative to the process of amending or revising the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution cannot be carried out through People’s Initiative. C.5. Can Congress enact a law which will allow the shift of the government to federalism? Answer: No. A shift to federalism will require a constitutional amendment and not simply by act of congress. In a federal state, the political subdivisions enjoy some degree of independence from the national government and certain powers have to be shared. At present, the Philippines has a presidential form of government where the local government units is the extension of the national government. D.1. Can the newly-elected President propose to change the country’s name, national anthem and government seal? Answer: Yes. The country’s name, national anthem and government seal may be changed by law provided the same is submitted to the people for ratification (Art. XVI, Sec. 2). D.2. May the President be held liable for the death of police officers in an encounter with the National People’s Army under the principle of command responsibility? Answer: No. The principle of command responsibility/ chain of command will only apply when the President acts as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Art. XVI, Sec. 4, Art. XVI, Sec. 5, Art. XVIII, Sec. 24). The Philippine National Police is not part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. (Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. 183871, 18 February 2010, 613 SCRA 233.) D.3. In view of the growth of cable television industry in the country, some foreignowned broadcast media would like to engage business in the Philippines and register under Philippine laws with the hope that it can compete with local companies. Is this legally possible? Answer: No. The Constitution provides that ownership and management of mass media shall be 100% Filipino owned (Art. XVI, Sec. 11(1)). D.4. Adorable Advertising Company is a company owned by Mexican nationals. Can it be allowed to engage in advertising business in the Philippines? Answer: No. The Constitution provides that ownership of advertising companies shall be 70% Filipino owned (Art. XVI, Sec. 11(1), Art. XVIII, Sec. 23). II. General Considerations A. NATIONAL TERRITORY A.1.What are the relevant laws which define the Philippine territory? Answer: Article I, 1987 Constitution defines the National Territory of the Philippines. The following subsequent treaties and laws define the national territory as well: Treaty limits: Treaty of Paris, Art. III Treaty between Spain and U.S. concluded at Washington on November 7, 1900 and that between U.S. and Great Britain on January 2, 1930 Method of determining baselines under R.A. No. 3046, June 17, 1961, R.A. No.5446, September 8, 1968; and R.A. No. 9522( Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law) , March 10, 2009, using the straight line approach Other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction P.D. No. 1596, June 11, 1978 Two Hundred-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone under P.D. No. 1599, June 11, 1978 A.2. What are the remedies available to state parties of UNCLOS in case of conflicts? Answer: A state signatory of UNCLOS may avail of the following remedies: 18 | P a g e

Article 279: Pacific settlement between the two conflicting states Article 280: Voluntary arbitration Article 286: Compulsory arbitration A.3. As a signatory of UNCLOS, may the Philippines seek legal relief on its claim as a coastal state against another signatory to the agreement? Answer: Yes. The Philippines filed an arbitration case-“The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China”-to challenge China’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea. On October 29, 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration has ruled that it has jurisdiction on the Philippines’ case questioning the legality of China’s enormous claims in the South China Sea. The Philippines’ case is anchored on the 1982 convention which allows coastal states the right to manage, explore and exploit areas within its 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone. It also tackles the status of certain maritime features in the South China Sea (which the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea) and the maritime entitlements they are capable of generating, and the lawfulness of certain actions by China in the South China Sea that are alleged by the Philippines to violate the UNCLOS. The Philippines said China’s assertion of having “indisputable” and “historical” claims that extends beyond what is allowed by the UNCLOS infringes on the country’s maritime jurisdiction and prevents it from exercising its right under the convention. A.4. What are the significant pronouncements of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in its July 12, 2016 ruling? Answer: The PCA "concluded that, as between the Philippines and China, there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources, in excess of the rights provided for by the Convention, within the sea areas falling within the '9-dash line.' Answer: The tribunal said that "all of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands (including, for example, Itu Aba, Thitu, West York Island, Spratly Island, North-East Cay, South-West Cay) are legally "rocks" that do not generate an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.") A.5. What are some of the maritime zones of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, April 30, 1982 which are pertinent to the Philippine government? The following provisions of UNCLOS are relevant to the Philippine government: Internal waters of the Philippines consist of waters around, between and connecting the islands of the Philippine Archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, including the waters in bays, rivers and lakes. No right of innocent passage for foreign vessels exists in the case of internal waters. (Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5 th ed., 1998, p. 407). Under UNCLOS, however, warships enjoy a right of innocent passage when a portion of the territorial water of the coastal state is used for international navigation. Article 42(2) of UNCLOS provides that there shall be no suspension of innocent passage through straits used for international navigation. The right of the coastal state to suspend the same requires that the coastal nation must publish the same and without any publication, it cannot insist to suspend the use of such body of water. A claim that suspension of innocent passage is necessary for national security may be cited by the coastal state. Upon the other hand, if a war ship delayed its right of innocence, the same may justified under Article 18(2) of UNCLOS if the delay was caused by rendering assistance to persons or ship in distress. Contiguous zone is the zone contiguous to the territorial sea and extends up to twelve nautical miles from the territorial sea and over which the coastal state may exercise control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within the territory or territorial sea. (Article 33 of UNCLOS) Exclusive Economic Zone is the zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a state over which the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing its natural resources, whether living or nonliving, of the waters super adjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and subsoil and with 19 | P a g e

regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone. (Articles 56 and 57, UNCLOS) Flag state means a ship has the nationality of the flag of the state it flies, but there must be a genuine link between the state and the ship. (Article 91, UNCLOS) Flag of convenience refers to a state with which a vessel is registered for various reasons such as low or non-existent taxation or low-operating costs although the ship has no genuine link with that state. (Harris, ibid. p.425) A.6. What are the other corollary rights states may enjoy under UNCLOS? Answer: It is the right to exercise freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit through the straits used for international navigation, i.e., between two areas of the high seas or between two exclusive economic zones. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage. The requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State. (MagallA.ona, 2005; Article 38[2], UNCLOS) A.7. Distinguish between innocent and transit passage under UNCLOS. Answer: Innocent passage is for travel within territorial waters while transit passage is for any zone. Innocent passage applies only to ships while transit passage applies to aircrafts as well. In transit passage, military vessels are also allowed which are not allowed in innocent passage. A.8. Is the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity considered a political subdivision and therefore a part of the Philippine territory? No. Consolidated Petitions: Province of Cotabato v. G.R.P., G.R. No. 208566, October 14, 2008. The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity is not a political subdivision within the contemplation of the Constitution. It is more in the nature of an associative state under public international law and it can eventually gain statehood. The Court held that no province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. D. STATE IMMUNITY D.1.What is state immunity? State immunity is a shield which the state enjoys and may claim in the event a suit is filed against it. D.2. Can a private party make a government entity liable on a contract which that private party executed with another private party? No. Under the principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, a third party cannot hold a government entity liable. The government entity is a stranger to the contract. Dept. of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA: The state cannot be sued without its consent. The assets of the government cannot be held liable for liabilities of a private person. Such assets cannot be subject to levy and garnishment for to allow such actions would impair government operations and delay delivery of vital public services. 20 | P a g e

