Lenin, Trotsky & Jewish Identity

Lenin, Trotsky & Jewish Identity - Peter Myers, February 18, 2002; update January 11, 2009. My comments are shown {thus}. Write to me at contact.html. You are at http://mailstar.net/lenin-trotsky.html. A reader writes, "Lenin was no Jew ... Trotsky was no friend of the Jews." In dealing with this question, I do not want to get bogged down in questions of race; what counts is identity. Most people have diverse ancestry, but select certain features of it with which to identify. This subjective factor - in the mind - far outweighs race. Ten generations back, each of us has 1024 ancestors; to select one (eg the bearer of our surname or religion) to identify with, is arbitary, but meaningful in cultural terms. (1) Dmitri Volkoganov on Lenin and Trotsky (2) Conversations with an old Jewish man (3) Josepha Nedava on Trotsky (4) Letter to Israel Shamir & Henry Makow (5) "Lenin ... fought the Jewish Bund and was shot by a Jewish assassin" - Israel Shamir

(1) Dmitri Volkoganov on Lenin and Trotsky Volkoganov was Director of the Institute For Military History in the USSR in its latest years. After the fall of the USSR he gained access to the previously-secret archives on Lenin. Pavel Sudoplatov, Stalin's spymaster, attests that Volkogonov is a reputable historian, in his book SPECIAL TASKS (LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, London 1994). On p. 428, Sudoplatov introduces Volkogonov as "Colonel General Dmitri Volkogonov, who was writing biographies of Stalin and Trotsky ... " In Footnote 10 on p. 428, Sudoplatov writes of him: "Volkogonov was deputy chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet army, in charge of psychological warfare against the American armed forces in the 1970s and 1980s. He became director of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense in 1986." sudoplat.html. In Volkogonov's biography Lenin, he writes of Lenin's Jewish self-identity: Lenin's sister Anna confirmed it in a letter to Stalin.

"{p. 8} In her letter to Stalin, Anna wrote, 'It's probably no secret for you that the research on our grandfather shows that he came from a poor Jewish family ... "{p. 9} ' ... she also asserted ... that Lenin's Jewish origins 'are further confirmation of the exceptional abilities of the Semitic tribe, [confirmation] always shared by Ilyich [Lenin] ... Ilyich always valued the Jews highly'. ... Anna's claim explains, for instance, why Lenin frequently recommended giving foreigners, especially Jews, intellectually demanding tasks, and leaving the elementary work to the 'Russian fools'.. "But a little over a year later, Anna approached Stalin again, asserting that 'in the Lenin Institute, as well as in the Institute of the Brain ... they have long recognized the great gifts of this nationand the extremely beneficial effects of its blood on the progeny of mixed marriages. Ilyich himself rated their revolutionary qualities highly, contrasting it with the more sluggish and unstable character ofthe Russians. He often pointed out that the great [attributes of] organization and the strength of the revolutionary bodies in the south and west [of Russia] arose precisely from the fact that 50 per cent of their members were of that nationality.' But Stalin, the Russified Georgian, could not allow it to be known that Lenin had Jewish roots, and his strict prohibition remained firmly in place." "{p.xxxvii} He {Lenin} went on: 'Hand out the work to Russian idiots: send the cuttings here, but not occasional issues (as these idiots have been doing until now).' "{p. 112} He {Lenin} might have been thinking of Parvus (or perhaps himself?) when he said to Gorky: 'the clever Russian is almost always a Jew or has Jewish blood in him.'" {Trotsky in New York - 1917. The Kerensky government asked the British to release him from detention in Halifax, Canada}} {p. 64} His sons went to school in New York and quickly learnt English. They had already acquired French in Paris and German in Vienna, and were growing up in a cosmopolitan environment and shared their father's life. Trotsky spent two months giving lectures in New York, Philadelphia and elsewhere. He met Nikolai Bukharin, Alexandra Kollontai and Grigori Chudnovsky, as well as a few other revolutionaries, but he had barely found his feet among his compatriots when exciting and at first incomprehensible news began arriving from Russia. It was reported from Petrograd that on 15 March two members of the Duma, Alexander Guchkov and Vasili Shulgin, had visited the Tsar in his headquarters at Pskov and accepted his abdication in favour of his brother, Grand Duke Michael. The Duma members had done their level best to save the monarchy, as was made clear by the leader of the

liberals (Kadets), Paul Milyukov, who was reported as saying: 'We cannot leave the question of the form of our state structure open. We are thinking of a parliamentary and constitutional monarchy.' When Trotsky read this he flung the newspaper down in disgust and cried: 'The Kadets have crawled into the prompter's box and are chanting {p. 65} their old line!' His wife was more philosophical: 'Lyova, what would you expect?' Later, when he was back in Russia, Trotsky would learn that Michael had said he would only accept the crown if it were the will of the people, as expressed in a constituent assembly, and since neither the early convocation of such a body, nor indeed Michael's own safety, could be promised by the members of the Provisional Govemment, Michael had followed Nicholas's example and abdicated. Three hundred years of the Romanov dynasty came to an end, and Russia was without a monarchy. But what of the socialists? Where was Lenin? How would relations between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks be affected? Meanwhile, the news was dizzying. Could it really be true that the Red Flag was flying over the Winter Palace? Meetings that Trotsky attended in New York were triumphant. He was almost never at home. Having heard the news of the February revolution, he at once determined that his place was back in St Petersburg, now named Petrograd, and on 27 March, together with his family and some other Russians, he boarded the Norwegian steamer Christiania Fjord, bound for Europe. When the ship was searched at the Canadian port of Halifax, the Trotsky family and a number of other Russian passengers were arrested. While in detention they learned that the British government had reported that Trotsky was travelling to Russia at the expense of the German government and with the intention of overthrowing the Provisional Government. Indeed, after his arrival in Petrograd the local newspapers continued to print this story. The issue remained controversial for decades, and conclusive proof was not available until the early 199Os, when access was finally obtained to Lenin's archives. These revealed that the Bolshevik Party had been covertly receiving large sums from the German government, with which they financed their propaganda among the troops and workers following the February revolution. But as early as 1917 well-informed observers were in no doubt that the Bolsheviks owed a great deal to financial aid from Germany, funnelled into Lenin's coffers by various channels and under different names. After several protests against Trotsky's arrest appeared in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda, the Provisional Government felt compelled to cable Halifax and request the release of the interned Russian citizens, and within three weeks, on 18 May, Trotsky was in Petrograd ... {end}

(2) Conversations with an old Jewish man Not long after I wrote my article Hiding Behind Auschwitz, I had some amazing conversations with a Jewish man who must have assumed that I am Jewish on account of my surname. I commented to him that "Capitalism is a cruel system", which is my honest belief, when he agreed and went on to say, "Communism was the perfect system", because it was "one for all and all for one". Although he is an atheist, he also said, "What we have now is no good. The Jewish religion is 100%. [Even] Catholicism was not bad." He also said, "They were all Jews - Marx was a Jew, Lenin was a Jew, X was a Jew, Y was a Jew." Even though I had read that Lenin considered himself a Jew, I was so stunned to hear him say so, that I missed catching the names of the X and the Y. This man had been a prisoner at the Belsen concentration camp. Yet he said to me, "Hitler did a lot of good for his people. Mussolini did a lot of good for his people. Mussolini's only mistake was to join with Hitler."

(3) Josepha Nedava on Trotsky On Trotsky, the following is from Josepha Nedava's book Trotsky and the Jews (Nedava himself is Jewish): Joseph Nedava, Trotsky and the Jews, The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia 5732 / 1972. {start quote} {p. 36} A Jewish journalist who knew Trotsky from the period of his stay in Vienna ("when he used to play chess with Baron Rothschild in Cafe Central and frequent Cafe Arkaden daily to read the press there") is even firmer on the Yiddish issue: "He [Trotsky] knew Yiddish, and if at a later date, in his autobiography, he pretends to know nothing about Jews and Judaism, then this is nothing but a plain lie. He who had visited at Cafe Arkaden for years on end must have mastered both these matters to perfection. The language in greatest use at that Cafe was - besides 'Viennese-German' - Yiddish."26 {see note 26 below} Trotsky of course had no objection to the Yiddish language as such (as Hebraists, for instance, had, contending that Hebrew was the only national language of the Jews); this appears from his reply to Lazar Kling, the editor of the Jewish Trotskyite organ in New York (Unzer Kamf - Our Struggle): You ask, what is my attitude to the Yiddish language? - As to any other language. If indeed I used in my autobiography the word "jargon," it is because in my youth the

Jewish language was not called "Yiddish," as it is today, but "jargon." This is how the Jews themselves called it, {continued below at p. 37} {footnote 26 to the above is on p. 237:} {p. 237} 26. M. Waldman, "Trotski be-Vina-Zikhronot" [Trotsky in Vienna reminiscences], Ha'olam (Jerusalem) 27, no. 55 (2 October 1940): 864. Trotsky was a keen chess player; Ziv, Trotsky, p. 76. At those Vienna cafes he learned the colloquial Yiddish word kibitzer - "an onlooker . . . especially one who volunteers advice" (Webster's New World Dictionary). In a speech in Moscow he once said: "I lived as an emigre in Vienna for several years, and there they use a word which, it seems to me, cannot be found in any other language - kibitzer. Remember this word it will prove useful to you. This word designates a man who, seeing two people playing chess, takes without fail a seat nearby and always knows the very best move, and if you sit down to play a game with him, he proves to be an ignoramus after the first move"; Pravda, no. 219, 20 October 1922; and L. Trotsky, Pokolenie Oktyabrya (Moscow, 1924), p. 77. {end note 26} {p. 37} at least, in Odessa, and they have injected into this word absolutely nothing of slight. The word "Yiddish" has been made of common use, in any case, in France, for instance, only for the last 15-20 years. {p. 106} Much more helpful to the suffering Jews in those dire days was Trotsky's sister, Olga Kamenev, wife of the influential Bolshevik {p. 107} leader Lev Kamenev {one of the triumvirate who succeeded Lenin, with Zinoviev and Stalin; of the three, only one was non-Jewish}. {p. 195} Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the future Zionist leader, related in his autobiography that "Switzerland - and this meant chiefly Berne and Geneva was, at the turn of the century, the crossroads of Europe's revolutionary forces. Lenin and Plekhanov made it their center. Trotsky . . . was often there." ... Trotsky must have followed very closely the Sixth Zionist Congress at Basle in 1903. Shortly after the close of the Second Social-Democratic Congress in London he arrived in Switzerland, at the very time when the Zionist Congress was taking place, in August. It should be noted that this congress marked the zenith of Dr. Herzl's activities, and the Zionist Organization was granted an international status following the diplomatic negotiations which had been carried on by the British government with its representatives. Preparations for convening the Zionist Congress were well publicized by the world press, and Trotsky was attracted - either on his own account or through his Bundist acquaintances - to

{p. 196} attend its proceedings. He read the Zionist organ Die Welt, as well as the general press, which reflected the keen interest in the Zionist movement even among non-Zionist and non-Jewish circles. ... {p. 204} On his arrival in Mexico in January 1937, Trotsky granted several interviews to the press, in which he expressed his views on Jewish problems. He admitted that with Hitler's rise to power in Germany, things had altered considerably for European Jewry. Agonizingly he had to reappraise his former assumptions: During my youth I rather leaned toward the prognosis that the Jews of different countries would be assimilated and that the Jewish question would thus disappear, as it were, automatically. The historical development of the last quarter of a century has not confirmed this view. Decaying capitalism has everywhere swung over to an intensified nationalism, one aspect of which is anti-Semitism. The Jewish question has loomed largest in the most highly developed capitalist country of Europe, Germany. Trotsky still did not concede that the Jewish question could be solved within the framework of the capitalist system; but assimilation, as a kind of self-regulating process which might have taken care of the problem over an extended period of time, could no longer be relied upon; its pace was not speedy enough to cope with the appearance of such radically destructive movements as nazism. Palliatives, therefore, had to be sought, and Trotsky was driven to admit the existence of one of them territorialism. "The Jews of different countries," he said, "have created their press and developed the Yiddish language as an instrument adapted to modern culture. One must therefore reckon with the fact that the Jewish nation will maintain itself for an entire epoch to come." The admission of the existence of a "Jewish nation" was a weird recantation on the part of Trotsky, unless it was a mere semantic slip of the tongue. Admitting in 1937 the need for a palliative solution to the Jewish problem but realizing, of course, that Zionism was basically a territorial movement. Trotsky took issue with it, not on the grounds of substance, but rather practical viability. He said so explicitly: We must bear in mind that the Jewish people will exist a long time. The nation cannot normally exist without common territory. Zionism springs from this very idea. But the facts of every passing day demon{p. 205} strate to us that Zionism is incapable of resolving the Jewish question. The conflict between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine acquires a more and more tragic and more and more menacing character. I do not at all believe that the Jewish question

can be resolved within the framework of rotting capitalism and under the control of British imperialism. In his interview with the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Trotsky recalled that he had been inclined toward the idea of assimilation of Jews, but had changed his attitude because of "historical developments." He then brought up a new concept, which had never before preoccupied the minds of Marxist doctrinaires: emigration. Orthodox socialism, which claims to be anchored in the underlying fraternity of the human race, does not envisage the need for transplanting peoples in order to solve social problems. Trotsky, however, admits to the peculiarity of the Jewish problem in this respect too: Socialism will open the possibility of great migrations on the basis of the most developed technique and culture. It goes without saying that what is here involved is not compulsory displacements, that is, the creation of new ghettos for certain nationalities, but displacements freely consented to, or rather demanded, by certain nationalities or parts of nationalities. The dispersed Jews who would want to be reassembled in the same community will find a sufficiently extensive and rich spot under the sun. The same possibility will be opened for the Arabs, as for all other scattered nations. National topography will become a part of the planned economy. This is the great historic perspective as I see it. To work for international Socialism means to work also for the solution of the Jewish question.* {Why does Trotsky mention the Arabs, if not implying that Palestine would be given to the Jews? H. G. Wells also envisaged mass migration in his world state.} Here Trotsky may have prophetically adumbrated the national renascence which sprouted among wide sections of Soviet Jewry, which, following the Six-Day War of 1967, has assumed the form of a persistent struggle for the right of immigration to Israel.? * Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 18 January 1937. ? It is noteworthy that P. B. Akselrod anticipated Trotsky by many years in defending the idea of Jewish immigration to Palestine. See Deich, Yiden in der Rusisher Revolutsie, 1:9. {p. 206} In June 1937 Mrs. Beba Idelson, a Russian-born Jewish socialist Zionist leader in Palestine, visited Trotsky in Mexico. First she participated in a press conference at Diego Rivera's residence and then had a long conversation with Trotsky in his study. The following are some of her recollections of that conversation:

I told him who I was, and that at the time I had been expelled from Russia as a Zionist-Socialist. If he was interested, I would tell him about our life in Palestine. Trotsky got up from his chair, asked me to wait awhile, and soon returned with his wife. He introduced me to her and asked me to tell him everything. He wanted to know about Palestine and was happy to hear a report from a person living there. I talked to him not as one talks to a stranger. A feeling accompanied me all the time that he was a Jew, a wandering Jew, without a fatherland. This brought me closer to him, aroused in me confidence that my story was addressed to a man who was able to understand. I interrupted my story several times, asking him whether he was sure he had the time to listen to me, and he urged me to continue, jotted down some points, and then began to question me: How many Jews are there in Palestine? Where do they reside; is it only in towns? He asked numerous questions about the kibbutzim and the Histadrut. Are we able to work in harmony with the employers within the framework of the Zionist Organization; how do we bring Jews to Palestine and how do they join our party; how is our young generation being brought up and what is its language? He asked me to say a few sentences in Hebrew and smiled at the sound of the language. He wrote several words and noted down mainly the names of the Zionist leaders, the parties, the Histadrut, and various places in Palestine. He showed interest as if he were a man hearing about an unknown land, but I was under the impression that the subject absorbed his thought and heart. The conversation lasted nearly three hours. After telling how we were fighting for Jewish immigration into our country, and he was deeply immersed in thought, I asked him: "Here is a country that is ready to admit you; perhaps you, too, will go to Palestine?" I felt that a shiver ran through his spine. He replied with a calm question: "Wouldn't you be afraid to accept me?" I answered: "No, we won't be afraid, for our idea is stronger than any fear of any man, even of a man like you." Trotsky came over to me, pressed my hand, and said: "Thank you. It is a long time since I have felt so good. But you should know that I have friends throughout the world. We have not renounced our views, {p. 207} even though I am rejected by Stalin and his Oprichniks [this is Trotsky's expression, referring to the special corps created by Ivan the Terrible to fight treason which instituted the reign of terror]. I have friends, and they are also persecuted." I told him that his persecuted friends lived in their own countries, whereas he had no country of refuge, for he was a Jew. Trotsky nodded agreement. We had lunch together. His wife showed no interest in our conversation. From time to time she would address questions to him, but he would put off his reply and then turn to me with further questions about matters relating to Palestine. He was particularly interested in our relations with our Arab neighbors. He asked me whether there were

Communists in Palestine, and why they did not go to Russia instead of staying in a Zionist country. He also wanted to know whether the Communist party was legal, big or small. When I told him that the Communists were not among the builders of the kibbutzim ("communes," as Trotsky called them), he laughed, commenting: "They do not have this in Russia, either." He was very interested in the status of women in Palestine, and also asked a personal question - how I had arrived in Mexico and what the nature of my mission was. He showed me his library, which filled a large hall, consisting of books in various languages; I realized how spiritually attached he was to this single possession of his in exile. I asked him: "Should you be obliged to leave Mexico - what will you do with this library: perhaps you would transfer it to Palestine?' When we renewed our conversation after the meal, he listened attentively to what I told him about the cultural work being carried on in our country, about the libraries in each and every settlernent, about the National Library in Jerusalem, about the Hebrew press. I can no longer recall all his questions, but I cannot forget how attentively he listened to what I told him about our children, the sabras, and their love of their fatherland. I noticed that my words penetrated deep into his heart, that he was glad to hear about a world from which he had dissociated himself. I sensed that he was listening not like a man who placed himself above all nationality, and that our great idea found an echo in his heart. At the end of our conversation Trotsky asked me not to publish the fact of our meeting and its contents: "Let the matter remain between us. The world will not understand. People will seek in this, too, grounds for accusing me of harboring alien views, and perhaps even sympathy for Zionism." I promised him this and kept my promise for nineteen years. {end quote} More from Nedava at nedava.html.

(4) Letter to Israel Shamir & Henry Makow 4.1 Henry Makow writes that the "Enlightenment" is actually a Luciferian Revolt: http://www.etherzone.com/2003/mako090803.shtml. 4.2 Israel Shamir wrote: [shamireaders] Discussion on Communism Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2003 21:36:03 +0300 From: "Israel Shamir"

Preface Our friend anti-Zionist Henry Makow promoted on his site http://www.savethemales.ca a book by an Estonian writer Juri Lina who happened to combine hatred to Jews, Christianity and Communism. Lina wrote: "Both Christianity and Marxism were created with a view to slavery" - that is really Hitlerite line that any neo-con would subscribe to. I actually share his idea of similarity of 'Christians and Communists', and belong to both. But what he curses, I bless daily in the church. For whatever was its conception, the Communism as it became known in the second half of the 20th century was a wonderful humanistic faith of mutual support, heavily influenced by the Orthodox Christianity of Russia. Many anti-communist theories and 'facts' are provided in order to facilitate the great robbery of Russia in 1991 and the rest of the Third World. Lina collected all garbage produced by CIA- paid anticommunists of Russia. Otherwise, he reprocessed the old stuff well known to all of us. As for Jews, by stretching this term to infinity (from Proudhon to Torquemada, from Lenin to Robespierre, and to practically every non-Estonian) he makes it meaningless. In no way one can desribe Lenin or Marx as 'Jews'. Marx was a Christian, and a strongest anti-Jewish voice from St Paul to modernity, Lenin was a Russian noble and a (lapsed) Christian, who fought the Jewish Bund and was shot by a Jewish assassin. If a few drops of Jewish blood would qualify for calling a man - a Jew, we would have a billion of Jews. ... {endquote} 4.3 Juri Lina's book - reply to Henry Makow and Israel Shamir Israel & Henry, I have a copy of Juri Lina's book Under the Sign of the Scorpion, and find it a mixture of valuable information I did not know before, and unsubstantiated statements. I would like to see it rewritten, with the latter either backed-up or removed. Making sense of the Soviet Union and East Bloc has become more important that we thought 10 years ago. My websitesite, while not comprehensive, provides a lot of "missing" information about the stages the USSR went through. 1. The early, pre-Stalin, phase, was set up by Non-Theistic Jews. I provide verification of this from reliable sources. See the information provided above, and zioncom.html. Non-theistic Judaism is a religion, a variation of Judaism: philos.html.

When I say that they were Jews, this is not a matter of blood, but of their own personal Identity - they way they saw things. That can change over time. No-one should be categorised, judged or imprisoned by factors he or she did not choose, such as ancestry or the name given by parents. There's no point in denying it; however, interpreting it is another matter. One interpretation might stress "benevolence": this faction of Jews is ruling for the benefit of the lower orders. Another interpretation stresses "malevolence": the hijacking of the socialist movement for their own totalitarian purposes. 2. Stalin rose to power for a number of reasons: - because the Red Army's attempt in 1920 to smash Poland and reach Germany failed - because Trotsky was feared by other Jewish Bolsheviks. When Lenin died, power passed to a triumvirate: Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin. Of these, Stalin was the only nonJew - because Trotsky did not attend Lenin's funeral - and perhaps, because of hostility to Jewish domination; this factor increased later 3. Stalin was brutal, but his brutality was, in part, directed against the non-theistic Jewish Bolsheviks ... who in time, came to reassess Trotsky and coalesce around him as the rival leader, the exiled pretender to the throne. Thus Isaac Deutscher, in his book The Prophet Outcast, records Trotsky's aspiration - even in 1939 - to return to the USSR in the wake of Stalin's overthrow (Victory in Defeat: pp. 510ff). Deuscher articulated a strong Jewish Identity: deutscher.html. 4. The plan by the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committe for a Jewish Republic in the Crimea, the Baruch Plan of 1946 for World Government, and the rallying of Soviet Jews to Israel (eg at Golda Meir's visit) affected Stalin's perception of Jewish solidarity with Jews in the US and Israel. Moscow & Jerusalem became rival centres representing divergent visions of socialism. This was an unseen Cold War:sudoplat.html. 5. Stalin was murdered, within 2 months of the Doctors Plot being announced; Zionism was one of the issues in his murder: death-of-stalin.html. The murderers comprised a "Jewish" faction (Beria, Kaganovich et al) and a "Russian" faction (Khruschev et al). Beria, of the Jewish faction, took power, and

instituted "reforms" of the type Gorbachev was to repeat later. East Germany began to collapse ... in response, the "Russian" faction was able to overthrow Beria and install Khruschev: beria.html. 6. Gorbachev seems to have removed the totalitarian aspects of Communism; on that account, he may have been the best ruler. But he was aiming at Beria's "Convergence" policy, i.e. at a World Government, a Single Civilization uniting East & West. For this, he thought he must dismantle the heritage of Stalin, including the East Bloc: convergence.html. 7. Convergence is associated, loosely, with the Trotskyist movement, which is also loosely called "Marxist Anti-Communist" (see kostel.html) and "New Left": newleft.html. The magazine New Left Review, for example, was closely attuned to the ideas of Isaac Deutscher, a champion of Trotsky. 8. Convergence is also associated with the "Open Conspiracy" for World Government: wells-lenin-league.html. 9. The kind of "Marxism" we now have in the West is the Trotskyist kind. Thus the Greens promote Gay Marriage and Open Borders. The Gay & Radical Feminist movements are following the policies of the Trotskyist period of the USSR, during which Marriage was officially abolished and homosexuality (including sodomy) normalised. Stalin re-instituted marriage, and made sodomy a crime: sex-soviet.html. {end}

(5) "Lenin ... fought the Jewish Bund and was shot by a Jewish assassin" - Israel Shamir The Bund is a Jewish-separatist socialist organisation, a member of the Socialist International. The Socialist International (SI) was anti-Stalin, favouring the separation of East Europe from the Soviet bloc and its incorporation into a united Europe. Yet the SI promoted International Socialism. Willy Brandt was a prominent leader of the SI; in Australia, Gough Whitlam promoted it. Some details at http://www.iisg.nl/archives/gias/s/10769647.html. (5.1) "Lenin ... fought the Jewish Bund and was shot by a Jewish assassin" Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2004 23:47:22 +0300 From: "Israel Shamir"

: You wrote, "Lenin ... fought the Jewish Bund and was shot by a Jewish assassin" : Is this the woman called Kaplan? Dear Peter, yes, Fanny Kaplan. No she was not a Bundist, but an SR (socialist revolutionary). : Did the shooting have a connection with Lenin's crackdown on the Bund? I have not heard of direct connection, and I did not claim there is. Still it is probably Lenin was not seen as a good guy for nationally aware Jews; the Jews in the Party were anything but nationally minded as a rule. : I understand that the doctors could not remove the bullet from Lenin's : head. Did this shooting cause Lenin's later strokes ... and early death? It is very possible that this wound caused Lenin's premature death. (5.2) Fanny Kaplan shot Lenin on August 30, 1918; who were the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs)? Dmitri Volkogonov, Lenin: Life and Legacy, translated and edited by Harold Shukman (HarperCollinsPublishers, London, 1994): {p. 172} There was, it is true, a moment when the Left SRs wanted to merge with the Bolsheviks, but, as Trotsky recalled, Lenin decided to 'let them wait'. But, for a time, the collaboration was a fact. Of the twenty members of the Cheka Collegium, seven were Left SRs, including Dzerzhinsky's deputies Alexandrovich and Zaks. In April 1918 the Left SRs helped the Bolsheviks to crush the Anarchists (who were splintered into a host of groupings, some of them supporting the Bolsheviks, most opposed to Lenin's strong, centralized form of government), and also helped to spread Bolshevik influence in the countryside by supporting the infamous decree of 13 May 1918 which legitimized the confiscation of grain from the peasants. Before the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921, force was virtually the sole means employed by the regime to bring the peasants under its control. It soon became clear, however, that the Bolsheviks did not want to share power with any party. When the Left SRs opposed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, under which Lenin withdrew from the war at huge cost, and resigned from the government, the

Bolsheviks heaved a sigh of relief, and smashed them as a party on 6-7 July 1918 by mass arrests and deportations to prisons and concentration camps. Lenin was less concerned with unstable allies like the Left SRs and drop-outs from Vikzhel than he was with the impending Constituent Assembly. ... Despite his promise of land, Lenin knew that the peasants would not vote for the Bolsheviks, but would support the Socialist Revolutionaries as the more familiar party. {p. 173} It was not possible to complete the election in one day - in some places it took the entire month of December. 703 deputies were elected, of whom only 168 were Bolsheviks. The SRs won 299 seats, the Left SRs 39, the Mensheviks 18, the Popular Socialists 4, the Kadets 17, and 158 were elected from various national groups. {p. 341} Lenin could scarcely conceal his dissatisfaction that the SR programme, while socialist in essence, said nothing about the dictatorship of the proletariat, and put the land problem in the context of the traditional peasant commune. The SRs saw the state as an auxiliary element. {p. 346} The SRs, who were regarded as the defenders of the peasants' interests, bitterly criticized the Bolsheviks. In 1921 their Central Committee published an underground pamphlet entitled 'What Have the Bolsheviks Given the People?' It stated: {quote} From the start of their accursed empire the Bolsheviks have shown themselves to be enemies of the peasants. They sent armed detachments into the countryside to get grain ... The peasant cannot breathe freely it's either confiscations or loading duties, or tree-cutting or the army, and bring your carts with you, or bring your last livestock for slaughter. There are ninety million peasants in Russia, that is, the huge majority. But what part do they have in running the state? {endquote} (5.3) More on the Jewish Bund - from J. Landowsky, Pavel Sudoplatov, Jaff Schatz, George Bailey Shamir rejects Red Symphony, and I cannot be sure of its veracity - Peter M. (5.3.1) RED SYMPHONY, by Dr. J. Landowsky, translated by George Knupffer (Christian Book Club of America P.O. Box 900566 Palmdale, CA 93590-0566, First Printed 1968 Reprinted 2002): {p. 29} It was not for nothing that the real party of the "non-party" Trotzky was the ancient "Bund" of the Jewish proletariat, from which emerged all the Moscow

revolutionary branches, and to whom it gave 90% of its leaders; not the official and well-known Bund, but the secret Bund which had been infiltrated into all the Socialist parties, the leaders of which were almost all under its control. G. - And Kerensky too? R. - Kerensky too ..., and also some other leaders who were not Socialists, the leaders of the bourgeois political fractions. G. - How is that? R. - You forget about the role of freemasonry in the first phase of the democraticbourgeois revolution? G. - Were they also controlled by the Bund? R. - Naturally, as the nearest step, but in fact subject to "Them." G. - Despite the rising tide of Marxism which also threatened their lives and privileges? R. - Despite all that; obviously they did not see that danger. Bear in mind that every mason saw and hoped to see in his imagination more that there was in reality, because he imagined that which was profitable for him. As a proof of the political power of their association they saw that masons were in governments and at the pinnacle of the States of the bourgeois nations, while their numbers were growing all the time. Bear in mind that at that time the rulers of all the Allied nations were freemasons, with very few exceptions. This was to them an argument of great force. They fully believed that the revolution would stop at the bourgeois republic of the French type. {end} red-symphony.html (5.3.2) SPECIAL TASKS : THE MEMOIRS OF AN UNWANTED WITNESS - A SOVIET SPYMASTER, by Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter (LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, London, 1994): {p. 288} In the early 1920s, when the Bolshevik regime was first establishing itself, there was a preponderance of Jewish names in administrative positions at all levels because they had the education to fill these jobs. At this time there were no internal passports in Russia, so people were not officially identified as Jews or other nationalities. In 1922 and 1923 there was a rapid roundup of the leaders of all Jewish and other nationalist underground groups. The Police of Zion organization

(Politzi Tzion) was extremely active, for example, and outmaneuvered GPU surveillance teams in Odessa; the Zionists led the secret service officers to a remote cemetery and then turned on them and beat them. Haganah had its origins in Zhitomir in the Ukraine, but the irony is that the Jews who worked in the Ukrainian GPU were put in charge of the operations against the Zionist underground groups. The crackdown included the Jewish Bund, a socialist organization that was a member of the Socialist International. The Jewish Communist party, a splinter group from the Jewish Bund, was also dissolved. This was the Bolshevik policy, to eliminate any political national splinter group in or out of the Communist party. The separatist Ukrainian Communist party was also dissolved. The Communist Party of the Ukraine (Bolsheviks) was the established and approved political party. It was the only party with its own politburo. The Jewish leadership was either exiled or permitted to emigrate. Before 1928, there was no barrier to emigrating; the procedure for leaving the country was simpler than now. The effect of the loss of these leaders was that Jews no longer had any political organizations and lost their Jewish identity. The Jewish intelligentsia lost its political roots. In 1933 the internal passport system was introduced, and Jews were identified as a national group, even though they had no republic to be their homeland. In every major ministry at this time, Jews held top positions. I scarcely remember the directive of the Central Committee in 1939, after the Great Purge, to look into how many people of any one nation{p. 289} ality were occupying key positions in sensitive ministries, but it was more potent than I perceived it to be. For the first time, an effective quota system came into being. Fortunately, most of my comrades-in-arms {Jewish?}, men and women who became distinguished fighters, agents, and officers during the war, were already in place and were not affected by this directive. {end} sudoplat.html (5.3.3) Jaff Schatz, The Generation: The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland, Uni. Of California Press, Berkeley, 1991: {p. 34} The young assimilationists placed their hopes in the Polish left, although some, disappointed by anti-Jewish hostility, found their way back into the Jewish world as Zionists or Bundists. {p. 42} ... messianic activism, called by its opponents a "wrong messianism" or "mad messianism," was never entirely wiped out. As a nearly permanent latent factor, it has repeatedly manifested itself in Jewish history in the form of different messianic movements. ... The

{p. 43} Zionists, the Bundists, and the Jewish Communists shared the same messianic activism and emancipatory ideal, the token of all modern Jewish secular politics. ... To point out the central significance of messianic traditions in modern Jewish ideology, identity, and politics does not mean that this tradition is an exclusively Jewish possession. In secularized form, elements of the messianic idea permeated the European Enlightenment and the French and Industrial revolutions. Under the influence of religious and political liberalism, urbanization, and industrialization, and united with elements of utopian thought, messianic millennialism was transformed into the modern idea of progress. However, if the messianic idea was of such great significance within the general society, it was immensely more so in the community that created and carried it throughout the ages. The messianic tradition permeated Jewish civilization to such a degree that it became one of its very central, even when latent, features and a backbone of its popular culture. It resisted the impact of secularization and acculturation, the challenge of modernity, by transforming itself into radical political options, in which activist forces were immensely strengthened. {p. 51} ... some of the radical peers were to become Bundists, some others Zionists, and still others Communists. {p. 52} The Bundist vision lost its social substance with the physical disappearance of the large Yiddish-speaking radical Jewish working class. As the Communists took over Poland, the Bundists had to capitulate: they either became resigned fellow travelers or emigrated. {p. 114} ... For these young Communists, there existed an increasing gap of totally different values, attitudes, and images separating them from their parents and their "world of yesterday." As the gap between the generation grew, the Communist movement increasingly became a substitute for their original families. This phenomenon was not exclusively Communist. The Zionist and Bundist movements, with their large profile of activities{p. 115} schools, summer camps, social clubs, and so on - and the fact of their legality, were able to function as social substitutes for the family. They "helped give party members the feeling that they resided in a 'new world,' as opposed to the 'old world' of the home and the synagogue." {p. 232} ... In 1948 they (and the Bund) had to join the Zionists in fund-raising, the recruitment of volunteers for Haganah (which soon became the official Israeli army), and in military training, all carried out with the quiet blessing of the authorities. On Israel's victory in the war for independence, several Jewish

Communists were provided with party contacts and sent to Israel with officially proclaimed wishes for good luck in the task of building socialism there. {p. 252} An important ideological signal that precluded the final Communist offensive in the Jewish sector was Ilya Ehrenburg's Pravda article of September 21, 1948. This obviously offficially sanctioned article condemned Zionism as "mysticism," denied that there was any afffinity between Jews of different countries, condemned Jewish nationalism, stressed the necessity of class struggle in the newly created Jewish state, and declared that Communism and not the bourgeoisgoverned State of Israel was the solution to the Jewish problems. {p. 254} ... This was soon followed by deep and lasting political and organizatlonal changes in the Jewish sector. Separate Jewish schools, which previously had been subordinated to the CKZP, were at the beginning of the 1949-50 school year taken into the state budget and soon wholly incorporated into the national school system. The vocational ORT schools were taken over by the state in 1950. Toward the end of 1949, against the wishes of the CKZP and the Communist activists, the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) was ousted from Poland as part of the severing of contacts with the West. The Jewish welfare institutions and the Jewish theater, which had been operating with AJDC aid, were nationalized. Jewish libraries were merged with non-Jewish ones, the Jewish Writers Association, Jewish youth organizations, and the lands{p. 255} manshaften were either dissolved or merged with national organizations. At the end of 1949, the Jewish cooperative movement Solidarnosc was merged with its Polish counterpart. After having been under intense ideological attack, the Bundists were made to retract their "rightist-nationalist tendencies" and reject their "separatist" program of national-cultural autonomy. Sharing the fate of the PPS, the Bund was dissolved on January 16, 1949, and some of its members admitted to the Communist party. The Zionist parties and organizations were disbanded later that year. The Union of Jewish Religious Congregations changed its name to the Union of Congregations of the Mosaic Faith, and its contacts with Jewish organizations abroad were greatly limited. Finally, the by then totally Communist-dominated CKZP was in October 1950 officially merged with the Jewish Cultural Society to form the TSKZ. Thus, the Jewish sector was reshaped. It was reduced and reconstructed beyond recognition and its remaining institutions placed under exclusive political and ideological Communist domination. From being merely a minor factor among Polish Jewry, Jewish Communists were now in total command of what remained. {end} schatz.html

(5.3.4) George Bailey, The Making of Andrei Sakharov, Allen Lane the Penguin Press, London 1989: {p. 129} In pre-revolutionary Russia Jewish youth provided the cadres of revolutionary parties and organizations in large part. This was especially true of the Bund, which was in a class by itself. The Jewish Social Democratic Union (Bund), although specifically Jewish, was the oldest, most active and for a long while the most effective element of the Russian social democratic movement. 'When the first Zionist congress met in Basel in 1897 and in the same year the first all-Russian congress of the Bund took place,' runs the report, 'giving expression to both national and social radicalism, the enthusiasm aroused among the Jews of Russia was vast and overwhelming.' From the very first, then, the contest between Zionism and Communism was given. Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, with his idea of the agrarian production collectives or kibbutzim, was a socialist of the first wafer. The Bund became wholly devoted to Zionism, ultimately providing the leaders and cadres for the founding and building of the state of Israel. The Bolshevik Party was no exception to the other revolutionary parties: about one half of the Central Committee's members were Jews. All key positions and posts of power within the Central Committee were occupied by Jews. There was Trotsky, the commander and in no small part creator of the Red Army and the political leader second only to Lenin. There was Sverdlov, who headed the regime and was Lenin's right-hand man; Zinoviev, leader of the Comintern and Party boss of Petrograd; Kamenev, Lenin's first deputy in the Council of People's Commissars, manager of the Soviet economy and head of the Moscow Party organization. In the Politburo of 1921 all members excepting only Lenin and Stalin were Jews. {end} convergence.html (5.3.5) Trotsky on Ukranian separatism Joseph Nedava, Trotsky and the Jews (The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 5732/1972): {p. 219} By envisioning an "independent Jewish republic," Trotsky in fact placed the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union on the same basis as the Ukrainian problem. During the last year of his life Trotsky came out openly in favor of the establishment of "a united, free, and independent workers' and peasants' Soviet Ukraine." He was willing to go the whole way of granting self-determination to the Ukraine, even to the extent of separation from the Soviet Union. "The fervid worship of state boundaries is alien to us. We do not hold the position of a 'united and indivisible' whole. After all, even the constitution of the USSR acknowledges the right of its component federated

peoples to self-determination, that is, to separation." He expected that such an independent Ukraine "might subsequently join the Soviet federation; but voluntarily, on conditions which it itself considers acceptable." {end} The coup against Gorbachev was prompoted by his plan for a referendum on a Union Treaty, which also offered the possibility of secession. He was following - whether he knew it or not - the path set out by Trotsky above. But whereas Trotsky countenanced the breakup of Stalin's USSR, would he have done so if he himself were in charge?

Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks - Peter Myers. Date September 6, 2001; update June 30, 2006. My comments are shown {thus}. Write to me at contact.html. You are at http://mailstar.net/sudoplat.html. Sudoplatov had a Jewish wife and was loyal to Beria, and was arrested when Beria was arrested, accused of Zionist sympathies, in connection with the Doctors Plot. Although Sudoplatov dismisses that plot as false, other authors present new evidence that Stalin was murdered. The best coverage is the book The Death of Stalin: An Investigation by 'MONITOR': death-of-stalin.html. Edvard Radzinski's book Stalin is pro-Zionist, but also presents an interesting coverage, on pp. 539-556: January 13, 1953: Tass announced the discovery of a terrorist group of poisoning doctors (Radzinsky, p. 539). February 8, 1953: Pravda published the names of Jewish saboteurs etc. February 11, 1953: the USSR severed diplomatic relations with Israel (Yosef Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations 1953-1967, published by Frank Cass, London 1998, pp. 3-4). End of February, 1953: rumors went around Moscow that the Jews were to be deported to Siberia (Radzinsky, p. 542), with March 5 rumoured to be the date when this would happen (p. 546}. Radzinsky claims that Stalin was inviting war with America, the home of Zionism and world finance, over this issue, because America was dominated by Zionist financiers (p. 543).

March 5, 1953: Stalin declared dead. Evidence That Stalin was murdered (Radzinsky, pp. 547-556): radzinsk.html. For a Jewish view on the Doctors' Plot see Louis Rapaport, Stalin's War Against the Jews. Lazar Kaganovich's account of the Murder of Stalin: kaganovich.html.

SPECIAL TASKS : THE MEMOIRS OF AN UNWANTED WITNESS - A SOVIET SPYMASTER Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter Foreword by Robert Conquest LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY London 1994. {The 1995 paperback edition contains a new Foreword, pp. ix-xvii, defending Sudoplatov's account of the atomic spies, from critics: atomic-spies.html; but page numbers for the body of the text remain unchanged. The footnotes at the bottom of pages in the text are by Robert Conquest; only selected footnotes are included here.} {p. 3} My name is Pavel Anatolievich Sudoplatov, but I do not expect you to recognize it, because for fifty-eight years it was one of the best-kept secrets in the Soviet Union. You may think you know me by other names: the Center, the Director, or the head of SMERSH (the acronym for Death to Spies), names by which I have been misidentified in the West. My Administration for Special Tasks was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination of our enemies beyond the country's borders. It was a special department working in the Soviet security service. I was responsible for Trotsky's assassination and, during World War II, I was in charge of guerrilla warfare and disinformation in Germany and German-occupied territories. After the war I continued to run illegal networks abroad whose purpose was to sabotage American and NATO installations in the event hostilities broke out. I was also in charge of the Soviet espionage effort to obtain the secrets of the atomic bomb from America and Great Britain. I set up a network of illegals who convinced Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, Bruno Pontecorvo, Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, and other scientists in America and Great Britain to share atomic secrets with us. {p. 4} It is strange to look back fifty years and re-create the mentality that led us to take vengeance on our enemies with cold self-assurance. We did not believe there

was any moral question involved in killing Trotsky or any other of our former comrades who had turned against us. We believed we were in a life-and-death struggle for the salvation of our grand experiment, the creation of a new social system that would protect and provide dignity for all workers and eliminate the greed and oppression of capitalist profit. We believed that every Western country hated us and wished to see our doom. Therefore, anyone who was not for us was against us. In the Great Patriotic War against Hitler, the struggle between good and evil was simplified. All anti-Nazis knew that we were the only hope of destroying the fascist regime. Good men and women of every nationality became pro-Communist and gave their lives in this clear-cut cause for human freedom. There was no doubt in our minds that we had to learn how to build an atomic bomb before the Germans. We resented that the Americans moved ahead in this field without us, even though they were our wartime allies against Germany. Therefore, every theft of atomic secrets was a heroic act. Every scientist who handed over diagrams and formulas for building a bomb was counted a Soviet hero working for world peace. After Hitler was defeated, it became less clear who was against us and who was merely critical of our methods. We had no time or patience for these distinctions. Good men who had risked their lives and suffered torture by the Nazis spent years in the cells of Lubyanka for merely doubting that we knew best. The result was that we created a weakness in ourselves that we never overcame.We never learned how to incorporate and deal with diversity. You in the West have your weaknesses as well. The diversity in America, the plethora of foreign-born immigrant communitieswithin your population, are the pride of your melting pot. Yet within these communities we were able to enlist thousands of agents ready to destroy you in case war broke out between us. During World War II, more than ninety percent of the lonely soldiers spread throughout Western Europe who sent us crucial information that enabled us to beat back the German invasion were Jews whose hatred of Hitler spurred them to risk their lives and families. Yet when the Western tide of sentiment turned against the Soviet Union after World War II and our own internal conflicts within the leadership weakened us, we turned against the Jews who had served us loyally. {p. 5} My wife, Emma, a lieutenant colonel in the KGB, who was a Jew, had served proudly. She retired in 1949, just in time to avoid the new purge of Jews from the security forces that was a result not of any disloyalty, but merely of their identification as Jews in intelligence work.

I was a witness to the purges of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s and saw how they affected the development and history of my country. The truth of the past fifty years is still being subordinated to politically self-serving interprerations of the events. Those claiming to write our history cannot whitewash the czarist empire and Lenin simply to expose Stalin as a criminal - that is too easy, given his intellect and vision. Victorious Russian rulers always combined the qualities of criminals and statesmen. In this regard it is overlooked that Stalin and Beria, who played tragic and criminal roles in our history, at the same time played a constructive one, turning the Soviet Union into an atomic superpower. It is that accomplishment which determined how events in the world would unfold. So we must ask, How did these individuals perform as statesmen? What were the rules of the game in the inner development of the Soviet superstate from the 1930s until Stalin's death in 1953, and afterward, under his heirs? My conclusions are based on my own personal involvement with these people and events. Unfortunately, due to its political sensitivity, this book is being published first in the West in order to assure its access to Russian readers. I hope historians will find the events I recount and my explanations helpful. I am not going to whitewash anybody, and I do not intend to justify what I did as a member of the foreign intelligence service from the 1920s to the early 1950s. That was a different time, a different historical period. What is needed is to understand the mechanism of the power struggle and how this mechanism developed into present-day Russia. {p. 17} I was overwhelmed by Paris and remain under its spell to this day. This was a city of history, and it occurred to me that the French Revolution lasted for a hundred years, until the Paris Commune of 1871. What the French went through in the nineteenth century, we Russians are enduring in the twentieth. {p. 31} According to his NKVD personnel file, Naum Isakovich Eitingon was born on December 1, 1899, in the city of Sklov in the Mogilov district of Byelorussia, not far from Gomel, the big Jewish center where Emma was from. In the Lubyanka and among friends we always called him Leonid Aleksandrovich, because in the 1920s Jewish CHEKA officers adopted Russian names so as not to attract attention to their Jewish origins while working with Russian informers and officers. {p. 88} disinformation ... convinced a suspicious Stalin and his defense minister, Kliment Y. Voroshilov, that the generals were maintaining secret contacts with German military commanders. This was the version repeated by Khrushchev in his address denouncing Stalin to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. The German connection must be understood against the background of a close relationship between German and Soviet strategic thinkers. In 1933, Stalin ended a

long period of cooperation between the military leadership of Germany and the Soviet Union under the fabricated pretext that the Germans were leaking information to the French about secret Soviet-German military contacts.1 A group of Soviet generals, led by Marshal Tukhachevsky, had wanted to continue it, hoping to utilize Germany's technological leadership. There was similar interest, but for different reasons, on the German side, especially among highranking East Prussian officers, followers of the Wehrmacht's founder, General Hans von Seeckt. After defeat in World War I, Von Seeckt spent years rebuilding German military strength and studying its strategic options. He demanded that the German leadership improve relations with the USSR to avoid the danger of war on two fronts. The second version alleges that the victims were the intellectual superiors of Voroshilov and had a stronger, more professional military overview. They disagreed with Stalin and Voroshilov on issues of strategy and military reform, the theory goes, and therefore Stalin got rid of them, fearing they would become rivals to power. The third version states that they were eliminated because of a long-simmering hostility between Tukhachevsky and Stalin over blame for military mistakes during the Civil War and the war against Poland in 1920. The Red Army was defeated on the outskirts of Warsaw because Stalin and Voroshilov blocked the transfer of cavalry troops to assist Tukhachevsky in the battle of the Vistula River. My own view differs from these three versions. I recall being startled 1. In a secret message to the German Embassy in Moscow in June 1933, Nikolai Krestinsky, deputy commissar of foreign affairs, falsely accused German vice chancellor Franz von Papen of disclosing the top-secret Soviet-German military contacts to French officials and canceled further cooperation. The Soviet note was unexpected because in May Voroshilov and Tukhachevsky had received a toplevel German military delegation. Stalin's decision was dictated by his belief that the Germans had served their purpose, helping to lay the foundations for Soviet tank and aircraft production. N. Roshchin, writing in Voyennoi Istorischeski Zhurna/ (Journal of Militarv History), August 1993, p. 41. {p. 89} when I examined the reports coming from Germany in August 1939 that revealed the German high command's rather high assessment of the Red Army's potential. I remember, as well, a document of the German high command intercepted by us that postulated the causes for Marshal Tukhachevsky's fall as his ambitions and basic disagreement with the quiet Marshal Voroshilov, who was wholly subservient to Stalin's views. Beria underlined one sentence in this document: "The fall of Tukhachevsky decisively shows that Stalin tightly controls the Red Army."

This statement was quoted by Beria in the summary of intelligence information he forwarded to Stalin, probably to please Stalin with fawning affirmation of his good judgment in getting rid of Tukhachevsky. I remember Beria's comments on this case and especially those of Viktor Abakumov, who was in charge of military counterintelligence during the war, supervising the political and combat reliability of the armed forces. Both men remarked on the impudence of Tukhachevsky and his subordinates, who, they said, planned to demand that Stalin dismiss Voroshilov. This, Beria explained, clearly indicated that the highest military ranks were behaving contrary to party rules, daring to make proposals totally beyond their authority. The Politburo, according to Beria, was the only institution that could initiate any move to substitute or change a people's commissar of defense. Besides, Abakumov noted several times, Tukhachevsky and his crowd had behaved immodestly, in a manner not befitting senior officers. They had ordered the military orchestra to stage private concerts for them and to play for parties at Tukhachevsky's dacha. I learned what was proper behavior from a conversation in October 1941 with Marshal Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, who succeeded Tukhachevsky. In the urgency of wartime, I had suggested that to speed up the general staff's reaction to information from highly placed agents, we should channel it directly to him. He replied in a self-effacing manner: "Golubchick [Little Pigeon, a common term of endearment among Russians], important military intelligence should always first be sent to the political leadership of the country. Most urgent messages should be sent simultaneously to Stalin, as people's commissar of defense, and to Beria as your direct superior, with a copy to me. Remember, these are the strict rules which we are in no way authorized to modify." The marshal was a seasoned bureaucrat.2 2. Shaposhnikov was forced to step down because of poor health in 1942, and he died in 1945. 94 Special Tasks {p. 94} Shevardnadze, his former foreign minister. The use of the clippings was abandoned by Gorbachev only in November 1991, on the eve of his downfall. Vitaly Ignatenko, head of TASS and an ally of Gorbachev, put an end to this longestablished procedure. In the 1930s it seemed to me that anyone who was exposed as disloyal to the government or to party leaders, such as Stalin and Voroshilov, was undoubtedly an enemy of the state. Only later did I realize the cynicism of Beria's and Abakumov's comments on Tukhachevsky; the top leadership knew the accusations were fabricated. They preferred the story of a military plot because it would have been damaging to

themselves and to the party to admit that the targets of their purges were in fact rivals for leadership. What had been a grave crime in 1937, spreading critical remarks about Voroshilov, which indeed Tukhachevsky had done, suddenly in 1957, when he was rehabilitated, was no longer a crime. There was no change in the law and no apology. There were only vague references to "mistakes" in the official party documents. On April 8, 1938, the NKVD rezident in Finland, Boris Rybkin, was summoned to the Kremlin, where Stalin and other members of the Politburo, in a formal way, entrusted him with the mission of acting as informal envoy of the Soviet government in Finland. Rybkin donated money, on Stalin's orders, to the formation of the Small Farmers party, which propagated a neutral stand for Finland. Rybkin was ordered to offer the Finnish government a secret deal, sharing interests in Scandinavia and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, on the conditions of their signing a pact of mutual economic and military assistance in case of aggression by third parties. The pact was to guarantee Finland eternal safety from attack by European powers and mutual economic privileges for the two countries on a permanent basis. Included in the proposals was a division of spheres of military and economic influence over the Baltic areas that lay between Finland and the Soviet Union. Rybkin expressed his doubts that the Finns would agree to a treaty contrary to their historic hostility toward their eastern neighbor, but Stalin stressed that these proposals should be offered orally, without the involvement of our ambassador. Rybkin did as he was told, and the proposals were turned down by the Finns; however, they caused a split in the Finnish leadership that we later exploited when we managed to sign a separate peace treaty with Finland in 1944, with the Swedish Wallenberg family acting as intermediaries. {p. 95} While I have no knowledge whether or not similar proposals were made informally to the Germans, I believe that Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, chairman of Finland's defense council, informed Hitler about our overtures. Therefore, Hitler, when he sent his foreign minister, Joaquim von Ribbentrop, to Moscow in August 1939 to negotiate a nonaggression treaty, was not relying just on the spontaneous reaction of Molotov and Stalin. He knew that we were open to such suggestions because we had already sought a similar deal with Finland that had failed. The Finns refused the deal in April 1938 because for them it was more important to remain allied with Britain, Sweden, and Germany. They saw no benefit in becoming the buffer zone between East and West. Later this role was forced on them by their

defeat in the border war between us and then in the German-Soviet war. For attacking the Soviet Union jointly with the Germans, Finland reaped the war's bitter harvest. As a consequence, Finland had to live with a less advantageous form of the original plan offered by Rybkin in 1938.7 The intelligence traffic was intensive in August 1939. After Donald Maclean was transferred from London to Paris,8 we received reliable reports that the French and British governments were reluctant to commit support to the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany. This dove-tailed with information we had received three or four years before from the Cambridge ring - Philby, Maclean, and Burgess that the British cabinet, namely Neville Chamberlain and Sir John Simon, were consid7. Formal negotiations with the Finns to move the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian isthmus farther away from Leningrad and, to protect the city from attack by sea, for the Soviet Union to take over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, broke down as the Finns refused Stalin's demands. On November 30, 1939, the Winter War began as Soviet troops from the Leningrad military district attacked. What the Soviets thought would be an easy victory turned into a humiliating and costly little war, with heavy Soviet losses. The Finns in camouflage white on skis were better prepared for winter warfare, and it was not until February 17, after a massive artillery bombardment followed by 1,000 tanks and 140,000 troops, that the Mannerheim Line was breached and the Finns ran out of reserves. The Finns were forced to agree to tougher terms from Stalin and cede 22,000 square miles of their territory to end the war on March 11,1940. See Alan Bullock, Hitlerand Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), pp. 659-662. 8. After more than two years in a London posting, Donald Maclean had been routinely reassigned by the British Foreign Office and by late fall 1938 was in place as third secretary in the Paris embassy. {p. 96} ering a secret agreement with Hitler to support him in a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. We also gave special attention to the information from three reliable sources in Germany. They said that the Wehrmacht generals strongly objected to any war on two fronts. We received instructions to look quickly into possible options for nonaggression cooperation, not only with the British and French, with whom we were already cooperating, but also with Germany. In Germany only East Prussian aristocrats and influential military figures supported a peaceful settlement with the Soviet Union. These were the same ones who had given credence to cooperation between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, encouraged by Tukhachevsky.

Having been ordered to look into the alternatives, either an agreement with the English and French or a settlement with Germany, it did not occur to me that a separate deal between Berlin and Moscow was already afoot. When I was informed of the imminent arrival of the German foreign minister in Moscow on August 23,1939, just hours before it took place, it came as a surprise to me. When Ribbentrop arrived and the nonaggression pact was signed in the Kremlin thirteen hours later, at 2:00 A.M. on August 24, it became evident that this was not a sudden decision. The strategic goal of the Soviet leadership was to avert war on two fronts, in the Far East and in Europe, at any cost. {i.e. to break up the Anti-Comintern Pact; at this time, Korea, Manchuria and other parts of China were under Japanese occupation} This pattern of diplomatic relations not governed by ideological considerations had already been established in the 1920s, when the Soviet Union carried on economic cooperation and normal relations with Italy after the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini came to power in 1922. The Kremlin leadership was ready for a compromise with any regime, provided it guaranteed stability for the Soviet Union. The first priority of Stalin and his aides was the fulfillment of their geopolitical aspirations to transform the Soviet Union into the largest superpower of the world. The country had developed more or less steadily only after the end of the collectivization drive in 1934. Up until then it had undergone civil war and chaos, turmoil, and upheavals. Only by the mid-thirties did industrialization begin to bear fruit. The growing might of the country was displayed in successful military confrontations with Japan in Mongolia and Manchuria. Although the country had established diplomatic relations with all the major powers and was thus seemingly accepted as a member of the international community, it was nevertheless kept in isolation when the world powers settled their interests among themselves. All cardinal agreements on the future of Europe and Asia were {p. 97} undertaken by the Western powers and Japan with no concern for the interests of the Soviet Union. The Anglo-German agreement of 1935, accepting German naval rearmament, and the subsequent agreements between major powers in the naval arms race, did not include the Soviet Union. The French and British delegations that arrived in Moscow in August 1939 to probe the possibility of an alliance against Hitler were headed by secondary figures. Stalin's policy of appeasing Hitler thus was based on the reasonable belief that hostility against Soviet communism by the Western world and Japan would forever keep the USSR in isolation from the international community. Looking back, all three future allies - the Soviet, British, and French governments were guilty of letting Hitler unleash World War II. Mutual suspicion ruled out

compromise agreements between the British and French on one side and the Soviet Union on the other that could have halted Hitler's aggression against Poland. It is overlooked by historians of World War II that only President Franklin D. Roosevelt's initiative started British, French, and Soviet negotiations in May 1939 in an attempt to stop Hitler's aggression. Donald Maclean reported that Roosevelt had sent an envoy to Prime Minister Chamberlain warning that the domination of Germany in Western Europe would be detrimental to American and British interests. Roosevelt urged Chamberlain to enter into negotiations with Britain's European allies, including the Soviet Union, to contain Hitler. Our intelligence sources reported that the British government reacted reluctantly to this American initiative and had to be forced by Roosevelt to start negotiations with the Soviets on military measures to stop Hitler. Nevertheless, the nonaggression treaty with Hitler came out of the blue for me, because only two days before it was signed I was receiving orders to look into options for peaceful settlement with Germany. We were still sending these strategic propositions to Stalin and Molotov when the treaty was signed. Stalin had handled the negotiations on his own in total secrecy. I did not know about the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,9 but such protocols are a natural feature of diplomatic relations regarding sensitive issues. On the eve of outbreak of war, the 9. The secret protocols of the pact spelled out how Germany and the USSR would divide the territory of Poland and the Baltic states between them. {p. 98} British government signed secret protocols with Poland concerning its obligations for military assistance to Poland if war broke out between Poland and Germany. Similarly, in 1993 the German weekly Wecht published secret protocols and minutes of confidential meetings between Gorbachev and Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the eve of the unification of Germany. When I look now at the Molotov - Ribbentrop secret protocols, I find nothing secret in them. The directives based on these agreements were definite and clear, and were known not only to the intelligence directorate but to the heads of military, diplomatic, economic, and border guards administrations.10 In fact, the famous map of the division of Poland, which was attached to the protocols in October 1939, was published a week later in Pravda, without Stalin's and Ribbentrop's signatures, for the whole world to see. By then, of course, Poland had fallen to Germany, and Britain and France had entered the war. {excursus

Chamberlain, far from being a mere "appeaser" as usually presented, was, by freeing Hitler from worries about his Western frontier, giving him a free hand in the East, and encouraging conflict between Germany & the USSR, i.e. between Liberalism's two rivals. However, Clamberlain was under pressure from Roosevelt, Churchill, Leo Amery, etc, and eventually changed course, committing Britain to war with Germany if the Polish border were violated. The Soviet-German Pact was Stalin's masterstroke to break the Anti-Comintern Pact. Yet it also indicates that Stalin did not want peace. If he had not made the pact with Hitler, he would have had a defacto pact with Britain against Germany. Japan, in consequence of the Soviet-German Pact, decided to Strike South rather than Strike North (ie attack the US rather than the USSR). But for the Soviet-German Pact, Japan, already entrenched in Manchuria, would probably have joined in a German attack on the USSR. The struggle between the Strike North and Strike South factions in Japan is described in David Bergamini's book Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. Sudoplatov wrote that Chamberlain changed his policy because of pressure from the Roosevelt administration. Sudoplatov said that the Roosevelt pressure on Chamberlin came in May 1939. But Britain guaranteed the Polish border on March 31, 1939. David Thomson wrote in Europe Since Napoleon (2nd ed., Longmans, London, 1963): "The British guarantee to Poland, given on March 31, 1939, was destined to become the formal reason for Britain's declaration of war on Germany five months later." (p. 713). In April 1939 Roosevelt wrote to Hitler and Mussolini seeking assurances of nonaggression (Thomson, op. cit., p. 714). It would not be surprising, then, if his pressure on Britain had begun earlier than May. As a result of Britain's guarantee to Poland, Thomson wrote, Hitler knew that if he attacked Poland he faced war on two fronts. But Stalin also knew that if Germany attacked the USSR, it would be at war with Britain too, and that Germany dreaded having to fight on two fronts:

{p. 713} He drew the contrary inference, that since he now controlled the balance of power in Europe, he could afford to make {p. 714} terms with Germany which would ensure ... a large share of Polish territory for himself ... a buffer ... between the Soviet Union and Germany, and encourage Hitler to direct his first main onslaught against the West. Stalin used his new-found immunity to buy both space and time, and to gamble on a long, mutually destructive war between central and western Europe from which the Soviet Union could derive both security and profit. The idea of the Nazi-Soviet pact was born of the Franco-British guarantee to Poland. {end} Thomson thus holds a similar assessment of Stalin's strategy, to Viktor Suvorov's in his book Icebreaker. But Suvorov goes further, arguing that once Hitler was at war with Britain, Stalin planned to give him the second front he dreaded. Thomson wrote that "Chamberlain ... on August 25 made a formal assistance pact with Poland" (p. 715). Sudoplatov says that secret protocols within Britain's guarantee to Poland, the one of August 25, set the tripwire which committed Britain to war if Germany invaded Poland. Why did Britain keep them secret, if their purpose was to deter Germany? The text of the Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance and the Secret Protocol, of London, 25 August 1939: http://2ndww.tripod.com/Germany/390825.htm. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939 also contained secret clauses, providing for the partition of Poland. Hitler attacked Poland on September 1. Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the USSR Moscow, 23 August, 1939: http://2ndww.tripod.com/Germany/390823.htm#B. Did Stalin plan to attack Germany, as Victor Suvorov alleges? Gabriel Gorodetsky, who teaches at Tel Aviv University, argues against Suvorov's claim that Stalin intended to attack Germany. The debate is reviewed here: Raack, R.C., "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II," World Affairs, (vol. 158, no.4) Spring 1996: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/raack.htm

Daniel Michaels, Revising the Twentieth Century's 'Perfect Storm': Russian and German Historians Debate Barbarossa and Its Aftermath: http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v20/v20n6p59_Michaels.html end of excursus} In October 1939, together with Pavel M. Fitin, director of intelligence, and Vsevolod Merkulov, Beria's deputy, I attended a meeting in Molotov's Kremlin office that included the director of the operational department of the general staff, Major General Aleksandr M. Vasilevsky (minister of defense in the 1950s); Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. P. Potemkin; Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee Borisov; the deputy chief of the navy, Admiral Ivan S. Isakov; the chief of the Border Troops, General Ivan 1. Maslennikov; and the chief of the GRU, Major General 1. V. Panfilov. The agenda of the meeting was to put forward recommendations for defending our strategic interests in the Baltic states. Our troops were already deployed there under pacts with the governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Molotov, who opened the meeting, stated, "We have agreement with Germany that the Baltic zone is to be regarded as an area of most important geopolitical interest to the Soviet Union. It is clear, however," continued Molotov, "that although the German authorities accept that in principle, they would never agree to any 'cardinal social transformations' that would change the Baltic states into constituent republics of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the Soviet leadership believes that the way to defend the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union in the Baltic zone in the most lasting manner would be to help the proletarian internationalist movement in the area. That would change this region into a reliable frontier of the Soviet state." 10. The full texts were released from the Presidential Archives in 1992. {p. 99} From that comment it was clear how we intended to interpret the terms of the agreement with Hitler. In the late autumn of 1939, however, there was a new impetus for activating our political, economic, military, and intelligence operations in the Baltic republics. From our rezidenturas in Sweden and in Berlin we received checked and reliable information that the Germans were planning to send top-level economic delegations to Riga and Tallinn to make long-term agreements with these regimes to include them under Germany's political and economic umbrella. The cables from Berlin and Sweden were each dispatched under two signatures, the rezident's and the ambassador's, which was unusual and meant high priority. On arrival the cables were countersigned by Molotov and then Beria, and then normally forwarded with Beria's orders to Fitin and me in the NKVD for action. Whenever top-level cables were signed by both ambassadors and rezidents, they were also channeled to several top members of the Politburo as well as to the minister of foreign affairs.

Fitin routed the cables to Gukasov, chief of the section dealing with nationalist and emigrant organizations settled in areas near our borders. It was Gukasov who had called for the Party Bureau to investigate me a year earlier. Now, still suspicious of my loyalty and probably holding a grudge, he didn't pass on Beria's instructions to me. On his own, Gukasov prepared inadequate recommendations to counter German intelligence in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and then routed them back to Fitin, bypassing me. His plan was to use only agent networks comprised of Russian and Jewish emigrants in the three Baltic republics. A scandal ensued. Beria summoned Fitin and me to his office, and when Fitin reported Gukasov's recommendations Beria asked my opinion. I answered honestly that I had no opinion, never having received any instructions and being unaware of German intentions in Riga. I had been busy with other matters. He exploded with rage; the cables were once again brought into his office. He saw that my signature was missing; the standard rule was that any secret paper passing through the hands of an official in the intelligence bureau should be signed by that official. Gukasov was then called on the carpet and Beria threatened to take his head off for not complying with his order. Gukasov said he had not shown me the cables because - he dropped his voice in a confidential manner - he was informed by the chief of the Investigation Department, Sergienko, that there was incriminating evidence of my suspicious contacts with the former leadership of the intelligence bureau, exposed as dangerous enemies {p. 102} The fate of the Baltic states, which was originally decided in the Kremlin and in Berlin, was similar to the fate of the East European states decided at Yalta. There are striking similarities:the preliminary agreement was to set up coalition governments friendly to both sides. We needed a buffer between us and the spheres of influence of the other world powers, and we were willing to face harsh confrontations in those areas where the Red Army remained in place at war's end. Once again, for the Kremlin, the mission of communism was primarily to consolidate the might of the Soviet state. Only military strength and domination of the countries on our borders could ensure us a superpower role. The idea of propagating world Communist revolution was an ideological screen to hide our desire for world domination. Although originally this concept was ideological in nature, it acquired the dimensions of realpolitik. This possibility arose for the Soviet Union only after the Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact was signed. In the secret protocols the Soviet Union's geopolitical interests and natural desires for the enlargement of its frontiers were for the first time formally accepted by one of the leading powers in the world. {p. 116} Much has been written about intelligence information that was gathered on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, showing the inevitability of the German attack upon us. Stalin's stupidity in waiting for the invasion before counterattacking is frequently offered as one of the reasons for the defeats and heavy losses suffered by

the Red Army in 1941. In general I agree that the leadership of the country did not assess the intelligence information correctly, but we must look into the content of this intelligence information. We were in a state of alert from November 1940. By that time, Pavel Zhurovlev and Zoya Rybkina had initiated the operational file (liternoye delo) named Zateya (Venture), which gathered the most important information on German military moves against Soviet interests into one place. This file would make it easier to monitor events and inform the leadership about trends in German policy. Information from this file was regularly reported to Stalin and Molotov, and they tried to use it in their policy of both appeasing Hitler and cooperating with him. The Venture {p. 117} file contained disturbing reports that caused the Soviet leadership to seriously suspect the sincerity of Hitler's proposals for a division of the world between Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan - a proposal he made to Molotov in Berlin in November 1940. Although our intelligence disclosed Hitler's intentions to attack the Soviet Union, the reports were to a certain extent contradictory. They didn't contain assessments of the potential of the German tank force and air force units or their capability of breaking the defense lines of the Red Army units deployed on our borders. No one in the intelligence service examined the real balance of forces on the Soviet-German frontiers. Thus the strength of Hitler's strike came as a surprise to our military commanders, including Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the Red Army chief of staff at the time, who admits in his memoirs that we did not foresee an enemy able to unleash large-scale offensive operations by mass tank formations simultaneously in several directions. What was overlooked in the intelligence information was the qualitative force of the German blitzkrieg tactics. We believed that if war broke out the Germans would first try to seize our Ukrainian regions which were rich in food supplies and raw materials. We knew from their military strategic games that a prolonged war would demand additional economic resources. This was a big mistake: GRU and NKVD intelligence did not warn the general staff that the aim of the German army in both Poland and France was not to seize the territory but rather to destroy the military might of the opposing army. When Stalin learned that the German military games showed the German general staff the logistical problems of waging a prolonged war, he ordered that Hitler's military attache in Moscow be shown our industrial military might in Siberia. Sometime in April 1941 the German attache received a tour of new plants producing planes, engines, and the most advanced tanks. Through our rezidentura in Berlin we also tried to spread rumors in the Ministries of Aviation and Economics

that the decision to wage war against the Soviet Union would be tragic for Hitler's leadership. Our rumors promised that it would be a prolonged war on two fronts; its outcome would be fatal to Germany and to its geopolitical interests. In early 1941 there were contradictory signs concerning peace and war. On January 10, Molotov and Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, signed a secret protocol on territorial issues in Lithuania. Germany gave up its interest in certain {p. 118} areas of Lithuania in return for 7.5 million American dollars in gold. At the time, I didn't know about this protocol; I was only briefly informed that we had reached an agreement with the Germans on territorial issues in the Baltic area and on economic cooperation throughout 1941. From Britain we also received reliable messages that any German offensive against the Soviet Union depended on their rapprochement with the British government, because they could not risk fighting a war on two fronts. From K. A. Umansky, our ambassador in Washington, and Ovakimian, our rezident in New York City, we received reports that Montgomery Hyde, an MI-6 (British Secret Intelligence Service) officer working for William Stephenson's British Security Coordination in the Empire State Building, had planted a choice bit of disinformation with the German Embassy in Washington. If Hitler invaded England, the Germans were told, the Russians planned to wage war on Hitler. Analyzing the information that was received by both the NKVD and GRU from trusted sources, it becomes clear that half the data before May and even June 1941 contained confirmation that war was inevitable; but it also showed that a clash with us depended on whether or not Germany invaded England. Philby reported the plans of the British cabinet to stimulate tension and military conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union to distract the Germans and bring about their defeat. In the liternoye delo file Black Bertha,l6 in NKVD archives, there is a reference to information coming from either Philby or Cairncross that British agents through contacts in the United States were spreading rumors that war between Germany and the Soviet Union was imminent and would be started by the Soviet Union in a preemptive strike in southern Poland {Viktor Suvorov's book Icebreaker presents evidence that Stalin was indeed preparing to attack, when Hitler pre-empted him}. The thickness of this file grew day by day, as we received further reports of British activity to stimulate fear among the German leadership that the Soviet Union was coming into the war. There were also reports of increased serious contacts between British and German informal representatives in search of peaceful solutions to the European war.

Meanwhile, Stalin and Molotov, Beria told me, had decided to at least postpone the military conflict and better our situation by resorting to a scheme they had abandoned in 1938. This was the plan to 16. This file, says P. A. Sudoplatov, was called Black Bertha because that was Rudolph Hess's nickname among homosexual circles of Nazis in the 1920s in Munich. Hess, deputy leader of the Nazi party and Hitler's close confidant, fled to Scotland on May 10, 1941, on an unauthorized peace mission. {p. 119} overthrow the Yugoslav government. In March 1941 GRU and NKVD rezidenturas actively supported a coup d'etat against the pro-German government in Belgrade. Molotov and Stalin hoped to strengthen the USSR's strategic position in the Balkans. A new anti-German government in Belgrade, they reasoned, could impede and prolong Italian and German operations against Greece. Major General Solomon R. Milshtein, deputy director of the GRU, was sent to Belgrade to assist the military action in the overthrow of the pro-German government. We also sent two experienced illegals: Vassili Zarubin and A. M. Alakhverdov, an Armenian. By this time in Moscow, with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we formally recruited as our agent the Yugoslavian ambassador to the Soviet Union, Gavrilovich. Peter Fedotov, director of the Counterintelligence Department, and I ran him together. However, we suspected him of playing a double game in the interests of the British, because every week he contacted British representatives in Moscow. A week after the coup, we signed a pact of mutual assistance with the new government in Belgrade. On April 6, the day after the signing, Hitler attacked, and in two weeks the Yugoslavian army ceased to exist. The reaction of Hitler to the coup was prompt and effective, and I admit we didn't expect such total and rapid military defeat of Yugoslavia. We were shocked. Hitler clearly showed that he was not bound to official and confidential agreements, because the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact included prior consultation before any military move. Even though both sides were involved in active consultations on the division of spheres of influence from November 1940 until March 1941, mutual distrust was in the air. Hitler was surprised by the events in Belgrade, and we were surprised by his invasion of Yugoslavia. Following these events, on April 18,1941, Isigned a directive to all rezidenturas in Europe ordering activation of our agent networks and lines of communication for conditions of war. The GRU sent similar warnings to its networks in Europe. We also planned to send to Switzerland a group of experienced operators, including the Bulgarian Boris Afanasiev, to act as links with reliable sources, using their cover from

neutral Switzerland. There was no direct land travel to Switzerland; our agents had to take a train through Germany, changing in Berlin. It was decided to strengthen our rezidenturas in Berlin and in other German and Polish areas; some of our operatives were summoned to Berlin from F~rance and Italy. Belgium was already occupied. We did not cope fast {p. 120} enough with the speedy developments; we did not get radio equipment, batteries, and spare parts to our German agents fast enough, and even worse, they had not been sufficiently trained either in intelligence tradecraft or in the art of clandestine radio communications. We began to pay more attention to the possibility of using political refugees who had come to Moscow from the countries occupied by the Germans. Before escaping to Britain, Benes ordered young Lieutenant Colonel Ludvik Svoboda to Moscow to act as his secret military representative. Svoboda was given the status of a secret envoy and lived comfortably in a safe apartment and at my dacha in the outskirts of Moscow. In May and June, just before the war, we started discussing with him the idea of forming Czech units in the Soviet Union and parachuting them into the rear of the German army to wage guerrilla operations in Czechoslovakia. I vividly remember him, always polite, always dignified.17 At the same time, Stalin and Molotov transferred substantial numbers of army units from Siberia in April, May, and early June to protect our western borders {Suvorov claims, in his bookIcebreaker, that these armies were intended to attack Germany; that Hitler learned of this; that many Soviet troops were in trains when Hitler attacked}. In May, on the eve of Eitingon's appearance in Moscow from China, together with Caridad Mercader, I signed a directive to prepare Russian and other national emigrant groups in Europe for their involvement in wartime intelligence operations. We now know that secret consultations between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Molotov, searching for a strategic alliance among Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, led Stalin and Molotov to the illusion that they could come to terms with Hitler. They believed until the last moment that their authority, coupled with the military might displayed to German experts, would stave off the war for at least a year while Hitler searched for a peaceful formula to settle his disputes with Britain. Stalin and Molotov were annoyed with opinions that contradicted their strategic plans to avoid military conflict, which explains rude notes written by Stalin on the report sent by Merkulov on June 16, warning of signs 17. During World War II Svoboda led a Czech battalion against the Germans. After the war General Svoboda was the pro-Communist minister of defense under Benes

and played an active part in the overthrow of parliamentary democracy in Czechoslovakia. He joined the Communist party in 1948 but was regarded with deep suspicion by Stalin, who had him demoted. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev, who had known Svoboda during World War II, helped to rehabilitate him. Svoboda hecame president of Czechoslovakia after Antonin Novotny's fall in 1968. He put up gallant resistance to Soviet bullying when the liberal regime was suppressed by the USSR. He died in 1979. {p. 121} of imminent war. That Stalin relied on his personal contacts with Hitler and was confident he could convince Hitler not to launch the war is revealed by the fact that he appointed himself prime minister, the formal head of the government, in May 1941. The famous statement by TASS on June 14 indicated that he was ready for negotiations and that this time he would lead them directly. Although large-scale military preparations for war were under way in Germany for a long time, Stalin and Molotov knew that Hitler had still not made the final decision to attack, and that there was serious disagreement among German military leaders. The archives show that the TASS statement appeared on the day Hitler fixed the date of the invasion. Two other little-known matters remain to be mentioned. In May 1941, a German Junkers 52 intruded into Soviet airspace undetected by Soviet air defense and landed safely at the central airfield in Moscow near Dynamo Stadium. This caused an uproar in the Kremlin and led to the purge of the military command; first came dismissals, then the arrest and execution of top figures in the administration of the air force and in the command of the Red Army. To Hitler, this spectacular landing signaled that combat readiness of the Red Army was low. Second, the military leaders and Stalin's entourage were under the illusion that the Red Army's might was equal to the German units deployed along our western frontiers. Why the miscalculation? First, although the Red Army had tripled in numbers, this had happened only recently, because military conscription was not introduced until 1939. Given that more than thirty-five thousand officers had been purged in the 1930s, there was a lack of personnel experienced in even elementary military arts. The mobilization and a large network of military colleges and schools established in 1939 were impressive but in no way adequate. Even though some purged officers were returned from jail and the Gulag camps, they could not cope with the large numbers of recruits. Zhukov and Stalin overestimated the strength of our combat units; the inadequately trained army and air force cadre did not have a system for creating combat readiness. They had not yet perceived what modern warfare meant in terms of the coordination of air force, tank units, communication troops, and ground forces. They believed that their numbers were enough to halt any onslaught and to prevent significant German incursion onto Soviet soil. Contrary to the

leadership, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, commander of the navy, correctly assessed the weakness of his forces. {p. 172} The most vital information for developing the first Soviet atomic bomb came from scientists designing the American atomic bomb at Los Alamos, New Mexico - Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard. {the 1995 paperback edition says on p. 172: The most vital information for developing the first Soviet atomic bomb came from scientists engaged in the Manhattan Project to build the American atomic bomb - Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard.} Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard, and Szilard's secretary were often quoted in the NKVD files from 1942 to 1945 as sources for information on the development of the first American atomic bomb. It is in the record that on several occasions they agreed to share information on nuclear weapons with Soviet scientists. At first they were motivated by fear of Hitler; they believed that the Germans might produce the first atomic bomb. Then the Danish physicist Niels Bohr helped strengthen their own inclinations to share nuclear secrets with the world academic community. By sharing their knowledge with the Soviet Union, the chance of beating the Germans to the bomb would be increased. As early as 1940, a commission of Soviet scientists, upon hearing rumors of a superweapon being built in the West, investigated the possibility of creating an atomic bomb from uranium, but concluded that such a weapon was a theoretical, not a practical, possibility. The same scientific commission recommended that the government instruct intelligence services to monitor Western scientific publications, but no gov{p. 173} ernment funds were allocated for research. However, Leonid Kvasnikov, chief of the NKVD scientific intelligence desk, sent an order to all stations in the United States, Great Britain, and Scandinavia to be on the lookout for information on the development of superweapons from uranium. A major shift in our intelligence priorities occurred just as Vassili Zarubin, aka Zubilin, was posted to Washington, ostensibly as secretary of the Soviet Embassy but actually as our new NKVD rezident. Stalin met with Zarubin before his departure for Washington on October 12,1941, just as the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow. Until then, our political intelligence collection in America had been minimal because we and the United States had no conflicting geopolitical areas of interest. Now we realized we needed to know American intentions because America's participation in the war against Hitler would be decisive. Stalin ordered Zarubin to set

up an effective system not only to monitor events, but to be in a position to influence them through friends of the Soviet Union. Over the next year and a half, however, intelligence reports from Britain, America, Scandinavia, and Germany concerning the development of nuclear weapons would drastically alter our priorities once again. Less than a month before Zarubin's departure, Donald Maclean, code-named Leaf, who was part of our Cambridge ring, reported from London that the British government was seriously interested in developing a bomb with unbelievable destructive force based on atomic energy.1 When France fell to the Germans in June 1940, Maclean, third secretary in the British Embassy in Paris, returned to the Foreign Office in London. He reported on September 16,1941, that the uranium bomb might be constructed within two years through the efforts of Imperial Chemical Industries (IcI) with support of the British government. The project to build a uranium bomb was called Tube Alloys, code-named Tube. Maclean sent us a sixty-page report, minutes of the British Cabinet Committee on the Uranium Bomb Project.2 1. In the archives of the NKVD/KGB file, number 13676, vol. 1, are Donald Maclean's messages reporting on the first British efforts to build an atomic bomb. According to Sudoplatov: "Maclean was under the operational control of Anatoli Veniaminovich Gorsky, our rezident in London. Gorsky used Vladimir Borisovich Barkovsky as the case officer for Maclean because as an engineer, Barkovsky was capable of dealing with the technical details." 2. The British cabinet report from Maclean and the .~ssessment of it by Igor Kurchatov, the physicist who headed Soviet atomic research, are on pages 20-38 of the operational file (liternoye delo) code-named Enormous. See Appendix Two, Document 2. {p. 188} to our old moles all their confidential contacts with friendly sources around Oppenheimer in California. Vasilevsky took part in this operation. Under Beria's direct orders we forbade Kheifetz and Semyonov to tell anybody from the American section of the Foreign Directorate about this transfer of contacts. Later, in the purges of 1950, Kheifetz and Semyonov were accused of losing these contacts, which was untrue. Meanwhile, there were multiple intelligence approaches, some of which worked and some of which did not. Our principal targets of penetration were Los Alamos and the research labs servicing it, and the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, plant. We also attempted to get into the companies doing the actual manufacturing work for the government. In 1943 a world-famous actor of the Moscow Yiddish State Art Theater, Solomon Mikhoels, together with well-known Yiddish poet Itzik Feffer, toured the United

States on behalf of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. Before their departure, Beria instructed Mikhoels and Feffer to emphasize the great Jewish contribution to science and culture in the Soviet Union. Their assignment was to raise money and convince American public opinion that Soviet anti-Semitism had been crushed as a result of Stalin's policies. Kheifetz made sure that the message they brought was conveyed to Oppenheimer. Kheifetz said that Oppenheimer, the son of a German-Jewish immigrant, was deeply moved by the information that a secure place for Jews in the Soviet Union was guaranteed. They discussed Stalin's plans to set up a Jewish autonomous republic in the Crimea after the war was won against fascism.14 Although they were unaware of it, Oppenheimer and Fermi were assigned code names, Star and Editor, as sources of information. Star was used as the code name not only for Oppenheimer, but also for other physicists and scientists in the Manhattan Project with whom we had contact but who were not formally recruited agents. Code names were changed from time to time for security reasons; Oppenheimer and Fermi were also jointly known as Star.15 14. See Chapter Ten. 15. Anatoli Yatskov, in an interview in October 1992, before his death in March 1993, said the FBI uncovered "perhaps less than half" his network. He referred to Perseus as a code name for a major source still alive. Says Sudoplatov: "I do not recall that code name or such a source, but I remember a cable from New York reporting the date of the first nuclear blast which referred to information passed by three moles and friendly sources - Charles (Klaus Fuchs), Mlad (Pontecorvo), and Star (meaning Oppenheimer and Fermi). The three moles, whose names I do not remember, worked {footnote continued onm p. 189} {p. 189} In developing Oppenheimer as a source, Vassili Zarubin's wife, Elizabeth, was essential. She hardly appeared foreign in the United States. Her manner was so natural and sociable that she immediately made friends. Slim, with dark eyes, she had a classic Semitic beauty that attracted men, and she was one of the most successful agent recruiters, establishing her own illegal network of Jewish refugees from Poland, and recruiting one of Szilard's secretaries, who provided technical data. She spoke excellent English, German, French, Romanian, and Hebrew. Usually she looked like a sophisticated, upper-class European, but she had the ability to change her appearance like a chameleon. She came from a family of revolutionaries related to Anna Pauker, the founder of the Romanian Communist party. Elizabeth's elder brother had been the head of the military terrorist section of the Romanian party. Twice he had escaped from a military court while being tried, but finally, in 1922, he was killed in a firefight.

