LGC Case Digests

Case Digest in Local Government Code (Part II) 1. Vicente De La Cruz vs. Edgardo Paras G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983 Fernando, CJ:

FACTS: De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND A ND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS” . Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under revie w were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.

If night clubs were merely then regulated and not proh ibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

2. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991 1

GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS: Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner’s plant in Sta. Ma ria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayor’s permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without notice, caused the padlock of company’s plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of  its operation. Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not it is within the power of the Mayor to order the closure of private business operation within his territory? HELD: The Court held in the affirmative. The Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry but it must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of th e pollution of the environment. 3. CHUA HUAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-53851 July 9, 1991 DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS: Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested Manila City Engineer and Building Official Manuel del Rosario to condemn the dilapidated structures located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. The said official issued notices of condemnation to petitioners based on Inspection Reports showing that the buildings suffered from structural deterioration of as much as 80%. The condemnation orders stated that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It was stated that the notice was not an order to demolish as the findings of the City Engineer are still subject to the approval of the Mayor. The Mayor confirmed the condemnation orders.

More than 3 months after the issuance of the condemnation order, petitioners protested against the notices of condemnation on the ground that the buildings are still in good physical condition and are structurally sound. Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition order. The petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition, with PI or TRO against the City Mayor, City Engineer, Building Officer and Manuel Uy and Sons Inc. The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to comment. Respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed claiming that: (1) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila 2

falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600); and (2) the power to condemn and remove buildings and structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety. ISSUE: WON the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive  jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Official; HELD: The Court held in the affirmative. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Officials. The Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila and the National Building Code, also provide the authority of the Building Officials, with respect to dangerous buildings. Respondent City Engineer and Building Official can, therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition orders. This is also true with the Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnation orders as provided in Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.

4. HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991 PARAS, J.

FACTS: Petitioner passed a resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the office of the mayor, of extending financial assistance of five hundred pesos (500.00) to a bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. This resolution was re-enacted again by a subsequent resolution.

The dispute arose when respondent issued an order disapproving the disbursement of the City's funds pursuance to the said resolution. The COA argued that there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under the assailed Resolutions, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." Also COA alleged that the resolution violate the prohibition that government funds must be disbursed for public purpose. Moreover, COA alleged that there was violation of the e qual protection clause, since classifying pauper residents would be an invalid classification since there is not substantial distinctions form the other residents of Makati. ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions are within the power of the Sanguniang Panglungsod of Makati. HELD: 3

The Court held in the affirmative. Municipal corporations are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." As to the first defense of COA- it does not hold water since COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." It has been ruled by the court that police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. As to the second defense of COA- COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social  justice, as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. As to the third defense of COA- there is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Note: This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. Note further: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the 4

repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to en able them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." 5. TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC 207 SCRA 157 G.R. No. 40243 11 Mar 1992 FACTS: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse. A c ommittee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void? HELD: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate 5

trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision. 6. RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE MEDINA and FORTUNATA ROSELLON, respondents. G.R. No. 97477 May 8, 1992 ABATEMENT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE FACTS: Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that during the mayor, the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals religiously until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the government since money is allocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants. ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code? Held: Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that “Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which: … hinders or impairs the use of the property.” Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be equal.”

Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance: 1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance 2. Civil action 3. Abatement without judicial proceedings In the present case, the municipality chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the PR. Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before summarily abate a public nuisance. Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private respondent. 7. Greater Balanga Development Corporation vs. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1998) G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994 FACTS:

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The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the public market in the Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered in the name of Greater Balanga Development, Corp., owned and controlled by the Camacho family. The lot was part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in the name of Aurora Banzon Camacho, which was later subdivided into certain lots, some of which were sold, others donated. Five buyers of the lot filed a civil case against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles. Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the Mayor of Balanga but failed to mention the existence of the civil case for partition and delivery of titles. The permit was granted the privilege of a “real estate dealer/privately-owned market operator.” However, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed Resolution No. 12 s-88, annulling the Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on the ground that the issue as to the ownership of the lot caused “anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the stallholders and traders in the lot,” and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit “to operate a publi c market.” The Mayor then revoked the permit through EO No. 1 s-88. Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction or restraining order and to reinstate the Mayor's permit and to curtail the municipality's collection of market and entrance fees from the lot occupants. He alleges that: 1) it didn't violate any law, thus, there's no reason for revocation of the permit; 2) Respondents failed to observe due process in the revocation; 3) the collection of market fees is illegal. On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief executive has the power to issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that the revocation was due to the violation by Petitioner of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1) made false statement in the application form, failing to disclose that the lot was subject to adverse claims for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to apply for 2 separate permits for the 2 lines of business (real estate and public market). ISSUE: W/N the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid. HELD: NO. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality. The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is premised on a violation by the grantee of any of its conditions for its grant. For revocation to be  justified under the Balanga Revenue Code, there must be: 1) proof of willful misrepresentation, and 2) deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed.