D.3. Can a local government unit excuse itself from paying the balance of just compensation? Yujuico. Atienza, 472 SCRA 463. The City of Manila cannot be excused from paying the property owner the balance of just compensation because it was the city which initiated the expropriation proceedings. Please note that the rule on torts committed by special agents under the Civil Code, Art. 2180 (Consent to be sued includes actions for tort – this is an express consent to be sued) Teotico v. City of Manila: The City of Manila was held liable under the provision of the Civil Code which mandates it to maintain and ensure the safety of the public in all public places like roads (even national roads) in its territorial jurisdiction. By law, GOCCs have the right to sue and be sued. Government is not immune from suit due to implied consent: When the Government enters into business contracts; and when it would be inequitable for the Government to claim immunity D.4. Can a government counsel be personally held for damages through a counterclaim while defending the interest of the state? No. Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282: A public officer may not be held liable for the counterclaim by one of the accused when he performs his duties in good faith. D.5. May private individuals bring a suit against a warship of the United States of America for its grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations which cause and continue to cause environmental damage to the marine resources of the Philippines in violation of environmental laws of the country? Bishop Arigo et al v. Scott H. Swift et al: The Court held that the liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules “collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.” The Court reiterated its ruling in the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows: “The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium– that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.”(Emphasis supplied.) E. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES E.1. John Williams is a member of the U.S. Armed Forces participating the Balikatan exercises under the Visiting Forces Agreement. Peeved by the attitude of Pedro Reyes, a Filipino waiter, in a local bar in Olongapo City, he hit him and Reyes fell on the ground which accidentally caused his death. Can John Williams be criminally held under Philippine laws?

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Answer: Yes. In Nicolas v. Romulo, Daniel Smith was tried and convicted of rape under the Revised Penal Code. As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. E.2. Two consular officers of China were fatally shot in a restaurant in Cebu City. The two assailants were also identified as consular officers of China as well. May the two assailants be held liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines? Answer: Considering the victims are also members of the diplomatic corps of China, the government of China may invoke diplomatic immunity from the domestic laws of the receiving state. The sending state may take custody of the two assailants and it will be responsible for their repatriation and eventual prosecution under the sending state’s domestic laws. E.3. If an ambassador of a foreign country is found liable under Philippine laws, which court has jurisdiction over the case? Answer: The Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors. (Sec.5 (1), Art. VIII) E.4. Only independent states may become subjects of public international law. Characterize an independent state. Answer: The existence of a state is a function of recognition in a community of nations. The Court said that a state is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. (Elements: people, territory, government and sovereignty). Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 (1971) Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 (1971): Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 (1971) C.5. May citizens belatedly ask that treaty provisions be reviewed since the same overlooked the damages they sustained? Answer:No. Relations between nations may be jus gentium (governed by the law of nations) and jus inter gentis (agreement between nations). Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 25, 2010 and August 13, 2014: The Supreme Court adopted ICJ’s ruling in Barcelona Traction that “within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. “The Court concluded that the State is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. Since the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. The Court held that a mandatory injunction will not lie since it requires the performance of a particular act. Hence, it is an extreme remedy to be granted only if the following requisites are attendant, namely: (a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse; (b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and

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(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. Power of expanded judicial review: On the issue of withdrawal of MOA by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines: In the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court rendered judgement on the MOAD despite the fact that the same has become moot and academic. It said that: “For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale. An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. Simply stated, there is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events xxx In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo(2006), this Court held that the moot and academic principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;[ (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The Supreme Court justified the review in the MOA AD case using the third exception. What are the three distinct legal disciplines in international law? Answer: Three distinct legal disciplines in international law: public international law (treaty law, law of the seas, international criminal law, human rights law, international humanitarian law, law on war); conflict of laws (question of which entity would have jurisdiction; and what law will be applied in the issues to be resolved); and supranational law (regional agreements which may render inapplicable domestic law if it conflicts with the supernational legal system). Please take note that in this instance, the Supreme Court is a trier of facts. The same provision also allows the Court to receive evidence over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. Petitions for issuance of the writs of amparo, habeas data and Kalikasan also necessitate reception of evidence before the Court. The Court is also a trier of facts when a suit is filed to determine the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and must decide the same within a period of 30 days from the date of filing which is an exception to the general rule that it has 24 months to decide on cases. (Sec. 18, Art. VII) The Court en banc also receives evidence when it convenes the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. (Sec.4, Art. VII) What will be the effect on an action filed before the Supreme Court if the Court did not meet the required majority vote? Answer: The Court said it in this wise: “As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.” Therefore, the Indigenous People’s Rights Act remains in effect. The rights of the indigenous peoples remain protected. Equally, the state shall continue to enjoy the right to govern and the right to own properties and may regulate the exploitation, development and utilization of 23 | P a g e

its natural resources as it may deem fit in exercise of the general welfare clause. (Isagani Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, G. R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000) May a taxpayer file a suit to compel Congress to enact a law making the use of marijuana for medical reasons legal? Answer: No. The writ of mandamus will not lie because this violates the principle of separation of powers. It is discretionary on the part of Congress to consider bills which its judgment will serve the public. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. (Sec.1, Art. VII). There is no legally demandable right to compel Congress to make such law. May the tarsiers of Loboc, Bohol bring an action in court to nullify a service contract signed by the President? Answer: Answer: No, in Resident marine mammals of Tanon Strait joined in and represented herein by human beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, in their capacity as legal guardians and as responsible stewards of God's creations v. Secretary Angelo Reyes et al (G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015), the Court allowed the resident mammals of Tanon Strait as petitioners provided that the action is brought in the nature of a citizen suit with natural

persons acting as their legal guardians and as friends for being stewards of creation. Under the Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases. A citizen suit is encouraged for the protection of the environment. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn. In the action filed by the stewards of the Bohol tarsiers, can the respondents claim that their approval of service contracts, which require presidential approval, amounts to approval of the president under the doctrine of qualified political agency? Answer: No. The Court reiterated its ruling in Joson v. Torres. In this case, the Court explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this wise:” Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” The Court further reiterated: “As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly. xxx it must be shown that the government agency or subordinate official has been authorized by the President to enter into such service contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the President subsequently approved of such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in the case at bar.” The President granted Mr. Estrada pardon. Mr. Estrada was elected Mayor of Manila. Alicia, a registered voter of Manila questioned the grant of pardon alleging the text of the pardon appears to be conditional and therefore, Mr. Estrada is not qualified to hold the post of Mayor. Is the position of the registered voter tenable? 24 | P a g e