Elizabeth became part of the intelligence system in 1919 as a junior case officer in Dzerzhinsky's secretariat. While working for Dzerzhinsky, Elizabeth met and fell in love with Yakov Blumkin, the assassin of Count Mirbach, the German ambassador in Moscow in 1918. Blumkin was a key figure in the plot of the Socialist Revolutionaries against Lenin in July 1918. When the plot failed, Blumkin was pardoned and continued to work for Dzerzhinsky and Trotsky. In 1930 Elizabeth and Blumkin were posted as illegals in Turkey, where he was to sell prized Hasidic manuscripts from the Central Library in Moscow. The money was intended to support illegal operations in Turkey and the Middle East, but Blumkin gave part of the funds to Trotsky, who was then in exile in Turkey. Elizabeth was outraged, and exposed her husband. She contacted Eitingon and Pyotr Zubov, who were on a mission in Turkey, and they arranged for Blumkin to be recalled to Moscow via a Soviet ship. Blumkin was immediately arrested and executed by a firing squad. After Blumkin's execution, Zarubin promptly married Elizabeth, and they traveled and spied together for nearly seven years, using the cover of a Czechoslovakian business couple. One of their accomplishments was the recruitment of the deputy director of a Gestapo section, {footnote continued from p. 188} in their laboratories. Vasilevsky knew the details, as he was the first intelligence of ficer to approach Pontecorvo directly in 1943. It should not he excluded that Perseus is a creation hy Yatskov or his colleagues to cover the real names of the sources." {p. 195} use of hardware was needed. Vannikov was our equivalent of the American General Leslie Groves. Not only were we informed of technical developments in the atomic program, but we heard in detail the human conflicts and rivalries among the members of the team at Los Alamos. A constant theme was tension with General Groves, director of the project. We were told of Groves's conflicts with Szilard. Groves was outraged by Szilard's iconoclastic style and his refusal to accept the strictures of military discipline. The "baiting of brass hats" was Szilard's self-professed hobby. Groves believed that Szilard was a security risk and tried to prevent him from working on the Manhattan Project despite Szilard's seminal contributions to the development of the first chain reaction with Fermi. Kheifetz described Oppenheimer as a man who thought of problems on a global scale. Oppenheimer saw the threat and promise of the atomic age and understood the ramifications for both military and peaceful applications. We always stressed that contacts with him should be carefully planned to maintain security, and should not be used for acquiring routine information. We knew that Oppenheimerwould remain an

influential person in America after the war and therefore our relations with him should not take the form of running a controlled agent. We understood that he and other members of the scientific community were best approached as friends, not as agents. Since Oppenheimer, Bohr, and Fermi were fierce opponents of violence, they would seek to prevent a nuclear war, creating a balance of power through sharing the secrets of atomic energy. This would be a crucial factor in establishing the new world order after the war, and we took advantage of this. The line between valuable connections and acquaintances, and confidential relations is very shaky. In traditional Russian espionage terminology, there is a special term, agenturnaya razvedka, which means that the material is received through a network of agents or case officers acting under cover. Occasionally the most valuable information comes from a contact who is not an agent in the true sense - that is, working for and paid by us - but who is still regarded in the archives as an agent source of information. Our problem was that the atomic espionage business required new approaches; we used every potential method to pen{p. 196} etrate into a unique area of activities that was intensively guarded by the American authorities. I was pleased that the worldview of the Western scientists was strikingly similar to that of our own leading scientists - Kapitsa, Vernadsky, loffe - who were quite sincere in suggesting that our government approach the British and Americans to share with us information about atomic research. They suggested the organization of a joint team of Soviet, American, and British scientists to build the bomb. This was also the ideal of Bohr, who had greatly influenced Oppenheimer, both as a scientist and in his political worldviews. While Bohr was in no way our agent of influence, his personal views were that atomic secrets should be shared by the international scientific community. After meeting with Bohr, Oppenheimer suggested that Bohr visit President Roosevelt and try to convince him that the Manhattan Project should be shared with the Russians in the hope of speeding up its results. Our sources in England told us that Bohr not only made this suggestion to Roosevelt but allegedly, on the instructions of Roosevelt, returned to England to try to win British approval of the idea. Churchill, we were told, was horrified, and urged that all efforts be taken to prevent Bohr from contacting us.22 If the development of atomic weapons had been left totally to the scientists, they might have changed the course of history. In the KGB files there is a report that the Swedish government received detailed information from its intelligence service on the technical design of the atomic bomb in 1945 or 1946. The Swedes rejected the idea of building their own nuclear weapons because of the huge resources required, but the fact that they knew enough to reach

such a decision leads to the conclusion that Niels Bohr had the data after leaving Los Alamos. The Zarubins, despite their success, did not stay long in Washington. It was not their fault or the prowess of the FBI. One of Vassili Zarubin's 22. Bohr saw Churchill on May 16, 1944, for thirty minutes at 10 Downing Street with his son Aage, who described the meeting as "terrible." "We did not speak the same language," Bohr said afterward. While he was in London waiting to see Churchill, Bohr was invited to the Russian Embassy to receive a letter from Pyotr Kapitsa inviting him to the Soviet Union, "where everything will be done to give you and your family a shelter and where we now have all the necessary conditions for carrying on scientific work." See Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, pp. 528531. {p. 197} subordinates who worked in the NKVD rezidentura in the Soviet Embassy, Lieutenant Colonel Mironov, sent a letter to Stalin denouncing Zarubin as a double agent. He had followed Zarubin to some of his clandestine meetings with American agents and in his letter to Stalin specified the dates and hours of these meetings, alleging that Zarubin was contacting the FBI. It was either in 1943 or 1944 when Mironov's letter caused Zarubin's recall to Moscow. The investigation against him and Elizabeth lasted six months and established that all his contacts were legitimate and valuable, and that he was not working with the FBI. Mironov was recalled from Washington and arrested on charges of slander, but when he was put on trial, it was discovered that he was schizophrenic. He was hospitalized and discharged from the service. By 1943 it was agreed at the Center that all contacts with Oppenheimer would be through illegals only. Lev Vasilevsky, our rezident in Mexico City, was put in charge of running the illegal network after Zarubin left. But Vasilevsky was directed to control the network from Mexico City, not to move to Washington, where the FBI could more easily monitor our activities. Our facilities in Washington were to be used as little as possible. Vasilevsky told me that on one occasion in 1944 he visited Washington in order to pass to the Center materials received from Fermi. To his dismay, the embassy radio operator, who was supposed to encode his message, was missing. The next day the clerk was brought to the embassy by the American police, who had picked him up dead drunk in a nearby bar. Vasilevsky decided on the spot not to use the Washington embassy to transmit any of his sensitive messages; he would rely on Mexico City.

In 1945, for his work in handling the Fermi line in the United States, Vasilevsky was appointed deputy director of Department S. For a short period in 1947 he was the director of the department of scientific and technological intelligence in the Committee of Information, which was the central intelligence-gathering agency from 1947 to 1951. Vasilevsky was ousted in the anti-Semitic purges of 1948 and permitted to retire on pension. He died in 1979. A description of the design of the first atomic bomb was reported to us in January 1945. In February, although there was still uncertainty in the report, our rezidentura in America stated that it would take a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years to make a sizable bomb. The {p. 206} of the Committee on Problem Number One because of his conflict with Beria, Voznesensky, and Kurchatov. Since Bohr had turned down Kapitsa's invitation to the Soviet Union in 1943, and because of the internal conflicts in the scientific community, we decided to rely on scientists already in the project who were also intelligence officers. There was not a big choice. The scientists suggested Professor Yakov Borisovich Zeldovich, a member of the Kurchatov team with high professional skills. But Zeldovich was not aware of all the developments in the West because his access to the information we received was limited. We had only two officers who were both physicists and fluent in English. One was Arkady N. Rylov, who was less a physicist than an intelligence officer; the other was Yakov Petrovich Terletsky, who had a reputation as a real researcher. Most important, he was the man who had processed and edited all the scientific information that was gathered by our intelligence networks and reported personally to the closed sessions of the scientific technical committee for the project. With the exception of Kurchatov, he was the most knowledgeable, and would be able to hold his own with Bohr. Terletsky made his own scientific analyses of intelligence materials we received. That sometimes created problems, because we received atomic information twice a day and sometimes Terletsky was late with his assessments. I would then be reprimanded for lack of discipline in my department, but I recognized that we were operating not with ordinary agent reports but with complex theoretical scientific formulations. Traditional discipline might be detrimental to the end result. We decided that Terletsky should be sent to see Bohr in the guise of a young Soviet scientist working on a project supervised by Academicians loffe and Kapitsa. He was to explain the problems in activating the nuclear reactor to Bohr and to seek his advice. Terletsky could not be sent alone on such a critical assignment, so he was accompanied by Lev Vasilevsky, who had run the Fermi line from Mexico and now

was my deputy director of Department S. He would lead the conversation with Bohr while Terletsky would handle the technical details. The meeting was arranged with the help of the Danish writer Martin Andersen Nexo, a friend of Zoya Rybkina. I met with Terletsky in 1993, just before he died. He recalled that at first Bohr was nervous and his hands trembled, but he soon controlled his emotions. Bohr understood, perhaps for the first time, that the decision that he, Fermi, Oppenheimer, and Szilard had made to allow their trusted scientific proteges to share atomic secrets had led him to meet {p. 207} agents of the Soviet government. Bohr had sent official confirmation to the Soviet Embassy that he would meet with a delegation and now he realized that the delegation contained both a scientist and an intelligence officer. Thus, after this first contact with Vasilevsky, Bohr preferred to speak only to Terletsky, his scientific counterpart. There was no choice but to let Terletsky meet Bohr alone with our translator. Terletsky thanked Bohr in the name of loffe, Kapitsa, and other scientists in Russia known to him, for the support from and consultations with their Western colleagues. Bohr readily explained to Terletsky the problems Fermi had at the University of Chicago putting the first nuclear reactor into operation, and he made valuable suggestions that enabled us to overcome our failures. Bohr pointed to a place on a drawing Terletsky showed him and said, "That's the trouble spot." This meeting was essential to starting the Soviet reactor, and we accomplished that feat in December 1946. My relations with Kurchatov, Alikhanov, and Kikoin became especially friendly when Terletsky returned from his meeting with Bohr in Denmark. Together with Emma we spent several weekends at a special rest house with the scientific troika and their wives. At my flat near Lubyanka I hosted lunches and cocktail parties in the Western style for them and their subordinates at the suggestion of Vasilevsky, who toyed with the idea of using Terletsky and other Soviet nuclear experts to lure Western scientists to the Soviet Union. In Western Europe, Vasilevsky took advantage of the charms of Lubov Orlova, the famous film actress, and Gregory Alexander, her husband, a film producer, as the cover for meeting Bruno Pontecorvo, Frederic Joliot-Curie, and other well-known Western scientists. Vasilevsky also relied on professionals. He took with him three key figures: Vladimir Barkovsky, who handled Fuchs in Britain from 1944 to 1947; Anatoli Yatskov, who handled Fuchs in the United States and Britain; and Aleksandr Semyonovich Feklisov, who took over Fuchs in Britain from 1947 to 1950.

Vasilevsky's successful trips to Denmark, Switzerland, and Italy coincided with the start of the Cold War. Beria awarded him a choice apartment and $1,000 - a considerable sum at that time - for his expenses abroad. After our reactor was put into operation in 1946, Beria issued orders to stop all contacts with our American sources in the Manhattan Project; the FBI was getting close to uncovering some of our agents. Beria said we should think how to use Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szi{p. 208} lard, and others around them in the peace campaign against nuclear armament. Disarmament and the inability to impose nuclear blackmail would deprive the United States of its advantage. We began a worldwide political campaign against nuclear superiority, which kept up until we exploded our own nuclear bomb, in 1949. Our goal was to preempt American power politically before the Soviet Union had its own bomb. Beria warned us not to compromise Western scientists, but to use their political influence. Through Fuchs we planted the idea that Fermi, Oppenheimer, and Szilard oppose the hydrogen bomb. They truly believed in their positions and did not know they were being used. They started as antifascists, and became political advocates of the Soviet Union. Beria's directive was motivated by information from Fuchs in 1946 saying there was serious disagreement among leading American physicists on the development of a hydrogen bomb. In a panel that met in April 1946, Fermi objected to the development of the superbomb, and Oppenheimer was ambivalent. Their doubts were opposed by fellow physicist Edward Teller. Fuchs, who returned to England in 1946 and declined the offer of Oppenheimer to work with him at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, continued to supply us with valuable information. From the fall of 1947 to May of 1949, Fuchs gave to Colonel Feklisov, his case officer, the principal theoretical outline for creating a hydrogen bomb and initial drafts for its development, at the stage they were being worked on in England and America in 1948. Most valuable for us was the information Fuchs provided on the results of the test explosions at Eniwetok atoll of uranium and plutonium bombs. Fuchs met with Feklisov six times, usually every three or four months, in London. Feklisov was assisted in preparations for these clandestine meetings by three experienced MGB officers who checked for hostile surveillance. Every meeting was carefully planned and usually lasted for no more than forty minutes. Fuchs's meetings with Feklisov remained undetected by British counterintelligence. It was only after Fuchs came under suspicion and he himself offered that he might become a security risk when his father was appointed to a professorship in theology at the University of Leipzig in East Germany that he was accused of giving secret information to the Soviet Union.

When he was arrested in 1950, the indictment mentioned only one meeting in 1947, and this was based on his confession. {p. 209} The information Fuchs gave us in 1948 coincided with Maclean's reports from Washington on America's limited nuclear potential, not sufficient to wage an allout and prolonged war. Maclean had become first secretary and acting head of chancery at the British Embassy in 1944. Looking back, one may say that in every scientific team, both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, there were politically motivated figures, Kurchatov in the Soviet Union, Edward Teller in America. Kurchatov always kept the interests of the state first in his mind. He was less stubborn and less independent than men like Kapitsa or loffe. Beria, Pervukhin, and Stalin immediately sensed that he was different from the scientists of the older generation; they saw that he was young, ambitious, and fully prepared to subordinate academic traditions to the interests of the state. When the government wanted to speed up the test of our first atomic bomb in 1949, Kurchatov went along with copying the American design. However, parallel work continued on the Soviet-designed bomb, which was exploded in 1951. In the United States, Edward Teller assumed a similar role later, when he was put in charge of the hydrogen bomb project. Oppenheimer reminded me very much of our classic scientists who tried to maintain their own identity, their own world, and their total internal independence. It was a peculiar independence and an illusion, because both Kurchatov and Oppenheimer were destined to be not only scientists but also directors of huge governmentsponsored projects. The conflict was inevitable; we cannot judge them, because the bomb marked the opening of a new era in science, when for the first time in history scientists were required to act as statesmen. Initially neither Oppenheimer nor Kurchatov was surrounded by the scientific bureaucracies that later emerged in the 1950s. In the 1940s, neither government was m a position to control and influence scientific progress, because there was no way to progress except to rely on a group of geniuses and adjust to their needs, demands, and extravagant behavior. Nowadays no new development in science can be compared to the breakthrough into atomic energy in the 1940s. Atomic espionage was almost as valuable to us in the political and diplomatic spheres as it was in the military. When Fuchs reported the {p. 210} unpublished design of the bomb, he also provided key data on the production of uranium 235. Fuchs revealed that American production was one hundred kilograms of U-235 a month and twenty kilos of plutonium per month. This was of the highest importance, because from this information we could calculate the

number of atomic bombs possessed by the Americans. Thus, we were able to determine that the United States was not prepared for a nuclear war with us at the end of the 1940s or even in the early 1950s. This information might be compared with Colonel Oleg Penkovsky's information to the Americans during the early 1960s on the size of the Soviet ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) arsenal. Just as Fuchs enabled us to determine that the United States was not ready for nuclear war against the Soviet Union, Penkovsky told the United States that Khrushchev was not prepared for nuclear war against the United States. Stalin pursued a tough policy of confrontation against the United States when the Cold War started; he knew he did not have to be afraid of the American nuclear threat, at least until the end of the 1940s. Only by 1955 did we estimate the stockpile of American and British nuclear weapons to be sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union. That information helped to assure a Communist victory in China's civil war in 1947-1948. We were aware that President Harry Truman was seriously considering the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a Chinese Communist victory. Then Stalin initiated the Berlin crisis, blockading the Western-controlled sectors of the city in 1948. Western press reports indicated that Truman and Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, were prepared to use nuclear weapons to prevent Berlin's fall to communism, but we knew that the Americans did not have enough nuclear weapons to deal with both Berlin and China. The American government overestimated our threat in Berlin and lost the opportunity to use the nuclear threat to support the Chinese nationalists. Stalin provoked the Berlin crisis deliberately to divert attention from the crucial struggle for power in China. In 1951, when we were discussing plans for military operations against American bases, Molotov told me that our position in Berlin helped the Chinese Communists. For Stalin, the Chinese Communist victory supported his policy of confrontation with America. He was preoccupied with the idea of a SinoSoviet {p. 211} axis against the Western world. Stalin's view of Mao Tse-tung, of course, was that he was a junior partner. I remember that when Mao came to Moscow in 1950 Stalin treated him with respect, but as a junior partner. In August 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device. This event, for which we had worked a decade, was not announced in the Soviet press; therefore, when the American media announced our explosion on September 23, Stalin and the Soviet security establishment were shocked. Our immediate reaction was that there had been an American agent penetration of our test; but in a week our scientists

reported that nuclear explosions in the atmosphere could be easily detected by planes sampling air around Soviet borders. This scientific explanation relieved us of the burden of proving there was no mole among us. Kurchatov and Beria were honored by the government for outstanding contrlbutions and services in strengthening the might of the country. They received medals, monetary awards, and certificates granting them lifetime status as honored citizens. Free travel, dachas, and the right of their children to enter higher education establishments without exams were granted for life to all key scientific personnel on the project.33 In assessing all the materials that were processed by Department S, we must take into account the views of Academician Yuli Khariton and Academician Anatoli P. Aleksandrov, president of the Academy of Sciences, who said that Kurchatov (19031960) was a genius who had made no major mistakes in the design of our first atomic bomb. They made their comments on the eighty-fifth anniversary of Kurchatov's birthday, in 1988. They noted that Kurchatov, having in his possession only several micrograms of artificially produced plutonium, was brave enough to suggest the immediate construction of major facilities to refine plutonium. The Soviet bomb was constructed in three years. Without the intelligence contribution, there could have been no Soviet atomic bomb that quickly. For me, Kurchatov remains a genius, the Russian Oppenheimer, but not a scientific giant like Bohr or Fermi. He was certainly helped by the intelligence we supplied, and his efforts would have been for naught without Beria's talent in mobilizing the nation's resources. 33. The children of illegal officers serving abroad were also admitted to universities without entry examinations. In 1960 Khrushchev canceled free travel for the scientists. {p. 217} At the height of the so-called Zionist conspiracy in 1952 and 1953, we claimed that the Rosenberg case proved the United States had a consistent policy of anti-Semitism. At the same time,Soviet propaganda insisted there was nothing anti-Semitic in exposing the Zionist conspiracy, while actually a very real antiSemitic campaign was gaining momentum in the Soviet Union. In the United States the Rosenberg trial heightened anti-Semitism; the writer Howard Fast exposed it in his plays and stories, which were promptly translated and published in the Soviet Union. The case of the Rosenbergs became a major cause for the peace movement. {p. 221} The conventional wisdom is that the Cold War started with Winston Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, on March 6, 1946, but for

us, confrontation with the Western allies had begun when the Red Army liberated Eastern Europe. The conflict of interest was evident. The principle agreed upon with Roosevelt at Yalta, providing for multiparty elections, was acceptable to us only for the transition period after the defeat of Germany, while the fate of Eastern Europe was in the balance. I remember the remarks of Foreign Minister Molotov and Beria, saying that coalition governments in Eastern Europe would not last long. Later, at the gatherings of the Committee of Information, which Molotov headed in 1947, these statements of Molotov's acquired new significance. From 1947 to 1951, the Committee of Information was the central decision-making group that collected all foreign intelligence and acted upon it. The road to Yalta, strange as it may seem, was opened by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Without claiming any high-minded moral principles for that deal in 1939, it was clearly the first time the USSR was treated as a superpower. Following Yalta, Russia became one of the political power centers in determining the future of the world. Nowadays many analysts point to the similarity of Stalin's and Hitler's {p. 222} approaches to dividing the world. Stalin is bitterly attacked for betraying principles of human morality in signing a pact with Hitler; it is overlooked that he also signed a secret deal to divide Europe with Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta, and later with Truman at Potsdam. Principles of ideology are not always decisive in secret deals between superpowers; this is one of the rules of the game. I met Ambassador Konstantin Oumansky in Beria's office in December 1941, when he returned from Washington after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He told me that to defuse the opposition and give Roosevelt a stronger hand in providing us lend-lease aid, Harry Hopkins had insisted on the dissolution of the Comintern and on our rapprochement with the Orthodox church. These informal recommendations came from Roosevelt via Hopkins, his close friend and personal envoy on many important missions, and were accepted by Stalin. As the time neared for the Yalta Conference, all these requests had been met. At the end of 1944, in preparation for the Yalta Conference in February 1945, there was a meeting of the intelligence services, chaired by Molotov. The goals of this meeting were to assess what strength Germany had left to continue the war and to analyze areas of future peace settlements with America and Britain. We were not informed of the dates of the Yalta meeting, but Molotov said that the summit would take place in the Crimea within two months. After that meeting Beria appointed me the chief of the special team to set up a group to present information to Molotov and Stalin. Beria went to Yalta but did not take part

in the conference. In preparation for what we could expect at Yalta from the Allied leaders and their aides, we provided him with psychological portraits of the American delegation. We knew that neither the American nor British delegation had a coherent program for postwar policy in the countries of Eastern Europe. There was no agreement between them and no organized program. They were just seeking to restore to power the Polish and Czechoslovakian leaders of governments-in-exile in London. The reports from military intelligence and our directorate indicated that the Americans were ready for a compromise and that a flexible position on our part would ensure a fair division of influence in postwar Europe, and probably the world as a whole. To the Allies, this "flexibility" meant that the Polish government-in-exile should be given some important posts in the postwar government; but Churchill and Roosevelt's demands at Yalta were very naive, because from our point of view {p. 223} the composition of the Polish government would be decided by the power structures that were receiving their support from the Red Army. In the period before Yalta, the Red Army was fully engaged in combat operations against the Germans and had liberated large areas of Poland. The political turn of events in our favor in all the countries of Eastern Europe was easy to predict, especially in the areas where the Communist parties were active in national salvation committees, which were de facto provisional governments under our control. We could be flexible and allow democratic voting because the governments-inexile could not challenge our influence. Benes, for example, escaped from Czechoslovakia to Britain using NKVD money and was highly influenced by us. Ludvik Svoboda, who later became president of Czechoslovakia, was a supporter of the Soviet government and the Red Army. The head of Czech intelligence, Colonel Muravitz, was a fulltime NKVD agent, recruited by our rezident in London, Chichayev. In Romania, young King Michael relied on Communist combat troops to arrest General lon Antonescu and implement his anti-Hitler coup d'etat when he joined the antifascist coalition. The situation in Bulgaria was advantageous to us because of the strong presence and influence of the legendary Georgi M. Dimitrov, former chairman of the Comintern. At the time of the Yalta Conference, we were secretly taking uranium ore from the Rodopi Mountains in Bulgaria for our atomic project. In 1945 I met Averell Harriman, the ambassador of the United States to the Soviet Union, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was introduced as Pavel Matveyev, an official from Molotov's secretariat in the Kremlin, in charge of preparations for the Yalta Conference. After the first formal meeting, I invited Harriman to lunch at the Aragvi, a restaurant famous for its Georgian cuisine.

Harriman seemed pleased to accept the invitation. I brought with me to the lunch Prince Janusz Radziwill, to act as my mterpreter. He was introduced as a Polish patriot living in exile in Moscow, but at that time was, in fact, our controlled agent. When Harriman and Radziwill met in the Aragvi, it was a reunion of old friends. Harriman owned a chemical plant, a porcelain factory, {p. 224} two coal mines, and two zinc mines in Poland. More important, Radziwill and Harriman jointly owned Spulnata Intersuv, a coal mining and metallurgical enterprise that employed forty thousand workers. Janusz Radziwill was an important political figure in Poland. He was a senator and chairman of the commission on foreign affairs of the Sejm, the Polish parliament. In the 1930s he had assisted Harriman in acquiring shares of Polish businesses in fierce competition with French and Belgian entrepreneurs. As I've previously related, we had kept our eye on Radziwill from the middle of the 1930s; and after we had seized him in 1939, following the invasion of Poland, Beria recruited him for use as an agent of influence. I then arranged for him to return to Berlin, where for a time our rezidentura reported on him. He was spotted at diplomatic functions there and in the company of his former hunting companion, Goring, who had been a guest at the Radziwill estate near Vilnius. In late 1944 or early 1945 I was summoned to Beria's office and informed that Radziwill had been arrested by SMERSH, military counterintelligence, in Poland or Lithuania and would be transferred to Lubyanka in two days. At that time our relations with the Polish authorities were very tense. The pro-Communist Lublin Provisional Committee proclaimed itself the government of Poland in opposition to the Polish government-in-exile in London. We were prepared to use Radziwill in a very active manner to soothe the pro-British Poles. In the meantime, British and American authorities made inquiries into Radziwill's whereabouts. A routine check of his prewar connections revealed Radziwill's business association with Harriman. On hearing this, Beria ordered Radziwill moved from Lubyanka, where he had spent a month, into a safe house in the outskirts of Moscow under house arrest. He was to be used as an intermediary with Harriman. At the lunch with Harriman and Radziwill, I was ready to express our tolerance of Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox priests, even those who had collaborated with the Germans in the occupied territories during the war. (I myself received Archbishop Slipi, later the cardinal of the Ukrainian Catholic church; although he had collaborated with the Germans, he was allowed to return to Lvov. A year after Yalta, however, he was arrested and exiled to a labor camp on the orders of Khrushchev.) At

lunch I was prepared to discuss the fate of Russian Orthodox priests and to assure Harriman that no leaders of the Orthodox church were being persecuted by the Soviet government. {p. 225} When I raised this subject at the lunch, Harriman said that the recent meeting to elect a patriarch for the church had produced a favorable impression on American public opinion. That was as far as we got with my agenda. Harriman quickly sensed that Radziwill was serving as interpreter in an informal role and proceeded to discuss with him possible business ventures in the Soviet Union after the war. I was not prepared for that kind of overture. Harriman said that business opportunities were the logical outcome of the defeat of Germany. He was interested in mines and railways. I told him that we were impressed by the information provided to us by Amerlcan agents in Switzerland who had contacts with the German underground, in particular with the Halder group and General Ludwig Beck's group, who had tried unsuccessfully to overthrow Hitler. I mentioned that we had informed the State Department about our clandestine meetings with the Finns to achieve a peace pact and the mediation role of the Wallenberg family. Finally, I asked Harriman what the Americans hoped to accomplish at Yalta. My purpose was to prepare responses to the American positions on sensitive issues such as the future of Poland, the future boundaries of Europe, and the fate of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Austria. Harriman was not prepared to explore any of these problems. Clearly, he wanted to receive instructions on how to proceed. Harriman was interested to know how long Radziwill was planning to stay in Moscow. I assured him that Radziwill was free to travel to London, but he preferred to go directly to Poland as soon as it was liberated from the Germans. Harriman was interested in problems relating to the involvement of Jewish capital. Informally, he assured full support by the American administration for plans to use Jewish funds for the restoration of the Gomel area in Byelorussia, which was totally destroyed by the Germans and was one of the primary areas for Jewish settlements in prewar Russia. I tried to divert his attention from investments by taiking about a personal matter. In a very gentle manner, I advised Harriman to look closer at the adventures of his daughter in Moscow, because her relationships with certain Russian young men could lead her to trouble Moscow was full of hooligans and gangsters in this last year of the war {p. 226} but Harriman did not respond to my warnings. He was concerned with assurances about the supply of vodka and caviar for the participants at the Yalta

meeting. This warning about his daughter was very friendly; I emphasized that our government "in no way would permit any dubious actions of any of its institutions" against Harriman or his family, and stressed that he was highly respected by our leader. This meant that the warning was in no way a threat of blackmail; our purpose was to show that he was beyond any provocations by us. We showed by this that we could discuss any delicate matters, both personal and diplomatic. Harriman pointed out to Radziwill that Yalta would give the green light for interesting business ventures in postwar Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. I said that the purpose of Radziwill's stay in Moscow in hiding was to rule out rumors that a friend of Goering's was about to appear in Sweden or Britain as a courier from Hitler for peace overtures. Radziwil! not only translated my remarks but supported them, confirming his desire to appear in Europe only after the end of the war. Since I was supposed to be a high official of the Council of Ministers, I presented Harriman with a tea service, a gift on behalf of our government. My conversations with Harriman at the Aragvi restaurant and later at the Sovietskaya Hotel, which was once the residence for Western delegations, were taped. We listened to these conversations to pick up revealing remarks that would help develop our psychological profiles of American delegates, which were more important to Stalin than intelligence information. From this he knew that the personal deals and relations he would establish with Roosevelt and Churchill at the conference would be decisive. These personal relations would predetermine all the formal documents and agreements. In November 1945, when Stalin was on leave in the Crimea, Harriman tried in vain to meet him personally to discuss plans for economic and political cooperation. I was told that he came to see Molotov, saying that he was a friend who for a number of years discussed very sensitive issues with various Soviet officials and with Stalin personally, but Molotov remained strictly official at that meeting. This signaled an end to Harriman's high-level access and thus his effectiveness as the ambassador. In the summer of 1941 Harry Hopkins suggested to our ambassador in Washington, Oumansky, that they establish confidential relations. {p. 230} Some eighty percent of intelligence information on political matters comes not from agents but from confidential contacts. Usually these contacts are detected by counterintelligence services, but it is always problematic to prove the case of espionage. Indeed, the policy of Soviet intelligence in 1942 was to cut off any connection hetween Communist party members and intelligence activities. If the source of information was important enough, he was ordered by us to publicly declare his severance from the party to show that he was disillusioned with communism.

It is interesting to observe shifts in the history of diplomatic contacts between American and Soviet representatives. Throughout the war Hopkins and Harriman maintained personal, informal, and diplomatic relations with Soviet leaders, and I believe they were fulfilling instructions of Roosevelt. Stalin resorted to informal diplomacy only in the first period of the war, using Oumansky and Litvinov. When he himself established relations with Roosevelt at Tehran, he no longer needed Litvinov, the skillful negotiator with fluent English, French, and German, in America. Andrei Gromyko's appointment as ambassador in 1943 was a clear sign of the establishment of a personal link between Stalin and Roosevelt. Stalin no longer needed a strong intermediary such as Litvinov or Oumansky. Later Stalin got rid of all who engaged in informal contacts with Roosevelt's envoys. This explains why he dropped Litvinov. Our last effort to ensure friendly ties with Americans before Yalta was our disclosure to them that Roosevelt's interpreter was the son of one of the leaders of Oberleague, the White Russian terrorist organization. This happened just two days before the start of the Yalta Conference. The news was channeled to Beria, and on his instructions Sergei Kruglov, who chaired the guards for the conference, informed the chief of the American guards. The interpreter was immediately evacuated from Yalta to one of the American ships anchored near Crimea. Originally, Soviet intentions were to participate in the Marshall Plan. I remember meeting Molotov's assistant, Mikhail Vetrov, on the eve of his {p. 231} departure to Paris with Molotov to participate in talks about rebuilding Europe in June 1947. Vetrov was an old friend with whom I had worked in Riga in 1940. He told me that the directive was to cooperate with the Western allies in the implementation of the Marshall Plan, giving special attention to restoring the devastated industrial facilities in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Leningrad. Then, in a sudden turn of policy, I was summoned to meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky and Peter Fedotov, his deputy in the offices of the Committee of Information. VyshinskY explained that they had received a cable from an agent, code-named Orphan, who was Donald Maclean. As first secretary of the British Embassy in Washington and acting head of chancery, Maclean had access to all of the embassy's classified traffic. He stated that the goal of the Marshall Plan was to ensure American economic domination in Europe. The new international economic organization to restore European productivity would be under the control of American financial capital. The source for Maclean's report was British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin. This fateful report decided the future disparity between the economic levels of Eastern and Western Europe. Vyshinsky knew he must immediately report this message to Stalin. However, before doing that

he wanted to double-check the credibility of Maclean and the agents in his group Philby, Burgess, Cairncross, and Blunt. Vyshinsky was frightened that Aleksandr Orlov, who had defected to the West, had been in contact with these agents and might have compromised them. Vyshinsky asked me and Fedotov to what extent Philby, Maclean, and Burgess might be engaged in a double game. I was the one responsible for giving orders to resume contacts with Philby and Maclean in 1939 after Orlov's defection. Since my signature was on the formal order registered in Maclean's file, Vyshinsky created an awkward moment when he asked if I was still confident of Maclean's reliability. I told him that Iwas responsible for the orders I signed, but that I was unaware of Maclean's work only until 1939 and it had not been reported to me since 1942. At the same time I added, "Every important source of information should be subjected to regular checks and evaluation, with no exceptions for Philby, Burgess, and Maclean." Vyshinsky, clearly distressed, was relieved by my final remark: "But Comrade Stalin persollally ordered the NKVD not to track down Orlov or persecute members of his family." This convinced Vyshinsky that there was no reason to withhold the information from Stalin pending a new check on Maclean. If Maclean's information was tainted, Vyshinsky could wash {p. 232} his hands with Stalin's own order to leave Orlov alone. Besides, I told all this to Vyshinsky in the presence of Fedotov, so he could use him as a witness against me in case the Maclean information was proven false. The message revealed a crucial point: the Marshall Plan was intended to be a substitute for the payment of reparations by Germany. This was a serious concern for the Soviet leadership, because at that time war reparations were the sole source of foreign capital to restore our economy. At Yalta and Potsdam it had been agreed that German reparations in the form of equipment, manufacturing machinery, cars, trucks, and building supplies would be sent to Russia regularly for five years. This was essential for modernizing our chemical and machine tool industries. It was not to be regulated by international control. That meant we could use these supplies for whatever purposes we found necessary. The Marshall Plan was quite different, because all its economic projects would be under international or American control. The scheme would have been attractive if it were an additional element to the regular flow of reparations from Germany and Finland. However, the Maclean report indicated that the British and American governments wanted to replace reparations to the Soviet Union and East

European countries with international aid, based not on bilateral agreements but on international control. This was totally unacceptable because it would obstruct our consolidation of control in Eastern Europe. It meant that Communist parties already established in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would be deprived of economic levers of power. Six months after the Marshall Plan was rejected by the Soviet Union, multiparty rule in Eastern Europe came to an end. On instructions from Stalin, Vyshinsky sent a coded message to Molotov in Paris which summarized the Maclean report. Based on Maclean's information, Stalin instructed Molotov to obstruct the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Eastern Europe. This was carried out in various ways. Vyshinsky personally conducted negotiations with King Michael of Romania for his abdication, guaranteeing part of his pension in Mexico. In Bulgaria the situation was unique. During the war1 I met frequently with Georgi Dimitrov, the head of the Comintern until it was disbanded in 1943. For a year he was the first director of the interna{p. 233} tional department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. When Dimitrov returned home to Bulgaria in 1944, he allowed the czarina and her son, the heir apparent, to leave the country with their personal wealth and property. Sensing the danger that might come from monarchist emigres, Dimitrov decided to eliminate the entire political opposition; he purged and liquidated all key figures in the former parliament and government of czarist Bulgaria. As a result of this action, one which today would be considered a terrorist act, Dimitrov was the only Communist leader in Eastern Europe who did not face the existence of an emigre organization in the West. Dimitrov's followers exploited the absence of a political opposition for more than thirty years. The former minister of defense of Bulgaria, General Ivan Genarov, who worked under my command in the Fourth Directorate during the war years, told me later, when we met in Moscow in the 1970s, that Bulgaria "is the only socialist country without any dissidents in the West because we ourselves learned the lesson from you and wiped them out before they were able to escape to the West." {p. 285; Chapter 10} THE JEWS: CALlFORNlA IN THE CRIMEA From where I sat on the seventh floor of Lubyanka, many sensitive issues crossed my desk demanding action. Perhaps the most politically charged were those

dealing with the Jewish question.Not only was my wife Jewish, but many of my most trusted colleagues were of Jewish origin, including my deputy, Leonid Eitingon. He was among the principal figures accused in the 1952-1953 Doctors' Plot and the so-called Zionist conspiracy. Contrary to widespread reports that antiSemitism was Stalin's main reason for the persecution of Jews, I regard anti-Semitism as Stalin's weapon but not his determining strategy. In 1944 and the first half of 1945, Stalin's strategic motivation was to use the Jewish issue as a bargaining chip to bring in international Jewish capital to rebuild the war-torn Soviet Union and to influence the postwar realignment of power in the Middle East. Stalin planned to use Jewish aspirations for a homeland to attract Western credits. Intentions to form a Jewish republic really existed, based on a letter addressed to Stalin from the Jewish Antifascist Committee. The letter, which was to prove a fateful milestone in Jewish life in the Soviet Union, was written by Solomon Mikhoels, a beloved actor of the Yiddish State {p. 286} Art Theater and a leading member of the committee; Shakhne Epshtein, the executive secretary of the committee; and Itzik Feffer, a popular poet and a member of the committee who accompanied Mikhoels on a speaking tour of the United States from June to December 1943. This letter, addressed to Stalin and dated February 15, 1944, was later shown to Vyacheslav Molotov by Solomon Lozovsky, deputy foreign minister and supervisor of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. Under Molotov's instructions, he edited the letter, redated it February 21, and readdressed it to Molotov. On February 24 the letter was registered in Molotov's secretariat under the number M-23314 and the same day, with Molotov's notation on it, the letter was redirected to Georgi Malenkov, secretary of the Communist party; Anastas Mikoyan, minister of foreign trade; A. S. Shcherbakov, secretary of the Moscow party committee and chief of the armed forces political directorate; and Aleksei Voznesensky, chairman of GOSPLAN, the State Planning Committee. Part of the letter, published for the first time in 1993, stated: The creation of a Jewish Soviet republic will once and forever, in a Bolshevik manner, within the spirit of Leninist-Stalinist national policy, settle the problem of the state legal position of the Jewish people and further development of their multicentury culture. This is a problem that no one has been capable of settling in the course of many centuries. It can be solved only in our great socialist country.1

The letter, whose existence is officially admitted in the journals of the Communist party,2 is still not declassified and was not shown with the archival material of the Jewish Antifascist Committee that was displayed in Washington, D.C., during President Yeltsin's visit in 1992. Gregory Kheifetz, our operative who had been successful in atomic espionage, told me that the letter was a proposal with details for a plan to make the Crimean Socialist Republic a homeland for Jewish people from all over the world. This would have required the resettlement of the population still living in the Crimea. In March and April 1944 the Crimean Tatars were forcibly deported from the area; 150,000 people 1. Literaturnaya Cazeta, July 7, 1933. 2. Izvestia CC CPSU, no. 12, 1989, p. 37. {p. 287} were moved to Uzbekistan in Central Asia.3 That the letter and the order to move the Tatars bore virtually the same dates - February 14 and 15, 1944 - was completely coincidental. The order by Stalin to move the Tatars (they were accused of mass collaboration with the Germans) had been signed earlier, but it came to Beria for signature a day before the letter from the Jewish Antifascist Committee was received. Coordination and execution of Stalin's plans to lure foreign Jewish capital was entrusted to Kheifetz, who orchestrated Mikhoels's trip to America in 1943, while Kheifetz was serving as vice consul in San Francisco. At the time, we were trying desperately to obtain as much aid as possible from America. Before his departure to the United States, Mikhoels was summoned to Beria's office in the Lubyanka and instructed to establish broad contacts in the American Jewish community. Our plan was for him to lay the groundwork for American investment in the metal and coal mining industries in the Soviet Union. It was rumored that Mikhoels might be offered the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet in the proposed new Jewish republic. Apart from Molotov, Lozovsky, and other high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mikhoels was the only one aware of Stalin's plans to establish another puppet state in Palestine or the Crimea. Stalin hoped to receive $10 billion in credits for the restoration of the economy after the war. I did not know the detailed contents of the Jewish Antifascist Committee letter to Stalin. I was informed by Beria that the initiative came from the American side, from American Jewish organizations. I regarded the discussions about an autonomous Jewish republic within the Soviet Union as a probe of Western intentions to give us substantial economic aid after the war. The letter remained in the file for four years, its contents the subject of rumors. Then, in 1948, Malenkov used it as a weapon in Stalin's purge of the Jewish Antifascist Committee and later the old guard in the

leadership. Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Voznesensky, and finally Beria because of their Jewish relatives or 3. The idea of resettling Soviet Jews in the Crimea first arose in the 1920s. It became a lingering myth, a vast projected scheme that would involve a million acres and 400,000 people. It was to be an answer to the impoverishment of Jews caused by the end of petty trade, and a way of maintaining Jewish national cohesion. Thus even at thls early stage it posed the dilemma of whether or not it encouraged nationalism, in conflict with socialist goals. See Nora Levin, The Jews in the Soviet Union Since 1917 (New York: New York University Press, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 147, 455-456. {p. 288} their involvement in the discussions of a separate autonomous Jewish republic in the Crimea - were tainted with what had become an outrageous affront to Stalin's control.4 In the early 1920s, when the Bolshevik regime was first establishing itself, there was a preponderance of Jewish names in administrative positions at all levels because they had the education to fill these jobs. At this time there were no internal passports in Russia, so people were not officially identified as Jews or other nationalities. In 1922 and 1923 there was a rapid roundup of the leaders of all Jewish and other nationalist underground groups. The Police of Zion organization (Politzi Tzion) was extremely active, for example, and outmaneuvered GPU surveillance teams in Odessa; the Zionists led the secret service officers to a remote cemetery and then turned on them and beat them. Haganah had its origins in Zhitomir in the Ukraine, but the irony is that the Jews who worked in the Ukrainian GPU were put in charge of the operations against the Zionist underground groups. The crackdown included the Jewish Bund, a socialist organization that was a member of the Socialist International. The Jewish Communist party, a splinter group from the Jewish Bund, was also dissolved. This was the Bolshevik policy, to eliminate any political national splinter group in or out of the Communist party. Theseparatist Ukrainian Communist party was also dissolved. The Communist Party of the Ukraine (Bolsheviks) was the established and approved political party. It was the only party with its own politburo. The Jewish leadership was either exiled or permitted to emigrate. Before 1928, there was no barrier to emigrating; the procedure for leaving the country was simpler than now. The effect of the loss of these leaders was that Jews no longer had any political organizations and lost their Jewish identity. The Jewish intelligentsia lost its political roots. In 1933 the internal passport system was introduced, and Jews were identified as a national group, even though they had no republic to be their homeland. In every major ministry at this time, Jews held

top positions. I scarcely remember the directive of the Central Committee in 1939, after the Great Purge, to look into how many people of any one nation4. Molotov and Voroshilov had Jewish wives. Mikoyan and Voznesensky were involved in the discussions of establishing a Jewish homeland in the Crimea. Beria was instrumental in the establishment of the Jewish Antifascist Committee during the war and arranged for Mikhoels's trip to America in 1943. {p. 289} ality were occupying key positions in sensitive ministries, but it was more potent than I perceived it to be. For the first time, an effective quota system came into being. Fortunately, most of my comrades-in-arms {Jewish?}, men and women who became distinguished fighters, agents, and officers during the war, were already in place and were not affected by this directive. The establishment of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Birobidzhan in 1928 was ordered by Stalin only as an effort to strengthen the Far Eastern border region with an outpost, not as a favor to the Jews. The area was constantly penetrated by Chinese and White Russian terrorist groups, and the idea was to shield the territory by establishing a settlement whose inhabitants would be hostile to White Russian emigres, especially the Cossacks. The status of this region was defined shrewdly as an autonomous district, not an autonomous republic, which meant that no local legislature, high court, or government post of ministerial rank was permitted. It was an autonomous area, but a bare frontier, not a political center. Before the war, Stalin's government toyed with the idea of using the leaders of the Jewish Socialist Bund, Henryk Ehrlich and Victor Alter, for pursuing Soviet policy goals abroad. General Raikhman, former deputy director of the Second Directorate in charge of counterintelligence, told me in 1970 that these leaders of the bund were arrested in Poland in September and October 1939. When the war with the Germans broke out, they were released in September 1941, summoned to Beria, and offered the opportunity to set up a Jewish anti-Hitler committee. At first it was planned that Ehrlich was to become the head of the committee and Mikhoels was to become his deputy; Alter was to be the executive secretary. This plan was abandoned because these people knew too much about Stalin's intentions to use them for raising money in the West. In December 1941, Alter and Ehrlich were rearrested. No charges were brought against them. Ehrlich wrote to President Kalinin on December 27, 1941, protesting that he was loyal to the Soviet government and eager to cooperate with the NKVD. In his letter he said: The main task of the proposed Jewish Anti-Hitler Committee should be intensive propaganda among Jewish communities of the U.S.A. and Britain for rendering the

fullest necessary aid to the USSR in its struggle against Hitler's invasion. All of our proposals were fully endorsed by the leadership, {p. 290} and the NKVD was entrusted to find a suitable place for the committee's headquarters.5 Ehrlich never received an answer to his letter. The archives show that in December Beria ordered Ehrlich and Alter placed in solitary confinement and assigned prisoner numbers 41 and 42. It was forbidden to interrogate them or fill in their names on prison registration forms in the Kuibyshev NKVD jail, where they were transferred. General Raikhman later told me that there was a special order to conceal from the personnel of the jail the real names of prisoners 41 and 42. The orders came from Stalin, Molotov, and Beria, but they were strange orders, forbidding the interrogation of the prisoners. In 1942 American politician Wendell Willkie and William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, inquired about the fate of Ehrlich and Alter through Soviet ambassador Maksim Litvinov. So did the Polish ambassador to Moscow, Stanislaw Kot. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky hinted in his reply to Kot that Ehrlich and Alter were pardoned by mistake; it had been determined that they were secretly conspiring with the Germans. Willkie inquired in late 1942 but received no answer until February 1943. Litvinov was authorized by Molotov to say that on December 23, 1941, Ehrlich and Alter were sentenced to death because in October and November 1941 they "systematically were involved in treasonous activities in their efforts to spread hostile propaganda in the Soviet Union to halt the war and sign a peace treaty with fascist Germany."6 This reply was a deliberate lie. By the time it was sent, Ehrlich had committed suicide (May 14, 1942) by hanging himself in his cell. Alter remained in solitary confinement until February 17,1943, when he was secretly shot on orders from Beria. At the time, I was not aware of their fate. All this happened on the eve of Mikhoels's visit to the United States as head of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. Only in September 1992 were the true facts of Ehrlich's and Alter's fate revealed from their files in the KGB'S weekly newspaper, Shait y Mech (Shield and Sword). The elimination of Ehrlich and Alter was the first stage in Stalin and Molotov's conspiracy to conceal clandestine informal contacts of the Soviet leadership with influential representatives of the foreign Jewish community. Ehrlich and Alter were removed because Stalin feared their independence and political influence. I believe 5. Shait y Mech (Shield and Sword), Septemher 3, 1992, p. 13.

6. Ibid. {p. 291} they were eliminated because their popularity went beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Mikhoels faced the same fate. His successful trip to America immediately made him suspect in Stalin's eyes. He had become a cultural hero for Jews around the world. The plan to lure American capital was associated with the idea of a Jewish state in the Crimea - what we called California in the Crimea. This idea was widely discussed in American Jewish circles, Kheifetz told me. In particular he mentioned the interest of Eric Johnston, president of the American Chamber of Commerce, who in June 1944 was received by Stalin with Ambassador Averell Harriman to discuss the reconstruction of areas that used to be major Jewish settlements in Byelorussia and resettlement of Jews in the Crimea. Johnston drew a rosy picture for Stalin that long-term American credits would be granted for this purpose to the Soviet Union after the war. The idea of setting up a Jewish socialist republic in the Crimea was openly discussed in Moscow, not only in the Jewish community but at the administrative level of the government. I remember that in mid-1944 or 194S, at a meeting of the state committee on atomic energy, Borisov, deputy chairman of GOSPLAN, said, "Our resources are too scarce, Comrade Pervukhin. We have just received instruction to look into the financial requirements for creating the infrastructure for a future Jewish republic in the Crimea." Mikhoels greatly relied on Feffer, a full-time controlled NKVD agent run personally by Commissar of State Security Leonid Raikhman. Occasionally even Beria met with Feffer in a safe apartment to review the Jewish question and encourage the project. Until June 1945 this plan appeared to be operational and on the way to realization. In preparation for the Yalta Conference, Harriman inquired of me and Novikov, Molotov's aide, how much progress had been made in plans to establish a Jewish republic, in connection with future American credits for this project. I recall seeing reports that Stalin discussed the plan for setting up a Jewish republic in the Crimea and restoring the Gomel area of Byelorussia with American senators who visited the Soviet Union right after the war. He asked them not to confine possible Western credits and technical assistance to these two areas, but to make the aid unrestricted.

Then, in June 1945, after Yalta and after the victory over Hitler, Stalin issued a decree declaring the Crimea to be only an administrative district, not a republic. Before the war the Crimea had been an autono{p. 292} mous republic {within the Russian Republic} with strong Tatar representation at government levels. In November 1945, when Harriman tried to reach Stalin through Molotov to discuss economic cooperation, his request for a meeting was rebuffed on Stalin's orders. Stalin apparently had abandoned the plan for a Jewish republic in the Crimea. "Stalin was of a different opinion on the solution to the problem of the Jewish people. He did not support the idea of a Jewish republic in the Crimea. Without any consequences the [Jewish Antifascist Committee] letter found its place in the archive. It was taken out four years later and was given the matching color of an indictment for dozens of innocent people," writes Arkady Vaksberg in Literaturnaya Gazeta,7 in answer to a reader's inquiry whether the idea of setting up a Jewish republic in the Crimea was Beria's provocation for a campaign against the Jews or whether a letter to Stalin actually existed and was seriously considered. After the war, Stalin preferred to play another game, which was to penetrate the Zionist movement. Until 1948 Great Britain held a mandate from the League of Nations to administer the territory of Palestine. Stalin and Molotov hoped to assuage the fears of the British that they would be pushed out of Palestine by the founding of a Jewish state there; part of the impetus for a Jewish homeland in the Crimea was to help our British allies. It was held out as a diversion for world Jewish leaders, to confuse the focus on Palestine as a solution to the Jewish problem. When it became clear at the end of 1945 that Stalin was not going to fulfill his earlier hints of a Jewish republic in the Crimea, the British and Americans set up the AngloAmerican Committee in Palestine, leaving out the Soviet Union. This was contrary to a previous understanding that there would be joint consultation of the three wartime allies. Thus in April 1946, Dekanozov, deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Vyshinsky, also a deputy minister, wrote a memorandum to Stalin and Molotov stressing that the Soviet Union had been snubbed. The Palestinian issue would be settled without the Soviet Union. They suggested that the leadership formulate a public policy of looking favorably on a Jewish state in Palestine. Under an alias, with the consent of Molotov, Vyshinsky published an article in the magazine Novoye Vremya, affirming the necessity of creating a democratic Jewish state in the territory of the British mandate. Clearly the intention was to 7. July 7, 1993, p. 15.

{p. 293} strengthen the Soviet stand in the Middle East and to undermine British influence among Arab states, who objected to the Jewish state, by showing their inability to stop the Jews.8 Concurrent with this political move, I was ordered to send agents to Palestine through Romania in 1946. They were to set up an illegal network that might participate in combat and sabotage operations against the British. I assigned three officers, Josef Garbuz, Aleksandr Semyonov (real name Taubman; he was Grigulevich's assistant in the Lithuanian underground and had helped liquidate Rudolf Klement in Paris in 1938), and Julius Kolesnikov. Garbuz and Kolesnikov had experience in guerrilla warfare in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia, where they had carried out sabotage operations against the Germans. Semyonov and Kolesnikov settled down in Haifa and built two networks, but they did not participate in any active sabotage operations against the British. Kolesnikov arranged for the shipment of small arms and antitank grenades seized from the Germans in Romania to Palestine. Semyonov attempted to renew contacts with an agent of Serebryansky, who had been planted in the Stern organization, an anti-British terrorist group, in 1937. Garbuz remained in Romania, gathering candidates for settlement in the future Israel. When the order came to plant agents in Palestine and provide ammunition to the Jewish guerrilla organizations, it became clear to me that while we were ostensibly helping the Jews, the real purpose of our efforts was to set up our own network within the Zionist political and military structure. The Jews were seeking independence and were deeply involved with America. They would not be subject to our influence to the degree that Eastern Europe was, but we felt it important to plant our presence there. Kheifetz told me that as early as 1943 Litvinov, in a message to Molotov from Washington, stressed that Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state would become a major issue in the postwar international order. It was in the second half of 1946, when Stalin had become disenchanted with Jewish alliances abroad and Jewish demands at home and was feeling isolated by the British-American joint stand in Palestine, {could the Baruch-Lilienthal Plan for World Government have been a factor? The Lilienthal report of March 16, 1946, updated as the Baruch Plan of June 14, 1946, were put to Stalin, on behalf of the American Government; both authors were Jewish: baruch-plan.html} that he began to stimulate an anti-Semitic campaign, which culminated in a purge of Jews from the party machinery, diplomatic service, military

8. Anatoli Sudoplatov conversation with a confidential source. {p. 294} apparatus, and intelligence services. It developed into the infamous Doctors' Plot and Zionist conspiracy charges, in which every Jewish doctor was suspect. The anti-Semitic campaign was a repeat of the purges of the 1930s, another maneuver by Stalin to sweep out all established power centers in the bureaucracy in order to replace them with weaker men and women who would not threaten his supreme hold on the country's leadership. In October 1946, for the first time, the specter of Jewish bourgeois nationalism as a threat to Communist ideology was raised, in a letter from Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov, newly appointed minister of state security, to Stalin. In the letter he accused leaders of the Jewish Antifascist Committee of engaging in nationalist propaganda, meaning they were putting Jewish concerns above Soviet interests. This was a heavy warning sign. Kheifetz, who had performed so brilliantly in obtaining atomic information for us and establishing high-level contacts in the American Jewish community, was suddenly out of favor. He continued to serve the Jewish Antifascist Committee as its secretary for foreign affairs, but he was forced to sever its contacts with the American Jewish community. One of the complaints in Abakumov's letter was that the committee intervened on behalf of Jews reclaiming their homes at the end of the war. Thousands of Jews had fled from Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Leningrad, and Moscow during the war to escape annihilation by the Germans. The Nazis had arrived promising to liberate Ukrainians and the Baltic states from "Jewish leadership." This found fertile soil among the nationalists, who seized Jewish property, homes, and apartments. In 1945 the Jews began to return, only to find they had been dispossessed. The government issued instructions regulating the return of the population to their homes. I remember when Khrushchev, then the secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party, telephoned Usman Usupov, the secretary of the Communist party of Uzbekistan, in 1947, complaining to him that Jews from Uzbekistan "are flying to the Ukraine like crows from Tashkent and Samarkand. I have no space to accommodate them because the city is destroyed. Stop the flow or pogroms will start." I was in Usupov's office at the time, and he told me the story because I had come to him with a request to accommodate three thousand Kurds, headed by Barzani, who had fled to Azerbaijan from Iran. It was dangerous to maintain them in the Caucasus, and we wanted to resettle them in Uzbekistan. To settle the Kurds was easy. Usupov ordered a new Kurdish collective farm to {p. 295} be built, a lot simpler than finding new homes for the displaced Jewish intelligentsia returning to Kiev.

Mikhoels had tried to intervene on behalf of the Jews, acting as the head of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. Abakumov's letter of complaint was meant to show that efforts to protect the rights of Jews to resettle in their former homes were a sign of Jewish bourgeois nationalism; it reflected the annoyance of party officials who were overwhelmed with problems of resettlement. Mikhoels's actions on behalf of displaced Jews not only annoyed Stalin, they made him deeply suspicious of Mikhoels. Imagine, in the Soviet system of discipline, suddenly a man with international reputation and authority begins to act on his own initiative. Mikhoels was doomed. The situation deteriorated in 1947. I remember the oral instruction from A. Obruchnikov, the deputy minister of state security in charge of personnel, not to enlist Jews as officers in the organs of state security. I could not imagine that this direct anti-Semitic order came from Stalin. I thought it must be Abakumov's initiative. It became clear to me that the grand plan of using our Jewish intellectuals for international cooperation with the world Jewish community had been abandoned. Eitingon, who kept complaining about an anti-Semitic campaign against his relatives in the university and medical services, was convinced that anti-Semitism was an essential element of the government's policy. In hindsight I realize that he understood the situation better than I did. Beria and Kobulov frequently told me that Stalin enjoyed anti-Muslim and antiAzerbaijani jokes and anecdotes told to him in the presence of Bagirov, the first secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist party, who was disheartened by Kobulov's imitation of Azerbaijani pronunciation of Russian words. This makes me believe that humor directed at any nationalist group was pleasing to Stalin, and that he was neither anti-Semitic nor anti-Muslim, only opposed to any nationalist enclave of power. Stalin and his close aides were interested in the Jewish issue mainly to exploit it politically, either for use in a power struggle or for consolidating their power. That's how the flirtation with anti-Semitism started in high party echelons. After Stalin opened an "anticosmopolitan" drive in 1946 and 1947, middle-level personnel and rank-and-file party bureaucracy took anti-Semitism for granted as the official party line."Rootless cosmopolitans" became synonymous with Jews; it meant that Soviets of Jewish origin shared cultural values with Western Jews and therefore were less than completely loyal to the Soviet Union. {p. 296} This anticosmopolitan drive coincided with a shift in the power balance around Stalin. Malenkov was demoted and Beria stripped of his position to supervise any activities in the sphere of state security. Rumors began to spread that he and Molotov surrounded themselves with Jews. Stalin's efforts after the war were

focused on extending Soviet hegemony, first over the countries of Eastern Europe bordering the Soviet Union, and then everywhere he was in competition with British interests. He foresaw that the Arab states would turn to the Soviet Union when they were frustrated by British and American support for Israel. The Arabs would appreciate the anti-Zionist trends in Soviet foreign policy. I was told by Vetrov, Molotov's assistant, later ambassador to Denmark, what Stalin said: "Let's agree to the establishment of Israel. This will be a pain in the ass for the Arab states and will make them turn their backs on the British. In the long run it will totally undermine British influence in Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq." The Cold War began in earnest in 1946 and 1947, when the illusion of postwar cooperation with the West ended. The wartime policy of treating Britain and America as allies turned into confrontation. The civil war in China was intensifying and tensions were rising in Italy and France because of the political struggle by the Communists to come to power. With the onset of the Cold War, our hopes for obtaining Western Jewish money faded. It became clear to the leadership that it could not rely on the support of the Jewish business community to invest in the reconstruction of the Soviet Union. The first victim was Mikhoels, who had been at the heart of the discussions to establish a Jewish Crimean republic. Stalin feared that Mikhoels would unleash forces that could not be controlled and would lead to unpredictable political consequences. Stalin feared a truly independent Jewish homeland. Mikhoels had the stature of a leader with world recognition, and Stalin could not risk his developing his own power base. Mikhoels was murdered in January 1948, under the direct order of Stalin. Probably because Emma was Jewish, the assignment, fortunately, was not given to me. The assassination was carried out by Colonel Lebedev under the operational control of the minister of state security of Byelorussia, Lavrenti Tsanava, and Sergei Ogoltsov, Abakumov's deputy, first deputy minister of state security. Mikhoels was lured to Tsanava's dacha on the outskirts of Minsk, ostensibly to meet leading Byelorussian dramatic artists. There Mikhoels, together with his {p. 297} secretary, V. Golubov, was jabbed with a poisoned needle. Golubov, unknown to Mikhoels, was an MGB informer who had become an unwanted witness because he had brought Mikhoels to the dacha. The two were thrown under the wheels of a truck to make it appear they had been killed on the street in a hit-and-run accident. When I first heard of Mikhoels's death, I kept my suspicions to myself. I never imagined that Ogoltsov would personally go to Minsk to supervise arrangements for

Mikhoels's assassination. I thought that probably Mikhoels was killed by an antiSemitic gangster who had been told in advance where to find such a notorious defender of the Jewish cause. I could not imagine that such an act, using such poor intelligence tradecraft, could be committed by trained officers. Such a crude execution did not seem to be the work of professionals. (I learned the details only after Stalin's death, when I was appointed by Beria to an MVD commission assigned to investigate the Doctors' Plot and the mysterious death of Mikhoels.) During most of 1948 I was preoccupied with the Berlin crisis and establishing a Kurdish guerrilla network in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey with the goal of overthrowing the government of Nuri Said and Faisal 11 in Iraq. This was the period when we were consolidating a Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, and I flew to Prague with Zubov to meet Benes, to neutralize his opposition to transferring power to Klement Gottwald. Emma had become seriously ill in 1947 and retired on a pension from the service. She was wise enough to retire from all operational work in 1940 and was appointed a senior lecturer for training illegals in the NKVD (later MGB) school. Occasionally she was used for contacting important women agents by the leadership of the Second Directorate, but most of the time she tried to avoid attracting attention. It was a happy coincidence that her illness and retirement came at about the time the purge of Jews began in the MVD, MGB, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1949 and was listed in the records under her maiden name, Kaganova. In 1949 and 1950, when I frequently had to leave Moscow for Prague, Western Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, Eitingon, my deputy, took command of Special Bureau Number One for Diversions and Intelligence. He visited Emma and told her that an anti-Semitic campaign was growing inharshness and scope. Eitingon's sister Sonia, a well-known cardiologist and the chief doctor at the polyclinic of the {p. 298} Stalin Automobile Factory, was fired. Emma's younger sister Elizabeth was denied postgraduate training at a medical institute in Kiev because she was Jewish. I intervened in these cases through a good friend, Andrei Muzichenko, director of the Central Clinical Research Institute of Moscow. In the 1930s he had been an NKVD illegal in France and Austria, but after the purges in 1938 he decided to rely on his diploma as a doctor and left the intelligence business. He offered jobs to Sonia and to Elizabeth, who is still working there. I was stunned when Gregory Kheifetz was arrested in 1948 or 1949, but neither I nor Eitingon could intervene. We attributed his arrest to Abakumov's anti-Semitic campaign. Almost all the members of theJewish Antifascist Committee and leading

Jewish intellectuals were arrested and tried for the conspiracy to separate the Crimea from the USSR. {Might the creation of Israel, an an external magnet for Jewish loyalties, have been a factor? Given the prominence of Jews in creating the USSR - the atheistic faction - the state of Israel - a religious state - was potentially not just an external homeland, but a rival centre of World Order. I therefore argue that the USSR was opposed, during the Cold War, not just by Aryanism but by Zionism, in an uneasy alliance; since the end of the Cold War, this has broken down.} An internal power struggle from 1948 to 1952 developed into the public antiSemitic campaign known as the Doctors' Plot. Although it was known as an antiSemitic campaign, the Doctors' Plot was not restricted to Jews. Rather it was part of a struggle to settle old scores in the leadership. On one side Stalin, with the help of Malenkov and Khrushchev, was trying to purge his own old guard andBeria. The scapegoats in the alleged Jewish "conspiracy" were to be Molotov, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan, the last of Stalin's Politburo old guard. The truth about the initiation of the Doctors' Plot has never been revealed, even during Gorbachev's glasnost, because it was a vicious power struggle in the Kremlin on the eve of Stalin's death that drew in the entire leadership. It is generally believed that the Doctors' Plot began with a hysterical letter to Stalin accusing Jewish doctors of plans to murder the leadership by means of maltreatment and poisoning. The notorious letter of Lydia Timashuk, a doctor in the Kremlin Polyclinic, was written and sent to Stalin not in 1952, just prior to the arrest of the doctors, but in August 1948. To her letter, which charged that Academician V. N. Vinogradov was maltreating Zhdanov and others and caused Zhdanov's death, Stalin's reaction had been: "Chepukha" - "Absurd." Her letter remained on file for three years without action and was only dug up at the end of 1951 when it became useful as a weapon in the power struggle. All members of the Politburo knew of the letter and had heard Stalin's reaction to it. (Colonel Boris Ludvigov, Beria's chief assistant on matters relating to the Politburo and Council of Ministers, told me this in Vladimir prison.) {p. 299} I always thought that Abakumov initiated the Doctors' Plot as a continuation of the anticosmopolitan drive. I learned differently in 1990, when the military prosecutor's office consulted me as a witness in the reinvestigation of Abakumov's postwar repressions. Instead of being the promulgator of the Doctors' Plot, he was a target of it. When he was arrested in 1951, he was accused of suppressing evidence of the plot to kill Stalin because he wanted to seize power and become the dictator of the Soviet Union. Abakumov was alleged to rely on Jewish doctors and Jewish sabotage experts in the Ministry of State Security (meaning Eitingon).

For Malenkov and Beria, the goal was to remove Abakumov, and they were prepared to use whatever means were at hand. Malenkov's chief assistant, Dmitri Sukhanov, in spring 1951 received in his office a rank-and-file investigator from the Investigation Department of the Security Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Ryumin, known to be a primitive anti-Semite. This meeting was another fateful turning point for Soviet Jews. Ryumin feared expulsion from the security service because he had received a reprimand for leaving an investigation file on the bus from Lefortovo jail to Lubyanka headquarters. Additionally, he had concealed from the party and from the organs of state security the facts about the kulak (rich land-owning peasants) origin of his father, that his brother and sister had been convicted of thievery, and that his father-inlaw had served as an officer in the White Army of Admirial Aleksandr Kolchak. To his credit, Abakumov knew that the earlier attempts of Ryumin to portray arrested Jewish doctors as terrorists was a prelude to the grand Doctors' Plot, and he curbed Ryumin's efforts for several months in 1950. To save his own career and to serve his anti-Semitic ambitions, Ryumin readily accommodated Sukhanov's demand that he write a letter to Stalin denouncing Abakumov. Thirty years after these events, my former sister-in-law, Nina Sudoplatova, who worked as a typist-clerk in Malenkov's office - Sukhanov was her immediate boss told me that Ryumin, a poorly educated man, had to rewrite his letter denouncing Abakumov eleven times. Sukhanov kept him waiting in the reception room for almost ten hours while he conferred with Malenkov on the contents of the letter. Only Sukhanov knows how Ryumin was chosen to denounce Abakumov, and he did not reveal this aspect of the story when he appeared on Russian television in July 1992 to discuss the origin of the Doctors' Plot. In his denunciation, Ryumin, inspired by Malenkov, stated that {p. 300} Abakumov instructed the Investigation Department to suppress evidence about a "Zionist conspiracy aimed against leaders of the Soviet government" in the form of terrorist acts. By that time, a number of well-known Jewish doctors had been arrested for antiSoviet Zionist propaganda. The most prominent of them, Dr. Yakob G. Etinger, tragically died in jail while being interrogated before Abakumov was arrested in July 1951. Ryumin charged Abakumov with being responsible for Etinger's death by placing him in a cold cell in Lefortovo; he charged Abakumov with attempting to kill the doctor to prevent his revealing other Zionist conspirators. Ryumin took advantage of this and other cases and inflated them into a full-scale Zionist terrorist conspiracy. Out of the files came Timashuk's accusations against Jewish doctors.

Abakumov, more experienced in such intrigues, had been afraid to inflate the Zionist conspiracy case with such gross fabrications. He sensed that Stalin would demand real evidence in such high-risk provocations. Besides, Abakumov knew well that the rule was not to take the initiative in situations created by the top leadership. Jewish doctors treated Stalin and had their own intimate and direct access to Politburo members by virtue of their professional doctor-patient relationships. Thus Abakumov was not enthusiastic about transforming the Jewish Antifascist Committee into a grand conspiracy that would cause tremors at the top and affect key members of the Politburo such as Voroshilov and Molotov, who had Jewish wives, and Kaganovich, who was Jewish. Abakumov's hesitancy contributed to his undoing. Ryumin was first appointed chief of the MGB Investigation Department and then deputy minister of security; he was given a free hand to manipulate the evidence against Abakumov, and with him out of the way, to unleash the alleged doctors' conspiracy. The new investigators demanded to know who the members of Abakumov's new government were to be once Stalin was overthrown. Abakumov was also charged with concealing the treacherous crimes of Molotov's wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina. He was accused of covering up her contacts with Israeli politician Golda Meir (then known as Golda Meyerson) . Abakumov vigorously denied any guilt in either suppressing exposure of the doctor's conspiracy or being himself the leader and instigator of the Doctors' Plot through his Jewish subordinates in the Ministry of Security. Abakumov stood firm in his denial despite heavy torture. He became a dying invalid, but still he refused to "confess." The whole case {p. 301} for a Jewish conspiracy in the Ministry of Security then rested on the confessions of Colonel Naum Shvartsman, a former journalist who had never conducted an interrogation but who acted as editor of falsified confessions extracted from prisoners. When Stalin ordered the arrest of the director and three deputy directors of the investigation section, one among them was Colonel Shvartsman, a Jew. He confessed to being Abakumov's deputy in the Jewish terrorist organization that comprised all senior Jewish security officers. Under interrogation Shvartsman confessed that he was instructed by Abakumov to set up a group of Jewish conspirators in the Ministry of State Security to plan terrorist actions against the government. Shvartsman also "confessed" to having homosexual relations with Abakumov, his son, and the British ambassador. Shvartsman confessed that he had used homosexual contacts with the American double agents Gavrilov and Lavrentiev, who had been

planted in the American Embassy compound, to pass orders for terrorist actions to Jewish conspirators.9 He knew the machinery of investigation; to escape being beaten he proved he was cooperating by accusing Jewish officials. At the same time he invented unbelievable stories, like being inspired in his terrorist activities by drinking Zionist soup prepared by his Jewish aunt, or sleeping with his stepdaughter, or having homosexual relations with his son. He wanted to be sent for psychiatric examination, and that was recommended by deputy military prosecutor Colonel Uspensky. However, when his testimony accusing thirty Jewish top officials of terrorism was reported to Stalin, Stalin told Ignatiev and Ryumin, "You are both fools. That scoundrel is playing for time. No need for any expert opinion. Arrest the whole group immediately." (Ludvigov told me this in jail.) Stalin ordered the arrest of all Jewish colonels and generals in the Ministry of Security. A total of some fifty senior officers and generals were arrested, including Eitingon, Raikhman, and deputy minister of security Lieutenant General Belkin. Retired colonel Maklarsky, who had become a successful scriptwriter of popular espionage films, was also arrested because Shvartsman fingered him. Colonel Andrei Sverdlov, son of the first Soviet president, was arrested, along with two deputy ministers of state security suspected of Jewish connections, Lieutenant General Selivanovsky and Lieutenant General Pitovranov. 9. Shvartsman confirmed this in 1953, when the cases of the doctors and Jewish security officers were reopened. Kiril Stolyarov, Golgotha (Moscow: Krasnoye Proletari Izdatelzvo, 1991), pp. 14-15. {p. 304} About one month later Ignatiev was appointed minister of state security, and on his direct order in October 1951 Eitingon was arrested at Moscow's Vnukovo airport when he returned from Lithuania. He had just succeeded in rounding up the leadership of the anti-Soviet underground there. His stepdaughter Zoya Zarubina phoned me at home to tell me that Eitingon had been detained in her presence when she went to meet him at the airport. I did not know how to respond this time. Emma suggested I remain silent. In my office the next morning, I asked Zoya to prepare her letter of resignation from the service. That Eitingon was her stepfather was not mentioned on her registration card. I immediately telephoned the rector of the Institute of Foreign Languages, Varvara Pivovarova, whose sister had worked under me as a translator in the MGB atomic intelligence bureau, to take on Zoya as an instructor on his staff. The important thing was to sever her contacts with the security system before anyone became aware of her relationship to Eitingon. Most people naturally knew her as the daughter of retired general Vassili Zarubin, who was divorced in 1925 from Zoya's mother before she married Eitingon.

In a few days I had the opportunity to meet Ignatiev at a staff meeting. He privately reproached me. "You were mistaken about Eitingon. What do you think of him now?" he asked me. I still remember my prompt reply. "My assessment of people and their deeds is always in agreement with the party line," I said. The party would eventually vindicate me. Here I must speak of my illusions. I always regarded the Doctors' Plot and the Zionist conspiracy as pure fabrications by scoundrels like Ryumin who were reporting to incompetent people like Ignatiev. Each time I met Ignatiev he appeared to be totally out of his depth in handling whatever was reported to him. His judgment was appalling. For him an agent report was a revelation, and he could be influenced by what he read without bothering to have it cross-checked for accuracy. He could be convinced of anything. Ignatiev was absolutely unfit for the job. One morning, in the midst of an operational conference with more than ten people present in his office, he became hysterically annoyed by a telephone call from the commandant of the MGB, General Blokhin. I remember that he shouted into the phone: "You should act in accordance with the law. Don't bother me." Then he hung up and told us, "I can't stand these regular telephone calls from Blokhin demanding I sign the orders for carrying out death {p. 305} sentences in accordance with internal MGB regulations. Why should I get involved in that? Why should I sign these orders? He should act in accordance with the law." Nobody answered. We sat in embarrassed silence. Ignatiev could be easily manipulated to fabricate cases against innocent people. Only later did I realize he was fulfilling orders that came from the top - from Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, and others. When TASS announced that well-known doctors and academicians were accused of a Zionist conspiracy to kill Stalin and the Politburo by injurious medical treatment, I believed it was a provocation, a continuation of the anti-Semitic campaign which had begun earlier, combined with the criminal incompetence of Minister of State Security Ignatiev. I looked into the files accusing Eitingon of training the doctors to perform terrorist acts against Stalin and the government. For that purpose, the indictment charged, Eitingon kept in his office samples of mines and explosives disguised as electrical appliances. These were the usual equipment for his special field of expertise. Moscow was flooded with rumors about attempts of Jewish doctors and pharmacists to poison ordinary citizens, and about coming pogroms. I was

worried when our two children, then about nine and twelve, came home from school with these rumors. Emma and I were in a difficult position; it was dangerous to instruct children of high-ranking security officials to contradict brazen antiSemitic remarks, because they would draw attention to themselves by inspiring debates. They would definitely be noticed by the local party administration, which monitored every sphere of public life. Add to this that they were going to school with Malenkov's and Kaganovich's sons, which meant that the school was under constant surveillance. Even as children they could not make political statements saying that Stalin and Lenin were always against anti-Semitism; this would be misinterpreted and would become twisted. Emma and I told them to say that in conditions that demand absolute vigilance, it was bad to spread rumors because they inspire "provocations." We all had to stick to the version of events printed in Pravda, the party newspaper, where there were no hints of pogroms or eradication of the Jewish nation. Wrath over treacherous, monstrous crimes of individual terrorists was understandable, we told the children, but spreading rumors meant playing with fire, and playing into the hands of enemies of our country. I wondered how this would sound at Pioneer meetings at school. Then the director of the school telephoned Emma and thanked her for the children's proper upbringing. He was in a difficult position because there were many Jewish children and teachers in {p. 306} his school, known for teaching subjects in English. He told Emma that the children's statement at the Pioneer meeting, that spreading rumors was a provocation, brought cheers and helped to calm the heated situation. Later, in Vladimir jail, when I shared a cell with Colonel Ludvigov, he revealed to me things I could hardly believe. He told me that Stalin had written on the minutes of one doctor's interrogation: "Put them in handcuffs and beat them until they confess." In the final period of the Zionist conspiracy in 1952, it ballooned out of its organizers' control. Ryumin and Ignatiev joined the minister of state security of Georgia, Nikolai M. Rukhadze, to accuse Beria of concealing his Jewish origin and fabricating a conspiracy against Stalin in Georgia. Beria was next on the list for elimination by Stalin. The Crimean conspiracy case, which had dragged on since 1948, was resolved in August 1952, with the execution of all arrested members of the Jewish Antifascist Committee and former deputy foreign minister Lozovsky. Kheifetz was kept alive to testify against Beria and Molotov when they would be accused of initiating the Crimean proposal and stimulating informal contacts with American Jewish communities.

My knowledge comes from the files on Abakumov's case that I read forty years later in the military prosecutor's office, forty volumes thick. I always believed that Ryumin was investigating the doctors' case to the day of Stalin's death, but Stalin was shrewd enough to realize that the plot portrayed by Ryumin was too primitive to be believed. He could not supply the details to make credible the story he was creating out of whole cloth. Ryumin was fired from his job by Stalin himself on November 12, 1952, for "being incapable of adequately fulfilling his duties." He was reappointed to the post he held before joining the security service, a rank-and-file accountant in the State Control Commission. He had earlier been a junior accountant in the Archangelsk cooperative union. At the peak of the anti-Semitic campaign, not Ryumin but Mesetsov, Konyakhin, and Ignatiev were in charge of the criminal interrogation and beating of the doctors. They were never prosecuted or charged with any crimes when the whole fabrication was exposed; they were promoted by Khrushchev and Malenkov to responsible Central Committee posts as a reward for faithfully following orders. At the end of February 1953, on the eve of Stalin's death, I noticed a growing uncertainty in the behavior of Ignatiev, and my intuition told {p. 307} me that the whole anti-Semitic drive was about to end. The time was coming for the investigators to become unwanted witnesses and be purged. After Stalin's death, Beria accused Ignatiev of deceiving the party and fired him. One important element not revealed is that among those investigated in the MGB for allegedly taking part in the Jewish conspiracy was Maironovsky, head of the MGB toxicological laboratory. In 1951 he was arrested and named a principal figure in the Doctors' Plot because he knew all the accused academicians and worked closely with them. He was a notable personality in Moscow medical circles. According to Ryumin, Maironovsky was acting under the direction of Eitingon in an effort to kill the leadership. Ryumin did not realize that he was treading on dangerous ground, since Maironovsky's work was top secret and carried out on Stalin's orders. Maironovsky confessed to everything he was asked, including that he was Emma's nephew, but then Ignatiev sensed that Ryumin had gone too far. Ignatiev decided that Maironovsky should be kept out of the main case against the doctors. On February 14, 1953, he was convicted by a special conference of the MGB and sentenced to ten years in prison for criminal possession of poisons. Stalin's death brought the end of the Doctors' Plot, but anti-Semitism remained a potent force. Beria initiated the exposure of the fabrications that had gripped the country in a paranoic spasm of fear, and began to rehabilitate the arrested doctors, but truth did not bring him friends at the top. In May 1953, two months after Stalin's

death, Zoya Zarubina, who had become a dean of the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages and a party secretary, heard at a confidential party meeting that Beria was concealing his Jewish origins. He was arrested two months later. The Doctors' Plot greatly damaged the general image of the medical profession in Russian society and created distrust toward doctors. After the exposure of the falsity of the plot, rival groups in the medical community found themselves in a difficult position. My friend Professor Andrei Muzichenko, director of the Moscow Central Clinical Research Institute, told me that the government stood in the middle of any conflict in the medical community because it was the only source of financial support in the whole system of medical care. The message to all bureaucrats was to avoid any professional controversy, because one could not predict where the chips would fall; they could be picked up by the lead{p. 308} ership and used politically in an unpredictable fashion that could bring Lubyanka into action. This created a dampening effect on creative controversy. It postponed government decisions on priority of resources for health care. The fear still persists that clashes of opinion on medical and other professional issues will cause Lubyanka people to investigate and report to the government their assessments of the arguments and the availability of incriminating materials against principal rival groups. No one knows how any argument will come out and what factors will decide it. It is rumored now that a plan existed for deportation of Jews from Moscow on the eve of Stalin's death. I never heard of it; if such a plan existed it could be easily traced in the archives of state security and of the Moscow party committee, because it would have required large-scale preparations. Deportation operations are very difficult to carry out, especially if they are not concealed beforehand. There would have been some sort of top-secret directive, endorsed by the government at least one month before the start of such an operation. Therefore, I believe that it was only a rumor, probably based on comments by Stalin or Malenkov assessing the outrage of public opinion against Jews associated with the Doctors' Plot. When righteous remarks are made at a high level suggesting that "Soviet workers and peasants are justified in demanding deportation of Jewish criminals," a vicious tradition develops. Even with this anti-Semitic atmosphere, started by Stalin and continued by Khrushchev, there remained the "selective" approach in which a closed group of Jewish intellectuals and highly qualified professionals were allowed to make their careers in the Soviet establishment; but the Zionist plot and the fall of Beria put an end to the employment of Jews in influential posts of the intelligence service or in the Central Committee. As far as I knew, the Committee for State

Security (KGB) in the 1960s and 1970s employed only two Jewish rank-and-file case operators, for use against Zionist organizations. The presence of large numbers of Jews in the intelligence services, which had been the case from the Revolution to 1948, came to an end. From the point of view of Soviet thought, the idea of establishing a Jewish republic with foreign support sounds ridiculous. It would constitute a basic interference in party and state affairs. Such a move would be regarded in Soviet terms as suspicious business because of the foreign involvement it would bring about in our closed society. In fact, that's what happened. For me at the time, sounding out Harriman on the idea {p. 309} of a Jewish republic was part of my instructions from Beria to ascertain America's intentions and the seriousness of its commitment to the idea. I knew that probes of this nature often led nowhere but were standard intelligence operational procedure. I could not imagine at the time that to be associated with such discussions would turn into a kiss of death. The tragedy was that in a closed society like the Soviet Union, the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 made the Jews appear to be the only significant national group with a foreign-based homeland. This automatically placed the whole national group under suspicion of potential divided loyalties, especially after Israel defeated the Arabs in the 1948 war of independence. The pride that followed the Jewish military victory revitalized the cultural consciousness of Soviet Jews, which had been destroyed in the twenties. The Jews and the Germans, since they had foreignbased homelands, were not allowed to form their own constituent republics in the Soviet Union with their own legislatures. Discrimination against all ethnic groups was harsher if they had potential support from overseas. Greeks, for example, were deported from the Caucasus to Uzbekistan. What had begun as another purge of the bureacracy and a sweeping away of failed policies had gotten out of hand. Stalin's use of anti-Semitism, antinationalism, and anti-bourgeois cosmopolitanism for his usual political juggling had turned into license for leaders who harbored old hatreds against Jews. For Stalin anti-Semitism was a tool, an opportunistic weapon; but in the hands of his subordinates it became a revival of an age-old tradition, pure hatred of Jews. Unfortunately, it was a legacy that remained and flourished after his death. The acceptance within the leadership of antiSemitic policies finally stripped the government of an entire population of public servants who had supported the Revolution and worked for the establishment of Soviet power. When the country came upon hard times and disintegrated, the flower of this educated leadership and their children had emigrated to Israel and the West.