In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requries the applicant to state the “type of business, profession, occupation, privileges applied for.” Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form. It is only in the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear. Revocation is not justified because Petitioner did not make any false statement therein. Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a groun d for revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. Granting, however, that separate permits are actually required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards the number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in. The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for expansion of the Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't actually maintain a public market on the area. Until

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expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land. Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders doing business on a property not owned by the Municipality cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of Petitioner. Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right to due process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation. Moreove r, Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3, and thus cannot collect market fees, which only an owner can do. 8. ALFREDO TANO, et. al. vs. HON. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, et. al. G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997 FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of:(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayor’s and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa and, (3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THECATCHING, GATHERI N, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS” The petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional HELD:

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NO. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and thepowers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), andunder Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve theexercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for itsefficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, amongother things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliantscientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve thecomfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) toestablish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a p eriod of fiveyears; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. 9. JOSE D. SANGALANG, et. al. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988 FACTS: The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use? HELD: No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a “[f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed “non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

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10. FRANCISCO U. DACANAY vs. MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., et. al. G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992 FACTS: An ordinance was issued designated certain city and municipal streets, roads, and other public areas for sites of public markets. Pursuant to this, licenses were issued to market stall owners to put up their stalls in certain streets. Thereafter, the OIC mayor of Caloocan has caused the demolition of the stalls, which was upheld by the trial court, saying that the public streets are part of the public dominion and is not open to the commerce of man. Then there come about a change in administration of the city. The next mayor did not continue the demolition of the stalls. Using the trial court’s decision, here now comes petitioner asking for the demolition of the stalls. ISSUE: Whether or not a public street may be subject to commerce of man? HELD: There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondent’s market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of the few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community. 11. Macasiano vs. Diokno 211 SCRA 464 G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992 FACTS: Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market. Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag. ISSUE:

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WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid. HELD: No. J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it can’t be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance. The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety & convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the inhanbitants pf the local units. As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose. The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable during its time. 12. MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. GR 135962 March 27, 2000 FACTS: On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

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ISSUE: WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power. HELD: A ‘local government’ is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs”. It is a “body politic and corporate” –  one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers] provided under the Code.” There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a “development authority” and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the Preside nt with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal. 13. Moday vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 107916 February 20, 1997

Municipal Corporation – Eminent Domain – Disapproval by SP of SB Resolution FACTS: Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan? HELD: 12

Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid. 14. PROVINCE OF CAM SUR vs. CA 222 SCRA 137 GR 103125 May 17, 1993 FACTS: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990. In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction. Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 3 37), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

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The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land. ISSUE: WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins. HELD: To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Resolution No. 219, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides: "A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose." Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to nonagricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. Ratio: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents. SO ORDERED. 14

15. Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court GR L-72126 29 January 1988

Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur FACTS: In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs 215165 and 37879 . The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of PMC's heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by TCT 37879. An opposition to the resolution was filed by the PPMC with the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of four members to investigate the matter. On 10 March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road. On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution 238, Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Meycauayan. The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew PPMC's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on 25 January 1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14 February 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the municipality. On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the property. PPMC went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for review. On 10 January 1985, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon motion for reconsideration by PPMC, the decision was re -examined and reversed. The appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined that the land is more ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished products. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the municipality went to the Supreme Court on petition for review on certiorari on 25 October 1985. ISSUE: Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMC’s property for the purpose of a connecting road, in light of other appropriate lots for the purpose. HELD: There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor. The 15

foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to require into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. The government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much Constitutional Law II, 2005 thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow. The Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that "there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandizing Corporation for use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot offered f or sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain decongestion of traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area." There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the municipalities's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road.

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