Answer: No. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit: “Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.” There can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted to Mr. Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon. He was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former Mr. Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. Please note that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Congress cannot in any way delimit the pardoning powers of the President. Grant of amnesty requires the consent of Congress. May a former Filipino citizen without perfecting his repatriation seek to be elected into public office? Answer: No. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727: The right to govern by virtue of a mandate from the people is not absolute. The Court held that” the will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.” Macquiling v. COMELEC, July 2, 2013: A candidate for a political position who repatriated himself as a Filipino citizen but who continues to use his American passport is deemed not qualified to run for an elective position. The passport is indicative of one’s citizenship. What is the rule on a claim of Philippine citizenship? Answer: A person claiming Philippine citizenship has the burden of proof to establish such claim. In the case of In re: Vicente Ching, the Court held that “Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.” Assume a situation where there is a seeming conflict as to availment of rights of a Filipino citizen under an international agreement and a Philippine law, which would prevail, the domestic law or the international agreement? Answer: Speaking through Justice Melo, the Court said that “the individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-à-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need.” In dismissing the petition, the Court upheld a citizen's basic due process rights against the “government's ironclad duties under a treaty.” The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. It chose not to favor the strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty because that would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy enshrined in the Constitution. (Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, 343 SCRA 377)

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Can the President of the Philippines declare a state of war? Answer: No. The Constitution provides that only Congress may declare the existence of a state of war. *Note that Congress cannot even declare a state of war but can only recognize its existence under the Constitution Please relate with the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy: In the field of public international law, the law of war has two dimensions: justifications to engage in war(jus ad bellum) and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (jus in bello or International humanitarian law). As a humanitarian concern, the laws of war address declarations of war, acceptance of surrender and the treatment of prisoners of war; military necessity (use of an attack or action intended to help the military objective and use of proportional and excessive force to endanger civilians(, along with distinction (careful assessment as to who are combatants and the civilians) and proportionality( the legal use of force whereby belligerents must make sure that harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated attack anticipated by an attack on military objective; and the prohibition of certain weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering. The laws of war should mitigate the consequences of war by: Shielding both combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering; Ensuring that certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians, are protected; and endeavoring that peace is restored. The Philippine Constitution has several provisions on respect for human dignity and human rights (Art. II, Sec. 11, Art. III, Sections 17-19, and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(2)). Is the Philippine government a signatory to any international agreement on human rights? Answer:Yes. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as an offshoot of the aftermath of World War II. The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols. In a strict sense, the Declaration is not treaty but it has been considered as a constitutive document for the purpose of defining “fundamental freedoms “ and human rights.” A number of Filipinos are considered “economic” migrants. What efforts has the government done to ensure the protection of Overseas Filipino Workers? Answer:The Philippines is a signatory to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. This instrument is multilateral treaty governing the protection of migrant workers and families. Concluded on 18 December 1990, the Convention entered into force on 1 July 2003 after the threshold of 20 ratifying States was reached in March 2003. The Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) monitors implementation of the convention, and is one of the seven UN-linked human rights treaty bodies. What other rights do Overseas Filipino Workers enjoy? Answer:In Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, the Court held that the holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved. Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the issues, the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.The Court resolved the poser in the affirmative. The Court held that those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under 26 | P a g e

Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 pursuant to Sec 2 of Article V of the Constitution which mandates that Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The Constitution has enshrined the family as a basic autonomous social institution under Sections 12 and 13, Art. II and Art. XV- The Family. May Congress intrude into this basic social institution? Answer:The Court has recognized that under Art. 52 of the Civil Code, marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Imbong v. Ochoa (April 8, 2014): The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the RH Bill as a valid exercise of police power. Issue on Right to Privacy: Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family. Issue on violation of Freedom of Religion: The provision which obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Issue on violation of Equal Protection Clause: Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government. Issue on Right of the State to impose Penalties: Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the law. One of the salient features of the Constitution is the recognition of the autonomy of local governments under Section 25 and Art. X. What are the political subdivisions under Section1 of Article X? Answer: The political subdivisions are: provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays as well as the autonomous regions of ARMM and CAR. What are the mandatory requirements to create a local government unit? Answer: The factors to be considered in the creation of local government unit are: (PILA) 1. Population to be authenticated by the National Statistics Office (now Philippine Statistics Authority); population must be actual and certification can only be issued by the Chief Statistician (Aldaba v. COMELEC, 2010); 2. Income: Average of two-year of the local government unit to be certified by the Department of Finance. Note that all treasurers of all local government units are appointed by the Secretary of Finance. The share of the local government in the IRA is included in the computation of income. (Alvarez v. Guingona, 1996) 3. Land Area: Area must be contiguous except for provinces comprising of islands. The land area must be authenticated by the Land Management Bureau of the DENR. (Navarro v. 27 | P a g e

Ermita, 2011), where the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Dinagat as a province despite the fact that it did not meet the prescribed 2,000 square meter area. It is impossible to achieve the minimum area requirement since the province of Dinagat is composed of islands and cannot be contiguous. Rule on creation of local government units and additional congressional districts: a plebiscite is required in the creation of local government units but not in the creation of additional congressional districts. Sema v. COMELEC: The ARMM Legislative Assembly cannot create provinces and the grant of such power under the ARMM Organic Act is deemed unconstitutional. It is not a valid delegation of power. The creation of local government units in provinces, cities, municipalities, and other political subdivision is a congressional/legislative prerogative while the creation of barangays shall be done by local ordinances in cities and provinces (for component cities and municipalities) through the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan as the case may be. League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC (2010). In upholding the legality of the creation of additional 16 cities, the Court held that Congress may apply the revised requirements in a new law during the pendency of the approval of all the bills creating such new local government units. How are boundary disputes among local government units resolved? Answer: Jurisdiction of boundary disputes: 1. Regional trial courts exercise original jurisdiction over boundary disputes in involving a MUNICIPALITY and an independent component city. 2. Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercises original jurisdiction over boundary disputes involving two municipalities of the same province. 3. Joint Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercises original jurisdiction over boundary disputes involving two municipalities of the different provinces. 4. Sangguniang Panlungsod exercises original jurisdiction over boundary disputes involving two barangays of the same city. 5. Joint Sangguniang Panlungsod exercises original jurisdiction over boundary disputes involving two barangays of two different cities. 6. The regional trial court exercises APPELLATE jurisdiction over boundary disputes among local government units. May a barangay order the closure of streets in a private subdivision? Answer: Yes. In the case of Sun Valley Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Sanggguniang Barangay of Sun Valley (July 2011), Petitioner wants the Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision but it miserably failed to establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the subject roads . Section 21 of the Local Government Code requires

the passage of an ordinance by a local government unit to effect the opening of a local road. The Court held that the subject provision can have no applicability to the instant case since the subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area - namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets - have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name of, the City Government of Paranaque since the year 1964. The Court also noted that the action of the Petitioner was premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the issues presented before which could have been resolved by the Mayor’s office. Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga v. C.A. (2007): The Court also held that no public funds may be used to construct an access road which would benefit solely the residents of a newly-developed subdivision. City of Manila v. Chinese Community (1919): A local government may not takeover a property for expansion of a public street when such property (cemetery) already serves a public purpose. 28 | P a g e