{p. 317} With these warring factions safely under Stalin's domination, he and Zhdanov initiated the anticosmopolitan campaign to wipe out Western ideological influence in the intelligentsia. Another of Stalin's purposes was to consolidate his newly acquired power in Eastern Europe and make his hold there equal to the repressive control he enjoyed internally. Concurrently, Israel's victory in its war of independence greatly strengthened awareness among Soviet Jews of their cultural identity. Israel presented a new magnet for emigration. The anticosmopolitan campaign quickly turned antiSemitic. Now the banner was against "rootless cosmopolitans," meaning Jews who had Western ties or ideas and might not hold the Soviet Union first in their hearts. Finally, this campaign provided Stalin with an excuse to be rid of the leaders of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. They were pressing for the fulfillment of promises made during the war, promises that they had conveyed to Jewish leaders abroad. Their connections to influential people in the West were sufficient reason to make them targets for Stalin. A year after Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, declaring confrontation and ideological war with communism, Stalin decided to tighten further ideological control of the party and the society, stamping out any sympathy, envy, or support for the West. The Cold War was on, and the immediate effect was a chill in all aspects of Soviet intellectual life. This set off a series of socalled scientific discussions in biology, philosophy, economic theory, literary criticism, and linguistics. Both Kremlin factions took advantage of the campaign for their own interests, trying to point out the ideological divergences of their rivals. This was not simply taking sides with Jews (cosmopolitans) against loyal Soviets; rather, the issue was a fundamental reshuffle of scientific and artistic personnel in the interests of the division of power at the top. The case of biology is notorious. In the 1930s a smoldering argument in the field of genetic science broke out of the academy and into politics. On one side were worldknown biologists pressuring the government to finance further research in plant and human genetics. Opposing them were the group led by Trofim Lysenko, who speculated on Marxist ideology, boldly asserting that plants, animals, and humans could be changed by factors in their material environment. He gave incredible examples to prove the impact of the external environment on the human race, claiming that Tatars had slanted eyes in response to their evolution under desert conditions facing centuries of sandstorms.

{p. 343} Beria ordered me and other top-ranking generals to check the falsified evidence of the Zionist conspiracy. What startled me most was that Zhemchuzhina, Molotov's wife, had maintained clandestine contacts through Mikhoels and Jewish activists with her brother in the United States. A letter to her brother dated October 5, 1946, before she was arrested, was purely Communist in outlook but otherwise nonpolitical. As an intelligence officer, I immediately understood that this letter was sanctioned by the top leadership with the purpose of establishing an informal confidential channel for future use. I couldn't imagine that Zhemchuzhina would write such a letter without permission. In her testimony she had denied that she had attended a synagogue service in Moscow in March 1945 devoted to Jews who had died in the war. Four independent witnesses placed her there. The diplomatic corps was also represented. Surely Molotov encouraged her to go because it was useful to have American observers see his wife there after the Yalta Conference, but as she was his wife, his instruction was oral, without record. Later, she did not want to implicate him so she denied the episode, but it was used against her and against him in the antiSemitic campaign and in ousting him from power. My contacts with Harriman on plans for a Jewish republic in the Crimea flashed through my mind; from the testimonies of Zhemchuzhina I realized that similar probes had been carried out simultaneously by her, by Mikhoels, and by an American journalist, Goldberg, a man close to the World Jewish Congress, who was editor of a New York daily newspaper.10 All of these were discussing the possibility of setting up "California in the Crimea." 10. Ben Zion Goldberg, of the New York Yiddish daily Der Tog, had visited the Soviet Union to report on the condition of Jews since the establishment of the Jewish autonomous region in Birobidzhan in 1928. He served as president of the American Committee of Jewish Writers, Artists, and Scientists, which hosted Mikhoels and Feffer's visit to the United States in 1943. He revisited the Soviet Union in 1946 and reported favorablv on the work of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. See Levin, The Jews in the Soviet Union Since 1917, vol. 1, pp. 457-4S8. {p. 428} ... In 1985 the Central Committee said it "does not find it expedient to return to this matter."9 Beria and his enemies in the leadership had identical morals. I agree with the writer Kiril Stolyarov, who said that the only difference between Beria and his rivals was the amount of blood they spilled. However, we must give them all their due. Despite their crimes, Beria, Stalin, Molotov, and Pervukhin succeeded in transforming the Soviet Union from a backward agrarian hinterland into a superpower armed with sophisticated nuclear weapons. While committing equally monstrous crimes against their opponents and innocent bystanders, Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Malenkov contributed much less to the transformation of the USSR. Unlike Stalin, they greatly weakened the state through their own power

struggles. Gorbachev and his aides, governed no less by personal ambition, caused the crumbling of the state. Gorbachev and Yakovlev behaved like traditional party bosses, exploiting the name of democracy to strengthen their own power base. They were naive as statesmen and under the illusion that they were capable of outmaneuvering their rivals and preserving their power. They accomplished nothing in domestic policy or in foreign affairs. In 1989 Gorbachev moved Erich Honecker out of power in East Germany, hoping to strengthen socialism, but it backfired. He and Shevardnadze were incapable of negotiating economic concessions from the West in return for the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe. During this period Colonel General Dmitri Volkogonov, who was writing biographies of Stalin and Trotsky, called me.10 In June 1989 Volkogonov managed to reach me in Peredelkino at the dacha of Zoya Rybkina, where I was staying. I had been warned to be cautious in my revelations to Volkogonov, but I decided to meet him because he had 9. From the Archives of the Central Committee, Document 1502, Top Secret File. In Rodina, July 4, 1992, pp. 62-63. (Rodina magazine publishes materials and documents from party archives.) Archive documents reveal that Beria's case was so sensitive, so extraordinary, that his sentence was carried out not by a rank-and-file executioner, but by a three-star general of the Red Army, A. Batitsky. This was intended, says P. A. Sudoplatov, to prevent any revelation of the deliberations and decision making by Khrushchev and his leadership in eliminating Beria. 10. Volkogonov was deputy ehief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet army, in charge of psychological warfare against the American armed forces in the 1970s and 1980s. He became director of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense in 1986. {p. 429} access to the archives and could present the story of past atrocities and triumphs in a clear, unfiltered light. Cautiously, and with natural mistakes because of his official position and subordination to military authority, he opened a new chapter in Russian historical studies. Volkogonov promised to support my rehabilitation in exchange for my cooperation. When we met on November 4, 1989, I suggested that Volkogonov correct his account of the Stamenov episode, which had just appeared in Oktyabr, a literary journal. He claimed in the article that Stalin had personally met Stamenov, which I knew was untrue. I myself had handled the probe to plant disinformation among Nazi diplomats, feeling out the Germans' desire for a peace settlement in 1941. When Volkogonov's book appeared, the episode was not corrected. He sticks to the

version that Stalin and Molotov planned a separate Brest-Litovsk type peace treaty with Hitler, using as his source references to discussions in the Politburo.11 The Politburo might have discussed this intelligence operation. As I have already explained, my orders were to plant disinformation about a possible peace with Hitler, using Stamenov as the source for the rumor. Beria and Molotov assumed that Stamenov would actively use this false information to enhance his image with the czar of Bulgaria. However, he chose not to report it to Sofia. I had not ordered him to do so; had I insisted, he could not have refused, because he was a controlled NKVD agent. But my instructions were to suggest the rumor, not order him to transmit it. I led Volkogonov straight to the Trotsky file in the KGB and Central Committee archives, a feat he could not have accomplished alone. Even if you are a top government official with the right to look at top-secret files, the whereabouts of any single piece of paper requires searching through a jungle. He could not know, for example, that Trotsky's own archives, stolen from Paris in 1937, were not where they should have been, but were actively used by the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Since the August 1991 attempted coup, there has been an undisciplined rush to lay hands on secret Communist party archives with the intent to use and sell them for films, research projects, and popular books. Although Volkogonov acknowledged my help in the introduction of his book on Trotsky, it appeared without his showing me the manuscript. That is perhaps why, for the first time, my code name and identity 11. Volkogonov, Stalln: Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 412-413. {p. 430} in the operation against Konovalets were revealed.12 The result, in 1992, was an indictment against me by the Ukrainian procurator's office. The Ukrainian indictment was dropped by the military procurator's office in June 1993 because it was established that Konovalets's terrorist organization had formally declared a state of war against the Soviet Union, which lasted from 1919 to 1991. In printing my name publicly in his book on Trotsky and telling of my real role in World War II guerrilla operations and atomic espionage, Volkogonov's history, though faulty, at least restored my identity. For many years my name had been a blank space in Soviet history, missing from all the accounts of heroic deeds my colleagues accomplished in the war against Hitler, under my leadership. It was Volkogonov who planted with my son the idea of telling the story of my life, which gives me the chance to set the record straight.

In 1991 the military procurator's office came to the conclusion that Abakumov's case was fabricated and that although he was guilty of unlawful repressions he was not guilty of high treason or crimes against the party. They recommended that the indictment against him should be amended to change the basis on which he was prosecuted. Abuse of power and falsification of criminal evidence were his actual crimes and according to law warranted the same punishment. The implication of the procurator's recommendation was that those above him were equally guilty of these abuses. The procurator took a new approach to Eitingon's and my cases. The record showed that we did not initiate liquidations or assassinations, nor did we fabricate false evidence against any victims. Thus, we had acted according to military discipline, taking our orders from legal directives of the government. The formal charges against us, abetting Beria in treason and planning terrorist acts against the government and Beria's personal enemies, were repudiated by the documents. Chief Military Procurator General Pavel Boriskin formally closed our cases and stated that if, before his retirement, he had not rehabilitated us, then the archives would show that he was another guilty participant in covering up the truth about the Kremlin power struggles in the 1950s. Four months after the August 1991 attempted coup, within days after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, and two days before his 12. Volkogonov, Trotsky (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 303-305. {p. 431} retirement, Boriskin made his peace with history. He endorsed the decision to rehabilitate Eitingon and me. He also dismissed the murder charge against Kalugin for Markov's liquidation in London, since Kalugin was fulfilling his military duty. My rehabilitation was no longer a political matter, but only a minor event in the history of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The military procurator's office was no longer obliged to consult the highest authorities of the Communist party on how to handle my case. A new generation that had been raised to power by the old generation, but not implicated in the atrocities of Stalin's and Khrushchev's authoritarian rule, was now the leadership. The icon of Khrushchev, useful in the new reform religion of glasnost and perestroika, lost its glow. In the tense atmosphere of the former Soviet Union, brought about by the lack of a new political tradition and culture to replace the old, and by a gridlock in the economy, hatred toward me persists only among those who would prefer that all witnesses to the old order disappear. Then there would be no one who could correct the record or tell where the truth is hidden in the archives. The Soviet Union - to which I devoted every fiber of my being and for which I was willing to die; for which I averted my eyes from every brutality, finding

justification in its transformation from a backward nation into a superpower; for which I spent long months on duty away from Emma and the children; whose mistakes cost me fifteen years of my life as a husband and father - was unwilling to admit its failure and take me back as a citizen. Only when there was no more Soviet Union, no more proud empire, was I reinstated and my name returned to its rightful place. Despite my rehabilitation, my medals have not been returned to me; let no one forget that I, too, have been a victim of political repression. {end of quotes}

Hiding Behind Auschwitz (updated to 2004) - This paper puts the case that The Protocols of Zion is a genuine document. Peter Myers, April 29, 2001; update March 6, 2004. Your comments please - write to me at contact.html. You are at http://mailstar.net/hiding.html. I wrote Hiding Behind Auschwitz in 1995. Since then, I have discovered more evidence, and considered the counter-arguments of Herman Bernstein and Norman Cohn, but I have decided to leave the original unchanged. I therefore preface it with some additional material (below). Correction (030211): the correct spelling of the name of the author of Icebreaker is Viktor Suvorov. The sequel to Hiding Behind Auschwitz (1995) is the Protocols of Zion Toolkit (2002) - the most complete study of the Protocols of Zion available: toolkit.html. The Protocols of Zion Toolkit does not repeat the material in Hiding Behind Auschwitz, but, rather, follows on from it. (1) New Material on evaluating The Protocols of Zion (2) Hiding Behind Auschwitz

(1) New Material on evaluating The Protocols of Zion (a) Who Is Norman Cohn? My main rival, the author whose study of The Protocols is now taken as final, is Norman Cohn. Not only did Cohn write Warrant For Genocide (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970); he also wrote the Introduction to Herman Bernstein's book The Truth About "The Protocols of Zion": A Complete Exposure (Ktav Publishing House, New York 1971).

This is how Norman Cohn is described in Who's Who in World Jewry, Pitman Publishing Co., New York 1972: "COHN, Norman, Eng, author, educator; b. London Eng, Jan 12, 1915; s.August and Daisy (Reimer); MA, Christ Church Sch, Oxford, 1939; DLitt Glasgow; m. Vera Broido, Sep 3 1941; c, Nik. Professorial F, U of Sussex since 1963; found dir, Cen for Research in Collective Psychopath, since 1963; prof, U Durham, 1960-63; F, Cen for Advanced Study in Behavioral Scis, Stanford, 1966. Capt, Brit Army, 1939-46. Author: The Pursuit of the Millennium 1957, rev ed 1970; Warrant for Genocide, 1970; trans: Goid Khan and Other Siberian Legends; contbr to profsl jours. Mem Athenaeum. Recipient, Wolf-Anisfield Prize for Race Relations, 1968 Hobbies: walking, travel. Home: 61 New End, London NW3, Eng. Office: 3 Henrietta St, London WC2, Eng." Only a Zionist of high rank would get such a writeup. Since Cohn is such a loyal Zionist, he can hardly be a neutral, unbiased, observer. Indeed, the title of his book Warrant For Genocide, is meant to make the Protocols itself - the book responsible for Auschwitz. What next - book burning? Book-banning? The Suppression of deviant views? Is this the mark of Intellect, of Reason? Or of Religion, of Propaganda? In Warrant For Genocide Cohn skirts the main issue: the pages of the Protocols which deal with finance, and seem to provide a manual on the operation of the Capitalist System. This website finally gives me the chance to display the wealth of evidence for my case. Cohn, the expert on millenial cults, fails to notice that the movement he himself belongs to - Zionism - is one of those millenial movements. And yet David ben Gurion himself articulated the Zionist millenial goal, sourcing it at the heart of Judaism, the Bible. Further, other writers featured on this website, such as Rabbi Harry Waton, clearly present a similar millenial vision. Jaff Schatz, author of The Generation: The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland, attests to the pervasiveness of such views. (b) J. L. Talmon, the Tsar and the Tsarina Another leading Zionist intellectual, J. L. Talmon, who receives an equally lavish writeup in the same issue of Who's Who in World Jewry, makes the following statement in his book Israel Among the Nations: "Three years later the Tsar and all his family were helpless prisoners guarded by a Jew and a few Latvian assistants. 'There was grim although probably quite accidental retribution' - says W. H. Chamberlain in his monumental Russian Revolution - 'in the fact that the chief executioner of Tsar Nicholas II and his

family in the Ekaterinburg cellar was a Jew', Jacob Yurovsky ... As if to heighten the symbolism of that dreadful end of one of the most powerful Royal dynasties in history at the hands of an obscure Jew, soldiers of the counter-revolutionary army seized Ekaterinburg a short time after, and found in the murdered Tsarina's room a copy of the Protocols of Zion ... " (pp. 69-70). Talmon seems to be following Norman Cohn's book Warrant For Genocide. Cohn wrote, "Some months before her murder at Yekaterinberg the deposed Empress had received from a friend, Zinaida Sergeyevna Tolstaya, a copy of Nilus' book containing the Protocols. ... the Empress took Nilus's book with her to her last home ...A week after the murder of the imperial family ... the remains of the Tsar, the Tsarina, and their children, dismembered and incinerated, were discovered at the bottom of a disused mine-shaft ... ... the examining magistrate found three books belonging to the Empress: the first volume of War and Peace, the Bible in Russian, and The Great in the Small by Nilus" (Warrant For Genocide, Penguin 1970, p. 126-7) The Great in the Small was the Nilus edition of the Protocols. If the Protocols were a forgery produced by the Tsar's own secret police, why would the Tsarina have kept a personal copy even in her own room, one of three books she took to her death?If it was a forgery, she would have had no use for it. The Protocols' promotion of monarchy & aristocracy is an argument in favour of forgery. If it be a forgery, it would have been done by the Czar's agents who penetrated Jewish revolutionary groups & knew their mindset. Herman Bernstein wrote in The Truth About "The Protocols of Zion": "{p. xxx} Tsar Nicholas himself was also deeply interested in the "Protocols." In the course of my research, I discovered a copy "{p. xxxi} of the 1906 Butmi edition of this anti-Jewish document in the private library of the Tsar acquired several years ago by the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C." In 1934-5 the Protocols was put on trial at Berne in Switzerland, by Zionists trying to suppress it. Cohn says (following evidence presented by Vladimir Burtsev at the Berne trial), that the Tsar was persuaded his by Minister For the Interior, Stolypin, that the Protocols was a forgery (Warrant For Genocide, Penguin 1970, pp. 125-6).

In that case, why did the Tsar keep a copy of the Protocols? A copy of a worthless document forged by his own secret police? Does this make sense? Herman Bernstein makes much of Phillip Petrovich Stepanov's affidavit in 1927, that he had been given a copy of the Protocols in 1895 (op. cit., p. xxx; a photocopy of Stepanov's hand-written statement in Russian is included at the back of the book). Yet Cohn argues that the Protocols cannot be dated earlier than 1897. He writes, "internal evidence suggests that in saying he received the Protocols in 1895 and published them in 1897 Stepanov was erring no more than is to be expected after thirty years." (Warrant For Genocide, Penguin 1970, pp. 111). The Protocols correctly anticipates certain phenomena, such as the draconian nature of Bolshevism, and the various attempts at World Government, which maintain the likelihood of it being genuine. If the Czar's regime wrote the Protocols, how come Jews owned much of the media in Russia at the time the revolution broke out? (c) Hyperbole: exaggerating the Opponent's Argument, in order to Ridicule it: A reader writes, "I am not prepared to believe that the Elders of Zion sat down in 929BC and decided to carve up the world by sending the symbolic snake of Judaism through its cities and all the other garbage about it. This is not even conspiracy theory, it's mystical crap." That's not what I believe about it. I believe it genuine, but that does not mean the Protocols is right about everything. I don't know anyone who interprets it that way. Nor does it mean that "there's a Jew under every rock" (another example of hyperbole). It does not mean that all of world history is carried out by Jews, but it does mean that Jewish actions are often "written out" of the historical record, setting others the task of "writing them back in". (d) The Parallels with Joly The existence of some parallel passages with Maurice Joly's book Dialogue aux Enfers entre Montesquieu at Machiavel, published in 1864, does not necessarily prove the Protocols of Zion a forgery.

i. If there is a worldwide conspiracy, then even if kept mainly oral, for co-ordination purposes it would have to be written down at times, and then some persons would have written accounts of it. The other explanation, then, is that Joly himself may have copied from its text for his book. The Protocols, on its own, cannot be used to establish a world conspiracy. But if such a conspiracy be verified FROM OTHER SOURCES - such as H. G. Wells' book The Open Conspiracyopensoc.html and Benjamin Ginsberg's admissions ginsberg.html and the 1946 Baruch Plan: baruch-plan.html ... then the Protocols can be re-examined in that light, and compared against the historical record. That is the only way to evaluate it. Herman Bernstein & Norman Cohn do not evaluate it that way; instead they compare it with other like material, and say, "this is a re-hash of the old familiar Anti-Semitic literature". ii. The Protocols predicts that, after a world war, there will be an atttempt to form a world government, secretly orchestrated by Jewish financiers. This happened at the Treaty of Versailles: wells-lenin-league.html iii. The Prtotocols also predicted a despotic government in the guise of socialism, once again secretly Jewish. This happened when Lenin & Trotsky set up the USSR: lenin-trotsky.html For all the Czar's toughness, his regime was more lenient than Lenin's; when the Bolsheviks came to power they were much more inclined to execute serious opponents. In the second volume of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's new book Two Hundred Years Together, which has not yet been published, he frequently refers to Jews as "the yeast of the Revolution". For this, he is being labelled Anti-Semitic. Will this book be freely available in bookshops in the West?

The Protocols of Zion Toolkit: Herman Bernstein (1935) and Norman Cohn (1970 and 1971) argue that the Protocols of Zion is a forgery; plus arguments that the Bernstein / Cohn "forgery" hypothesis is flawed: toolkit.html. (e) A Conjunction of Four Indicators Consider these four Indicators: i. A major political event occurs in world history, inaugurating a regime aiming to engulf the world, carried out by organised Jews as documented by Bertrand Russell, and by Robert Wilton and others. Even though some Jews opposed the new regime, that does not undo the fact that it was created by Jews. ii. The Jewish role is hidden, denied, kept invisible. Many of the Jewish participants came from the West - therefore, some Western Jewish groups knew of the Jewish role, yet kept it hidden from non-Jews (e.g. in the public media, partly owned by Jews). There have also been dissident Jewish groups which tried to warn of what was happening. iii. Non-Jewish supporters of the Socialist movement are led to believe that the new regime is benevolent, and the inauguration of a utopia. iv. In fact it is a despotic dystopia for the very people among whom it is carried out. Non-Jewish Socialists are deceived and manipulated. Now this pattern of events was predicted in The Protocols of Zion; yet no other type of literature, e.g. the Socialist literature preceding the event, correctly predicted this conjunction of events. It is this kind of "coincidence" that keeps the Protocols relevant. Is there any other literature that made such a prediction? If you know of other literature that correctly predicted this conjunction of events, please let me know mailto:[email protected]. (f) Verification, the limits of Knowledge, and the nature of Proof The Principle of Verification is incompatible with the Principle of Falsification. These are rival Epistemological Principles, used to evaluate concepts of Metaphysics (what is). The former is used to enforce official scepticism against dissident ideas, which are set a high bar to prove themselves. The Principle of

Falsification, on the other hand, posits that the onus is on the sceptic to disprove the new idea: unless disproved, all ideas can be considered. For more on this see perspectivism.html. The former is associated with a mood of Certainty, the latter with the idea that our knowledge can, at best, only asymptote into the truth, never quite get there. A Daoist approach to philosophy: daoist.html.

(2) Hiding Behind Auschwitz: Zion Against the Rest Peter Myers B. A. Hons B. Sc., 21 Blair St., Watson ACT 2602 Australia. Ph -61-262475187. Date 30 May 95; Update 29 Sept. 95.; email: [email protected] This paper puts the view that the holocaust at Auschwitz, terrible as it was, is being cynically exploited by the Zionist movement both to motivate its members and to deflect criticism from itself; that it enables a defensive mask to be used as a cover for what is actually an offensive policy, both in the Middle East and abroad. Further that the Protocols of Zion - the most tabooed book in the world - is an authentic document which contains a blueprint for Bolshevik Russia, and explains the terrible Debt crisis in the capitalist countries. The paper locates the Protocols within the Western utopian-fundamentalist-millenial tradition, which is the author's concern proper, the Protocols being but a sub-theme. As the Roman Empire declined, Christianity grew as a fusion of Hebraic and Greek culture-streams. The Enlightenment period of the last 500 years has attempted to regain what was lost of the Greek culture-stream, by throwing off the Hebraic strait-jacket. The Zionist movement assisted this process, because it rejected that particular branch of Hebraism which had led to the formation of the Christian Church; but it wanted to manipulate the Enlightenment to impose its own brand of Hebraism, secularised as Bolshevism. It persuaded many intellectuals to identify Bolshevism with Plato's Republic, using Socrates and Plato against Hellenism. Depicting Jesus as a figure like Che Guevara, it used him against Christianity. Moses Hess is a key link, the "red rabbi" who converted Marx and Engels to Communism, before coming out as a Zionist with his book Rome and Jerusalem. Universal Morality has been a cover for a Tribal Ethic. Now, as the Enlightenment falters, having compromised itself, a new Dark Age threatens. The word-count of this document by computer calculation is 22174 words. Breaking the taboo, I must justify myself. It would be assumed that I am racist; in fact I my wife is Asian, and our children have taken leading roles in multicultural performances for many years; we gave two of them names from mainland Asia. I

support the Native Title legislation, and immigration except in times of economic depression. I believe that the Sphinx depicts a negro (Fortean Times, Feb 95). I will be accused of "antisemitism", yet the Palestinians and other Arabs are semites more semitic than today's Israelis. Even Karl Marx was accused of "antisemitism"; are all such persons "far right"? It was a leftist, Anarchist leader Michael Bakunin, who first claimed that the Rothschilds were manipulating the Left for their own purposes: Jews, he said, had "one foot in the bank, the other in the Socialist Movement" (quoted in Anthony Masters, Bakunin, p.182). The most recent evidence for it is Roland Perry's The Fifth Man, which shows that Lord Victor Rothschild was the major British spy for the USSR. This paper argues that the taboo on the Protocols is based on disinformation. It begins with a statement of why this book should not be suppressed: 1. The Protocols is a historical document without which the history of this century cannot be understood: it is relevant to World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution and Terror, Nazism, World War II, and the Middle East crisis. A copy was registered in the British Museum in 1906; in Australia, copies are held in the National Library and various university libraries. 2. The claim that the Protocols is a forgery has not been proved. It is based on parallel passages with a book written several decades earlier. Yet in the case of the Gospels, parallel passages are taken as evidence, not of forgery, but of a common source in a third document. The forgery argument is unsustainable because the Protocols' sophisticated language (including words such as "perquisitions", "interpellation", "congizance", "cassate", "rebutment", "apotheosis", "inexpugnable") and its great length show that it was meant for an extremely-highlyeducated elite, whereas literature to rouse the masses to anti-semitism would have been much shorter and used simple language - as the Communist Manifesto does. 3. Suppressing it on the grounds that it is associated with Auschwitz makes no more sense than suppressing the Communist Manifesto because it is associated with Stalin's crimes. In each case the crime is independent of the book and cannot be blamed on the book. The Communist Manifesto is not suppressed; why should the Protocols be? Should the New Testament be suppressed on account of the Inquisition? 4. In the first instance the Protocols is relevant to Russia not Germany; specifically, the Bolshevik Revolution and the Terror introduced by Lenin and later perfected by Stalin; Hitler copied it but did not invent it. 5. The Protocols appears to contain a manual on the operation of the capitalist system, which could be of relevance to the third world debt crisis today, and the economic decline of the English-speaking world. It is a subject which one would not

the expect the Okhrana - the Russian secret police accused of forging the Protocols to create anti-Jewish sentiment - to have much expertise at. The material on capitalism is comparable to Karl Marx' papers On the Jewish Question and The Jewish Bankers of Europe . If the Protocols is suppressed, those papers will have to be suppressed too. So will the writings of Bakunin, Shakespeare, and the New Testament. There is no clear limit at which "the line" might be drawn. Are all these writers blamed for Auschwitz? 6. The Protocols could be relevant in understanding the crisis in the Middle East and exploring possible solutions to it which might avert world war; wars in that area tend to drag the great powers in. 7. The techniques of thought control espoused in the Protocols are as sinister as those depicted by George Orwell in 1984. Many people feel that we are approaching this condition today. It is reasonable to consider whether there might be any connection. 8. The Protocols is one of the earliest historical documents to draft a plan for a world government. 9. The label "antisemitic" is like "Pommie-basher" & "Japan-basher". Chalmers Johnson, expert on the rise of Japan, was labelled a "Japan-basher" for years; his analysis is now widely accepted. When any group feeling offence can take action against an author, scholarship is straitjacketed, the Enlightenment is at risk. Labels and slogans can be used to stop debate; even the Pope did not think of calling Galileo a "church-basher". 10. The chauvinist mentality of the Protocols, unbelievable to readers after the '60s enlightenment, was prevalent among the Christian Churches only 30 years ago: the "ghetto" mentality was common. The author must admit that, as a Catholic, he used to think of non-Catholics as "pagans" in need of salvation; only 20 years ago, having left the Church, he encountered a Protestant who yet regarded him as a "Papist". Such considerations should caution the reader from judging the viewpoint of the Protocols too harshly. The Protocols was first published in Russia by Professor Sergius Nilus, who stated that he had received a copy via dissident Jews who were privy to a plot to destroy existing societies and create a world government. A copy was registered in the British Museum on 10th August 1906. The original is generally dated about 1897, year of the first Zionist Congress. If authentic it may be but one statement of a plot which has existed for centuries. The main attack on the Protocols is Norman Cohn, Warrant For Genocide. The Protocols had three major distributions: (1) in Russia among the antiBolshevik forces during the Revolution, from which it also spread to Japan (2) in

Western Europe and the U.S. during the 1920s and 30s, and (3) by President Nasser in the 1950s & 60s. Jewish author Ben-Ami Shillony writes, in his book The Jews and the Japanese, 'In the 1980s the Protocols of the Elders of Zion came to enjoy a new popularity. In 1986 Yajima Kinji, professor of political science at the Christian Aoyama Gakuin University, published a book about how to read the "hidden meaning of the Jewish protocols." He called the Protocols the most mysterious document of the twentieth century, because all its prophecies had been fulfilled, in spite of its being regarded as a forgery. Yajima advised the Japanese to take the Protocols seriously in order to be prepared for the future. His book was a great success with fifty-five printings'(p. 218). The view that the Protocols explains U.S. foreign policy and its economic and social decline, freely expressed in Japan, is suppressed in Australia. The author obtained a copy of the translation from the Russian by Victor E. Marsden and from this produced a transcript for computerised analysis. The authenticity of the Protocols has not been thoroughly investigated; the following pages establish a context in which this may be considered, encompassing (i) a study of the capitalist system, in which the analysis of Karl Marx figures prominently - this is a quite unLeninist Marx (ii) an examination of the secular mutation of the millenialutopian myth from the time of the Enlightenment (iii) an examination of how the millenial-utopian myth entered Judaism from the Zoroastrian religion of the Persian Empire (iv) assessments of the decline of the U.S. and rise of Japan, in relation to Paul Kennedy's theme of the rise and fall of empires (v) the situation in the Middle East, and its connection to Zionism as a form of religious fundamentalism. Geopolitics: Decline of the Empire This paper is an analysis of Geopolitics from a Daoist point of view. Whereas the libertarian asserts the freedom of the individual and the authoritarian asserts the authority of social structure (family, state), the Daoist view affirms both sides of this Aristotelian contradiction: freedom is compatible with structure and both are necessary. Within that "whole", the Daoist emphasises freedom while the Confucian emphasises structure. This paper also has a somewhat Marxist perspective, but it is a Bakuninist Marx not a Leninist one: Bakunin saw human society as subject to Nature (the Dao, the Biological Inheritance), but Lenin, Nietzsche, Hitler and the Radical Feminists emphasise human will, humanity as maker of itself, society as malleable. This paper is not pro-Nazi, pro-British Empire, or religious-fundamentalist. It argues that the decline of Anglo-America cannot be understood without a study of the "Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion". "Anglo-America's ebb in the half century since 1945 exceeds any full century in the long-ago pullback of Rome", writes Kevin Phillips in his book Arrogant Capital (p.140); Jacques Attali expresses similar sentiments from a European perspective in

his book Millenium. Zbigniew Brzezinski admits to a crumbling of the United States in Out of Control. James Davidson and Lord William Rees-Mogg say that we are in a great depression, in The Great Reckoning, - a depression denied by our intellectual leaders and media. In the 1988 American elections, the impending $200 billion bailout of the Savings & Loans societies was concealed from the American people by both major parties and the major newspapers, until after the elections. The very same newspapers that had pursued Watergate with glee, turned down the chance to expose the Iran-Contra scandal. The fall in the American dollar has received virtually no analysis in depth. In The Confucian Renaissance, a study of the rise of East Asia, Reg Little and Warren Read accuse Western academics of "a spiritual and intellectual failure" in not understanding - even denying - what is happening to their society. It once seemed that the problem lay in Japan, but there is increasing recognition that it lies in the West itself. The United States has the world's biggest foreign debt, and may be attempting to pay it by printing dollars; this may be the reason for the ongoing devaluation of the dollar which may prompt East Asia and Europe to adopt regional currencies - the ECU and the Yen - in place of the dollar. Zbigniew Brzezinski writes of "indebtedness - which has already generated a cumulative national debt in excess of $4 trillion, which involves a budget deficit in the neighbourhood of some $400 billion in 1992, which imposes an increasingly critical - potentially even devastating - burden on America's future" (Out of Control, p. 104). According to Chalmers Johnson, by the Presidential election of 1996 "the United States' relative economic decline may be so marked as to require an end to its business-as-usual trade policies", in effect precipitating a break in the world trade system which would be a trauma comparable to the reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1997 (in The Empowerment of Asia, a paper either given in his 1994 tour of Australia, or thereabouts). As the American empire fragments, Britain is joining Europe, feeling as if it lost the Second World War. Australia is joining Asia, and the U. S. is withdrawing its zone of hegemony from the Western Pacific to the Americas, but also facing the prospect of civil war as the repercussions of the defeat ripple through the American people. When I read the Protocols of Zion late in 1994, many missing pieces of the jigsaw seemed to fall into place; yet I find that this book is unmentionable, almost unobtainable, and close to being censored. What had started my interest in Zionism was a quarrel between Prime Minister Paul Keating and his predecessor Bob Hawke, over the support of the Zionist Federation of Australia, reported in the media in mid 1994. Thinking it strange that they should be jostling for favours in this way, I decided to research Zionism. Prior to that I had no interest in this subject, and had never read or seen the Protocols. The common objection "I don't believe in conspiracies" need not be taken seriously, since every meeting behind closed doors is

a conspiracy. All diplomacy, foreign policy, business decisions and political strategies are done in this way. Conspiracies happen every day. The Forgery Hypothesis Disproved The Protocols refers to Goyim (gentiles) as if written by Jews; yet it has a number of passages in parallel with a book by French socialist Maurice Joly, Dialogue aux Enfers entre Montesquieu at Machiavel, published in 1864, in which the Goy/Jewish terms are omitted. There is also some continuity with a book Machiavelli, Montesquieu et Rousseau, by socialist Jack Venedey; the latter was Jewish but the former was not. The realisation that the end-justifies-the-means methods of gaining and holding power depicted by Machiavelli might be usable by the revolutionary movement goes as far back as Rousseau, who stated that "Machiavelli's Prince is a handbook for republicans" (Social Contract, Penguin, p. 118; also see p. 131n). If a forgery, the Protocols would have been done by the Okhrana, the Russian secret police, as propaganda to stir up anti-semitism amongst the masses. If authentic, then it could have be produced either (i) by Zionists making use of secular socialists to further their cause or (ii) by Bolsheviks making use of Zionists to further their cause. There is no proof that the Protocols is a forgery or is authentic; yet much knowledge is probabilistic. But the claim that the Protocols has been proved to be a forgery can easily be shown to be false, on four grounds. 1. Norman Cohn argues in Warrant For Genocide that parallel passages with earlier books show that the Protocols is a forgery. The Gospels are the most studied of parallel texts, but scholars do not argue that the Gospel of Matthew is a forgery just because it has parallel passages with Mark and Luke; most argue instead that the parallels point to a common source in a third document. Examples are John Crossan's "left" study Jesus: a Revolutionary Biography which puts the case for an underlying document called "Q", and Robert Funk et. al., The Five Gospels , which also infers the "Q" manuscript. Cohn fails to even consider such broader textual analysis. He knew his conclusion before commencing to write; that is why he chose such a polemic title. 2. The financial expertise of the Protocols is a subject which one would not expect the Okhrana to have much mastery of. Russia had considerable foreign debt, which the Protocols depicts as a trap. Cohn does not consider this at all; he completely omits to investigate the plausibility of the Protocols' financial statements. 3. The Protocols' length and complexity attests its orientation to an educated elite, whereas Okhrana propaganda would make more sense if oriented to the masses, shorter and simpler. The language of the Protocols is far too sophisticated for a book designed for the masses. Examples of its very difficult words are:

¥ "cassate": "If, however, anything like this should occur, we shall ourselves cassate the decision, but inflict therewith such exemplary punishment on the judge" (Protocol 15) ¥ "perquisitions": "This will give us the pretext for domiciliary perquisitions and surveillance on the part of our servants from among the number of the goyim police . " (Protocol 10) ¥ "cognizance ": "For our policy it is of the greatest importance to take cognizance of this detail" (Protocol 18) ¥ "rebutment ": "to which we shall respond either by accommodating them or by a wise rebutment to prove the short-sightedness of one who judges wrongly." (Protocol 19) ¥ "interpellation": "Besides this we shall, with the introduction of the new republican constitution, take from the Chamber the right of interpellation on government measures" (Protocol 10) ¥ "apotheosis": "Sulla enjoyed an apotheosis for his might in the eyes of the people" (Protocol 15); "They will acknowledge our ruler with a devotion bordering on apotheosis" (Protocol 15) ¥ "aureole": "The aureole of power requires for its existence ..." (Protocol 18). ¥ "inexpugnable": "They should recognise once for all that we are so strong, so inexpugnable" (Protocol 11). Is this the language of the masses, or of an exceptionally highly educated elite? The Protocols' length (about 26,500 words by computer count) also shows that it was meant for an elite rather than stirring the masses. 4. Protocol 5 says, "We have set one against another the personal and national reckonings of the goyim, religious and race hatreds, which we have festered into a huge growth in the course of the past twenty centuries" (emphasis added). But the Protocols was written about 1897. If this was a reference to the struggle with Christianity, the period would have been about 1850 years - not more than 19 centuries. If Christians had written it, then its origin-point would have been the Jews' rejection of Jesus, i.e. the end of the Old Covenant and start of the New (until then, from a Christian view, the Jews were still the Chosen People). If the Okhrana had written the Protocols, this anomaly of dating would not have occurred. It is more likely that the 2000-year period referred to, begins not with Christianity but with the

Zealot struggle which, from the Jewish point of view, began with the Maccobean War (which started about 167BC) or alternatively the hated Roman invasion (63BC). It was against the goy Romans, not the early Christians, that the Jews had struggled so bitterly, culminating in Masada. This dating is another argument against the forgery theory. The Expulsion From Spain This expulsion, in 1492, was remembered by Jewry in 1992; there had also been an expulsion from parts of France in 1489. Norman Cohn, in Warrant For Genocide (pp. 50-52), reports that a Rothschild publication Revue des etudes juivres (Review of Jewish Studies) published in 1880 a reprint of two famous letters relating to these expulsions: "they are known as The Letter of the Jews of Arles (or, in some versions, of Spain) and The Reply of the Jews of Constantinople; and they read as follows: "Honourable Jews, greetings and blessings! This is to tell you that the King of France, who is again master of Provence, has ordained by public proclamation that we must become Christians or leave his territory. And the people of Arles, Aix and Marseille want to take away our belongings, they threaten our lives, they wreck our synagogues, they cause us much vexation; and all this makes us uncertain what we ought to do to keep the Law of Moses. This is why we ask you to be so good as to let us know, in your wisdom, what we ought to do. Chamor, Rabbi of the Jews of Arles the 13th of Sabath, 1489". "Well-beloved Brethren in Moses, we have received the letter in which you tell us of the anxieties and adversities you are suffering. The advice of the grand satraps and rabbis is as follows: You say that the King of France demands that you become Christians; do so, since you cannot do otherwise, but keep the Law of Moses in your hearts. You say that you are forced to surrender your belongings: then make your children merchants, so that, little by little, they may strip the Christians of their belongings. You say that attempts are made against your lives: then make your children doctors and apothecaries, so that they may deprive Christians of their lives. You say that they are destroying your synagogues: then make your children canons and clerics, so that they may destroy their churches. You say that the people are vexing you in many other ways: then see to it that your children become advocates and notaries, so that you will get the Christians under your yoke, you will dominate the world, and you will be able to take your revenge. Do not depart from this order that we give you, for you will see by experience that, from the abasement in which you now find yourselves, you will attain the summit of power. V.S. S.V.F.F. Prince of the Jews of Constantinople the 21st of Casleu, 1489." Cohn says that these letters "were meant as a joke - the signature Chamor, for instance, is simply the Hebrew for donkey!" (p. 52). But why were they republished in a Rothschild publication in 1880? - on this, Cohn is silent. Karl Marx put a different view of the expulsions. In The Russian Loan, he wrote, "the Jews ... monopolise the

machinery of the loanmongering mysteries by concentrating their energies upon the barter of trade in securities, and the changing of money and negotiating of bills in a great measure arising therefrom. Take Amsterdam, for instance, a city harboring many of the worst descendants of the Jews whom Ferdinand and Isabella drove out of Spain, and who, after lingering awhile in Portugal, were driven thence also, and eventually found a safe place of retreat in Holland. ... The smartest highwayman in the Abruzzi is not better posted up about the locale of the hard cash in a traveller's valise or pocket than those Jews about any loose capital in the hands of a trader". This does not mean that Marx supported the expulsions, because he wrote other articles criticising discrimination against the Jews, but it does hint that the aggravation between the Christian and Jewish communities was not only caused by Catholic intolerance of "infidels"; Jewish moneylending also contributed. In their book Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, Therese and Mendel Metzger write, "However, the Jews were the first people to understand the importance of credit, and as early as the eleventh century they were engaged in providing loans auxiliary to their commerce" (p. 59). As friction between Jews and Christians grew, "in the end money-lending became the last economic link between Jewish groups and the majority of the Christian population" (p. 152). The "religious war" mentality of that time is strongly present in the Protocols. Funding a Chinese or Japanese Military Buildup The Protocols says that Japan or China might be funded to make war against uncooperative European governments: "At the present day we are, as an international force, invincible, because if attacked by some we are supported by other States" (Protocol 3). "In a word, to sum up our system of keeping the governments of the goyim in Europe in check, we shall show our strength to one of them by terrorist attempts and to all, if we allow the possibility of a general rising against us, we shall respond with the guns of America or China or Japan" (Protocol 7). Japan was funded by Jewish bankers for its 1904-5 war against Russia, which led to an attempted revolution in Russia after its defeat, a defeat desired by Russian Jews. Jewish author Ben-Ami Shillony writes, in his book The Jews and the Japanese, "The Jewish resentment against czarist Russia produced financial support for Japan. The phenomenon of Jewish financiers raising loans for Japan out of a special attraction to that country started in 1894, when Albert Kahn, director of the French bank Goudchaux and later head of his own bank, helped to float a Japanese loan in Paris to finance the Sino-Japanese War, which broke out that year ... When the RussoJapanese War broke out Jewish financiers in Europe and the United States, including the Rothschilds, refrained from extending assistance to Russia but were willing to give aid to Japan. This assistance, crucial in preventing a Japanese defeat, was

initiated and engineered by Jacob H. Schiff (1847-1920), a leading Jewish-American figure" (pp. 147-8, emphasis added). Subway Terrorism? Norman Cohn ridiculed the sentence in the Protocols about subway terrorism, but the recent gas attacks in the subways of Japan show that it is not as far-fetched as it seemed. Whether they were done by the "far right" or the "far left" is too early to say (things are not always what they seem) but the Protocols is the first historical document to contemplate subway terrorism, as follows: "You may say that the goyim will rise upon us, arms in hand, if they guess what is going on before the time comes; but in the West we have against this a manoeuvre of such appalling terror that the very stoutest hearts quail - the undergrounds, metropolitains, those subterranean corridors which, before the time comes, will be driven under all the capitals and from whence those capitals will be blown into the air with all their organizations and archives" (Protocol 9). Plan For a World Government The Protocols, dated about 1897, Cohn agrees, the year of the first World Zionist Congress, is the first historical document to depict a plan for a world government (Protocol 6 and others); not a forum for discussion but a government, as the League of Nations attempted to be (Schiff's original name for it was "League to Enforce Peace"). Article 10 provided for a World Army, overriding member sovereignty; the United States chose not to join the League, on this account; Gareth Evans has called for a U.N. standing army, in an article in Foreign Policy magazine. In the October 1994 issue of Round Table, journal of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies (a descendant of the Milner Group, on which see below) Australian contributor Sir Zelman Cowan wrote that the UN charter provides for a world army, with the Security Council overriding the sovereignty of member countries: "member-states are enjoined to make armed forces available to the Security Council itself, so that it could 'take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary' (Article 43)". Recent literature of the United Nations Association of Australia calls the UN a "global administration". But there is no proposal that the UN be democratic. In the General Assembly, China has one vote, and Vanuatu has one vote, despite the difference in population; the Security Council makes most of the big decisions, the General Assembly only being empowered when one of the permanent members exercises a veto. The move to abolish the veto is probably aimed at outvoting China in the Security Council. Those who talk of "one world or none" do not consider transferring the Security Council's power to a General Assembly directly-elected by proportional representation. This would give power to China and the third world; that is why it will not happen.

Economic Rationalism (Thatcherism) and Other Platonic Forms On this the Protocols says, "The goyim have lost the habit of thinking unless prompted by the suggestions of our specialists" (Protocol 3). "these specialists of ours have been drawing to fit them for rule the information they need from our political plans from the lessons of history, from observations made of the events of every moment as it passes. The goyim are not guided by practical use of unprejudiced historical observation, but by theoretical routine without any critical regard for consequent results. We need not, therefore, take any account of them - let them amuse themselves until the hour strikes, or live on hopes of new forms of enterprising pastime, or on the memories of all they have enjoyed. For them let that play the principal part which we have persuaded them to accept as the dictates of science (theory). It is with this object in view that we are constantly, by means of our press, arousing a blind confidence in these theories. The intellectuals of the goyim will puff themselves up with their knowledge and without any logical verification of them will put into effect all the information available from science, which our agentur specialists have cunningly pieced together for the purpose of educating their minds in the direction we want" (Protocol 2, bold emphasis added). "In order that the true meaning of things may not strike the GOYIM before the proper time we shall mask it under an alleged ardent desire to serve the working classes and the great principles of political economy about which our economic theories are carrying on an energetic propaganda" (Protocol 6). The Foreign Debt Crisis Explained The Protocols boasts, "Economic crises have been produced by us from the goyim by no other means than the withdrawal of money from circulation. Huge capitals have stagnated, withdrawing money from States, which were constantly obliged to apply to those same stagnant capitals for loans. These loans burdened the finances of the States with the payment of interest and made them the bond slaves of these capitals" (Protocol 20). "Every kind of loan proves infirmity in the State and a want of understanding of the rights of the State. Loans hang like a sword of Damocles over the heads of rulers, who, instead of taking from their subjects by a temporary tax, come begging with outstretched palm of our bankers. Foreign loans are leeches which there is no possibility of removing from the body of the State until they fall off themselves or the State flings them off. But the goy States do not tear them off: they go on in persisting in putting more on to themselves so that they must inevitably perish, drained by voluntary blood-letting. What also indeed is, in substance, a loan, especially a foreign loan? A loan is - an issue of government bills of exchange containing a percentage obligation commensurate to the sum of the loan capital. If the loan bears a charge of 5 per cent., then in twenty years the State vainly pays away in interest a sum equal to the loan borrowed, in forty years it is paying a double sum, in

sixty - treble, and all the while the debt remains an unpaid debt. From this calculation it is obvious that with any form of taxation per head the State is bailing out the last coppers of the poor taxpayers in order to settle accounts with wealthy foreigners, from whom it has borrowed money instead of collecting these coppers for its own needs without the additional interest. So long as loans were internal the goyim only shuffled money from the pockets of the poor to those of the rich, but when we bought up the necessary person in order to transfer loans into the external sphere all the wealth of States flowed into our cash-boxes and all the goyim began to pay us the tribute of subjects. If the superficiality of goy kings on their thrones in regard to State affairs and the venality of ministers of the want of understanding of financial matters on the part of other ruling persons have made their countries debtors to our treasuries to amounts quite impossible to pay it has not been accomplished without on our part heavy expenditure of trouble and money" (Protocol 20, bold emphasis added). The Protocols itself advocates the Social Credit economic system. The Destruction of History Australian writer Keith Windschuttle wrote a book titled The Killing of History, about the insidious effect of the postmodernist deconstruction movement in our universities. On this topic the Protocols says, "Classicism, as also any form of study of ancient history, in which there are more bad than good examples, we shall replace with the study of the programme of the future. We shall erase from the memory of men all facts of previous centuries which are undesirable to us, and leave only those which depict all the errors of the governments of the goyim" (Protocol 16, bold emphasis added). Destroying Family Life The Protocols says, "by inculcating in all a sense of self-importance, we shall destroy among the goyim the importance of the family and its educational value and remove the possibility of individual minds splitting off, for the mob, handled by us" (Protocol 10, bold emphasis added). It says that the party system is largely controlled by backing all sides. That activists infiltrate Left movements, attempting to steer naive utopians via slogans and block-voting towards the plot's goals. But that these plans and plots are confined to a few Zealots, that moderate Jews are as much manipulated by them as are gentiles, and that anti-semitism is useful to the zealots for bringing the Jewish masses under their influence. The Next Cold War? Leading U.S. theoretician Samuel Huntington has published a blueprint for a new Cold War against China and the Islamic block, in the Summer 1993 issue of Foreign

Affairs, journal of the Council On Foreign Relations, the leading agenda-setting forum of the U.S. Foreign Affairs bills itself as "the most influential periodical in print". Huntington says that individual nation-states can no longer withstand the internationalist pressures emanating from New York and Washington, and that they are coalescing into civilisation blocks for self-defence; those chiefly resisting are the Confucian and Islamic blocks. A U.S. alignment with Israel is implicit, and this is the basis of its opposition to Islam: it is central to the new "cold war" scenario. The U.S. is already implementing Huntington's blueprint: last December an American warship bailed up a Chinese submarine in international waters, and humiliated it; the Chinese government said that if this happens again its commanders will have orders to fire. President Clinton recently announced an embargo on Iranian oil, at a meeting of the World Jewish Congress; he earlier agreed to supply nine supercomputers to Israel "to simulate a nuclear weapon's launch, delivery and detonation, and complete its design without actual tests" (Canberra Times, 27/2/95). If the Huntington blueprint takes hold, as George Kennan's earlier one did, all of the world's major powers could get sucked into the Middle East conflict, on one side or another, with unpredictable results. Japan will leave its options open for as long as possible. It is too close for comfort to the scenario depicted by Nostradamus. Israel is a major nuclear power, with about 200 nuclear bombs, which it probably developed in conjunction with the apartheid regime of South Africa; Mordecai Vanunu is still in gaol for revealing this. Ari Ben-Menashe, an Israeli military intelligence officer, exposed the Iran-Contra scandal in Profits of War . This story of the decade was turned down by U.S. newspapers; he reveals that Israel and the U.S. supplied both sides in the Iran-Iraq war, to get those countries to destroy each other. Victor Ostrovsky, a former Mossad agent, also makes such revelations in By Way Of Deception and The Other Side of Deception. In the former, he says that Mossad's motto is, "By Way Of Deception, Thou Shalt Do War"; in the latter, that Mossad engineered the Gulf War, and killed Robert Maxwell because he threatened to reveal a meeting "that he had arranged between the Mossad liason and the former head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov ... at which Mossad support for the coup to oust Gorbachev was discussed ... [because] if the Soviet Union were to stop being the enemy, there'd no longer be a threat from the east, and the strategic value of Israel to its greatest ally, the United States, would diminish. Alliances between the United States and the Arab nations in the region would then be a realistic prospect" (pp. 285-6). Huntington's paper shows that that risk has been eliminated. A Medieval Movement Masquerading as Part of the Enlightenment The Protocols appears to be a record, for insiders' purposes, of a plot against the churches and governments, that would seem to have emerged from the religious warfare of medieval Europe. It has a distinctive anti-Enlightenment feel consistent

with both Christendom and Lenin's Russia: its most direct application is as a blueprint for the latter revolution and social experiment. The Anarchist leader Prince Kropotkin wrote to Lenin in December 1920, concerning his ruthless and merciless measures, "Is there none among you to remind his comrades and to persuade them that such measures are a return to the worst times of the Middle Ages and the religious wars, and that they are not worthy of people who have undertaken to create the future society?"(Volkoganov, Lenin: Life and Legacy, p. xxix-xxx). Such ruthlessness is prescribed in the Protocols. The psychology of the Protocols is behaviourist and inquisitorial, decades before "Behaviourism" was invented. Subjects (the goyim) are conditioned, using praise as positive reinforcement, rather than related-to as fellow human beings with whom one feels some empathy. Instead of debating an opponent, one "negatively reinforces" him by criticism. Any strong points in the opponent's favour are ignored; attention is instead focused on any defects in his character. This method is also used against organisations such as governments & churches. This lack of empathy with the goyim is the coldest and most terrifying aspect of the Protocols. Volkoganov says that Lenin's sister Anna wrote that Lenin's Jewish origins "'are further confirmation of the exceptional abilities of the Semitic tribe, [confirmation] always shared by Ilyich [Lenin] ... Ilyich always valued the Jews highly'. Anna's claim explains, for instance, why Lenin frequently recommended giving foreigners, especially Jews, intellectually demanding tasks, and leaving the elementary work to the "Russian fools'" (p. 9, emphasis added). This attitude of Lenin towards his own Russian people, is that of the author of the Protocols towards the goy. The Protocols claims that the plotters' financial control of the media allows them to work against existing society from the inside, using a few well-placed agents and the gullibility and trust of the upholders of the social order. So preposterous is it that the targets do not recognise that they are being conditioned to do the plotters' bidding; the Enlightenment is threatened with a new Dark Age. The plotters have been assisting the Enlightenment's rebellion against Christendom, only to subvert it in turn, leading to another theocracy, this time in their hands rather than the Christians'. This is a theocracy in which even atheists can participate however, because Jewry is a tribe, that tribe which is the people of God. The "godness" is preserved in the tribe itself; thus the connection with this-worldly dictatorship (Marx noted such "practicality"). The plot of the Protocols involves the control of a majority by a tiny minority, via a concept of power, "underground" or "bottom-up" power whose strength lies in its weakness. Such paradoxes feature in the Chinese Daoist classic The Tao Te Ching, Sun Tzu's The Art of War, in Zen, the martial arts of East Asia, and some passages in the Gospels. To understand it requires "dialectical" thinking; "linear" thinking cannot do so. The best example of linear thinking is Clausewitz, whose ideas led to the

carnage of World War I in which Germany and the British Empire bled to death, whereas the Zionist movement, using a dialectical approach, gained Palestine with very little effort on its part but by allowing others to use their strength. Hitler made a special mention of Clausewitz in his last testament, showing that he too was a linear thinker; Stalin was much more sophisticated. The Japanese "miracle-makers" have similarly baffled the Americans. In The Zionist Revolution, Jewish writer Harold Fisch explains that Zionism first appeared to be a national-liberation movement, attempting to create a nation-state in the Enlightenment Project. This, however, clothed a religious interior. He points out that "Ben Gurion would say, 'The Bible is our mandate- - meaning that it constitutes the basis of the Jewish claim to the land of Israel. ... Ben-Gurion ... was not capable of convincing the sceptic that he was talking about something as potent, say, as Mao's Little Red Book" (pp. 9-10, emphasis added). This statement of Ben-Gurion shows that Zionism is basically independent of antisemitism, i.e. it would exist even if there were no antisemitism, to recover the "promised land" on the basis of Bible texts; and secondly that Zionism does not shirk from violent means, as used in Mao's cultural revolution. In Israel today there is no civil marriage for Jews, only marriages performed by rabbis after tests of Jewishness, and a woman can only get a divorce if her husband agrees. The religious parties assume that the Bible is literally true, have forced the government to stop the national airline from operating on Saturdays, and have banned certain archaeological investigations. So much for Enlightenment Israel; shades of Khomeini's Iran. Fundamentalist Zionism has generated fundamentalist Islam, from the 1920s on, a clear example of the Hegelian dialectic. Karl Marx: Philosopher of Capitalism Although Leninism was despotic, Marx remains relevant as the philosopher of capitalism. Like all of us, he was right about some matters and wrong about others; I reject his millenarianism and his advocacy of civil war. Unlike Lenin, he did not hide his Jewish identity or do deals with Jewish financiers. Marx would complete the attack on authority Luther had begun: "As the revolution then began in the brain of the monk, so now it begins in the brain of the philosopher"; in The Criticism of Religion is the Presupposition of All Criticism, Karl Marx Library, Vol. 5, pp. 35-37. This sentence shows that Marx thought of himself as a philosopher, not an economist, and as being within the Western European tradition, whereas Lenin's Terror shows that he was outside the Enlightenment tradition and a major threat to it. A final point in Marx' favour is that he dissociated himself with the movement calling itself "Marxist", stating, "I am not a Marxist". Marx On the Jewish Situation

Paul Johnson, who gave a major address to the Conservative Party to help launch Thatcherism , says in his book A History of the Jews, "Marx was not merely a Jewish thinker, he was also an anti-Jewish thinker ... the roots of Marx's anti-Semitism went deep" (p. 348); however to Johnson, no criticism of Jewish culture is legitimate; it is all "anti-semitism". Marx wrote, "Money is the zealous one God of Israel, beside which no other God may stand. Money degrades all the gods of mankind and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal and self-constituted value set upon all things. It has therefore robbed the whole world, of both nature and man, of its original value. Money is the essence of man's life and work, which have become alienated from him. This alien monster rules him and he worships it. The God of the Jews has become secularised and is now a worldly God. The bill of exchange is the Jew's real God. His God is the illusory bill of exchange" (On the Jewish Question, in Dagobert Runes, ed., A World Without Jews. In the T.B. Bottomore translation of this paper one reads, "From the beginning, the Christian was the theorizing Jew; consequently, the Jew is the practical Christian. And the practical Christian has become a Jew again." Marx says that Christians learned the techniques of capitalism from the Jews; today he would say that the Confucians have followed suit. He wrote articles about the Jewish Bankers of Europe; in The Russian Loan (in Saul K. Padover (ed.) The Karl Marx Library, Vol. 5, p. 221) he wrote, "This Jew organisation of loanmongers is as dangerous to the people as the aristocratic organisation of landowners ... Let us not be too severe upon these loanmongering gentry. The fact that 1855 years ago Christ drove the Jewish moneylenders out of the temple, and that the moneylenders of our age enlisted on the side of tyranny happen again chiefly to be Jews, is perhaps no more than a historical coincidence. The loanmongering Jews of Europe do only on a larger and more obnoxious scale what many others do on one smaller and less significant. But it is only because the Jews are so strong that it is timely and expedient to expose their organisation." Marx' Theory of Capitalism The Protocols seems to include a manual on the operation of the capitalist system; Marx would have used this material. He invented the word "capitalism", after previously using "hucksterism", to describe what we now call the Economic Rationalist economy. According to him, its defining feature is usury, i.e. the charging of interest for money-lending. In practice, real interest rates of 1-2% must be accepted; what really characterises capitalism is real interest rates significantly above this range (the real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate). In the capitalist economy, according to Marx, the whole economy operates not for the benefit of society as a whole, but for the benefit of the money-lenders - who do no real work. Marx concluded that the capitalist system had been invented by Jews, and they

were at the forefront of keeping it operating; not ordinary Jews, just the big financiers in the league of the Rothschilds, the George Soroses etc. Most "leftists" misunderstand Marx' concept of Capitalism. They think they should encourage a struggle between "workers and bosses" or "men and women", a civil war which could hurt them all, whereas the real struggle Marx had in mind was that between the victims of usury and the promoters of usury - between those caught in the insecurity of the Economic Rationalist economy, and those doing well out of it. The struggle Marx wrote about is still going on, especially in the heavily indebted "South". In the capitalist system, one man's wealth is another man's debt: it is in this lien over the helpless poor, that the cruelty of capitalism is located. The media avoids mentioning the causes which keep the South in bondage; the Rwandan massacre was preceded by a Structural Adjustment Program of the World Bank, which exacerbated tensions in that country, yet this was not reported. Marx said that the payments going to the moneylenders amounted to taxes, taxes which should go to the government for spending on the people, but taxes instead diverted to the pockets of a financial aristocracy which had displaced the landed aristocracy, and which ruled society, controlling opinion through its ownership of the media and its influence on the political parties. This diversion of taxes is also done by the Mafia, and that is what the financial aristocracy is, a mafia, in whose grip we languish. Marx could see what was wrong with capitalism, but he did not have sufficient skill in economics to provide the blueprint for an alternative finance system; that was later done by Keynes, but to win support for it he disguised it as a form of capitalism ("counter-cycle spending") as shown in Paul Ormerod, The Death of Economics. Most "leftists" failed to realise that in Marx' time the Keynesian implementation of Market Socialism had not been invented. It was not that system that Marx called "Capitalism", but rather Thatcherism or Economic Rationalism. The Keynesian system Australia had from 1940 to 1972 (under Chifley, Menzies and McEwen) was a Market Socialist system with some similarities to Japan before Reagan forced it to partially Thatcherise, and other East Asian societies, characterised by a fullemployment policy rather than a low-inflation policy, low real interest rates, steeply progressive taxation, substantial government ownership of utilities etc., and substantial government guidance of the private sector, via tariffs, boards and subsidies. None of this was to the liking of usurers, but they had to wait until the advent of the so-called "Left" Whitlam Government before they could begin to dismantle it - in the noble name of Internationalism. Since 1972 Australia has had an era in which Right economic policy has been combined with "Left" social policy. The usurers do not mind "Left" social policy too much, especially if it divides and distracts the public as the "sex war" has done; what they do not want is "Left" economic policy, i.e. a return to Keynesianism. Yet that is the only hope for our disheartened country.

World War I and Bolshevik Terror The Protocols has some relevance to World War I, the war in which, through the rivalry of the Great Powers, Palestine was promised to Lord Rothschild. It says, "We must be in a position to respond to every act of opposition by war with the neighbours of that country which dares to oppose us: but if these neighbours should also venture to stand collectively together against us, then we must offer resistance by a universal war" (Protocol 7). The responsibility of the direct protagonists remains; the role the Protocols claims is that of facilitator. It claims to contribute to such wars via (1) funding (as was seen in the case of Japan, above) (2) exacerbating rivalries and (3) influencing members of secret societies. The Sarajevo bombing and assassination in 1914 were the work of such a society, Black Hand. Ben-Menashe and Ostrovsky (above) testify to such operations in recent years. Many passages in the Protocols advocate the use of "the terror which tends to produce blind submission" (Protocol 1), similar to the Terror of the Bolshevik state, which Left intellectuals had expected would instead be humane and enlightened. The horror of that terror, and the connection of terrorism with messianic millenial movements including secular ones, is well described in David Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications. The Subversion of Marxism Late last century Marx' movement was subverted by Eastern Jews fired by a messianic war against Christians. They spoke Yiddish and refused jobs which required work on Saturday, so lived quite separately from the Russians; relations were worsened by the czar's pogroms but also by the Jews' moneylending and their attempts at revolution. Their unassimilated chauvinism was the very thing Marx had condemned in On the Jewish Question, but that paper was now suppressed, and the people of the Protocols went on to create a totalitarian regime; Jewish chauvinists, the very people Marx had railed against, took over his movement. Lenin was a Jew, but kept it secret. His biographer Dmitri Volkoganov, a Colonel-General in the USSR, later Director of the Institute of Military History, in 1991 Defence Adviser to Yeltsin, writes, "But Stalin, the Russified Georgian, could not allow it to be known that Lenin had Jewish roots, and his strict prohibition remained firmly in place" (Lenin: Life and Legacy, p. 9). Lenin also hid the fact that his revolution was funded by a West European Jew called Parvus; and Trotsky's funding by German-American Jewish bankers. When Lenin took power, he sacked the assembly elected about October 1917 in which the Bolsheviks gained only 25%, and wasted no time setting up the Cheka (NKVD, KGB), with a Jew in charge, to conduct a "pogrom" to kill off the non-Jewish ruling class of the old order: this was the nature of the Terror which Lenin introduced and Stalin perfected. It was Lenin, not Hitler, who invented the term "concentration camp" (p. 234). As Volkoganov searched the Lenin archives, "gradually the creator and

prophet was edged out by the Russian Jacobin. I realised that none of us knew Lenin; he had always stood before us in the death-mask of the earthly god he had never been" (p. xxx); "The idea of the concentration camp system - the State Camp Administration, or GULAG - and the appalling purges of the 1930s are commonly associated with the name of Stalin, but the true father of the Bolshevik concentration camps, the executions, the mass terror and the 'organs' which stood above the state, was Lenin. Against the background of Lenin's terror, it becomes easier to understand the methods of Stalin's inquisition, which was capable of executing someone solely on the grounds of suspicion" (p. 235). Marx emerges better: "not that Marx, to give him his due, was much taken with the idea of dictatorship. Lenin, however, regarded it as Marxism's chief contribution on the question of the state" (p. xxxi). Whereas Nesta Webster, in her book Secret Societies and Subversive Movements, accuses Jews of secretly fomenting the French Revolution, Marx accuses Jews of ending it: "And now even the Jews, whose eminent representatives, at least since the emancipation of their sect, have spearheaded the counter-revolution everywhere what awaits them? The government has not even waited for victory to hurl them back into the ghettos", in Saul K. Padover (ed.) The Karl Marx Library, Vol. 5, p. 214. He says that Baronet Lionel Rothschild conspired with Napoleon in terminating the revolution, labelling him "a Jewish usurer who was notoriously one of the accomplices of the Bonapartist coup d'etat," in The Jewish Bankers of Europe in Saul K. Padover (ed.) The Karl Marx Library, Vol. 5, p. 215. When Jewish participation did swell it was largely in Eastern Europe, where they played a major role in establishing organisational structure, as Leonard Schapiro points out in a lecture to the Society for Jewish Study: "Thousands of Jews thronged to the bolsheviks, seeing in them the most determined champions of the revolution, and the most reliable internationalists. By the time the bolsheviks seized power, Jewish participation at the highest level of the party was far from insignificant. Five of the twenty-one full members of the Central Committee were Jews - among them Trotsky and Sverdlov, the real master of the small, but vital, secretarial apparatus of the party ... Jews abounded at the lower levels of the party machinery - especially, in the Cheka, and its successors the GPU, the OGPU and the NKVD" (The Role of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement, Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 40 1961, pp. 148-167). That was not counting Lenin, who kept his Jewish identity secret. According to Marxist writer Enzo Traverso, "In the course of the [Russian] civil war, the Jewish population rallied massively to the Red Army (often the only existing defense against the pogroms), and its intelligensia was recruited en bloc to the Soviet State apparatus. No longer an oppressed minority suffering discrimination, the Russian Jews were recognised as a nation with a modern culture. During the twenty years that followed the October Revolution, Yiddish culture - under all its forms,

scientific, literary, and artistic - was encouraged and experienced a great development, although, parallel to this, the pluralism that had characterised Jewish life in the preceding period disappeared" (The Marxists and the Jewish Question, p.7). "The revolution transformed the Jewish intelligensia, this layer of pariahs, humiliated and persecuted by the former regime, into an elite called upon to play a role of the highest importance in the construction of socialism. The Jews entered the state apparatus, universities, and liberal professions on a massive scale. In 1927, ten years after the revolution, they made up 1.8 percent of the total population of the USSR but represented 10.3 percent of the civil servants in the Moscow public administration, 22.6 percent in the Ukraine and 30 percent in Byelorussia. The sociologist Victor Zaslavsky has defined the situation of the Jews in revolutionary Russia as 'the first historical example of the coherent application of the principle of 'positive discrimination' founded on ethnic affiliation.' The conquest of the intelligensia was a decisive element in inspiring the Jewish population in its entirety toward an attitude of support for the Soviet regime" (p.153). Jewish author Ran Marom writes, "Since the end of 1917, the Bolsheviks had faced the problem of running a system with no professional bureaucrats and specialists. Without support from the Tsarist bureaucracy, they had to turn to the Jewish intelligensia which saw in the Bolshevik Revolution an opportunity to achieve full civil rights. Many Jewish figures suddenly appeared in the Bolshevik administration, in the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, and especially in education, justice, banks, commerce, foreign affairs, and the secret police", (in The Bolsheviks and the Balfour Declaration, in Robert S. Wistrich (ed.), The Left Against Zion). Stalin's purges were in part a cover for the removal of the Jewish intelligensia. Mao seems to have followed this cue: Paul Johnson says that on gaining power in China he expelled the Jews (p. 562). Soviet support for the Arabs in the Middle East wars led Jews to increasingly turn against the USSR, which was forced by their international pressure to allow Jews to emigrate, a successful defiance which emboldened other rebels. The USSR failed because lying became endemic. The nomenklatura were shielded from reality by their privileges and ideology; their repeated lies produced sullenness, distrust and passive resistance; just what faces us now. Sins of Right and Left Lenin, however, was clever enough to hide his paternity of the terror; the clean face was necessary to dupe the "Left" intellectuals in the West, those writing columns in newspapers and manning top posts in universities, and still refusing to acknowledge publicly that Hitler's terror might in some way have been a reaction to Lenin's earlier terror. It was the Jewish leadership of the revolutionary movement in Europe which prompted Hitler's genocide, an act that humanity should forever abhor: one genocide does not deserve another. What should be equally remembered is Mao's Great Leap

Forward of 1959-61, a failed "Left" experiment in utopia that caused a famine in which 30 million people died. The greatest manmade famine in human history occurred in our own lifetime, was created by a man many on the Left (including myself) regarded as a hero, and, compared to Auschwitz, is virtually unknown. Hollywood has showed no interest in it; there are no university chairs devoted to it; but does it not have lessons as stark as Auschwitz? Those who would "throw the first stone" at me for raising questions about the Protocols, should first be examined on their reaction to the Great Leap Forward. Have they written about it extensively in their newspaper columns? Are Chinese lives cheaper than Jewish ones? The Jewish Identity The Jews are called "semites", even though in genes and culture many are European. In his book The Thirteenth Tribe, Arthur Koestler showed that the East European Jews were mostly descendants of the medieval Khazar state which converted to Judaism. The word "semitic" signifies a cultural (language) group stretching from Iraq to Egypt to Morocco, also called "Afroasiatic". Into that region, about 4000 years ago, Indo-European (Aryan) invaders came with cavalry and chariots, the tanks of those days. The effect was so devastating, even on Egypt, that all societies had to adopt this chariot technology to survive: Pharaoh thenceforth was depicted riding a chariot, and there was even a branch of Jewish mysticism devoted to the image of Yahweh upon his throne-chariot, i.e. Merhavah (Merkabah); it is preserved in the Kabala (Zohar), the book of Ezekiel, and the Dead Sea Scrolls. Richard Friedman, in Who Wrote the Bible, shows that Yahweh's Tent (tabernacle) was placed in the First Temple, under the outstretched wings of two cherubs. A cherub was a winged human-headed lion - a sphinx. Margaret Barker, in The Older Testament, shows that the outstretched wings of two cherubs were also seen as supporting Yahweh's Chariot. In calling themselves "semites", the Jews are recalling their past. Their most devastating memory is the subjugation by Rome, while they have fond memories of the Persian Empire of Cyrus (also Indo-European); this was the empire which destroyed the independence of Ancient Egypt forever (tragically, in my view). Egypt was the great semitic civilisation, yet the Bible has not a good word for it: perhaps a case of Jewish antisemitism? Around 2000 BC, Aryan invaders had destroyed the civilisation of Ancient India (again, tragically), which had been bigger in extent than that of Egypt or Mesopotamia. The Jewish tradition fancifully tells them that they vanquished the Pharaohs, and that they can defeat Rome as well. The modern Rome being the U.S. (for Jehovahs Witnesses it is the modern Babylon), this is a problem, since more Jews prefer to live there than in Israel. Books such as David Vital, The Future of the Jews: a People at the Crossroads?, Seymour Lipset and Earl Raab, Jews in the New American Scene, and Jonathan Sacks, One People?, analyse the Jewish identity, torn between the country they are in

and a sense of themselves as a tribe, between secular and religious, between Orthodox and Reform. The tribal unifying factor is their ancient history, as presented in Bible, Talmud, and Kabbala (which horrifies fundamentalist Christians but fascinates New Agers). Few Christians know that the Jewish religion, like the Catholic Church, prizes Tradition as well as Scripture, the oral Torah alongside the written Torah. They see their Tradition as evolving, to cope with new circumstances. While rabbis have often been leaders, to some extent the Tradition is the hands of all Jews, i.e. the Jewish people. A person can convert to this faith, but the priesthood is hereditary: the tribe of Levi (Levy); the word Cohn (Cohen, Cowen) means "priest". Not believing in personal immortality, for Jews the only immortality is that of the Jewish people itself. The Jewish Utopia is not an ethereal "Heaven", but a future Israel on Earth, a theocracy over "the peoples" (as the Jewish Christian churches the Jehovah's Witnesses and Christadelphia Ecclesia preach). Such a view allows even Jewish atheists to participate in the messianic project. In contrast Jesus declared, Buddha-like, "my kingdom is not of this world"; man lives "not by bread alone" but by enacting, in one's life, a spiritual drama. Thus it has been in all traditional societies. Modernism, as an attempt to live "by bread alone", is destroying the West. The German-Jewish Dilemma Steven Aschheim, Brothers and Strangers, shows that the unfavourable image of the unassimilated Ostjuden was created by the emancipated western Jews themselves. Jacob Wassermann, My Life as German and Jew, published in 1933, depicts the difficulty in being both German and Jewish. He writes, "The tragedy of the Jew's life is the union in his soul of a sense of superiority and the feeling that he carries a stigma of inferiority. He must live and find his bearings in the constant conflict and friction between these two emotional currents ... I have come to realize that a race cannot be permanently the Chosen People, and that it cannot permanently designate itself as such, without conflicting with the proper order of things as seen by other nations" (p.75). He mentions that whereas in Germany Jews were unobtrustive, in Vienna "the whole of public life was dominated by Jews. The banks, the Press, the theatre, literature, social organizations, all were in the hands of Jews" (p. 144). It was Vienna that shaped Adolf Hitler's perceptions of the Jews. Wasserman recalls meeting in Hamburg, some years before 1914, a young Russian Jew whose "father had died in prison; his brothers were in Siberia; his sister had been killed in a pogrom. He himself was destitute, homeless, a fugitive. ... The scandal of the ages was unmasked, and justice bowed her head. Yet why was that austere masculine face transformed into a Gorgon's head before my eyes? Was it because of the terrible presumption of the individual who set himself up as the judge of all humanity? ... His keen logic and the scientific basis of his will to destroy laid bare the gulf between us" (pp. 162-3). "It is contrary to the divine ideal for the individual to claim the deciding voice in relation

between crime and atonement. With this belief I stand and fall. He may rave, he may destroy everything about him, with a flaming torch in his hand he may become as a demon accursed; yet with all his passion, and even by reason of it, he still submits to the divine ideal; or so it seems to me, for he remains within the sphere of humanity. But when he comes forward with a self-assumed judicial title, and by virtue of his sovereignly enlightened spirit seeks to arrest and adjust the scales that with their secular burden rise and fall incessantly between heaven and hell, then he is only the enemy of the human race, the man whom God cast out" (p. 164). Zealots, not the People The Protocols, if genuine, is a program of the "learned elders" of Zion: a group of zealots, not of the whole Jewish people. A Jewish newspaper of Sydney, The Hebrew Standard, ran a debate over Zionism between moderate Sir Isaac Isaacs, the most eminent Jew in Australia, the first Australian-born Governor General, and his Zealot critics. One of the latter wrote, "Zionism is a magnificent structure that was shaped and formed, with infinite love and immeasurable suffering by the master-minds of the Jewish people throughout countless generations" (letter by Rabbi L. A. Falk, Hebrew Standard, 15/1/1942, emphasis added here and below). Sir Isaac replied, 'It is common knowledge in Jewish history that the aggressive or "Masada" type of Zealots were also called Sicarii from the sica that is the dagger that each carried under his cloak, and with which he dispatched any one who advocated moderation or any course contrary to their fanatic tenets, and who was therefore regarded by them as a traitor. The modern "dagger" is of course the pen dipped in bitter ink' (letter, Hebrew Standard, 22/1/1942). He himself advocates spiritual Zionism, 'that looks to the future of Judaism as one of a fuller life for our people and the Faith we hold, a life of peace with all the world and universal goodwill. It is utterly opposed to the "Masada" stamp of Zionism, one of desperation, defeat and death.' In the 28/10/43 issue he even quoted Mein Kampf, and argued that antisemitism is caused by Jewish nationalists themselves: "ANTI-SEMITISM AND JEWISH NATIONALISM HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT IN COMMON. Both regard the Jews as a separate people from the Gentiles, and as STRANGERS and ALIENS in whatever country they may have settled over however long a period of time." A brave man. Originally Not Judaic The historicist component of Jewish thought is in origin not semitic but IndoEuropean. Zoroastrianism was the means by which this Indo-European idea entered Jewish consciousness from the time of the First Persian Empire (539BC) to the Parthian Empire. The ancient Persian god Zurvan, i.e. Time, i.e. Kronos, is deified in Marxism as "History". These influences on Jewish culture are described in Mary Boyce, A History of Zoroastrianism; this religion being the religion of the ruling elite

of the Persian Empire, it also greatly influenced the Greek philosophers, Greece being but a blip on the edge at the Persian empire - an empire which stretched from India to Upper Egypt. During this time Judaism was reconstructed by Ezra and the present Bible was written from oral traditions, beginning about 80 years after Cyrus freed the Jews in 539BC; any earlier written texts had been lost when the First Temple was destroyed by the Assyrians; the story of Adam and Eve was a late addition by Ezra. The Zoroastrian influence is discussed in Zoroastrians and the West, Unit 27 of the Open University series Man's Religious Quest. Influence from the Parthian Empire in the period 54-38 BC was particularly strong (p. 31). It is in this period that Barbara Thiering says Hillel and Menahem came to Israel from Babylonian Judaism: "Menahem was a man of talent who founded the Magians, whose name reflected their Babylonian culture ... It was probably Menahem, with his Essene interest in calendar and prophecy, who conceived the idea of a thousand year empire of the Jews." (Jesus the Man, pp. 27-28, emphasis added). The Kingdom of the Jews would be "the greatest empire yet known", the throne in Jerusalem, and Rome under its sway as "a subordinate territory" (pages 28-29). To this end the Essenes and Zealots devoted themselves, culminating in Masada; the Zionist movement kept the vision alive for two thousand years, but some Jews fear that it will lead to another Masada - on a much bigger scale. The same Jerusalem-Rome polarity reappears in the title of Moses Hess' book Rome and Jerusalem, which instigated the re-surfacing of the Zionist movement; Hess was the "red rabbi" who had earlier converted both Karl Marx and Frederick Engels to Communism, before disowning it himself. Tribalism and Universalism The Jewish ethic is a fusion of Tribalism and Universalism. The former is evidenced by the focus on Auschwitz to the exclusion of the terror of Leninism, the Great Leap Forward, and the war against the Palestinians. Zealot activists want to bring the millennium to the world (a thousand-year period of peace; it need not begin in any particular year, the point is its duration); the Protocols' program shows this feature: the goals are good, but it uses immoral means to achieve them. But though the aim would be to create an equal world, it is an equality administered by them; they are the light-bringers to humanity; their high-priest ("pope") is the mediator between God and humanity; and they themselves are a priestly people ruling as a theocracy. This scenario is much as "Jewish" Christian sects envisage, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Christadelphia Ecclesia, each conspicuous by a lack of ecumenical ties with any other "Christian" church, and for its subversive attacks on all other churches; each looks forward to Armageddon, with glee at the prospect of the wicked being destroyed by Jehovah. Each imagines that its adherents will form the theocracy of the New Earth, inspired by the image of those who reign "with Christ a thousand years" (Revelation 20:4); a thousand years being a millennium. The Jehovah's

