Lim v Pacquing Case Digest

#3 FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 115044 September 1, 1994 HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila; and THE CITY OF MANILA, Petitioners, vs. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila; and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (ADC), Respondents. PONENTE: QUIASON, J.

Facts: On 13 November 1971, petitioner approved Ordinance 7065 granting respondent ADC a franchise to operate a jai-alai in the city. Thereafter, ADC took steps to establish the jai-alai. However on 20 August 1975, after Martial Law was declared, Pres. Marcos promulgated PD 771 revoking the powers of the local government to grant permits or licenses and canceling all existing franchises to operate jai-alais. Shortly after, the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation, was granted a franchise to operate a jai-alai under PD 810. However, after the EDSA Resolution, Pres. Cory repealed PD 810 through EO 169. When ADC’s motion to reconsider its request for resumption of operations was denied by Mayor Lopez, it filed a petition for mandamus and specific performance on 2 August 1988 with RTC Manila (CC No 88-45660) which was granted on 9 September 1989. In 1991, the City of Manila filed an action to annul ADC’s franchise with RTC Manila (CC No 91-58913). On 21 December 1991, the case was dismissed holding that abandonment, as issue, was already resolved in (CC No 88-45660) and that the issue of repeal (by PDs 771 & 810) was not pleaded therein as a defense. On 28 March 1994, the RTC issued an Order in CC No 88-45660 granting ADC’s motion to compel petitioner Mayor Lim to issue the permit under Ordinance 7065. In 20 April 1994 Order, the RTC affirmed its March 28th Order after

petitioner’s motion to reconsider was denied in the 11 April 1994 Order. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari to SC under Rule 65 seeking to nullify the RTC Manila’s three Orders alleging that the CC No. 88-45660 decision, being implemented by said Orders, is null and void for Ordinance 7065 had already been canceled by PD 771 and that the RTC had traduced the law when it made it appear in its decision that Ordinance 7065 was still in full force and effect. Respondent, on the other hand, urged for petition’s dismissal on the ground of violations on prohibition against forum shopping, and required verification in petition. Issue: As far as petitioners are concerned, whether or not their contention is tenable. Ruling: NO. Petition for Certiorari is Dismissed. Petitioners failed to appreciate the distinction between a void and an erroneous judgment and between jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise thereof (Lamagan v. De La Cruz, 40 SCRA 101 [1971]). The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. The fact that the decision is erroneous does not divest the court that rendered it of the jurisdiction conferred by law to try the case (Quiason, Philippine Courts and their Jurisdictions, p. 199 [1993 ed.]). Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, or the jurisdiction over the subject matter, it does not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the

court of its power (Century Insurance Co. v. Fuentes, 2 SCRA 1168 [1961]). In the case at bench, there is no question that the Regional Trial Court has the competence to hear and decide Civil Case No. 88-45660, a special civil action for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. There is also no quarrel that said court has jurisdiction over an action for specific performance under Section 19(1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1990 (Lapitan v. Scandia, 24 SCRA 479 [1968]). Assuming arguendo that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the said civil case, the principle of estoppel will operate to bar petitioners from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time in the instant case (Tijam v. Sibonghanay, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Having jurisdiction over the civil case, whatever error may be attributed to the trial court, is simply one of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment cannot be corrected by certiorari but by appeal (Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780 [1990]; De Castro v. Delta Motor Sales Corporation, 57 SCRA 344 [1978]; Galang v. Endencia, 73 Phil. 391 [1941]). In fact, Mayor Lopez availed of such a remedy when he appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 88-45660 to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. No. 16477-SP). The issue on the cancellation of Ordinance No. 7065 by President Marcos could have been raised as a special defense in Civil Case No. 88-54660 but was not. The Revised Rules of Court frown at the piecemeal presentation of issues, and jurisprudence bars from subsequent litigation between the same parties matters that could have been raised in a previous case (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 39, Sec. 49[b]; Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 72 [1968]).

The City of Manila should have pursued in the appellate courts its appeal questioning the dismissal of Civil Case No. 91-58913, where the trial court ruled that Mayor Lopez and the city could no longer claim that Ordinance No. 7065 had been canceled by President Marcos because they failed to raise this issue in Civil Case No 88-54660. At any rate, the unilateral cancellation of the franchise, which has the status of a contract, without notice, hearing and justifiable cause is intolerable in any system where the Rule of Law prevails (Poses v. Toledo Transportation Co., 62 Phil. 297 [1935]); Manila Electric Co., v. Public Utility commissioners, 30 Phil. 387 [1915]). As a fall-back, petitioners claimed that assuming arguendo that the judgment in Civil Case No. 88 - 45660 dated September 9, 1986 is valid, its execution by mere motion on March 11, 1994 is irregular. Citing Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, they contended that the decision must be enforced by action, not motion (Rollo, pp. 13-14). - Digested [16 November 2016, 22:43]

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