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Homeowners Assn., Inc.: MMDA cannot require the opening of certain streets inside a private subdivision since it cannot make an ordinance because it has no rule-making powers. The opening of a street is a way of regulating use of property. Therefore, MMDA cannot also validly exercise police power. Sanggalang v. IAC (176 SCRA 716): Through the enactment of an ordinance which has reclassified Jupiter St., Bel Air Village, the local government may allow the use of former residential lots along the street for commercial purposes. Albon v. Mayor Fernando: No public funds may be spent for the upgrading of private subdivision roads unless they are turned over to the local government unit. May a local government unit reclassify the use of land which would violate the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law? Answer:The local government has authority to reclassify lands but not when such reclassification violates the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The exception to this general rule is when the local government unit had already reclassified the subject land before the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.MM. Ramos, Inc. (2011): The ordinance reclassifying the land in question shall prevail over the opposition of the Petitioner. The Court held Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the definition of agricultural land that is subject to CARP to "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act” and not classified otherwise. The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARP, the subject property should have already been reclassified as residential prior to said date. The ordinance was enacted prior to the effectivity of CARL. Davao New Town Development Corp. v. Spouses Espino et al (2013): The Court held that the subject property had been reclassified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988; hence, they are no longer covered by R.A. No. 6657.

May a zoning ordinance prevail over a restriction in the Transfer Certificate of Title which the Ayala Alabang Homeowners Association seeks to impose on the property owner? Answer: No. The annotation at the back of TCT No. 149166 covering the subject property provides: “PE-222/T-134042 - RESTRICTIONS - The property cannot be subdivided for a period of fifty (50) years from the date of sale. The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which may include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles. x x.” The Court held that the above restriction limits the use of the subject property for preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, without regard to the number of classrooms. The Court affirmed the judgement of the Court of Appeals which ordered the Petitioner to cease and desist from the operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms with the MODIFICATION that (1) the twoclassroom restriction is deleted, and (2) the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child School's grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted.” On the issue of estoppel. The Court held that the Petitioner cannot invoke estoppel on the part of the respondents. It said: “Estoppel by deed is "a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other party and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material facts asserted in it.” It said that “estoppel has been characterized as harsh or odious, and not favored in law. When misapplied, estoppel becomes a most effective weapon to establish an injustice, inasmuch as it shuts a man's mouth from speaking the truth and debars the truth in a particular case. Estoppel cannot be 29 | P a g e

sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly proved in all its essential elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. x x x.” What is social justice? Answer: Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940). In this case the Court defined social justice in this wise: “Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.” Note: The precept of social justice is interlinked with the exercise of police power. In the same case, the Court further said that: “Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Answer: What powers may academic institutions exercise to ensure the right to quality education under Sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Article XIV? Vivares and Suzara v. St. Theresa’s College-Cebu City: The writ of habeas data will not lie since the respondent school is not in the business of collecting data. The Court upheld the right of the school not to allow its students to graduate for violating the standing policy of the school on wearing immodest apparel and having their photographs posted in social media. Miriam College v. CA, 348SCRA 215: The school has the power to suspend students for use of vulgar language in the school’s official organ. The Court upheld the right of a school to prescribe rules governing discipline of students. University of San Agustin v. CA 270 SCRA 761: The Court held that their students are governed by the rules set forth in the student handbook. The failure of students to meet the academic standards set in the Student Handbook is a ground for disciplinary action. Ateneo v. Capulong 222 SCRA 643. The Court upheld the authority of the school to suspend students who were alleged to have participated in a hazing activity which resulted to the death of one of its students. In this case, the Court took the occasion to say that it is the national government that shall provide the overall policy on education to meet national goals. The discipline of students pursuing legal career is a matter which exacts rigid scrutiny. May a proclaimed candidate in a congressional seat ask the Court to enjoin the election protest filed against him before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal? Answer:No. This violates the doctrine of separation of powers. The doctrine of separation of powers is a principle of government under which three separate branches of government are empowered to carry out functions without interference or encroachment from another branch. Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936): The Court cannot interfere with an independent body like the Electoral Tribunal under the principle of separation of powers. It is premature for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review until after the tribunal has terminated its proceedings.

How principle is violated: interference and assumption to another branch’s functions often referred to as encroachment

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When can the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal take jurisdiction over an election contest? Answer: The HRET may take cognizance of any matter raised by a losing candidate related to the election, returns and qualifications (ERQ) as soon as the COMELEC proclaims the winning candidate and the latter shall have taken his oath as a member of the House of Representatives. Please take note of the following rulings on the three electoral tribunals enshrined in the Constitution:

Reyes v. COMELEC and Tan, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013: To be considered a member of Congress, there must be concurrence of the following requisites: a valid proclamation; a proper oath; and assumption to duty. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over said contest. Duenas v. HRET, 593 SCRA 3166: HRET has the competence to examine questioned ballots; a resolution signed by the majority of the members is sufficient. Vinzons-Chato v. HRET and Panotes, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013: digital images are functional equivalent of the paper ballots Martinez v. HRET, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010: nuisance candidates; mockery of election process Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET): composed of 3 Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice and 6 members of the Senate based on proportional representation; the Senior Justice acts as the Chairman. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET): composed of 3 Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice and 6 members of the House of Representatives based on proportional representation; the Senior Justice acts as the Chairman. Jurisdiction of Electoral Contests before the SET and the HRET: All matters pertaining to the election, returns and qualifications of a member, including issues involving citizenship and appreciation of ballots. Pimentel v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008: Once COMELEC has proclaimed the winner, it loses jurisdiction on all issues involving the election, returns and qualifications of a member of the Senate; the losing party must file the protest before the SET. Legarda v. de Castro: Petitioner can no longer pursue her election protest because she run for the Senate during the pendency of the case and after having been proclaimed winner in the senatorial race, she took her oath. To allow her to pursue the case will result to absurdity. She cannot be Vice President (executive branch) and be Senator (legislative branch) at the same time. This will result into incompatibility of offices. Note: As members of the PET, the justices of the Supreme Court are triers of facts and law and parties may seek relief to the Supreme Court if they are not satisfied with the findings of the SET. If members of the Senate and party list members of the House of Representatives are proclaimed by the COMELEC, what body undertakes the canvass of votes and proclamation of the President and the Vice President?