Witnesses is a hierarchical sect controlled by twelve men in Brooklyn. The Christadelphia Ecclesia book The Jews, Rome and Armageddon, by Roger Stokes, depicts the Jews as the true Christians, and the pope as the Antichrist. In its version of Armageddon, the final battle will between those who align themselves with the Jews, who will win, and the rest, who will lose; it is very much anti the Protocols, it rightly castigates Hitler but is pro- Lenin, despite his terror and his persecution of the churches, and strongly pro-Balfour Declaration and pro-Zionist. The Christadelphia Ecclesia used to place signs on railway stations in Sydney saying "One World Government in the Name of Our Lord Jesus Christ". When The Australian newspaper ran a supplement on Israel on 4 May 1995, the Christadelphia Ecclesia placed an advertisement in it, stating that the usual Christian interpretation of the Christian scriptures was unscriptural! A strange doctrine for a group calling itself "Christian"; could this instead be ideological warfare directed against Christianity - an attack from the inside? Could these two churches be affiliated with the Zionist movement, at the top level either now or in the past, as a means of sowing dissension within Christianity? The theocracy they advocate sounds like medieval Christendom. This is something like what the authors of the Protocols are aiming at: they would use greed, subversion, war etc. during the time of struggle, but after gaining world control they would abandon the ideology of Progress and return to Community. Frederick Engels, in his articles On the History of Early Christianity and The Book of Revelation, noted the similarity between the early Christian movement and the early Socialist movement. He pointed out that the author of Revelation regarded himself as a Jew (see Revelation 2:9 and 3:9), and that this is not a book of Love but a book of Hate, promising retribution - Hell - against the Romans who had put down the Jewish uprising. This element of Hate has also been present in the "Left" movement since the French Revolution; it is behind Lenin's terror. There is a parallel between what the Zealot fundamentalist movement has been doing to the West in recent centuries, and what the Christians did to the Roman Empire before Constantine's "conversion". Christianity began as a breakaway Jewish sect fusing Plato's God with Yahweh, spreading rapidly amongst people who had earlier converted to Judaism but found its pollution laws silly. It deconstructed the religious worldview of the empire, its metaphysics and value system, shielding itself all the while in the guise of victim. After Constantine, the Church gained power and turned the tables, switching from Victim to Enforcer. Ideological Warfare Ideological warfare is based on the premise articulated by Hegel, that what holds a society together is shared ideas, such that each culture lives in its own mental world. That there is a main idea in each culture, which is articulated in its family life, its economy, its manners, its art etc. What Marx added to Hegel is the insight that the

main idea, that which props up the whole social order, is inevitably a concoction of viewpoints which contains contradictions and errors. Normally, these are not brought to public attention, so people ignore them. If, however, they are brought to public attention, and public focus on them is sustained over a long period of time, then the social order is vulnerable to collapse, because its unifying idea is gone. This applied equally to those societies Marx despised, and to those constructed in his name. A remedy is possible where the contradictions and errors are minor and can be contained by a reconstruction of the main idea, resolving the exposed contradictions and error in a "development of doctrine". Where the contradictions are too great, as in the later Roman Empire, late Christendom, the late USSR, and perhaps our own Western culture at present, there is no remedy. E.F. Schumacher articulated the dangers in Small Is Beautiful (p 89-90). In both the later Roman Empire, and the modern European world, the method of attack has been (a) ideological subversion and (b) martyrdom, i.e. victimhood. Ideological subversion means deconstructing the world view and value system upon which the social order is based, so that people no longer know what to think (are confused), and social bonds are broken (are isolated). Every worldview can be thus criticised, but these masters in ideological warfare are holding a powerful torch, focused on their target, so that the beam does not shine on the holders themselves, shielding the inconsistencies etc. in their own world view from deconstruction. Kruschev's courageous speeches about Stalin led to the first major deconstruction of Leninism in the West. The ideological warrior knows that his lies must have an element of truth, for credibility. But there are many injustices around, to be picked on: numerous minorities receiving a bad deal, who often enough have genuine grievances, and can be brought into the revolution. The revolutionaries have contributed to remedying grievances such as the plight of colonised peoples. But those peoples liberated from European colonialism have often been cast into an even worse colonialism, that of the World Bank and IMF, not the charities they seem but profitmaking agencies bleeding the Third World to death. The lesson is that, when faced with an injustice and considering overthrowing it, one is tempted to assume that its replacement will be better than the initial situation. It may be; it may not be. The strategy of the ideological warriors is to pinpoint the weaknesses in the "enemy's" ideology and practice, and exaggerate them, so that the enemy appears, not just a "bad guy", but totally bad, lacking any good qualities whatsoever. As a result, followers are encouraged to feel that they have no common interests with the "bad guys", no common humanity. The way is then open for hate, killing, and revolution. But what kind of "good" regime can be built on such a foundation? The illusion of "good" must them be maintained by abolishing the memory of what things were like before the revolution, in case it seem better than what followed, vilifying it, changing the

terminology even, using terms which themselves contain judgments, like "female genital mutilation" in place of the more neutral "female circumcision". The findings of Cognitive Anthropology, which studies ideology in relation to language, may have been used for ideological warfare. Many Anthropologists take their cue from Rousseau and Plato, not Darwin, being not observers of human nature, but engineers of society. Newspeak - Language As Despotism Westerners overseeing modernisation in developing countries install an indigenous elite which is required to stamp out traditional ideas and practices inconsistent with an international division of labour and Western "internationalist" values. Development is assumed to be a linear process converging on a world culture. The elimination of tradition is done by manipulation of the language, so that words are no longer available to express the old culture, the idea being that actions are limited by thoughts, thoughts by words: rearrange the words and meanings available to people, and you rearrange their mental furniture, thereby eliminating unwanted features of the old culture. Newspeak, in a word; Kinhide Mushakoji's name for it is Occlusion, in his paper Post-Modern Cultural Development in East Asia, in The Futures of Asian Cultures, Unesco, Bangkok 1993. Occlusion is "a process influencing the cognitive structure of a society and affecting its discourse through the selective elimination or marginalization of concepts and propositions, which makes it difficult for the society to focus attention, or even to perceive a certain aspect of the reality which was previously included in its field of attention." (p. 78, note 12). This is a brilliant description of Newspeak such as in Australia today, with the marginalisation of the Menzies era as an "industrial museum", despite the greater social equity then. At least we had a manufacturing industry then. Now we turn coal and iron into steel bars and call them "elaborately transformed manufactures", while our trade in finished manufactured goods runs a large deficit. Victimhood means portraying one's movement as a victim of the social order, rather than the attacker undermining it, as persecuted rather than subversive. Stalin noted how clever Lenin was at this: in the early days of the revolution, when it was not secure, Lenin called for supporters to "defend the revolution", whereas he himself was launching the attack on the old order. Playing the victim motivates one's followers to struggle and sacrifice, since they are able to see themselves as Good and the "Oppressor" as Bad, in a Good-vs-Evil struggle which is the characteristic feature of fundamentalist thinking, including secular fundamentalism: this is "holy war", as much a feature of Bolshevism and Radical Feminism as of any religious movement. The Millenial Myth

The history of fundamentalist worldviews does not, however, begin with the Jews. They acquired it from the Zoroastrian religion, while they were living in Babylon, which they preferred to Jerusalem, even though Cyrus had allowed them to return. Cyrus is hailed in the Bible as a messiah who freed the Jews from exile. From the Zoroastrian religion the Jews borrowed Angelology, the God-vs-Satan struggle, the linear notion of history as a movement towards an apocalyptic armageddon inaugurating a millennium, draconian "pollution" laws based on the idea that outsiders are polluting, a hereditary priestly caste, the notion of the number seven as being a holy number - in Zoroastrian religion there are seven Archangels, and they actually appear in the later books of the Jewish bible. Even the notion of a "bible" itself, as a revealed book, probably comes from Zoroastrianism, since that religion already had its Avesta (bible), Zend (commentary, like the Talmud), and Gathas (Psalms, i.e. hymns). Jewish communities in Africa, e.g. Ethiopia, go back to pre-Persian times and know nothing of the Talmud. Theirs is more likely to reflect the original Jewish culture. They also retained a Goddess, Ishtar, whereas the Babylonian Judaism followed Zoroastrianism in its more male-oriented notion of sacredness. From narrowminded Zoroastrian religion the Babylonian Jews also developed the habit of judging all other cultures harshly, as being the work of Satan; we now name the evil force "Patriarchy". Hitler too thought in this manner, and made "Jewry" the evil force, as if by eliminating it from the world, he could eliminate evil. Zionists tend to think of "Nazism" in this metaphysical way, too. Nazism was a millenial movement (see James Rhodes, The Hitler Movement), and Zionism is too. Such movements see History as composed of three stages: an initial Paradise (Garden of Eden/ Ancient Athens/ Ancient Sparta/ the Aryan nomadic tribes/ Primitive Communism). After being cast out of Paradise there is a time of struggle between Good and Evil (God and Satan / ruling class and slave class / men and women etc.). Finally, after the climax of the struggle in the Great War (revolution/ Armageddon etc) there is a return to Paradise. It was the transition to this third phase that gave Nazi Germany its title "the THIRD Reich". These movements and myths re-work the same myth that has come down to us from Zoroastrian times. The key study on this Western myth is contained in the works of Eric Voegelin (1952 on); it was from Voegelin's insights that Norman Cohn produced The Pursuit of the Millennium. That book, however, only provides a cursory examination of the great secular millenial movements of our own time: Marxism, Nazism and Radical Feminism. Cohn's other major book, Warrant For Genocide, a study of the Protocols, is polemic rather than scholarly, the author being Jewish and keen to ignore any counter-evidence in the Protocols, such as its apparent linkage to later major historical events in the Twentieth Century. Cohn fails to even consider whether the Protocols might be seen as millenial literature - which it obviously is. The notion of an initial Paradise and a final Millennium (thousand-year

empire) is Zoroastrian - the word "paradise" is Persian. It is time that we got rid of this myth, before it kills us all, now that humanity has such powerful weapons. The solution is not to try to abolish the weapons - that can only be done by force, which itself requires weapons - but to finally expose this myth, lurking as it is within Christianity, Zionism, Islam, and Marxism. It is like a fatal virus which has gone unrecognised. The Fundamentalist Ideology This virus - fundamentalist thinking - often lies dormant within those civilisations, being brought to the fore during times of threat. Such Good-Bad thinking has probably existed in some way in most human societies, during times of war when, to mobilise the population, it is found expedient to demonise the opponent and exonerate one's own side. However, most societies have not generalised the Good-Bad polarity, taken it to the extreme of Absolute Good vs Absolute Evil in a permanent battle in a bifurcated universe. This can be seen from an examination of the society's "gods" or "spirit beings", which lay down the parameters of human life as seen within the society. In Ancient Egypt there was something of a Good-Bad struggle between Horus and Seth, but Horus had some faults and Seth had some good points. What distinguishes the fundamentalist ideologies is the incorporation of an Absolute Good vs Absolute Evil struggle into the metaphysics, i.e. the very structure of the world view (a culture's metaphysics is the structure of its worldview, its most basic view of reality). Non-Fundamentalist Ideology: East Asia Fundamentalist thinking is not part of the traditional Confucian/Daoist/Shinto outlook, which is based on complementary polarity (yin-yang) rather than antagonistic polarity (good-bad), and that is largely why, in my opinion, those traditional East Asian cultures offer humanity the best hope of getting away from the Millenial / fundamentalist world view we have inherited from Persia and the Middle East, worldviews which spread Enlightenment (Salvation) by the sword. If, as charted in the Protocols, zionist leaders still aim for a thousand-year empire, then they would regard the rise of Confucian East Asia as a threat, best dealt with by playing China and Japan off against one another; Chalmers Johnson recently pointed out (lecture, ANU, 15/11/94) that Huntington, by casting them as two different civilisations, hoped that they might fight one another. Johnson thought them smart enough not to fall for this trick. The Japanese and the Jews both admire and fear one another, as shown in their recent spate of books about one another: books by Masami Uno saying that the U.S. has been bankrupted because influential Jews caused the multinationals to move their factories from America to low-wage countries; Daniel Burstein's Yen: The Threat of Japan's Financial Empire; Isaiah Ben-Dasan's The Japanese and the Jews, Ben-Ami

Shillony's The Jews and the Japanese,; and The Jews in the Japanese Mind. This conflict is based on Japanese study of the Protocols, which was acquired from the "White" Russian armies during the civil war. At least part of the Japanese leadership seems to have regarded it as a genuine document, and furthermore judged that in it were exposed the secret ruling class and innermost weaknesses of Western society, which Jewish thinkers, being its victims - cast as God-killers, sacred executioners, agents of Satan - had studied for centuries, and which the fundamentalist Jewish factions were using to try to undermine that civilisation in order to further their own, in particular through having discovered ways to get Westerners to want things that were not in their own best interest; if correct these methods work because they exploit the other's structure of thinking, which the persons involved can never detect. In those Japanese eyes, this meant that the knowledge of these strategies might assist them too, in particular in financial management and the avoidance of foreign debt and control; but that the Jews had to be feared as much as respected. Jewish authors Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz, in their book The Fugu Plan: The Untold Story of the Japanese and the Jews During World War II, reveal that during the Pacific War, Japanese leaders put a deal to Jewish leaders, offering large-scale Jewish migration to Manchukuo, from Europe and America; in return these Jews would use their skills skills the Japanese felt they themselves lacked - to construct and administer the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. The problem for Jews was that they regarded the United States as a homeland, and could not work against it in this way. The Catholic and Judaic Heritage Fundamentalism in the Western religions is associated with the historicist theme in their mythology, which they acquired from the Zoroastrians. Inside both Judaism and Catholicism, underneath the Zoroastrian overburden, lies a rich legacy of the ancient world. The Catholic monstrance, for example, with its wavy sun-rays emanating from the golden centre, in which the consecrated host is located, is a momento of the religion of Mithra (Persia) / Ra (Egypt): Jesus as Sun God. The Virgin Mary preserves much of Isis, Sister-Wife of Osiris. As a Catholic, I used to chant litanies to Mary addressing her as Queen of Heaven, a title she inherited from the love-goddess Ishtar. It would be a shame to lose these precious relics of the past. Equally, the Kabalah preserves features of ancient Middle-Eastern mysticism, the Tree of Life for example, which we should cherish and rework into our understanding of the world. Catholicism and Judaism preserve many features of the earliest civilisations of the EgyptMesopotamia-Indus triangle - a priceless heritage. I can understand Jews wanting to return to a region so rich for them in memories. My hope is that they do not destroy it, and the rest of the world in the process. Fundamentalists are confident that the Good will survive Armageddon; I am not. Peace Between Jews and Christians

The key to understanding the barrier between Jews and Christians is provided by Hyam Maccoby, author of The Sacred Executioner: this is a book about human sacrifice. Maccoby's insights relate to those of Rene Girard about the linkage between violence and the sacred. Certain epic acts in the past - "heroic" acts - have "sacramental" value for us as we relive them. The Catholic mass is the sacrifice of the mass, in which Jesus is a human sacrifice. Jesus' body is recreated on the altar (a place of sacrifice, a sacred barbecue) by the priest and communally eaten by the community. This act goes back thousands of years: Jesus himself was a figure in the mould of Osiris, and James Frazer showed in The Golden Bough that other annual gods symbolising the vegetative cycle of spring and harvest, died, were ritually eaten by their devotees, and were reborn next spring. For Jews, the chief sacrifice was Abraham's sacrifice of his son Isaac, which is today commemorated in Israel at the Rock of Ages: this is the chief sacred site of Judaism (and a mosque is built upon it - trouble ahead). Maccoby points out that in the Bible story, Abraham is about to sacrifice Isaac to Abraham, when an angel appears giving him a lamb as a substitute. But, Maccoby says, it looks as if Isaac was saved by an editor rather than an angel. That is, a later scribe, re-copying the manuscript, thought it appropriate to change the story. The reader should consult Maccoby's book directly, but his case is convincing: Ancient Israel was founded upon a human sacrifice, that of Isaac. That is why, when considering offers to locate the new state of Israel in Kenya or Siberia, the leaders of the movement said "No" - their sacred site is in the old Israel, and it cannot be relocated. So now we have two human sacrifices: that of Isaac, inaugurating the Jewish Covenant with Yahweh; and that of Jesus, inaugurating, from the Christian point of view, the New Covenant, i.e. ending the Old one. And according to the New Testament, the sacrifice of Jesus was done by the Jews, symbolised by Judas, the mob choosing to free Barabbas rather than Jesus, and the High Priest. So there is a fundamental contradiction between Judaism and Christianity, in terms of their foundation sacrifices. No amount of apologising by the Pope can overcome this contradiction, because every crucifix points to it; every cross is offensive. The only way would be to abandon the New Testament and the notion of a New Covenant breaking the Old. It would be the end of Christianity. Peace Between Jews and Nazis But there is a third sacrifice. The Nazi genocide of the Jews, symbolised by Auschwitz, is also a human sacrifice, that human sacrifice which has been made the foundation of the modern state of Israel. That is why the Israelis can never get over it or forget it: it has sacramental value for them. They must forever mark the Nazis and the Germans as sacred executioners, just as Christians themselves mark the Jews in this way. To think that an unresolved problem 2000 years old could bring us to the point of destruction of the planet today! One pathway towards resolution is the

disclosure that Moshe Dayan actually admired Hitler, and sought to learn from him. Ostrovsky says that the Jewish Defence League are regarded by moderate Jews as "Judeo-Nazis". Furthermore, the Palestinians have suffered the same dispossession at the hands of Jews, as they themselves suffered at the hands of the Romans. When Lenin's sins are considered, and especially the Jewish contribution to the Bolshevik cause, then surely the conclusion is that we are all guilty, none of us superior to the others. Is this not an occasion for mutual public confession? And forgiveness, and a new start? A Conspiracy Inside a Conspiracy? The New World Order emerged from the two revolutions based on the ideas of Rousseau. Firstly in the American Revolution: the Great Seal of the United States, authorised in 1776, contains the words (in Latin) "Towards a New Order of the Ages". Secondly in the French Revolution; Marx wrote, "The French Revolution gave rise to ideas which led beyond the ideas of the entire old world order. The revolutionary movement which began in 1789 in the Cercle Social, which in the middle of its course had as its chief representatives Leclerc and Roux, and which finally with Babeuf's conspiracy was temporarily defeated, gave rise to the communist idea which Babeuf's friend Buonarroti re-introduced in France after the Revolution of 1830. This idea, consistently developed, is the idea of the new world order." (The Holy Family, Chapter 6, Part 3 - this part being written by Marx alone - in Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,Volume 4, p.119). In societies based on Rousseau's ideology of bottom-up legitimacy - sovereignty arising from the will of the people rather than descending from God - real power is underground: the ruling class rarely shows its face, except for a few icons. The book which best discloses how the Anglo-American political system works is Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment. It shows how consent is manufactured through informal power: how oligarchies informally control "formal democracies" by shaping public opinion in a subtle way, by having one's people in journalism, educational institutions and as party-bosses, to limit and massage the information reaching the public; in particular, they try to control the writing of History. The insiders anticipate issues, discuss them and determine the preferred courses of action. Then, when the matter is before the public, various well-known members of The Group, acting individually and apparently without collusion, express opinions publicly, in line with the pre-agreed position. Public opinion tends to follow, since there appears to be such consensus among the leaders of society. Think tanks and their journals are a key part of this process. The book charts this conspiracy, the Rhodes/Milner Group, from about 1870 to World War II. Cecil Rhodes aimed to create 'a kind of religious brotherhood, like the Jesuits, "a church for the extension of the British Empire".' (p. 34); the secret society of the Left, the Illuminati, also

modelled itself on the Jesuits. Under the leadership of The Group, facing growing moves for independence among the dominions and colonies, Britain developed an ideology which reconciled "freedom" with "empire", such that the British Empire appeared to be the primary instrument for the bringing of freedom to the world. This freedom involved minimal state involvement in the economy, free trade and free movement of capital (i.e. debt), which Britain alone adopted in the nineteenth century, and Anglo-Saxon "individualism", which justifies actions against the majority interest. While Europe and Asia were "oriental despotisms" ruled by bureaucracies which regarded the public as "spectators", in Britain the public ruled, i.e. rule was by "public opinion". In disclosing how opinion is manufactured, Quigley exposes the ideology of "freedom" as a fraud: the Group was 'an early example of what James Burnham has called the "Managerial Revolution" - that is, the growth of a group of managers, behind the scenes and beyond the control of public opinion, who seek efficiently to obtain what they regard as good for the people' (p. 85). The Group was amenable to One World Civilisation - one world government - provided that it was British and controlled by the Group. They did not want the dreaded "oriental despotisms" to have any part in it, and were alarmed when they realised that the League of Nations was trying to be a supra-national body overriding member sovereignty. Quigley shows that the empire is run by a conspiracy, but fails to consider if there are other conspiracies operating through the one he knows about. From 1888 to 1891, Lord Rothschild was the sole trustee of Rhodes' will (p. 34). One of Rhodes' associates, W.T. Stead, wrote, "he ... told me some things he has told no other man - save Lord Rothschild" (p. 37). In World War I Britain lost its empire, but Rothschild gained Palestine. Rhodes wrote in his will of 1877 that his plan for federation between the U.S. and the British Empire was aimed at "the foundation of so great a power as to hereafter render wars impossible" (p. 33). Years later, Schiff's first name for the League of Nations was the "League to Enforce Peace" (Cyrus Adler, Jacob H. Schiff: His Life and Letters, vol ii, p. 193). After the Treaty of Versailles, which The Group helped draft, the U.S. became the "Receiver" of the British Empire, and the Council On Foreign Relations was formed as the U.S. counterpart to the Milner Group, the new headquarters of the Anglo-Saxon "federated empire" planned by Rhodes. The concept of the Institute Of International Affairs and the CFR came from British historian Lionel Curtis, who set out his ideas in The Commonwealth Of Nations. The creation of the CFR and its control of U.S. foreign policy is described by Marxist scholars Lawrence Shroup and William Minter in Imperial Brain Trust. The Christian Right has also documented the activities of the CFR: Pat Robertson, The New World Order, and Ralph Epperson, The Unseen Hand. If only the Marxists or the Christians had done this one might suspect bias, but the fact that the CFR has been targeted by both sides means that criticism cannot be easily deflected. The CFR created the Trilateral Commission, the Trilateral Commission

created the Group of Seven, and the G7, combined with the Security Council, is the defacto world government; but the people of the world do not know that. In the U.S. today, all of the national television networks (currently three) transmit their news broadcasts around that country from New York, a suitable means of shaping opinion from a suitable headquarters. The Fall of the United States The rise of the "oriental despotisms" abhorred by the Group, Germany, Japan etc., as the "individualist" Anglo-Saxon countries flounder, shows that Burnham failed to distinguish between the nationalist and internationalist types of managerialism. The latter, whether of the laissez-faire or the central-planned variety, amounts to internal colonialism, plunder by an alien ruling class; this is prevented in the former by the very bureaucracy the Group disdained. The Anglo-Saxon world abandoned individualism when it turned to Keynes, and took it up again as it abandoned him. Huntington's co-worker Zbigniew Brzezinski, a leading theoretician of the Cold War, Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser and first Director of the Trilateral Commission, has admitted the U.S.' decline in his book Out Of Control. Similar assessments are made by J. K. Galbraith in Culture of Contentment, and Kevin Phillips in Arrogant Capital, the latter likening the U.S. today to the Roman Empire just before its collapse. How has the United States fallen from power and wealth so quickly? The Protocols might shed some light on this: it claims to have implanted the "laissez-faire" (Thatcherite) theory of economics into academia. It also says, "we will destroy the family life of the goyim". If there is any substance in this, it would have happened via the New Left movement, which had substantial Jewish leadership: in the Paris 1968 riots, Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Betty Friedan etc., but was far from being exclusively Jewish. Germaine Greer wrote, in The Female Eunuch, "Hopefully, this book is subversive ... the oppression of women is necessary to the maintenance of the economy ... If the present economic structure can change only by collapsing, then it had better collapse as soon as possible. ... The most telling criticisms will come from my sisters of the Left, the Maoists, the Trots, the I.S., the S.D.S., because of my fantasy that it might be possible to leap the steps of revolution and arrive somehow at liberty and communism without strategy or revolutionary discipline. But if women are the true proletariat, the truly oppressed majority, the revolution can only be drawn nearer by their withdrawal of support for the capitalist system. The weapon I suggest is that most honoured of the proletariat, withdrawal of labour" ( Paladin, p.21, emphasis added). Greer was calling on women to destroy Marriage; the I.S. are the International Socialists, a Trotskyist group. No-one could accuse any individual in these matters; as individuals they may have acted in good faith, for social justice etc., but the effect has been destructive: the loss of any predictability in marriage, any security for children whose family might

fracture, enormous social welfare costs, advocacy of children's rights to the extent of abandoning respect for parents and teachers, abandonment of the core area of history, tables and grammar from curricula, etc. The 60s rebellion had both libertarian (Anarchist) and authoritarian (Marxist) streams; the former tended to "drop out", the latter "stayed in the system to change it from the inside". The former wanted to build their own houses in the bush, and give birth at home, without regulations (I belonged to this stream, and have done both); the latter promoted regulation for "consumer protection" and "the maintenance of standards". The former favoured free love, even inside marriage, while elements of the latter have promoted the sex war, of women against men, and the destruction of the family. The Marxists tried to do deals with any movement trying to change society (unions, churches, ethnic groups, women's movement, environmentalists, homosexuals). They offered ideology (Good-Bad), battle-hardened members, and organisational techniques; the cost was that they would take over the movement to some extent, by having a clearer idea of where they were going, by block-voting to sway decisions and gain leadership positions, forming united fronts which blurred the boundaries between these reformist movements and revolutionary Marxism. The Cold War was fought, not only between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but also within those societies, and to some extent has not quite finished. The difference between the Marxists and the movements they used, is that many of the Marxists were aiming to destroy the social order, while the others merely wanted to improve it. To each movement, the Marxists brought the techniques of ideological warfare: religious brotherhood (sisterhood), focusing the torchlight on the enemy, keeping the beam off oneself. The enemy is evil, the movement is innocent. Such fundamentalism, undiagnosed because it is secular rather than religious, made its home in the heart of our universities. The Jesuits moulded children; the Marxists remoulded young adults. Jews and the New Left In Culture of Complaint: the Fraying of America, Robert Hughes noted that in the era since the Vietnam War, the generation which protested (I was one) has given up class as its major issue of concern, for others in particular gender. This marks a distinction between the Old Left, which mainly targeted Capitalism, and which supported family life, and the New Left, whose target was Patriarchy, and which regarded the family as "the source of our oppression", fostering instead radical feminism and "gay rights". Whereas the Old Left had favoured educational standards, the New Left promoted Individualism to the extent of the destruction of the core curriculum. The New Left has been much more Trotskyist and Internationalist; the difference between Old Left and New Left is articulated well in the Trotskyist 1979 publication Socialism or Nationalism Which Road for the Australian Labor Movement? by Jon West, Dave Holmes and Gordon Adler.

Only 2% of the population in the U.S. is Jewish; less than 1% in Australia. Yet Jewish author Philip Mendes writes, in his book The New Left, The Jews, and the Vietnam War 1965-1972 (pp. 21-22, emphasis added), "In the USA, it has been estimated that roughly one-third to one-half of New Leftists were Jews. Jews made up approximately two-thirds of the Freedom Riders that went South in 1961 ... In 1965 at the University of Chicago's Selective Service demonstration, 45 per cent of the protesters were Jews. At Columbia University in 1968 one-third of the demonstrators were of Jewish origin; three of the four students killed at Kent State in 1970 were Jewish ... Many of the important national officers in Students For A Democratic Society (SDS) were of Jewish origin. These included the founder ... Nearly half the delegates to the 1966 SDS convention were Jews ... In fact, the Jewish presence was so large that it concerned and, at times, even embarrassed the SDS leadership. An examination by Arthur Liebman of the New Left's theoreticians and intellectual articulators again revealed a significant Jewish presence. From 30 to 50 per cent of the founders and editorial boards of such New Left journals as Studies on the Left, New University Thought, and Root and Branch (later Ramparts), were of Jewish origin. Similarly, in Britain ... Jews were involved in particularly large numbers in the two main Trotskyist groups, the International Marxist Group and the International Socialists. In France, a number of prominent New Left leaders including Alain Krivine, Alain Gaismar and Daniel Cohn-Bendit were Jewish, and it is believed that about three-quarters of the members of the Trotskyite groups in the Paris area were identifiably Jewish." Giles Kepel writes in his book The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World, "When the twentieth anniversary of May 1968 was celebrated, many commentators pondered the 'Jewish nature' of that event - a topic which, some years earlier, would have been dubbed far right antisemitic propaganda. But in essence such questions show that the discovery of Jewish identity by certain '68 militants was actually retrospective. It was common knowledge that many of the leaders in those uprisings were Jewish. Indeed, there was a joke (one among many) which said that the only reason why Yiddish was not spoken at the politbureau of the largest Trotskyite organisation in France was that one of the committee members was a Sephardic Jew. And although some studies have linked the revolutionary commitment of the May '68 Jews with the fact that their families had been in the immigrant communist movement, the Resistance or the fight against Hitler, the 'Jewish nature' of this commitment was sublimated by the strictly atheistic revolutionary messianism with which left-wing militants were imbued at that time." Many were even anti-zionist, until the 1972 Munich Olympics split them and led many to return to their religion. They felt that the 1973 Middle East war was, unlike the Vietnam War, a just war, and rallied to the fold. The Gulf War was a similar test. They have called both for the abolition of nation-states, and the establishment of Israel

as a nation-state. These goals are contradictory: if the former applies, why bother with the latter? Robert Ellwood shows in his book The Sixties Spiritual Awakening that in the U.S., "To begin with, Jews participated in disproportionate numbers in the civil rights movement, in the counter culture, and in antiwar activity ... Not a few prominent voices in all these activities, from Allen Ginsberg to the Yippies Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, were of Jewish background. This participation certainly had roots in longstanding Jewish commitment to social justice, based in turn on Jewish experience of pogroms and persecutions ...But the deepest roots of Jewish activism undoubtedly lay in the long Jewish traditions of being a people set apart, always a little different, and so able to appreciate and flourish in the role of the marginalized, the cheerful iconoclast, or the outsider with a message" (p.235, emphasis added here and below). "Judaism itself was a counterculture of very long standing" (p. 244). This book documents the return to religion and orthodoxy, and the reassertion of monotheism as "the fundamental premise of Western religion: a single transcendent center of value that is more than merely subjective and beside which everything without exception must be weighed and judged" (p.95). This type of monotheism originated in Zoroastrianism; and it needs to be pointed out, and has not been pointed out, that the same definition shows that such monotheism is incompatible with true multiculturalism, for the latter is premised on the rejection of any single culture's blueprint for life as having authority over that of other cultures, as if to claim itself as a standard by which others are rightly judged. Not relativism, but live and let live, vive la difference, remember the glass house you live in before throwing the first stone - these are the key ideas of multiculturalism. I doubt that many of the Jewish activists in the New Left were consciously "conspirators", so the only way of fitting them into a conspiracy would be via a "bottom up" method of organising, i.e. by their indoctrination as young people into a culture with a "victim" view of history in which the "others" (non-Jews) are bad guys ever waiting to exterminate them, while they must constantly organise to defend themselves, attack the oppressor, and point the way forward for mankind. One of the ironies of this Jewish participation in the battle against "patriarchy", is that the Jewish Bible, in the story of Sodom and Gomorrah, is the main source of the West's view of homosexuality as not merely an anomaly but a sin (but the Gay movement uses the guise of minority rights to attack the family, the microcosm and building-block of society, the nursery of our young: an attack on heterosexuality itself, courtship newspeaked into harassment). Yahweh, unlike the gods of other peoples, had no female consort, no goddess: this has markedly affected the Western idea of the feminine, since it portrays sanctity as male, or at least much more male than female. The Catholic Church did something to remedy this: faced with the popularity of the

goddess Isis, it turned Mary into a defacto goddess with many of her qualities. The least the Jewish New Left might do, for the sake of consistency, is campaign for the rewriting of the Jewish Bible. Only in 1994 has such a call been made, by Bernard Boas in his book It's Time To Rewrite the Bible, but such is the power of Orthodoxy within Judaism, that he enlisted the support of Rabbi John Levi, for the foreword, and Christian bishop John Spong, for the preface. That book points out that the tenth commandment depicts a wife as a possession like livestock: "You shall not covet your neighbour's house; you shall not covet your neighbour's wife, nor his male or female slave, or his ox or his ass, nor anything that is your neighbour's" (Exodus 20:17, emphasis added). It points out that the Bible also says, "When anyone explicitly vows to the Lord the equivalent for a human being, the following scale shall apply: If it is a male from twenty to sixty years of age, the equivalent is fifty shekels of silver by the sanctuary weight. If it is a female, the equivalent is thirty shekels" (Leviticus 27: 1-4, emphasis added); and there are many other similar quotes demeaning women. The West's racism also largely derives from the Bible, from the story of God's condemnation of Ham and curse on his descendants (Genesis 5:32, 9:20-27). According to the New Bible Dictionary, Ham is regarded as the ancestor of the Egyptians (Mizraim), Libyans (Put), Ethiopians (Cush) etc (2nd ed., p.816). Genesis says, 'Noah, a man of the soil, was the first to plant a vineyard. He drank some of the wine and became drunk, and he lay uncovered in his tent. And Ham, the father of Canaan, saw the nakedness of his father ... When Noah awoke from his wine and knew what his youngest son had done to him, he said, "Cursed be Canaan: lowest of slaves shall he be to his brothers."' (Genesis 9: 20-25, emphasis added). This was a rationale for apartheid. Plato's Revenge One of the slogans of the New Left was "bring the war back home", i.e. promote a civil war on as many fronts as possible. But considering the social dislocation that the New Left has wrought, its weakening of the fabric of the United States such that it now seems to be sinking visibly, handing its imperial baton to Japan, one might wonder whether it would have been more honest if the overwhelming Jewish leadership and participation had been made public at the time. Why was this not done? If there has been a conspiracy, then this was possible because of the Platonic utopian heritage in our universities, specifically the belief that a perfect society was an actual possibility, not just a pipe dream, and that they - the university-trained intelligensia - would be the ones to implement it. This gave them the confidence to reject existing and past actual societies and instead engage in a social experiment on a massive scale involving hundreds of millions of people. To work for the destruction of existing society, as a way of preparing for the new, improved model. Socrates was an important example, the archetypal "deconstructor" of the Old Order, the Christ of the

intellectuals. Marx was fascinated by Professor D. Baur's paper on The Two Christs, about Socrates and Jesus, and wrote about this matter in detail in his own doctoral dissertation. Babeuf, the only person praised by Marx in The Communist Manifesto, linked Jesus and Socrates in his defence prior to his execution following the fall of Robespierre (see John Scott, ed., The Defense of Gracchus Babeuf Before the High Court of Vendome). The fact that Socrates' associates Alcibiades et. al. had helped bring about the destruction of Ancient Athens, its conquest by the Spartan tyranny, did not seem incongruous to these "Enlightenment" intellectuals. Nor did the fact that Plato and Rousseau frequently referred to Sparta as the model for the utopia to be created by intellectuals ("philosophers"). Sparta expressed the martial values on which both the USSR and the Third Reich were built; it was not known for its art, literature or science. Why would Enlightenment intellectuals reared as modern-day Athenians, help the Spartan cause? How could they combine Plato's utopia with the fundamentalist millennium? So, even if the Protocols is an authentic book, it is not justifiable to blame its activists for the demise of the West; on the contrary the real fault has been within ourselves, those activists were merely taking advantage of our weaknesses. We thought that freedom was incompatible with structure, rights with duties, and have chosen the former, destroying the latter, symbolised by the Family. As in polarities such as male-female, one must have both poles to make a whole, in economics we require both chaos and order, free enterprise and bureaucratic planning; E.F. Schumacher pointed this out 20 years ago in Small Is Beautiful. The Revisionist History of the Twentieth Century Robert John, Behind the Balfour Declaration, shows that World War I was so evenly balanced between Britain and Germany, that American support tipped the balance. The zionist movement was active in both Britain and Germany, on the basis that either side might win: it was as much pro-Germany as pro-Britain. However, Americans were isolationist, and their national identity revolved around the War of Independence from Britain. The crucial Americans who prevailed upon Wilson were Zionists, who Britain appealed to in 1917, offering Palestine in return for their support. The great majority of American Jews were anti-Zionist, but the Zionists had better connections. By that time, Britain had used up its prewar credits, and needed big loans - which German-Jewish American bankers on Wall Street were prepared to provide, conditional upon the Balfour Declaration, switching their allegiance from Germany at that point. A prominent German leader later stated that if Germany had realised that promising Palestine would sway America in the war, then Germany would have won. The other factor which prompted Britain to make the Balfour Declaration was the Bolshevik Revolution. Britain was aware that it was led by Jews, and that they intended taking Russia out of the war, freeing Germany from fighting on two fronts.

Britain thought that the offer of Palestine might prompt the Bolsheviks to stay in the war. But the arrival of American troops made up for the Russian exit. Hitler was an imperialist in the style of all the European empires. He was no more racist than the British had been, but while the Spanish and the British had done their bloody conquests in the "third world", away from prying cameras, Hitler did his in Europe itself, and his victims were Europeans (including the Jews). This is one reason for the special horror attaching to his name. In attempting to build an empire in Europe, he was following in the path of Napoleon, and he came to a similar fate. It is hypocritical to consider one a hero and the other a demon: they had more in common than they had apart. Napoleon, too, killed millions of people. Hitler's attitude to the Jews was in large part a reaction to Jewish leadership of the revolutionary movement in Europe, especially Russia, and the Terror that Lenin had launched. Hitler's propaganda machine matched that of the Bolsheviks, and came after, following in the wake of the former; in Hegelian terms, it was the antithesis to Bolshevism as thesis. It is hypocritical to condemn one but not the other; but it is appropriate to condemn both. Some of the blame for Hitler's racism must be attributed to the Social Darwinists, and some to the Bible's story of Ham, a major basis of Western racism. We cannot escape "the century of ideological wars", as Herman Hesse put it in The Glass Bead Game, without a public confession from all sides and factions. Anthony Sutton's books Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution and Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler show that Wall Street build up both regimes. Victor Suvurov, IceBreaker, shows that Stalin was as responsible as Hitler for World War II; moreso, since the USSR Constitution of 1924 states its aim as "one World-Wide Socialist Soviet Republic". As Roosevelt carefully crafted a scenario at Pearl Harbour in which Japan played the "baddie", so Stalin conspired in the division of Poland as much as Hitler but more craftily, delaying Russian entry until after German entry, making Hitler seem the sole aggressor. Stalin then invaded Finland and "liberated" the Baltic states; 4 republics were added to the USSR. The USSR had even allowed the German army to train in the USSR, violating the Treaty of Versailles. If Stalin had not wanted war with Hitler, he would not have agreed to the partition of Poland, for that removed a buffer state and gave Germany and the USSR a common border, facilitating a direct German attack. Instead Stalin regarded war through the perspective of the Hegelian dialectic: it was a powerful way to play thesis off against antithesis to achieve a desired goal as synthesis. Sutton's book National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union shows that the U.S. continued to supply the USSR with technology it could use for war, despite the two countries being protagonists in the Cold War. World War II begin in Poland; the Cold War began as a fallout between Stalin and the West over Poland; and the end of the Soviet Block began in Poland, with Solidarity. The Risks of War

Fundamentalist Zionists would be well aware of the following text in the Book of Genesis: 'On that day Yahweh made a covenant with Abram, saying, "To your descendants I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates"' (Genesis 15:18, emphasis added here and below). As for relations with Arabs, they are indicated by the story of Ishmael, born to Abram's Egyptian slavewoman Hagar; Abram's wife Sarah later gave birth to Isaac. The ominous text reads, 'But Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian, whom she had born to Abraham, playing with her son Isaac. So she said to Abraham, "Cast out this slave woman with her son; for the son of this slave woman shall not inherit along with my son Isaac." The matter was very distressing to Abraham on account of his son. But God said to Abraham, "Do not be distressed because of the boy and because of the slave woman; whatever Sarah says to you, do as she tells you, for it is through Isaac that offspring shall be named for you. As for the son of the slave woman, I will make a nation of him also, because he is your offspring."' (Genesis 21:9-13, emphasis added). Given Ben-Gurion's claim that "the Bible is our mandate" (see above), one can assume that Israel will try to gain more land from the Arabs to fulfil the promise of Genesis 15:18. But even if it expands in a non-military way, it will eat economically and politically into the heartland of Islam, which pressed will turn fundamentalist and retaliate against Israel and its Western allies. The Balfour Declaration may become the means of the destruction of civilisation; its birthplace may become its graveyard. Suppose that the Zionist plot is true, and Israel becomes the centre of a world empire; it would not last for long, because it would break up from its own internal struggles: Christianity emerged from Judaism in this way. Why risk the planet for such a dubious goal? It could not be achieved without another world war; could God reward those who use such foul means? Or have the leaders of the movement made of God a mere divinisation of themselves? The people best placed to act are moderate Jews: those who realise the risks. Rather than dismiss the Protocols out of hand, associating it with Auschwitz, moderate Jews should read it and seriously consider whether it might be authentic. If it is genuine, they would be the last to know. My message to them is: rediscover your pre-Zoroastrian past. A Resolution? A century ago, the pope gave up his "temporal" domain, his lands and armies, settling for Vatican City as the spiritual centre of Christianity. At the time this seemed a defeat, but it has allowed a greater focus on the spiritual side. That is what Judaism needs now. For the sake of world peace, Jewry should give up Israel as a Jewish state, i.e. a religious state with an established church, armed to the teeth, and settle for a small, spiritual "Vatican City" in Jerusalem, as its centre. An international settlement, involving all the interested religions, could lay the groundwork for harmony. This would not be a new exile - Jews and Arabs could remain in the land as brothers and

sisters, as they once were (as Ron David says in Arabs & Israel For Beginners, Jews must have descended from Arabs). If that happens then I too will visit it. And let us end usury: it is illegal in Israel today (or at least was recently); it is forbidden in the Koran; and it was forbidden in Christendom. Saving the Enlightenment Chalmers Johnson said that that rise of Japan has been possible because "they have no antagonistic culture: they had no French Revolution" (lecture, ANU, 15/11/94). If we want to get rid of this legacy of Hate in our own society, we cannot do it by means of Hate - against Jews, Leftists, Capitalists or whatever group - since Hate breeds Hate. The only way is to expose it and promote the understanding of it. John Ralston Saul, in Voltaire's Bastards, and John Carroll, in Humanism the Wreck of Western Culture, write of the failure of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment; the Postmodernist writers are similarly anti-Reason, even nihilist. The mistake of the Enlightenment was to see Reason as more than a Method - as having some particular Content or standpoint. Leninism was, not the culmination of the Enlightenment, but a perversion of the Enlightenment, and its origins must be traced back to Rousseau's advocacy of Machiavelli, to Plato's advocacy of Sparta, and to Socrates as the archetypal sophist and deconstructor, an intelligent man who pulled others' ideas apart but give no guidance on how to live (see I. F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates). To save the Enlightenment - to forestall a new Dark Age - we must discard these three philosophers, but keep the Presocratics and Voltaire, and look to East Asia as he did. Mushakoji (op. cit.) says that in East Asian culture there is a dialectical relationship between the Confucian and Daoist cultural poles: dialectical as Daoist "complementary polarity", not Hegelian "antagonistic polarity". Those cultures can help us to retain Reason but to keep it in perspective. E. R. Dodds describes a comparable situation to ours in Ancient Athens, at the time of the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta, which began about 432 BC and lasted 30 years. That it is comparable to the Cold War, though of a far smaller scale, is suggested firstly by its ideological nature, as a war between Sparta, the "people's democracy" of its day, and Athens the "democracy". Ideologically, Socrates and Plato took the Spartan side, as many Western intellectuals have taken the Bolshevik side. Following Plato, Rousseau idealised Sparta as a model for his Enlightenment state, and this was the model of leaders in the French Revolution such as Babeuf. Athens lost the war, whereas America won - so the story goes; but according to Chalmers Johnson the Cold War was lost by both sides, won by Japan (interview, Indian Pacific, ABC Radio, 30/12/91) - in this view both Athens and Sparta lost their war, to the advantage of Persia. The war finished off Ancient Athens, as Thucydides argued: it was the end of its creative period, and Greek philosophers ended up, several centuries afterwards, slaves of the Roman empire, tutoring the children of the rich. It was a time

when Greece had an "Enlightenment", brought about by its rationalist intellectuals, who by destroying the traditional religion had undermined the social fabric. In The Greeks and the Irrational, Dodds describes it as follows (the Inherited Conglomerate is the rejected traditional culture): "the new rationalism carried with it real as well as imaginary dangers for the social order. In discarding the Inherited Conglomerate, many people discarded with it the religious restraints that had held human egoism on the leash ... with most ... the liberation of the individual meant an unlimited freedom of self-assertion; it meant rights without duties ... The new rationalism did not enable men to live like beasts - men have always been able to do that. But it enabled them to justify their brutality to themselves" (p. 191). "... the regressiveness of popular religion in the Age of Enlightenment. The first signs of this regression appeared during the Peloponnesian War, and were doubtless in part due to the war. Under the stresses it generated, people began to slip back from the too difficult achievements of the Periclean Age; cracks appeared in the fabric ... As the intellectuals withdrew further into a world of their own, the popular mind was left increasingly defenceless" (p.192-3). Herman Hesse depicts our crisis today in his major work The Glass Bead Game: 'It was ... an era emphatically "bourgeois" and given to almost untramelled individualism' (Holt Rinehart & Winston edition, emphasis added, p.18). '... men came to enjoy an incredible degree of intellectual freedom, more than they could stand. For while they had overthrown the tutelage of the Church completely, and that of the State partially, they had not succeeded in formulating an authentic law they could respect, a genuinely new authority and legitimacy' (p.19). 'They faced death, fear, pain and hunger almost without defences, could no longer accept the consolation of the churches, and could obtain no useful advice from Reason. ... They moved spasmodically on through life and had no belief in a tomorrow' (p. 22). 'They struggled through a deluge of isolated cultural facts and fragments of knowledge robbed of all meaning. ... they were already on the verge of that dreadful devaluation of the Word ... At the end of an era of apparent victory and success they found themselves suddenly confronting a void' (p. 23). 'Even as intellectual ambitions and achievements declined rapidly during that period, intellectuals in particular were stricken by horrible doubts and a sense of despair. They had just fully realized ... that the youth and the creative period of our culture was over, that old age and twilight had set in.' (p. 23-4). 'celebrated and loquacious professors... offered them the crumbs of what had once been higher education ... The deeply debased intellectual professions were bankrupt in the world's eyes' (p.33-4). In Small Is Beautiful, E.F. Schumacher wrote, "The leading ideas of the nineteenth century, which claimed to do away with metaphysics, are themselves a bad, vicious, life-destroying type of metaphysics" (p.89). He quotes the statement "It was not

barbarian attacks that destroyed the Greco-Roman world ... The cause was a metaphysical cause. The 'pagan' world was failing to keep alive its own fundamental convictions ... owing to faults in metaphysical analysis it had become confused as to what those convictions were", then he comments, "This passage can be applied, without change, to present-day civilisation" (p.90). Zbigniew Brzezinski postulates that the U.S. faces disintegration, facing "an increasingly pervasive sense of spiritual emptiness", woes comprising "the economic, the social, and even the metaphysical" (Out Of Control, p.107, emphasis added); "social and especially cultural dilemnas are also ultimately philosophical in nature." (p.108). Astrophysicists Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe write in Our Place in the Cosmos, "The popular belief is that the Copernican Revolution and the inquisition of Galileo are things of the past. Human societies, it is claimed, have progressed beyond the stage when such outrages could happen again. In this book we show that the Copernican Revolution is far from over, and that society has not improved since the sixteenth century in any important respect. If anything the situation may have got worse, with the successes of the Industrial Revolution conferring upon human beings a degree of arrogance not seen before. The dogma has shifted from an Earth-centred Universe to the equally unlikely idea that life, which is the most complex and amazingly intricate phenomenon in the entire cosmos, must be centred on the earth. The new dogma has Judeo-Christian roots, but today its custodians are scientists rather than the high priests of the church" (p.1). Included in the dogmas is the Big Bang theory, demolished by Eric J. Lerner in The Big Bang Never Happened. One reason for the rootlessness in our society, is that since the French Revolution, the Far Left has managed to place great power in the hands of youth, blocking the transmission of tradition by the elders. The Means of the Transmission of Culture was seized, to destroy the old social order and create a new one. At the 1994 U.N. population conference in Cairo, the draft document stated that "in all societies discrimination on the basis of sex often starts at the earliest stages of life". The Radical Feminist authors were here attacking the "sexual division of labour", the natural basis of all traditional societies, where the breastfeeding of infants, often to the age of about three years (before "modern" times) causes women to live a different life from men - different but satisfying, as Margaret Mead said. This was a rejection of all past societies, an attack on human nature itself. Has the Enlightenment come so low? Is the Protocols right about the weakness of the goy intellect? {end of Hiding Behind Auschwitz (1995)}

The Protocols of Zion Toolkit. The strongest arguments that the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion is a forgery, and why they're wrong.

Write to me at contact.html. You are at http://mailstar.net/toolkit.html. Peter Myers, September 22, 2002; update December 6, 2010. My comments are shown {thus}. Newly added: 19. Stalin accused of endorsing the Protocols: toolkit3.html. In this study of the Protocols of Zion, I present the strongest counter-arguments of my ablest opponents (Israel Zangwill, Herman Bernstein, Norman Cohn), that it's a forgery, in their own words. I do so because, unless I can refute their strongest points, my case is not made. This, I believe, is my strength: that I am able to do so. I have yet to see any of my opponents, e.g. Jared Israel, place a link to this page on any of their websites, although I link to Jared Israel. Reader, if you know of such a link, please inform me: contact.html. Whilst I believe the Protocols of Zion authentic, my view is probabilistic. Philosophically, I emphasise uncertainty - the limits of human knowledge; that we only know partial truths - whereas dogmatists want to replace one system of certainty (e.g. Christian dogma) with another (e.g. Atheistic or New Age): perspectivism.html. In keeping with this philosophy, I have no problem with my opponents' views being publicly available, and facilitate this by quoting them or linking to them; they, however, seem not to reciprocate. The fact that I believe the Protocols authentic does not mean that I think it 100% "correct". For example, I disapprove of its endorsement of aristocracy; I interpret this as meaning that aristocratic control (feudalism) stood in the way of the revolutionary changes exemplified by the French and Russian Revolutions. To the extent that the Protocols seems to have correctly predicted the trend of events, this implies some constancy of intent. Even if so, things have not always gone to plan; there are other forces at play. History books may be 99% accurate, but the 1% they omit makes all the difference. When "writing in" that 1%, one might give the impression that the other 99% does not count; but, of course, one is merely correcting what has been omitted or distorted. This is Part 1 of the Toolkit. It deals with the arguments at the top level, and links to resources putting the case that the Protocols of Zion is a forgery, in particular a

plagiarism of Dialogues in Hell Between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, by Maurice Joly, published in 1864. These arguments are critically examined. Part 2 of the Protocols of Zion Toolkit deals with the Revolutionary background to Emperor Napoleon III of France, against whom Joly's Dialogues is pitched. The French Revolution, the Communist Revolutions of 1830, 1848 and 1871, and the Bolshevik Revolution are covered here. As the Dialogues presents it, Napoleon III is the Machiavellian, fooling the people; as the Protocols present it, the Revolutionaries are the Machiavellians, causing chaos and turmoil, and aiming at totalitarian control and a Reign of Terror. Part 2 is at toolkit2.html. Part 3 of the Protocols of Zion Toolkit deals with the events from 1914 to the early 1920s, which seemed to have been predicted in the Protocols: the World War, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Balfour Declaration inauguraing the state of Israel, and the attempt to make the League of Nations a World Government: toolkit3.html. 1. Introduction 2. The Case that the Protocols is a Forgery 3. Evaluating the Bernstein / Cohn Argument 4. Nesta Webster on Free Masonry, the French Revolution, and the Protocols of Zion 5. The Protocols of Zion compared to the Tanaka Memorial 6. Stalin accused of endorsing the Protocols 7. The Revolutionary background to Napoleon III 8. Napoleon III's Rule 9. Assessments of Napoleon III 10. The Push for World Government at the Peace Conference of Versailles (1919) 11. One man stops World Government. 12. The Protocols of Zion and the Peace Conference of Versailles 13. Douglas Reed on the ousting of Lord Northcliffe 14. More on the Ousting of Lord Northcliffe from The Times of London 15. Lloyd George explains why Britain made "a contract with Jewry" 16. Marranism and Universalism 17. Israel Zangwill on the Protocols 17. Herman Bernstein for World Government 18. One World - Utopian or Totalitarian? 19. Conclusion 20. Challenge to Jared Israel and Alexander Baron (November 28, 2002)

1. Introduction

My first article on the Protocols of Zion, titled Hiding Behind Auschwitz, was written in 1995, a few months after I encountered the Protocols. At the time, I had not read Joly's Dialogues, but I had read extracts of the parallel passages, plus the main arguments put by Norman Cohn. Hiding Behind Auschwitz contains material which is not repeated here; the Protocols of Zion Tookit is written in conjunction with it: hiding.html. The title of Norman Cohn's book, Warrant For Genocide, implies that the Protocols of Zion - the book itself - is responsible for Hitler's persecution of Jews. The implication is that anyone who believes the Protocols genuine is guilty of this. What then of the Russians, like Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who opposed Bolshevik rule yet found the Nazi invasion most unwelcome (not to say deadly)? Must they, too, be branded Nazis? Does Norman Cohn want the Protocols banned? Burned? Yet, one cannot understand twentieth century history without this book: it's in leading university and national libraries. Whereas Cohn blames this book for genocide, others regard it as a dire warning to distrust the World Government our beneficiaries seem determined to bestow on us. The Protocols appears to shed light on the social revolutionary movement, and the One World forces. Our task is not cheap propaganda, but a deep investigation of the "social revolution" afflicting the West at present, and tracing its roots back several centuries. This requires study of not only the French and Bolshevik Revolutions, but the Revolutions of 1848 & 1871 (Paris Commune), and the regime of Emperor Napoleon III of France, against which Maurice Joly wrote his Dialogues in Hell Between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, published in 1864, which has much in common with the Protocols of Zion. The reference to "hell" means the spirit world: the book is cast as a discussion between the ghosts of Machiavelli and Montesquieu. Emperor Napoleon III of France was sandwiched between two attempted Communist Revolutions. Joly, one of the revolutionaries, directed his Dialogues book against the Emperor.

Karl Marx took part in both Revolutions: in the German part of the 1848 revolution, and in the 1871 Paris Commune, in France. After the failure of the 1848 revolution, he spent more than a decade "in exile" in England, studying at the British Museum, and writing. So, the context of Joly's Dialogues is the choice between Revolution and Napoleon. Napoleon III will thus become a central figure in our study. The parallel passages in Joly's Dialogues comprise 16.45% of the Protocols, by word-count. This is substantial, but still less than one sixth of the total. What Norman Cohn especially omits to mention, is the Protocols' extensive coverage of the world finance system, unmatched in the Dialogues. Even the parallel passages, however, are not the same: the meaning is often quite different, despite the similarity. My argument is that Joly did not create these parallel passages ex nihilo, but modified an existing revolutionary text (precursor of the Protocols), reworking parts of it to suit his attack on Napoleon III. This is quite common for a writer. As I compose this very "toolkit", I am doing the same: blending many source materials in my possession, including reworking earlier articles of mine into my present purpose. There is no short-cut in investigating the Protocols: a painstaking historical study is required. The method here is, partly to quote the history books, but also to focus on connections they omit. Much of the material presented here can be used to support either position with respect to the Protocols. Much of it is background material, providing context in which to consider the issues. My own approach is not ideological. I do not think that there is any ideal form of government. Rather, any form of government can have good instances (good rulers) and bad instances. From does not determine content. My basic political philosophy has nothing to do with Jews. I formulated it in my article Living Without Utopia, dated March 22, 1994, as follows: "One might argue instead that structure or form, on its own, does not guarantee quality or content. That one might have a good Monarchy or a bad one, a good or

bad Republic, a good or bad Communist society. Revolution-borne experiments to create the perfect society, whether Stalin's, Hitler's, or the push for Matriarchy, are destructive and typically fail." utopia.html. This is not exactly a pessimistic view; rather, it argues that any good government, of whatever type, is unlikely to last; it will be replaced with another, which may or may not be better. This is our fate. Even though I have an opinion on the Protocols, as stated, it is not an unqualified one. I am not certain of it, and I accept that the evidence is not one-sided, but that there is a case each way. In presenting material arguing both sides, I hope to enable the reader to make an independent assessment. Investigating this topic takes us on an odyssey into the undercurrents of modern history. I invite quality refutations, and am prepared to add such material to this Toolkit: contact me at mailto:[email protected].

2. The Case that the Protocols is a Forgery Most writers who cite parallel passages to claim that experts have proved the Protocols a forgery are downstream popularisers of more academic treatments they DO NOT CITE. Philip Graves, a journalist employed by The Times of London in Constantinople and Jerusalem, and a non-Jew, was the first to argue, on the basis of parallel passages in Maurice Joly's book Dialogues in Hell Between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, that the Prtotocols was a forgery. Journalism, however, is no substitute for scholarly analysis. The more scholarly treatments were begun by Israel Zangwill, extended by Herman Bernstein, then by Norman Cohn, all three being Jewish. Not all people brought up as "Jewish" remain so, so it must be noted that the first two were Zionist, and Cohn was favourably cited in Who's Who In World Jewry. Ironically, one or the best arguments that the Protocols is genuine, is that one is not allowed, in public places e.g. in bookstores (other than mail-order ones), to present the case that it's genuine. What is distinctive about the Protocols Toolkit is that it presents the arguments of both sides. I have yet to encounter a proponent of the forgery case who is prepared to allow the other side to present its case too - e.g. who is prepared to place a link to this Protocols Toolkit.

2.1 The arguments of Israel Zangwill Zangwill pioneered the arguments later used by Bernstein: zangwill.html. 2.2 The arguments of Bernstein and Cohn Bernstein's book - THE TRUTH ABOUT "THE PROTOCOLS OF ZION": A Complete Exposure - contains an English translation of Joly's Dialogues. Bernstein's book was first published in 1935. A new edition of 1971 included an introduction by Norman Cohn. The following files are very big, and are therefore supplied in compressed form. Herman Bernstein (1935) argues that the Protocols of Zion is a forgery; with an Introduction by Norman Cohn (1971) : bernstein.zip. Bernstein's Exhibit A, Maurice Joly's book Dialogues in Hell Between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, is excluded from the Bernstein file above, but is at joly.zip. Cohn only has an introduction in Bernstein's book. For his detailed arguments in Warrant For Genocide (1970), see cohn.html. 2.3 Bernstein, Goedsche and the Devil Bernstein and Cohn indulge in hyperbole, exaggeratng their opponents' case and thereby exposing it to ridicule. In writing of the Protocols, they repeatedly beg the question by using the emotive expressions forgery, plagiaris[m], fantastic, spurious, notorious, fantasy, noxious fabrication, "needs no comment","his imagination", "of course", and the like. Perhaps it's understandable that they were unloosing their emotions; on the other hand, they claim academic objectivity, and emotion is a hindrance, not an aid, to it. Twice in his book The Truth About the "Protocols of Zion", Herman Bernstein claims that the story "The Jewish Cemetery in Prague and the Council of Representatives of the Twelve Tribes of Israel", published by Goedsche, has the Devil present at the meeting. On p. 21 Bernstein writes,

'According to Goedsche's fantastic story, the representatives of the twelve tribes of Israel meet once in a hundred years in the Prague cemetery ... The midnight meeting, depicted by Hermann Goedsche in the style of blood-curdling fiction, is secretly attended by a converted Jew and by a "large-sized man, with the pale serious face of Germanic type." The Devil himself, the son of "the accursed one," is also present at that midnight meeting of the representatives of the twelve tribes of Israel. And from time to time the Devil is quoted as making side remarks.' On p. 265 Bernstein writes, 'Here follows a translation from the Russian of the German novelette by the notorious Hermann Goedsche, who used the pseudonym of "Sir John Retcliffe." This product of "Retcliffe's fantastic imagination" tells its own story, clearly foreshadowing the Protocols, with all its accompaniment of melodrama, not even omitting the Devil himself.' This is incorrect. Bernstein implies on p. 21 that the expression "son of the accursed" means the Devil. But the text of the story, provided by Bernstein, reads: {quote} {p. 272} Thirteen old men came over to the tombstone ... {p. 273} At that moment the clock struck twelve. A sharp metallic sound rang out on the grave, after which a blue flame appeared and illumined the thirteen kneeling figures. "I greet you, Roshe beth Aboth (heads) of the twelve tribes of Israel," announced a dull voice. "We greet you, son of the accursed." {p. 274} {The representatives of the 12 Tribes introduce themselves, then the first speaker says:} "And I am the representative of the unfortunate and exiles," said the man who asked the questions in a dull voice. "I am myself wandering about all over the world in order that I may unite you ... " The man who was the first to arrive rose and then seated himself upon the tombstone. One by one the others came over to him and whispered in his ear a seven-syllabled word, and each time he nodded in approval. After that all returned to

their former places. "Brethren," said the Levite, "our fathers formed a union ... To us belong the earthly god, which was made for us with such sorrow by Aaron in the desert ... the Golden Calf which the backsliders are worshipping!" {end of quote} Clearly, the figure addressed as "son of the accursed" is a man, a Levite, the convener of the meeting. He is not the Devil. On p. 283 is stated, "It seemed to the doctor that on the top of the tombstone, in the bluish flame, there appeared a monstrous golden figure of an animal." This is a reference to the Golden Calf story (above) and the worship of money. The doctor is a gentile German scientist introduced on p. 270. There is no other statement that the Devil was present at the meeting in the cemetary. Added September 10, 2008: I received the following letter on this matter: {quote} From: F (name & email withheld) Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2008 15:39:43 +0000 Regarding your "The Protocols of Zion Toolkit", first part, section "2.3 Bernstein, Goedsche and the Devil" and the question of the Devil in the cemetery scene, I agree with your argumentation on the matter:there is no reason to suppose the dull voiced person is meant to be understood as devil. I feel that the mysterious character represents a completely another character, one of both Jewish and mythical origin: Ahasverus, the Wandering Jew. "We greet you, son of the accursed. ... And I am the representative of the unfortunate and exiles," ... "I am myself wandering about all over the world in order that I may unite you ... " Ahasverus is the cursed one, having been cursed to wander in exile until the second coming of the Jesus. Character fits the description completely. Being "son of the accursed" he might be meant to be understood within the story plot as the 19th century descendant (or follower) of the mythical Ahasverus. It is interesting to note how this Christian myth of medieval origins ties the end of Jewish people's exodus in with the Messianic times of the Second Coming. For more detailed information please see Wikipedia's article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wandering_Jew

Perhaps the original author wanted to include the character as a subtle artistic detail by borrowing the then well-known stereotype. Was there self-irony involved in it? (The fictional character of Ahasverus is of a distinctively Christian origin. The Jewish religious authorities do not recognize Jesus as a Messiah and thus do not coincide his second coming with the end of the exodus.) {endquote} And a follow-up: {quote} From: F (name & email withheld) Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2008 20:06:16 +0000 Thinking about this Ahasverus, now I'm quite sure the writer used the legendary character to add colour and perhaps self-irony to the story. I think that by no means did he meant the dull-voiced one to be understood literally as "son of the accursed", that is son of the Ahasverus. I think it's just one of those small details which show the text's author was not a bad writer at all. {endquote} 2.4 Cohn corrects Bernstein about Stepanov Bernstein writes in The Truth About the "Protocols of Zion": {p. 39} This account of the history of the Protocols in Russia is accompanied by a facsimile affidavit made in 1927 by Philip Stepanov, one of the two friends to whom Sukhotin first showed the Protocols in Russia. Stepanov's telltale affidavit, translated from the Russian, reads as follows: "In 1895 my neighboring estate owner in the province of Tula, retired Major Alexey Nikolayevitch Sukhotin, gave me a handwritten copy of the 'Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion.' He told me that a lady of his acquaintance (he did not mention her name), residing in Paris, had found them at the home of a friend of hers (probably of Jewish origin), and before leaving Paris, had translated them secretly, without his knowledge, and had brought one copy of that translation to Russia, and had given that copy to him, Sukhotin. "At first I mimeographed one hundred copies of the Protocols, but that edition was difficult to read, and I resolved to have it *A copy of L. Fry's book, "Waters Flowing Eastward," second edition, Paris, 1933, is in the New York Public Library

{p. 40} printed somewhere, without mentioning the time, the city and the printer; I was helped in this by Arcady Ippolitovitch Kelepkovsky, who at that time was Privy Councillor with Grand Duke Sergey Alexandrovitch; he had these documents printed at the Provincial Printing Press; that was in 1897. S. A. Nilus reprinted these Protocols in full in his book, with his own commentanes. "Philip Petrovitch Stepanov, former Procurator of the Moscow Synod Office; Chamberlain, Privy Councillor, and at the time of the publication of that edition, Chief of the district railway service of the Moscow-Kursk railway (in Orel). "This is the signature of a member of the colony of Rus~sian refugees at Stary and Novy Futog. (Cor. C. X. S.) "Witnessed by me, Stary Futog, April 17, 1927. "Chairman of the Administration of the Colony, "Prince Vladimir Galitzin." (Seal) * The translation of this handwritten affidavit by Stepanov, given in L. Fry's book, contains several minor inaccuracies. The signature of Prince Vladimir Galitzin is transcribed as "Prince Dimitri Galitzin." Thus the Russian anti-Semites themselves, anxious to vouch for the authenticity of the "Protocols" and their Zionist origin, by this affidavit give the lie to the Russian fabricators and disseminators of theProtocols, revealing that the Russian translation of the spurious document had reached Russia two years before the first Zionist Congress was held in Basle. This affidavit furnishes the missing link in the chain of incontrovertible evidence establishing the falsity of the Protocols and the sinister motives of the anti-Jewish forgers. It also confirms the fact that officials close to the Tsar's family participated in the launching of the Protocols in Russia. {end of quote} But in Warrant For Genocide (Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1970), Cohn refutes Bernstein's claim, from Stepanov's affidavit, that the Protocols was written in 1895, two years before the first Zionist Congress in 1897: {p. 111} As for the date, internal evidence suggests that in saying he received the Protocols in 1895 and published them in 1897 Stepanov was erring no more than is to be expected after thirty years. There is for instance the remark, at the end of 'protocol' 16, that as part of the plan to stupify the gentiles one of the Elders' agents, Bourgeois, is advocating a program of teaching by object lessons. The reference is to Leon Bourgeois, a highly suspect figure in the

{p. 112} eyes of the French right wing since, as Prime Minister in 1895-6, he had included nine Freemasons in his cabinet. From 1890-96 he frequently spoke in favour of a system of teaching by object lessons, and in 1897 these speeches were published in a book, L'Education de la democratie francaise; in 1898, as Minister of Education, he issued decrees on the subject. A similar reference which points in the same direction is the passage in 'protocol' 10 where the Elders recommend the election of presidents with some 'Panama' in their past. This refers almost certainly to Emile Loubet, who was Prime Minister of France when the Panama scandal reached its climax in 1892. Though certainly not involved in the scandal itself, Loubet showed no eagerness to institute inquiries against those who were; and this made him a suspect figure. In 1895 Loubet was elected President of the Senate, which made him a candidate for President of the Republic, and in 1899 he was elected President of the Republic. The passage in the Protocols could have been inspirted by either event. As for the Paris underground, the Metro, plans for it were announced in 1894, but it was only in 1897 that the municipal council granted the concession, and it was in 1900 that the first line was opened. In view of the threat in the Protocols to blow up capital cities from the underground railways, it is worth noting that in 1897 Drumont's Libre parole was lamenting the number of Jewish shareholders in the Metro. Again, it was in 1896 that the Russian Minister of Finance Sergey Witte first proposed the introduction of the gold-standard in Russia, in place of the gold-and-silver standard then in force; and in 1897 it was in fact introduced. This too figures in the Protocols - in 'protocol' 19 there is the observation that the gold standard has ruined every state that has adopted it. But, above all, there is the title of the forgery itself. One would normally expect the mysterious rulers to be called Elders of Jewry or Elders of Israel. There must be some reason why they bear the absurd name of Elders of Zion, and there is in fact a very plausible one. As we have seen, the first Zionist congress at Basel was interpreted by antisemites as a giant stride towards {p. 113} Jewish world-domination. Countless editions of the Protocols have connected that document with the congress; and it does seem likely that this event inspired if not the forgery itself, then at least its title. The year of the congress was 1897. All in all it is practically certain that the Protocols were fabricated some time between 1894 and 1899 and highly probable that it was in 1897 or 1898. The country was undoubtedly France, as is shown by the many references to French affairs. {end quotes}

2.5 Gagging the debate. In parliamentary procedure, to "gag" a debate is to curtail it, cut it short, "guillotine" it. What Cohn implicitly rules out of the debate: (a) He does not examine the Jewish domination in the early USSR, except cursorily, or the association between Jews and Revolution admitted by J. L. Talmon: talmon.html In Warrant For Genocide he briefly addresses these questions as follows: {p. 133} It remains true that Jews, in the sense of persons of Jewish descent, provided a disproportionate part of the leadership (though not of the total membership) of the two Marxist parties, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The reason is not hard to find. These were people who had broken with the traditional Jewish community and abandoned the Jewish religion but who nevertheless suffered discrimination and persecution under the tsarist autocracy; and this was sufficient to lead them towards the parties of the Left. ... Such Jews are usually idealists inspired by a vision of a society from which all forms of discrimination are banished. In general they make poor politicians and they tend to be ousted soon after a successful revolution. ... As for the Jews among the Bolshevik leaders, they too were almost all shot in the 1930s. {endquote} But Mensheviks such as Trotsky joined the Bolsheviks. As for the 1930s, what about Kaganovich and Beria, and the many Jews manning the Cheka? kaganovich.html And Nahum Goldmann, Israel's "ambassador to the world", wrote in The Jewish Paradox (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978): {p. 167} After the Revolution of 1917 there was a very intense Jewish cultural life in Russia, both in Yiddish and in Hebrew. It should not be forgotten that Israel's present national theatre, Habima, was created in Russia. All that intellectual activity, fed by newspapers and books in Yiddish, only disappeared when Stalin became a half-mad dictator haunted by the menace of an international Jewish conspiracy. And a Jewish life goes on in various other Communist countries. In Romania, for example, where there are eighty thousand Jews, there are synagogues, a Yiddish theatre and ritual foodstuffs. The ritual slaughterers in Romania have some trouble in emigrating to Israel because the rabbis need them where they are, and the authorities persuade them that it is their duty to provide kosher meat for the Romanian Jewish community. ...

{p. 171} Before the war, most Russian diplomats were Jews. {endquote} Isaac Deutscher wrote in his book The non-Jewish Jew and other essays, ed. Tamara Deutscher, OUP, London 1968: {p. 71} In the Lenin era ... The Jews were allowed, and even encouraged, to publish their newspapers and their literature in Yiddish, and to develop their theatre - and the Yiddish theatre was one of the best I have known. It is now probably forgotten that the first great Hebrew theatre in history, the Habima, was founded in Russia on the initiative of the Commissar of Education, A. V. Lunacharsky. (Incidentally, the Habima soon left Russia for Palestine.) {endquote} These reports hardly accord with Cohn's account. (b) Cohn does not examine Jewish promotion of World Government at the Peace Conference of Versailles (1919), or in the Baruch Plan for World Government (1946): baruch-plan.html For example, Nahum Goldmann wrote (op. cit.), {p. 107} When the United Nations Organization was founded there ought to have been an attempt at least to abolish the sovereignty of states and to constitute a sort of world power. Remember that despite appearances the scale is beginning to tip that way. State sovereignty is only a dangerous theory, but the reality is the Common Market, the Warsaw Pact, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and so on, proving that every state has to give up its vaunted sovereignty little by little because of the complexity of the threats that concern us all. ... {p. 109} In the same way, within a generation or two there will be a UN with real powers. In an organization of that kind, minorities - not just states - will have to be represented. {endquote} Many more such quotes from Jewish leaders are provided below. This can hardly be accidental, yet Cohn avoids discussing it. (c) He does not relate the Protocols' Jewish utopia to the Balfour Declaration, (Britain's "contract with Jewry" in order to win the First World War), or why the British Government might have thought that an alliance with Zionists would get the US into the war: l-george.html (d) He does not relate the above points to the ideas and sense of mission of the Jewish religion, i.e. to intention and program. This omission is the more striking

because Cohn has written (disparagingly) about nearly every kind of modern millenialism except the Jewish kind: zioncom.html (e) He does not relate the above points to the Jewish tradition of Marranism. In particular, he does not relate Marranism to the Letter of the Jews of Arles and the Reply of the Jews of Constantinople (f) He does not examine the politics of France before, during and after the reign of Napoleon III, against which Joly pitched his Dialogues (g) He does not examine the parallels between Joly's Dialogues and Jacob Venedey's earlier book Machiavel, Montesquieu, Rousseau (h) He does not examine the praise of Machiavelli, and appeal to Machiavelli, by Revolutionary writers and activists, such as Rousseau and Babeuf (i) After saying that the Tsar dismissed the Protocols as a forgery, Cohn does not explain why the Tsarina had a copy of the Protocols with her at the time of her death. The above considerations form the subject-matter of the rest of this investigation.

3. Evaluating the Bernstein / Cohn Argument 3.1 The Arithmetic of the Parallel Passages. The Forgery Hypothesis rests largely on the parallels between the Protocols (c. 1897) and Maurice Joly's book of 1864, Dialogue aux Enfers entre Montesquieu et Machiavel (translated into English as Dialogues in Hell Between Machiavelli and Montesquieu. The "hell" part refers to the spirit world: i.e. this is a debate between ghosts. Herman Bernstein lists the parallel passages in his book (above), side by side. Norman Cohn writes in his book Warrant For Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1970), {p. 82} In all, over 160 passages in the Protocols, totalling two fifths of the entire text, are clearly based on passages in Joly; in nine of the chapters the borrowings amount to more than half of the text, in some they amount to three quarters, in one (Protocol VII) to almost the entire text. Moreover with less than a dozen exceptions the order of the borrowed passages remains the same as it was in Joly, as

though the adaptor had worked through the Dialogue mechanically, page by page copying straight into his 'protocols' as he proceeded. Even the arrangement in chapters is much the same - the twenty-four chapters of the Protocols corresponding roughly with the twenty-five of the Dialogue. Only towards the end, where the prophecy of the Messianic Age predominates, does the adaptor allow himself any real independence of his model. It is in fact as clear a case of plagiarism - and of faking - as one could well desire. {endquote} Cohn's arithmetic is incorrect. The word-count of the parallel-passages from the Protocols, as listed by Bernstein (at bernstein.zip), is 4,361, while the wordcount of the Protocols is 26, 496. That is, the parallel passages comprise 16.45% of the Protocols; this is substantial, but still less than one sixth of the total. What Cohn especially omits to mention, is the Protocols' extensive coverage of the world finance system. Even the parallel passages, however, are not the same: the meaning is often quite different, despite the similarity. There are also parallels between Joly's book and Jacob Venedy's book of 1850, titled Machiavel, Montesquieu, Rousseau (i.e. Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau). The following quote is from http://www.vegan.swinternet.co.uk/articles/conspiracies/protocols_proof.html {quote} the passages quoted as being plagiarised from the Geneva Dialogues for the Protocols are remarkably similar to those in a book published in 1850, called, similarly, 'Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau' by Jacob Venedy. And Venedy was a Jew and a Freemason! He was a revolutionary and also a close associate of the Jew Karl Marx (real name Mordecai,) and Maurice Joly, the true author of the Geneva Dialogues! {endquote} Venedy's book is in some libraries - I have seen it - but there's no English translation, and it's written in the old Gothic German script, which few can read. It would be very helpful if someone who can read this script, could locate a copy of the book and translate it into English. Then we could examine the passages said to be in parallel with Joly's Dialogues. Please write me at mailto:[email protected]. A bookshop selling Venedey's book at http://dogbert.abebooks.com/abe/BookSearch?an=jacob+venedey

described it as follows: {quote} VENEDEY, Jacob. Machiavel, Montesquieu, Rousseau ... Erster Theil [Zweiter Theil]. Berlin, Franz Duncker, 1850. First edition of this important study. The German intellectual and revolutionary Venedey (1805-1871) continued his struggle after the failure of the revolution of 1848. The purpose of this triple biography was to advance political thinking in Germany by explaining the doctrines of the three greatest modern theorists of the state. The three authors are depicted as the embodiment of the theories they advanced: Machiavelli as the representative of absolutism, Montesquieu for constitutional monarchy and Rousseau as the advocate of the democratic republic. For Venedey, Montesquieu, as a leading advocate of constitutional monarchy was decidedly not radical enough to erect a system of government of definitive theoretical and practical value. In all three cases political theory is mixed with biographical detail. {endquote} Karl Marx also wrote on Machiavelli and Montesquieu, in his newspaper Rheinische Zeitung No. 125, May 5, 1842, Supplement. Karl Marx, Debates on Freedom of the Press and Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates. In In Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works, Volume 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975: {p. 161} Montesquieu has already taught us that despotism is more convenient to apply than legality and Machiavelli asserts that for princes the bad has better consequences than the good. Therefore, if we do not want to confirm the old Jesuitical maxim that a good end - and we doubt even the goodness of the end justifies bad means, we have above all to investigate whether censorship is by its essence a good means. {endquote} 3.2 Other Cases of Parallel Passages In the Bible, the Book of Genesis contains parallel passages giving rival accounts of Creation, the Flood, and many other events: bible.html. There are many parallel passages between the Gospels of Mark, Matthew and Luke. These three are called the synoptic Gospels; the Gospel of John stands apart, having a more Platonic outlook. Most scholars think that there was an earlier document called Q, used by the authors of Mark, Matthew and Luke. No one accuses these authors of plagiarism.

John Dominic Crossan writes in his book Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography, (HarperSanFrancisco, 1994): {p. x} If you read the four gospels vertically and consecutively, from start to finish and one after another, you get a generally persuasive impression of unity, harmony, and agreement. But if you read themhorizontally and comparatively, focusing on this or that unit and comparing it across two, three, or four versions, it is disagreement rather than agreement that strikes you most forcibly. And those divergences stem not from the random vagaries of memory and recall but from the coherent and consistent theologies of the individual texts. The gospels are, inother words, interpretations. Hence, of course, despite there being only one Jesus, there can be more than one gospel, more than one interpretation. That core problem is compounded by another one. Those four gospels do not represent all the early gospels available or even a random sample within them but are instead a calculated collection known as the canonical gospels. This becomes clear in studying other gospels either discerned as sources inside the official four or else discovered as documents outside them. An example of a source hidden inside the four canonical gospels is the reconstructed document known as Q, from the German word Quelle, meaning "source," which is now imbedded within both Luke and Matthew. Those two authors also use Mark as a regular source, so Q is discernible wherever they agree with one another but lack a Markan parallel. Since, like Mark, that document has its own generic integrity and theological {p. xi} consistency apart from its use as a Quelle or source for others, I refer to it in this book as the Q Gospel. An example of a document discovered outside the four canonical gospels is the Gospel of Thomas, which was found at Nag Hammadi, in Upper Egypt, in the winter of 1945 and is, in the view of many scholars, completely independent of the canonical gospels - Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. It is also most strikingly different from them, especially in its format, and is, in fact, much closer to that of the Q Gospel than to any of the canonical foursome. It identifies itself, at the end, as a gospel but it is in fact a collection of the sayings of Jesus given without any compositional order and lacking descriptions of deeds or miracles, crucifixion or resurrection stories ... {end quote from Crossan} downing.html. To study the debate about Q among New Testament scholars, refer to http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=Burton+Mack+Jesus+Q

Here are some samples: (i) Bruce Griffin, WAS JESUS A PHILOSOPHICAL CYNIC? http://wwwoxford.op.org/allen/html/acts.htm "Burton Mack, a professor of Claremont School of Theology ... published The Lost Gospel: the Book of Q and Christian Origins in 1993. Mack defended Q as the most reliable source for the reconstruction of the historical Jesus. Q in turn was believed to have gone through three different revisions or redactions before it was used as a source for Matthew and Luke. Mack here was relying on the brilliantly argued work of John Kloppenborg who believed that Q originally consisted of a collection of wisdom sayings ..." (ii) The Search for a No-Frills Jesus, by CHARLOTTE ALLEN, Atlantic Monthly, December 1996 http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/96dec/jesus/jesus.htm (iii) David Seeley, JESUS' DEATH IN Q {This article first appeared in New Testament Studies 38 (1992) 222-34 ...] http://www.bham.ac.uk/theology/synopticl/jdeath.htm (iv) Mark Goodacre, The Case Against Q: Studies in Markan Priority and the Synoptic Problem http://www.ntgateway.com/Q/ My argument, then, is that both the Protocols and Joly use a document like Q, unknown to us. This document would have circulated amongst leaders of some of the secret societies operating in Europe. 3.3 Differences between Dialogues & Protocols 3.3.1 Who are the Machiavellians? In Joly, the conspirator is the monarch; in the Protocols, the conspirators are those trying to overthrow him. In the Dialogues, Napoleon III is the Machiavellian, preventing the people, led by the Revolutionaries of 1848, from installing a People's Democracy along the lines of the French Revolution. In the Protocols, the shadowy leaders lurking behind the Revolutionaries are the Machiavellians. They are tricking the people into trusting their leadership, but when in power they will institute the Red Terror.

In the Dialogues, Napoleon (the Machiavellian) is resisting the Revolutionaries; in the Protocols, the Machiavellians are sponsoring these Marxists, anarchists, and utopian activists. 3.3.2 Joly is written "after the event", i.e. to satirise Napoleon's existing regime; the Protocols is written "in advance", anticipating a regime yet to come. 3.3.3 Joly's despot is one man; the Protocols' conspiracy has many participants. 3.3.4 Joly's despotism is localised to one country and one time; the Protocols' despotism extends widely, over many countries, regimes and decades. 3.3.5 The Protocols' conspirators envisages themselves running a World Government, and instituting a new type of regime, unknown to past history. Compare this with Trotsky on World Federation: 'We are of course talking about a European socialist federation as a component of a future world federation ... ' (Dmitri Volkogonov, Trotsky: The Eternal Revolutionary, tr. & ed. Harold Shukman, HarperCollinsPublishers, London 1996, p. 209). 3.3.6 Joly's despotism is achieved without violence: "violence plays no role" (p. 174); "I who have taken as final policy, not violence, but self-effacement" (p. 226); at p. 236 the despot says "sometimes of duplicity, sometimes of violence", but Napoleon III had no concentration camps or gulag, no death squads, no mass graves of victims executed by a bullet to the back of the head, no glorifying of violence. By comparison, Protocol 1 says that the best results are obtained by violence & terrorization; also, "we must keep to the program of violence and make-believe"; Protocol 3 advocates "the violence of a bold despotism". This is much closer to Trotsky's violence of the Kronstadt massacre: kronstadt.html and his orders to use relatives as hostages, with the threat of executing them: worst.html. 3.3.7 Napoleon (Joly's despot) is for religion; whereas the Protocols says its conspirators are against religion. 3.4 Timing & Future-orientation (Teleology)

Cohn admits that the Protocols was ignored until World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, 20 or so years after it was written. Cohn wrote in Warrant For Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1970): "The myth of the Jewish world-conspiracy would have remained the monopoly of right-wing Russians and a few cranks in western Europe, and the Protocols would never have emerged from obscurity at all, if it had not been for the First World War and the Russian Revolution and their aftermath." (pp. 14-15) "The success of the Protocols before the war was in fact limited. Zhevakhov tells how in 1913 Nilus complained to hlm: {quote} I cannot get the public to treat the Protocols seriously, with the attention they deserve. They are read, criticized, often ridlculed, but there are very few who attach importance to them and see in them a real threat to Christianity, a programme for the destruction of the Christian order and for the conquest of the whole world by the Jews. That nobody believes ... {endquote}" (pp. 124-5) More at cohn.html If it were a forgery designed to stir up pogroms etc, one would think that the forgers had failed, since it had no effect for 20 years. Given that these alleged forgers had been stirring up pogroms repeatedly, one would think that they would be better at it, than 20 years of failure implies. It was only when World War I (1914-8), the Bolshevik Revolution (1917), the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the attempt to make the League of Nations a World Government at the Peace Conference of Versailles (1919) seemed to bear out predictions in the Protocols - predictions which are not in Joly's Dialogues that the Protocols was taken seriously. The same people who deny Jewish control of the Bolshevik Revolution (until Stalin stole their conspiracy), also deny the authenticity of the Protocols. Therefore, demonstrating this Jewish control is the first step in puncturing their argumnent: russell.html. 3.5 Control of Media The London Times was not in Jewish hands during World War I; but its anti-Zionist owner Lord Northcliffe, was ousted soon after: http://users.cyberone.com.au/myers/toolkit3.html.

