Liberty of Abode and Travel Digests

Marcos vs. Manglapus [GR 88211, 15 September 1989] En Banc, Cortes (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 5 dissent in separate opinions, 1 on leave Facts: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced theconstitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On 28 August 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same — a split in the ranks of the military establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over the military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military. But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements in the military establishment and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own in the areas they effectively control while the separatists are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up in these groups' determination to wrest power from the government. Not only through resort to arms but also through the use of propaganda have they been successful in creating chaos and destabilizing the country. Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, Marcos' petition for mandamus and prohibition, asking the court to order Raul Manglapus as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Catalino Macaraig as Executive Secretary, Sedfrey Ordonez as Secretary of Justice, Miriam

Defensor Santiago as Immigration Commissioner, Fidel Ramos as Secretary of National Defense, and Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff, to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Issue: Whether Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode, in light of the attendant circumstances in the present case. Held: The individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and freedoms of others." as distinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof. On the other hand, the Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and thepromotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to

them. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. Since the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered, the constitutional guarantees must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests, as such are neither absolute nor inflexible. The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, the Court cannot argue with that determination. MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989] Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right

to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ [217 SCRA 633; G.R. NOS. 99289-90; 27 JAN 1993] Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired. Issue: Whether or Not the petitioner’s right to travel is impaired. Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)

Yap vs. CA Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, “in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years.” He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accused’s bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel? Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. YAP vs. Court of Appeals Ramon Yap purchased a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, from the spouses Carlos and Josefina Nery. The lot was thereupon registered in the name of Ramon Yap he also declared the property in his name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due threon from 1966 to 1992. In 1962 Ramon Yap constructed a two storey 3 door apartment building for the use of the Yap family. 1/5 of the cost of the construction was defrayed by Ramon Yap while the rest was shouldered by Chua Mia, the mother of Lorenzo, Benjamin and Ramon. Upon the request of the old woman the tax declaration for real estate was placed under the name of Lorenzo Yap. Lorenzo Yap died on 11 July 1970. A few month leter, his heirs including Ramon yap allowed petitioners to use one unit of the apartment building. On March 18, 1992, Ramon Yap sold the land and his share of the 3-door apartment to his brother, his herein co-respondent Benjamin Yap, for the sum of P337,500.00 pursuant to a Deed of Sale. Petitioners advised respondents of the former’s claim of ownership over the property and demanded that respondents execute the proper deed necessary to transfer the title to them. Petitioners claim that Lorenzo requested his brother Ramon to allow the use of the latter’s name in the purchase, registration, and declaration for tax purposes of the subject lot to which Ramon Yap consented. It was agreed that the property would remain registered in the name of Ramon yap until such time as Lorenzo would have acquired

Philippine citizenship but that, should Lorenzo, the lot would then be transferred to Lorenzo’s heirs upon the latter’s naturalization. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court denied the petition and dismisses the case. Issue: WON the petitioners are entitled to own the questioned property. HELD: Petitioners were not able to prove adequately the agreement between them and the respondent. The petition was denied and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. Yap vs. Court of Appeals [GR 141529, 6 June 2001] Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur Facts: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, Francisco Yap Jr. (@ Edwin Yap] was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years." He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 17 February 1999. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, Yap filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that Yap may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant." Yap filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail. The resolution of the Court of Appeals, issued on 6 October 1999, upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General. A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by the court, but was denied in a resolution issued on 25 November 1999. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the bail may be fixed at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which the accused is charged. Held: The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to Yap on appeal. The court stated that it was doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by Yap's admission he went out of the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail.

Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano, the Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions. At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail: (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) Penalty for the offense charged; (d) Character and reputation of the accused; (e) Age and health of the accused; (f) Weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) Forfeiture of other bail; (i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements. Herein, where Yap was found to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a holddeparture order against him. Under the circumstances, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of Yap's right to bail. The purpose for bail is toguarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the Court. The amount should Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which Yap is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this the Court cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.