Answer: Congress acts as the Board of Canvassers in presidential election. Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress, G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004. The Congress is a continuing body and must fulfil its constitutional mandate to conduct the presidential canvass of votes even it if is in recess. The Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not

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later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Lopez v. Senate, G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004: Senate is a continuing body only on this matter and committee hearings and not to consider bills. Can a losing candidate as kagawad of a barangay file an election protest? Answer:Yes. The Municipal Trial Courts have jurisdiction over election contests involving elective positions at the barangay level. A party not satisfied with the ruling of the trial court, may file an appeal before the COMELEC. A division of the COMELEC is assigned to review the appeal. If parties are not satisfied with the ruling of the Division, they can file an appeal before COMELEC en banc and parties may ask the Supreme Court en banc to review the decision of the COMELEC en banc. Please note that all decisions of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be reviewed by the Supreme Court en banc. The newly-elected directors of the Philippine National Red Cross (“PNRC”) requested the Commission of Audit to conduct an audit of the accounts of the organization. A former director sought to enjoin the conduct of the audit. Will the objection of the former director of the PNRC prosper?

Answer:No. The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality which does not fall within the Constitutional prohibition in Art. XII, Section 16. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.” Thesecorporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices. (BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COA (G.R. No. 177131, 2011)) Can a public officer claim reimbursement for medical expenses and other travelling costs? Answer:No. COA may disallow expenses which do not pass the “public purpose test” (claims for executive check-up, basic monthly allowances, reimbursement for gasoline allowance, etc.) Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose. As understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right. The public servant has the burden to proof to establish that use of public funds is related to the discharge of his official functions. (RAMON R. YAP v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (G.R. No. 158562, 2010). Twelve new positions were created by a local government but no ordinance was enacted to fund the newly-created positions. Subsequently, the Mayor sought approval of an ordinance which would allow the persons occupying the newly-appointed positions to draw their salaries. A taxpayer filed an action against the Mayor before the Office of the Ombudsman. Will the case prosper? Answer:No. Whatever defect there may have been in the approval of unappropriated positions was cured subsequently by the creation of said position and the revalidation of respondent’s appointment. That appointment was ultimately approved by the Civil Service Commission thus giving it finality. The Court reiterated that elementary is the rule that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman 32 | P a g e

that a review of factual findings may aptly be made. . (TOLENTINO v. Mayor LOYOLA et. al. (G.R. No. 153809, 2011). Note: NATIONAL ARTIST VIRGILIO ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 189028, January 16, 2013). There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is: 1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or 2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. Congress enacted the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”) which included a provision allowing the President to distribute a lump sum amount to all members of the legislative branch. The GAA allowed the President to prescribe the criteria for the distribution of such amounts needed by the members of Congress. Special requirements were allowed at the congressional district level. May Pedro Reyes and other taxpayers question the constitutionality of the subject provision of the GAA? Answer:Yes. The provision violates the principle of checks and balances. This principle in constitutional law where there is a system-based regulation that allows one branch to limit actions of another branch in keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers. Consolidated Petitions: Belgica et. al. v. Executive Secretary et. al., G.R.No. 208566, Alcantara et. al. v. Drilon et. al. G.R. No. 208493, and Nepomuceno et. al. v. Pres. Aquino et. al., G.R. No.209251, Nov. 19, 2013: The Court resolved issues related to procedural matters and substantive matters. Procedural Matters: Is the case subject to judicial review? Yes, there is a question raised on the constitutionality of the provision of PDAF in the General Appropriations Act. This is a justiciable issue. Do the petitioners have legal standing to sue? Yes, as taxpayers there are qualified to raise the issue of the constitutionality of PDAF. As taxpayers they stand to suffer material injury because the funds covered under the General Appropriations Act come from revenues collected from taxpayers. Substantial Matters: Is there a violation of the principle of separation of powers? Yes, the executive branch encroached upon the power of the legislative branch when it determined how the PDAF will be distributed. The legislative branch also exercised the power of implementation when it identified priority projects in their jurisdiction. Is there a violation of the principle of checks and balances in the implementation of the projects under PDAF? Yes, it deprives the President of his item veto power under the constitution Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution because the appropriations are general (lump sum) instead of being itemized.

Is there violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power? Yes, the legislative branch allowed the executive branch to define the parameters as to how the PDAF can be availed of by the members of Congress. The Department of Budget and Management provided for a ‘menu” where the funds may be spent. Is there a violation of the constitutional provision on political dynasty? While portions of the PDAF were meant to enhance the continued stay in power of incumbent politicians, the constitutional provision prohibiting political dynasty, the same is not self-executing. To date, Congress has not enacted a law to put the provision into effect. Thus, there is no violation of the constitutional provision. Is there a violation of the principle of local autonomy? Yes, when the incumbent members of Congress dictated which projects would be implemented at the local level without the participation of the local government units, it violated the essence of local autonomy under Article X of the Constitution. Congress enacted a law which created the Fair Competition Commission (“FCC”) under the supervision of the Secretary of Finance. Without awaiting the appointments of the Chairman and the four Associate Commissioners of the FCC, the Secretary of Finance published the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FCC. Is the act of the Secretary of Finance proper? 33 | P a g e

Answer: No. The act of the Secretary of Finance violated the principle of separation of powers. He should have first allowed the President to appoint all the five members of FCC. Two tests of valid delegation: Completeness test and sufficient standard test How law-making power is delegated: suppletory rule-making (filling in details to ensure enforcement of the law) and contingent rule-making (ascertaining the facts to bring the law into operation) The President reorganized the Office of the Press Secretary. In the process some of the employees were given new assignments. The affected employees questioned the reorganization arguing that it violated their security of tenure. Is the legal argument of the affected employees tenable? Answer:No. The Court held: “It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department, what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.” (EIIB v. Zamora (July 10, 2001)) The local government of Manila enacted an ordinance which granted ABC Corporation to operate a jai alai in the City of Manila. The newly-elected Mayor refused to grant a business permit to ABC Corporation on the ground that the ordinance cannot prevail over a Presidential Decree which required that the grant of franchise to operate jai alai is invested in the Games and Amusement Board. ABC Corporation asked the Manila RTC to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the newly-elected Mayor to issue the business permit to ABC Corporation. As judge, will you issue the writ? Answer: No.: Former Chief Justice Puno in his Dissenting Opinion in this 1995 case said that the exercise of police power is not without limit. He said that while it is the “prerogative of the State to promote the general welfare of the people thru the use of police power ; on the opposite end is the right of an entity to have its property protected against unreasonable impairment by the State. Courts accord the State wide latitude in the exercise of its police power to bring about the greatest good of the greatest number. But when its purpose is putrefied by private interest, the use of police power becomes a farce and must be struck down just as every arbitrary exercise of government power should be stamped out.” (Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649) When exercise of police power may be questioned Answer: Where is there is no explicit grant of power, a government agency cannot exercise police power. The Court said: “Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.”-p The municipality of Teresa, Rizal enacted an ordinance which sought the expropriation of a property upon which it will build an evacuation center as part of its Disaster Preparedness Program. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved the ordinance. May the municipality still exercise the power of eminent domain? 34 | P a g e