Robert Wilton wrote of the Russian media: "Moreover, the Press, almost entirely in Jewish hands, had gone over to the Soviet, and Moderate organs that would not publish the Soviet proclamations glorifying spoilation and promoting Anarchy had been summarily "expropriated" on behalf of newly founded Socialist publications." (Russia's Agony, London, Edward Arnold, 1918, p. 174). Benjamin Ginsberg, Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University writes, "Today, though barely 2% of the nation's population is Jewish, close to half its billionaires are Jews. The chief executive officers of the three major television networks and the four largest film studios are Jews, as are the owners of the nation's largest newspaper chain and most influential newspaper, the New York Times." (The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State, University of Chicago Pres, Chicago 1993, p.1):ginsberg.html. Michael Bakunin wrote: Arthur P. Mandel, Michael Bakunin: Roots of Apocalypse, Praeger, New York 1981. {p. 330} "I know very well," he went on, "that in frankly expressing my personal thoughts about the Jews I expose myself to enormous dangers. Many people share [these views], but very few dare to express them publicly, because the Jewish sect, far more formidable than Catholic Jesuits and the Protestants, constitute a real force in Europe today. They reign despotically in commerce and in the banks and have overrun three-quarters of the German press and a very significant part of the press of other countries. Too bad for anyone careless enough to displease them!"{endnote 86: Bakounine, Oeuvres, vol. V, pp. 243-4}. correctness.html. Israel Shahak wrote: "The bulk of the organized US Jewish community is totalitarian, chauvinistic and militaristic in its views. This fact remains unnoticed by other Americans due to its control of the media, but is apparent to some Israeli Jews. As long as organized US Jewry remains united, its control over the media and its political power remain unchallenged." (Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign Policies, Pluto Press, London 1997, p. 139). More of Shahak at shahak1.html. 3.6 Finance

The "forgery" hypothesis says that the Okhrana plagiarised the Dialogues of Maurice Joly. But the Protocols opposes the policy on government debt endorsed in the Dialogues. Joly's despot says, "I will borrow" the funds for government expenditure (Dialogues, p. 209); borrow from the public (p. 215); but pay reduced interest (p. 217). He speaks of the benefits of government debt (p. 214) joly.zip. The Protocols acknowledges that government debt is a trap; that governments need not borrow funds for their expenditure on goods & services available in the local currency, but can create the money by fiat, as the banks do (but for which the banks charge interest, in effect a private tax). This was the way the finance system of the USSR operated. When taxes were insufficient for government expenditure, Gosbank (the state bank) issued fiat money to make up the difference:http://www.cbr.ru/eng/today/history/gosbank.asp. Protocol 20 says: {quote} Every kind of loan proves infirmity in the State and a want of understanding of the rights of the State. Loans hang like a sword of Damocles over the heads of rulers, who, instead of taking from their subjects by a temporary tax, come begging with outstretched palm of our bankers. Foreign loans are leeches which there is no possibility of removing from the body of the State until they fall off themselves or the State flings them off. But the goy States do not tear them off: they go on in persisting in putting more on to themselves so that they must inevitably perish, drained by voluntary blood-letting. What also indeed is, in substance, a loan, especially a foreign loan? A loan is - an issue of government bills of exchange containing a percentage obligation commensurate to the sum of the loan capital. If the loan bears a charge of 5 per cent., then in twenty years the State vainly pays away in interest a sum equal to the loan borrowed, in forty years it is paying a double sum, in sixty - treble, and all the while the debt remains an unpaid debt. From this calculation it is obvious that with any form of taxation per head the State is bailing out the last coppers of the poor taxpayers in order to settle accounts with wealthy foreigners, from whom it has borrowed money instead of collecting these coppers for its own needs without the additional interest.

So long as loans were internal the goyim only shuffled money from the pockets of the poor to those of the rich, but when we bought up the necessary person in order to transfer loans into the external sphere all the wealth of States flowed into our cashboxes and all the goyim began to pay us the tribute of subjects. {endquote} In other words, the interest on foreign loans must be paid by the taxpayers. Governments could avoid that interest burden by issuing the money themselves; after all, the banks themselves create it ex nihilo. The lesson is, that we need a finance system akin to the Communist one. Protocol 20 also says: "The present issue of money in general does not correspond with the requirements per head, and cannot therefore satisfy all the needs of the workers. The issue of money ought to correspond with the growth of population and thereby children also must absolutely be reckoned as consumers of currency from the day of their birth." This is the way a welfare system operates (child endowment, pensions etc); i.e., the government issues money to parents for the care of their children, either directly via "family allowance" payments, or via additional wages or reduced taxes for workers with dependents. Yet it's unlikely that in 1897 any state had this type of money-issue. "... the gold standard has been the ruin of the States which adopted it ... With us the standard that must be introduced is the cost of working-man power, whether it be reckoned in paper or in wood. We shall make the issue of money in accordance with the normal requirements of each subject, adding to the quantity with every birth and subtracting with every death." protocol.html This accurately describes the sort of finance system the USSR had. I believe that, via such prescriptions, the Protocols contains not only the key to what is wrong with our finance system, but also the way to fix it. The conspirators did not want such a solution to be implemented, until they controlled the state directly, not indirectly (through other people). At the time the Protocols was written, Russia was getting deeply into foreign debt: W. O. Henderson, The Industrialization of Europe 1870-1914 (Thames and Hudson, London 1969).

{p. 87} Foreigners also helped to build Russia's early railway lines. Much of the capital of the Great Russia Railway Company of 1857 was raised abroad. Three French banks were particularly active in providing money for the company and the necessary bridges, locomotives and rolling-stock were largely supplied by French firms. However, Russia's industrial progress in the 1890s was to a great extent the achievement of Count Sergei Witte, Minister of Finance between 1892 and 1903. In the eleven years that he held office Witte pressed forward energetically with his plans to speed up the pace of industrialization. Since he considered the construction of a greatly improved railway system the key to future economic progress, he had the railways of Russia nearly doubled in length: Moscow was linked with the ports of Archangel and Riga and the textile centre of Ivanovo-Vognesensk; St Petersburg gained direct access to the Ukraine, while Kiev was joined to the Donetz valley, and Rostov, on the Don, was linked with the oilfield of Baku. Witte's most spectacular railway was the Trans-Siberian line, of which well over 3,000 miles had been completed by 1899. Heavy government investment in railways fostered the expansion of the iron, steel and engineering industries; there was great activity in the Krivoi-Rog ironfield, the Donetz coal basin and the Baku oilfield; the industrial resources of Siberia and Central Asia {p. 88} began to be opened up, and even the remote Chinese provinces of Manchuria and Korea were subject to Russian economic penetration. To finance an enormous programme of public works Witte relied heavily upon government borrowing from abroad and upon persuading foreign capitalists to invest in Russian industrial enterprises. In answer to his critics Witte insisted that in the past all underdeveloped countries had relied upon borrowed money to assist in financing the early phase of industrialization. But his financial policy undoubtedly placed heavy burdens upon the Russian taxpayers and consumers. Witte's critics complained that prices were rising, that grain was being exported even when there was a poor harvest and that 'Witte's system' could survive only so long as foreign particularly French - investors were prepared to go on buying Russian State bonds and shares in new Russian joint-stock companies. They claimed that many of the new industries were being run by foreign entrepreneurs for the benefit of foreign investors, and that although some manufacturing regions (such as the Donetz valley) might appear to be flourishing, older industrial areas (such as the Urals) were declining. The critics also argued that if industry were to flourish there must be a heavy home demand for consumer goods. Towards the end of his term of office Witte began to realize the need for overall State economic planning. With incomparable energy he extended his influence over the

activities of one branch of the civil service after another. But in the Russia of his day he could never hope to gain decisive control over all aspects of economic life. Moreover, he came to see that the peasant problem lay at the root of Russia's difficulties in the 1890s. His recommendations for dealing with it fell upon deaf ears, though they foreshadowed the subsequent agrarian reforms of Stolypin. While Witte believed that an autocratic form of government was essential for Russia, he realized that Nicholas II lacked the understanding and will-power needed to carry out the crucial reforms. {endquote} The Protocols was written around the same time as Witte was finance minister. If the Protocols was created by the Okhrana (Secret Police), then this arm of government was warning of the danger of foreign debt, at the same time as the finance branch of the Russian government was endorsing Russia's getting deeply into that same foreign debt. 3.7 Broadening the Topic Cohn could have agreed, like Benjamin Ginsberg (above), that Jews created the Bolshevik Revolution (not all Jews, but Jews), and that they largely control the US media and government. He could have said, "yes, but", as Israel Shahak does. That would have been an acceptable position. Instead, Cohn broadens the topic beyond the Protocols of Zion, to any material on Jews behaving in a conspiratorial way: "Stalin in his last years produced a new version of the conspiracy-myth, in which Jews figured as agents of an imperialist plot to destroy the Soviet Union and assassinate its leaders; this was used to secure the execution of Rudolf Slansky and his Jewish colleagues on the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist party in 1952, and it also formed the basis for the story of the 'doctors' plot' in 1953." (Warrant For Genocide, p. 15). Stalin was murdered soon after: death-of-stalin.html. After Stalin, the contest between Zionists and anti-Zionists continued in the USSR. A document called "The Catechism of the Jew in the [former] Soviet Union", circulated in the last decades of the USSR, and was published there in a newspaper in 1990. A copy is at http://www.radioislam.org/zionism/#catechi.

Cohn wrote, "New forgeries were also produced to supplement the Protocols and bring them up to date. The most celebrated of these was a document said to have been found on a Jewish Bolshevik commander in the Red Army, of the name of Zunder." (Warrant For Genocide, p. 130). He rejects not only the Protocols, but any claim of Jews acting in a conspiratorial way, treating this as tantamount to the Protocols. In thus overstating his case, he makes refutation easier. It can be refuted by any direct evidence, e.g. of Jewish domination of the US media. Can one disclose such information in public, without being ignored, vilified, subjected to argumentum ad hominem? Then this also provides evidence of who is in power: those you cannot criticize, are those in control. Cohn's book, and books arguing a similar viewpoint, can be sold in bookshops. Can one get a critique of Cohn and Bernstein into the bookshops? Why? 3.8 Procedure The Protocols, on its own, cannot be used to establish a "One World" conspiracy, Jewish or otherwise. But if such a conspiracy can be verified FROM OTHER SOURCES - such as H. G. Wells' affirmation of the Open Conspiracy for World Government (opensoc.html) or the 1946 Baruch Plan (baruch-plan.html) - then the Protocols can be examined to see if it provides extra information. That is the only way to evaluate it. Herman Bernstein & Norman Cohn do not evaluate it that way; instead they compare it with other like material, and say, "this is the old familiar literature". The Protocols predicts that, after a world war, there will be an atttempt to form a world government, secretly orchestrated by Jewish financiers. This happened at the Treaty of Versailles: wells-lenin-league.html. The Prtotocols also predicted a despotic government in the guise of socialism, once again secretly Jewish. This happened when Lenin & Trotsky set up the USSR: lenintrotsky.html.

It is this kind of "coincidence" that keeps the Protocols relevant. Is there any other literature that made such a prediction? 3.9 The Question of Socialism I maintain that the USSR, if only we could study it properly, would offer both lessons to avoid and lessons to adopt. In saying so, I expect to win few friends; but I believe that Capitalism is on its last legs. Any future attempt at socialism cannot be dominated by Jews, but neither can it exclude Jews; therefore the whole question of Jewish politics must be brought out into the open. The secret Jewish control of Bolshevism was complicated by Stalin. After his ascendancy, there was a continuing struggle between the two factions, until Gorbachev. This bitter struggle destroyed Communism, except in Asian countries where Jews were lacking. Stalin overthrew Jewish control, but still had to use Jews in his administration. He could not admit that the USSR had been established by Jews, for fear that the regime he had inherited would be delegitimated. Similarly, Christians are often embarrassed about the Jewish origins of Christianity, and try to deny it. If today's proponents of One World are benevolent as they claim - if they only wish our good - why do they not admit the truth about the USSR?

4. Nesta Webster on Free Masonry, the French Revolution, and the Protocols of Zion Let us begin with Leon Trotsky's observations on Freemasonry, which he studied when in Odessa prison: From Leon Trotsky, My Life, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975. { p. 124} It was during that period that I became interested in freemasonry. ... In the eighteenth century freemasonry became expressive of a militant policy of enlightenment, as in the case of the Illuminati, who were the forerunners of the revolution; on its left it culminated in the Carbonari. Freemasons counted among their members both Louis XVI and the Dr. Guillotin who invented the guillotine. In southern Germany freemasonry assumed an openly revolutionary character, whereas at the court of Catherine the Great it was a masquerade reflecting the { p. 125} aristocratic and bureaucratic hierarchy. A freemason Novikov was exiled to Siberia by a freemason Empress. ...

{ p. 126} I discontinued my work on freemasonry to take up the study of Marxian economics. ... The work on freemasonry acted as a sort of test for these hypotheses. ... I think this influenced the whole course of my intellectual develop- {p. 127} ment. {end quotes} Nicholas Best on Templars, Freemasons and the French Revolution: correctness.html. Nesta H. Webster, Secret Societies and Subversive Movements, Omni Publications, Palmdale Ca; no publication date supplied, but the title pages say "first published 1924". {p. 252} After the death of Babeuf, his friend and inspirer Buonarotti with the aid of Marat's brother founded a masonic lodge, the Amis Sinceres, which was affiliated to the Phila delphes, at Geneva, and as "Diacre Mobile" of the "Order of Sublime and Perfect Masons" created three new secret degrees in which the device of the RoseCroix I.N.R.I. was interpreted as signifying "Justum necare reges injustos." {footnote 1: Archives Nationales, Piece remise par le Cabinet de Vienne (1824), F7.7566.} The part to be assigned to each intrigue in preparing the world-movement of which the French Revolution was the first expression is a question on which no one can speak with certainty. But, as at the present moment, the composite nature of this movement must never be lost to sight. Largely perhaps the work of Frederick the Great, it is probable that but for the Orleanistes the plot against the French monarchy might have come to nought; whilst again, but for his position at the head of illuminized Freemasonry it is doubtful whether the Duc d Orleans could have commanded the forces of revolution. Further,how far the movement, which, like the modern Bolshevist conspiracy, appears to have had unlimited funds at its disposal, was financed by the Jews yet remains to be discovered. Hitherto only the first steps have been taken towards elucidating the truth about the French Revolution. In the opinion of an early nineteenth-century writer the sect which engineered the French Revolution was absolutely international: {quote} The authors of the Revolution are not more French than German, Italian, English, etc. They form a particular nation which took birth and has grown in the darkness, in the midst of all civilized nations, with the object of subjecting them to its domination.2 {footnote 2: Chevalier de Malet, Recherches politiques et histoiques, p. 2 (1817).} It is curious to find almost precisely the same idea expressed by the Duke of Brunswick, formerly the "Eques a Victoria" of the Stricte Observance, "Aaron" of the

Illuminati, and Grand Master of German Freemasonry, who, whether because the Revolution had done its work in destroying the French monarchy and now threatened the security of Germany, or whether because he was genuinely disillusioned in the Orders to which he had belonged, issued a Manifesto to all the lodges in 1794, declaring that in view of the way in which Masonry {p. 253} had been penetrated by this great sect the whole Order must be temporarily suppressed. It is essential to quote a part of this important document verbatim: {quote} Amidst the universal storm produced by the present revulutions in the political and moral world, at this period of supreme illumination and of profound blindness, it would be a crime against truth and humanity to leave any longer shrouded in a veil things that can provide the only key to past and future events, things that should show to thousands of men whether the path they have been made to follow is the path of folly or of wisdom. It has to do with you, VV. FF. of all degrees and of all secret systems. The curtain must at last be drawn aside, so that your blinded eyes may see that light you have ever sought in vain, but of which you have only caught a few deceptive rays.... We have raised our building under the wings of darkness; ... the darkness is dispelled, and a light more terrifying than darkness itself strikes suddenly on our sight. We see our edifice crumbling and covering the ground with ruins; we see destruction that our hands can no longer arrest. And that is why we send away the builders from their workshops. With a last blow of the hammer we overthrow the columns of salaries. We leave the temple deserted, and we bequeath it as a great work to posterity which shall raise it again on its ruins and bring it to completion. {endquote} Brunswick then goes on to explain what has brought about the ruin of the Order, namely, the infiltration of Freemasonry by secret conspirators: {quote} A great sect arose which, taking for its motto the good and the happiness of man, worked in the darkness of the conspiracy to make the happiness of humanity a prey for itself. This sect is known to everyone: its brothers are known no less than its name. It is they who have undermined the foundations of the Order to the point of complete overthrow; it is by them that all humanity has been poisoned and led astray for several generations. The ferment that reigns amongst the peoples is their work. They founded the plans of their insatiable ambition on the political pride of nations. Their founders arranged to introduce this pride into the heads of the peoples. They began by casting odium on religion. ... They invented the rights of man which it is impossible to discover even in the book of Nature, and they urged the

people to wrest from their princes the recognition of these supposed rights. The plan they had formed for breaking all social ties and of destroying all order was revealed in all their speeches and acts. They deluged the world with a multitude of publications; they recruited apprentices of every rank and in every position: they deluded the most perspicacious men by falsely alleging different {p. 254} intentions. They sowed in the hearts of youth the seed of covetousness, and they excited it with the bait of the most insatiable passions. Indomitable pride, thirst of power, such were theonly motives of this sect: their masters had nothing less in view than the thrones of the earth, and the government of the nations was to be directed by their nocturnal clubs. This is what has been done and is still being done. But we notice that princes and people are unaware how and by what means this is being accomplished. That is why we say to them in all frankness:The misuse of our Order, the misunderstanding of our secret, has produced all the political and moral troubles with which the world is filled to-day. You who have been initiated, you must join yourselves with us in raising your voices, so as to teach peoples and princes that the sectarians, the apostates of our Order, have alone been and will be the authors of present and future revolutions. We must assure princes and peoples, on our honour and our duty, that our association is in no way guilty of these evils. But in order that our attestations should have force and merit belief, we must make for princes and people a complete sacrifice; so as to cut out to the roots the abuse and error, we must from this moment dissolve the whole Order. This is why we destroy and annihilate it completely for the time; we will preserve the foundations for posterity, which will clear them when humanity, in better times, can derive some benefit from our holy alliance. {endquote} {footnote 1: Eckert, La Franc-Maconnerie dans sa veritable signification, II. 125.} Thus, in the opinion of the Grand Master of German Freemasonry, a secret sect working within Freemasonry had brought about the French Revolution and would be the cause of all future revolutions. We shall now pursue the course of this sect after the first upheaval had ended. Three years after the Duke of Brunswick issued his Manifesto to the lodges, the books of Barruel, Robison, and others appeared, laying bare the whole conspiracy. It has been said that all these books "fell flat." {footnote 2: Mr. Lucien Wolf, "The Jewish Peril," article in the Spectator for June 12, 1920.} This is directly contrary to the truth. Barruel's book went into no less than eight editions, and I have described elsewhere the alarm that his work and Robison's excited in America. In England they led to the very tangible result that a law was passed by the English Parliament in 1799 prohibiting all secret societies with the exception of Freemasonry.

{The books by Barruel and Robison are: (a) Abbe Barruel, Memoire pour servir a l'histoire du jacobinisme (1797) (b) John Robison, Proofs of a Conspiracy against All the Religions and Governments of Europe} It is evident, then, that the British Government recognized the continued existence of these associations and the danger {p. 255} they presented to the world. This fact should be borne in mind when we are assured that Barruel and Robison had conjured up a bogey which met with no serious attention from responsible men. For the main purpose of Barruel's book is to show that not only had Illuminism and Grand Orlent Masonry contributed largely to the French Revolution, but that three years after that first explosion they were still as active as ever. This is the great point which the champions of the "bogey" theory are most anxious to refute. "The Bavarian Order of the Illuminati," wrote Mr. Waite, " was founded by Adam Weishaupt in 1776, and it was suppressed by the Elector of Bavaria in 1789. ... Those who say that 'it was continued in more secret forms' have never produced one item of real evidence." {footnote 1: A. E. Waite, "Occult Freemasonry and the Jewish Peril," in The Occult Review for September, 1920.} Now, as we have seen, the Illuminati were not suppressed by the Elector of Bavaria in 1789, but in 1786 - first error of Mr. Waite. But more extra ordinary confusion of mind is displayed in his Encyclopedia of Freemasonry, where, in a Masonic Chronology, he gives, this time under the date of 1784, "Suppression of the Illuminati," but under 1793: "J. J. C. Bode joined the Illuminati under Weishaupt." At a matter of fact, this was the year Bode died. These examples will serve to show the reliance that can be placed on Mr. Waite's statement concerning the Illuminati. We shall now see that not only the Illuminati but Weishaupt himself still continued to intrigue long after the French Revolution had ended. Directly the Reign of Terror was over, the masonic lodges, which during the Revolution had been replaced by the clubs, began to reopen, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century werein a more flourishing condition than ever before. "It was the most brilliant epoch of Masonry," wrote the Freemason Bazot in his History of Freemasonry. Nearly 1,200 lodges existed in France under the Empire; generals, magistrates, artists, savants, and notabilities in every line were initiated into the Order. {footnote 2: Deschamps, op. cit., II. 197, quoting Tableau historique de la Maconnerie, p. 38.} The most eminent of these was Prince Cambaceres, pro Grand Master of the Grand Orient. It is in the midst of this period that we find Weishaupt once more at work behind the scenes of Freemasonry. ... {p. 408} APPENDIX II

THE "PROTOCOLS" OF THE ELDERS OF ZION Contrary to the assertions of certain writers, I have never affirmed my belief in the authenticity of the Protocols, but have always treated it as an entirely open question. The only opinion to {p. 409} which I have committed myself is that, whether genuine or not, the Protocols do represent the programme of world revolution, and that in view of their prophetic nature and of their extraordinary resemblance to the protocols of certain secret societies in the past, they were either the work of some such society or of someone profoundly versed in the lore of secret societies who was able to reproduce their ideas and phraseology. The so-called refutation of the Protocols which appeared in the Times of August 1922, tends to confirm this opinion. According to these articles the Protocols were largely copied from the book of Maurice Joly, Dialogues aux Enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu, published in 1864. Let it be aid at once that the resemblance between the two works could not be accidental, not only are whole paragraphs almost identical, but the various points in the programme follow each other in precisely the same order. But whether Nilus copied from Joly or from the same source whence Joly derived his ideas is another question. It will be noticed that Joly in his preface never claimed to have originated the scheme described in his book; on the contrary he distinctly states that it "personifies in particular a political system which has not varied for a single day in its application since the disastrous and alas! too far-off date of its enthronement." Could this refer only to the government of Napoleon III, established twelve years earlier? Or might it not be taken to signify a Machiavellian system of government of which Napoleon III was suspected by Joly at this moment of being the exponent? We have already seen that this system is said by M. de Mazeres, in his book De Machiavel et de l'influence de sa doctrine sur les opinions, les moeurs et la politique de la France pendant la Revolution, published in 1816, to have been inaugurated by the French Revolution, and to have been carried on by Napoleon I against whom he brings precisely the same accusations of Machiavellism that Joly brings against Napoleon III. "The author of The Prince," he writes, was always his guide," and he goes on to describe the "parrot cries placed in the mouths of the people," the "hired writers, salaried newspapers, mercenary poets and corrupt ministers employed to mislead our vanity methodically " - all this being carried on by "the scholars of Machiavelli under the orders of his cleverest disciple." We have already traced the course of these methods from the Illuminati onwards. Now precisely at the moment when Joly published his Dialogues aux Enfers the secret societies were particularly active, and since by this date a number of Jews

had penetrated into their ranks a whole crop of literary efforts directed against Jews and secret societies marked the decade - Eckert with his work on Freemasonry in 1852 had given the incentive; Cretineau Joly followed in 1859 with L'Eglise Romane en face de la Revolution, reproducing the documents of the Haute Vente Romaine; in 1868 {p. 410} came the book of the German anti-Semite Goedsche, and in the following year on a higher plane the work of Gougenot Des Mousseaux, Le Juif, le Judaisme, et la Judaisation des Peuples Chretiens. Meanwhile in 1860 the Alliance Israelite Universelle had arisen, having for its ultimate object "the great work of humanity, the annihilation of error and fanaticism, the union of human society in a faithful and solid fraternity" - a formula singularly reminiscent of Grand Orient philosophy; in 1864 Karl Marx obtained control of the two-yearold "International Working Men's Association," by which a number of secret societies became absorbed, and in the same year Bakunin founded his Alliance Sociale Democratique on the exact lines of Weishaupt's Illuminism, and in 1869 wrote his Polemique contre les Juifs (or Etude sur les Juifs allemands) mainly directed against the Jews of the Internationale. The sixties of the last century therefore markan important era in the history of the secret societies, and it was right in the middle of this period that Maunce Joly published his book. Now it will be remembered that amongst the sets of parallels to the Protocols quoted by me in World Revolution, two were taken from the sources above quoted - the documents of the Haute Vente Romaine and the programme of Bakunin's secret society, the Alliance Sociale Democratique. Meanwhile Mr. Lucien Wolf had found another parallel to the Protocols in Goedsche's book. "The Protocols," Mr. Wolf had no hesitation in asserting, "are, in short an amplified imitation of Goedsche's handiwork" {footnote: Spectator for June 12, 1920} and he went on to show that "Nilus followed this pamphlet very closely." The Protocols were then declared by Mr. Wolf and his friends to have been completely and finally refuted. But alas for Mr. Wolfe's discernment! The Times articles came and abolished the whole of his carefully constructed theory. They did not, however, demolish mine; on the contrary, they supplied another and a very curious link in the chain of evidence. For is it not remarkable that one of the sets of parallels quoted by me appeared in the same year as Joly's book, and that within the space of nine years no less than four parallels to the Protocols should have been discovered? Let us recapitulate the events of this decade in the form of a table and the proximity of dates will then be more apparent: 1859. Cretineau Joly's book published containing documents of Haute Vente Romaine (parallels quoted by me)

1860. Alliance Israelite Universelle founded. 1864. 1st Internationale taken over by Karl Marx " Alliance Sociale Democratique of Bakunin founded (parallels quoted by me). " Maurice Joly's Dialogue aux Enfers published (parallels quoted by Times). {p. 411} 1866. 1st Congress of Internationale at Geneva. 1868. Goedsche's Biarritz (parallels quoted by Mr. Lucien Wolf). 1869. Gougenot les Mousseaux's Le Juif, etc. " Bakunin's Polemique contre les Juifs. It will be seen, then, that at the moment when Maurice Joly wrote his Dialogues, the ideas they embodied were current in many different circles. It is interesting, moreover, to notice that the authors of the last two works referred to above, the Catholic and Royalist Des Mousseaux and the Anarchist Bakunin, between whom it is impossible to imagine any connexion, both in the same year denounced the growing power of the Jews whom Bakunin described as "the most formidable sect" in Europe, and again asserted that a leakage of information had taken place in the secret societies. Thus in 1870 Bakunin explains that his secret society has been broken up because its secrets have been given away, {footnote 1: James Guillaume, Documents de l'Internationale, I, 131} and that his colleague Netchaieff has arrived at the conclusion that "in order to found a serious and indestructible society one must take for a basis the policy of Machiavelli." {footnote 2:Correspondence de Bakounine, published by Michael Dragomanov, p. 325} Meanwhile Gougenot Des Mousseaux had related in Le Juif, that in December 1865 he had received a letter from a German statesman saying: {quote} Since the revolutionary recrudescence of 1848, I have had relations with a Jew who, from vanity, betrayed the secret of the secret societies with which he had been associated, and whowarned me eight or ten days beforehand of all the revolutions which were about to break out at any point of Europe. I owe to him the unshakeable conviction that all these movements of "oppressed peoples," etc., etc., are devised by half a dozen individuals, who give their orders to the secret societies of all Europe. The ground is absolutely mined beneath our feet, and the Jew provide a large contingent of these miners. ... " {endquote} {footnote 3: Le Juif, etc., pp. 367, 368}

These words were written in the year after the Dalogues aux Enfers were published. It is further important to notice that Joly's work is dated from Geneva, the meetingplace for all the revolutionaries of Europe, including Bakunin, who was there in the same year, and where the first Congress of the Internationale led by Karl Marx was held two years later. Already the revolutionary camp was divided into warring factions, and the rivalry between Marx and Mazzini had been superseded by the struggle between Marx and Bakunin. And all these men were members of secret societies. It is by no means improbable then that Joly, himself a revolutionary, should during his stay in Geneva have come into touch with the members of some secret organization, who may have betrayed to him their {p. 412} own secret or those of a rival organization they had reason to suspect of working under the cover of revolutionary doctrines for an ulterior end. Thus the protocols of a secret saciety modelled on the lines of the Illuminati or the Haute Vente Romaine may have passed into his hands and been utilized by him as an attack on Napoleon who, owing to his known connexion with the Carbonari might have appeared to Joly as the chief exponent of the Machiavellian art of duping the people and using them as the lever to power which the secret societies had reduced to a system. This would explain Maurice Joly's mysterious reference to the "political system which has not varied for a single day in its application since the disastrous and alas! too faroff date of its enthronement." Moreover, it would explain the resemblance between all the parallels to the Protocols from the writings of the Illuminati and Mirabeau's Projet de Revolution of 1789 onwards For if the system had never varied, the code on which it was founded must have remained substantially the same. Further, if it had never varied up to the time when Joly wrote, why should it have varied since that date? The rules of lawn tennis drawn up in 1880 would probably bear a strong resemblance to those of 1920, and would also probably follow each other in the same sequence. The differences would occur where modern improvements had been added. Might not the same process of evolution have taken place between the dates at which the works of Joly and Nilus were published? I do not agree with the opinion of the Morning Post that "the author of the Protocols must have had the Dialogues of Joly before him." It is possible, but not proven. Indeed, I find it difficult to imagine that anyone embarking on such an elaborate imposture should not have possessed the wit to avoid quoting passages verbatim - without even troubling to arrange them in a different sequence - from a book which might at any moment be produced as evidence against him. For contrary to the assertions of

the Times the Dialogues of Joly is by no means a rare book, not only was it to be found at the British Museum but at the London Library andrecently I was able to buy a copy for the modest sum of 15 francs. There was therefore every possibility of Nilus bein suddenly confronted with the source of his plagiarism. Further, is it conceivable that a plagiarist so unskilful and so unimaginative would have been capable of improving on the original? For the Protocols are a vast improvement on the Dialogues of Joly. The most striking passages they contain are not to be found in the earlier work, nor, which is more remarkable, are several of the amazing prophecies concerning the future which time has realized. It is this latter fact which presents the most insuperable obstacle to the Times solution of the problem. To sum up then, the Protocols are either a mere plagiarism of Maurice Joly's work, in which case the prophetic passages added {p. 413} by Nilus or another remain unexplained, or they are a revised edition of the plan communicated to Joly in 1864, brought up to date and supplemented so as to suit modern conditionsby the continuers of the plot. Whether in this case the authors of the Protocols were Jews or whether the Jewish portions have been interpolated by the people into whose hands they fell is another question. Here we must admit the absence of any direct evidence. An International circ!e of world revolutionaries working on the lines of the Illuminati, of which the existence has already been indicated, offers a perfectly possible altemative to the "Learned Elders of Zion." It would be easier, however to absolve the Jews from all suspicion of complicity if they and their friends had adopted a more straightforward course from the time the Protocols appeared. When some years ago a work of the same kind was directed against the Jesuits, containing what purported to be a "Secret Plan" of revolution closely resembling theProtocols, {see footnote 1 below} the Jesuits indulged in no invectives, made no appeal that the book should be burnt by the common hangman, resorted to no fantastic explanations, but quietly pronounced the charge to be a fabrication. Thus the matter ended. But from the moment the Protocols were published the Jews and their friends had recourse to every tortuous method of defence, brought pressure to bear on the publishers - succeeded, in fact, intemporarily stopping the sales - appealed to the Home Secretary to order their suppression, concocted one clinching refutation after another, all mutually exclusive of each other, so that by the time the solution now pronounced to be the correct one appeared, we had already been assured half a dozen times that the Protocols had been completely and finally refuted. And when at last a really plausible explanation had been discovered, why was it not

presented in a convincing manner? All that was necessary was to state that the origin of the Protocols had been found in the work of Maurice Joly, giving parallels in support of this assertion. What need to envelop a good case in a web of obvious romance? Why all this parade of confidential sources of information, the pretence that Joly's book was so rare as to be almost unfindable when a search in the libraries would have proved the contrary? Why these allusions to Constantinople as the place "to find the key to dark secrets," to the mysterious Mr. X. who does not wish his real name to be known, and to the anonymous ex-officer of the Okhrana from whom by mere chance he bought the very copy of the Dialogues used for the fabrication of the Protocols by the Okhrana itself, although this fact was unknown {footnote 1} 1. Revolution and War or Britain's Peril and her Secret Foes, by Vigilant (1913). A great portion of this book exposing the subtle propaganda of Socialism and Pacifism is admirable; it is only where the author attempts to lay all this to the charge of the Jesuits that he entirely fails to substantiate his case. {end footnote} {p. 414} to the officer in question? Why, further, should Mr. X., if he were a Russian landowner, Orthodox by religion and a Constitutional Monarchist, be so anxious to discredit his fellow Monarchists by making the outrageous assertion that "the only occult Masonic organization such as the Protocols speak of" - that is to say, a Machiavellian system of an abominable kind - which he had been able to discover in Southern Russia "was a Monarchist one"? It is evident then that the complete story of the Protocols has not yet been told, and that much yet remains to be discovered concerning this mysterious affair. {p. 370} 15. The Real Jewish Peril In considering the immense problem of the Jewish Power, perhaps the most important problem with which the modern world is confronted, it is necessary to divest oneself of all prejudices and to enquire in a spirit of scientific detachment whether any definite proof exists that a concerted attempt is being made by Jewry to achieve world-domination and to obliterate the Christian faith. That such a purpose has existed amongst the Jews in the past has been shown throughout the earlier chapters of this book. The conception of the Jews as the Chosen People who must eventually rule the world forms indeed the basis of Rabbinical Judaism. {p. 402} It is this solidarity that constitutes the real Jewish Peril and at the same time provides the real cause of "anti-Semitism." If in a world where all patriotism, all

national traditions, and all Christian virtues are being systematically destroyed by the doctrines of International Socialism one race alone, a race that since time immemorial has cherished the dream of world-power, is not only allowed but encouraged to consolidate itself, to maintain all its national traditions, and to fulfil all its national aspirations at the expense of other races, it is evident that Christian civilization must be eventually obliterated. The wave of anti-Jewish feeling that during the last few years has been passing over this country has nothing in common with the racial hatred that inspires the "anti-Semitism" of Germany; it is simply the answer to a pretension that liberty-loving Britons will not admit. Those of us who, sacrificing popularity and monetary gain, dare to speak out on this question have no hatred in our hearts, but only love for our country. We believe that not only our national security but our great national traditions are at stake, and that unless England awakens in time she will pass under alien domination and her influence as the stronghold of Christian civilization will be lost to the world. {p. xii} {footnote 10} 10. I use the word "anti-Semitism" here in the sense in which it has come to be used--that is to say, anti-Jewry, but place it in inverted commas because it is in reality a misnomer coined by the Jews in order to create a false impression. The word anti-Semite literally signifies a person who adopts a hostile attitude towards all the descendants of Shem--the Arabs, and the entire twelve tribes of Israel. To apply the term to a person who is merely antagonistic to that fraction of the Semitic race known as the Jews is therefore absurd, and leads to the ridiculous situation that one may be described as "anti-Semitic and pro-Arabian." This expression actually occurred in The New Palestine (New York), March 23, 1923. One might as well speak of being "anti-British and pro-English." {end of quotes} Nesta Webster's book Secret Societies and Subversive Movements is online at these websites: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19104/19104-h/19104-h.htm http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/19104 http://textual.net/access.gutenberg/1/Nesta.H.Webster http://www.archive.org/details/secretsocietiesa19104gut. Trotsky on the Illuminati penetration of Freemasonry at the time of the French Revolution: worst.html. Nicholas Best on the link between Templars and Freemasons, and the Freemasons' role in the murder of the King during the French Revolution, as payback for the execution of Templar leader Jacques de Molay: correctness.html.

The secret Zionism of the Freemasons and Rosicrucians; includes a photo of Karl Marx giving what is claimed as a Masonic handsign: rosicrucian.html.

5. The Protocols of Zion compared to the Tanaka Memorial Ben-Ami Shillony, The Jews and the Japanese: the Successful Outsiders, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Rutland, Vermont, 1991. Professor Shillony, who bills himself as "a Jew, an Israeli" (p. 10), combines Zionism with Marxism (Trotsky's, not Stalin's). Here, he explains the Jewish religion to Japanese readers, perhaps more frankly than he would to Westerners: {p. 224} The Japanese and the Jews complement each other in many ways. While the Jews have developed much of the "software" of Western civilization: great philosophical constructs, new theories, and revolutionary ideologies, they often failed to act prudently on these ideas, becoming themselves the victims of their own contributions, as in the case of Marxism {an allusion to Stalin}.The Japanese {p. 225} are now providing the "hardware" of modern civilization: the machines and the material assets, but they have not yet produced any grand theories that could deploy material abundance in a new way. These two kinds of mastery, if combined, could provide new and unforseeable achievements. ... In an economically and culturally integrated world, in which people enjoy unrestricted mobility and access to each other's cultural assets, the labels "Jews" and "Japanese", as well as those of other ethnic and religious groups, may lose their validity. When every human being becomes heir to the whole cultural heritage of mankind, there will be no more outsiders. {Is this what Zionism has striven for ... its own disappearance?} {p. 64} ... the Jews sought to revise, redraw, and replace the basic tenets of the West. {p. 64} It is difficult to imagine the world today without the contributions of Karl Marx {note that he is placed first, although the list is not chronologically ordered}, Leon Trotsky {tribute to Trotsky is the mark of a Trotskyist: Stalinists never do it}, Sigmund Freud ... Many of these eminent persons were iconoclastic geniuses ... all shared the Jewish trait of challenging accepted truths and searching out new ways of understanding the world. Carrying on the tradition of nonconformism and argumentation, they came to shatter accepted doctrines and to offer new theories and concepts.

{but if Jewish iconoclasm is mainly directed at non-Jewish culture, may it not be a type of propaganda - especially if scrutiny and criticism of Jewish politics is stymied as "anti-semitic"?} {p. 65} Unlike Marx, Freud never abandoned Judaism, even though he was not a practising Jew. ... {p. 68} The strong moral element in Judaism, and the fact that they had long been the victims of persecution and discrimination, made the Jews sensitive to all forms of injustice. {what about the Red Terror, established by Lenin & Trotsky?} The conspicuous role Jews plasyed in socialist and communist movements in many countries was a clear expression of this moral sensitivity. {but the Palestinians and the Arabs have not noticed it} In Germany one finds Moses Hess, Karl Marx, Ferdinand Lassalle, Eduard Bernstein, and Rosa Luxembourg. In the Russian revolution one finds Leon Trotsky {here's a Zionist supporting Trotsky}, Maxim Litvinov, Grigori Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Karl Radek, and Lazar Kaganovich. {Kaganovich's nephew Stuart Kahan wrote, "Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich ... orchestrated the deaths of 20 million people" (The Wolf of the Kremlin, pp. 1415): kaganovich.html} {p. 70} To be Jewish in the ethnic sense and to be Jewish in the religious sense were considered one and the same. In modern Hebrew the single word yahadut stands for both Jewry and Judaism. {i.e. Jews are a religion} {p. 17} Like most other peoples in the world, the Jews and the Japanese have regarded themselves as unique nations. {Shillony claims that the Jews are a nation, but I argue that Jews, like Moslems, are a religion. The quote from p. 70 (above) supports this case; below (p. 19), Shillony says that Abraham was not born a Jew, but became one through adopting the Jewish religion. On p. 30, below, Shillony says that to become a Jew involves religious conversion} ... in Judaism, the concept of a Chosen People ... referred to a particular ethnic group, the Children of Israel, who were bound by blood ties, and at the same time was conditional on their behaviour towards God and one another. {but not conditional on their behaviour to those not of their faith; has this not also been a mark of Christianity and Islam, Judaism's daughters?} {p. 19} Abraham was not born a Jew.

{p. 20} Both the Jews and the Japanese regarded themselves - and still do - as categorically different from any other peoples. ... From what did this sense of separateness derive? In the case of the Jews, the cause was originally religious: Jews believed that God had chosen them above all other peoples, established a covenant with them, and entrusted to them his holy commands. ... Other nations that were not chosen for this special covenantal relationship were called "gentiles" or "the other nations of the world". The Bible puts the following description of Israel in the mouth of the gentile prophet Balaam: "There is a people that dwells apart ..." {p. 22} The religion that was subsequently called Judaism started as a spiritual revolution. ... The reduction of the number of deities from many to one ... was an affirmation of the basic unity of the universe and of the moral purposiveness that underlies it {thus put, Judaism would develop non-theistic variants too, as in the case of Marx and Freud} ... Judaism and Shinto have treated other religions and creeds in opposite ways. The strict monotheism of Judaism excludes the belief in any other divinity. {p. 23} This religious exclusivity was transmitted to Christianity and Islam. {as a result, clashes between them are titanic and uncompromising} ... Shinto ... has been tolerant towards other religions and deities. ... Judaism sets strict moral rules ... there are hundreds of injunctions regarding how one should bahave toward God and toward one's fellow human beings, what one should eat, and what one should wear. ... {p. 24} Shinto does not have such a strict moral code. ... it presents no specific injunctions ... there is no Satan, or ultimate evil, in Shinto. {p. 25} The Jews, however, were the first to sanctify the week ... based on the biblical story of creation ... {Shillony implies that Judaism invented the seven-day week. But the number seven had long been venerated in Babylonia because there were Seven Planets, each considered a god: Sun, Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Sunday is the Sun's day, Monday the Moon's day, Tuesday Mars' (Teutonic Tiu's) day,

Wednesday Mercury's (Teutonic Woden's) day, Thursday Jupiter's (Thor's) day, Friday Venus' (Freya's) day, Saturday Saturn's day. Gilbert Murray writes, "Secondly, all the seven planets. ... Even Plato in his old age had much to say about the souls of the seven planets. Further, each planet had its sphere. The Earth is in the centre, then comes the sphere of the Moon, then that of the Sun, and so on through a range of seven spheres" (Five Stages of Greek Religion, Watts & Co., London 1935, p. 140).} {p. 26} Different as these two religions are in their fundamental spirituality, they are both interested in this world rather than in the next. {p. 27} Shinto and Judaism are religions that affirm life and shun suffering and death. There are no Jewish monks or nuns, as there are no Shinto monasteries. Neither of these religions considers sex to be a sin or a weakness of the flesh as Christianity and Buddhism do. Both Shinto and Judaism reject celibacy. Abraham had both a wife and a concubine ... The Japanese emperors ... used to have many wives and concubines, as did the Jewish kings. It was only in the twentieth century {p. 29} In Shinto not only mortals have weaknesses, but so do the gods. {like the old Indo-European tribal gods} ... Judaism and Shinto ... have both remained national religions. Belonging to the Jewish people and to the Jewish religion are synonymous; a {p. 30} Jew who converts to another religion ceases to be a member of the Jewish community, and a convert to Judaism automatically joins the Jewish people. Most of the Jewish festivals relate to the history of the nation ... {i.e. the Jews are a religion, not a nation in the normal sense; Jews constitute "a nation" only in the way Moslems do. That's why non-Jews i.e. goyim are called "the nations"; it follows that, within Judaism, there is no separation between "church" and "state". This contributed to Marx's concept of Praxis, the unity of thought and action, which led to the stifling of dissent under communism.} {p. 31} ... Judaism was the first religion to make world peace a central element in its eschatology. {borrowed from Zoroastrianism} {p. 32} Yet quite often peace implies domination, and in many languages the word "pacify" also means "conquer". King Solomon could afford to be a king of peace because he ruled "over all the kings from the Euphrates to the land of the Philistines, and to the border of Egypt."

{this quote is from 1 Kings 4:21. At Genesis 15: 18, Exodus 23: 30-31, Deut 11: 24, and Josh 1:4, Jews are promised that they will rule these lands again} ... The peaceful world that the Jewish prophets envisioned was to be ruled over by a scion of the House of David, later called the Messiah. The Jews ... were always inspired by the belief that in the future world of peace and justice they would serve as spiritual leaders {i.e. rulers}. This vision of a world mission gave them the strength to suffer severe persecution and propelled them to the forefront of various messianic and "idealistic" movements in modern times like those of human rights, socialism, and communism. {i.e. Jewish Internationalism is partly motivated by the desire to rule} {p. 38} Versed in languages, familiar with different cultures, and with relatives or associates scattered throughout many towns and countries, the Jews were well suited to engage in international trade. Indeed, their trading expertise made them asssets to rulers of countries wishing to advance their own economies, such as the kings of Poland in the sixteenth century, who, to this end, invited Jews to come and settle there. {from where they later went to Russia} {p. 40} Despite the fact that for almost two thousand years there has been no Temple, the hereditary Jewish priests still enjoy a special religious status and a Jewish male usually knows if he is a priest or not. This is often apparent in his {p. 41} last name, for if it is Cohen, Kuhn, Kaplan, or any of the derivatives of these, it is highly probable that he is a kohen. As the distinction between priests and ordinary Israelites is transmitted from one generation to the next, those who are kohanin are usually aware of their status even if their names do not suggest it. ... The Jews have preserved the identity not only of their hereditary priests, but also of the whole tribe of Levi, of which the priests were a part. Descendants of that tribe, the Levites, still tend to carry such last names as Levy, Levinson, Segal (an abbreviation ofsegan Levi, or deputy Levite), or derivatives of these. ... various traditions and regulations that have no immediate relevance ... are retained in reverence for the past, as a substitute for the rites of the Temple, and in anticipation of the eventual return to the Holy Land and the rebuilding of the Third Temple there. {and in the endnotes to this chapter (Chapter 4), on p. 229, he adds: '"Kaplan" is "chaplain", i.e. "priest". As "Kahn" in German means "ship", some German Jews who were called Kahn changed their name to the other German word for "ship", which is "Schiff."'}

{p. 71} Many ... famous Jews ... were apostates, but some of these converts, like Heine and the British statesman Benjamin Disraeli, remained proud of their Jewish origins and continued to consider themselves ethnically and spiritually Jewish people despite their conversions. {i.e. were Marranos, practitioners of Marranism} {p. 74} Christianity embodied the spiritual essence of the West; it was the religion of the white man. ... both the Jews and the Japanese rejected Christianity out of conviction that it was unnecessary for achieving modernization and out of fear that it might destroy their self-perceived uniqueness. {Shillony implies that Jews do not think of themselves as "whites", even if widely regarded as such; presumably "whites" means "Aryans" to him} {p. 77} Anti-Semitism is as old as the Jewish people {why? why don't other religions have the same problem?} ... The great anti-Semites in modern times were often those who also feared and hated the "yellow race." {p. 78} By the beginning of the twentieth century the racists claimed that Western civilization was under double attack from the inscrutable Japanese without and the cunning Jews within. {p. 79} World War I ... advanced the international status of both the Japanese and the Jews due to Britain's dire need for support in the war. In 1914 Japan acceded to Britain's request to join the war against Germany and was promised, as the spoils of victory, part of the German empire in Asia and the Pacific. ... Britain also needed the support of the Jews, especially those in the United States and in postrevolutionary Russia, for fighting the war against Germany. ... {p. 80} But in 1922 Britain abrogated its treaty with Japan, and in its White Paper of 1930 it reneged on much of its committment to a Jewish national home in Palestine, slaps in the face that both groups would not forget. The suspicion with which large segments of Western society viewed Jews and Japanese after World War I was reinforced by the {p. 81} appearance of two forged documents ... One of these was the Protocols of the Elders of Zion ... The other forged document was the Tanaka Memorial. {To the contrary, I argue that both are genuine; the Tanaka Memorial (July 25, 1927) was a blueprint for Japan's conquest of China and then Asia: tanaka.html. Ironically,

the strongest reason for having a the UN, or even "One World" government, is our fear of each other - fear of domination by any nation, race, religion, or class} {p. 85} Cordell Hull, whose 1941 note, demanding a complete Japanese withdrawal from China as a condition for lifting the embargo on Japan, finally pushed Japan toward war. {p. 86} After World War II the Jews and the Japanese became the two most upwardly mobile ethnic minorities. with the highest levels of education and the lowest rates of crime. The Japanese who emigrated to the United States assumed new identities. ... they transfered their committments and allegiances from their former nation to their new one. {p. 87} It is significant that Americans of Japanese ancestry call themselves Japanese-Americans, whereas the Jews living in America refer to themselves as American Jews. ... Unlike the Japanese-Americans who gave up allegiance to Japan, American Jews later became vigorous supporters of Israel. ... American Jews lobby for Israel. {p. 95} Auschwitz and Hiroshima thus represent new kinds of modern atrocities ... The fact that these horrors were perpetrated against the Jews and the Japanese puts these two peoples in the unique position of having experienced the worst that modern science enables human beings to do to human beings. {yet Shillony lists Trotsky and Kaganovich as heroes, on p. 68 above, without any hint of compassion for their victims} {p. 103} The difference between Israel's earnings and its greater expenditures is covered by U. S. grants, which are larger than those to any other country. ... Israel has become a major exporter of armaments. {p. 106} Germany's trade surplus in 1988 was larger than that of Japan ... but the resentment against Japan was much stronger ... {p. 107} Like the Jews in the Protocols, they are depicted as strongly knit aliens ("Japan Inc.") plotting world domination. {p. 108} Ever since the wars between the Greeks and the Persians in the fifth century BCE, the West has been haunted by the specter of domination by

Orientals. During the Middle Agesand for most of the modern period the Jews constituted the Oriental element ... In the twentieth century the Japanese assumed the position of Oriental menace to Western civilization. {this is a repudiation of the Liberal view emphasising the virtues of Athens; but George Soros warned against Japan, in his book The Alchemy of Finance (pp. 350-4), and many other Jewish leaders did likewise, such as Daniel Burstein, author of the book Yen: The Threat of Japan's Financial Empire. Another Jew, Ezra Vogel, presently heads the American Government's intelligence agencies' Japan specialists} {Shillony, somewhat odiously, keeps playing the "whites" (i.e. Aryans to him) against the Japanese. But another Jew, Samuel Roth, wrote "America ... will expel us, just as Spain expelled us ... Before America will have realized her loss in the loss of the Jews the yellow peoples will be on her back and at her throat. ... But we still have a century or so in America - perhaps more, perhaps less." (Now and Forever: A conversation between Israel Zangwill anbd Samuel Roth, Robert M. McBride & Company, New York, 1925, p. 138} {p. 112} In the sixteenth century {p. 129} the word "Portugese," when referring to people in Europe outside of Portugal, was often taken as synonymous with "Jew." One of the first Portugese to arrive in Japan was Fernao Mendes Pinto, a merchant, adventurer, and for a short time a Jesuit, whose written accounts of his travels stirred the imagination of many Europeans. According to the editor of the English translation of hisTravels, Pinto may have been related to the wealthy Mendes family of former Jews. Luis de Almeida, a merchant and physician who arrived in Japan in 1556 and later joined the Society of Jesus, may also have been a former Jew, as former Jews were prominent among Portugese physicians at that time. There were several former Jews among the founders of the Society of Jesus, and some of them engaged in propagating the faith in the Middle East, but as the order grew, former Jews were gradually forced out of its ranks, and by the seventeenth century they were forbidden to join. {p. 147} The Japanese victories ... were hailed by American Jews ... Shortly after the war broke out, on February 26, 1904, the London newspaper Jewish Chronicle reported that the Jews of Atlanta, Georgia, were collecting three million dollars in order to purchase a battleship for Japan, to be named the Kishineff. The Jewish resentment against czarist Russia produced financial support for Japan. The phenomenon of Jewish financiers raising loans for Japan out of a special attraction to that countrystarted in 1894, when Albert Kahn, director of the

French bank Goudchaux and later head of his own bank, helped to float a Japanese loan in Paris to finance the Sino-Japanese War, which broke out that year ... When the Russo-Japanese War broke out Jewish financiers in Europe and the United States, including the Rothschilds, refrained from extending assistance to Russia but were willing to give aid to Japan. This assistance, crucial in preventing a Japanese defeat, was initiated and engineered by Jacob H. Schiff (1847-1920), a leading {p. 148} Jewish-American figure and president of the banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb, and Co., one of the major investment banks in the United States. ... Schiff convinced his own firm as well as the First National Bank and the National City Bank to sponsor the Japanese war loans in the United States. His efforts helped Japan raise nearly two hundred million dollars on American markets, about half of the total war loans floated abroard to buy the warships, cannons, and ammunition needed to win the war. In March, Jacob Schiff and his wife visited Japan. Emperor Meiji hosted them at a luncheon at the imperial palace, and conferred upon Schiff the Order of the Rising Sun, having earlier awarded him the Order of the Sacred Treasure. He was the first foreigner to be awarded the Order of the Rising Sun. {p. 149} Although the Japanese feared socialism and anarchism at home, during the war they looked favorably on the Russian revolutionaries, among whom were many Jews. {p. 150} While Jews regarded the victory of Japan as divine retribution for Russian anti-Semitic policies, the great Russian writer Leo Tolstoy viewed it as precisely the opposite: as a punishment of Russia for its being too influenced by Jews. In a 1905 letter to a friend he explained his country's defeat: {Tolstoy quote} This debacle is not only of the Russian army, the Russian fleet and the Russian state, but of the pseudo-Christian civilization as well ... The disintegration began long ago, with the struggle for money and success in the socalled scientific and artistic pursuits, where the Jews got the edge on the Christians in every country and thereby earned the envy and hatred of all. Today the Japanese have done the same thing in the military field, proving conclusively, by brute force, that there is a goal which Christians must not pursue, for in seeking it they will always fail, vanquished by non-Christians. {end Tolstoy quote} Although Tolstoy disapproved of anti-Semitism, his analysis of the Russian defeat reflected the anxiety of those Christians at the time, who viewed the victory of Japan and the ascendancy of the Jews as two aspects of the same

phenopmenon. According to their interpretation, the infidel Jews were undermining Western society from within while the heathen Japanese were eroding it from without. From that erroneous perspective, the Jewish moral and financial support for Japan during the Russo-Japanese War was seen as further proof of the complicity of these two peoples in a plot directed against the Western world. {p. 153} In 1927 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration Baron Tanaka Giichi, prime minister and foreign minister of Japan (whose name had been appropriated in the same year in the forged Tanaka Memorial), instructed the Japanese {p. 154} consul general in Shanghai to convey to the Shanghai Zionist Association "hearty congratulations on the steadily progressing organizations of the Zionists, and on the remarkable advancement of the Jewish nationalist institutions, which they have achieved in Palestine." {the Tanaka Memorial was a blueprint for the invasion of Asia} {p. 209} Ishihara Shintaro, ... known for his support of nationalist causes, was elected in 1988 as president of the Japan-Israel Friendship Association. {p. 218} In the 1980s the Protocols of the Elders of Zion came to enjoy a new popularity. In 1986 Yajima Kinji, professor of political science at the Christian Aoyama Gakuin University, published a book about how to read the "hidden meaning of the Jewish protocols." He called the Protocols the most mysterious document of the twentieth century, because all its prophecies had been fulfilled, in spite of its being regarded as a forgery. Yajima advised the Japanese to take the Protocols seriously in order to be prepared for the future. His book was a great success with fifty-five printings. {p. 224} On September 26, 1988, Ibuka Masaru, honorary president of Sony, wrote an article ... in which he cited education as the reason that Jews, contributing only threetenths of one percent of the world's population, had received 10 percent of all Nobel prizes. {That's 30 times as many as the world per-capita average! The Jewish participation rate in the anti-Vietnam War protest movement in the U.S. was also about 30 times the rate for non-Jews (Philip Mendes, a Jewish author, in his book The New Left, The Jews, and the Vietnam War 1965-1972, pp. 21-22), and their entry into New Age sects (Buddhist, Hindu) was up to 16 times the non-Jewish rate at that time (The Jew in the Lotus, p. 7 & p. 9.}

{end of quotes} Part 2 of the Protocols of Zion Toolkit covers 6. The Revolutionary background to Napoleon III 7. Napoleon III's Rule 8. Assessments of Napoleon III Part 2 is at toolkit2.html. Part 3 of the Protocols of Zion Toolkit covers 9. The Push for World Government at the Peace Conference of Versailles (1919) 10. One man stops World Government. 11. The Protocols of Zion and the Peace Conference of Versailles 12. Douglas Reed on the ousting of Lord Northcliffe 13. More on the Ousting of Lord Northcliffe from The Times of London 14. Lloyd George explains why Britain made "a contract with Jewry" 15. Marranism and Universalism 16. Israel Zangwill on the Protocols 17. Herman Bernstein for World Government 18. One World - Utopian or Totalitarian? 19. Stalin accused of endorsing the Protocols (added August 11, 2003) 20. Conclusion 21. Challenge to Jared Israel and Alexander Baron (November 28, 2002)

The Death of Stalin: a Coup d'Etat - Peter Myers, March 26, 2002; update December 26, 2011. My comments are shown {thus}; write to me at contact.html. You are at http://mailstar.net/death-of-stalin.html. On March 5, 1953, the Soviet media announced the death of Stalin. There is overwhelming evidence that he was murdered. He died within 2 months of the Doctors' Plot being announced. His murderers were in two factions: a Jewish one (Beria, Kaganovich, Molotov) and a "Russian" one (Khruschev). The Jewish one seized power, but was overthrown a few months later by Khruschev. The fall of Beria was announced on 10 July, 1953: beria.html. Voroshilov and Molotov were in the Jewish faction. In Special Tasks, Sudoplatov says that their wives were Jewish, p. 288 footnote 4: sudoplat.html.

On Beria's belonging to the Jewish faction, see Sudoplatov, pp. 287-8, 296, 298, 306. On Kaganovich being Jewish, see Sudoplatov, p. 300. Mikoyan was also in the Jewish faction; he had been involved in the plan for a Jewish republic in the Crimea: Sudoplatov, p. 288 n4. Stalin died within 2 months of the Doctors' Plot being announced. The successor Government, run by the Jewish faction, denounced the Doctors' Plot as bogus. On the successor-governments following the death of Stalin, see Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich UTOPIA IN POWER: the History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, translated by Phyllis B. Carlos (Hutchinson, London, 1985): beria.html. Stalin killed, directly and indirectly, millions of people; there is no question of making him a hero. But the murder of such a powerful man, and its cover-up, raise even more questions about who was controlling Communism. (1) Stalin died within 2 months of the Doctors' Plot being announced (2) Georges Bortoli, The Death of Stalin (3) The Death of Stalin: An Investigation by 'MONITOR' (4) Ludo Martens' online book Another view of Stalin (5) Beria vs. Stalin (6) Stalin's Body Removed From Lenin's Tomb (7) Nikita Khruschev on Stalin's "Anti-Semitism" (8) Stalin died on the feast of Purim, 1953 (1) Stalin died within 2 months of the Doctors' Plot being announced From The Death of Stalin: An Investigation by 'MONITOR' (p. vi, below): January 13th 1953: The 'Doctors' Plot' Exposed - nine Kremlin physicians arrested. March 4th: Moscow radio announces Stalin's illness. March 5th: The death of Stalin announced. March 6th: Beria's tanks surround Moscow. March 9th: Stalin's funeral. April 3rd: Kremlin doctors freed. January 13, 1953: Tass announced the discovery of a terrorist group of poisoning doctors. (Edvard Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 539) radzinsk.html

February 8, 1953: Pravda published the names of Jewish saboteurs etc. ( Radzinsky p. 542) February 11, 1953: the USSR severed diplomatic relations with Israel (Yosef Govrin, Israeli-Soviet Relations 1953-1967, pp. 3-4). moscow-vs-jerusalem.html End of February, 1953: rumors went around Moscow that the Jews were to be deported to Siberia (Radzinsky, p. 542), with March 5 rumoured to be the date when this would happen (p. 546}. Radzinsky claims that Stalin was inviting war with America, the home of Zionism and world finance, over this issue, because America was dominated by Zionist financiers (p. 543). March 5, 1953: Stalin declared dead. (2) Georges Bortoli, The Death of Stalin, tr. Raymond Rosenthal, Praegar Publishers, New York 1975. {p. 175} On March 9, Soviet newsreel cameramen filmed the funeral in all of its details. The results of their labors would never be seen. All of the cameramen's work was consigned to the film arehives, where it remains to this day, unavai]able for foreign or domestic consumption. For, before the film of the funeral was ready, the wind had changed and it was already time to forget Stalin. F.L., a literary critic, received an urgent commission from a Moscow magazine to write an essay on Stalin's place in Soviet literature. The entire April issue of the magazine would be devoted to the deceased leader. About two weeks after the assignment, the cditor-inchief telephoned: "No point in continuing. You will be paid for the essay, of course. But the table of contents for April has been changed." Pravda remained Stalinist-tinged for about thirteen days: From the mourning issue of March 10, which was devoted entirely to the funeral ceremonies, to March 22 inclusive. During this time, Stalin continued to be quoted in many articles. Poems inspired by him still appeared, and his name was still accompanied by glowing superlatives. One also found the themes that had filled the paper before his death: "doctor-assassins" "hidden enemies of our people," "henchmen of the Zionist Jews," as well as the usual appeals for spying on {p. 176} one's neighbors and the usual denunciations of "slackness and naivete." With spring, everything changed. The great man's name appeared only two or three times in each issue of the newspaper; sometimes it was completely absent.

On April 7, the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. ceased to be "Stalinist Constitution," and became, quite simply, the "Soviet Constitution." On the same day, Yekaterina Furtseva, quoting Stalin's last work, already failed to qualify it as "inspired." On and after March 23, the word "vigilance" seemed to have been forgotten as all the commentators began discussing the "prosperity of the people." The plots of land given to the workers to grow potatoes became a subject of great concern to the organ of the Central Committee. At the same time, the articles against Jews ceased. The last big anti-Semitic feature article - one of the most violent published - appeared in the March 20 issue of Krokodil. Vasily Ardamatsky, the author of this ill-timed article, would have the unpleasant experience of being shunned by his colleagues and of hearing himself nicknamed Vasya Timashuk, after the woman doctor who had denounced and caused the arrest of the "men in white." Tears had not yet been dried, but the process of de-Stalinization got under way enthusiastically, and, in the leading circles, one could almost hear an enormous but discreet sigh of relief. For the old guard, it was a matter of preserving the advantages of succession while elirninating its dangers - of maintaining power but diminishing tensions. After thirtyfive years of existence, the Party could flatter itself that it bore, in the eyes of Soviet citizens, the mysterious seal of legitimacy. But now the leaders were going to disassociate the Party from Stalin, even though the habit of identifying it with him had become deeply rooted.° ° A convincing example of this can be found by comparing two writings of Mikhail Sholokhov published in Pravda at an interval of less than five months. The first was the great funeral chant which appeared on March 8, after Stalin's burial: Farewell, father! Farewell, dear father, whom we shall love until our last breath. You will always be with us and with those who are born after us. We hear your voice in the rhythmic rumble of the turbines of the gigantic hydro-electric power plants, and in the crash of the waves of the seas created by your will, and in the cadenced step of the invincible Soviet infantry and in the soft soughing of foliage on the well-timbered plains which stretch to infinity. The second text, which appeared on July 30, was entitled: "Live eternally our dear Party." In this article, Sholokhov did not mention Stalin's name even once.

{p. 177} The transition would be difficult. On March 14, Malenkov, who appeared to be the chief heir on March 6, abandoned part of his heritage. Keeping only the presidency of the government, he left the secretariat, and the small wave of adulation which he had enjoyed during those eight days vanished. A month later, a new formula rose on the political horizon: "Collective leadership, supreme principle of the leadership of our Party." Officially, the collectivity had three heads. Malenkov was actually surrounded by Beria and Molotov, who, besides their titles of first vice-president of the Council, had received, respectively, portfolios as the heads of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Behind them were other illustrious figures: Bulganin, Kaganovich, and Mikoyan. The West, which was not very sensitive to obscure maneuvers inside the Party, continued to pay little attention to Nikita Khrushchev. Yet it was he who became First Secretary of the Central Committee when Malenkov was "relieved" of his post. Quietly, without a fuss, he began to gather into his hands the real reins of power. Malenkov, meanwhile, was doing what he could to occupy the front of the stage, to be, if not the boss, at least a bossling. He decided to display his managerial skills. He decided to raise the Soviet standard of living. The reduction in prices which he had decreed on April 1 was far greater than the reductions announced, ritually, each year under Stalin. To cope with this mass of liberated money, the government feverishly imported consumer goods; it even went so far as to buy 30,000 tons of butter in Denmark, Holland, Australia, and New Zealand. Yet it goes without saying that most of the imports came from the satellite countries, where the U.S.S.R. could have certain quantities of products set aside in advance and could buy at super-preferential prices. The workers of East Berlin, whose production "norms" were greatly increased, would make it clear, with paving stones and Molotov cocktails, that they were not quite ready to foot the bill for raising Soviet citizens' standard of living. {p. 186} Professors M. G. Kogall and Etinger figured among the people who had been mistakenly arrested, but they could not be found among those who had been freed. "Well," said the lieutenant. "Those two went into prison but they did not come out." With their congenital feeling for the implied unstated, Soviet readers understood what the communique had failed to explain: The "inadmissible methods of investigation" utilized "by the workers in the investigative service" - those horrible workers - had transformed two of the accused into corpses.

Right below the communique, Pravda had run a big article on fruit trees. Looking carefully, a little lower down, attentive readers discovered a very short paragraph announcing that the Supreme Soviet had annulled the decree which conferred the Order of Lenin on Dr. Lidia Timashuk, the woman who had denounced the "assassins in white coats." The Israeli delegation to the United Nations immediately made it known that it would bring the problem of anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. before the international organization. The entire Soviet press had begun to condemn "all propaganda for racial or national discrimination." It rehabilitated, posthumously but with special and warm emphasis, the actor Solomon Mikhoels, "this honest citizen, this great artist of the people of the U.S.S.R." The same person who, just two months before, had been labeled a paid agent of American Zionists. In the world at large, those who for the last twenty years had denounced the Moscow trials as faked, the confessions extorted, now triumphed. But Communist militants, as a group, did not even flinch. For them, crimes unmasked in the inner circles of the Soviet police were mere accidents. "We belong to an army - and to an encircled army," said an old member of the French Communist Party. "When some lance corporal gets the clap, an entire army should not feel dishonored." Yet Beria, with his blunt communique, had put a crack - still almost invisible - in the principle of infallibility. Stripped of the Order of Lenin but still on the job, Dr. Timashuk pursued an inglorious career as X-ray technician at the Kremlin Hospital, where she met again the colleagues she had had arrested - at least those who had survived. But not everyone was treated with the same gentleness as she. Ryumin, the former Deputy Minister of State {p. 187} Security, who had personally directed the investigation of the "men in white," was arrested together with a number of his colleagues. This little man with the look of a pink cherub was actually a frightful torturer. Moreover, it was convenient to make him rather than the former Minister Ignatyev shoulder the heaviest responsibility for the affair. Ignatyev was loyal to Khrushchev, and Khrushchev defended him tooth and nail. So, for the moment, he was only criticized for "political blindness and credulity." He did not follow his ex-subordinate to jail, but he lost his new and prestigious position of Secretary of the Central Committee, to which Khrushchev had just assigned him. Behind the pompous words, the new scandal fouled up the settlement of accounts. For three months, Ignatyev had given Beria's men in the heart of the security organization

some bad moments. Now it was his turn. Furthermore, what most struck the political class about the news of the freeing of the doctors was the signature: "Communique of the Ministry of the Interior." In other words, Beria. This sounded like a challenge to the completely new practices of the collective leadership. By mounting all alone this operation from which he gained a certain popularity, the Georgian showed that he could outmaneuver his colleagues. Would he try to get rid of them tomorrow? To denounce the torturers of yesterday, one had to borrow phrases from their dreadful vocabulary: "Spies and diversionists, bearers of bourgeois ideology, degenerates.... Against these true enemies, open and recognized, of the people, these enemies of the Sovict State it is always necessary to keep our powder dry." Again, the style of the purges. Who would be the "enemies of the people" tomorrow? (3) The Death of Stalin: An Investigation by 'MONITOR', pub. Allen Wingate, London 1958. {p. vii} THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS is the subject of our investigation:January 13th 1953 The 'Doctors' Plot' Exposed - nine Kremlin physicians arrested. March 4th " Moscow radio announces Stalin's illness. March 5th " The death of Stalin. March 6th " Beria's tanks surround Moscow. March 9th " Stalin's funeral. March 20th " Malenkov released from his duties as Secretary General of the Communist Party. April 3rd " Kremlin doctors freed. July 10th " Beria dismissed from the Communist Party. September 12th " Krushchev elected First Secretary of the Communist Party. December 23rd " Beria tried, found guilty and shot. February 8th 1955 Malenkov released from his duties as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. February 24th 1956 Krushchev's 'Secret' Speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party.

February 29th " Krushchev appointed Chairman of the newly created Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party for the affairs of the Russian Federal Republic. June 2nd 1957 Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich disgraced. August 16th 1958 Bulganin exiled from Moscow. {p. viii} It is a paradox that while the details of his final illness were broadcast to the whole world, the atmosphere of mystery shrouding the circumstances of the death of Stalin has never been dispersed. A number of people, satisfied with the information given, accept the fact that Stalin died of cerebral haemorrhage. Many, suspecting that his end was altogether too opportune, speak of it as a miracle that saved Russia from a new reign of terror. Some are of the opinion that the 'course of nature was assisted'. Others, dismnissing his illness as fictitious, believe that Stalin was murdered. The purpose of our investigation is to discover from the evidence available whether or not Stalin died a natural death. {p. 1} Chapter I THE SETTING ON JANUARY 13TH, 1953, the TASS News Agency reported the 'arrest of a terrorist group of physicians, uncovered by the State Security Organs of the USSR'. Why physicians? And Kremlin physicians at that? Was it possible that Stalin, once again, suspected that he was being poisoned? And was he? Let us investigate these questions. Amongst those arrested were Doctor G. 1. Mayorov, and the Profcssors M. S. Vovsi, V. N. Vinogradov, M. B. Kogan, B. B. Kogan, P. 1. Yegorov, Y. G. Etinger, A. 1. Feldman and A. M. Grinstein. According to the report 'most of the members of this terrorist group were in the pay of the American intelligence service, and received their instructions through the medium of JOINT, the international Jewish bourgeois nationalist organization set up by the American intelligence service, allegedly for rendering material aid to Jews in other countries, but which actually conducts espionage, terroristic, and other subversive activities in a number of countries including the Soviet Union. 'Other members', said the statement, 'have proved to be British intelligence agents of long-standing. All the criminals have confessed to causing the deaths of Zhdanov by

false diagnosis and injurious treatment, and investigation has shown that they shortened the life of Shcherbakov, and had tried to disable Marshals Vassilevsky, Govorov and Koniev, General Shetemenko, Admiral Levenchko and others. 'Their aim was first of all to undermine the health of Soviet leading military cadres, to disable them, and so weaken the defence of the country. They have failed in this purpose but {p. 2} have succeeded in murdering A. A. Zhdanov and A. S. Scherbakov ...' Zhdanov was regarded as one of the most powerful members of the Politburo after Stalin. Up to the time of his death in 1948, due to angina pectoris and cardiac asthma,* it was widely considered that he would succced Stalin as President of the Council of Ministers. Shcherbakov, who died in 1945 of 'paralysis of the heart', was Director of the political administration of the Soviet Army. All those named to be 'disabled' were elderly and very senior officers with the exception of one, General Shetemenko, a comparatively young man, who in 1948 had succeeded Marshal Vassilevski as Chief of Staff to the Soviet Army. On the same day, Pravda wrote: 'The fact that this group of cheap monsters, recruited amongst scientists, was able to go about unpunished shows that some of our Soviet authorities and lcaders have forgotten about vigilance'. This article referred to the 'shortcomings' of the State Security services. Five days later, on January 18th, Pravda wrote in an editorial of: 'the fight for the fulfilment of the tasks laid down in Stalin's work of genius, Economic Problems of the USSR', and called for 'stricter discipline, high political vigilance, and an irreconcilable attitude towards shortcomings'. The article quoted the new Party Statutes obliging 'all members to keep Party and State Secrets'. 'A carefree, smug, and complacent mood has penetrated the Party ranks', Pravda stated. 'Vigilance has been blunted and such unpleasant facts as capital encirclement and plots have begun to be forgotten. Party members are losing sight of the fact that the imperialists, especially the Americans, in developing preparations for the new war, attempt to send into our country and other countries of the sociallst camp twice and three times more agents, spies and diversionists, than into the rear of any bourgeois country'. * Author's italics. See Menzhinsky trial: Chapter III.

{p. 3} On the last day of January Pravda published a list of officials said to have been guilty of criminal carelessness or deliberate espionage. An editorial on the same day stated that important documents were being badly guarded in the Economic Bank, the Ministry of Health, and the State Supply System, and that the imperialist countries were spending huge sums of money in their efforts to gather secret information. It announced that 'a group of rootless cosmopolitans and Jewish-bourgeois nationalists have been unmasked in Lithuania'. On February 6th, Pravda announccd the arrest of four Russians for spying for foreign powers. Three days later, the main offices of the Soviet Legation at Tel Aviv were wrecked by a bomb thrown through a window, and the Minister's wife and two members of the legation staff were injured.As a result of this outrage, a note was sent from Moscow severing diplomatic relations with Israel. The note declared that the bomb explosion had been engineered with the obvious connivance of the Israeli police, and that, in spite of the Israeli Government's condemnation of the outrage, 'the participation of Israeli Government members in the systematic fannling of hatred and enmity towards the Soviet Union and in incitement to hostile actions against the Soviet Union, is universally known and indisputable'. An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the decision to break off diplomatic relations was the culminatioll of a campaign of 'open animosity and poisonous slander by the USSR against Israel, Zionist organisations, and the Jews which had been carried on by the Soviet bloc for a long time, and had increased during the past two months, the real aim of which is to isolate and frighten the Jews in Soviet Russia, whose fate arouses dcep concern'. On February 13th, the day following the incident at Tel Aviv, Moscow Radio reported the death 'after a long and serious illness' of Lev Zaharovich Mekhlis, one of the {p. 4} two Jewish members of the Communist Central Committee. On February 21st, the invitations issued for the Soviet Army Day reception revealed that Marshal Sokolovsky had replaced General Shetemenko as Chief of Staff to the Army. The latter was one of those whom the 'doctor-plotters' had allegedly 'tried to disable'. In the early hours of March 4th, Moscow Radio broadcast the news that Stalin had been elected to the Moscow City Soviet. That morning, the usual light music programme was replaced by a women's choir and a Beethoven concert. Pravda and the other newspapers were four hours late.

