Literal or Grammatical Rule of Interpretation

Literal or Grammatical Rule of Interpretation & The Golden Rule

Submitted to:

Submitted by:

Ms. Anju Berwal

Surya Sharma B.A. LL.B (Hons.) 5th Semester Group-1(Section-B) Roll No.: 100/13

TABLE OF CASES

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Lord Wensleydale in Becke v Smith,1836

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Grey v Pearson, 1857

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Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Employees AIR 1960 SC 675

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Lee v. Knapp (1967) 2 QB 442

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M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal v. STO, AIR 1973 SC 1034

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Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi AIR 1986 SC 842

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Dharamchand Khushalchand Mutha v. Anjana Medical Surgical Stores, through Partners 1992 Bom CJ 453 (Bom).

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Oriental Insurance Ltd Co. v. Sardar Sadhu Singh, AIR 1994 Raj 44.

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Manipal v. State of Karnataka AIR 1995 Kant 273

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Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab AIR 2001 SC 2524

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PUCL v. Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 363

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B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, AIR 2011 SC 1925

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Justice Chandrashekaraiah (retd.) v. Jenekere C. Krishna and others, AIR 2013 SC 726

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Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 2014 SC 184

Literal or Grammatical Rule of Interpretation If the words given in the statute are lucid and explicit, it is not for the judges to go beyond that language or words to try and establish what the legislative might have meant by using that word. It is also known as “Grammatical Interpretation”. 1 The Courts have to follow this principle even if it results in irrationality or even if it is contrary to the policy or intention of legislature. It doesn’t look beyond the litera legis  legis  which means letter of legislation. 2 It just looks at what law says. Words and phrases are to be construed by the courts in their ordinary sense, and the ordinary rules of grammar and punctuation have to  be applied. If, applying this rule, a clear meaning appears, then this must be applied, and the courts will not inquire whether what the statute says represents the intention of the legislature. In order to determine the literal meaning of a statute the courts have to ascertain the ordinary meaning of a word in a statute by referring to a dictionary or scientific or any other technical works where the words have been used. It is a rule of construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the word is to be adhered to. 3 The words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. 4 If the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in provision. 5 The sole purpose purpose of interpretation interpretation is to discover discover what the legislature legislature intended. intended. If the words of the the statute are in themselves themselves precise and unambiguous, unambiguous, then no more can can be necessary than to expound words in their natural and ordinary send because the words themselves alone, in such cases, best declare the intention of the law-giver. Thus, where the words used in the language and clear and precise and suffer with no ambiguity, the legislative legislative intent has to be gathered from the language itself. Under the literal rule/grammatical rule, it is the task of the court to give a statute’s words their literal meaning regardless of whether the result is sensible or not.

1

 Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Employees AIR 1960 SC 675  AIYER,P.RAMNATHAN, LAW LEXICON 1363 (2nd ed.,Wadhwa and Co., ,2002). 3  Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi AIR 1986 SC 842 4  Oriental Insurance Ltd Co. v. Sardar Sadhu Singh, AIR 1994 Raj 44. 5  Manipal v. State of Karnataka AIR 1995 Kant 273 2

In other words, a statute should be read as it is, without distorting or twisting its language. This rule is the most widely used Rule of Interpretation for the statutes to ascertain the legislative legislative intention behind the framing of the enactment. Where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary.6 The rule governs and regulates the meaning of the law in as much as the rule provides that the meaning has to be ascertained from the text of the law itself. In M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal v. STO 7, this Court observed that: In interpreting a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of interpretation is the literally construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the  provision say. If the provision is unambiguous unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear. Moreover, it is been regularly held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that one of the  basic principles of interpretation of Statutes is to construe the words according to their  plain, literal and grammatical meaning. If this principle is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. The intention of the Legislature is to be found in the words used by the legislature which is the primary rule of interpretation. 8 Once the Court departs from the literal rule then any number of interpretations can be put to a statutory provision, each judge having a free play to put his own interpretation as he

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 PUCL v. Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 363  AIR 1973 SC 1034 8  Justice Chandrashekaraiah (retd.) v. Jenekere C. Krishna and others, AIR 2013 SC 726 7

likes. This would be destructive of judicial discipline and also the basic principle that it is not for the Court to legislate. Even if the literal interpretation results in hardship or inconvenience it has to be followed. Hence departure from the literal rule should only be done in very rare cases, and ordinarily there should be judicial restraint in this connection.9 It is incumbent on the court to use the grammatical meaning. The statutes should be construed in such a manner as though there is no other meaning except the literal meaning.