Answer: Yes. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is a power delegated by Congress to political subdivisions. Moday v. C. A. 268 SCRA 586: The Court reiterated the limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. In the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the enumerated factors in R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR formula (in AO 5-98) that reflect these factors. Courts may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before them. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the factors and formula that the law and the rules have provided. The “time of taking” refers to that time when the State deprived the landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to the property or as of the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Iloilo City initiated expropriation proceedings against Spouses Espinosa. During the pendency of the case, the city government and the property owner agreed to settle the case through a compromise agreement. The Court approved the compromise agreement between the parties. Before fully paying for the property, the city government questioned the compromise agreement arguing that it was not the court which fixed the just compensation. Is the argument of the city government valid? Answer: No. A compromise agreement is valid since it has the effect of a ruling on the merit. The city government is also precluded to question such ruling of the trial court because it voluntary submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. (City of Manila v. Alegar Corporation et. al. June 25, 2012) Public Purpose – Housing for the poor: Ortega v. City of Cebu, 602 SCRA 601 (2009) Taking for a cultural/historical purpose: Manosca v C.A., G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996 Taking is not justified when a similar facility within the vicinity already serves the same purpose: Masikip v. Pasig City, 497 SCRA 391(2006) Just Compensation – Principal criterion to determine just compensation will be the character and use of the land at the time of taking: Tinio et al. v. NAPOCOR, G.R. 160923, January 24, 2011 Compensation based on R.A. 6657 is required in the determination of just compensation if the property is covered by CARP: LBP v. Ferrer et al., G.R. No. 172230, February 2, 2011 Recognition of Fair Market Value will form part of the basis of just compensation: EPZA v. Estate of Salud Jimenez, et al., G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011 Interest rate on just compensation is 6% per annum: Apo Fruits Corp. et al. v LBP, G.R. No. 164, October 12, 2010 Reconveyance – If government does not use the property for an unreasonable period of time for the public purpose it acquired the property, the property owner can ask for reconveyance of the same. If there is unreasonable delay (5 years) of payment of just compensation, the property owner can ask for possession of property until just compensation is fully settled. (Ouano v. MICAA)

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An American company sought to avail of benefits under a tax treaty between the Philippines and the Federal Government of Germany. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not allow it to enjoy such benefits. The American company refused to pay the assessment of the BIR and instituted an action before the Court of Tax Appeals. As justice of the CTA, how will rule on the case? Answer: I will rule in favor of the BIR and deny the petition of the American Company. Being a stranger to the treaty, it cannot avail of the benefits of the tax treaty between the government of the Philippines and Germany. Com. of Internal Revenue v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87. In negotiating tax treaties, the underlying rationale for reducing the tax rate is that the Philippines will give up a part of the tax in the expectation that the tax given up for this particular investment is not taxed by the other country. In order to eliminate double taxation, a tax treaty resorts to several methods. First, it sets out the respective rights to tax of the state of source or situs and of the state of residence with regard to certain classes of income or capital. The second method for the elimination of double taxation applies whenever the state of source is given a full or limited right to tax together with the state of residence. In this case, the treaties make it incumbent upon the state of residence to allow relief in order to avoid double taxation.

Power of Taxation: rule on taxation: must be uniform and equitable; Congress to evolve a progressive system of taxation- The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall " evolve a progressive system of taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977) (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 1995). Q. Aahon Party List sought to be accredited as a party list. The members of Aahon are males and females which have different sexual preferences. The COMELEC denied their accreditation based on biblical passages. Is the denial of COMELEC proper? Answer: No. Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, G. R. No, 190852, April 8, 2010: Accreditation is

done solely by COMELEC. The Court said that under the country’s system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their cha or association. The Court said that the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. Thus it held: “To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.” Other rulings on party list system: BANAT V. COMELEC, 592 SCRA 294: The Constitution provides that Congress shall not have more than 250 members unless Congress provides otherwise and out of the total number of incumbent members not more than 20% shall come from the party list. Of the party list members, each party list shall be entitled to a maximum of three seats. Paglaum v. COMELEC, 694 SCRA 477 (2013): sectoral representation need not be limited to the poor or marginalized group; extent of national membership; performance in party list election process PGBI v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010. The COMELEC has the power to delist a party list on two grounds under Section6 (8) of R.A. 7941.

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Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012. The registration of political parties does not involve administrative liability as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration A group of public school teachers instituted an action before the Supreme Court to question the veracity of the entries to the congressional journal regarding the passage of the law on grant of additional allowances of public school teachers for poll duty in the forthcoming May 2016 elections. They alleged that the law signed the President reflected a lesser amount that what has been reported in the media. Will the action of the public school teachers prosper? Answer: No The courts may not go behind the legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (U.S. v. Pons, 34 Phil., 729-735 (1916)) Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969): An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recomment the inclusion. Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974): The Court held that that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. What are the three functions of judicial review? Answer: The functions of Judicial Review are: Checking – looks into possible abuses of each branch of government; review of decisions of lower courts; Legitimizing – looks into constitutionality of laws and its application; and Symbolic – looks into issues although they have become moot and academic. REMEMBER THE EXPANDED POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE S.C. Under normal circumstances, S.C. will not disturb the findings of facts of administrative tribunals and the trial courts. However, S.C. may review findings of facts the lower courts under recognized exceptions: when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; where there is abuse of discretion; when judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, when the findings of facts are conflicting; when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to those of the trial court; when findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and when the findings of fact of the C.A. are premised on supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by evidence on record. General Rule: All courts can exercise judicial review Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality Under Civil Code, Art. 7, Statute is void when declared unconstitutional Statute is not always void but may produce legal effects b) Moot Questions General Rule: A matter is moot if further legal proceedings with regard to it can have no effect, or events have placed it beyond the reach of the law. Normally, courts will defer to acting on a matter that has become moot and academic. Exception: Where matters of transcendental importance arise, the Court render a resolution to give guideposts to the bench and bar if a similar matter should arise in the future.