At 8 a.m. (Moscow time) the following announcement was made over the radio:'The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union notify the misfortune which has overtaken our Party and our people - the serious illness of Comrade J. V. Stalin. 'In the night of March 1st-2nd, while in his Moscow apartment, Comrade Stalin suffered a cerebral haemorrhage affecting vital areas of the brain. Comrade Stalin lost consciousness and paralysis of the right arm and leg set in. Loss of speech followed. There appeared to be serious disturbances in the functioning of the heart and breathing. 'The best medical brains have been summoned for Comrade Stalin's treatment: Professor-Therapeutist P. E. Lukomsky, permanent member of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR; Professor-Neuropathist N. V. Konovalov; ProfessorTherapeutist A. L. Miasnikov; Professor-Therapeutist E. M. Tareyov; ProfessorNeuropathist I. N. Filimov; Professor-Neuropathist R. A. Tkachev; ProfessorNeuropathist I. S Glazuhov; Reader-Neuropathist V. I. Ivanov-Neznamov. 'Comrade Stalin's treatment is being carried out under the guidance of the Minister of Health, Dr. A. F. Tretyakov, {p. 5} together with L. I. Kuperin, Chief of the Medical Health Board of the Kremlin. 'The treatment is conducted under the constant supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet and the Soviet Government. 'In view of the serious condition of Comrade Stalin's health, the Council of Ministers of the Union of the SSR have recognized the necessity of publishing medical bulletins on the condition of Joseph Vissarionovitch Stalin's health as from today. 'The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Union of the SSR as well as our whole Party and the whole Soviet people fully recognize that the serious illness of Comrade Stalin will lead to his more or less prolonged absence from the activities connected with his leadership. 'The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers leading the country take with all seriousness into consideration all the circumstances connected with the temporary withdrawal of Comrade Stalin from the leadership of the Government and Party activity. 'The Central Committce and the Council of Ministers express their conviction that our Party and the whole Soviet people will in these difficult days display the greatest

unity, solidarity, fortitude of spirit and vigilance; that they will redouble their energy for the building of Communism in our country and rally round the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union even more closely than hitherto.' There followed this announcement, the first medical bulletin, which was rcpeatedly broadcast throughout the day:'In the night of March lst-2nd, 1953,Joseph Vissarionovitch Stalin suffered from a sudden cerebral haemorrhage, affecting vital areas of the brain, as a result of which there set in paralysis ... {p. 52} No one really knows how many died or disappeared without trace as the result of the Moscow trials. But by July 30th, 1938 it was estimated that some seven million prisoners were held in the concentration camps alone. Many more were exiled and sentenced to life imprisonment. Such figures would appear incredible until one recalls the mass deportations from Leningrad, Georgia and the Ukraine where, first Yezhov, and later, Beria 'mowed in large armfuls of political prisoners' under Stalin's orders. In the last year of the trials, 1938, there died or disappeared almost all the eighty members of the Council of War constituted four years before to assist the Commissar of Defence. Marshals and Generals, Admirals and Vice-Admirals were sentenced to death, as were thousands of other officers of all ranks. In that single year, there were more than 30,000 victims of the purge in the 'Red' Army and Navy. In his 'Secret' speech Krushchev stated that '5,000 of Russia's best officers were murdered during the blood-baths that followed the secret trial for treason of Marshal Tukhachevsky.' There perished, too, Assistant Commissars of Foreign Affairs, as well as ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and consul-generals. Almost the entire staffs of Pravda and Izvestia disappeared, together with hundreds of authors, critics, directors of theatres and actors and actresses, as step by step Stalin methodically passed from the Party to the Armed Forces, from the diplomatic corps to the secret police, from industry to agriculture and commerce, and from commerce to the arts. Now, in 1953, history repeated itself. Every day the newspapers throughout the country announced new arrests, fresh exposures of groups of diversionists, saboteurs and capitalist spies. In January, most of the victims were Jews, businessmen, writers, lawyers and doctors. Once again, the Ukraine, Krushchev's country, was the centre of an outbreak of anti-Semitism. Then, the Ukrainian Party organization was

{p. 53} attacked for 'corruption and subversion'. Other provincial Party organizations were brought into disrepute, and in every case their leaders came under suspicion. Pogrom is a Russian word meaning the organized massacre of a body or class of pcople. With the arrest of the doctors - six of whom were Jewish - the dismissals, sudden deaths by heart failure, suicides, and disappearances of Jews all over Russia, it was easy to see which way the seering wind of this new pogrom was sweeping. Three years later, shortly after he had made his 'secret' speech, Krushchev told a smaller Party meeting how after the 'Doctors' Plot', Stalin became inflamed with hatred against the Jews. His rage grew until, shortly before his stroke in March, 'he told a meeting of Soviet leaders that he had decided to gather all the community together and transport them to a northern region within a new pale'. Krushchev told his audience that when Mikoyan and Voroshilov protested and said that such conduct was worthy of Hitler, Stalin worked himself into a fury. By February, it was Moscow's turn again to be gripped by the new 'terror'. Palgunov, the head of the Tass News Agency, vanished without trace. There were arrests in Molotov's Foreign Office, members of which 'confessed' to having connections with the bourgeois-imperialists. Even Madame Molotov was arrested for no other reason than that she was a Jewess. Professors disappeared from the Moscow University and the Academy of Science. Doctor Frumkin, famous for his regenerative grafting of male sex organs, suffered a severe heart attack, and there were fresh rumours that a number of other physicians had been arrested in connection with the 'Doctors' Plot'. In that same month, Doctor Saiffrudin Kitchlu, the Stalin Peace Prize winner, visited the Kremlin and reported Stalin to be in vigorous health and carrying his seventy-three years lightly. Senor Bravo, the Argentinian Ambassador, and other {p. 54} diplomats presenting their credentials, also remarked that Stalin looked fit and well. Mr. K. P. S. Menon, the Indian Ambassador, who went to the Kremlin on February 17th, reported finding Stalin in the best of health. But throughout his interview, he remarked that Stalin kept doodling on a pad of paper, as was his habit. Mr. Menon noticed that he was drawing wolves one after another. And after a while, Stalin spoke about wolves. He said that the Russian peasant knew how to deal with these beasts by exterminating them. Wolves, Stalin said, realised this and behaved accordingly. The Ambassador stated that he thought perhaps Stalin was referring to American capitalist 'wolves'. There were those who, when they heard this story, interpreted it differently. The trouble was that during those first months of 1953, nobody knew who were the 'wolves' destined to be exterminated. The Jews, of course. But who else? The

members of the disbanded Politburo? The Marshals named as the prospective victims of the doctor-assassins? The men in the Kremlin? Men like Kaganovich who was a Jew, and even Beria, whose mother was said to have been Jewish? On March 5th, when the first bulletin of Stalin's illness was published, the new 'terror' was momentarily forgotten. On that day, Alexis, Patriarch of All Russia, Solomon Schiffer, the Chief Rabbi, and the clergy of all denominations bade the people pray for Stalin's recovery. And during those anxious hours the churches were crowded with the faithful. One wonders whether all their prayers were offered up with the same intention? {p. 55} Chapter VII THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE THE SOVIET NEWSPAPERS, possibly to please Stalin, to whom the idea of death was said to be anathema, frequently published articles concerning the longevity of Georgians, many of whom were reported as living to a hundred and twenty and more years of age. Scientists and doctors of medicine - men like Dr. Frumkin mentioned in the preceding chapter - devoted much time and energy towards the prolongation of human life. And in the past twenty-five years the Soviets claimed to have made great strides with their experiments in this direction. At seventy-three, Stalin was not old. Older than Lenin when he had suffered a stroke, but still not old, certainly by Georgian standards. If Lenin had recovered, then why should not Stalin, particularly as medicine had progressed so much since Lenin's day? If there was any truth in the rumour that Stalin had survived a stroke in 1947, there was no reason why he should not recover from this latest attack. Such were the immediate reactions of many to the first news of Stalin's illness. Even western medical specialists, while agreeing that his condition as described in that bulletin was serious, commented that his excellent physical condition, rugged constitution, and his great will to live, would help his doctors. And the fact that he had survived the initial attack, greatly impressed western experts. However, some of them expressed surprise that not one of the nine doctors mentioned as attending Stalin appeared to be Jewish, although the Russian medical journals frequently gave the names of Jewish doctors as the recognized brain specialists in the Soviet Union. {p. 56} Before writing this book, the author submitted all the bulletins issued during Stalin's illness to a distinguished English doctor for comment. The latter reported as follows:-

'I have studied the bulletins. My opinion is that these are perfectly consistent with the view that Stalin died primarily of the results of a cerebral haemorrhage complicated by the effects of coronary disease (the coronary arteries are those which supply the heart itself with blood). The irregularity of his pulse may have suggested that an electro-cardiogram be done (this test was apparently performed at 11 a.m. on March 5th). The unfavourable results were apparently broadcast at 8 p.m. on that day. 'Earlier (apparently at 2 a.m. on March 5th) it had been reported that the cerebral haemorrhage had not been arrested; in addition to lesions in the cortex (affecting speech and the right side of his body) new signs were appearing which suggested that the medulla was being affected (what they call the truncus cerebri). Here are located what are termed vital centres regulating respiration and circulation. The disturbances of circulation may have suggested the desirability of doing an electro-cardiogram. 'The treatment reported as having been carried out seems to me logical and appropriate. They gave him oxygen (to aid respiration), camphor, strophanthin and caffeine (to aid and strengthen the heart) and penicillin because he had a raised temperature and an excess of leococytes (white corpuscles) in his blood. (There is always a risk of a blood clot in the brain or anywhere else becoming infected). 'The use of leeches strikes us as archaic, but is is remarkable till how late these were kept in stock in London hospitals. Their intended effect is to reduce congestion and in the past they were used in congested heart failure. They could not possibly have done him any harm, and the doctors may have decided to use leeches (or announce that these had been used) {p. 57} because this form of treatment may still be regarded in the USSR (especially amongst the rural populations) as a time-honoured remedy, the omission of which might conceivably have provoked adverse comment among the people to whom the description of modern treatments would be meanillgless. It may well be that lecches were thought to wield some magical effect such as sucking the poison out of one's system.' It is inconceivable that this doctor, or any other, for that matter, would be able to fault the medical bulletins. For even if, as some suspect, these bulletins were without foundation because Stalin did not die of a cerebral haemorrhage, they would still have been irrefutable. The Russians, who as liars are without peer, would never have been so clumsy as to issue any 'facts' about Stalin's fatal illness that could be suspect. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note one similarity between the treatment given to Stalin, and that administered to Menzhinsky by Dr. Levin and Dr. Kazakov, as

described by the former at his trial for murder.* This similarity is the use of the drug strophanthus or strophanthin. This drug, which is derived from the Nombe plant of Central Africa, and, incidentally, used by the natives for arrow poison, acts as a cardiac tonic and a diuretic (an agent which increases the flow of urine). It is one of the most highly poisonous drugs known to the medical profession, and, consequently, can only be injected in the minutest quantities. An overdose, however small, would prove lethal. Stalin's body, like that of Lenin, was embalmed and the viscera cremated. But unlike Lenin's, his remains were the subject of a post mortem. On March 7th, Moscow radio announced that 'the examination established a large centre of haemorrhage in the left hemisphere of the brain, and this haemorrhage had destroyed vital parts of the brain and * See Chapter III {p. 58} affected breathing and blood circulation. The examination confirmed that the doctors' diagnosis was correct and all the measures taken could not have prevented the fatal outcome of Marshal Stalin's illness.' This announcement, like the bulletins that had gone before it, was without precedent, as also was the carrying out of the post mortem. In order to make such an autopsy, the pathologists would have had to remove the top of the skull so that the brain could be extracted and dissected. Such, however, must have been the skill of the embalmers that no traces of this major surgical operation were visible to those viewing Stalin's body as it lay in state in the Hall of Columns forty-eight hours later. Mr. Harrison Salisbury, the Moscow correspondent to the New York Times, in his book, Stalin's Russia and After, described his visit to the Hall of Columns on March 7th, as follows: '... together with the Diplomatic Corps, I joined the fantastic procession that was hurried and jostled, sixteen abreast, past the open coffin where Stalin lay, his face as waxen as a calla lily. I stumbled in the blinding glare of the klieg lights as I was forced at a half-trot past the bier, and, now, when I try to bring back the picture in my mind I see only the masses of flowers, the guard of honour half-hidden by the greenery, and the face of Stalin, blanched as an almond, and his old hands which seemed still clutching, in pain or terror, at the edge of his coverlet.' {p. 59} Chapter VIII THE NEW ORDER

IF THIS INVESTIGATION was concerned with the political trend in Russia after March 5th, 1953, our task would have been easy, for in a matter of weeks, if not days, after Stalin's death, the clues were thick upon the ground. At the same time, too, it would have been almost as simple to have gathered enough circumstantial evidence in Soviet Russia there is seldom any other kind - to prove which side would eventually win the battle for power being waged in the Kremlin. With almost indecent haste Stalin's name disappeared from the newspapers. It was replaced, not by the name of any one man, but by those of Malenkov, Molotov, Krushchev and Bulganin. Curiously - or so it seemed at the time - Beria's name was not so prominent as the others, although he was again back as head of State Security and Internal Affairs, merged together once more. If one member of the Party appeared slightly more in the foreground than any other, it was Malenkov, with the result that the western world talked of 'the new Malenkov Govemment.' But that, of course, was a misnomer, for from its very outset the opposition to Malenkov was as strong as it was sure of its success. On March 14th, after holding office for less than ten days, Malenkov, whom Beria in his funeral oration had called 'the talented pupil of Lenin and loyal colleague of Stalin', resigned his post as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. On March 20th, the following communique confirming this was issued:{p. 60} At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held on March 14th, 1953, the following decisions were adopted: 1. To accede to the request made by Comrade G. M. Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, that he be released from his duties as Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 2. To elect as the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrades N. S. Krushchev, M. A. Suslov, P. N. Pospelov, N. N. Shatalin, S. D. Ignatyev. 3. In accordance with paragraph 32 of the Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to transfer Comrade N. N. Shatalin from the status of an alternative member to that of a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. So, on March 14th, Krushchev became First Secretary of the Party, although he was not referred to yet as Secretary General or General Secretary, since that had been

Stalin's title. But that, in fact, is what he became when he took over the key position by means of which Stalin had consolidated his power after Lenin's death. On March 15th, the IVth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held in the Great Kremlin Palace in Moscow. It was opened by Deputy M. A. Yasnov, Chairman of the Soviet Union. He proposed that the deputies rise in tribute to the 'bright memory of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin'. In sorrowful silence, in tribute to the great Stalin, the deputies and guests rose in their places. A little later in the session, Comrade Krushchev moved that Comrade Voroshilov be elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Comrade Krushchev's motion was unanimously adopted. Then, Beria submitted the proposal that Comrade Malenkov be appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the {p. 61} USSR, and requested Malenkov to submit to the Supreme Soviet his proposal for the composition of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In his speech Beria repeated almost word for word what he had said about Malenkov at Stalin's funeral, and again referred to his candidate as 'the talented pupil of Lenin and loyal colleague of Stalin.' The session unanimously resolved to appoint Comrade Malenkov Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, amidst tumultuous applause. The new Chairman then submitted the namcs of the Council of Ministers to the assembly as follows: First Vice-Chairman and Minister of Internal Affairs - Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria; Minister of Foreign Affairs - Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov; Minister of Defence-Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin; President and Chairman of the Supreme Council Presidium - MarshalVoroshilov; Minister of Home and Foreign Trade-Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. There then followed a list of the remaining ministers appointed, including the Minister of State Control, Vsevolod Merkulov. The newly elected Presidium lost no time in declaring its policy of leniency towards many of those who had been harshly punished by the former regime. On March 27th, a Decree of Amnesty was adopted which stated: 'As a result of the consolidation of the Soviet social and State system, the rise in the material and cultural standards of the population, the growth of consciousness of the citizens, and

their honesty in carrying out their civic duty, law and order have been strengthened and crime has considerably declined in the country.' These flattering remarks were an overture to a decision to release 'from places of detention persons who have committed crimes which do not represent a great danger to the State'. A week later, there occurred an event of the greatest possible {p. 62} significance to our investigation. On April 3rd, the Soviet Press published a communique issued by Lavrenti Beria's Ministry of Internal Affairs, which read: 'The Ministry has made a thorough investigation of all the materials of the preliminary investigation and other data in the case of a group of physicians accused of wrecking, espionage and terrorist activities against leaders of the Soviet State. 'As a result of verification it has been established that Professors M. S. Vovsi, V. N. Vinogadov, M. B. Kogan, B. B. Kogan, P. I. Egorov, A. I. Feldman, Y. G. Etinger, V. H. Vasilenko, A. M. Grinstein, V. F. Zelenin, B. S. Preobrazhensky, N. A. Popova, V. V. Zakusov, N. A. Shereshevsky and Doctor G. I. Mayorov implicated in this case were wrongly arrested by the former Ministry of State Security of the USSR through the use of methods of investigation which are inadmissible and most strictly forbidden by Soviet law. 'On the basis ofthe finding ofthe investigation commission specially set up by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to verify the case, the above-mentioned and others implicated in this case have been fully cleared of the charges preferred against them and, in conformity with Article 4, Point 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, have been released from custody. 'The persons guilty of the improper conduct of the investigation have been arrested and are criminally held responsible.' The communique also stated that the award of the Order of Lenin to Doctor Lidya Timashuk, the woman doctor who had accused the physicians, had been annulled. It should be noted that the fact that the communique gave the name of fifteen professors and doctors and referred to 'others implicated in this case' confirmed the rumours that other doctors had been arrested in connection with the 'plot'. The release of the doctors and the official pronouncement

{p. 63} that they had been wrongfully arrested, inspired Pravda to publish a leader headed 'Soviet Socialist Law Is Inviolable'. In this the onus of the scandal was laid on 'the former leaders of the Ministry of State Security', amongst them Ignatyev and Ryumin. The former was dismissed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee, while the latter, who had been Deputy Minister and Chief of the Investigation Section of the Ministry, was arrested. Pravda denounccd Ryumin as 'a contemptible adventurer' who had framed the Kremlin physicians, and then went on to declare that the new regime's courage in unmasking such villains was proof of its internal unity and strength. From having been "hired assassins of JOINT, 'spies', and 'saboteurs', the released doctors were once more 'honest Soviet citizens' and 'eminent scientists", the 'victims of criminals who dared to ride rough-shod over the inalienable rights of Soviet citizens inscribed in our Constitution'. Thus, the doctors were set free and exonerated from their alleged crimes. Yet, the 'Doctors' Plot' which was the spark that set alight the new purge that threatened the lives of countless numbers of Russians, is a mystery and is likely to remain such for generations. Who was its instigator ? Who conceivcd this tortuous intrigue that incited Stalin's rage to the pitch when he vowed to exterminate the entire Jewish community in Russia? When Krushchev referred to the plot in his 'secret' speech, he threw his huge audience into a state of consternation. 'Let us recall the "Affair of the Doctor-Plotters",'* he said. 'Actually, there was no "affair" outside the declaration of the woman doctor, Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by someone to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that the doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatmcnt.' * Author's italics {p. 64} It is incredible that those ambiguous words were used by the best-informed man in Russia to explain away a scandal that had shaken the Soviet Party and the USSR to its foundations. Again, it may be asked: 'Who was that someone to whom the First Secretary referred in such vague or evasive terms?'

Someone, it is logical to assume, of importance in the Party and close to Stalin, since Krushchev admitted: 'Such a letter was sufficient* for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion* that there were doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders at once to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally gave advice on the conduct of the investigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said that Academician Vinogradov should be put in chains; another beaten. Present at this Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State Sccurity, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him: 'If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head !' So Stalin was sufficiently convinced by the letter of the woman doctor 'who was probably influenced or ordered by someone' to reach the immediate conclusion that these distinguished physicians, who were personally known to him since they attended upon the Kremlin, were a gang of murderers. It does not make sense. And what of Comrade Ignatiev, the man whom Pravda had accused of riding roughshod over the inalienable rights of Soviet citizens ? Surely he could have thrown some light on the mystery or even identified the nebulous someone who appeared to have been responsible for the affair that never existed outside the declaration of Lidya Timashuk? But, perhaps, once again he had saved his head from being shortened by obeying the orders ofthe First Secretary? Was silence the price he had paid for his reinstatement to the membership of the Party? Krushchev's explanation of the 'Doctors' Plot' was no ex* Author's italics. {p. 65} planation at all. He merely blamed Stalin for everything. 'Stalin,' he said, 'personally sent for the investigation Judge, gave him instructions and advised him as to the methods he should use. These methods were simple - beat, beat, and, once again, beat !' 'This ignominious case was set by Stalin,' Krushchev told his hushed audience. 'But,' he added, 'he did not have time to bring it to an end - as he conceived that end - and for that reason the doctors are still alive.' It may well be asked: 'And how many others?' {p. 84} It was not merely by coincidence that Bulganin, Malenkov, Molotov, and Krushchev addressed the same meetings, appeared together on the same platforms, visited the same factories, and stood side by side in the same photographs, one never

more prominent than another, but sharing the limelight equally between them. And the backcloth was always Lenin's portrait. Thus, after the curtain rose on the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in the white and gold assembly room of the Kremlin Palace, it seemed only natural to the thousand delegates present that one speaker after another should repudiate individualism. The trend of the Congress was succinctly summed up by a resolution passed during the proceedings, which stated: 'The 20th Congress and the entire policy of the Central Committee of the Soviet Party of the USSR since Stalin's death clearly show that, within the Central Committee of the Party, there was a Leninist core of leaders who correctly understood the immediate requirements of both internal and foreign policies . . . And immediately after Stalin's death, this Leninist core of the Central Committee began a resolute struggle against the personality cult and its grave consequences. At the same time, this resolution could have left no doubt in the minds of the delegates that the rumours of internal Party strife at the time of Stalin's death were well-founded. That reference to 'a Leninist core' plainly indicated the existence of turbulent factions within the Central Committee. It was obvious too from the wording of the resolution that these factions had become involved in a 'resolute strugglc' the moment Stalin died. And as one speaker followed another, it became comparatively easy to judge who belonged to which faction. Comrades Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Shepilov were ranged {p. 85} against First Secretary Krushchev, Comrades Kikoyan and Pospelov, Pravda's editor, and the soldiers, represented by Marshals Bulganin, Voroshilov, and Zhukov. However, it was not quite so casy at the outset of the Congress to pinpoint the cause of the trouble. On the face of it, it seemed absurd to divide the members of the Central Committee into 'Stalinists' and 'anti-Stalinists' They had all been 'Stalinists', at least, ostensibly, until March 5th, 1953. With the possiblc exception of Comrade Mikoyan they had all referred to one another as faithful 'pupils' 'disciples', and 'loyal supporters' of the great Stalin. One had only to recall those funeral orations to prove that. Unlike Lavrenti Beria, none of them could be an out-and-out individualist and, therefore, openly opposed to this new doctrine of collective-leadership for, unlike Bcria, they were all present at this Congress.

When Comrade Mikoyan rose to speak, he severely censored the old regime, condemning its architecture as obsolete; fit only to be demolished and rebuilt. In his suave manner Mikoyan, who always dressed likc a bourgcois capitalist rather than a Party worker, even ventured to criticise Stalin by name. And since his speech was reported in the newspapers and over the radio, it made history. For never before had Soviet citizens read or listened to Stalin's name in a critical connection. But those who read their papers intelligently were not wholly unprepared for such a shock, for shortly before the Congrcss opened,Pravda had come out with an editorial headed, 'The Cult of the Individual' that clearly showed which way the wind was blowing. Ncvcrthclcss, even for those delegates who had suspectcd him of anti-Stalinist tendencies, Mikoyan's speech must have sounded surprisingly outspoken. Yet it could not have prepared them for what was to come. On the last day, February 24th, the Congress went into {p. 86} secret session, and it was after midnight when First Secretary Nikita Krushchev rose to address the delegates. The speech he delivered is now known to the whole world as the 'secret' speech. We have already quoted from it in these pages. Now, we must examine it in detail. It was a long speech and lasted for three and a half hours. But since, to say the least, it is relevant to this investigation, we offer no excuse for quoting long passages from it. However, it is important they should be read in the light of what has already been written. The First Secretary began: 'Comrades ! In the report of the Central Committee of the Party at the Twentieth Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, and also during recent plenary sessions of the Central Committee, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences. 'After Stalin's death, the Central Committee of the Party began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behaviour. 'Such a belief about a man - and specifically about Stalin - was cultivated among us for many years.

'The object of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin's life and activity. Concerning Stalin's merits, an entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies have already been written in his lifetime . . . At present we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the Party now and for the future. With how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage {p. 87} the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality. 'Because of the fact that not all as yet have fully realised the practical consequences resulting from the cult of the individual, the great harm caused by the violation of the principle of collective direction of the Party, and because of the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of a person - the Central Committee of the Party considers it absolutely necessary to make this material pertaining to this matter available to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.' With these words Krushchev began his indictment of Stalin, thus placing the responsibility for everything he was to say upon the Central Committee. He spoke in its name, with its connivance, as its First Secretary. What is more, as he told the delegates - not at the beginning but almost at the end of his speech - everything he had said was confidential and for their ears alone. 'We cannot', he warned them, 'let this matter get out of the Party, especially to the Press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes ...' Incredible as it may seem, that is what he said! Could he really have been so naive as to believe that his indictment of Stalin would never be heard outside the gilded walls of the Kremlin Palace? Did he not realise that he was providing his enemies with a wholr arsenal of ammunition with which to sabotage Communism all over the world? {p. 88} Chapter XIV THE STALINIST-LENINIST MYTH EARLY IN HIS SPEECH Krushchev set about destroying 'the iconography' as Trotsky had called it, which portrayed Stalin in Lenin's company; in other words, the hyphenate of 'Stalinist-Leninism', which Stalin himself had invented and so skilfully used in his early days to impose himself upon the Central Committee. (It is worth noting that throughout his career, which has so faithfully followed the Stalin pattern, Krushchev has shown a marked tendency to do exactly the same.)

'During Lenin's life', the First Secretary went on, ' the Central Committee of the Party was a real expression of collective leadership of the Party and the nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers. He tried to convince some; he patiently explained his opinions to others. 'In addition to the great accomplishments of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin ... His great mind expressed itself also in that he detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences.* 'Fearing the future fate of the Party and of the Soviet nation, Lenin made a completely correct characterisation of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of the Secretary-General because of the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a proper attitude towards his comrades, that he is capricious and abuses his power. * Author's italics. {p. 89} 'In December, 1922, in a letter to the Party Congress Vladimir Ilyich wrote:"After taking over the position of Secretary-General Comrade Stalin accumulated in his hands immeasurable power, and I am not certain whether he will always be able to use this power with the required care." 'This letter - a political document of tremendous importance, known in the Party history as Lenin's "Testament" - was distributed among the delegates to the Twentieth Party Congress. 'You have read it, and will undoubtedly read it again more than once. 'You might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expression is given to Vladimir llyich's anxiety concerning the Party, the people, the State, and the future dircction of Party policy. It must be remembered that the Lenin 'Testament' was banned during Stalin's lifetime, and it says much for the internal security in Russia under Stalin that there were many delegates to the Congress who had never heard of the famous document. If they had, it would not have been necessary for Krushchev to break off in the middle of reading it to explain what it was. He went on reading it:-

"Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, bccomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary-General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man who, above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness and more considerate attitude towards comrades, a less capricious temper, etc." {p. 94} Chapter XV AN ENEMY OF THE PARTY WHILE DESTROYING THE IDOL OF STALIN, the First Secretary went to great pains to restore that of Lenin to its former place. Like Stalin, he must have realised that the only way to supreme power was by declaring his abject devotion to Vladimir Ilyich. 'Our Party,' Krushchev declared, 'fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for the construction of Socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this fight, had the Party's devotion to principles been skilfully combined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted but rather drawn to our side - we would certainly not have had such a brutal violation of revolutionary legality and many thousands of people would not have fallen victim ofthe method of terror. Extraordinary methods would then have been resorted to only against those people who had committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.' {Yet the Terror was set up by Lenin and Trotsky themselves} Still delving deep into the past, Krushchev harked back to the days of the October Revolution when two members of the Central Committee - Kamenev and Zinoviev had opposed Lenin's plan for an armed uprising. Lenin, always the humanitarian, forgave them. Then, Krushchev cited the case of the Trotskyites as another instance of Lenin's tolerance. 'At present, after a sufficiently long historical period,' Krushchev said, 'we can speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyse this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all,around Trotsky were people whose origin cannot by any means be traced to {p. 95} bourgeois society. Part of them belonged to the Party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers. We can name many individuals who in their time joined theTrotskyites; however, these same individuals took an

active part in the workers' movement before the Revolution, during the Socialist October Revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of all revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people? We are deeply convinced that had Lenin lived such an extreme method would not have been taken against any of them.' Almost in the same breath, Krushchev posed another question to the Congress. 'But can it be said that Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means against enemies of the Revolution when this was actually necessary? No, no one can say this. Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the Revolution and of the working class, and when necessary resorted ruthlessly to such methods.' By this method of question and answer, Krushchev struck a sinister note of warning. Evidently, there was a subtle difference between 'enemies of the people' and 'enemies of the Revolution.' And in the name of Vladimir llyich Lenin, it was right and proper to annihilate the latter by the most ruthless methods. But what Lenin did in the name of the Rcvolution, Stalin continued to do when the Revolution had been won and domestic peace reigned over the Soviet State. 'Then,' said Krushchev, 'Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilising the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annilation, not only against actual enemies ... {p. 115} There followed the Berlin blockade, which because of the Air-lift, failed. At the same time, it brought Russia to the very edge of war. ... Finally, in 1950, with a view to containing large American forces in the Far East, he instigated the Korean war, which continued without success until after his death, when the new regime immediately supported armistice negotiations.= Why was it Khrushchev never mentioned these escapades of Stalin's, any one of which could have invoilved the USSR in a third world war? ... {p. 116} Surely, to have proved to the Congress that Stalin's wilfulness and haughtiness was leading the country towards war would have given strength to Krushchev's argument against the cult of the individual. Why, then, did he refrain from making this telling point? Was he afraid that by so doing he would over-play

his hand and so foster the suspicion that Stalin's death was a 'miracle' that had saved the Soviet people from the horrors of a third World War? Whatever his reasons, Krushchev dropped the subject of Stalin's foreign policy after assuring his listeners as follows: 'We have carefully examined the case of Yugoslavia and have found a proper solution which is approved by the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia as well as by the working masses of all the people's democracies and by all progressive humanity. The liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole camp of Socialism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the whole world.' Now, the wording of that last sentence cannot but strike the reader as odd. How better to liquidate that abnormal relationship than by liquidation of the man whose mania for greatness had created it? {p. 117} Chapter XIX THE BUREAUCRAT OF TERROR WE HAVE NOW REACHED THAT POINT in Krushchev's speech when he startled his audience by suddenly referring to 'the affair of the doctor-plotters.' In Chapter 6 we have already quoted a part of the First Secretary's brief and extremely ambiguous explanation of this famous scandal. He continued as follows: 'Shortly after the doctors were arrested we members of the Political Bureau received protocols with the doctors' confessions of guilt. After distributing these protocols Stalin told us, "You are blind like young kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognize enemies". 'The case was so presented that no one could verify the facts on which the investigation was based. There was no possibility of trying to verify facts by contacting those who had made the confessions of guilt. 'We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was questionable. We knew some of these people personally because they had once treated us. When we examined this "case" after Stalin's death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end. 'This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not, however, have the time in which to bring it to an end - as he conceived that end - for this reason the

doctors are still alive. Now all have been rehabilitated; they are working in the same places they were working before; they treat top individuals, not excluding members of the {p. 118} Government; they have our full confidence; and they execute their duties honestly as they did before. 'In organising the various dirty and shameful cases, a very base role was played by the rabid enemy of our Party, an agent of a foreign intelligence service - Beria, who had stolen into Stalin's confidence. In what way could this provocateur gain such a position in the Party and the State, so as to become the first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee Political Bureau? It has now been established that this villain had climbed up the Government ladder over an untold number of corpses.' Let us dissect this statement and examine it thoroughly in the light of what has been written. At the time of the doctor's arrest Stalin was in good health. Indeed, we have the evidence of Doctor Kitchlu, Senor Bravo, Mr. Menon and others to prove that he was perfectly well; in fact, in vigorous health and carrying his seventy-three lightly, in February, less than three weeks before he died. Seventy-three is no great age for a Georgian. Moreover, as we have said, it is a well-known fact that, like many old men, Stalin hated the mere thought of death, and it was never mentioned in his presence. Is it likely, then, that he would have spoken as Krushchev states? Would this man, to whom the very word death was anathema, have said, in effect; 'What will happen to you all when I die? When I am dead you will perish.' Remember, Krushchev had said that 'Stalin was a very distrustful man - sickly suspicious ... This sickly suspicion caused him to distrust even eminent Party workers whom he had known for years.' Yet Krushchev would have us believe that Stalin talked about what would happen when he was gone in front of members of the Political Bureau whom he did not trust further than he could see them. {p. 119} Like the First Secretary's other anecdotes about Malenkov and Mikoyan, this story does not ring true. But, like those others, Krushchev told it with an ulterior motive. He wanted to create the impression in the minds of the delegates that at the time of the 'Doctors' Plot' Stalin was an old man; a vain old man preoccupied with death, yet fearing what would happen to Russia when the blind young kittens ruled in his stead.

Why could the facts on which the investigation into the 'Doctors' Plot' were based not be verified? According to Krushchev, neither he nor Mikoyan were cowards where Stalin was concerned. They had questioned his decisions and contradicted his opinions in the past. Yet, now, when the lives of these doctors, who had once treated them, were at stake, they never said a word. They believed in the innocence of these unfortunate men, but made no protest when they were handed the protocols of their 'confessions' which were in the familiar pattern of all those other 'confessions'. But, perhaps, Krushchev really expected to be believed when he said that it was not until they examined the 'case' after Stalin's death that they found it was fabricated from beginning to end.' Having found out, why not clean up such a dirty and shameful case once and for all by telling the whole truth about it? Why not tell the delegates that far from being murdered by the Kremlin physicians,Comrade Zhdanov had died of angina pectoris and cardiac asthma in 1948, and Comrade Shcherbakov of a 'paralysis of the heart' in 1945? Surely, since the doctors were once more treating top individuals and members of the Government, amongst whom these particular diseases appeared so prevalent, the true facts should have been made known ? Would it not have cleared the air if Krushchev had told his listeners that, amongst Stalin's other manias, and sickly suspicions, was the one that his enemies were trying to poison him? It would have been so easy to have laid the blame on {p. 120} Beria for the whole business. It would have been so convincing - not to say reassuring for their patients - if the First Secretary had handed out protocols from the rehabilitated physicians stating precisely what had really happened. But since he did none of these things, the 'Doctors' Plot' must continue to remain a mystery. It will remain a mystery, too, how Beria not only retained his position in the Party and the State after Stalin's death, but was given back his old job at the head of the Ministries of State Security and Internal Affairs. Krushchev offers no explanation for that extraordinary situation. Yet, this is what he had to say about 'the rabid enemy of the Party': 'Were there any signs that Beria was an enemy of the Party? Yes, there were. Already in 1937 at a Central Committee plenum, former People's Commissar of Health Protection Kaminsky said Beria worked for the Mussavat intelligence service. But the Central Committee plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Had Stalin examined Kaminsky's statement? No, because Stalin believed in Beria, and that was enough for him. And when Stalin believed in anyone or anytlling, then - no one could say anything which was contrary to his opinion; any one who would dare express opposition would have met the same fate as Kaminsky ...'

It is only necessary to remark that this statement seems inconsistent with Krushchev's previous statements about Stalin's suspicious and distrustful nature. {In Khrushchev Remembers, Khrushchev says that Stalin was afraid of Beria, and elevated him (Khrushchev) to put a check on Beria and Malenkov (p. 250 and pp. 311-3). Also that Beria mocked Stalin (p. 318)} As further proof of Beria's duplicity, Krushchev followed his usual formula by quoting at length from the pages of Soviet Party History. He first read a long declaration made to the Central Committee by Snegov who, after being in prison for seventeen years, had been rehabilitated. This proved that in 1931 Beria had been directly responsible for the death of a certain Comrade Kartvelishvili. {p. 121} Krushchev cited at great length and with a wealth of detail two further cases; that of the old Communist and friend of Lenin, Kedrov, shot at Beria's orders, and Ordzhonikidze, once a close associate of Stalin's, who after attempting to expose Beria, committed suicide. These cases are only of interest to our investigation because they clearly illustrate how faithfully Krushchev stuck to the formula of producing evidence from the distant past in proving his case. All that he had to say about Beria's recent criminal activitics - about those 'heinous crimes aimed at physically exterminating honest people' and his 'criminal anti-Soviet designs' is contained in the following two sentences: 'Beria was unmasked by thc Party's Central Committee shortly after Stalin's death. As a result of the particularly detailed legal proceedings it was established that Beria had committed monstrous crimes and Beria was shot.' * That was all! Not a word of explanation. No mention of the seventy-six hour siege of Moscow. No reason given why Lavrenti Beria remained in high office for four months after the death of Stalin. Not a single quotation from those 'particularly detailed legal proceedings'. Nothing! To paraphrase Krushchev's own words: the question arises why Beria, who had liquidated tens of thousands of Party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked immediately after the death of Stalin? That question still remains unanswered. And probably it always will. * Author's italics. {p. 122} Chapter XX TOWARDS THE MOTIVE

TIRELESSLY, RELENTLESSLY, the First Secretary's speech went on as the clock in the Spassky Tower of the Kremlin chimed out the hours of a new day. 'Comrades! The cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person ... Was it without Stalin's knowledge that many of the largest enterprises and towns were named after him? Was it without his knowledge that Stalin monuments were erected in the whole country - these "memorials to the living?" ... Comrades! The cult of the individual has caused the employment of faulty principles in Party work and in economic activity ... Comrades! If we sharply criticise to-day the cult of the individual which was so widespread during Stalin's life and if we speak about the many negative phenomena generated by this cult, which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons may ask: "HOW could it be? Stalin headed the Party and the country for thirty years and many victories were gained during his lifetime! Can we deny this?" In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blind and hopelessly hypnotised by the cult of the individual, only by those who do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet State, only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist manner, the role of the Party and of the nation in the development of the Soviet society ...' Stalin was to blame for everything. That was the essence {p. 123} of this part of the First Secretary's speech. And now that Stalin was dead, conditions were improving everywhere; on the collective farms, in the factories, and in Russia's relationship with foreign countrics. Then, Krushchev said: 'Some comrades may ask us; where were the members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee? Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And why is this being done only now'? The questions were pertinent. But the answers could scarcely have been less apposite. 'First of all', Krushchev explained, 'we have to consider the fact that the members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times. Initially, many of them backed Stalin actively because Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and Party work. 'It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially during the first years, actively fought for Leninism against the enemies of the Lenin theory and against those who deviated ... Later, however, Stalin, abusing his power more and more, began to fight eminent Party members and Government leaders and to use terrorist methods against

honest Soviet people ... Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent falling victim to repression ... It is clear that such conditions put every member of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. And when we also consider the fact that in the last years the Central Committee plenary scssions were not convened and that sessions of the Political Bureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time, then we will understand how difficult it was for any member of the Political Bureau to take a stand against one or another unjust or improper procedure against serious errors and shortcomings in the practices of leadership ...' {p. 124} In other words, none of the Party hierarchy dared to stand up to Stalin at the risk of being liquidated. Krushchev then treated the delegates to another anecdote to illustrate the precarious position of members of the Central Committee at that time. 'In the situation which then prevailed', he told them, 'I have talked often with Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin. Once when we two were travelling in a car, he said, "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend, and when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will go next - home or to gaol".' If, in fact, Bulganin really did say that, one wonders whether he recalls the remark now as he sits, a lonely exile, discredited and dishonoured for having wavered in his support of First Secretary Krushchev in the latter's battle against Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich in 1957? Banished from Moscow, does the Marshal reflect upon how similar has been Krushchev's rise to power with that of Stalin's? If so, he must feel grateful that the new Master prefers to banish his old comrades instead of liquidating them. However, to return to Krushchev's vindication of himself and his comrades for tolerating Stalin's monstrous behaviour. 'The importance of the Central Committee's Political Bureau,' he said, 'was reduced and its work was disorganised by the creation within the political Bureau of various commissions - the so-called "Quintets", "Sextets", "Septets" and "Novenaries". Here is, for instance, a resolution of the Political Bureau of October 3rd, 1946:- 'Stalin's proposal:1. The Political Bureau Commission for Foreign Affairs (Sextet) is to concern itself in the future, in addition to foreign affairs, also with matters of internal construction and domestic policy.

2. The Sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of the {p. 125} State Commission of Economic Planning of the USSR, Comrade Vozesensky, and is to be known as a Septet. 'Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin.' 'What a terminology of a card player!' Krushchev exclaimed, amidst laughter. 'It is clear that the creation within the Political Bureau of this type of commission "Quintets", "Sextets", "Septets" and "Novenaries" - was against the principle of collective leadership. The result of this was that some members of the Political Bureau were in this way kept away from participation in reaching the most important State matters. 'One of the oldest members of our Party, Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he was actually deprived of the right to participate in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents. When the Political Bureau was in session and Comrade Voroshilov heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction. 'Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed also with the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was an English agent. This revelation was greeted with laughter. 'It is true - an English agent!' Krushchev assured the delegates. 'A special tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there', he added. At the time of writing, Voroshilov is still in power. But, when we consider what has since become of the subject of Krushchev's other anecdotes, we cannot but ask: For how much longer? 'By unilateral decision', the First Secretary continued, 'Stalin had also separated one other man from the work of {p. 126} the Political Bureau - Andrev Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled acts of wilfulness. 'Let us consider the first Central Committee plenum after* the Nineteenth Party Congress when Stalin, in his talk at the plenum, characterised Vyacheslav Ivanovich

Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers of our Party were guilty of some baseless charges. 'It is not excluded that had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably have not delivered any speeches at this Congress. 'Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau. He often statcd that Political Bureau members should be replaced by new ones.* 'His proposal, after the Nineteenth Congress, concerning the selection of twenty-five persons to the Central Committee Presidium was aimed at the removal of the old Political Bureau members and the bringing in of less-experienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways. 'We can assume that this was also a design for the future annihilation* of the old Political Bureau members and in this way the cover for all shameful acts of Stalin, acts which we are now considering.' Let us consider these revealing words with the greatest care. Firstly, let us examine Krushchev's statement that at a plenum of the Central Committee after the Nineteenth Congress in October 1952, Stalin laid some 'baseless charges' against Molotov and Mikoyan. Since he did not say what these charges were, it is useless to speculate as to their character. However, according to Krushchev, Stalin 'suggested that these old Party workers were guilty'. How is it then that they not only escaped punishment but retained their positions in the Government? Having made such accusations against them in *Author's italics. {p. 127} the presence of the Central Committee, it seems most unlikely that Stalin would have taken no further action. Krushchev states that these charges were laid at the plenum of the Central Committee; that is on October 17th, 1952. Therefore, his sinister speculation as to what might have happened to Molotov and Mikoyan had Stalin 'remained at the helm for another several months' is pointless. Stalin, in fact, lived for more than four months after that meeting.

Secondly, let us examine Krushchev's statements that Stalin 'evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau' and that he had 'a design for the future annihilation' of the old members of that body. Since Krushchev did not see fit to offer a shred of evidence in support of those astonishing accusations, let us accept them as they stand. Krushchev himself has aLready made it palpably clear that Stalin had rendered the members of the Political Bureau ineffectual by splitting them into 'Quintets' and 'Septets'. Their posts were mere sinecures. None of them had any voice in the Government of their country. None of them dared to express an opinion unless it echoed Stalin's views. Yet, Stalin had planned to 'finish them off'. If Krushchev is to be believed, Stalin was determined to rid himself of the very men whom he had trained into submission and to replace them by others. Why? In all the years they had served him, these old members of the Political Bureau had never questioned his judgment or protested against his despotism. But now, suddenly, after the plenum of the Central Committee on October 17th, 1952, Stalin made up his mind to 'finish off' the 'blind young kittens' whose eyes were so conveniently shut to all his wilfulness and brutalities. {p. 128} Why? Krushchev would have us believe that having gone to all the trouble of splitting them up into harmless little groups, Stalin immediately decided to annihilate them all. Why? Is it possible that those little 'Sextets' and 'Novenaries' were not so harmless? Could it have been that, smarting under the Secretary-General's open contempt, the old members of the Political Bureau had begun intriguing behind his back? Is it not within the bounds of probability that another several months after the plenum of the Central Committee, in January, 1953, to be precise, Stalin discovered that these slighted and moody men were planning to poison him with the connivance of certain doctors in attendance on the Kremlin? {p. 129} Chapter XXI AN ANALYSIS

'COMRADES! The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had manifested with a new strength the unshakable unity of our Party, its cohesiveness around the Central Committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building Communism. 'And the fact that we present in all their ramifications the basic problems of overcoming the cult of the individual which is alie to Marxism-Leninism, as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is evidence of the great moral and political strength of our Party. 'We are absolutely certain that our Party, armed with the historical resolutions of the Twentieth Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victones. 'Long live the victorious banner of our Party-Leninism!' With those words, amidst prolonged and tumultuous applause, ending in a standing ovation, Nikita Krushchev concluded his speech. It may well be asked, why did he ever make it? The wishful thinking which he indulged in that it would remain a secret was shortlived. Less than a month after the Twentieth Congress, as a direct result of the shock of the 'secret' speech, there were riots in Tiflis. Within a matter of weeks, the speech was fully reported by the foreign Press, and having read it, thousands of loyal Communists all over the world, who until then had given blind allegiance to the Party, renounced Communism for ever. To claim as Krushchev did that in order to destroy the cult {p. 130} of the individual it was necessary to make such a fearful indictment of Stalin, is not true. We have seen how quickly Stalin's name was forgotten in the USSR. We have seen how calmly and with what few tears the Russian people received the news of his death. After their brief moment of mourning, they went about the State's business as if nothing had happened. Incredibly, Stalin's death made scarcely a ripple on the waters. Indeed, the new leaders who, as we have also seen, so greatly feared that the shock of Stalin's passing might cause popular demonstrations, had good reason to be thankful for the fact that nowhere in the whole of the USSR was there the slightest sign of unrest.

If more workers than usual queued patiently to enter the mausoleum in the Red Square now that Stalin lay beside Lenin, it was probably out of curiosity to see in the flesh the man known to them only through his photographs. The novelty would soon wear off. Left to the Russian climate, the statues of Stalin would crack and crumble. Except culturally, they did no harm to the people. In numerous ways, the new regime had already demonstrated that under collective leadership terrorism was ended. Beria, the arch-assassin, had been publicly discredited and shot. The wings of the dreaded secret police had been clipped. Under the Decree on Amnesty, the thousands released from places of detention had returned to their homes all over the country as living evidence of the tolerance of the new rulers of the USSR. After Stalin's death, the whole vast machinery of Soviet propaganda went to work to spread the doctrine of Leninism and colleaguality at home. While abroad, Lenin's own phrase 'peaceful co-existence' was freely used to express the new Government's foreign policy. And to foster this illusion, first Malenkov, and then Krushchev and Bulganin set out on a round of visits to shake hands with bourgeois imperialists. {p. 131} Then, suddenly and without a word of warning, three years after Stalin's death Krushchev launches his bitter, recriminating attack. To what purpose? So far as the delegates to the Congress were concerned, the large majority must have been aware of the terror that had dominated Russia for thirty years, even if there were not many left who knew the awful details as revealed by Krushchev. If we accept the fact that Krushchev was not really so naive as to think his speech would remain a secret from the outside world, why did he go to such lengths to confirm what Stalin's enemies had so long believed? Why, then, and with what object did Krushchev make his speech? We believe he delivered it to prove a case of justifiable homicide - the killing of Stalin. We believe that he delivered it so that if at any time he and his accomplices should stand accused of Stalin's murder, he could answer: 'I have proved to you all what manner of man he was. Had we not the right to kill him?'

It must be remembered that at the time when Krushchev made the 'secrct' speech, in February, 1956, the battle for power still raged in the Kremlin and, although he was gaining ground, his position was not yet secured. The opposition was still strong. Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Shepilov and Bulganin still had some fight left in them. And all of them knew what had happened to Stalin. Any one of them could have used that knowledge as a weapon to destroy Krushchev. That is why in his specch he was at pains to implicate them all. That was the purpose of the little anecdotes, not only about the opposition but about his supporters as well - Mikoyan, Voroshilov and Zhukov - in fact, all the members of the old {p. 132} Politburo. It was imperative to establish that every one of them had a motive for murdering Stalin. Let us therefore consider the salient points of the secret speech together with what we have already written in this light. {p. 133} Chapter XXII RECONSTRUCTION WHENEVER POSSIBLE IN THIS CHAPTER we will use Krushchev's own words together with the evidence previously presented in our endeavour to solve the mystery of the death of Stalin. As far back as 1922, after he had suffered his first stroke, Lenin began worrying about his protege, Stalin. Since becoming General Secretary, Joseph Vissarionovich had accumulated immeasurable power into his hands, and it was not at all certain whether he always used that power with the required care. There were times - and they were becoming more frequent - when Stalin was not only excessivcly rude, but intolerant and capricious. So, Lenin thought fit to write a letter to the Tenth Party Congress, which he was too ill to attend, warning the members about Stalin's negative characteristics. The Congress thought that Lenin's 'Testament', as they called it, would prove a sufficient warning to Stalin to mend his ways. Instead of replacing him by another kinder and more loyal man, as Lenin had suggested, they allowed him to continue as General Secretary. But far from mending his manners, Stalin became more rude and more capricious as the years went by. He did not mellow with age. The negative characteristics which, in Lenin's time, were only incipient, developed steadily. And during the last years of his life they acquired an absolutely insufferable character.

Stalin ceased to tolerate colleaguality in leadership and began to practise brutal violence towards anyone who opposed his capricious and despotic character or who ran contrary to his {p. 134} concepts. Anyone who tried to prove his viewpoint was doomed to removal from the leading executive and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This despotism displayed itself at the Seventeenth Party Congress and after, when Stalin ordered no fewer than ninety-eight innocent members and candidates to be arrested and shot as 'enemies of the people' - a phrase he himself had originated. From then on, Stalin, using his unlimited power, did not even trouble to inform the Central Committee of his decisions. Indeed, plenums of the Committee were hardly ever called. Not once during all the years of the patriotic war did a single meeting take place. After the war the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became ever more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimcnsions, so that many workers were becoming enemies before his very eyes. Worse still, Stalin separated himself from the Collective even more. Everything was decided by him alone, without any consideration for anyone or anything. It is true to say that Stalin was sickly suspicious, and those who worked with him knew it. He would look at a man and say: 'Why are your eyes so shifty to-day? Why are you turning so much to-day and avoiding looking me directly in the eyes? This sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even towards eminent party workers whom he had known for years. Everywhere and in everything he saw 'enemies', 'twvo-facers' and 'spies'. Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed with the absurd and ridiculous idea that Voroshilov might be an English agent. A tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there. Voroshilov found himself in an almost {p. 135} impossible position. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau scssions. Consider what happencd at the meeting of the Political Bureau in 1946. It was then that the importance of the Ccntral Committec was reduced by the creation of various comlllissions - the so-called 'Quintets', 'Sextets', 'Septets' and 'Novenaries.' Stalin

proposed these innovations, with the result that some membcrs of the Political Burcau were kept away from participation in reaching most important State decisions. Again, consider what took place just after the Ninetecnth General Congress, in October, 1952, the first to be convened for thirteen years. Stalin's proposal concerning the selection of twenty-five persons to the Central Committee Presidium was aimed at the removal of the old members of the Political Bureau and the bringing in of lessexpcrienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways. Indeed, it can be assumed that this was also designed for the future annihilation of the old Political Bureau membcrs. At the first Central Committee plenum after the Nineteenth Congress, in his talk at the plenum, Stalin characterised Molotov and Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers were guilty of somc baseless charges. Indeed, had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months Molotov and Mikoyan would probably not havc made speeches at thc Twentieth Congrcss. It is evident that Stalin had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau. That, then, was the situation in the autumn of 1952 according to Krushchev, as he described it in his own words. We now come to January, 1953, and the 'affair of the doctor-plotters'. It will be recalled that the woman doctor Timashuk who was probably influenced by someone, wrote Stalin a letter in which she declared that the doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment. {p. 136} Having received this letter, Stalin reached an immediate conclusion that there were doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists, some of who had personally treated Krushchev and others in the Kremlin. More than that, Stalin issued advice on the conduct of the investigating of the plot and the methods of interrogation to be used against the doctors. He instructed that one of them, Professor Vinogradov, was to be put in chains, and another beaten. He told the then Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev, curtly: 'If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head.' Shortly after the arrest of the doctors, Stalin distributed protocols of their confessions of guilt to the members of the Politburo, including Krushchev, and told them: 'You are blind like young kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognise enemies.'

Here, we will pause to ask the question: Does that anecdote ring true? We do not think that it does. Like Krushchev's others, we believe it to be a lie. In this instance, its purpose was to draw a red-herring across the scent by suggesting that Stalin did not suspect any of the old members of the Politburo of being involved in the 'Doctors' Plot'. They were merely helpless creatures and because their eyes were shut, they had no idea there were evil workers in the Party who were planning to poison the General Secretary. So far as Stalin was concerned, the 'Doctors' Plot' was not a matter for jest. The moment he heard about it, he acted immediately, and made it his personal business to find out the truth. He even threatened to hang his Minister of State Security if he did not obtain confessions from the doctors. And it is reasonable to suppose Ignatiev wasted no time in executing his orders. {p. 137} Who was the mysterious 'someone' who influenced or ordered Lidya Tamashuk to write to Stalin.? It will be recalled that when Krushchev was discussing the Soviet war films, the theme of whose propaganda, he declared, was praising Stalin as a military genius, he said: 'Let us recall the film "The Fall of Berlin". Here Stalin alone acts, he issues orders in the hall in which there are many empty chairs and only one man approaches him and reports something - that is Poskrebyshev, his loyal shieldbearer.' Now, that remark caused laughter in the hall, as we believe Krushchev intended. He wanted to de-bunk not only the film but Poskrebyshev; to turn him into a figure for ridicule, so that those few who knew him would forget what he had really been like. A sinister, shadowy figure, never far from his master's side-a grey, ghost of a man, who had disappeared like a ghostwithout trace the day that Stalin died. We believe the loyal shield-bearer disappeared because he was liquidated by the very men whom he had unmasked as the instigators of the 'Doctors' Plot'. What other reason could there have been for Poskrebyshev's disappearance except that he knew too much? Nor even Krushchev questions his loyalty to Stalin, nor since the latter had chosen him as his personal aide-de-camp, could it possibly be doubted. As we have already said, it is extremely unlikely that Stalin would have planned to finish off all the old members of the Politburo unless they had given him cause. And what better cause could they have given him than by plotting his murder aided by his own doctors? Can it be doubted that, having discovered such a plot,

Stalin's persecution mania would not have reached such dimensions that he would attempt to annihilate the entire Politburo? He had done it before, when he had ordered those ninety-eight members and candidates to the Seventeenth Congress to {p. 138} be shot, and he would do it again - if he remained at the helm ... And in January, 1953, there was no reasoning for supposing that Stalin would not. We have the evidence of Mr. Menon, Doctor Kitchlu and others to prove that the capricious, irritable, and distrustful old man of seventy-three was in vigorous health. The members of the Politburo had the evidence of their own eyes. Seven weeks elapsed between the announcement of the 'Doctors' Plot' and that of Stalin's death. Time enough, it may be thought, to mete out summary justice to the plotters. Yet Krushchev had stated that Stalin did 'not have time' in which to bring the case of the Kremlin doctors to an end- 'as he conceived that end'. But even if Stalin had died a fortnight before March 5th, which is possible, he would still have had the time. On the evidence of Mr. Menon, we know that he was alive and well on February 17th, more than five weeks after the announcement of the exposure of the plot. During that period, it should be recalled, several prominent people had already died suddenly, suffered heart attacks, or disappeared into thin air, including Mekhlis, the Minister of Security, Doctor Frumkin, and General Shetemenko. The latter, mentioned as one of the proposed 'victims' of the doctor-assassins, was Chief of the Soviet General Staff. Twelve days before Stalin's death, he was relieved of his post, and then vanished. During that period, too, countless others had been arrested. When Krushchev said that time had saved the doctors' lives, he was deliberately confusing the issue. His conjecture that Molotov and Mikoyan might not have addressed the Congress had Stalin lived for 'another several months' was made with the same intent. He wanted to allay the suspicion lurking in the minds of many of the delegates that the members of the Politburo were involved in either the 'Doctors' Plot' or {p. 139} Stalin's timely demise. His purpose was to justify Stalin's murder; not to reveal who did it. In any attempt to solve the mystery of Stalin's death, time must play an important part. From the moment the doctors were arrested, time was running short for a great many people. Indeed, nothing could save them except a miracle - of time.

If the doctors had hatchecd their plot amongst themselves, let us suppose, to bring about such a miracle by poisoning Stalin, they would have been liquidated immediately. The very fact that they were not is proof that Stalin needed time to find out how many were actually implicated. And the greater the number, the more time he would have needed. Paradoxically, Krushchev's own words can be used to prove our point. Stalin did not have time to end the case - 'as he conceived that end.' Stalin conceived not merely the deaths of a dozen or so Kremlin physicians who were ostensibly plotting to kill a number of ageing Marshals. He conceived the unmasking and finishing off of Beria, Krushchev, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, and the rest of the old members of the Politburo. But they did not give him time. {p. 140} Chapter XXIII THE DEATH OF STALIN AT THIS POINT we must state that on the evidence of Krushchev's speech we can no longer accept the belief that Stalin died a natural death. We cannot even accept as true the statement that he suffered a cerebral haemorrhage, or the theory that his enemies seized upon his illness as a heaven-sent chance to hasten his end. If such had been the case, Krushchev's speech would never have been delivered. But it was delivered. If it is a damning indictment of Stalin, it is an equally damning indictment of Krushchev and his confederates, for Stalin's murder. We have said that it was a plea of justifiable homicide. However, as such we are not concerned with it, for we are not concerned with the ethics of the case. Although we must confess in our opinion ethics played no part in the killing of Stalin. In the final analysis, if he had lived, his assassins would have died. It was their lives or his. That is a succinct summing up of the case. Who killed Stalin? The answer can only be that it is improbable that we shall ever know the identity of his executioner. He must have been someone who was in the habit of visiting Stalin regularly and therefore unlikely to arouse his sickly suspicions. A doctor? In the circumstances, we think not. A close friend, whom he trusted? Lavrenti Beria, for example? Perhaps. A genial companion, with whom he might sometimes drink a glass of vodka? Nitika Krushchev, possibly? Again, perhaps.

Both men aspired to take Stalin's place. And while one {p. 141} failed where the other succeeded, undoubtedly both were deeply involved in the murder. How was Stalin murdered? Again, we shall probably never know. It may be assumed, however, that the method used was governed by the fact that the body would be embalmed and placed on exhibition. Therefore, it is likely that Stalin was poisoned. To a lesser degree than either Beria or Krushchev, a large number of others were involved, for the murder of Stalin, carried out with immediacy, was nevertheless perfectly organised. A trifle too perfectly, perhaps. In their anxiety to make their victim's death appear natural, we cannot help but feel that, as is so often the case, the murderers overplayed their hand. For, as we have said, with their many signatories, wealth of detail, and frequency, the bulletins did give rise to doubt in cynical minds. It must be admitted, too, there was something suspicious about the timing and precision with which Beria's MVD troops surrounded Moscow. But even more dubious was the alacrity with which Beria was restored to office as head of the Secret Police. Indeed, it is time to reconsider Beria's role in the light of the 'secret' speech. There is no need to stress with what bitterness and savagery Krushchev attacked Beria's memory. The speech was almost as much an indictment of the late Minister of State Security as it was of his master the General Secretary. It remains to ask why? Unlike his master's, Beria's name had been publicly blackened before death. Why, then, the stream of invective and abuse? Why the recriminations? Why the use of such phrases as 'Beria who murdered thousands of Communists', 'this rabid enemy of our Party', 'this villain who climbed up the Government ladder {p. 142} over an untold number of corpses', 'this abject provocateur', 'this vile enemy?' Why?

In his determination that the evil that Beria did will live after him, we are left with the feeling that Krushchev harbours a great personal hatred against the dead man. And we wonder why? It is not impossible that Beria was restored to his former office in recognition for his part in Stalin's murder, after which he may or may not have attempted to seize power by surrounding Moscow with his troops. We are inclined to the theory that this was, in fact, a demonstration of strength staged to deter the Army from attempting a coup d'etat. However, there is not the slightest doubt that afterwards and very soon afterwards - Beria began to use his immeasurable power for his own ends. The struggle between him and Krushchev was to the death. At some point in that struggle - possibly when Krushchev had won the alliance of the Army - realising he was losing, it may well be that Beria threatened to expose Krushchev as Stalin's murderer and it would have been to his advantage whether the allegation were true or not. And for this reason, he was shot. What evidence can we offer in support of this? The evidence of Krushchev's own words. The evidence that he considered it necessary to go to such lengths in reiterating Beria's past crimes when they were well-known to all the delegates at the Congress. The evidence of Krushchev's insistence that until the very end Beria was at one and the same time Stalin's faithful servant and evil genius. 'Why was not Beria unmasked during Stalin's life?' he cries in horror. And then immediately answers his own question: 'Because he utilised very skilfully Stalin's weaknesses; feeding him with suspicions, he assisted Stalin in everything, and acted with his support'. {p. 143} So, no man dared to lay a finger on Beria until Stalin was dead! What else did Krushchev say? Only this: 'Beria was unmasked shortly after Stalin's death. As a result of the particularly detailed legal proccedings it was established that Beria had committed monstrous crimes, and Beria was shot'. More red herrings across the scent. More generalization about time! However, from this vague and unsatisfying statement it can be gathered that the lapse of time between Beria's arrest and his trial was intended to prove that the new Government's methods of justice were different from those of Stalin. Many months, therefore, were needed for the 'particularly detailed legal proceedings' in order that Beria's trial, heard in camera, should be a just one. No 'protocols' of these proceedings were, of course, supplied to the delegates.

If further evidence should be needed, we would cite the fact that of all those who were involved in any way as accomplices to the murder, Beria was the only one to be shot. His fate, as Krushchev no doubt intended, acted as a deterrent to others who might have attempted to play his game. Nevertheless, it is possible that in 1956, Krushchev feared that in the heat of the struggle for power or in the moment of defeat, one or another of his opponents would emulate Beria. And so, to safeguard himself and, at the same time, to implicate his friends and enemies alike in Stalin's murder, he delivered his 'secret' speech. He achieved his objective. A few days after the 20th Congress, on February 29th, 1956, Krushchev was appointed Chairman of the newly created Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party for the Affairs of the Russian Federal Republic. Thus, his powers were extended far beyond those even of Stalin. Fifteen months later, at a plenary session of the Central {p. 144} Committee, it was found that 'the anti-Party group MalenkovKaganovich-Molotov had for the past three to four years run counter to the course of the Party policy. These comrades had entered upon a path of group struggle against the leadership of the Party. Having discussed among themselves on an antiParty basis, they aimed to change the policy of the Party and to lead the Party back to those incorrect mcthods of leadership which were condemned by the 20th Party Congress'. The Committee resolved, first, 'to condemn the factional activities of the anti-Party group of Malenkov-Kaganovich-Molotov, and of Shepilov who joined them, as incompatible with the Leninist principles of the Party. Second, to expel these comrades from membership of the Presidium and from the Central Committee ... This resolution was passed unanimously by all members of the Central Committee, with one abstention - in the person of Comrade Molotov.' Marshal Bulganin has since followed these comrades into the wilderness. Having branded them all potential murderers, Krushchev could afford to treat them with magnanimity now that he himself had climbed to the top of the Government ladder, not over an untold number of corpses, but certainly over that of Beria and, in all probability, that of Stalin as well. {end of text}

(4) Ludo Martens, Another view of Stalin Ludo Martens writes in his online book Another view of Stalin (Copyright © 1995 John Plaice) at http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node153.html Stalin's death A few months before Stalin's death, the entire security system that protected him was dismantled. Alexandr Proskrebychev, his personal secretary, who had assisted him since 1928 with remarkable efficiency, was fired and placed under house arrest. He had allegedly redirected secret documents. Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Vlasik, Chief of Stalin's personal security for the previous 25 years, was arrested on December 16, 1952 and died several weeks later in prison. P. Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars (1984), p. 321; cited in Bland, op. cit. , p. 24. {Bill Bland, 'The "Doctors' case'' and the death of Stalin' (London: The Stalin Society, October 1991)} Major-General Petr Kosynkin, Vice-Commander of the Kremlin Guard, responsible for Stalin's security, died of a 'heart attack' on February 17, 1953. Deriabin wrote: '(This) process of stripping Stalin of all his personal security (was) a studied and very ably handled business'. Deriabin, op. cit. , p. 209; cited in Bland, op. cit. , p. 27. Only Beria was capable of preparing such a plot. On March 1, at 23:00, Stalin's guards found him on the floor in his room, unconscious. They reached the members of the Politburo by telephone. Khrushchev claimed that he also arrived, and that each went back home. Deriabin, op. cit. , p. 300. No-one called a doctor. Twelve hours after his attack, Stalin received first aid. He died on March 5. Lewis and Whitehead write: 'Some historians see evidence of premeditated murder. Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov sees the cause in Stalin's visible preparation of a purge to rival those of the thirties'.

J. Lewis and P. Whitehead, Stalin: A Time for Judgment (London, 1990), p. 279; cited in Bland, op. cit. , p. 34. Immediately after Stalin's death, a meeting of the presidium was convened. Beria proposed that Malenkov be President of the Council of Ministers and Malenkov proposed that Beria be named Vice-President and Minister of Internal Affairs and State Security. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit. , p. 324. {Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: André Deutsch, 1971)} During the following months, Beria dominated the political scene. 'We were going through a very dangerous period', wrote Khrushchev. Ibid. , p. 331. Once installed as head of Security, Beria had Proskrebychev, Stalin's secretary, arrested; then Ryumin, who had led the inquiry into Zhdanov's suspicious death. Ignatiev, Ryumin's boss, was denounced for his rôle in the same affair. On April 3, the doctors accused of having killed Zhdanov were liberated. The Zionist author Wittlin claimed that by rehabilitating the Jewish doctors, Beria wanted to 'denigrate ... Stalin's aggressive foreign policy against the West, the United States and Great Britain primarily'. Wittlin, op. cit. , p. 388. {Thaddeus Wittlin, Commissar: The Life and Death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria (New York: Macmillan, 1972)} Still in April, Beria organized a counter-coup in his native region, Georgia. Once again he placed his men at the top of the Party and the State. Dekanozov, later shot along with Beria, became Minister of State Security, replacing Rukhadze, arrested as 'enemy of the people'. Bland, op. cit. , p. 46. Fri Aug 25 09:03:42 PDT 1995 {end of text} (5) Beria vs. Stalin After Stalin's death, Malenkov became Premier, with Beria (of the Jewish faction) holding power in the shadows. New evidence on Beria's downfall:http://cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf/e7b8938c6eedaba4852564a7007a887a/a9b 4bb47747a3c0e852564c2006250a5?OpenDocument.

From http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node149.html, the website of the (proStalin) Progressive Labor Party: {start} This political weakness was further aggravated by revisionist tendencies within the leadership of the Party that emerged at the end of the forties. To direct the different sectors of the Party and the State, Stalin had always relied on his closest collaborators. Since 1935, Zhdanov had played an essential rôle in the Party consolidation work. His death in 1948 left a vacuum. In the beginning of the fifties, Stalin's health took a dramatic turn for the worse after the overwork incurred during the war. The problem of Stalin's succession posed itself for the near future. It was around this time that two groups of revisionists within the leadership became visible and started to plot their intrigues, while preaching fidelity to Stalin. Beria's group and Khrushchev's contituted two rival revisionist factions that, while secretly undermining Stalin's work, were waging war with each other. Since Beria was shot by Khrushchev in 1953, soon after Stalin's death, it might be supposed that he was an adversary of Khrushchevian revisionism. This is the position that Bill Bland took in a well documented study of Stalin's death. Bill Bland, 'The "Doctors' case" and the death of Stalin' (London: The Stalin Society, October 1991), Report. However, testimony from diametrically opposite sources concur in their affirmation that Beria held rightist positions. For example, the Zionist author Thaddeus Wittlin published a biography of Beria in the nauseating style of McCarthyism. Here is an example: 'the Dictator of Soviet Russia looked down at his peoples as if he were the merciless new god of millions of his people'. Thaddeus Wittlin, Commissar: The Life and Death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 354. Literally. But, presenting the ideas developed by Beria towards 1951, Wittlin claimed that he wanted to authorize private enterprise in light industry and 'to moderate the collective farm system', as well as 'by returning to the approach of the pre-Stalin era, the NEP'. 'Beria ... was against the Stalin policy of Russification of non-Russian nations and republics'. Beria wanted 'Better international relations with the West' and 'also intended to restore relations with Tito'.

Ibid. , pp. 363--365. This homage to Beria's 'reasonable politics' stands out, coming from such a sickening anti-Communist pen. Tokaev, clandestine opponent, claimed that he knew Beria and others in the thirties, 'not of servants, but of enemies of the régime'. Tokaev, op. cit. , p. 7. Gardinashvili, one of Beria's close collaborators, had close relations with Tokaev. Ibid. , p. 101. Khrushchev, for whom it would be in his interest to depict Beria as being close to Stalin, wrote: 'In the last years of Stalin's life Beria used to express his disrespect for Stalin more and more baldly.' Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: André Deutsch, 1971), p. 313. 'Stalin feared that he would be the first person Beria might choose'. Ibid. , p. 311. 'It seemed sometimes that Stalin was afraid of Beria and would have been glad to get rid of him but didn't know how to do it.' Ibid. , p. 250. We should not forget Molotov's opinion. He and Kaganovich were the only leaders to remain faithful to their revolutionary past. 'I cannot exclude the possibility that Beria provoked Stalin's death. I felt it through what he was saying. May Day 1953, on the Tribune of the Mausoleum, he made such allusions. He was looking for complicity. He said, "I made him disappear". He tried to implicate me. "I saved you all".' Chueva, op. cit. , p. 327. 'I consider Khrushchev as rightwing, but Beria was even more rightwing. Both were rightwing. And Mikoyan too. But they had different personalities. Khrushchev was to

the right and completely rotten, but Beria was even more to the right and even more rotten.' Ibid. , p. 335. 'Without question, Khrushchev was reactionary and succeeded in infiltrating into the Party. Of course, he believed in no form of communism. I consider Beria as an enemy. He infiltrated himself into the Party with destructive goals. Beria was a man without principles.' Ibid. , p. 323. During Stalin's last years, Khrushchev and Mikoyan clearly hid their political ideas to better place themselves after the succession. Khrushchev's disdain for Stalin shows up clearly in his memoirs: 'In my opinion it was during the war that Stalin started to be {not - Peter M.} quite right in the head.' Ibid. , p. 311. At 'the end of 1949', a 'sickness ... began to envelop Stalin's mind'. Ibid. , p. 246. Enver Hoxha noted Khrushchev's impatience for Stalin to die. In his memoirs, he noted a discussion that he had had in 1956 with Mikoyan: 'Mikoyan himself told me ... that they, together with Khrushchev and their associates, had decided to carry out a "pokushenie", i.e., to make an attempt on Stalin's life, but later, as Mikoyan told us, they gave up this plan.' Enver Hoxha, With Stalin: Memoirs (Toronto: Norman Bethune Institute, 1980), p. 31. {end of text} (6) Stalin's Body Removed From Lenin's Tomb Jennifer Rosenberg writes at http://history1900s.about.com/library/weekly/aa040600a.htm

Stalin's Body Removed From Lenin's Tomb After his death in 1953, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's remains were embalmed and put on display next to Vladimir Lenin. ... At the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, an old, devoted Bolshevik woman, Dora Abramovna Lazurkina stood up and said: {quote} My heart is always full of Lenin. Comrades, I could survive the most difficult moments only because I carried Lenin in my heart, and always consulted him on what to do. Yesterday I consulted him. He was standing there before me as if he were alive, and he said: "It is unpleasant to be next to Stalin, who did so much harm to the party." {endquote} {quoted in Robert Payne, The Rise and Fall of Stalin, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965, pp. 712-3} This speech had been pre-planned yet it was still very effective. Khrushchev followed by reading a decree ordering the removal of Stalin's remains. {quote} The further retention in the mausoleum of the sarcophagus with the bier of J. V. Stalin shall be recognized as inappropriate since the serious violations by Stalin of Lenin's precepts, abuse of power, mass repressions against honorable Soviet people, and other activities in the period of the personality cult make it impossible to leave the bier with his body in the mausoleum of V. I. Lenin. {endquote} {quoted in Payne, op. cit., p. 713} A few days later, Stalin's body was quietly removed from the mausoleum. There were no ceremonies and no fanfare. About 300 feet from the mausoleum, Stalin's body was buried near other minor leaders of the Revolution. Stalin's body was placed near the Kremlin wall, half-hidden by trees. A few weeks later, a simple dark granite stone marked the grave with the very simple, "J. V. STALIN 1879-1953." In 1970, a small bust was added to the grave. {end} (7) Nikita Khruschev on "Stalin's Anti-Semitism" and the proposal for a Jewish Crimea Khruschev Remembers, translated by Strobe Talbot; with an Introduction, Commentary and Notes by EDWARD CRANKSHAW (Sphere Books, London, 1971) {p. 258} Stalin's Anti-Semitism

{Crankshaw's comment} One of the most interesting aspects of this narrative is the way in which Khrushchev goes out of his way to condemn anti-Semitism. Guilt feelings must play their part here. There is no evidence to indicate that Khrushchev himself was ever committed actively to anti-Semitic policies, but time and time again he is on record as making disparaging remarks about Jews and insisting that they should be kept in their place. He may have been horrified by the pogroms of his childhood, but he did not like Jews, and as master of the Ukraine, he kept silent about the mass-murdering carried out by the Nazis (including the massacre at Babi Yar on the outskirts of Kiev). In accordance with Stalin's policy, which he later made his own, he refused to admit that Jews had suffered more than non-Jews on Soviet territory; he must also have connived at Stalin's own postwar deportation of Jews from the Ukraine into deep Siberta. Everything he has to say about the fate of individual Jews in this period is true; he might have said much more. It is interesting to get the story of Mikhoels' murder offcially confirmed and to have an illuminating sidelight on the fate of poor Lozovsky. None of this, incidentally, was mentioned in the Secret Speech. Nor was the a rest and imprisonment of Molotov's wife. On the other hand, the Secret Speech contained more information than occurs in this chapter on Stalin's destruction of whole peoples in the Crimea and the Caucasus (tartars, Chechens, Ingushes, and so on), as a punishment for "col{p. 259} laboration" with the Germans. Khrushchev's own slapdash attitude toward violence and arbitrary rule comes out in this chapter, as in the earlier chapters on the great purges. "I'm all for arresting people' he says, but with the implication that it should be done in the proper form. {end Crankshaw's comment} WHILE we were still pushing the Germans out of the Ukraine, an organization had been formed called the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee of the Sovinformbureau [Soviet Bureau of Information]. It was set up for gathering materials - positive materials, naturally - about our country, about the activities of our Soviet Army against the common enemy, Hitlerite Germany, and for the distribution of these materials to the Western press, principally in America where there is a large, influential circle of Jews. The committee was composed of Jews who occupied high positions in the Soviet Union and washeaded by Lozovsky, a member of the Central Committee and former chairman of Profintem [the Trade Union Intemational]. Another member was Mikhoels, the most prominent actor of the Yiddish theater. Yet another was Molotov's wife, Comrade Zhemchuzhina. I think this organization was first created at the suggestion of Molotov, although it may have been Stalin's own idea. The Sovinformbureau and its Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were considered indispensable to the interests of our State, our policies, and our Communist Party.12 {see footnote}

Lozovsky used to get in touch with me whenever I came to Moscow, and sometimes he would call me on the telephone asking for material to use as propaganda about the Hitlerite fascists. I gave orders for the preparation of such material over the signatures of various authors, and it was sent to America, where it was widely used to publi{footnote - Crankshaw's comment} 12. Lozovsky was well known to western correspondents and respected by them as the soviet official spokesman. He simply vanished in 1948 and was sadly missed. Soon it was known that he had been shot, along with a number of Jewish writers, after the sudden disbandment of the Jewish Anti-Fascist committee. Khrushchev's first reference to the "Crimean Affair" was in an interview with a delegation of Canadian Communists in 1956. The famous Jewish actor Mikhoels also vanished at this time. It was soon known, though not admitted, that he had been shot. He was the brother of one of the Kremlin doctors falsely accused of poisoning activities and as himself built into the-so-called plot by the NKVD. Madame Molotova (Zhemchuzhina) had been an important figure in her own right, at one time head of the State Cosmetic Trust (which introduced perfumes and lipstick to the Soviet young). Molotov had to stand by and suffer her arrest and exile without murmuring at the very time when he was turning his iron front to the West in the early days of the Cold war. {end Crankshaw's footnote} {p. 260} cize the successes of the Red Army and to expose the atrocities committed by the Germans inthe Ukraine. On the whole, Lozovsky's activities were very worthwhile. He was an energetic person and sometimes almost annoyingly persistent. He used virtually to extort material from me, saying, "Give me more materiall! More! More!" We were busy with the reconstruction of the economy and didn't have much time for such matters. He wouldn't let up on me: "You must understand how important it is for us to show the face of our common enemy to the world, to expose his atrocities, and to show the process of reconstruction which is taking place in our cities and villages." Once the Ukraine had been liberated, a paper was drafted by members of the Lozovsky committee. It was addressed to Stalin and contained a proposal that the Crimea be made a Jewish Soviet Republic within the Soviet Union after the deportation from the Crimea of the Crimean Tartars. Stalin saw behind this proposal the hand of American Zionists operating through the Sovinformbureau. The committee members, he declared, were agents of American Zionism. They were trying to set up a Jewish state in the Crimea in order to wrest the Crimea away from the Soviet Union and to establish an outpost of American imperialism on our shores which would be a direct threat to the security of the Soviet Union. Stalin let his imagination run wild in this direction. He was struck with maniacal

vengeance. Lozovsky and Mikhoels were arrested. Soon Zhemchuzhina herself was arrested. The investigation of the group took a long time, but in the end almost all of them came to a tragic end. Lozovsky was shot. Zhemchuzhma was exiled. I thought at first she had been shot, too, because nothing of what had happened was reported to anyone except Stalin, and Stalin himself decided whom to execute and whom to spare. I remember Molotov calling to ask my advice about this whole affair. Apparently Zbemchuzhina had pulled him into it. Molotov never did agree with Stalin about the necessity for arresting Zhemchuzhina. When the question of removing her from the staff of the Central Committee came up at a Central Committee plenum and everyone else voted aye, Molotov abstained. He didn't vote nay, but he still abstained. Stalin blew up at this, and the incident left its imprint on Stalin's attitude toward Molotov. He started kicking Molotov around viciously. Kaganovich's maliciousness was a particularly good barometer of Molotov's precarious position. Incited by Stalin, Kaganovich played the part of a vicious cur who was unleashed to tear limb from limb any {p. 261} member of the Politbureau toward whom he sensed Stalin's coolness, and Kaganovich was turned loose on Molotov. I didn't find out that Zhemchuzhina was still alive until after Stalin's death, when Molotov told me that she was living in exile. We all agreed she should be freed. Beria released her and solemnly handed her over to Molotov. Beria used to describe how Molotov came to his office at the Ministry of Internal Affairs to be reunited with Zhemchuzhina. Molotov was overjoyed that she was still alive and threw himself into her arms. Beria expressed his sympathy to Molotov and Zhemchuzhina at the time, but he made a point of reminding them that she had been freed on his initiative and he told this story with a touch of irony in his voice. A question of substance: was it necessary to create a Jewish Union or autonomous Republic within the Russian Federation or within the Ukraine? I don't think it was. A Jewish autonomous Region had already been created which still nominally exists, so it was hardly necessary to set one up in the Crimea.13 But this question was never discussed in substance. We had been conditioned to accept Stalin's reasoning, and we gave in to his absolute authority. He contended that if a Jewish Republic were created in the Crimea, then Zionism, which is rampant in America, would gain a foothold in our country. That was all there was to it. He had made up his mind, and he had people arrested, arbitrarily and without any regard for legal norms, regardless of the important and positive role which the accused had played during the war in helping to bring to light the atrocities committed by the Germans. Theirs had been constructive work, but now it counted for nothing. They were deprived of their liberty

and in many cases their lives. I consider the whole affair to have been a disgrace. Stalin could have simply rejected their suggestion and rebuked them. But no, he had to destroy all those who actively supported the proposal. It was only by some miracle that Zhemchuzhina stayed alive and got off with a long term of exile. More typical was the cruel punishment of Mikhoels, the greatest actor of the Yiddish theater, a man of culture. They killed him like beasts. They killed him secretly. Then his murderers were rewarded and tbeir victim was buried with honors. The mind reels at the thought! It was announced that Mikhoels had fallen in {footnote - Crankshaw's comment} 13. This refers to the Autonomous Republic of Birobidzhan in Siberia, designated as a national home for soviet Jews It never came to much. Understandably the Jews took to it only in small numbers. {end Crankshaw's footnote} {p. 262} front of a truck. Actually he was thrown in front of a truck. This was done very cleverly and efficiently. And who did it? Stalin did it, or at least it was done on his instructions. After Stalin's death, when we opened the archives of the Ministry of State Security and interrogated Beria's men, we found out that they had planned to murder Litvinov [Molotov's predecessor as foreign minister] by a similar method. Litvinov was to have been ambushed and killed on the road while he was traveling from Moscow to his dacha. 14 Later, a group of Jews at the Stalin Automobile Factory were put on trial. In this case, too, Stalin was looking for schemes of American imperialism operating through Zionists. It was all pure nonsense, of course. But this was the sort of thing that happened as a result of Stalin's arbitrary rule and the absolute absence of any restraints on his authority. It still seems inconceivable to me that this kind of thing happened in our time. I'm all for arresting people, but the accused should be given a fair trial and exiled or imprisoned only if an honest approach to their cases proves that they really are criminal or political offenders. A prosecution and a trial should proceed according to the norms of the law. Trials should be conducted in the open so there will be no doubt in anyone's mind that the accused actually are guilty. That way no one will come to the defense of people who have been punished, and public opinion will genuinely support the punitive agencies. In our day we had people lifting up their voices in court, vouching for the truth of accusations, beating their breasts, and swearing that the accused were enemies of the people - all without any real knowledge about what had happened. A witness would endorse the verdict and raise his hand, voting for the elimination of the accused without really knowing about the facts of the alleged crime, much less the role of the alleged criminal. These were not real trials anyway. They were closed courts in the hands of troikas. And who made up the troikas? Three men

who arrested, prosecuted, and judged the accused all by themselves. Most of the people who lost their heads in Stalin's time were tried by this kind of court. ... {footnote - Crankshaw's comment} 14. M. M. Litvinov, Soviet foreign minister, was replaced by Molotov after tho failure of his "collective security" drive in 1939. The story of his planned assassination is new. In the end he died a natural death. {end Crankshaw's footnote} {end} (8) Stalin died on the feast of Purim, 1953 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purim Stalin was suddenly paralysed on 1st March 1953, which corresponds to Purim 1953, and died 4 days later. Due to Stalin's death, nation-wide pogroms against Jews throughout the Soviet Union were averted, as Stalin's infamous doctors' plot was halted. == How Stalin's Rage Saved the Jews By Larry Domnitch from the March 2003 Edition of the Jewish Magazine http://www.jewishmag.com/65mag/stalin/stalin.htm The following story was leaked to the press at a time when the Soviets, frequently accused of anti-Semitism, sought to improve their image. In 1956, two accounts appeared. One in the London Times, the other in France Soir, one year later, a similar account appeared in the New York Times. These accounts depicted the events surrounding the last living moments of Soviet premier Joseph Stalin. There is no certainty regarding the accuracy of these accounts, but there is no evidence to the contrary. At the end of February 1953, a meeting took place between leaders of the Soviet regime. There, Stalin revealed his plans for Soviet Jewry. No Mordechai or Esther was present, but Haman was there. At the meeting, Stalin's pent up fury reached a crescendo and exploded into an uncontrolled rage, which resulted in his death and perhaps the salvation of millions.

Not even ten years after the Nazi destruction of European Jewry, Josef Stalin was bent upon the same course. Decades of purges, executions, imprisonment's and exiles of tens of thousands of Soviet Jews had escalated during the early years of the Cold War into a full-scale attack upon Soviet Jewry. By early 1953, the media launched daily attacks against the Jews under the pretext of the infamous "Doctors plot" in which Jewish doctors were accused of planning to poison government officials. As a result of the accusations, numerous doctors and other Soviet Jews were incarcerated, and executed. As in Nazi Germany, and so many other nations throughout history, they were used as scapegoats for all of their nation's woes. Hounded by both the media and the police, the Jews of the Soviet Union, lived in terror. The driving force behind the terror was Stalin. Stalin's onslaught against the Jews was not something random; there was a calculated purpose to his madness. At the time, rumors had already become widespread that he was planning to deport thousands of Jews to Biro Bidzhan (an alleged Jewish autonomous region) and Siberia. A broadcast on Voice of America stated, "Biro Bidzhan the 'Jewish autonomous republic' has been transformed into a concentration camp. A surreptitious tendency is observed to deport to Biro Bidzhan all Jews arrested. It is difficult to establish the number of camps in Biro Bidzhan. Suffice it to say that one of the camps along the Biro River there are five to six departments; each department is reckoned to have 200-300 slaves." Those rumors were soon the subject of a meeting between Stalin and his presidium. Stalin pre-empted the meeting with the two-dozen leaders present by rehashing the usual accusations of "Zionist imperialist plots" and the "doctor's plot" and spoke of the need for collective deportation of the Jews to Central Asia and Biro Bidzhan. The implications were clear. A hushed silence followed the speech. Lazar Kaganovich, one of Stalin's loyal enforcers was the first to speak. He asked hesitantly, whether all Jews were to be deported. Stalin replied, "a certain section." Again there was silence. Another presidium member, Vyacheslav Molotov, whose Jewish wife Paulina was exiled to the Kazakhastan wilderness a few years earlier, broke the silence and dared to object stating that the expulsion of Jews would have a negative impact on world opinion, while another longtime Politburo member, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, shook his head in agreement. The unusual display of opposition continued. Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov dared to defy the dictator. Just days earlier, four government agents arrived at his home to arrest his Jewish wife. More loyal to his wife than to the regime, Voroshilov, with gun in hand chased them away. In a dramatic gesture of defiance, he threw his party card on the table and resolutely stated that he no longer wanted to be a part of the Communist party. Enraged, Stalin bellowed in response that only he determined who remained within the party.

As Stalin's rage reached a crescendo, he collapsed on the floor suffering a massive stroke. As he lay stricken, no specialist arrived to help him. They were all executed and imprisoned during the "Doctor's plot." Fifteen to 20 minutes' later, doctors arrived. Stalin was brought to his private apartment where he lay gravely ill. Soviet party leaders surrounded him, many eagerly anticipating his imminent death and the end of his reign. In his final gesture, he pointed his finger towards those present at his bedside including his daughter suggesting their guilt or complicity in a conspiracy to kill him. Then he died. Following Stalin's death, there was concern that his successors would be as evil or even worse. No one knew what to expect from the Soviets. Perhaps the next leader would blame the Jews for the Premier's death. An editorial from a contemporary Jewish periodical concluded its summation on Stalin's death; "The fate of Jews in the Red Empire hangs in the balance." Stalin's death, which was announced on March 5, was actually cause for great relief. The purges almost immediately ended as did most of the media attacks against Jews and Israel. Soon, the surviving doctor's arrested were released. Soviet Jewry's struggles were far from over, but they were relieved of their greatest antagonist. Stalin died as he was planning Jewry's destruction in the Soviet Union. The exact day of his death remains a mystery. Perhaps he died on Purim day (March 1) itself. But one thing could be said, in the safety of their private confines, Soviet Jews celebrated Purim marking the salvation of Jewry in ancient times and in their own as well. == http://volokh.com/posts/1142377314.shtml 3.14.2006 9:08pm (link)Lena Matis (mail): Josef Stalin suffered a massive stroke on Purim Day 1953 He died two days later (the official date of death is March 5). Prior to that Purim Day, Stalin was executing his own mad well-calculated plan of deportation of the Soviet Jews into Far Eastern concentration camps. Thus Stalin's collapse on Purim Day, followed by his death, prevented the otherwise inevitable distruction of the Jews in the USSR. == http://www.aish.com/h/pur/t/48955726.html Stalin and the Purim Present

A new book reveals that Stalin met his fate poised to launch a post-Holocaust holocaust of his own. by Am Echad Resources March 5 this year was the first day of the Jewish month Adar (actually the second of two Adars during this Jewish leap year). We are enjoined by the Talmud to "increase happiness" in Adar, the month of Purim, when we celebrate and express our gratitude to God for delivering the Jews in ancient Persia from their enemies. On Purim, Jews give alms to the poor and gifts of food to one another. This year, March 5 brought us an early Purim present. It wasn't food, but it was definitely food for thought. The previous day had been the 50th anniversary of the death of Iosef Vissarionovich Dzugashvili, better known as Joseph Stalin. A new book on the Soviet dictator and mass murderer, "Stalin's Last Crime," is set to be published shortly, and it was on the 5th that The New York Times ran a lengthy article about the book, including its suggestion that Stalin may have been poisoned. The Soviet leader hadcollapsed after an all-night dinner with four member of his Politburo at Blizhnaya, a north Moscow dacha, and languished for several days before dying. If indeed he was done in, as the book's authors suspect, the likely culprit, they say, was Lavrenti P. Beria, the chief of the Soviet secret police. The book also recounts the story of the infamous "Doctors' Plot," a fabricated collusion by Kremlin doctors to kill top Communist leaders. "By the time Stalin disclosed the plot to a stunned Soviet populace in January 1953," the article notes, "he had spun it into a vast conspiracy, led by Jews under the United States' secret direction, to kill him and destroy the Soviet Union itself." The article goes on to relate something less widely known. "That February," it states, "the Kremlin ordered the construction of four giant prison camps in Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Arctic north, apparently in preparation for a second great terror -- this time directed at the millions of Soviet citizens of Jewish descent." That terror, however, thankfully never unfolded. Two weeks after the camps were ordered built, Stalin attended the Blizhnaya dinner and, four days later, was dead at the age of 73. The gift we have been given this Adar is the knowledge of what the killer of millions of his countrymen had apparently planned for the Jews under his control. That he met

his fate (however that may have happened) poised to launch a post-Holocaust holocaust of his own, is something we might well add to our thoughts of gratitude at our Purim celebrations this year, a half century later. And we might note something else as well, especially during this season of meaningful ironies, when God's hand is evident "between the lines" of history to all who are sensitive enough to see it. Stalin, according to his successor Nikita Khrushchev, who was present at the dinner party, had apparently collapsed after the feast, at which, Khrushchev also recounted, the dictator had gotten thoroughly drunk. The feast ended in the early hours of March 1. Which, in 1953, corresponded to the 14th day of Adar, otherwise known as Purim. {end} Pavel Sudoplatov on the proposal for a Jewish Crimea: sudoplat.html. Lazar Kaganovich on the Death of Stalin: kaganovich.html. Edvard Radzinsky on the Death of Stalin: radzinsk.html. Mao stayed loyal to Stalin. When he saw how Stalin had been treated, he inaugurated the Let 100 Flowers Bloom campaign, to draw his enemies out. He became destabilized, launching the Great Leap Forward. Its failure led to Mao's demotion; to regain his power, he promoted the disastrous Cultural Revolution. Finally he accepted Nixon's olive branch, delivered by Kissinger; the USSR thus gained Vietnam, but lost China. In 1979, with Vietnam invading Cambodia, China invaded Vietnam. Vietnam had just renewed a treaty with the USSR; China was testing that treaty. The US warned the USSR not to intervene - thus taking China's side. In the 1980s, China allowed the CIA to monitor Soviet nuclear tests from within China: U.S., China Team Up in Drug War; New Center Helps Nations Eavesdrop on Traffickers The Washington Post; Washington, D.C.; Oct 31, 1998; John Pomfret; Douglas Farah; ISSN: 01908286

http://burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199811/msg00070.html In a step toward joint operations to fight international crime, the United States and China have established a secret electronic surveillance post along China's border with Burma to eavesdrop on narcotics traffickers from the Golden Triangle, one of the world's biggest sources of heroin, Chinese and U.S. sources say. ... It follows on the operation in the 1980s by the CIA and its Chinese counterpart of listening posts in China's far-western Xinjiang Autonomous Region to monitor Soviet nuclear weapons tests. ... {end}. The conflict between the Zionist and Stalinist factions of Communism, emerging in public with the Doctors' Plot, thus brought it down. The John Birch Society and the League of Rights blame Kissinger for accepting defeat in Vietnam, not crediting his role in winning China. These McCarthyists, like Douglas McArthur, would have used nuclear weapons in the Korean & Vietnamese wars. After Mao's death, Deng Xiao-ping visited Japan, and decided to move towards the Japanese economic model. But Japan's hierarchic society, culminating in the Keiretsu, was different from China's; China later found the South Korean chaebol a better model for it to follow. The Basle Accord of 1987 brought down the Japanese banks; and the Asia Crisis of 1997 destroyed the independence of the "Asian Tigers", leaving China with the inheritance of the "Asia model". Its Comnmunist Party helps to preserve its independence from the West; more on Asia at asia.html. Making Sense of Stalin: stalin.html. Seeing the real Trotsky: trotsky.html. Isaac Deutscher wrote that the Bolshevik Government, in its first years, was run by "emigres had lived many years in the West", who looked down on Russian "backwardness" and pursued "internationalist" politics: "... they were Marxists in partibus infidelium, West European revolutionaries acting against a non-congenial Oriental background, which ... tried to impose its tyranny upon them. Only revolution in the West could relieve them from that tyranny ... "

"No sooner had Bolshevism mentally withdrawn into its national shell than this attitude became untenable. The party of the revolution had to stoop to its semi-Asiatic environment. It had to cut itself loose from the specifically Western tradition of Marxism ... " Beria and Gorbachev attempted to return to this "Western" Marxism: each emphatically rejected Stalin. But Deutscher was a Jewish Trotskytist, and this "Western" Marxism is Trotskyism by another name:beria.html. On the successor-governments following the death of Stalin, see Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich UTOPIA IN POWER: the History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, translated by Phyllis B. Carlos (Hutchinson, London, 1985): marx-vsthe-peasant.html.