If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous the court must give effect to it and it has no right to extend its operation in order to carry out the real or supposed intention of the legislature. 10

The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation is the rule and only if language of an enactment is ambiguous recourse to other rule can be taken. 11 The Courts cannot add words to a statute or read the words into which are not there. The Courts should proceed on the assumption that the Legislature did not make a mistake and that it intended to say what is said. 12

9

 B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, AIR 2011 SC 1925 MN RAO & AMITA DHANDA, N S BINDRA’S INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 433(10th edn Lexis  Nexis Butterworths, 2007). 11  Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 2014 SC 184 12  Dharamchand Khushalchand Mutha v. Anjana Medical Surgical Stores, through Partners 1992 Bom CJ 453 (Bom). 10

Golden Rule of Interpretation This rule is modified form of literal rule. It allows departure from strict literalness by recourse to consequences of applying natural or the ordinary meaning. According to the literal rule the grammatical or literal sense of words to be adhered to. But if the literal interpretation leads to absurdity or some inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, the literal interpretation may be dispensed with and grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity. This is the golden rule. It says that ordinarily the Court must find out the intention of the legislature from the words used in the statute by giving them their natural meaning but if this leads to absurdity, repugnance, inconvenience, hardship, injustice or evasion, the Court must modify the meaning to such an extent and no further as would prevent such a consequence. On the face of it, this rule solves all the problems and is, therefore, known as the golden rule. According to this rule, the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning because when meaning of the word is plain, it is not the duty of the courts to  busy themselves with supposed intention. intention. But when grammatical interpretation leads to absurdity it is permissible to depart from and to interpret the provision of statutes in such a manner so that absurdity is removed. re moved. The court when faced with more than one possible interpretation of an enactment is entitled to take into consideration the result of each interpretation in a bid to arrive at the true intention of the legislature. The golden rule comes into play where some doubt exists so as to the meaning of the word. Where absurdity or inconsistency flows from literal construction and such construction cannot be reasonably accepted to be the true one, the Golden Rule may be invoked to remove such absurdity. Like the literal interpretation rule, it gives the words of a statute their literal, ordinary meaning. However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature's intention, intention, the judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs,

where a word can have more than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning. The Supreme Court in a case observed that to find the meaning of a word not defined in an enactment the court c ourt apply the ‘subject and object rule’ which means it is necessary to ascertain carefully the subject of the enactment where the word occurs and have regard to the object which the legislature has in view. In selecting one out of the various meanings of a word regard must always be had to the context. 13 The golden rule can be applied in two ways: Narrow Approach- This approach is applied when the word or phrase is capable of more

than one literal meaning. This allows the judge to apply the meaning which avoids the absurdity. Broad Approach- This approach is applied when there is only one literal meaning. But

applying that one literal meaning would cause an absurdity. Under this approach the court will modify the meaning to avoid the absurdity. The modification shall be made keeping in mind the intention of the Parliament in making the law in question. The golden rule of statutory interpretation allows a shift from the ordinary sense of a word(s) if the overall content of the document demands it. It states that if the literal rule  produces an absurdity, absurdity, then the court should look for another meaning of the words to avoid that absurd result. The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. 14 In Lee v. Knapp, 15 interpretation of the word ‘stop’ was involved. Under section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 a driver causing an accident shall ‘stop’ after the accident. In this case a driver stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then went away. The defence taken by the driver was that as per the literal meaning of the section, he stopped after causing the accident and then went away. Applying the golden rule, the

13

 Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab AIR 2001 SC 2524  Lord Wensleydale in Becke v Smith,1836 and in Grey v Pearson, 1857 15 (1967) 2 QB 442

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court held that requirement of the section had not been followed by the driver as he had stopped for a reasonable period requiring interested persons to make necessary inquiries from him about the accident. It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute as it allows to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case it allows the language to be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience.

Bibliography 

Books 

Langan P St. J, Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur; Twelfth edition (2010).

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Bhattacharyya Bhattacharyya Prof T., The Interpretation of Statutes, Central Law Agency, 2014

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Sarkar S.C., Principles of Statutory Interpretation Interpretation and Statutory Words and Phrases, Dwivedi Law Agency, 2008.

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Mathur DN, Interpretation of Statutes, Central Law Publications, 2013.

Websites 

www.lawnotes.in

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www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj

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www.lawyersclubindia.com

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e-lawresources.co.uk

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www.inbrief.co.uk