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Concept of expanded power of judicial review: resolve matters of transcendental importance/ address matters which have been rendered moot and academic c) Political Question Doctrine Baker v. Carr: What is the political question doctrine: "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; (4) or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; (6) or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. The political question doctrine could be read narrowly or more broadly. Read narrowly, the political question doctrine should be invoked only when the issue presented to the Court is one that "has been textually committed to another branch of government." That is, if the framers of the Constitution made clear their intention that the judiciary not resolve a particular question of constitutional interpretation, that determination must be respected. More broadly, the political question doctrine might be invoked when there is a lack of judicially manageable standards to decide the case on the merits, when judicial intervention might show insufficient respect for other branches of government, or when a judicial decision might threaten the integrity of the judicial branch. (Baker v. Carr, 1962) Marcos et al. v. Manglapus et al. G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989: When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. A newly-elected member of the Senate proposed a tax measure which would effectively reduce the tax impositions on salaried employees. Is the proposal valid? Answer: No. Demetria v. Alba, G. R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987. All appropriations bill must emanate from the House of Representatives and the executive branch has no power to transfer one budget for another purpose for which it was originally intended. Tax laws (Art. VI, Sec. 28, Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3)). All tax, tariff and other revenue bills must originate in the House of Representatives but the Senate may introduce amendments. Demetria v. Alba, G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987: no cross border transfer of funds; all appropriations bill must emanate from the House of Representatives and the executive branch has no power to transfer one budget for another purpose for which it was originally intended. Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208493, November 19, 2013: limitations on the power to enact appropriation bills YMCA v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 33 Phil. 217(1916): taxpayer has burden of proof to claim tax exemption Quezon City v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 166408, Oct. 6, 2008: LGUs have power to collect local franchise tax

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Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 484 (2000): only Congress has the power to grant franchise Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27(1985): effectivity of laws; mandatory publication; characteristics of publication of general circulation Two members of the House of Representatives figured in a brawl during the heated deliberation on the passage of the bill legalizing marijuana. The incident was a subject of media coverage. Delfin Rosario, a taxpayer, asked the Ethics Committee of the House of Representatives to discipline two members of Congress. Will his action prosper? Answer: Yes. Each house may determine the rules of proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. May the President restrict the attendance of the members of the Cabinet in congressional hearings? Answer: No. This will violate the principle of checks and balances. Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1: The President cannot clip the powers of the legislative branch by restricting the attendance of officers and other officials of the executive branch from appearing in congressional hearings in the exercise of the constitutionally-mandated power to conduct inquiries.(referring to Section 21 of Art. VII) Neri v. Senate Committees. The executive branch may invoke executive privilege in matters covered by a legislative hearing and may even decline attendance or responding to queries if the same is not carried out in aid of legislation. May the House of Representatives consider simultaneously several complaints for inclusion in the Articles of Impeachment? Answer: Yes. Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G. R. No. Feb. 15, 2011. Congress may look into separate complaints against an impeachable officer and consider the inclusion of matters raised therein in the adoption of the Articles of Impeachment to be forwarded to the Senate as the impeachment tribunal. The Court has repeatedly held that: “Impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by nature, a sui generis politico-legal process that signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt.” (Francisco v. House of Representatives, on one year rule) Votes in impeachment proceedings A majority vote of the members of the Committee on Justice of HOR is necessary for consideration of its report in a plenary session. (Sec. 3(2), Art. XI) A vote of at least 1/3 of all members of the HOR is necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment or override its contrary resolution. A verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by 1/3 of all members of the HOR shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment. Two thirds vote of all members of the Senate is necessary to convict the impeached public officer. Gutierrez v. HOR, Feb. 15, 2011: consideration of two complaints as basis Francisco v. HOR, 415 SCRA 44: initiation of a complaint for impeachment Chief Justice Corona v. Senate of the Philippines et al., G.R. No.200242, July 17, 2012: The power of judicial review includes the power of review justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. 39 | P a g e

Considering that the positions of the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor are provided in the Constitution. May the President relying solely on his judgment remove them from office? Answer:Yes. Gonzales III v. Office of the President at al/ Bareras –Sulit v. Ochoa et al (2014).The Court held that the Office of the President has the power to discipline and even dismiss the overall deputy Ombudsman and the other deputies provided under the Constitution as well as the Special Prosecutor. The Court said that the Ombudsman is vested with broad investigative and disciplinary powers. These powers include the scrutiny of all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the “protector of the people” against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses, and excesses of the bureaucracy. As the Ombudsman is expected to be an ”activist watchman”, the Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by R.A. No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution. A Supreme Court Associate Justice will retire on February 14, 2016. May the Presidentappoint his replacement when an election ban is in effect? Answer:Yes. Midnight appointments: The outgoing President must refrain from filling vacancies to give the new President opportunity to consider names in the light of his new policies especially so when he ran on a platform approved by the electorate.( Art. VII, Sec.15) De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010: This case questioned the power of the President to appoint the Chief Justice during the prohibitive period. The S.C. held that the appointment of the members of the judiciary is not covered by the prohibition on midnight appointments. Power of Removal: For appointees who serve at the pleasure of the President, they may also be removed if there is loss of trust and confidence in them. Other public servants may be removed for cause provided for by law. May the representative of the Committee of Justice of the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously represent the Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council? Answer: No. Chavez v. JBC: The Congress is entitled only to one representative in the JBC and not one for each from the House of Representatives and the Senate. Recent rulings related to the JBC: Villanueva v. JBC (2015): A first level trial court must await a 5-year period before he can be promoted as RTC judge. The Court sustained the power of the JBC to prescribe rules in the screening of qualified candidates to the judiciary to ensure that only men of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence will be appointed to the bench. Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Sereno and JBC (2015): Having been denied due process, Jardeleza should be included in the list of nominees to be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court. An issue about his integrity was raised in the selection process but Jardeleza was never given the opportunity to be heard to overturn the allegation against him. With the recently SAF 44 incident, a newly-elected member of the House of Representatives proposed that Congress amend the Philippine National Police to include for confirmation the Chief PNP by the Commission on Appointments. Is the proposal valid?

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Answer: No. Article VII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution reads: "The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987): Appointment of Bureau of Customs Commissioner does not need confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Tatad v. Commission on Appointments, G.R. No. 183171, August 11, 2008: With the resignation of the nominee, there is no longer an actually justiciable controversy. Gregorio, a police officer, was charged for violation of the VAWC law and an administrative complaint was likewise filed against him before the People’s Law Enforcement Board. Can Gregorio move for the dismissal of the criminal case against him due to the pendency of his administrative complaint before the PLEB? Answer: No. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. (Acuzar v. Jarolan and Apresa PLEB, G.R. No. 177878, April 7, 2010) Lolita is a flight attendant who has exceeded the prescribed weight of the airline company. Despite repeated warnings, she failed to meet the prescribed weight and was accordingly dismissed by the airline company. She filed an action before the NLRC for illegal dismissal because she was denied the equal protection of the law. Will the action prosper? Answer: No. The claim of denial of the equal protection clause may only be invoked against the state.( Ysaregui v. NLRC and PAL) Garcia v. Hon. Drilon et al., G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013. R.A. 9262 does not violate the equal protection clause for the following reasons: the classification rests on substantial distinctions; the classification is germane to the purpose of the law; and the classification is not limited to existing conditions only and apply equally to all members. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 et al., G.R.Nos.192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010: E.O. is unconstitutional for singling out President Arroyo’s administration only. STANDARDS OF REVIEW (BILL OF RIGHTS) Prevailing standard used: Deferential or Rational Basis Scrutiny which establishes a rational connection to serve legitimate state interest. Middle Tier or Intermediate Scrutiny: Challenged classification serves important an important state interest. Strict Judicial Scrutiny: Burden is on the state to prove that classification achieves a compelling state interest. As counsel of a complainant, how will ensure that you can obtain a valid search warrant? 41 | P a g e