Beria vs. Stalin: "Western" Marxism vs "Russian" Marxism - Peter Myers, January 8, 2003; update July 22, 2007 My comments are shown {thus}. Write to me at contact.html. You are at http://mailstar.net/beria.html. Isaac Deutscher wrote that the Bolshevik Government, in its first years, was run by "emigres had lived many years in the West", who looked down on Russian "backwardness" and pursued "internationalist" politics: "... they were Marxists in partibus infidelium, West European revolutionaries acting against a non-congenial Oriental background, which ... tried to impose its tyranny upon them. Only revolution in the West could relieve them from that tyranny ... " "No sooner had Bolshevism mentally withdrawn into its national shell than this attitude became untenable. The party of the revolution had to stoop to its semi-Asiatic environment. It had to cut itself loose from the specifically Western tradition of Marxism ... " Beria and Gorbachev attempted to return to this "Western" Marxism: each emphatically rejected Stalin. But Deutscher was a Jewish Trotskytist, and this "Western" Marxism is Trotskyism by another name. Stuart Kahan wrote in The Wolf of the Kremlin, (William Morrow and Company, New York, 1987):

{p. 256} Stalin was about to launch a new terrorist campaign against the party's higher-ranking members, and it appeared that no one was safe, least of all those with Jewish connections. They would be the targets for the upcoming purges. Besides Molotov, Voroshilov had married a woman of Jewish extraction, Beria's mother was half-Jewish, Khrushchev's son-in-law was of Jewish origin, and Lazar himself was a Jew. {endquote}kaganovich.html (1) Sudoplatov's Beria (2) Walter Duranty, USSR: the Story of Soviet Russia (3) Stalin and Beria as a Team (4) Ludo Martens on Beria (5) Isaac Deutscher, Russia After Stalin With a Postscript on the Beria Affair (6) Mikhail Heller & Aleksandr Nekrich on the successor-governments following the death of Stalin

(1) Sudoplatov's Beria SPECIAL TASKS: MEMOIRS OF AN UNWANTED WITNESS - A SOVIET SPYMASTER Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter Foreword by Robert Conquest (Little, Brown and Company, New York 1994, 1995): {p. xiii} INTRODUCTION {by} Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter {p. xvi} Beria, argues Sudoplatov, was an innovator who would have brought ahout the unification of Germany in the 1950s, avoiding the crises that led to the construction of the Berlin Wall. In the few short months between Stalin's death and his arrest by Khrushchev's supporters, Beria had begun emptying the Gulag and urged that political prisoners he released. Sudoplatov rejoiced in the freeing of his friends, mostly Jews who had been purged from the intelligence service during the so-called Zionist conspiracy. Sudoplatov's Beria is part monster and part reformer, too strong for Stalin's other heirs to let him live. Khushchev successfully destroyed Beria and then created a historical image, still popularly held, that it was primarily Beria who shared with Stalin culpability for the crimes that preceded Khrushchev's leadership. {end} Sudoplatov writes on Beria at sudoplat.html.

(2) Walter Duranty, USSR: the Story of Soviet Russia, Hamish Hamilton, London 1944. {p. 103} To the Western world it seemed that the bitter and protracted conflict inside the Communist Party which followed Lenin's death, was mainly a struggle for power, for the inheritance of Lenin's mantle, between two rivals, Stalin and Trotsky. In reality the conflict began much earlier and covered much wider ground than a quarrel of individuals. I have already mentioned the deep-seated jealousy and ill feeling between the "Western exiles," the small group of Bolshevik leaders who had lived in Switzerland, France and England during the decade of repression from 1907 to 1917, and those of their comrades who had stayed in Russia as desperate champions of an illegal and "underground" movement. Secondly, there was a sharp divergence of views in the Central Committee itself, not so much about principles as about methods, persons and timing, that is, how the principles should be applied, and by whom and at what moment. Official Bolshevik records show that such divergences had always been a feature of discussions in the higher ranks of the Party, that they had existed, sometimes to a damaging degree, during the period between the abdication of the Tsar and the seizure of power in November, 1917. {end}

(3) Stalin and Beria as a Team From http://www.stabi.hs-bremerhaven.de/whkmla/region/russia/cccp2939dom.html : {start} New Economic Policy 1921-1928 Domestic Policy : Party Purges, Kulak Famine and the Gulag J.V. Stalin, as GENERAL SECRETARY of the Communist Party, with BERIA, head of the secret police, closely cooperating, was the most powerful person in the Soviet Union. Yet the office of general secretary was not defined as such; it had been Stalin who had filled the office with this power. In order to secure the power against actual or potential political rivals, Stalin had them, one by one, over a period of several years, arrested, accused of counterrevolutionary activities or conspiracy in SHOW TRIALS, sentenced and eiled to Siberia or executed : KAMENEV and SINOVEV in 1934 (Siberia) and 1936 (shot), TUKHACHEVSKY (1937, shot), BUKHANIN (1938) etc. The persecution was not limited to the top level; supporters of those sentenced in show trials were eliminated in PARTY PURGES conducted again and again. Anybody suspected of having supported one of those deemed counterrevolutionaries or dissidents were in danger of being deported, down to school

children who had written essays on the history of the revolution. The minimum age for the death penalty in 1935 was lowered to 12 years. The Siberian prison system, referred to as the GULAG, in 1938 had an estimated 3 to 5 million inmates, mostly political prisoners; conditions were horrible, many did not return (here lack of nutrition and exposure to the extreme climatic conditions, as well as lack of medical care were the main killers). The KULAKS, landowning peasants reluctant to give up their farmland and join a Kolkhoze, were expropriated, but excluded from the kolkhoze. Thus deprived of their livelihood, the authorities at Stalin's order, did nothing to prevent the KULAK FAMINE of 1933, a mass starvation neither caused by war nor by misharvest. Stalin prohibited any food shipment into the affected areas (mainly UKRAINE). When western relief organizations offered help, Stalin refused, denying the problem to exist. Some refugees reached the west, though. The number of victims is estimated at over 6 million. With some legitimation Stalin could claim that the living standard of the Soviet industrial worker had risen ("life has become merry", 1935). Yet shared housing was still normal, a bicycle a valued possession; the demand for personal privacy was condemned by the Communist Party as "petitbourgeois mentality", and rejected. In 1936 the TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLIC was dissolved into the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani SSR. The Soviet Union declared to be against IMPERIALISM, and established numerous autonomous republics (ASSRs) for ethnic minorities, for instance the KARELIAN ASSR in 1935, the KOMI ASSR in 1936, the MORDOVIAN or MORDVINIAN ASSR in 1934 etc.; later in the 1930s, however, a RUSSIFICATION policy was pursued. Certain ethnicities, such as the Crimean Tatars, became the object of MASS DEPORTATION. {end of text}

(4) Ludo Martens on Beria Ludo Martens writes in his online book Another view of Stalin (Copyright © 1995 John Plaice) at http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node153.html Stalin's death {my comments are in curly brackets}

A few months before Stalin's death, the entire security system that protected him was dismantled. Alexandr Proskrebychev, his personal secretary, who had assisted him since 1928 with remarkable efficiency, was fired and placed under house arrest. He had allegedly redirected secret documents. Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Vlasik, Chief of Stalin's personal security for the previous 25 years, was arrested on December 16, 1952 and died several weeks later in prison. P. Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars (1984), p. 321; cited in Bland, op. cit. , p. 24. {Bill Bland, The "Doctors' case" and the death of Stalin (London: The Stalin Society, October 1991) http://harikumar.brinkster.net/BLAND/DOCTORS%20CASE_FINAL.htm} Major-General Petr Kosynkin, Vice-Commander of the Kremlin Guard, responsible for Stalin's security, died of a `heart attack' on February 17, 1953. Deriabin wrote: '(This) process of stripping Stalin of all his personal security (was) a studied and very ably handled business'. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 209; cited in Bland, op. cit., p. 27. Only Beria was capable of preparing such a plot. On March 1, at 23:00, Stalin's guards found him on the floor in his room, unconscious. They reached the members of the Politburo by telephone. Khrushchev claimed that he also arrived, and that each went back home. Deriabin, op. cit., p. 300. No-one called a doctor. Twelve hours after his attack, Stalin received first aid. He died on March 5. Lewis and Whitehead write: 'Some historians see evidence of premeditated murder. Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov sees the cause in Stalin's visible preparation of a purge to rival those of the thirties'. J. Lewis and P. Whitehead, Stalin: A Time for Judgment (London, 1990), p. 279; cited in Bland, op. cit., p. 34. Immediately after Stalin's death, a meeting of the presidium was convened. Beria proposed that Malenkov be President of the Council of Ministers and Malenkov

proposed that Beria be named Vice-President and Minister of Internal Affairs and State Security. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit., p. 324. During the following months, Beria dominated the political scene. 'We were going through a very dangerous period', wrote Khrushchev. Ibid., p. 331. Once installed as head of Security, Beria had Proskrebychev, Stalin's secretary, arrested; then Ryumin, who had led the inquiry into Zhdanov's suspicious death. Ignatiev, Ryumin's boss, was denounced for his rôle in the same affair. On April 3, the doctors accused of having killed Zhdanov were liberated. The Zionist author Wittlin claimed that by rehabilitating the Jewish doctors, Beria wanted to 'denigrate ... Stalin's aggressive foreign policy against the West, the United States and Great Britain primarily'. Wittlin, op. cit., p. 388. {77. Thaddeus Wittlin, Commissar: The Life and Death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria (New York: Macmillan, 1972)} Still in April, Beria organized a counter-coup in his native region, Georgia. Once again he placed his men at the top of the Party and the State. Dekanozov, later shot along with Beria, became Minister of State Security, replacing Rukhadze, arrested as 'enemy of the people'. Bland, op. cit., p. 46. {endquote}

(5) Isaac Deutscher, Russia After Stalin With a Postscript on the Beria Affair, Hamish Hamilton, London 1953: {p. 30} In later years, when economic reconstruction was under way and the ruling group might have met with more popular support, its members were already fixed in undemocratic habits of government and had a stake in persisting in those habits. It is as a rule easier for any government or party to move away from a democratic principle a thousand miles than to go back to it a single yard. {Deutscher implies that the USSR was "democratic" before Stalin, i.e. in its "Trotskyist" period. This view, coupled with his castigastion of Stalin, shows that he is a Trotskyist}

Stalin was not inclined to go back a single inch. He identified himself wholeheartedly and unreservedly with the development towards autocracy. He became its chief promoter and its chief beneficiary. Unswervingly he remoulded the Leninist State into a new, authoritarian-bureaucratic shape. He had even less hesitation in breaking away from the revolutionary internationalist aspect of Leninism. During the Leninist period he had, like every other Bolshevik, expounded the view that the Russian revolution could not be self-sufficient, and that its future depended on the progress of world revolution. He emphatically repeated this even shortly after Lenin's death, saying that socialism could not be built up in a single isolated country, especially in one as 'backward' as Russia. Even while he was reiterating this Leninist axiom, world revolution was to him merely an abstract idea. The immediate reality in which he was wholly immersed, and to which he genuinely responded, was the Russian revolution. The other party leaders, who as emigres had lived many years in the West and had been impressed by its seemingly powerful Marxist movement, could argue with great sincerity that international communism had first claim on Soviet Russia, or even that the interests of Soviet Russia had to be subordinated to those of world revolution. To Stalin this reasoning was little better than a mental aberration of emigres, on whom the West had cast a magic spell, depriving them of any sense of reality. {p. 31} Instinctively he adopted an attitude towards which the Russian revolution was in any case drifting, an attitude of national self-centredness and selfsufficiency. To many rank and file Bolsheviks world revolution had become a lamentable myth by 1924, while the building of socialism in Russia was the exacting and exhilarating experience of their generation. Despite all his verbal tributes to Leninist internationalism, Stalin became the chief mouthpiece of this sentiment. He elevated the sacred egoism of the Russian revolution to a supreme principle - this was the real meaning of his idea of 'socialism in one country'. He was determined to make the sacred egoism of the 'only proletarian State in the world' the guiding idea of international communism as well. Whenever the interests of foreign communism clashed or appeared to clash with those of the Soviet Union, he sacrificed foreign communism. By the middle of the 1920's Bolshevism had virtually solved its dilemma of 'liberation' versus 'containment' in favour of containment. World capitalism was not to be allowed to overlap the frontiers of the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union was not to forgo even the slightest chance of an understanding with any bourgeois government, even if such an understanding could be bought only at the price of

'betraying' foreign communism. Fascist regimes, bourgeois democracies, and Oriental reactionary dictatorships - all were equally good, or equally bad, as partners in trade and diplomatic bargaining. The Communist International still proudly claiming to be the vanguard of world revolution became the rearguard of Stalin's diplomacy. It was used as an instrument of Soviet pressure upon capitalist governments rather than as a militant movement fighting for their overthrow. 'Socialism in one country' was in effect the formula in which Bolshevism, under Stalin's leadership, intimated its readiness for self-containment to a world which was anyhow bent on containing it. Thus the statesmen of {p. 32} the Western world understood the formula; and most of them applauded Stalin's victory over Trotsky, in whom they saw the hateful incarnation of all the world-revolutionary aspirations of early Bolshevism. (Little did those statesmen expect that one day they would feel threatened by a revolution carried on the point of the bayonets of Stalin's armies!) As long as Bolshevism hoped and believed that its ultimate salvation would come from abroad, it remained in a sense elevated above its Russian environment. It did not feel dependent on that environment only. It could afford to express its disdain for native 'backwardness', for Russia's semi-Asiatic outlook, and for her Tsarist past; and nobody vented that disdain more often and with less inhibition than Lenin did. During the early years of the Soviet regime, the Bolshevik leaders had the feeling that they were Marxists in partibus infidelium, West European revolutionaries acting against a non-congenial Oriental background, which temporarily restricted their freedom of movement and tried to impose its tyranny upon them. Only revolution in the West could relieve them from that tyranny; and that it was about to do so was beyond doubt. No sooner had Bolshevism mentally withdrawn into its national shell than this attitude became untenable. The party of the revolution had to stoop to its semiAsiatic environment. It had to cut itselfloose from the specifically Western tradition of Marxism. It had to lay itself open to the slow, persistent infiltration of native backwardness and barbarism, even while it struggled to defeat that backwardness and barbarism. The adjustment began in the early part of the Stalinist era, and it did so in every field of activity: in the method of government, in the approach to problems of culture and education, in the relations with the outside world,

{p. 33} in the style of diplomatic dealings, and so on. The process of infiltration was gaining momentum throughout the Stalinist era; and it reached a grotesque climax just at its end. This does not mean that Bolshevism surrendered to its native environment. On the contrary, during the greater part of the Stalin era Bolshevism was as if at war with it industrializing, collectivizing, and modernizing it. In a sense, Bolshevism has 'Westernized' the essential framework of Russian society. But it could do so only by itself becoming 'Orientalized'. This mutual interpenetration of modern technology and Marxist socialism with Russian barbarism formed the content of the Stalin era. Shortly before his death Lenin had a premonition of the shape of things to come. He recalled the familiar historical phenomenon when a nation which has conquered another nation culturally superior to it succumbs to the political and cultural standards of the conquered. Something similar, so Lenin argued, may happen in class struggle: an oppressed and uneducated class may overthrow a ruling class culturally superior to it; and then the defeated class may impose its own standards upon the victorious revolutionary forces. In a flash of extraordinary foresight, Lenin had the vision of his disciples, the former professional revolutionaries, adopting the methods of government and the standards of behaviour of the Tsars, the feudal boyars, and the old bureaucracy. Lenin warned his followers against this danger; but up to a point he himself furthered it. He argued, for instance, that in order to prepare Russia for socialism industrially, technologically, and educationally, Bolshevism must drive barbarism out of Russia by barbarous methods, as Peter the Great had done in his time. This obiter dictum, one of Lenin's many and sometimes contradictory sayings, became Stalin's guiding principle. He had none of the qualms about barbarous methods which beset Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders; and he had no hesitation in proclaiming that the driving {p. 34} out of barbarism in a barbarous manner was no mere preliminary to socialism - it was socialism itself. To sum up: the transition from Leninism to Stalinism consisted in the abandonment of a revolutionary internationalist tradition in favour of the sacred egoism of Soviet Russia; and in the suppression of Bolshevism's pristine attachment to proletarian democracy in favour of an autocratic system of government. The isolation of the Russian revolution resulted in its mental self-isolation and in its spiritual and political adaptation to primordial Russian tradition. Stalinism represented the amalgamation of Western European Marxism with Russian barbarism.

A brief historical digression may perhaps be permitted here. We have seen that Marxist communism had had its cradle in the industrial West. A Western philosophy (Hegel), a Western political economy (Ricardo), and the ideas of Western Utopian socialism (Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen) had nursed it. Marxism claimed to make articulate theoretically and to express politically the revolutionary aspirations of Western industrial workers. During many decades it then strove to convert and conquer the West through the exertions of the Western working classes. By the turn of the century great labour movements had sprung up all over Western Europe, which marched under Marxist banners and solemnly vowed to use their first opportunity to carry out proletarian revolutions. Yet this apparent success of Marxism was spurious. More than a hundred years after the message of the Communist Manifesto had first resounded throughout the world not a single proletarian revolution has triumphed in the West. Not even a single fullscale attempt at such a revolution, an attempt genuinely backed by a majority {p. 35} of the working class, has taken place in the West, apart from the Commune of Paris, defeated in 1871. Instead Marxism has spread to the East; and by the efforts of the intelligentsia and a young and small working class it has conquered primitive peasant nations, from whom it had expected little or no response, and whom it had not considered capable of initiating a socialist order. At the middle of this century Marxism has become in a sense displaced from the West and naturalized in Russia and China. Where it has survived as a mass movement in the West, in France and Italy, it has done so in its 'Orientalized' form; and it exists there as a broad reflex of the Russian metamorphosis of Marxism. In the East Marxism has absorbed the traditions of Tsardom and of Greek Orthodoxy. It has indeed become so thoroughly transformed that the West has almost forgotten that Marxism is its own authentic product and has come to treat it almost as if it were an exotic Oriental religion. In its prevalent Stalinist version Marxism has very nearly ceased to understand the West, and has itself become incomprehensible to the West. So profound has become the displacement and transformation of the greatest revolutionary and international movement of our age. A striking parallel to this is found in the fortunes of early Christianity, which came into being as a Judaic 'heresy', as one of the extreme sects in the Synagogue, wholly in character with old Biblical tradition, and bent on converting to its beliefs primarily the Jews. Yet it was not given to Christianity to convert the people from whose midst its Man-God and its Apostles had come. Instead, Christianity moved into

a disintegrating pagan world, whose mind was no longer dominated by the old gods, where Jupiter's thunder no longer made men {p. 36} tremble, and Neptune was no longer able to shake the seas. It was in the temples of the old Graeco-Roman deities that Christianity made its conquests; and it began to breathe the air of their temples, to absorb and assimilate pagan myths, symbols, and beliefs. It came to dominate its new environment while it was adapting itself to it. It ceased to be a Jewish heresy; it ceased to live on the Nazarene memories of the Old Testament and on Jewish oral tradition. It ceased to understand the Jews and it became incomprehensible to the Jews. From the Judaic creed of the oppressed it became the religion of the Roman Casars. But converting the Casars, it also became converted to Caesarism, until the Holy See became an Imperial court, and until the hierarchical habits of the Roman Empire became its ecclesiastic canons. In Christianity this evolution lasted centuries; in Bolshevism - only decades. If Lenin was the St. Paul of Marxism, who set out to transplant the movement from its original environment into new lands, Stalin was already its Constantine the Great. He was, to be sure, not the first Emperor to embrace Marxism, but the first Marxist revolutionary to become the autocratic ruler of a vast empire. {p. 174} Fighting for the life of the revolution and for its own life, Lenin's government broke that promise. It destroyed Soviet democracy and banned all parties; but it still preserved democracy within Bolshevik ranks. Yet it could not allow the Bolsheviks the freedom which it had denied to others. Lenin proceeded to restrict inner party democracy, and Stalin abolished it. The reverse process can begin only with the infusion of democracy in the Communist Party. Only from there can freedom of expression spread to other bodies, covering an ever wider range, until a fully fledged Soviet democracy comes into being, backed by a high industrial civilization and by an up-to-date socialist system. Historically, the Communist Party has lost its own freedom because it denied it to others. When at last it regains freedom it cannot but return it to others. This great goal still looms only dimly on a distant horizon. To come nearer to it, Russia needs peace, peace, and once again peace. However half-hearted the intentions of the Malenkov government may have been and whatever its ultimate fate, it already has the historic distinction that it has taken the first steps which should lead towards democratic regeneration.

For decades freedom was banned from Russia because it was, or was supposed to be, the enemy of socialism. If Russia had been free to choose her own road she would hardly have marched in the direction in which Bolshevism has led her. But freedom may once again become the ally and friend of socialism; and then the forty years of wandering in the desert may be over for the Russian revolution. {p. 175} POSTSCRIPT THE BERIA AFFAIR BERIA'S downfall, announced on 10 July, marks the end of a distinct phase in Russia's political evolution after Stalin. During that phase, which lasted from March till the end of June, the advocates of reform at home and conciliation abroad were on the ascendant, while the diehards of Stalinism and the 'anti-appeasers' were compelled to yield one position after another. The East German revolt of 16 and 17 June brought into play a new factor which discomfited the reformers and conciliators and allowed their opponents to strike a counter-blow, the first since Stalin's death. Inside the ruling group a coalition of the most diverse groups and interests raised the cry: 'Enough of "liberalism"! Enough of appeasement! Enough of the betrayal of Stalinist orthodoxy!' To the world's amazement, Beria, Stalin's countryman, henchman, admiring biographer, and for many years chief policeman, was denounced as the arch-traducer of Stalinism. The Beria affair is undoubtedly an incident in the personal rivalry between Stalin's successors. It represents one stage in the process by which a candidate for the vacant post of the autocrat may strive to eliminate his competitors. But personal rivalry is only one of the elements of the drama: and in itself it is of secondary importance. More significant is the conflict of principles and policies hidden behind the clash of personalities - the world is interested in the policies rather than the personalities which are going to emerge victorious. {p. 176} Let us briefly survey the trend of Soviet policies since Stalin's death in order to see which are the major issues at stake. From March to the middle of June one domestic reform followed upon another in close succession. The Stalin cult was virtually abolished. A campaign of 'enlightenment' was in progress, designed to make it impossible to replace that cult by the adulation of any other Leader. The administration was being overhauled and shaken from its Byzantine-totalitarian rigidity. A fairly comprehensive amnesty was

decreed. The frame-up of the Kremlin doctors was declared null and void. The inquisitorial methods of the political police were bluntly condemned. {Yet Beria had been in charge of them} The rule of law was proclaimed. Strong emphasis was placed on the constitutional rights of the citizen. Newspapers asked almost openly for the abolition of censorship and official control. (The Literary Gazette, for instance, frankly demanded that the Soviet theatre be allowed to manage its own affairs without outside interference, a demand which nobody would have dared to raise during the Stalin era and which obviously set an infectious example to others.) The need for the 'monolithic' outlook was implicitly or even explicitly questioned at almost every step. Free expression of views was encouraged; and the holder of unorthodox views was no longer labelled an enemy, a traitor, or a foreign agent. High officials were demoted merely on the ground that they abused their power and acted unconstitutionally; no predatory or counter-revolutionary intent was attributed to them. The relaxation of the over-centralistic method of government was noticeable above all in the dismissal of Russifiers from high office in the Ukraine, in Georgia, and other outlying Union Republics. Russification was emphatically disavowed. Together with the cessation of anti-Semitic incitement these moves promised a new and hopeful beginning in the treatment of the smaller nationalities. {Before Stalin, the Jewish Bolsheviks dominated by rallying minority peoples against the Russians: convergence.html; Stalin reversed this process, introducing Russification, e.g. in the Central Asian parts of the USSR. In the West, Jewish Communists have similarly promoted ethnic minorities against the "Anglo" majority, even to the point of weakening the cohesiveness of the society} Last but not least, the government ordered a revision {p. 177} of the targets of the current economic plans. Consumer industries were to raise their output. A higher standard of living and contentment of the masses were obviously regarded as vital preconditions for the success of the new policy. A new spirit made itself felt in the conduct of foreign affairs. Moscow consistently exercised its influence in favour of a truce in Korea; and not even Synghman Rhee's provocations diverted the Russians (or the Chinese or the North Koreans) from this path. In Europe Malenkov's government began, as it was forecast, 'to explore the lines of retreat from Germany'. It is enough to recall here the moves made by Soviet diplomacy only during the week which preceded the Berlin revolts: After General Chuikov had been recalled from Berlin the whole policy of the PieckUlbricht government was dramatically reversed. The 'iron curtain' between Eastern

and Western Germany was nearly demolished. Labour policy was revised. The struggle between the government and the Evangelical Church was called off; and the Church regained its former privileges. Collectivization of farming was stopped. The farmers who had fled to Western Germany were invited to come back and take possession of their property. Private capital was also invited to return to industry and trade. From the Russian viewpoint these moves made no sense at all unless they were part and parcel of a policy calculated to bring about the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of occupation armies. There was little doubt in Berlin that Moscow was really prepared to abandon the government of Pieck and Ulbricht. So strongly indeed did Soviet representatives in Berlin encourage this belief and so frankly did they negotiate with non-Communist leaders about a change of the regime that by this alone the Russians themselves unwittingly induced the people of Berlin to descend upon {p. 178} the streets, to clamour for the resignation of the Communist government, and to storm that government's offices. 'Russia is willing to abandon her puppets - let us remove them at once!' this was the idea behind the German revolt. In the same week, on 10 June, Moscow established diplomatic relations with Austria and proclaimed an end to the regime of occupation there. Restrictions on inter-zonal traffic were abolished in Austria as well. And on the same day, as a side-line, Moscow solemnly renounced all its claims on Turkey, the claims that had played a fateful role in the opening phases of the cold war. What was surprising in all these developments, domestic and foreign, was their extraordinary consistency and apparently frictionless progress. Stalin's successors showed no sign of hesitation in pursuing the new course. They betrayed no second thoughts. They seemed to bask in the glory of unaccustomed generosity. Was it possible, one wondered, that the die-hards of Stalinism and other opponents of 'appeasement' should be so weak and discredited that they were unable to put a brake upon the new course? Or were they perhaps retreating tactically and merely waiting until the new policy had run into serious trouble? Where did Beria stand in all this? To which faction did he belong? In watching the Russian scene it is not difficult to arrive, by processes of deduction and analysis, at a definition of the broad viewpoints and political conceptions contending for acceptance by the ruling group. Nor is it very difficult to see the sectional interests and aspirations reflected in the competing conceptions. The broad forces aligned with, or arrayed against, one another

throw their shadows sharply enough even across the veil of secrecy that surrounds them for the outsider to be {p. 179} able to guess the approximate disposition of those forces. But only in exceptional cases is it possible to venture even a guess about the attitude of this or that official personality on any specific issue. In Russia After Stalin the supposition was expressed that 'in the inner councils of the party Beria did not necessarily represent the anti-liberal attitude of the police', that he may, on the contrary, have acted against the 'die-hards of the police' as one of the promoters of reform. This supposition appears to have been borne out by the facts in the meantime. In the last period of his activity Beria represented the curious paradox of a semi-liberal police chief in a totalitarian state. The period up to the East German revolt might indeed be described as Beria's Hundred Days. Beria took upon himself the responsibility for two major political acts, two unforgivable 'crimes' in the eyes of the die-hards of Stalinism and their associates. First, he humiliated the political police when he exposed its practices in connection with the 'doctors' plot'. Next, he offended, 'Great Russian chauvinism' when he, the Georgian, called for an end to Russification in Georgia, in the Ukraine, in the Baltic lands, and in Central Asia. Both these acts, the former more explicitly than the latter, had ostensibly been endorsed by the other party leaders. But as Minister of the Interior Beria was identified with these acts more closely than anyone else. No wonder that some of the old hands of the political police, resentfully straining to recover their sacred right to extort 'confessions' from their victims, and the Great Russian chauvinists, joined hands to wreak vengeance on him. Beria was less directly associated with the conduct of foreign affairs; but, as a member of the Politbureau (now the Praesidium), he exercized a strong influence in that field, too. Bolshevik foreign policy has never been made {p. 180} by the Foreign Minister of the day, Molotov, Vyshinsky, Litvinov, or Chicherin - it has always becn the prerogative of the Politbureau. That foreign and domestic policies are closely interdependent has been an axiom. The man in charge of domestic security must therefore have had a considerable say in foreign affairs as well. Beria certainly had a decisive say in the affairs of Eastern Germany and generally of Eastern Europe, which had a direct bearing on Russia's internal security,

on the one hand, and on diplomacy, on the other. Thus his opponents could easily blame him for 'appeasement' as well as for the domestic reforms. From March to June Beria acted in close alliance with Malenkov. Together they swayed the Praesidium, probably against Molotov's and certainly against Khrushchev's opposition or semi-opposition. Jointly they represented the strongest bloc of power within the Praesidium. The new policy aroused great hopes and was undoubtedly very popular; and as long as this was so, nobody could challenge Malenkov's and Beria's joint authority. (Against this interpretation the old argument may be advanced that under a totalitarian regime the states of the popular mind and the social, cultural and moral trends at work in society are of no political importance. In his criticism of Russia Afer Stalin, Mr. George F. Kennan, for instance,writes that the 'majority of students of modern totalitarianism ... feel that if the ruling group remains united, vigilantand ruthless, it need not defer extensively to, or be seriously influenced by, subjective feelings within the populace at large'. And again: 'In general, totalitarian leaders who retain their internal unity and their ruthlessness can scoff at subjective states of the popular mind. ...' (My italics- I.D.) Mr. Kennan's words, written before Beria's fall, reflected an assumption that there was no need for Western policy to take into account any genuine divisions within the Soviet ruling group, because no such {p. 181} divisions existed. This assumption has been proved wrong. But what conclusion is to be drawn from the fact that the Soviet ruling group does not 'remain united' and does not 'retain its internal unity' ? Surely the 'subjective states of the popular mind' do acquire some political significance thereby? And those states of mind may in part even account for the differences within the ruling group itself?) From the beginning, however, the forces opposed to the Malenkov-Beria policy were formidable. The old hands of the political police were not idle. Some party stalwarts were shocked by the all round break with the old-established canons of Stalinism. Some chiefs of armed forces pondered with alarm the implications of the quasi-liberal reforms: Would the reforms not cause a slump in labour discipline and imperil the armament programmes? By dint of tradition the army has been the mouthpiece of 'Great Russian chauvinism' and has viewed with suspicion and hostility the 'centrifugal' nationalisms of the outlying Republics. Some marshals and generals could not adopt a favourable attitude towards a foreign policy obviously directed towards an eventual withdrawal of the occupation armies from Germany and Austria.

But the coalition of shocked Stalinist diehards, resentful policemen, and anxious generals was helpless as long as the new policy was triumphantly carried forward on a tide of popular enthusiasm. The first hitches apparently occurred on the home front. To judge from circumstantial evidence, labour discipline did slump in industry, and collective farms lagged with food deliveries. But these hitches were either not serious enough to permit the opponents of the new policy to launch a frontal attack on it, or else they did not provide convenient ground for such an attack. It was Eastern Germany that gave the opponents of the new policy the opportunity they had eagerly awaited. The Germans who on 16 and 17 June descended upon {p. 182} the streets, clamouring for the dismissal of the government of Pieck and Ulbricht, assailing the People's Police, and meeting Russian tanks with a hail of stones, did in fact bring about an upheaval; but the upheaval took place in Moscow, not in Berlin. Almost certainly a cry against 'appeasement' went up at once within the walls of the Kremlin. Army chiefs could now argue that it was the army that had to bear the consequences of the neck-breaking political experiments started by the civilians; that order reigned in Eastern Germany as long as General Chuikov ruled there with an iron hand; that the trouble began as soon as the general had been replaced by Semyonov, as High Commissioner, and a civilian regime had been established; and that then it was the army that had to rescue that regime. Starting from the German issue the critics could turn against the new policy as a whole. They could point out that not only Germany but the West at large was receiving Russian concessions as proof of Russian weakness; and that Washington in particular was using these concessions as the starting point for an intensified onslaught on Russia's positions in Eastern and Central Europe. Moreover, the ruling group saw that the new policy was indeed becoming a source of weakness for Russia: it plunged the whole of Eastern Europe into a turmoil; it caused a rapid deterioration in Russia's bargaining position; it tempted American diplomacy to pass from 'containment' to 'liberation'; and it threatened to rob Russia of the fruits of her victory in the Second World War, without any compensating gains. The 'appeasers' may still have argued that the new line had not yet been given a chance; that it would be wrong to abandon it immediately after it had encountered the first difficulties; and that only by persisting patiently in the policy of concessions could the Soviet Government reap its benefits.

{p. 183} But after the earthquake in Eastern Germany, after the tremors in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, after all the calls for a tough policy which resounded from Washington, the argument against 'appeasement' carried more weight in the Kremlin. In Russia as in the United States there exist groups which hold the view that all peaceseeking is futile; these groups regard with Schadenfreude any setback suffered by the conciliators. The position of such groups was now greatly enhanced: the advocates of a tough policy in the West had effectively played into their hands. There is no reason, however, to assume that after 16 and 17 June these extremists became the real masters of Soviet policy. The core of the ruling group still consists of men prepared to seek agreement with the West. But even the men of the 'centre must have been affected by the arguments against 'appeasement'. They had to admit that the conduct of Soviet policy since Stalin's death was rather inept in some respects. Thcy had to admit that Moscow was over-hasty in making concessions and overzealous in demonstrating its willingness to make further and more far-reaching concessions. Official spokesmen had many times confidently stated that the government would never accept Washington's demand that Russia must yield substantial ground before the West opened negotiations. In fact Malenkov's government behaved as if it had tacitly accepted that demand - it did make concessions in advance of negotiations. Even from the viewpoint of the Soviet appeaser the initiation of the mild course in Eastern Germany turned out to have been 'premature'. It provoked a near collapse of the Communist regime there. From the Soviet viewpoint it would have been justifiable to take such risks only after the West had agreed to an all-round withdrawal of the occupation armies. The undoing of the Communist regime in Eastern Germany would then be the price Russia paid ... {end of quotes}

(6) Mikhail Heller & Aleksandr Nekrich on the successorgovernments following the death of Stalin Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, UTOPIA IN POWER: the History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, translated by Phyllis B. Carlos (Hutchinson, London, 1985).

{p. 512} CONFUSION AND HOPE 1953-1964 THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE After Stalin's death, Malenkov seemed to be the natural successor, having become the main political figure in the party during Stalin's last years. At the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, for the first time since the Fourteenth Party Congress of 1925, someone other than Stalin gave the Central Committee main report. It was Malenkov. A photograph of Malenkov with Stalin and Mao Tse-tung appeared in every newspaper on March 12, 1953, next to Mao's article, which said: "We profoundly believe that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government with Comrade Malenkov at its head will undoubtedly be able to continue the work of Comrade Stalin." This was tantamount to an assertion of Malenkov's right to the succession. Malenkov offhandedly brushed aside Khrushchev's proposal that they meet to discuss how and by whom affairs would be conducted in the future. "We'll all get together and then we'll talk," he retorted, departing from Stalin's dacha after the physicians had certified Stalin's death. Khrushchev said nothing but took his own measures: he removed some important archives to his own offices at the Central Committee and began to prepare for the decisive battle for power. {p. 513} At the joint session of the Central Committee and the leading government bodies on March 6, 1953, Khrushchev gained his first important victory: he was released from his duties as secretary of the Moscow Committee with the recommendation that he concentrate on work at the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Neither Malenkov nor Beria, who had become allies since the time of the "Leningrad affair," saw in Khrushchev a serious rival. Both were directing their thoughts toward seizing control over the state apparatus. Both committed a serious error when they overestimated the significance of their respective posts as head of government and head of the secret police and underestimated the importance of possessing control over the party apparatus. It was the personality of the head of government - not the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers - that was important for holding power. As chairman of the Council of Ministers, Stalin remained the all-powerful dictator. Malenkov occupied this post, but he was not a dictator - he was only the prime minister. Khrushchev did not try to contend for the premiership. Contrary to his nature, this time he was patient enough to wait. As far as he was concerned, Malenkov was no danger to him. The danger lay in an alliance between Malenkov and Beria. Khrushchev was the embodiment of the party apparatus and understood perfectly well the mood of the regional secretaries, who had now become the real power locally.

They wanted to be free from fear and from surveillance by the chiefs of local state security agencies. They were loyal, but they desired greater independence in deciding local matters and a guarantee of personal security. For them, as for Khrushchev, the most dangerous man was Beria, whom the majority of party leaders and the military bureaucracy hated. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev very rapidly managed to separate the power of the party and the power of the government. On March 14, 1953, Malenkov at his own request was released from his duties as secretary of the Central Committee, but he remained chairman of the Council of Ministers. Khrushchev in effect became first secretary of the Central Committee. This office, abolished after the Nineteenth Party Congress, was officially reinstated in September 1953. On March 15, 1953, the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR confirmed the new government leadership. Voroshilov was elected to the nominal, yet honorary post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. {Voroshilov and Molotov were in the Jewish faction. In Special Tasks, Sudoplatov says that their wives were Jewish, p. 288 footnote 4: sudoplat.html. On Beria's belonging to the Jewish faction, see ibid., pp. 287-8, 296, 298, 306. On Kaganovich being Jewish, see ibid., p. 300. Mikoyan was also in the Jewish faction; he had been involved in the plan for a Jewish republic in the Crimea: ibid., p. 288 n4.} Malenkov was named chairman of the Council of Ministers; Beria, Molotov, and Kaganovich {all in the Jewish faction} became his first deputies, and Bulganin and Mikoyan were made deputies. The first "triumvirate" - Malenkov Beria, and Molotov - had come to power, although Molotov was actually shunted aside to the realm of foreign policy. {p. 515} In 1954 the tax on cows and pigs was abolished. By this time the tax on the private plot had decreased by some 60 percent as compared with 1952. The effect of these measures was staggering: the countryside and the cities located close to rural areas ceased to experience acute food shortages, although the situation remained grave enough. But above all, the peasants {p. 516} once again began to believe in the government and in the possibility of an improvement in their bleak existence. It is easy to imagine what the results of a total restructuring of agriculture might have been if granting relative freedom in the use of the private plot, which represented only 2 percent of all cultivated land in the Soviet Union, changed conditions so quickly.

On April 4, 1953, a report was published, without any commentary, by the Ministry of Internal Affairs: the "doctors' plot" had been concocted as a provocation by the former leadership of the former Ministry of State Security, and the accused were innocent of any crimes. This was an astonishing announcement, for Ignatiev, the former chief of state security, had been made a secretary of the Central Committee immediately after Stalin's death. He could not have been elected to the Secretariat of the Central Committee without Khrushchev's consent. But Ignatiev bore direct responsibility for the preparation of the doctors' trial. Did Khrushchev have anything to do with this affair? The question is all the more justified, because Ignatiev was never called to account for his actions, and after he was relieved of his duties as secretary of the Central Committee he was named first party secretary of Bashkiria. Be that as it may, the MVD's April 4 announcement had enormous political significance as a declaration of a break with the previous practice of lawlessness and terror. Many families of those arrested as "enemies of the people" saw the potential for obtaining a review of the accusations and convictions of their relatives. The procuracy of the USSR and Flrty agencies were deluged with hundreds of thousands of individual petitions to review the cases of people who had been convicted. Later, after Beria's arrest, it was contended in party circles that Beria had not submitted this communique to the Secretariat of the Central Committee for approval; otherwise, it would have been published under the name of the entire government not just the Ministry of Internal Affairs - and it would have been formulated differently. Indeed, that was probably the case. The MVD communique created a new, immense, and rather undesirable problem for the new leadership: the rehabilitation of hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people who disappeared during the Stalin terror. There was probably not one major party or government figure who was not involved, either directly or indirectly, in the massive crimes of the Soviet regime or, at a minimum, who had not derived some profit for himself during the terror of the 1930s and 1940s. Now the number of Beria's enemies in the leadership had increased substantially, since many were in danger of being exposed. In the meantime, Beria gave the order to free the families of members of the leadership who had been arrested and sent to the camps during the last years of Stalin's life. Beria personally {p. 517} officiated when Molotov was reunited with his {Jewish} wife, P. S. Zhemchuzhina, who had been sent to a camp just before Stalin's death. At the same time, he gave the order to free the former minister of state security, Abakumov, who had landed in prison as a result of the "doctors' plot." N. D. Yakovlev, a marshal of the artillery, and his son, as well as aviation Marshal Novikov, who was arrested after having been denounced by Vasily Stalin, were also released from prison.

For a short while, Beria's name became fairly popular among the intelligentsia and the urban population in connection with the April 4 communique. Beria and the "triumvirate" made a clever move in combining the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the Ministry of State Security to create a reconstituted Ministry of Internal Affairs. The frightening words state securit disappeared in a short time, creating the illusion of change and causing a storm of applause among leftist intellectuals in the West. But these hopes were premature, as evidenced by the decree of the Supreme Soviet on the amnesty of March 27, 1953. This decree, incorrectly called the Voroshilov amnesty (Voroshilov signed it as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, but it had been drawn up with Beria's active participation), released from prison all those who had received sentences up to five years, sometimes up to eight years, as well as certain categories of invalids, minors, and women. The amnesty did not affect political prisoners. In the summer of 1953 masses of criminals who had been freed from the camps by the March decree filled the cities. Even in Moscow it became dangerous to go out at night because one could easily be robbed or killed. Ministry of Intemal Affairs troops were brought into Moscow and mounted patrols appeared. Later, after his removal, Beria was accused, among other crimes, of intending to use criminals released from prison to seize power. Beria became popular in the non-Russian republics. His name symbolized a turning point in nationalities policy, toward granting more rights to the union republics. The central committee plenums of each of the republics condemned the Great Russian policy. At the Ukrainian Central Committee "grave distortions" in nationalities policy were discussed. Melnikov, chief of the Ukrainian Communist party, was reproached in particular for the fact that workers from other provinces of the Ukraine had been sent to work in supervisory capacities in the western Ukraine and because, to all intents and purposes, education in the Russian language had been introduced at all institutions of higher learning in the western Ukraine. A similar discussion took place at the plenum of the Lithuanian Central Committee: the inadequate promotion of Lithuanian nationals to supervisory positions was criticized. During this time open protests against Russifi{p. 518} cation could be heard without exception at every non-Russian national party's central committee plenum. ... Beria, who was guilty of a multitude of crimes against humanity, was the driving force in the first "triumvirate," as can be concluded from the charges leveled against him in the letter by the Central Committee, addressed to members of the party organizations and to them alone, which followed Beria's arrest. It turns out that it

was Beria who defended the idea of international detente, the reunification and neutralization of Germany, reconciliation with Yugoslavia, the granting of further rights to the republics, an end to russification in the cultural arena, and the advancement of members of non-Russian nationalities to local leadership posts. The Central Committee letter also pointed to the extraordinary activity of Beria, who {p. 519} had inundated the Presidium of the Central Committee with all sorts of projects. Molotov, the third member of the triumvirate, was made minister of foreign affairs, as we have said. An expert in cold war tactics, he now had to normalize relations between the Soviet Union and the Western nations, particularly the United States: these relations had become severely strained over the Korean war and the German question. The new govemment's program was revealed as early as Malenkov's speech of March 15, 1953. Besides the usual assurances of the USSR's peaceful intentions, the speech contained an indirect appeal to the United States, inviting it to reevaluate U.S.-Soviet relations. The U.S. government reacted without equivocation, although without haste. In a speech on April 16, 1953, which contrary to the usual practice was published in its entirety in the Soviet Union ten days later, President Eisenhower affirmed: "We welcome every honest act of peace. We care nothing for mere rhetoric." More concretely, he proposed the following: to make peace with honor in Korea; to conclude an agreement on Austria; and to create a broad European association which would include a reunified Germany. He also pressed for the complete independence of the Eastern European states, arms limitation, and the intemational control of atomic energy. Pravda's commentary on April 25, 1953 ("On the speech of President Eisenhower"), was very mild in tone. The Times of London praised Pravda's article: "The article as a whole represents the calmest, clearest, and most rational statement of Soviet policy that has appeared for many a long month." The reaction of the British government, too, was positive. Prime Minister Churchill declared, "We have been encouraged by a series of amicable gestures on the part of the new Soviet government," and proposed to convene a summit conference. The results of this shift in Soviet foreign policy were not slow in coming. On July 27, 1953, the armistice was signed in Korea and the war was over. The echoes of Stalin's death, Beria's arrest, and the press campaign in defense of legality reached the ears of millions of prisoners languishing in Soviet concentration camps. They began to go on strikeand revolt everywhere: in the Komi republic (Vorkuta), the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan. The most

important was the uprising at Kengir in the spring and summer of 1954,28 in which 9,000 male prisoners and 4,000 female prisoners took part. An attempt by the Kengir camp administration to provoke the common criminals against the politicals unexpectedly set off a general strike and {p. 520} an uprising by both categories of prisoners. The revolt continued for fortytwo days. The prisoners presented demands of a political and social nature, including a call for review of all sentences and a general amnesty, implementation of an eighthour workday, conversion of "special regime" camps into regular ones, removal of prison numbers from clothing, and improvement of living conditions. They also demanded a meeting with a representative of the Central Committee. Their slogan was: "Long live the Soviet constitution." Several years later, a human rights movement adopted the same slogan. On Moscow orders, 3,000 soldiers with tanks were sent against the Kengir prisoners. The unequal battle, which began at dawn on June 26, 1954, lasted for more than four hours. The prisoners put up a desperate resistance, hurling Molotov cocktails at the tanks. Their strength won out, however. The prisoners were defeated by the overwhelmingly superior force of the state. The most active rebels were arrested, convicted, and sent to Kolyma. During this revolt, a solidarity strike was declared on June 10 at the Dzhezkazgan camp. After June 26 the punitive detachment with its tanks turned to Dzhezkazgan. The 20,000 prisoners there were not prepared to do battle; they surrendered. However, the forty-two days of revolt at Kengir were not in vain. There were changes in the lives of the prisoners: now they began to work at 8 AM, instead of 6, and they worked until 5 PM. The bars on the windows of the barracks, torn off during the revolt, were not replaced. Numbers were removed from prisoners' clothing. Some imprisoned invalids and juveniles were released, and others had their sentences reduced. Two years before the revolution in Hungary, Soviet prisoners revolted in the camps. At the time their heroic feat went unnoticed by the rest of the world, but theirs was a historic deed, for they partially defeated the terrorism, the exploitation of prisoners, and the arbitrariness that had been rampant in the camps for years. The Resistance movement of prisoners in the Soviet camps also helped make possible the dramatic developments at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. Stalin's death and the first steps toward liberalization undertaken by the new Soviet leadership found an immediate echo in the Soviet Union's satellites in Eastern and

Southeastern Europe. Disturbances began everywhere, and the struggle between the old Stalinist leadership and the anti-Stalinists intensified sharply. Only Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria remained more or less calm. In Albania, Enver Hoxha, a staunch Stalinist, had already dealt with all likely and unlikely opposition beforehand. In Romania and Bulgaria, too, the Stalinists held the reins of government {p. 521} firmly in hand. It was only later, after the Twentieth Party Congress, that the anti-Stalinist forces were activated in those countries. The first serious disturbance in the socialist bloc occurred in Czechoslovakia in early June 1953. Its immediate cause was the monetary reform of May 30, 1953, which seriously affected the workers' already low standard of living. On June 1 disturbances broke out at Plzen; at the same time a general strike was called in the coal mines of Moravska Ostrava. In Plzen 5,000 demonstrators burst into the town hall and ripped down the portraits of Stalin and Gottwald. Troops summoned to the scene refused to fire on the demonstrators. Demands were made for free elections, and the names Masaryk, Benes, and Eisenhower drew strong applause. No one, however, called for the overthrow of the government. The movement was spontaneous and had no leaders. There was not even any bloodshed: after the troops refused to open fire, special police forces were called in, but they met with no resistance. The unrest in Czechoslovakia was an indication of the discontent brewing against the policies of the Communist party that had seized power in February 1948. Agitation against the government's economic policy was also the cause of an uprising in East Germany in June 1953. The industrialization and forced collectivization carried out by the East German government led to a massive flight of the population from East to West Germany. The government's response was to increase obligatory deliveries of produce from the peasant households and to force payment of taxes in arrears. In April 1953 distribution of ration cards for foodstuffs to "alien class elements" or to inhabitants of East Berlin employed in the Western sector of the city were terminated. At the same time pressure was put on the workers to increase labor productivity. At the end of May 1953 the Council of Ministers of the GDR issued a decree increasing production norms by 10 percent. Population flow to the West increased. During the first five months of 1953 190,000 people left East Germany for West Germany, as opposed to 182,000 during all of 1952. At exactly the same time, Moscow received word that the situation in Hungary was deteriorating. The new Soviet leaders insistently advised their satellites to change economic policies immediately, to cease pressuring the workers, peasants, and middle strata of society, and to renounce their costly and unjustifiable programs of industrialization. During the Stalin era the satellites had tried to copy "big brother" in every possible way, utterly ignoring the economic realities of their countries.

Under pressure from Moscow, the Central Committee of the East German Communjst party adopted a resolution condemning their former economic policy, admitting serious errors, and revoking all the unpopular measures {p. 522} of the previous months. On the list of errors committed and measures for their rectification, however, no mention was made of the increased production quotas. The resolution was followed by the announcement that these quotas would go into effect precisely on June 30, 1953. On June 16 the workers of East Berlin responded with an immediate work stoppage and mass demonstrations. Thousands of workers converged on the main government building in East Berlin, demanding that the new quotas be withdrawn and prices lowered. They presented political demands as well: the dismissal of Walter Ulbricht, leader of the party, and the reunification of Germany, followed by free elections. The next day, a general strike began in East Germany, and disturbances broke out in a number of other cities, including Leipzig, Dresden, and Magdeburg. Workers in these cities attacked police stations and prisons, freeing political prisoners. As many as 100,000 people took part in these actions. In order to suppress the incipient general insurrection in the GDR, the Soviet authorities brought in tanks. The Soviet troops were aided by the GDR police. According to some sources, nearly 500 people were killed. The Soviet government portrayed this bloody suppression of a workers' uprising in the GDR as the liquidation of an attempted fascist rebellion. Even more than thirty years later, the Soviet people still do not know what happened in East Germany in June 1953. The new Soviet leadership observed events developing in Hungary with great uneasiness. The leader of the Hungarian Communist party, Matyas Rakosi, was conceivably the most devoted to the Soviet Union of all the leaders of the socialist countries. He sought to imitate Soviet policies in every respect. As a result, by the early 1950s Hungary was in a disastrous situation economically and politically. Rakosi and the other Hungarian leaders were summoned to Moscow in the spring of 1953. The Soviet leaders demanded from Rakosi an end to the unwarranted, adventuristic course of superindustrialization and forced collectivization. Moscow insisted on a reorganization of the leadership, the resignation of Rakosi as prime minister, along with the ministers of heavy industry and defense, and the condemnation of past errors. Imre Nagy, an old Comintern member, was named to take Rakosi's place as the head of government; Nagy was considered a moderate and in fact had opposed Rakosi's policies. The Hungarian Politburo accepted the resolution forced upon it but kept its contents secret, getting away with publishing a nebulous communique. But Nagy, who had been placed at the head of the government, embarked on a policy similar to the NEP.

Rakosi remained at the head of the party, and soon a bitter struggle developed in the Hungarian leadership. Nagy was accused of rightist de{p. 523} viation and removed from his post as prime minister in April 1955. But at the same time the rehabilitation of the victims of the Rakosi regime had begun, paralleling developments in the Soviet Union. In Hungary, unlike in the Soviet Union, many were restored to their positions in the Communist party. Hungary became the scene of a broad movement for liberalization, which won the support of the entire intelligentsia, from students to writers. Social organizations and circles of various kinds made their appearance, as did magazines and anthologies by writers and artists of a liberal bent. Works that developed a point of view critical of the situation in socialist Hungary were published. A spiritual revolution had begun in Hungary. On July 10, 1953, Soviet newspapers announced Beria's arrest. The groundwork for Beria's removal had been laid by Khrushchev, in a deal with the other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. The arrest was carried out by the military group, headed by Marshal Zhukov and assisted by Ivan Serov. Beria's fall brought the end of the first triumvirate. The prestige and influence ofKhrushchev, the organizer of the plot against Beria, increased significantly. Malenkov, without Beria's support, came to depend all the more on Khrushchev, who very quickly assumed control of the party apparatus. Khrushchev was not yet able to dictate his own decisions, but even Malenkov could no longer act without Khrushchev's consent; each still needed the other's support. Khrushchev controlled not only the party apparatus; the army, which he had used to eliminate Beria, was also behind him. Zhukov, Konev, Moskalenko, who had directly executed the logistics of Beria's arrest, as well as Marshal Bulganin, who was utterly devoted to Khrushchev, were assigned to the most important political and strategic area - the Moscow Military District. The official trial of Beria and his accomplices was held in December 1953. (Beria was already dead, although the people did not know this.) Among other things, he was accused of organizing "a group of anti-Soviet conspirators whose aim was to seize power and to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie." It is doubtful, however, that Beria would have sought to restore power to the bourgeoisie rather than for his own dictatorship. At the same time Beria was declared to have been an agent of British intelligence since 1918. He was tried and sentenced to death along with several other high-ranking members of state security, including some former ministers and their aides. In 1954 Ryumin, the man personally responsible for the "doctors' plot," was tried and shot. The same fate later befell the former minister of state security, Abakumov, who was found guilty, among a multitude of crimes, of fabricating the Leningrad affair.

After Beria's removal, the state security establishment was reorganized. {p. 526} However, when the question arose of rehabilitating those guilty of "counterrevolutionary crimes," nothing could be done without a general resolution on a government-wide scale. In 1953 some 4,000 people were released. According to the most cautious estimates, there were 8-9 million prisoners in the camps. Although from 1953 through 1955 prison conditions were eased, the problem remained unsolved. The release of prisoners continued, but during 1954 and 1955 only 12,000 people were released and rehabilitated. In 1955 amnesty was declared for those who had collaborated with the Germans in 1941-1944. German prisoners were liberated the same year, in connection with West German chancellor Adenauer's visit to the Soviet Union. In 1956 the Japanese prisoners of war were freed. After the Twentieth Party Congress, rehabilitation took on a massive character. Special rehabilitation commissions were created endowed with the power to liberate prisoners on the spot, in the camps themselves. The overwhelming majority of surviving prisoners were freed in 1956, the year of the congress; many were rehabilitated posthumously, but this process continued for many long years. The problem was particularly difficult with regard to those who had participated in opposition groups. No opposition leaders were rehabilitated, although, gradually many of the victims of the trials of 1936-1938 were posthumously cleared of the charges against them. Bukharin, Rykov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and some others remained "guilty," although their innocence of the crimes they were accused of, such as plotting to assassinate Lenin in 1918 (Bukharin), espionage and organizing terrorist activities (Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin), and sabotage (all of them, plus Rykov), was absolutely clear and was confirmed by the rehabilitation of their "accomplices." The rehabilitation was necessary not only to those directly affected and their families. It also had enormous significance for the population as a whole. The moral conscience of society was awakened. Candidates for elections to party committees and trade unions were recommended on the basis of their moral values. The survivors, raised from the dead, rehabilitated and returned to their lives and families, played a major role in exposing the lawless nature of the Soviet state and the immorality of its social system. But was this true only of the Soviet system? The events in Eastern Europe demonstrated that the problem was significantly larger: it was a matter of the socialist system in general and the legitimacy of its existence. In the fall of 1954 facts concerning the tortures used by Polish state security received wide pub-

{p. 527} licity. At the same time, Wladislaw Gomulka, one of the most prominent Polish Communists, was released from prison. In January 1955 the state security agencies in Poland were abolished, and those guilty of torture were brought to trial. ... During this time Khrushchev climbed steadily higher. At the Central Committee plenum in September 1953, where he gave the main report on the agricultural situation, Khrushchev was formally appointed first secretary of the Central Committee, which confirmed his leading position in the party. ... At the Central Committee session of January 1955, Malenkov was criticized for giving priority to light, not heavy industry and for his errors in directing agriculture in the early 1950S. In February 1955 Malenkov submitted his formal resignation from his post as prime minister. In it, making a public "self-criticism," he admitted his mistakes and explained that he had not been trained adequately for a role as a government leader. {end} Isaac Deutsher does not admit that the Bolshevik Government had a Jewish leadership. Without that admission, one cannot make sense of Stalin. Bertrand Russell, having made a trip to the USSR in 1920, wrote, in The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (George Allen & Unwin, London 1975), p. 354: "Bolshevism is a close tyrannical bureaucracy, with a spy system more elaborate and terrible than the Tsar's, and an aristocracy as insolent and unfeeling, composed of Americanised Jews. No vestige of liberty remains, in thought or speech or action." russell.html. The same letter appears in volume two of the hardback, 3-volume edition of Russell's autobiography, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1914-1944, (Little, Brown & Co., Boston 1968), p. 172. The Jewish identities of Lenin and Trotsky: lenin-trotsky.html. Yet, prior to his trip, Russell had been sympathetic to Bolshevism, even regretting that the Bolsheviks had failed in their uprising in Germany. In his book Roads to Freedom, published in 1918, he wrote, "If the Russian Revolution had been accompanied by a revolution in Germany, ... the idea of fraternity might have ... entered the world of practical politics ... A simultaneous revolution in Germany and Russia would no doubt have had such an

effect, and would have made the creation of a new world possible here and now." (Unwin paperback, London 1977, p. 120). So, when Deutscher says that Marxism was brought to Russia from the West, what it means - given Russell's evidence - is that it was brought by Jews. Stalin, and he alone, wrested their power from them and returned it to the Russian people. Isaac Deutscher on the Great Purges: deutscher.html. Making Sense of Stalin: stalin.html. Beria's role in the murder of Stalin: death-of-stalin.html. Gorbachev's program shares many similarities with Beria's. Making sense of Gorbachev: convergence.html. David Ben-Gurion's vision resembles Beria's (scroll down): bengur50.jpg. For a bigger image see bengur62.jpg. The CIA infiltrating the Left: cia-infiltrating-left.html. Now that the Cold War is over, the West is in the grip of a Trotskyist cultural revolution like the one the Jewish Bolsheviks brought to Russia. But we do not have a name for it, because we associate "Communism" with Stalin: new-left.html. I was part of the "New Left", but have turned against it because of its homogenization of the sexes: engagement.html.

Sex in the Soviet Union - Peter Myers, October 3, 2001; update July 24, 2009. My comments are shown {thus}. Write to me at contact.html. You are at http://mailstar.net/sex-soviet.html. For the last 30 years, the West has been experimenting with the abolition of marriage, as was done in the Soviet Union until Stalin reversed it. This policy has been brought to the West under the label "Feminism", but it is merely "Communism" by another name. Yet, given that the USSR was "Stalinist" for most of its history, the word "Communism" is misleading, since Trotskyism and Stalinism are diametrically opposed.

When co-habitation between the sexes is treated the same as marriage; when "Gay" relationships are called "marriage"; then marriage has been abolished. The only difference is that this step was done openly in the USSR, but our leaders in the West are less straightforward. Trotsky is associated with the abolition of the state and the family; Stalin with their reintroduction. To re-introduce marriage is not oppressive, as Trotskyists and Feminists argue, but merely a return to the age-old custom of all human societies: a recognition of human nature. Trotskyism, with its promotion of Gay Marriage, reduces the two sexes to one, and Marriage to the status of sexual partner. Trotsky advocates abolishing the Family; Stalin its restoration: trotsky.html. Marxists, faced with the imperfection of the Soviet Union, often see it as "not living up to Marxist Principles". They are thus able to remain believers in Marxism as an ideal, while criticising the USSR in practice. This criticism was often directed at Stalin, the scapegoat for all that went wrong. There is nothing in Marxist theory that says that Jews will rule, yet the USSR was created by a faction of atheistic Jews: zioncom.html. When Lenin died, a triumvirate took power (Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin), of whom Stalin was the only nonJew: ginsberg.html.These Jewish conspirators wanted to appear incognito, and this helped Stalin gain power. He purged the usurpers and restored Russia to the Russian people - although in the end he was murdered: death-of-stalin.html. He is blamed for all the evils of the system, yet after the fall of Communism, when the West bestowed economic "liberalism" on Russia, the Russian people have come to see that Stalin did some good for them. We in the West are already half-way through a Trotskyist Revolution, which is shattering our family life. Stalinism fell, but the West is in the grip of Trotskyists promoting open borders, Gay Marriage, etc: xTrots.html. Most of the writers presented here are Trotskyists, condemning Stalin's crackdown on sodomy and his tightening of the marriage laws. One must sift out their "spin" from the historical data they provide. If they do not mention Stalin by name, they insinuate him by referring to "bureaucracy". Thought control was introduced to the USSR by Lenin and Trotsky; because of it, one often had to use indirect means of conveying information, but one can read Newspeak if one has the right dictionary. Why destroy the family? Karl Kautsky explains, "communism ... tries to convert its community into a new family, for the presence of the traditional family tie is felt as a disturbing

influence":http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/works/1900s/christ/ (Book Four, Part I). The whole society is to be one big family, with communal husbands & wives. H. Kent Geiger's book The Family in Soviet Russia is the definitive study of family life in the Soviet Union. The "feminist" West is following the same path. (1) Germaine Greer, Sex and Destiny (2) Alix Holt, tr. & ed., Selected Writings of Alexandra Kollontai (3) Ferdinand Mount, The Subversive Family: An Alternative History of Love and Marriage(4) Fannina Halle, Women in the Soviet East (5) Ekaterina Alexandrova, Why Soviet Women Want to Get Married (6) Igor S. Kon, The Sexual Revolution in Russia (7) Alison M. Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (8) H. Kent Geiger, The Family in Soviet Russia, Cambridge, Mass., 1968 The selections begin with Germaine Greer, who somewhat outgrew her earlier Trotskyist ("UltraLeft") orientation; in these selections, my comments are enclosed {thus}:

(1) Germaine Greer, Sex and Destiny, Secker & Warburg, Melbourne, 1984. {p. 228} The received idea of the ultra-left is that Soviet moves to weaken the family, by the institution of state nurseries, the facilitation of divorce, the ideology of free love, and the legalisation of birth control and abortion, were modified because the family was found to be the necessary training ground for the submissive citizen, and so it is, but not in quite the way that revolutionary Marxist orthodoxy sees it. What state capitalism realised was that the nuclear family is the most malleable social unit; houses were built for it, social services catered to it, and its descendants were drawn off into training institutions and its parents into state care. State capitalism and monopoly capitalism necessitate the same patterns of consumption, mobility and aspiration. The idea is simple and irrefutable;if all men are to be brothers, then nobody can be anybody else's brother. It is as true for Western Europe and America as it is for those parts of the Soviet Union where Family has been shattered. The operation of the process in the Soviets may be cruder, more brutal {p. 229} than in, say, Australia, but it is only therefore slightly less likely to succeed. ... If we whittle Family down to nuclear families, the nuclei will continue to act in their own interest, but by division the quotient of self-interest will be reduced to a manageable level. ... Rooted in territoriality, self-defensive, disciplined in aggression, the Family is resistant to any authority but its own, while the biddable nuclear family propitiates its children, unable to check their insistent demands for gratification

without experiencing guilt, because self-indulgence is the creed on which their fragile social micro-organism is built. The Marxist-Leninist attack on the Family was inevitable but its attack on the nuclear family was half-hearted and was soon abandoned. {end}

(2) Alix Holt, tr. & ed., Selected Writings of Alexandra Kollontai, Allison & Busby, London 1977. The back cover says, "Alexandra Kollontai - the only woman member of the Bolshevik central committee and the USSR's first Minister of Social Welfare - is known today as a historic contributor to the international women's movement, and as one of the first Bolshevik leaders to oppose the growth of the bureaucracy in the young socialist state", i.e. she supported Trotsky. Kollontai enables the reader to see that the day care centres, creches etc we now have in the West were copied from the early Soviet Union. {p. 226} The individual economy which springs from private property is the basis of the bourgeois family. The communist economy does away with the family. In the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat there is a transition to the single production plan and collective social consumption, and the family loses its significance as an economic unit. The external economic functions of the family disappear, and consumption ceases to be organised on an individual family basis; a network of social kitchens and canteens is established, and the making, mending and washing of clothes and other aspects of housework are integrated into the national economy. In the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat the family economic unit should be recognised as being, from the point of view of the national economy, not only useless but harmful. The family economic unit involves (a) the uneconomic expenditure of products and fuel on the part of small domestic economies, and (b) unproductive labour, especially by women, in the home - and is therefore in conflict with the interest of the workers' republic in a single economic plan and the expedient use of the labour force (including women). Under the dictatorship of the proletariat then, the material and economic considerations in which the family was grounded cease to exist. The economic dependence of women on men and the role of the family in the care of the younger generation also disappear {day care centres, creches etc: the conspirators steal our children, to mould them as they see fit}, as the communist elements in the workers' republic grow stronger. With the introduction of the obligation of all citizens to work, woman has a value in the national economy which is independent of her family and marital status. The economic subjugation of women in marriage and the family is done away with, and responsibility for the care of the children and their

physical and spiritual education is assumed by the social collective. The family teaches and instils egoism, thus weakening the ties of the collective and hindering the construction of communism. However, in the new society relations between parents and children are freed from any element of material considerations and enter a new historic stage. Once the family has been stripped of its economic functions and its responsibilities towards the younger generation and is no longer central to the existence of the woman, it has ceased to be a family. The family unit shrinks to a union of two people based on mutual agreement. {p. 227} Thus the workers' collective has to establish its attitude not to economic relationships but to the form of relationships between the sexes. What kind of relations between the sexes are in the best interests of the workers' collective? What form of relations would strengthen, not weaken, the collective in the transitional stage between capitalism and communism and would thus assist the construction of the new society? The laws and the morality that the workers' system is evolving are beginning to give an answer to this question. Once relations between the sexes cease to perform the economic and social function of the former family, they are no longer the concern of the workers' collective. It is not the relationships between the sexes but the result - the child - that concerns the collective. The workers' state recognises its responsibility to provide for maternity, i.e. to guarantee the well-being of the woman and the child, but it does not recognise the couple as a legal unit separate from the workers' collective. The decrees on marriage issued by the workers' republic establishing the mutual rights of the married couple (the right to demand material support from the partner for yourself or the child), and thus giving legal encouragement to the separation of this unit and its interests from the general interests of the workers' social collective (the right of wives to be transferred to the town or village where their husbands are working), are survivals of the past; they contradict the interests of the collective and weaken its bonds, and should therefore be reviewed and changed. The law ought to emphasise the interest of the workers' collective in maternity and eliminate the situation where the child is dependent on the relationship between its parents. The law of the workers' collective replaces the right of the parents, and the workers' collective keeps a close watch, in the interests of the unified economy and of present and future labour resources. In the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat there must, instead of marriage law, be regulation of the relationship of the government to maternity, of the relationship between mother and child and of the relationship between the mother and the workers' collective (i.e. legal norms must regulate the protection of female labour, the welfare of

expectant and nursing mothers, the welfare of children and their social education). Legal norms must regulate the relationship between the mother and the socially educated child, and between the father and the child. {end}

(3) Ferdinand Mount, The Subversive Family: An Alternative History of Love and Marriage, Jonathan Cape, London 1982. {p. 34} The makers of Soviet Russia were in a somewhat different situation. Like the early Christians, many of the old Bolsheviks were hostile or indifferent to marriage, though of course for opposite reasons. They often believed in free love, which was regarded as a 'Gift of the Revolution'. Many nineteenth-century socialists had subscribed to the view that sex was or ought to be as simple and trivial a satisfaction of physical needs as drinking a glass of water. As for the family, at one time or another, Trotsky, Alexandra Kollontai, Lunacharski and Krylenko all subscribed to the view that it would wither away in due course. The radical view was summarised by A. Slepkov, an influential Leningrad party member: {quote} Bourgeois ideologists think that the family is an eternal, not a transitory organization, that sexual relations are at the basis of the family, that these sexual relations will exist as long as the two sexes, and since man and woman will both live under socialism just as under capitalism, that therefore the existence of the family is inevitable. That is completely incorrect. Sexual relations, of course, have existed, exist, and will exist. However, this is in no way connected with the indispensability of the existence of the family. The best historians of culture definitely have established that in primitive times the family did not exist . . . Similar to the way in which, together with the disappearance of classes, together with the annihilation of class contradictions, the state will disappear, similarly to that, together with the strengthening of the socialist economy, together with the growth of socialist relationships, together with the overcoming of earlier pre-socialist forms, the family will {p. 35} also die out. The family is already setting out on the road to a merging with Socialist Society, to a dissolution into it. An openly negative attitude toward the family under present conditions does not have sufficient grounding, because presocialist relationships still exist, the state is still weak, the new social forms (public dining rooms, state rearing of children, and so forth) are as yet little developed, and until then the family cannot be abolished completely. However, the coordination of this family with the general organization of Soviet life is the task of every communist, of every Komsomolite [member of Communist Youth League]. One must not shut oneself off in the family, but rather, grow out of the family shell into the new Socialist Society. The contemporary Soviet family is the springboard

from which we must leap into the future. Always seeking to carry the entire family over into the public organizations, always a more decisive overcoming of the elements of bourgeois family living - that is the difficult, but important task which stands before us. {endquote; Quoted, H. Kent Geiger, The Family in Soviet Russia, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, pp. 44-5} Lunacharski, the Commissar of Education, wrote as late as the early 1930s: {quote} Our problem now is to do away with the household and to free women from the care of children. It would be idiotic to separate children from their parents by force. But when, in our communal houses, we have well-organized quarters for children, connected by a heated gallery with the adults' quarters, to suit the requirements of the climate, there is no doubt the parents will, of their own free will, send their children to these quarters, where they will be supervised by trained pedagogical and medical personnel. There is no doubt that the terms 'my parents,' 'our children,' will gradually fall out of usage, being replaced by such conceptions as 'old people,' 'children,' and 'infants.' {endquote; Ibid., pp. 47-8} This, according to Lunacharski, was to be an essential part of the transition to the new society - 'that broad public society which will replace the small philistine nook, that little philistine apartment, that domestic hearth, yes, that stagnant family unit which separates itself off from society.' {ibid., p. 68} A genuine Communist would avoid such a permanent pairing marriage and would seek to satisfy his needs by ' ... a freedom of the mutual relations of the husbands, the wives, fathers, {p. 36} children, so that you can't tell who is related to whom and how closely. That is social construction.' {ibid.} ... The after-effects of civil war and the new sexual freedoms combined to produce social chaos, a great number of unwanted and abandoned children, venereal diseases and also - a factor not to be underestimated - millions of shocked and puzzled peasants, particularly women, who regarded the new freedoms as dangerous and unhealthy. The Communist Party began rapidly to change its tune. {p. 37} In 1935, 1936 and 1944, new laws were introduced to compel divorced parents to contribute towards the maintenance of their children, to make abortion illegal and divorce itself more difficult and expensive. Homosexuality became a criminal offence in 1934. In 1936, Pravda commented that, 'Marriage is the most serious affair in life.' {Geiger, Family in Soviet Russia, p. 94} Stalin had changed direction and everyone else had to change too. Entirely spurious interpretations were dredged up to prove that Marx and Engels had never been against the family. The new scapegoats came in handy here:

{quote} The enemies of the people, the vile fascist hirelings - Trotsky, Bukharin, Krylenko and their followers - covered the family in the USSR with filth, spreading the counter-revolutionary 'theory' of the dying out of the family, of disorderly sexual cohabitation in the USSR, in order to discredit the Soviet land. {endquote; Quoted, ibid., p. 104} Why did Stalin turn? No doubt it was partly because the family had stubbornly refused to die out, and its official revival would be generally popular and help to deal with genuine social problems; but the main reason was surely that the regime had simply allowed too large an area of Soviet life to escape its control. It was not only that the {p. 38} Soviet concept of 'free marriage' - involving divorce and abortion at will - had proved a social failure. It was rather that no fully articulated Soviet attitude towards marriage and the family existed at all.The only answer was, so to speak, to 'patriate' the family - to glorify it as a popular, essentially Russian institution. In other words, on this question as on so many others, Stalin resorted to compromise between Marxism-Leninism and the Russian tradition. The family was good because it was created by the Russian people; hence it was good because it was socialist too. {end} The West, however, did not learn from the Russian experience, because the Trotskyist & Fabian forces in the West regarded Stalin as a traitor. A longer extract from Ferdinand Mount's book The Subversive Family is at mount.html.

(4) Fannina Halle, Women in the Soviet East, Martin Secker & Warburg, London 1938. This book shows that Polygamy was abolished, just as other writers (below) show that Homosexuality was being legalised. Also, native i.e. non-Russian peoples had to give up their own traditions about family life, a fate that awaits our own native peoples if the forces of "Tolerance" and "Multiculturalism" win. {p. 130} WOMEN IN THE SOVIET EAST So, too POLYGAMY is rendered a penal offence, and is punishable with hard labour for the period of a year or a fine not exceeding a thousand roubles.

{p. 131} Certain republics even used the formulation of supplementary paragraphs to the code for purposes of propaganda, and created a new legal language, not uncommon in the Soviet Union, markedly different from the dry legal style in use in other states. Thus a special law of the Kirghiz against polygamy reads as follows: Only such persons may marry as are living in no other registered marriage nor in a relation similar to registered marriage. Polygamy is absolutely forbidden, as an evil custom, highly injurious to the moral dignity of Kirghiz women, and leading to their enslavement and the exploitation of their persons. Thus the law resolutely attacked all the antiquated forms of social life, for without their abolition no real liberation of Eastern women could be conceived. The manner in which the courts applied the penal paragraphs, especially during the early transition period, bore witness to their good will to make an end of the relics of the past and to clear the way for new developments. BYT CRIMES IN THE COURTS {"byt" is a Russian word meaning domestic conditions, human relations - p. 127} It was, of course, not possible to abolish byt crimes at the first attack, in spite of vigorous threats of punishment and an increasingly intense propaganda campaign. Frequently the conditions which made them possible, and in certain cases even inevitable, persisted, and, moreover, the customs now more or less plainly branded as byt crimes were too deeply rooted in the people's lives. At first, especially, there was not the slightest sense of guilt, and the prisoners who experienced the full severity of the law could not understand for what misdeed they were being punished. Nevertheless, some undoubted success has been achieved in abolishing out-of-date marriage forms.

(5) Ekaterina Alexandrova, Why Soviet Women Want to Get Married in Tatyana Mamonova (ed.), Women and Russia: Feminist Writings from the Soviet Union, Beacon Press, Boston 1984. Peter Myers, July 16, 2001; {Trotskyist}. {p. 39} Let us now turn to a discussion of the laws that regulate family and marital relations in the U.S.S.R. As is well known, a series of laws governing such topics was {p. 40} passed in 1917-1918, immediately after the October Revolution. The main result of these laws was the secularization of marriage. Since then, as far as the government is concerned, the only valid marriage is a civil marriage, not a religious one. Therefore, when a Soviet woman speaks of marriage, she always

means civil marriage; the word marriage has been used only in this meaning in this article. In addition, the following policies were proclaimed: (1) freedom from restrictions that had formerly been imposed on marriage (for example, the religious denomination of the bride and groom); (2) freedom and ease of divorce; and (3) equality in every respect between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children. In the next round of legislation - the Laws of Marriage of 1926 - the "freedom" of marriage was expanded even further, practically to the point that it was of no legal consequence whether the marriage was registered or not. In order for a marriage to be considered as legitimate, it was "sufficient that a man and women living together considered their liaison marriage and not debauchery." 2 Grounds for divorce were even broader and obtaining a divorce was made even easier. Divorce occurred without recourse to a court; it was not even necessary to be physically present. Divorce occurred in the absence of one of the spouses, by the declaration of the other. The equality of legitimate and illegitimate children was underscored. But with the new law of 1926, the period of "revolutionary experiments" in relations between the sexes came to an end. {Stalin came to full power about 1928} The next legislative acts concerning the family and marriage - the Decree of 1936 and the Edict of 1944 - were pervaded by an entirely different spirit. In the first place, in contrast with everything that had gone before, the new laws emphasized that 2. I. Kurganov, Sem'ya v SSSR, 1917-1967 (Frankfurt/Main: Possev-Verlag, 1967), p. 89. {p. 41} the only marriage considered valid in the eyes of the government was a registered marriage. The Edict of 1944 stated directly, "Only a registered marriage gives rise to the rights and duties of a husband and wife, as envisioned in the legal code of marriage, family, and child custody." In the second place, the Decree of 1936 and the Edict of 1944 turned divorce into a difficult and expensive process. Furthermore, the Edict of 1944 pointedly began to separate "legitimate" children from "illegitimate" children. According to the law, the father of an illegitimate child had no responsibilities for his child, just as if he had no relationship to the child whatsoever. He was not obliged to help the mother support the child. One measure that became highly controversial was the requirement by the Edict that a slash be drawn across the blank marked father on the birth certificate of an illegitimate child. This slash is the first thing that catches your eye when you pick up

one of these documents. That requirement alone put both mother and child in a "special," extremely degrading position. The 1936 Edict also banned abortions; these were permitted again in 1955 for medical reasons, and in 1968 without restrictions. The other measures were eased only toward the middle of the 1960s when divorce was simplified and the slash on the birth certificate of an illegitimate child was no longer required.