Answer: The Supreme Court has consistently held that the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons and things to be seized. (HPS Software and Communication Corp. and Yap v. PLDT, et al., G.R. No. 170217, 170694, December 10, 2012) People v. Belocura, G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012: The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for illegal possession of marij11ana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, depends on the integrity of the chain of custody of the marijuana from the time of its seizure until the time of its presentation as evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an acquittal because the State fails to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. CHAIN OF CUSTODY DOCTRINE: People v. Ronaldo de Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010: The law enforcers have the duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. This guaranty of integrity of evidence to be used against the accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights. Confiscation of seized items despite acquittal under P.D. 969: Nogales v. People, G.R. 191080, November 21, 2011 PROBABLE CAUSE: HPS Software and Communication Corp. and Yap v. PLDT, et al., G.R. No. 170217, 170694, December 10, 2012: Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. LOSS OF PROTECTION OF RIGHT: Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 6, 2013: The search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence. Petitioner’s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants pocket after the frisker’s hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities. Yao v. People: personal knowledge is mandatory in issuance of a warrant and not reliable information. While serving the search warrant, the law enforcers sensed that more unclicensed firearms were kept in the locked cabinets. They forced open the cabinets and true enough several high powered firearms were seized but were not covered by the warrant. Can the accused move for the exclusion of the seizure of the firearms not covered by the search warrant? Answer: Yes. People v. Nunez: the seizure of items not particularly described in the search warrant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 must be returned to the accused unless they are illegal and will be destroyed by the state. UNILAB v. Isip: Plain view doctrine will not apply when the following cannot be proved: prior intrusion must be legal; officer must discover the incriminating evidence inadvertently; and the object must be immediately apparent. Exceptions: search incident to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto, hot pursuit and escaped prisoners), search of moving vehicles, plain view doctrine and airport searches; and all circumstances set forth in the Rules in Criminal Procedure. 42 | P a g e

Cite instances when the freedom of movement may be restricted. Gudani v. Senga: the power of the President as Commander in Chief was sustained in restraining officers from testifying before the Senate. Fr. Roberto P. Reyes v. Gonzalez: Writ of Amparo will not lie to overcome a Hold Departure Order. The Writ of Amparo was intended to address the intractable problem of “extrajudicial killings” and “enforced disappearances.” OCA v. Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012. The Court may impose travel restrictions on judges. Marcos v. Sandiganbayan: humanitarian a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion. Other relevant rulings on: Freedom of Abode and Freedom of Movement: the right to choose one’s domicile; right to travel. Marcos v. COMELEC: the surviving spouse has the right to choose her residence other than the conjugal home. Aquino v. COMELEC: a lease contract is not conclusive proof of length of residence to meet the requirements to run for public office. Villavicencio v. Lukban: the Mayor’s order that some 170 individuals be put in custody and be dispatched to Davao City for work is a valid subject of a writ of habeas corpus. Freedom of abode is guaranteed “for ours is a government of laws and not of men.” Are professors of law claim that their allegations against a justice of the Supreme Court for plagiarism protected by free speech? Answer: No. The Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency. The accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. (RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT (A.M. No. 10-10-4- SC, 2010)) THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015) In upholding the Petition, the Court relied on a the definition of the right as elucidated by a prominent political theorist “T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social judgments through democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole way of life. The theory grew out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new society in which man's mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative, progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full potentialities. It spurns the alternative of a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and stagnant.”

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FREEDOM OF SPEECH TESTS: O’Brien Test on Content-Neutral Restrictions: Social Weather Station v. COMELEC, 357 SCRA 504 (2001) (simple public disclosure of survey results) Miller Test on Indecent Speech:Soriano v. Laguardia, 587 SCRA 79 (safeguard community values and morals) Roth Test on Obscenity: Gonzales v. Kalaw- Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717 (Movie Classification) Clear and Present Danger Test (Do not use the Dangerous Tendency Test) A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable. The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument. May a person who voluntarily surrendered invoke the Miranda rights? Answer: When will Miranda Rights apply – 1. One must be in the custody of law enforcers; 2. One must be under investigation for a commission of an offense; and 3. The information sought is testimonial in nature. Ho Wai Ping v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011: Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such investigation. "The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation." What is transactional immunity? Answer: Government may enter into an agreement to grant immunity provided grantee will become a state witness. Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010: TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY AND THE USE-AND-DERIVATIVE-USE IMMUNITY Transactional Immunity - two kinds of statutory criminal immunity available to a witness: transactional immunity and the use-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction to which the testimony relates. In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. (Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, 476 SCRA 202, 2005) If one has been convicted for violation of an ordinance, may be held accountable again under a national law? Answer: No. Requisites of Double Jeopardy (Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010): 1. Identity of the elements of the crime committed as set forth in the information. 2. Accused has entered his plea. 3. Prosecution and the defense have presented evidence. 4. The court has ruled on the merits. 5. The decision has become final and executory. People v. Dante Tan G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010: In People v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases 44 | P a g e

is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Bangayan, Jr., v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777, October 19, 2011: It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. The exception where the acquittal may be questioned based on denial of the State's right to due process can be found in Galman v. Sandiganbayan (1986) Exception, when invoked: Lejano v. People, G.R. Nos. 176389 and 176864, January 18, 2011: To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. Can a person accused of plunder be entitled to bail? Answer: Yes. In JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the Court granted Senator Enrile the right to bail. The Court elucidated that purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. It further said that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to: x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. chanRo”blesvirtualLawlibra”

Can a local government unit impose annual garbage fee? Answer: No. It violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.bThe collection of garbage 45 | P a g e

is a basic public service which local governments are mandated to undertake. (Ferrer v. Mayor Herbert Baustista, 2015) Can a local government impose socialized housing fee? Answer: Yes. Clearly, the Socialized Housing Tax charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Aside from the specific authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings. The collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products. (Ferrer v. Mayor Herbert Bautista, 2015) What are the requirements to consider an ordinance valid? Answer: It should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable. What are the tests for the validity of an ordinance? Answer: As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).Ch Can a barangay chairman issue a Barangay Protection Order? Answer: Yes. A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The protection orders issued by the court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a Barangay Protection Order. Can a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may required by court order to give a portion of his retirement benefits to his spouse after the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order by the trial court for violation of R.A No.9262 (VAWC Law)? Answer: Yes. Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the military institution. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government. It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement legislation. The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their personal safety and security.

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