(6) Igor S. Kon, The Sexual Revolution in Russia, tr. James Riordan, Free Press, NY 1995. {Kon does not name Trotsky, but appears to be a Trotskyist, being very critical of the 1930s and the crackdown on sodomy. Kon articulates his own "liberal" views on p. 246.} {p. 59} Lenin was sceptical of and even frankly hostile to all theories touting the absolute importance of sexuality, above all Freudian theory. {the synthesis of Marx & Freud is a badge of the New Left and associated with Trotskyism} {p. 70} In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the antisex crusade was allpervasive. When Wilhelm Reich, the influential German protege of Freud and admirer of Marx {the Marx-Freud synthesis is a badge of Trotskyism}, visited Moscow in 1929, hoping to find there a Mecca of sexual freedom, he was surprised and shocked by its new "bourgeois moralistic attitudes."6 One repressive measure followed another. The first measure was an official restoration of criminal penalties and reinforcement of persecution for male homosexuality. The initiative for revocation of the antihomosexual legislation, following the February 1917 Revolution, had come not from the Bolsheviks but from the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats) and the anarchists. Nonetheless, once the old criminal code had been repealed after the October Revolution, Article 516 also ceased to be valid. The Russian Federation criminal codes for 1922 and 1926 did not mention homosexuality, although the corresponding laws remained in force in some places where homosexuality was traditionally the most prevalent - in the Islamic republics of Azerbaijan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan, as well as in Christian Georgia. Soviet medical and legal experts were very proud of the progressive nature of their legislation. At the Congress of the World League for Sexual Reform, held in Copenhagen in 1928, Soviet legislation was cited to repre-

{p. 71} sentatives of other countries as an example of progressivism. In 1930, medical expert Mark Sereisky wrote in The Great Soviet Encyclopedia: "Soviet legislation does not recognize so-called crimes against morality our laws proceed from the principle of protection of society and therefore countenance punishment only in those instances when juveniles and minors are the objects of homosexual interest."7 The official stance of Soviet medicine and law in the 1920s, as reflected in Sereisky's encyclopedia article, was that homosexuality was not a crime but a disease that was difficult, perhaps even impossible, to cure: While recognizing the incorrectness of homosexual development, society does not and cannot blame those who bear such traits. . . In emphasizing the significance of sources that give rise to such an anomaly, our society combines prophylactic and other therapeutic measures with all the necessary conditions for making the conflicts that afflict homosexuals as painless as possible and for resolving their typical estrangement from society within the collective.8 Sereisky pinned indefinite hopes for a future "radical cure" for all homosexuals on the possibility of transplanting testicles from heterosexual to homosexual men, as had been suggested by the German biologist E. Steinach. During the 1920s, the status of Soviet homosexuals was relatively tolerable. Some homosexuals - Mikhail Kuzmin, Nikolai Klyuev, and Sophia Parnok, among others played major roles in Soviet culture, although the opportunity for an open, philosophical, and artistic discussion of the theme, which had opened up at the start of the century, was gradually whittled away.9 On December 17, 1933, however, the government announced the change in law, which would be compulsory in all the republics in March 1934: accordingly, muzhelozhstvo (buggery) once more became a criminal offense. An item to that effect was inserted in the criminal codes of all the Soviet republics. According to Article 121 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, muzhelozhstvo, sexual relations between men, was punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of up to five years, and, in cases involving physical force or the threat thereof, or exploitation of the victim's dependent status, or in relation to a minor, a term of up to eight years. In January 1936, Nikolai Krylenko, people's commissar for justice, announced that homosexuality was a product of the decadence of the exploiting classes who knew no better ... {p. 78} The middle 1930s saw a gradual, deep, and radical change in official language. Whereas the sexophobia of the 1920s had been reinforced by arguments about class interests and by mechanistic theories ahout the possi-

{p. 79} bility and necessity ot channeling indivldual "sexual energy" into more exalted social goals, the authorities now propagated a strict morality camouflaged as concern for shoring up marriage and the family. Bourgeois and peasant families that owned private property were not dependent on the state, so the Bolsheviks tried to destroy or at least weaken them through the process of socialization of everyday life and especially the education of children. As the American historian Richard Stites notes, in the 1920s, this policy of "defamilization" of everyday life had been motivated by the noble mission of "rescuing housewives from the slavery of kitchen life," kitchen life being "the strongest symbol of a nuclear family"25 But the state's provision of food and preschool education turned out to be much less effective than domestic family provision. "Student communes," which had been widespread in the 1920s, were also shortlived, one of the difficulties being that "the open-door policy interfered with sexual activity"26 The Soviet return to the ideals of stable marriage and family life in the 1930s seemed a retreat from the original ideology of the Revolution, and many Western scholars trumpeted noisily about it. Yet the appeal for the stabilization of marriage and the resurrection of "family" ideology was merely a manifestation of the growing conservatism of Soviet society {another attack on Stalin}. Having no private property, the "new Soviet family" - all income and living arrangements of which depended exclusively on the state - not only could not be independent of the state but was itself becoming an effective instrument of social control over the individual. To fulfill that mission, the "strong family" had to be an administratively controlled and regulated union. In 1936, the procedures for dissolution of marriage became more complicated. This change was in certain ways quite reasonable, inasmuch as previously divorce had been practically unregulated - one spouse could dissolve the marriage by a simple declaration at the registry office, without even informing the other. But actually, the increasing difficulty of obtaining a divorce was just one more way in which the state could legally intrude into the life of the individual. After 1944, divorce could be effected only through the courts, which was relatively expensive (although much less so than in the United States) and time-consuming. The court could delay the granting of a divorce considerably, and in some cases could even refuse to grant one. The degree of the judges' liberalism depended upon the instructions given by the Supreme Court. During one period of time, they tried to prevent the granting of any divorces at all, whereas at other times, they acted more liberal.

{p. 246} Homophobia, irrational fear of homosexuality, and hatred of gays constitute one of the main problems in present-day Russian sexual culture {Kon is here showing his Trotskytist allegiance}. ... As cross-cultural research shows, the level of homophobia in a given society depends on a wide range of factors. First, it depends on the overall level of a society's social and culturaltolerance. Intolerance of differences, typical of any authoritarian regime, is ill-suited to sexual or any other kind of pluralism. ... The more antisexual the culture, the more sexual taboos and fears it will have. The former USSR in this respect was, as ever, an extreme case. Third, homophobia is closely linked with sexism {wrong: the Gay movement is Heterophobic}, and sexual and gender chauvinism. Its major function in social history has been to uphold the sanctity of the system of gender stratification based on male hegemony and domination. Obligatory, coercive heterosexuality is intended to safeguard the institution of marriage and patriarchal relations; under this system, {p. 247} women are second-class beings, their main- perhaps even sole- function is to produce children {a Gay put-down of Heterosexuality}.

(7) Alison M. Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa NJ, 1983. This book is very important, for it shows that the New Left/Trotskyist/Feminist rejection of Human Nature and the Sexual Division of Labour explicitly contradicts Marx and Engels, supporting my case that Trotskyism is a conspiratorial movement lurking beneath a Marxist mask. {p. 67} The radical call to abolish sexual distinctions in the market (and, apparently, distinctions based on age as well) represents the dominant tendency in traditional Marxist theorizing about women. But another side to Marxist theory does {p. 68} emphasize the significance of the biological differences between women and men. On this view, expressed mainly in "asides" rather than in explicit argument, the biological differences between the sexes have not only determined a sexual division of labor in the past, but mean that the future can never be totally androgynous. Marx and Engels believe that there has always been a sexual division of labor and that this, at least until the advent of capitalism, has taken a remarkably constant form. Apart from "the division of labour in the sexual act," they believe that women have always been concerned primarily with the household and men with obtaining "the food and instruments necessary for the purpose." In many passages Marx and Engels refer to this division of labor as "natural" or

"spontaneous." For instance, in The German Ideology they write about the origins of the division of labor as being "originally nothing but the division of labour in the sexual act, then that division of labour which develops spontaneously or 'naturally' by virtue of natural predisposition (e.g., physical strength, needs, accidents, etc.)."36 On the following page, they refer again to "the natural division of labour in the family." These remarks are not just youthful slips. In his mature work, Capital, Marx several times repeats the suggestion that there is a sexual division of labor in the family that is natural. For instance, he writes about the "spontaneously developed" system of organizing labor in "the patriarchal industries of a peasant family, that produces corn cattle, yarn, linen, and clothing for home use." This family {quote} possesses a spontaneously developed system of division of labour. The distribution of the work within the family, and the regulation of the labour-time of the several members, depends as well upon the differences of age and sex as upon natural conditions varying with the seasons.37 {end quote} {note 37: Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 77-78.} Later in the first volume of Capilal, Marx repeats the point. "Within a family . . . there springs up naturally a division of labour, caused by differences of sex and age, a division that is consequently based on a purely physiological foundation."38 {note 38: ibid., p. 351} Marx and Engels clearly believe that the division of labor within the family is natural because it is biologically determined, "based on a purely physiological foundation." Yet they never explain just what the division is, why it occurs nor whether it can be overcome in future forms of the family. In his Critique of the Gotha Programme, moreover, Marx even seems to reconsider his call to abolish the sexual division of labor in the market. He writes: {quote} The standardization of the working day must include the restriction of female labour insofar as it relates to the duration, intermissions, etc., of the working day; otherwise it could only mean the exclusion of women from branches of industry that are especially unhealthy for the female body or objectionable morally for the female sex.39 {end quote} {note 39: Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, p. 334} This passage carries the alarming suggestions that women's capacity to enter public industry is limited both by biological and by moral factors. The latter suggestion is repeated in Marx's apparent endorsement of the view of the British factory inspectors that one of the most deplorable effects of the factory system was the moral degradation it imposed on women and girls. It caused them to be dirty, to

drink, to swear and to wear men's clothes - none of which Marx considered to be especially injurious for men.40 {note 40: Compare Capital, pp. 257(n), 399, 464, 49899. I owe these references to Sandra Bartky.} One more aspect of gender needs to be considered, the "division of labor" that is supposed to occur in sexual activity. In the passage quoted already from {p. 69} The German Ideology, Marx and Engels write that the social division of labor originates in "the division of labor in the sexual act." If we take this remark seriously, it implies that, no matter how much society may seek to abolish the division of labor, such divisions are always likely to reemerge so long as "the division of labor in the sexual act" remains. Whether or not it is true that divisions of labor, such as the class division and the division of mental from manual labor, will always be regenerated by "the division of labor in the sexual act," it does seem at least plausible that a division of labor in sexual activity will always encourage a regeneration of the more extensive sexual division of labor that constitutes the basis of the institution of gender. This is because, in capitalist society though perhaps not in all others, sexual orientation is one of the defining features of gender identity. If an individual's primary sexual and emotional interest is in members of her or his own sex, then her or his gender identity is conventionally called into question. Thus, gay men are considered conventionally to lack masculinity, to be less than men, and lesbians to lack femininity, to be less than women. If gender is to be eliminated entirely, then, it seems that it may be necessary to abolish normative heterosexuality, the notion that heterosexual relations are more "natural" and legitimate than homosexual relations. In other words, "the division of labor in the sexual act" will have to be abolished. Neither Marx nor Engels, however, considers seriously and explicitly the radical implications of their own suggestion in The German Ideology. In an admittedly early work, Marx writes that "the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being,"41 and Engels always assumes that normal sexual relations are heterosexual. For instance, he condemns the Athenian men who "fell into the abominable practice of sodomy and degraded alike their gods and themselves with the myth of Ganymede,"42 and his discussion of the "mutual sexual love" that will be possible for us all only under socialism is conducted exclusively in heterosexual terms. From this examination of Marx's and Engels' writings, I conclude that there is considerable ambiguity and even inconsistency in their view of women's nature. They waiver between the radical ideal of full female participation in every area of life and the assumption that, while women's biology may allow for considerable participation, the complete achievement of this goal is impossible. The compromise view seems to be that, under socialism, women's nature would be much more like men's nature than

it is under capitalism, especially among the capitalist class, but would not be identical with it. Certain unspecified biological differences between women and men would mean that there could never be a complete abolition of the sexual division of labor, either in the family, in the workplace, or in bed. Consequently, while gender differences under socialism would be considerably muted, complete psychological androgyny would be impossible. {end of selections}

(8) H. Kent Geiger, The Family in Soviet Russia (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968). {p. 10} In some ways what men believe to be true is more important than the truth. The statements of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels about the family, though they were often false or misleading, have had great influence on the way the Soviet rulers have dealt with the Soviet family and have also inuenced, we may be sure, the Soviet man in the street. Since the time when the notions of the founders of marxism were elevated to social dogma, their scientific validity, or lack of it, has ceased to be of primary importance. I shall therefore often be more interesed in exploring the relation of an idea to other ideas, especially to the underlying structure and spirit of Marx's and Engels' thought, than to the real world it purports to represent. The positions, inconsistencies, and errors of marxism have all been significant because they constitute a large portion of the prologue to the present Soviet attitude toward the family. {p. 11} ONE | THE FAMILY FROM THE ARMCHAIR OF MARX AND ENGELS WHEN MARX AND ENGELS wrote about the family from time to time over a fortyyear period, they described the family as they saw it about them under capitalism, discussed the family in the past, and were interested in the family's future. The main point about the family which drew their interest was the relation of husband and wife and the way it is affected by property relations and other aspects of economic life in the larger society. The most complete discussion of the marxist theory of the family was published by Engels in 1884, after Marl's death, in the book The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, in the Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan. Although Engels was the author of this work, he noted in the preface to the first edition that Marx himself had hoped to undertake the task and had made extensive extracts which he, Engels, had reproduced "as far as possible." Actually, many of the ideas in The Origin can be found in the first joint work of the two writers, The

German Ideology, not published during their lifetimes. Quite clearly, then, this, like most other products of their collaboration, was in the main a joint work of the two founders of marxism and points to an impressive unity and continuity over four decades in the basic outlines of their thought. Knowledge of this collaboration makes the involved exposition easier to follow. There were apparently some differences between the two men about the family, but since we are unaware of precisely what they were, for the purposes of this book their ideas will be assumed to be both in agreement with one another and of mutual origin. The Marxist Approach to the Family One of the conclusions to which Marx and Engels were led, with the support of Morgan's researches, was that the family assumed many different forms as it evolved through history and thus constitutes a "series in historic development," as Marx wrote in Capital. They also felt that these different forms were in rough correspondence with the {p. 12} principal stages of social development postulated in their vision of human history. The final typology, developed largely by Morgan and endorsed by Engels (presumably also by Marx), included four major forms of relations between the sexes. The first form was a stage of unrestricted sexual freedom or complete promiscuity. In the beginnings of human history, in fact, as man became human in the transition from the animal, there was no family or marriage whatsoever. The second form was group marriage, which developed very early and had several subtypes. The main characteristic of group marriage as a whole was the absence of the incest taboo, and the earliest subtype in Engels' system, based on his understanding of the moiety system of the Australian aborigines, was essentially "mass marriage" whereby "not the individuals, but the entire groups are married, moiety with moiety" (p. 38). Since there were in existence only two moieties, the range of sexual choice was indeed a wide one. The next subtype was the "consanguine family," with mating taboo between the generations but in which "brothers and sisters, male and female cousins of the first, second, and more remote degrees, are all brothers and sisters of one another, and precisely for that reason they are all husbands and wives of one another" (p. 32, Engels' italics). The third and highest subtype was the "punaluan family," whose essential feature was "mutually common possession of husbands and wives" by a number of the same sex, same generation, consanguineal relatives on one side, but in which the incest taboo, already effective between generations, was now etended to brother and sister and to opposite-sex cousins (p. 34 et passim). It is interesting to note

that the social mechanism proposed by Morgan, and endorsed by Engels, which was to explain the gradual etension of the incest taboo and thus the gradual evolution of the relation between the sexes, was simply the principle of natural selection: "the tribes among whom inbreeding was restricted ... were bound to develop more quickly and more fully" (p. 34). The third major form of relationship between man and woman was the monogamous family, corresponding to civilization, the era of history in which Marx and Engels were most interested; this form will be discussed at length. Finally, the whole spirit of Marx's and Engels' thinking provides a fourth major type, which I shall call simply "the pattem of the future," under communism. Hence, there are four main stages in the {p. 13} "historical series": sexual promiscuity, group marriage, monogamy, and the pattern of the future. The variable element in these forms does not correspond very closely with that of the main typology of evolutionary social orders developed by Marx and Engels and expressed in terms of the division of labor and property forms: primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism. In fact, the correspondence of family form with the major historical epochs of Morgan is also forced: to the period of savagery corresponds group marriage, to barbarism the "pairing family," and to civilization monogamy (pp. 47, 66). In the pairing family, neither fish nor fowl, one man lives with one woman but polygamy and "occasional infidelity" remain his right, though not hers. Furthermore, the marriage tie can be easily dissolved by either partner (p. 41). Engels notes that the pairing family had already been appearing in group marriage or even earlier, and also that it is a "form of monogamy" (pp. 40, 25). Consequently, it is best considered a transitional form between group marriage and monogamy. Moreover, since the principle of natural selection had taken full responsibility for the earlier development of the family, as the really central principle of the tide of history began to take over the pairing family also represented the transitional form between primitive communism and slavery. With the rise of private productive property, the temporary alliances of the pairing family were no longer adequate. When property existed and had to be transmitted, heirs were needed. Hence still another transitional form appeared, this time a clear subtype of the monogamous family, the patriarchal family. It is the first family form to be found in written history (pp. 5053). The concept of a transitional family form will be encountered once more in the proletarian family. First, however, the reader should understand that the rather

tortured system of types to which Engels (and Marx) subscribed has, it is agreed at present, little validity as a chronological series. It is perhaps most useful simply to note the main theme and key principle of the relations between the sexes before the advent of private property. The theme is the progressive narrowing of the "circle of people comprised within the common bond of marriage, which was originally very wide, until at last it includes only the single pair, the dominant form of marriage today" (p. 276). The key interpretive principle is natural selection. There is also a trace of another mechanism, a product of the rationalistic spirit of the times - the surrender of the {p. 14} "woman's" right to complete chastity before marriage and of monogamous intercourse in marriage for the observance of monogamy (partial at least) on the part of the man (pp. 10, 447). The family owes its origin, it would seem, to the operation of these two principles. In the beginning there was only promiscuity and then came group marriage (pp. 15, 30). Later the pairing family, combining characteristics of both group marriage and monogamy, appeared before the rise of history's main determining principle, private property. Although the monogamous family, the only one found in civilization, represents a higher stage of historical development than the earlier forms, Engels (and apparently Marx as well) was quite fascinated by the sexual lot of primitive man. Group marriage, for instance, he said, "seen at close hand, does not look quite so terrible as the philistrnes, whose minds cannot get beyond brothels, imagine it to be"(p. 39). "The Australian aborigine," Engels continued, "wandering hundreds of miles from his home among people whose language he does not understand, nevertheless often finds in every camp and every tribe women who give themselves to him without resistance and without resentment" (p. 58). With civilization, however, "monogamous marriage comes on the scene as the subjugation of the one sex by the other." In fact, while "a great historical step forward," it, "together with slavery and private wealth ... opens the period that has lasted until today in which every step forward is also relatively a step backward, in which prosperity and, development for some is won through the misery and frustration of others" (p. 58). As the social role of the man in using tools and transforming things into property for other than immediate consumption assumes the center of the stage, it leads to the form of monogamy known to the present. But a difficulty is presented by the fact that Engels sometimes uses the concept monogamous family to refer variously to the pairing family (in a matrilileal gens [clan] in which women are dominant), to the

patriarchal family, to the family of the bourgeois, to the proletarian family, and even to the family of the future, while elsewhere he uses it to refer quite exclusively to the bourgeois family under capitalism. I shall avoid this difficulty by concentrating on family types in relation to the structure of property relations. Clearly, Marx and Engels felt that property played the central role in civilized society, and it was indeed the civilized historical present in which {p. 15} they were most interested. But the image of the future as they saw it, also constitutes part of the marxist heritage with which the Soviet regime had to deal. Hence, I shall examine at length their concepts of the bourgeois family under capitalism, the proletarian family under capitalism, and the family in the society of the future, when private property ownership would be abolished. The details of each of these types reveal important aspects of marxist thought, as does the role played by the family in Marx's and Engels' social theory, historical materialism. Marx and Engels eagerly seized upon the ideas of Morgan, ideas which later research has shown to be inaccurate or, at best, unprovable hypotheses, because he, in the name of respected scholarship, supported some of their ideas which were most bitterly contested by their contemporaries: the central role of the forms of economic development and private property in causing social change, the notion that society develops or evolves in a relatively orderly fashion through a series of stages, and a concept of which more will be said later, the "survival." Marx and Engels were particularly happy to analyze the family because it was such a small, manageably observable unit - "a society in microcosm." If it could be proved that the various family forms constituted a historical series, the point would lend not inconsiderable support to their contention that society, too, had had and would take different forms in past and future. Hence the founders of marxism were most receptive to the ideas of a man who, in the modern verdict, is adjudged as no more than another nineteenthcentury evolutionist now thoroughly discredited on empirical grounds. The Bourgeois Family Corrupted Marx and Engels spoke of the family life of the bourgeoisie in terms of greed, oppression, exploitation, boredom, adultery, and prostitution. The bourgeois family was quite corrupt, but, and this was for them a main point, it pretended to be something quite different. In fact, "boredom and money are the binding factor, ... but to this ... dirty existence corresponds the sacred conception of it in official phraseology and in general hypocrisy." Again and again they stress that the bourgeois family is in a state of de facto dissolution (Auflosung). The "inner bond" of the family ties of "obedience, piety, marital troth" were all gone. Nothing was left but "property relations" and their consequences.

{p. 16} Thoughts of property and money, the spirit of exchange, dominated the ties of the bourgeois with his wife and with his child. Future husbands haggled with future fathers-in-law over the size of the dowry, while fathers and sons sparred greedily over the question of inheritance. Under these conditions there could be no true love between husband and wife a fact institutionalized, claimed Marx and Engels, in the "marriage of convenience." Hence, marriage among the bourgeoisie amounted to forced cohabitation, or, as a favorite phrase had it, de facto prostitution, in which the woman "only differs from the ordinary courtesan in that she does not let out her body on piece-work as a wage worker, but sells it once and for all into slavery" (p. 63). In addition to exploitation of the helpless wife - both of her labor in open or concealed domestic slavery" as "head servant" in the household, and of her body as producer of an heir or simply as an object of loveless lust - there were broader developments. The first, about which gels seemed rather ambivalent, was adultery. The second, about which he had nothing good to say, was prostitution. Both were said to be part and parcel of bourgeois family life, an assertion that is apparently to be understood in quite a literal sense. Of course, Marx and Engels conducted no field studies on these matters, but Engels confidently describes the supplanting of feudalism by the bourgeois social order in France: "The right' of the first night' passed from the feudal lords to the bourgeois manufacturers. Prostitution assumed proportions hitherto unknown.Marriage itself remained, as before, the legally recognized form, the official cloak of prostitution, and was besides supplemented by widespread adultery." Another concept derived from this situation is the notion of "an exclusive attitude" toward other families. Though a minor theme in the thought of Marx and Engels, it is found repeatedly at both beginning and end of their careers and serves to introduce an idea which came to be more central in the early years of Soviet history - the family as a divisive force in the larger society. Within the family, as Engels' memorable aphorism put it, the husband is the bourgeois and the wife is the proletarian. And it was not only property ownership which brought inequality of power. In the bourgeois family the husband earns the living and supports the family, a situation which, said Engels, "in itself gives him a position of supremacy" (pp. 65-66). From this twofold advantage of the bourgeois husband Mar and Engels deduced, came the "domestic slavery" of the wife and {p. 17} all the other sad consequences it entails. The fact that there are some differences between the various types of bourgeois families, that sometimes the German philistine's wife revolts and "wears her husbands trousers," that the French husband often "wears horns," and so on, are all minor eddies in the pool of bourgeois pestilence (pp. 60, 63).

Nevertheless, the concept of the family was indispensable to the bourgeois in order to preserve control over his property. For this reason the greedy, lusty bourgeois fiercely defended the idea of the family as embodied in law and religion. Nothing was the equal, avowed Marx and Engels, of the hypocrisy of bourgeois morality. {echoing Engels' theme, Germaine Greer wrote in The Female Eunuch, "... if women are the true proletariat, the truly oppressed majority, the revolution can only be drawn nearer by their withdrawal of support for the capitalist system. The weapon I suggest is that most honoured of the proletariat, withdrawal of labour" (Paladin, p.21). Greer was calling on women to destroy Marriage.} The Proletarian Family The marxist image of the proletarian family is ambiguous. Perhaps it is akin to a more general ambivalence in marxist thought toward wealth, power, and other things of this world. While there was no question about the depravity of the bourgeois in his relation to wife and children, or about the reason for it, the social relations of the proletarians were free of the corrupting influence of private property. The proletarian was, for instance, more generous than the bourgeois; although he was poor, beggars turned to him, wrote Engels, rather than to the stingy bourgeois. On the other hand, the proletarian family was poverty-stricken. Since the worker was at best an exploited wage earner and at worst a member of the "reserve army of unemployed," his family lacked not only property but income. Food, clothing, and decent shelter were short. The emergence of capital accumulation, monetary exchange, commercial competition, and the concentration of property ownership had left him helpless and exposed. His lot was one of starving, stealing, and suicide, and in his family life were drunkenness, brutality, and sexual irregularity. In fact, his family was "torn asunder by modern industry" to the point where there occurred a "perpetual succession of family troubles, domestic quarrels, most demoralizing for parents and children alike." Engels repeatedly used such phrases as "the ruin of all domestic relations" or asserted that "no family life was possible." He did not blame the workers for this, though; since they were denied all other privilege by the system which gripped them, no one could blame them for turning to those pleasures which were left, drink and sexual indulgence. "The workingmen, in order to get something from life, concentrate their whole {p. 18} energy upon these two enjoyments, carry them to excess, surrender to them in the most unbridled manner." The breakup, factual dissolution, or practical absence (all terms used synonymously by Engels) of proletarian family life was owing in the first instance to economic need, but also to one of its immediate consequences - the employment of

women and children in industry. Under the conditions of capitalism painted by Marx and Engels, the liberating influence of social production was only a portent. At the moment proletarian women and children were exploited mercilessly, with long hours, low wages, and unbelievable working conditions. Thus, said Engels, the employment of women breaks up the family. As the mother grows away from the children, they are neglected and grow up as savages, and are then, of course, unprepared to form and maintain decent families when they become adults. So the cycle repeats. From this central thesis, Marx and Engels deduced several subsidiary patterns. The proletarian tends to marry early as a means of self-protection, for then, in true Darwinian fashion, he can procreate many children and put them to work in the sweatshops and the mines. The fact that "the absolute size of the families stands in inverse proportion to the height of wages ... calls to mind the boundless reproduction of animals individually weak and constantly hunted down," wrote Marx. Moreover, complained Engels somewhat incongruously, the employment of the wife is likely to "turn the family upside down." A situation is created in which the husband cannot find work, but his wife can because she will work for less. Thus he sits at home while she becomes the breadwinner. Engels then treats the reader to the "outrageous episode" of poor Jack who must sit at home and mend his wife's stocking with the bodkin while she is off at work. But, in positive terms, the absence in the proletarian family of the original source of all the trouble, private property, can have only a salutary effect, in view of the havoc it creates among the bourgeois family. In deference to the logic of their analysis of the bourgeois family, Marx and Engels also conclude that among the proletarians the family is "based on real relations" (reale Verhdltnisse). In the beginning of their collaboration real relations seem to mean several more or less vaguely stated natural or environmental conditions - not only property but social, ecological, and physiological factors. A typical excerpt refers to the "real body of the family" and includes relationships given by "the presence of children, the construction of the contemporary city, for {p. 19} mation of capital."In Engels' later writing, however, real relations increasingly mean personal preference and mutual love, or as Engels liked to call it, true or mutual "sex love." Engels also asserted that marital equality existed in the proletarian family. This situation results from the absence of property and also from the fact that the wife is frequently employed, two conditions whichgive her the power to dissolve the

marriage if she wishes and also bring her the position and respect associated with a productive economic role. Among the proletarians, who regard the norms of religion and laws as no more than embodiments of bourgeois interest, "if two people cannot get on with one another, they prefer to separate." Obviously there is also no reason for adultery, prostitution, or religion, and they "play an almost vanishing part" (p. 64). The positive side of the proletarian family thus contains true love marital equality, willingness and freedom to divorce on appropriate occasion, and disregard of the traditional morality as merely an expression of class interests. In all of these, as well as in the determining conditions, freedom from property ownership and the employment of the wife, the proletarian family approaches Marx's and Engels' image of family life under communism. Unde capitalism there are important differences, to be sure. When Engels says that the family is still an "economic unit of society," he refers to the continuing fetter imposed upon the wife by the tasks of housekeeping and the care of children. These place her in a position in which "if she carries out her duties in the private service of her family, she remains excluded from public production and unable to earn; and if she wants to take part in public production and earn independently, she cannot carry out her family duties" (p. 65 ). In spite of this seemingly crippling defect, in his last major work Engels paints a positive picture of the proletarian family. Freely contracted marriage and true love are the rule. Perhaps there is, concedes Engels, "something of the brutality toward women that has spread since the introduction of monogamy" (p. 64), but he apparently now thinks of it as a pure survival, with no source in the conditions of proletarian life. In general, Engels' thoughts on the proletarian farnily constitute a clear example of the conflict between analytical principles that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, there is the corrosive effect of exploitation and poverty: "The great overturn of society through com{p. 20} petition, which dissolved the relationship of the bourgeois among themselves and to the proletarians into relationships of money, changed the various 'sacred things' listed above into items of commerce, and destroyed for the proletarians everything natural and traditional, for eample, family and political relationships together with their entire ideological superstructure." Turning the coin over, the absence of private property makes social equality and love possible: "Sex-love in the relationship with a woman becomes, and can only become, the real rule among the oppressed classes, which means today among the proletariat" (p. 63).

In his first work, The Condition of the Working Classes in England in 1844, Engels emphasized the first principle and neglected the second. In his last work, he emphasized only the liberating absence of private property among the proletarians. There is scarcely a reference to the dire effects of poverty in the entire book. Because of his tendency to impute concreteness to an analytical notion, Engels' propositions have outstripped him, a fiaw that frequently appears in the writing of Engels and Marx. In this case, the interpretive principles clash in the direction of infiuence they are supposed to exert to such a degree that one of them tends to push the other completely out of the picture. The Pattern of the Future: Equality, Freedom, and Love Under communism life would be better. Classes would disappear, the state would be unnecessary and would wither away, and the antagonisms between town and country and between physical and mental work would end. There would be no such deadening division of labor with its strict and narrow work specialization as eisted under capitalism, and there would be no religion, because the social contradictions from which it had risen would have disappeared. Marx and Engels were quite explicit about what would happen to the family under such conditions. A good part of it would disappear, consigned like the state to "the museum of antiquities." Property-holding, work, consumption, and the rearing and education of children would be surrendered to society. All these activities, according to the founders of marxism, in one way or another breed inequality within the family and hence oppression, marital or parental. Curiously, other than to note that all children would be reared on {p. 21} a communal basis, Marx and Engels had little to say about the future relationships of parents and children. Apparently they would not continue to live together, because society was to rear and educate. Whether they would see each other and, if so, how frequently are questions left unanswered. It is only asserted that the communal rearing of children would bring "real freedom" among all members of the family. The union of man and woman clearly would continue to be a close one, however. The promise discernible in the proletarian family would then be unmistakably fulfilled, and its two defects, poverty and maintenance of a private household, would have ended. Women would have been drawn into the liberating sphere of "social production" and freed from the domestic slavery of the individual family household. As a first approximation, then, it seems that under communism the family would disappear, but marriage would remain. Rather than marriage, perhaps the word love should be used - love purified and exalted, free from all economic considerations which "exert such a powerful

influence on the choice of a marriage partner. For then there is no other motive left except mutual inclination" (p. 72). But would inclination not lead to the "free love" or "sexual communism" that horrified the nineteenth century. Engels replied to this criticism early in his career, in 1847, by answering the question: What will be the influence of communist society on the family? It will transform the relations between the sexes into a purely private matter which concerns only the persons involved and into which society has no occasion to intervene. It can do this since it does away with private property and educates children on a communal basis, and in this way removes the two bases of traditional marriage, the dependence, rooted in private property, of woman on the man and of the children on the parents. And here is the answer to the outcry of the highly moral philistines against the "community of women." Community of women is a condition which belongs entirely to bourgeois society and which today finds its complete expression in prostitution. But prostitution is based on private property and falls with it. Thus communist society, instead of introducing community of women, in fact abolishes it. In other words, it will be nobody's business but the man and woman concerned; and, since things can hardly get worse, they have to get better. Later a more substantial clue was given. Relations between the sexes would revolve around the nature and significance of love, about which {p. 22} Engels had very definite ideas. He considered it "by its nature exclusive." Hence, a marriage based on it would be an "individual marriage" (p. 72). But he did not see such a bond as indissoluble: marriage would continue only so long as love continued, and "the intense emotion of individual sex-love varies very much in duration from one individual to another, especially among men" (p. 73). Obviously, then, and Engels makes this explicit, if love comes to an end or is supplanted by a "new passionate love," separation will benefit all concerned. Divorce will not be needed, however, only separation. As a matter of course, under such conditions both adultery and prostitution will also disappear, for they will simply be unnecessary. Complete sex equality, complete freedom of choice, perfect love - such was the promise of communism. Further than this - the emergence of those features of family life which were emphatically absent in the bourgeois monogamous family - Engels did not go, but he reiterated his stand of the early years with these words: "But what will there be new? This will be answered when a new generation has grown up ... When these people are in the world, they will ... make their own practice and their corresponding public opinion about the practice of each individual and that will be the end of it" (p. 73).

Moreover, in the family of the future, after the abolition of private property ownership and the assumption of social responsibility for children, there would be no anxiety about the material consequences ofunwanted pregnancy. Similarly, illegitimacy would carry no stigma, for society would care for legitimate and illegitimate alike. And, of course, there would be no anxiety about inheriting and bequeathing wealth. The thoughtful reader will perceive some difficulties in these formulations. Parenthood, for instance, is given short shrift. The question of mutuality in love, a very troublesome matter, and the related fact that in Engels' own words men are "by nature" more polygamous than women are not adequately settled (pp. 10, 447, 73). Neither is the question of whether there will be individual dwellings for men and women. But the founders of marxism had written in The Communist Manifesto that "the theory of the Communist may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property." And now, it seems, they were seeking to be consistent in drawing out the implications of this commitment. Hence the concepts of the family and marriage were {p. 23} greatly overshadowed by the concern with liberation of the individual from all external constraint. The family of the future was essentially a naturalistic unit rather than a social institution, for social relationships were regarded as little more than the extension of the individual's potentialities for equality, freedom, and love. {p. 24} TWO | HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND THE FAMLY THE FAILURE OF Marx and Engels to clarify the eact relation of the family to historical materialism left the main axiom of historical materialism unbowed but led to weakness and ambiguity in the marxist theory of the family. As a result, the gates were open wide for a rich tide of supplementary theories as well as legislative experimentation in the post-revolutionary USSR. On the Withering Problem Historical materialism clearly extends priority, if not exclusive reign, to the influence of economic factors. In the causation of social change, the "mode of production" is seen as the prime mover. In marxian terminology, the conditions constituting this force have come to be designated as the "base" (Unterbau) and the phenomena of change which are dependent upon it as the "superstructure" (Vberbau). Although this conceptual scheme dramatizes effectively the determinist facet of Marx's and Engels' theories, it is unfortunate and misleading and does not reflect the

best thinking of the two originators of marxism. Not only does it suggest an overly rigid notion of the direction in which causal influence is exerted from base to superstructure but it also leads to an unproductive dualism in ordering social forces. That is, it suggests only two conceptual dimensions: the economic (sometimes, more broadly, materialistic) base and all those other phenomena dependent on it, the superstructure. Actually, Marx and Engels most frequently thought in terms of a threedimensional scheme made up of cultural forms or patterns of social institutions, the proper realm for "survivals"; social relations as they "really exist" (for example, in the proletarian farnily under bourgeois capitalism); and economic or materialistic conditions. Unfortunately, because of the base-superstructure scheme, apparently taken from the building trade, and because of the presence of careless or elliptical statements in which Marx and Engels seem to be working with a dualistic scheme, in marxist theory only the first and third elements {p. 25} can be identified with certainty as superstructure and base. The middle element, social relations, responds to changes in the third and also can be seen as itself causing changes in the first. Hence, it can be located according to desire either in base or in superstructure. Marx and Engels made use of Morgan's term "survival" to refer generally to components of an outmoded superstructure. The state, law, religion, morality in general were all part of that superstructure, and, consequently, since superstructural elements were presumed to be the result of contradictions at a lower level, they would all disappear under communism. The fate Marx and Engels assigned to the family was not unrelated to their general discussion of life under communism. Their interpreters have frequently contended that they felt the family was also part of the superstructure, and hence that it took a form which was essentially a function of the state of economic forces at a given moment in history. As such, the family not only was a totally dependent institution, and therefore unimportant, but would ultimately disappear completely. This conclusion is supported on at least four grounds. First, Marx and Engels do occasionally speak quite plainly of abolishing the family, as in the following: "That the abolition of [the] individual [household] economy is inseparable from the abolition of the family is self-evident" (Ideology, p. 18). Another is found in the Communist Manifesto: "Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists. On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form, this family exists only among the bourgeoisie, but this shape of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution. The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its

complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital" (The Communist Manifesto, p. 77). Secondly, Marx and Engels suggest an analogy between social classes and state on one side and spouses and family on the other. The state, clearly a superstructural element that was developed by the bourgeoisie to protect its property interests inevitably falls with the fall of classes (Origin, p. 158). The family would suffer the same fate, for its function apparently was analogous to that of the state. It was an institution to protect the husband's interest in exploiting the wife. He was the bourgeois and his wife the proletarian. {p. 26} Thirdly, at both the beginning and the end of their writing careers Marx and Engels made statements that seem to treat the family as a survival from an earlier era. The cultural ideal (or social institution) of the family no longer corresponded with the underlying reality they saw. Thus, Marx wrote that under capitalism the exercise of parental control over children became anachronistic, indeed evil. "The capitalist mode of production, through the dissolution of the economic basis for parental authority, made its exercise degenerate into a mischievous misuse of power" (Capital, I, 535). And Engels felt the accepted relationship between man and wife was no longer possible in a case where the wife took outside employment. In fact, their relationship was turned "upside down"; the reason - "simply because the division of labor outside the family had changed" (Origin, p. 147). Such instances could easily be multiplied, for time and again the founders of marxism seemed to forget the complexity of the conditions and forces determining a given concrete phenomenon and to attribute the properties of necessity and sufficiency to a single factor. Finally, the student of marxism knows that the pattern of the future is not without its precedent in the past. The merging of future and past is especially prominent in The Origin. Ostensibly on the basis of Morgan's research into the North American Iroquois and other preliterate societies, Marx and Engels concluded that primitive man was in a happier condition than his civilized cousin. They wrote of the Iroquois: {quote} And a wonderful order [Verfassung] it is, this gentile order, in all its childlike simplicity! No soldiers, no gendarmes or police, no nobles, kings, regents, prefects, or judges, no prisons, no lawsuits - and everything takes its orderly course. All quarrels and disputes are settled by the whole of the community affected, by the gens or the tribe, or by the gentes among themselves ... Although there were many more matters to be settled in common than today - the household is maintained by a number of families in common, and is communistic, the land belongs to the tribe, only the small gardens are allotted provisionally to the households - yet there is no need for even a trace of our complicated administrative apparatus with all its

ramifications ... There cannot be any poor or needy - the communal household and the gens know their responsibilities towards the old, the sick, and those disabled in war. All are equal and free - the woman included ... And what men and women such a society breeds is proved by the admiration inspired in all white people who have come into contact with unspoiled Indians, by the personal dignity, uprightness, strength of character, and courage of these barbarians. [Origin, pp. 86-87.] {endquote} {p. 27} Against the "simple moral greatness" of the old "gentile" society Marx and Engels juxtaposed the corrupt civilization they saw around them, with its "base greed, brutal appetites, sordid avarice, selfish robbery of the common wealth" (Origin, p. 88). The cause, of course, was the development of private property and classes, as Marx and Engels had long since concluded. Morgan's research was doubly attractive to them because it detected a pattern of life in the past which corresponded in many respects with the hopes nourished by Marx and Engels for the future and hence united a happier future with a happier past in a comforting similarity. This point is explicitly stated on the last page of The Origin, where Engels cites with approval Morgan's judgment of the coming "next higher plane of society," and even underlines the book's concluding words: "It will be a revival in a higher form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient gentes" (p. 163). The unification of the two utopias - past and future - is not without significance to our interest. For, "under the gentile order, the family was never an organizational unit [Organisationseinheit], and could not be so, for man and wife necessarily belonged to two different gentes" (Origins, pp. 991). This statement anticipates the ultimate prediction of Marx and Engels. It almost but not quite explicitly indicates that there will be no family under communism. Again, Engels resorts approvingly to ideas of Morgan: {quote} When the fact is accepted that the family has passed through four successive forms, and is now in a fifth, the question arises whether this form can be permanent in the future. The only answer that can be given is that it must advance as society advances, and change as society changes, even as it has done in the past. It is the creature of the social system, and will reflect its culture. As the monogamian family has improved greatly since the commencement of civilization, and very sensibly in modern times, it is at least supposable that it is capable of still further improvement until the equality of the sexes is attained. Should the monogamian family in the distant future fail to answer the requirements of society ... it is impossible to predict the nature of its successor. [Origin, p. 74.] {endquote} This passage very strongly implies that the monogamous family will indeed fail to answer society's requirements in the future.

All of the above lends support to the view that Marx and Engels felt that the family would wither away. However, passages can also be found which suggest that they thought of and used the term family in two distinct senses: (1) to refer to the social relations clustering around {p. 28} the facts of sex and age differences, sexual attraction, sexual intercourse, and reproduction; and (2) as a strictly cultural or institutional entity, a survival of the past in relation to the conditions appearing on the scene with modern bourgeois capitalism. Examples of the second usage have alredy been given, and the following is an example of the first, more general, connotation: "Modern industry, by assigning as it does an important part in the process of production, outside the domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economic foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes" (Capital, I, 536; my italics). This semantic problem caused difficulties similar to those brought on by the dualism suggested in the concepts of base and superstructure. The family would indeed wither away if the term meant the cultural forrn of the detested "monogamous family of civilization," but it would not wither, at least not entirely, if the term referred to the observable clustering of certain kinds of behavior and social relations around sex, age, and reproduction. In addition to the semantic confusion, there were other complexities. Underlying Thought-Models: An Emerging Multi-Factor Theory Marx's and Engels' major concept was the central place of economic factors in social change. But the world of facts is stubbornly complex, and the marxist treatment of the family has been particularly shaky because of certain facts relating to biological ties and to sexual reproduction which seem to be materialistic but yet are not economic. This clash of social theory, with its inherent press toward completeness and closure, and the world of observable facts resulted in two fissures, possibly a third, in the structure of economic determinism, both of which are of the greatest interest for students of marxism and students of social theory in general. Two of these "underlying thought models" are presented in some detail in this section, and a third is briefly alluded to. Neither of the first two was ever made very explicit in the writing of Marx and Engels, thus have led to considerable confusion and uncertainty among marxists about the role of the family in historical materialism. The third analogy is almost entirely latent. As noted previously, the tendency in Marx's and Engels' writings on the family is to treat the family principally as a function of economic

{p. 29} developments. Throughout Engels' major work on the subject there are references to the determining effect of property relations, the division of labor, the employment of women, and, as an extension of the latter, a kind of "reflection" theory of the family. For example, Engels argued that as wealth increases, the man overthrows the traditional order of inheritance - reckoned in the female line, according to him, a fact which "was the world historical defeat of the female sex" (Origin, p. 50; Engels' italics). Two different but closely related economic factors are held directly to influence the positions of husband and wife: an increase in wealth, with subsequent change in the inheritance role, and the wage-earning work role of the husband. In both cases an advantageous economic position is seen as inevitably leading to unbalanced personal power which in turn leads to oppression and inequality. This mode of analysis is certainly consistent with the main thesis of Mar and Engels' thought. At first sight, then, it does not seem inconsistent to find such depictions of the family as the following, in which Engels is speaking of the monogamous family: "It is the cellular form of civilized society, in which the nature of the oppositions and contradictions fully active in that society can be already studied" (Origin, p. 58). Such descriptions can easily and conveniently be interpreted simply as elements in a reflection theory of the family, for they are explained entirely by the portrayal of the economic circumstances reigning in society as a whole. But this leads us to our first underlying analytical model. Early in their career the two collaborators spoke of the "latent slavery in the family" (Ideology, p. 21), and in Capital Marx wrote about a division of labor in the family which "spontaneously developed" and which depends upon or is caused by "differences of age and sex" (pp. 90, 386). Surely these must be reckoned as references to a noneconomic factor, unless Marx and Engels are simply being elliptical, which seems unlikely. To call "differences of age and sex" aspects of property relations, or of economic forces of any kind, would be stretching the meaning of this latter concept to the breaking point. More likely, Engels and Marx saw age and sex differences in themselves, that is, as facts of nature, as a source of inequality (ultimately of power) and oppression. From this point of view, then, insofar as Marx conceived them to be capable of variation, as is implied by the use of the term slavery (which obviously could not be eternal), family relationships can be seen as a superstructure over a biological base. {p. 30} A further analogy, also focusing on a biological fact, is found in the earliest exposition of historical materialism made by the two writers (Ideology, pp. 127). There they assert that three basic premises support their analysis: (1) the production of material things to enable man to live; (2) the infinity of human needs - as soon as one is satisfied, new needs appear; and (3) reproduction. They then continue their

exposition to develop the idea that to each mode of production or industrial stage - see premise (1) - there corresponds a "mode of cooperation" or "social stage." This mode of cooperation (Weise des Zusammenwirkens) is, they say, itself a force of production (Produktivkraft) and thus becomes also a condition (fact, moment, premise), the fourth, of the historical process. These ideas were considerably refined in later writings. The important fact in the present context is what appears to be the assignment by Marx and Engels of an independent and fundamental role to the process of reproduction, premise (3). There is little doubt that this is what they meant. They wrote: "The production of life, both of one's own in labor and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other hand as a social relationship" (Ideology, p. 18; my italics). If The German Ideology were the only place in which such an idea was presented, one would be inclined to assume that they later thought better of it. But the notion recurs in similarly explicit form in the last major work of the founders of marxism, The Origin of the Family, and again in a letter of September 21, 1890, from Engels to Bloch. In The Origin Engels referred to the earlier book and repeated with approval the following: "The first division of labor is that between man and woman for the propagation of children" (p. 58). Engels did not propose to abolish this division of labor, though he may have wished to, but he did consider reproduction to be of such importance to historical materialism that it receives explicitly equal weight with production. In the preface to the first edition of The Origin of the Family, he wrote: {quote} According to the materialistic conception, the determining factor in history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction of the immediate essentials of life. This, again, is of a twofold character. On the one side, the production of the means of existence, of articles of food and clothing, dwellings, and of the tools necessary for that production; on the other side, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species. The social organization under which the people of a particular {p. 31} historical epoch and a particular country live is determined by both kinds of production; by the stage of development of labor on the one hand and of the family on the other. The lower the development of labor and the more limited the amount of its products, and consequently, the more limited also the wealth of the society, the more the social order is found to be dominated by kinship groups. However, within this structure of society based on kinship groups the productivity of labor increasingly develops, and with it private property and exchange, differences of wealth, the possibility of utilizing the labor power of others, and hence the basis of class antagonisms: new social elements, which in the course of generations strive to adapt the old social order to the new conditions, until at last their incompatibility brings

about a complete upheaval. In the collision of the newly-developed social classes, the old society founded on kinship groups is broken up; in its place appears a new society, with its control centered in the state, the subordinate units of which are no longer kinship associations, but local associations; a society in which the system of the farnily is completely dominated by the system of property, and in which there now freely develop those class antagonisms and class struggles that have hitherto formed the content of all written history. [Pp. 5-6; Engels' italics.] {endquote} Apparently Marx and Engels vere inclined somehow to look upon reproduction as part of the base. It seems quite clear that they were on the verge of an analogy between the mode of production and the mode of reproduction, to which would correspond, respectively, two separate and parallel sets of modes of cooperation or social stages. The social stages which correspond to the different stages of development of the mode of production were of course the stages in the historical development of society: primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, and so forth. The social stages which presumably would correspond to "variations" in the mode of reproduction were the different forms of social relationship, group marriage, monogamous family, and so on, which Marx and Engels saw as clustering around sex and reproduction a line of thought much encouraged by Morgan. The analogy is obviously faulty, since the process of reproduction is hardly a variable in the same sense as the process of production. Moreover, Marx and Engels never developed it in any explicit and systematic way, and to their followers it has proved to be either embarrassing or mystifying. Heinrich Cunow, for example, found it "almost incomprehensible how Engels could have made such a mistake," and soberly asserted that the "production of men" had always been accomplished "in the same way and with the same means." His colleague, Karl {p. 32} Kautsky, noted that the phrasing in The Origin corresponded almost word for word with that in The German Ideology and found it "very remarkable" that nothing more was said about it in the intevening years. Even Lenin, in reply to criticism by the sociologically inclined N. K. Mikhailovski about this phrase of Engels' was not able to give an effective defense or explanation. Nor have efforts by Soviet theorists been very successful. For some time it was simply dismissed as a mistake or an inaccuracy on the part of Engels, while more recently the view has been taken that Engels' reference in The Origin to the determining importance of reproduction was meant to refer to the earliest period of human history, when "people were still more like beasts than people" and the means of production had little influence on their relations. In fact, however, a careful reading of the quotation above makes such an interpretation dubious. The forthright manner of its presentation and the persistence of

the idea over forty years of more or less continuous thinking and polemical activity by the two founders of marxism strongly suggests that the family was not seen by them as of the same ilk as the state, religion, and so forth - that is, as an element of the superstructure dependent entirely on contradictions arising out of material circumstances - and that they felt the family, insofar as it was a part of the superstructure, was "originally tied" with a base other than an economic one. It is not impossible to conclude from this review that Marx and Engels were for their time unusually acute sociological analysts and were close on the track of the essentials of modern sociological theory. In these scattered comments they seem to be moving in the direction of a multifactor theory of the determination of concrete social structure. Thus their thoughts about the family tended to lead them in a direction opposite to that in which they wanted to move, which was toward economic determinism, a single-factor theory. But Marx and Engels were moralists and political activists as much as they were social theorists, and these interests had their influence on the theories they developed. Admittedly, even the most indignant of men are unlikely to become very exercised over the injustice arising from the division of labor in reproduction. According to still a third pattern, implicit in the writings of Marx and {p. 33} Engels, the family can be analyzed in terms of an analogy with the main axiom of historical materialism. This belief extends the parallel between the mode and relations of production (in the economic realm) to the mode and relations of reproduction. In both cases important needs are involved, certain objects can satisfy those needs, and rights are at stake. To the need for food, clothing, and shelter correspond the sexual need of the individual and the (derived) need of society for new members. To the means and instruments of production correspond the sexual characteristics and organs of men and women. And to the economic commodity and to property rights correspond both seual satisfaction and sexual rights and the fruit of intercourse - a new life - and parental rights. Carrying the analogy further, the element corresponding to socialization of the means of production is clearly the socialization of the bodies of men and women and of their children or, if one prefers, the abolition of private sexual and parental rights. Ad, of course, to the economic greed and exploitative nature of the bourgeois correspond the sexual jealousy and sense of parental ownership which are part and parcel of the institution of the monogamous family. Marx and Engels were clearly willing to consider a certain abolition of parental rights, since under communism the rearing of children would be the responsibility and right of society as a whole; but the abolition of sexual rights (which they tended to see as

simply the right of the husband to his wife's body) was another matter. As a problem in their scheme, it was solved by means of an image of what would happen once women were freed from their economic and legal inferiority. Marx and Engels apparently felt that once women had obtained a position of equality with men, there would be no need for any kind of rights, for natural man and natural woman would engage in sexual relations strictly according to mutual inclination. This naturalistic humanism protected them against the charge of proposing a onesided socialization of women. They did not, however, envisage the possibility that in the future society women themselves might wish, in numbers large or small, to treat their own bodies as public property, in which case the criteria of both naturalism and mutuality would be satisfied. Their presumption that sexual love is individual is one of the unscientific elements present in their ideas. {p. 41} II THE SOVIET REGIME CONFRONTS THE FAMILY {p. 44} In Pursuit of the Marxist Theory of the Family Perhaps the most lively question posed by the writing of Marx and Engels, and the one receiving the most ambiguous response, was on the future of the family: Would the family, like the state, religion, and other institutions, wither away with the attainment of the classless society? More specifically, three questions, or at least three elements of the issue, seemed to be at stake here: Would the family disappear at some future, unspecified, time? If so, what implication did this have for the young socialist society; that is, would the disappearance or withering begin immediately? And again, if so, should the party and its followers take an active role in bringing about such a process? Among the positions taken on the far left was that of the leader of Bolshevik feminism Alexandra M. Kollontai, whotended to answer all three with a vigorous yes. On the far right were those who, like the German Social Democrat, Karl Kautsky, argued that the family would not disappear, now or in the communist future, and that in any case little could or should be done by the communists themselves, for such action would be "unmarxist." For example: "The communists see the only lever to a real transformation of human relations in a change of the productive base, the economic foundation of social life, over which the various ideological forms constitute multiform superstructures in which are clothed human consciousness, morals and customs." Somewhere between these two extremes, but closer to Kollontai, the views of the majority can probably be found. In the years between 1917 and 1934 most party members apparently subscribed to the following formulations, written by an influential member of the Leningrad party organization:

{quote} Bourgeois ideologists think that the family is an eternal, not a transitory organization, that sexual relations are at the basis of the family, that these {p. 45} sexual relations will exist as long as the two sexes, and since man and woman will both live under socialism just as under capitalism, that therefore the existence of the family is inevitable. That is completely incorrect. Sexual relations, of course, have existed, eist, and will exist. However, this is in no way connected with the indispensability of the existence of the family. The best historians of culture definitely have established that in primitive times the family did not exist ... Similar to the way in which, together with the disappearance of classes, together with the annihilation of class contradictions, the state will disappear, similarly to that, together with the strengthening of the socialist economy, together with the growth of socialist relationships, together with the overcoming of earlier pre-socialist forms, the family will also die out. The family is already setting out on the road to a merging with Socialist Society, to a dissolution into it. [But] an openly negative attitude toward the family under present conditions does not have sufflcient grounding, because presocialist relationships still exist, the state is still weak, the new social forms [public dining rooms, state rearing of children, and so forth] are as yet little developed, and until then the family cannot be abolished completely. However, the coordination of this family with the general organization of Soviet life is the task of every communist, of every Komsornolite [member of Communist Youth League]. One must not shut oneself off in the family, but rather, grow out of the family shell into the new Socialist Society. The contemporary Soviet family is the springboard from which we must leap into the future. Always seeking to carry the entire family over into the public organizations, always a more decisive overcoming of the elements of bourgeois family living - that is the difficult, but important task which stands before us. {endquote} To summarize, the family will eventually die out, is in fact starting to do so now, but nonetheless will be needed for the duration of the transition period, and the party and its followers should take an active role in helping things along, mainly by setting a good eample. Preconditions for the new social ordering of the relations between the sexes were required. The most crucial was the entrance of woman into social production, which would give her economic independence and hence social equality. Her work in social production would then have to be balanced by society's assumption of the responsibilities of childrearing, supplying and preparing food, washing clothing, and so on. All such patterns - the entry of women into the labor market, the socialization of household chores, the assumption of public responsibility for childrearing - were originally subsidiary links in the causal chain

{p. 46} leading to the end of the family, and to equality and freedom for the individual, but in early Soviet writing they tended to assume the status of end-goals in themselves, and to be justified in their own terms. Lenin himself elaborated slightly the position of Marx and Engels on social equality for women. He was as strongly opposed as they, perhaps even more so, to the individual household with its "stinking kitchen," and, like them, asserted that only socialism and an end to small households could "save woman from housewifery." Also, like Fourier, Marx, and Engels, Lenin saw in the liberation of women, the weaker sex, a symbol of a more general liberation, though he placed more stress on the psychological factor of participation in social production as a source of personality development, which would then serve generally to put women on a more equal footing with men. Conversely, Lenin seemed more irritated with the specific nature of the housewife's tasks than Marx and Engels had been when they had confined themselves more to the general factors of property relations in the family and the wife's entry into social production. Lenin wrote: "Women grow worn out in the petty, monstrous household work, their strength and time dissipated and wasted, their minds growing narrow and stale, their hearts beating slowly, their will weakened." In this, he continued, it is not only the woman who suffers: "The home life of a woman is a daily sacrifice to a thousand unimportant trivialities. The old master right of the man still lives in secret. His slave takes her revenge, also secretly. The backwardness of women, their lack of understanding for the revolutionary ideals of the man, decrease his joy and determination in fighting. They are like little worms which, unseen, slowly but surely rot and corrode." These subtleties constituted a relatively small shift of explanatory emphasis. For the rest, Lenin agreed that the development of public restaurants, creches, and similar facilities was crucial, and that the abolition of the small household economy was, in the words of one of his colleagues, E. A. Preobrazhenski, "theoretically indisputable for every Communist." Further arguments in support of the socialization of household chores were that the maintenance of an individual household was uneconomical and perpetuated the small, isolated, shut-off family unit, a source of hostility toward the new socialist way of life. During the 1920's, considerable effort was expended in the calculation of how many hours of labor were required to run an individual household, and a comprehensive survey of the life of Moscow workers conducted in {p. 47} 1923-1925 reported that some twelve working hours per day were needed, on the average, to carry on individual family life. At one time it was estimated that in Russia 36,000,000 work hours were spent every day only on the preparation of food in individual households, whereas centralized production would have required only 6,000,000 work hours. Later, in the middle of the First Five Year Plan, the complaint

was made that 30,000,000 individuals were giving their full time to unproductive household work. As a corollary to such information, the liberation of women in itself was seen as a condition for economic development. Thereby the family became by implication a direct obstacle to the "development of the base." Trotsky went even further, reversing the usual order of precedence in the marxist theory of the relation between family and economic life: "Until there is equality in the family, there will be none in social production." The rearing of children by society was hailed by all not only because it saved time and released the mother for outside work, but because it could be more scientific, more rational, more organized than rearing within the individual family. Some carried the argument even further and contended that in a society organized around a collective work system it was more appropriate to accustom a child from the earliest years to life in the collective rather than to train him in the individualistic small family. Kollontai's early formulation is characteristic: "The contemporary family, as a specific social collective, has no productive functions and to leave all care for posterity in this private collective cannot be justified by any positive considerations ... Logically speaking, it would seem that care for the new generation should lie with that economic unit, with that social collective, that needs it for its further existence." To many observers the most striking feature of early Bolshevik family theory concerned the future of parent-child relations. Marx, Engels, and even Lenin had left the field open for the most radical pretensions of the leftists. Perhaps it is significant that neither Engels nor Lenin ever became a father. In any event, the writing of Marx and Engels clearly disregarded the positive contribution to society ofmotherhood and fatherhood. As a result, A. V. Lunacharski, Commissar of Education, could write in the early 1930's: "Our problem now is to do away with the household and to free women from the care of children. It would be idiotic to separate children from their parents {p. 48} by force. But when, in our communal houses, we have well-organized quarters for children, connected by a heated gallery with the adults' quarters, to suit the requirements of the climate, there is no doubt the parents will, of their own free will, send their children to these quarters, where they will be supervised by trained pedagogical and medical personnel. There is no doubt that the terms 'my parents,' 'our children,' will gradually fall out of usage, being replaced by such conceptions as 'old people,' 'adults,' 'children,' and 'infants.' Kollontai, prominent opponent of motherhood, saw it as an unjust burden and, in her zest for feminine emancipation, seemed to want to see women and men placed in identical social roles.

{Feminism in the West has developed 'benchmarks' for 'equality', meaning 'sameness'} At times the radical image of the future took on very concrete form. In a series of publications of the late 1920's L. M. Sabsovich urged an immediate and complete change in all phases of everyday life - a radical cultural revolution. He advocated complete separation of children from parents from the earliest years and said that those who argued for recognition of such concepts as the natural biological tie between parents and children, were "soaked in petit bourgeois and 'intelligentsia-like' prejudices." He held that social and economic factors accounted entirely for the feeling of exclusive love toward one's own children: in the future society there would be only love for children in general. Moreover, he pointed out that since the child was the property of the state, not the individual family, the state therefore had the right to compel parents to surrender their children to special "children's towns" to be built "at a distance from the family." This was but one element in a broader scheme devised by Sabsovich for the construction of a new type of "socialist city" (the contemporary form of city was a "capitalist invention") in which not only work but all aspects of leisure and consumption activities were to be organized on a collectivist basis. The family dwelling would be completely eliminated, to be replaced by individual rooms for individual persons (though married persons could have adjoining rooms). Sabsovich urged that such reorganization of life into a "truly socialist" form start immediately: "Down with socalled 'transitional forms'!" The workers should not be furnished with gas, electricity, and other conveniences, but instead provided with a thorough socialist reconstruction within the next five to eight years. We may doubt that such views were widely shared. One opponent of Sabsovich referred to "various strange ideas about home life under {p. 49} socialism," such as, "all individual home life (not only family life) will disappear under socialism," and, "the whole life of a person, physical and mental, can be lived within the collective." Nadezhda Krupskaia, Lenin's widow, noted that children belonged neither to parents nor to the state, but to themselves. Furthermore, the state was due to wither away, and "the parental sense will not be suppressed, but will flow in another channel; it will afford much more joy to children and to parents." Hence, parents would be justified, she wrote, in refusing to turn their children over to children's towns in the manner proposed by Sabsovich. All in all, on the level of ideology the first decade or so of post-revolutionary thought brought a rich and often quite interesting tide of theories about the family. With no official party line on the subject, the writings of Marx and Engels were ambiguous

enough to elicit a variety of theories, and the emerging problems seemed to justify the number of them evoked. Property and Inheritance Some marxist ideas about the family found concrete embodiment in the realm of legal actions. Since marxist thought insisted so vigorously on the corruptive influence of private wealth, it was only natural that its presumed power should be curtailed. On April 27, 1918, it was decreed: "Testate and intestate succession are abolished. Property of an owner (movable as well as immovable) becomes after his death the domain of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic." Other legal measures were taken to forestall immediately the detested "marriage of calculation." The 1918 family code proclaimed that "marriage does not establish community of property" and that "agreements by husband or wife intended to restrict the property rights of either party are invalid, and not binding." Nevertheless, the retreat from the abolition of inheritance began immediately, even in the very decree in which it was abolished. Though succession was repealed in principle, immediate relatives who had been living with the deceased were permitted to inherit if the value of the estate did not exceed 10,000 rubles, close relatives who were incapable of working were to receive an amount necessary for support, and so on. This situation was an early example of one which was to be {p. 50} come prototypical: the bolsheviks were simply not in a position to carry out their declared aims. In 1919 the Commissariat of Justice decreed that the 10,000-ruble limit did not apply to peasants' farmsteads, in 1922 the Civil Code explicitly permitted inheritance up to 10,000 rubles to specified persons, and in 1926 the upper limit was abolished entirely. However, hostility to the principle of inherited property continued and was expressed by a strongly progressive inheritance tax until 1943, when the tax itself was abolished. All that remained after that was a fee, progressive but never higher than 10 per cent. The abolition of the concept of community property of husband and wife was also a source of trouble to the Soviet leaders. Motivated largely by the desire to abolish marriage for money, the decree seemed a logical corollary to the marxist devaluation of household labor. All agreed in principle that women must be drawn out of the home and into social production, but the difficulty was that many married women could not, or would not, be so drawn out. There were large families to care for, there were not enough creches and kindergartens, and there was unemployment during most of the years of the New Economic Policy from 1921 to 1928. But in those families where the wife did not work, such goods and money as were acquired after marriage could be interpreted as the legal property of the husband. In case of divorce, a phenomenon of

increasing frequency in those days, the purpose of the law - to protect both spouses, but especially the woman, from exploitation - could boomerang to the disadvantage of the housewife. Thus, practice showed that laws of good intention could lead to bad results. So, in 1926 the principle that property acquired after marriage is community property of the spouses was restored to the code of laws on marriage and family. One of the main functions of private wealth in most societies, whether accumulated or inherited, is to provide for times of sickness, old age, or other need for self or relatives, and the 1918 code recognized that legal responsibility for maintenance of children, the aged, and the invalid would have to continue for a time. In the 1918 decree on inheritance, for example, certain relatives (if propertyless and disabled) were authorized to receive, from an estate exceeding 10,000 rubles in value, a sum necessary for self-support. This exception was justified by a condition - "until a decree for universal social insurance is issued." Although the idea of societal support for the individual was central to marxist socialism, it is an index of developing problems that in the 1926 code the individual's legal responsibility for support of {p. 51} needy relatives, instead of being narrowed, was widened to include brother, sister, grandparents, and grandchildren. Presumably "marriages of calculation" continued with much the same frequency as before, though as time went on the determining factor came to be more a matter of selecting a husband who was a "big specialist" rather than wealthy. The continuing importance of money in famly life was also shown by the large number of lawsuits about problems of alimony. Parents: A Hotbed of Traditionalism Though the theme is barely present in Marx and Engels, largely because of the limited importance of the transition period in their thinking, it was not long before their Soviet followers decided that the family was definitely not on the side of the Revolution. Kollontai put it very well: "The family deprives the worker of revolutionary consciousness." She, like many of her colleagues, fulminated against the "small, isolated, closed-in family" and awaited the time when first loyalty would be to society, while family, love, all of personal life would come second. Such theorists saw not only that in the family the spirit of acquisition and the sense of private property were born and nourished, but also that the family was intimately connected with religion. Life's most significant personal events - birth, marriage, and death - were after all those of family life, and somehow even the most convinced Communists found it hard to see the revolutionary "Dead March" supplant a Christian burial. Among the rank and file clearly there was nothing to take the place of the church, as the party members complained among themselves, and so the

struggle against religion often was carried over into antagonism toward its everyday social context - the family. One can gain an understanding of the spirit of the time by looking more closely at the strand of bolshevik social thought which might be called "totalism." The search for a total, though as yet voluntary,monopoly of the individual's personal loyalty is an early harbinger of the political totalitarianism that came later. The rationalistic Bolsheviks simply had no use for the "anarcho-individualistic disorganization" of the family, which demanded loyalty and time that they felt to be due the Revolution and the Cause. In fact, one influential party leader, A. A. Solts, even pointed to a contradiction between sexual needs, a "very individual matter," and the building of a collective society. {p. 52} The intractability and hostility of the family were demonstrated when it became apparent that it was not only the peasant and worker masses who stubbornly clung to their traditions. Trouble developed in the party itself. The old-fashioned family explained why workers did not join the party in the first place, and family pressure as well as church weddings caused misunderstandings among party members and exclusions from the membership ranks. There was some discussion in the early years about what to do with Communists who took wives from an "alien class." In those years revolutionary political activity, especially at the lower levels, was a masculine one to which wives often responded with lack of enthusiasm. In 1923, one author argued, probably with considerable truth, that since only 10 per cent of the party members were women, the bulk of party wives must be politically unresponsive and "philistine." This situation led to an interesting conflict between the marxist principle of sex equality in the family and the Communist's obligation to impose his communist ideas. The outcome of this dilemma suggests the relative importance of the two norms: "We have the right to demand and we must demand from party members that the spiritual supremacy rn the family belong to them - communists." In still another way, not at all foreseen by Marx and Engels, the family presented problems. It is the family, and the older generation, complained a writer in 1927, through which "the filth of the old world is passed to the youth." Here, then, were a myriad of relatively inviolable self-oriented groups with an acquisitive attitude toward property, too often professing belief in religion, showing sexual selfindulgence, and even harboring open hostility to the new order. Truly the family seemed to be the enemy of everything the Revolution represented. It is little wonder that the bulk of bolshevik theorizing placed the family in the same boat with prostitution; in the future, both would disappear. The concept of the family as "the most conservative stronghold of the old regime" therefore reinforced the more

doctrinaire thought inherited from Engels, that the monogamous family was not worth much even in itself because of its internal structure. To a considerable extent, perhaps, the family was also a favorite scapegoat. Many party leaders were surprised and chagrined to find that the workers, to say nothing of the peasants, were often neither enthusiastic about the Revolution nor much interested in the new way of life. {p. 53} The family was most likely slated for extinction anyway, and its deep conservatism could account for the fact that bolshevism was not accepted more quickly. Thus, attacks on the family helped assuage the conscience of the more democratic and utopian-minded in the party. The "family" is of course a rather abstract notion, but the individual persons who make it up could be held more immedtely accountable. The targets of the most direct and concrete hostility were parents.They were seen as conservative or even reactionary toward the new way of life: mothers were religious and fathers were drunken or obsessed with private property. Since classical marxism, as we know, had nothing positive to say about the parent-child relationship under any circumstances, its relative silence about the tender love of mother and child, the closeness of father and son, and the like could be called upon for support. Actually, Marx and Engels tended to depict the parent-child relationship under capitalism in only one way: as tainted with exploitation. Perhaps they found it even more hopeless than the relationship between husband and wife, for if the latter tie was to be redeemed and purified in the future society, the same could not be said of the former because the state would rear the children. Then, too, there was a certain inviting feasibility about destroying the family by attacking the parents. If parents could somehow be bypassed, the children could be used for the purposes of the regime. They were accessible to influence in the schools, their unformed minds were still suggestible, and they represented the future, for which hopes were high. As early as the Second Komsomol Congress in 1919, Komsomolites were being urged to split young people away from their parents, to induce, as one phrasing put it, "a psychological stratification in the rural family, drawing rural youth over to the side of the toilers' government." A resolution of the Congress urged Komsomol members to give special help to young Cossacks "who are rising up against their fathers." In the mid-twenties, an active party publicist, A. B. Zalkind, urged in books and pamphlets that children should respect their fathers only if their ideas were correct; neither respect nor obedience was due a reactionary father. Children who had parents with lagging revolutionary consciences were asked to criticize and

reform their mothers and fathers. Parents, in turn, were to adopt a new and comradely attitude toward their children. To give teeth to the new image of parentchild relations, speakers and writers announced that the use of physical punishment by {p. 54} parents was forbidden. Indeed, a 1927 publication of the Commissariat of Justice described Soviet law as, among other things, "a new law which categorically denies the authority of the parental relationship." At the Seventh Congress of the Komsomol in 1926 Krupskaia urged upon the delegates the importance of the Young Pioneer organizations in the task of rearing the new generation. "The Pioneer detachment," she asserted, "must be, for the Pioneer, something like what the family used to be." Six years later, at the Ninth Congress in 1931, one delegate asserted that the Soviet regime had done away with the "fetish of the family, the subordination to the parents," and that children were now concluding "social contracts" with their parents. Contrasting the interests of the regime with those of the individual family, she continued, "We have taught children to proceed from higher interests - from the interests of the proletarian class." A resolution of the Congress spoke of the "extension of our influence in the family through the children themselves." Along with parents, schoolteachers were demoted. In 1931 a prominent party leader urged that leadership in the schools be exercised predominantly by the organized children. During these years some children actually brought their parents into court. The most dramatic episode, which colored the tone of the entire era, was the case of Pavlik Morozov, who when he took the side of the regime in the war being conducted with the peasantry denounced his own father and was subsequently killed for that act. He became an official martyr, and The Great Soviet Encyclopedia tells the story this way: {quote} Morozov, Pavlik (Pavel Trofimovich, 1918-1932) - A courageous pioneer who, after selflessly struggling against the kulaks [rich peasants] of his community during the period of collectivization, was savagely killed by a kulak gang. The pioneers were carrying on an active struggle against the kulaks. M. exposed his own father, who had been at that time (1930), chairman of the village Soviet, but had fallen under the influence of kulak relatives. After telling his representative of the district committee of the party about how his father was secretly selling false documents to exiled kulaks, M. then testified in court in his father's case, and labelled him a traitor. The kulaks decided to settle matters with M. He was killed, together with his younger brother, on September 3, 1932, in a forest, by kulak bandits. The name of Morozov was given to the kolkhoz which was organized in Gerasimovka after his death, and also many other kolkhozes, pioneer palaces, and libraries." {endquote}

{p. 55} A more vigorous symbolization of the discrediting of the older generation, the rising power of youth, and the regime's willingness to trample family loyalty underfoot could hardly be devised. These policies were not without their effect. As the power and the responsibility of the parent were gradually being relaxed, the rearing of children was becoming, it seemed, more and, more a function of the larger society. But the new society was not equipped to deal with such a heavy duty. Ideological pretensions had again outrun institutional capacities, and to the extent that parental authority declined, Soviet children were more and more on their own, for the authority o youth organizations and "society as a whole" was largely chimerical. Social Equality for Women The equalitarian reformist zeal of the early years must not be underestimated. After all, the traditional form of the parent-child tie was considered unsatisfactory by the bolsheviks not only because parents were apt to be conservative or reactionary toward the new regime, but also because it epitomized the old moral system - based on blood ties and sympathy for relatives. Hence, just as in capitalist society, this tie bred further inequality by virtue of the differential capacities of parents to give their children edudcation and a suitable general upbringing. But the epicenter of communist equalitarian aspirations was in the relation between the sexes. After the abolition of private property ownership, the assumption of family functions by the state, and the engagement of all women in social production, a situation was to arise in which "marriage will no longer have the appearance of a family as its obligatory consequence." The author of this phrase went so far as to allege that the separation of the kitchen from marriage is "a more significant historical event than the separation of church from state." In fact, as we have seen, there was not a little sentiment in favor of residential separation of husband from wife. As one radical young woman wrote in an "open letter," "It is precisely a separate life [of husband and wife] which creates full 'equality of rights' for both parties, guarantees spiritual growth, liberates the woman." Many were in disagreement with this, but all were willing to vote for the desirability of economic independence for women. In countless pamphlets, posters, and speeches Russian women were urged to enter {p. 56} the factory and office. Since this goal could obviously be achieved only gradually, it soon became clear that an additional measure was needed: motherhood deserved special economic support. As Kollontai, the most enthusiastic proponent of independence for women, had written even before the Revolution, only with "all around security of motherhood" could marriage be cleansed of that "bourgeois scum," that calculated self-interest which had nothing in common with love. A later

writer, with a fine nair for phrasing, carried on the Kollontai tradition by referring to the need of a "social correction factor for the biological inequality of the sexes." In addition to its programs, proclamations, and exhortations, the new regime did actually take some important legal measures. It repudiated the conservative, patriarchal Church, decreeing thathenceforth only, civil marriages were to be legal. It granted substantial freedom of marriage and divorce to all except near relatives. Mutual consent was the main requirement for marriage, and for divorce the desire of either of the spouses was deemed sufficient cause. The new freedoms were taken with sufficient seriousness by enough people so that in a few years the divorce rate began to rise, and the complaint could be made that the courts were "buried under alimony cases." Actually, even the party itself played a role in the trend, since from time to time members were encouraged to look closely after the political education of their wives and to divorce those who were hopeless laggards. In addition, full equality of legal and political rights was accorded to women in the marriage relationship. Alongside those securing freedom of choice in marriage and divorce, several provisions attracted considerable attention at the time because of their symbolic importance, especially those providing that the wife "need not follow the husband" in case of change of residence and concerning the surname to be taken by the woman after marriage. The former is best interpreted as an epression of resentment against an explicit provision of Tsarist law which did require the wife to follow the husband if he should for any reason change his residence; it was easy for communist thinkers to see this as intentional and unjust interference with the right of the wife to pursue an occupational career independently, and hence as constituting the real underpinning of inequality. The article on surnames gave three possible choices: husband's, wife's, or joint surnames. For some reason, in the first code of laws on marriage and family, permission was not given to allow each party to retain his or her premarital name. This lack {p. 57} aroused some criticism at the time and was suitably amended in 1926. Once women had also been accorded full rights to vote, to participate in public associations and activities, and, of course, to enter into occupational life, or social production, on a basis of full equality with men, the problem was then seen as one of persuading women to seize their new opportunities. A special section of the party, the Women's Section (Zhenotdel), occupied itself mainly with the task of drawing women into broader public activities. However, no special rights were accorded at this time to women for those "biological infirmities," pregnancy and childbirth. In addition to such positive measures as these, the fight was carried on against "survivals of the old regime." The chief targets relevant to sex equality were the

Church, the Islamic tradition with institutions perpetuating the inferior status of women such as the bride price, and those basic attitudes of the population, especially among the peasantry, which were so strongly linked to the old patriarchal mores. The prevailing communist attitude toward sexual jealousy was particularly revealing. It was seen as an extension of the private property spirit: "Nowadays it is one of the worst crimes to kill a woman for jealousy, because we are trying to free our women, not regard them as the property of man any more. If a man kills his wife or lover out of jealousy, he is given the maximum penalty - ten years - and in Central Asia he is shot." But good marxist regarded such details as minor, for their central verbal commitment was to the development of facilities which would accord de facto release from kitchen and children. Virtually every public utterance on family and women from the time of the Revolution forward was to be permeated with this thought. Unfortunately, with the exception of the period known as War Communism, when ration cards were issued on the basis of employment, the drift of women into social production was very slow. It was no secret that for many there were no opportunities. During the New Economic Policy (NP) period, and in glaring contradiction with the goal and intention of the party, unemployment was widespread, and those women who could find work often faced the unsolved question of providing for children and maintaining the household. In spite of repeated assertions of the intention to establish communal kitchens, dining halls, laundries, and a network of children's homes and creches, it was hard to accomplish much. The extensive communal institutions of War Communism could not be continued for financial {p. 58} reasons, and owners and managers of private enterprise during the NEP period were reluctant to invest in such uneconomic ventures as creches and public restaurants. In the press, side by side with the stated intention of doing better, there were constant complaints about the insignificant extent of communal feeding. For example, the party's leading publicist on such affairs, Emelian M. Iaroslavski, counted "public dinners" served on November 1, 1925: 20,000 in Moscow, 50,000 in Leningrad, and 67,000 in the provinces, a total of 137,000. At the same time he noted that only three out of 100 children were coming to the creches. All the rest were being reared entirely by individual families. With the end of the NEP period further efforts were made in the direction of socializing the family's functions, but as resources and personnel were committed to the "harder" part of the Five Year Plan, the claim of establishing creches and public dining rooms began to sound more and morehollow.

This problem concerned quality as well as quantity. In the early communal facilities the food was bad and poorly served, often in crude, unpleasant surroundings. The children's creches were dirty and understaffed and, as one writer put it, "the public laundries tear and steal more than they wash." Reactions were understandably negative, and the tendency of some of the party theorists to identify the institutions of War Communism as a first step toward the achievement of the idealized classless society could hardly have been more ill conceived. All in all, it was a poor beginning, and the population was skeptical about such communal activities for years afterward. Apparently there was little improvement in later years. Various epert estimates and surveys established in the early 1930's that few in the population were interested in communal housing, and that Russian women did not care about communal dining halls and were avoiding the creches, while the "better-placed workers" who ate in the public dining halls were glad to return to their family dining tablesas soon as rationing was abolished (in 1935). Within the family nobody could be certain whether women were becoming more nearly equal, but many opinions were expressed. Some pointed to greater sex equality in everyday life as an accomplished achievement of the Revolution. More writers stressed the slowness of change in everyday living and complained about the continued presence of prostitution, "calculation in marriage," and the fact that "men remain superior and continue to exploit the women." An especially bitter pill {p. 59} was the discovery of a new social type, the party member who was reactionary in domestic life. One woman wrote to the newspaper about her husband, an important activist, who had forbidden her to work or engage in political activity: "And in those very meetings which he forbids me to attend because he is afraid I will become a real person, what he needs is a cook and mistress wife - in those very meetmgs where I have to slip in secretly, he makes thunderous speeches about the role of women in the revolution, calls women to a more active role." A widely recommended proposal for correction of the "temporary" inability of the state to take over the family's functions was that men share women's household work. In 1920 Lenin, in commiseration with the much pitied housewife of marxist theory, had complained to Zetkin: "So few men - even among the proletariat - realize how much effort and trouble they could save women, even quite do away with, if they were to lend a hand in 'woman's work.' But no, that is contrary to the 'right and dignity of a man.'" A few years later E. O. Preobrazhenski, noting that there was as yet no socialist childrearing available, called for an "elementary equality" between man and woman in discharging this responsibility, asserting that in no case should the burden lie fully upon the woman. In later years others carried on the theme: Lunacharski wrote that he would shake the hand of a comrade - an "honest Leninist "-

who would rock the baby's cradle so his wife could go out to a meeting or to study. And Krupskaia, lamenting in 1928 that the rationalization of daily life was still not complete, urged that all members of the family share the housework. She was glad to report that: "The new is already starting to break into the pattern of daily life; even now one sees a grown worker take a child out for a walk, a husband help a wife at home." One suspects, however, that the Soviet husbandly masses were as a rule little inclined to take over duties that in other bolshevik speeches were described as trivial and properly social rather than familial functions. Possibly the problem is best epitomized by the eperience with the new freedom about surnames. As of 1928 ninetenths of the women marrying were still taking the name of the husband, and cases in which the man would take the wife's name could "be counted absent." Probably closer to reality was the view held by some that the first decade or two of Soviet history saw a worsening rather than an improvement in the status of Soviet women. The great mass of women, illiterate {p. 60} and submissive, were little interested in their new freedoms and equality. Legal rights were often completely unappreciated. Peasant women, for example, rarely sought alimony in the event of divorce. In urban families the right to work, if it existed in the form of a concrete opportunity, was more often seen as a financial necessity than as a new freedom. Without replacing childrearing, food purchase and preparation, and the like by the family, the Revolution simply brought an additional burden to women. They remained tied to the family and home and often, in addition, had to work in a factory or office. Studies made in these years showed that women were on a day-today basis generally busier than men. Since they could spend less time in public or political work, study, and even sleep, they were less able to develop themselves and become the equals of their husbands. Trotsky wrote in 1937: "One of the very dramatic chapters of the great book of the Soviets, will be the tale of the disintegration and breaking up of these Soviet families where the husband as a party member, trade unionist, military commander or administrator, grew and developed and acquired new tastes in life, and the wife, crushed by the family, remained on the old level. The road of the two generations of the Soviet bureaucracy is sown thick with the tragedies of wives rejected and left behind." All in all, it was the men who profited most surely and immediately by the new freedoms intended to bring equality to women. The women who remained tied to the family often seemed more liable to exploitation after the Revolution than they were before. Perhaps the most spectacular, if relatively rare, variety of male who exploited the situation was the crafty peasant who married a peasant girl in the spring to get

himself an extra harvest hand and divorced her in the fall to save the epense of feeding her over the winter. Much more common was sexual exploitation. The Sex Problem Though they originated in the most admirable of motives and were based on years of socialist thinking about the proper pathways to individual freedom and social equality between the sexes, the regime's doctrinal position and policies with regard to the family caused a sex problem. The devaluation of family life and the introduction of such policies {p. 61} as easy divorce, free abortions, and de facto marriage (in the 1926 code), had their repercussions. Of course, responsibility for the social patterns of the 1920's and early 1930's cannot be placed entirelyt the door of the bolsheviks: war, civil strife, poverty, and the general atmosphere of revolutionary social reconstruction also contributed, perhaps crucially, to the disorganization. Nevertheless, the party must bear considerable responsibility, for the sexual problem is very closely connected with an important marxist principle - that promise of complete freedom in private life which plays such a prominent role in Engels' writings. Correspondingly, the predominant view in the early years was that family life was not a public function and that sex life was "outside the area of regulation of the Communist Party." Indeed, the strength of feeling can be gauged by a statement made in 1923 by Lunacharski, Commissar of Education, to the effect that the state regulation of a person's life was one of the "dangers threatening communism." Furthermore, "the morality of communist society will be found in the fact that there will be no precepts; it will be the morality of the absolutely free individual." If there will be freedom in personal life, then, said Lunacharski, there will be a great variety in the relationships found, and so much the better. Paraphrasing Engels, Lunacharski foresaw not only the absence of the government regulation of private life, but "no pressure of public opinion is permissible either; there must be no 'comme il faut'!" Moreover, "all of this or most of this applies also to our own time; in relation to so-called sex life there can be only one precept: it is necessary to defend the weak in that unique type of struggle which boils in the soil of love." But even this is not moral regulation, he argued, but a juridical matter. For the rest, said Lunacharski, "all the freedom possible." To most party members these statements seemed good marxist doctrine. In spite of growing opposition to the idea, a scholarly monograph published as late as 1929 could cite both Marx and Engels as authorities for the strict separation of private and plblic life. It therefore also seemed appropriate to hold that sex life was an individual matter, entirely outside the party's purview. Sofiia N. Smidovich, an influential feminist and

party member, wrote on the subject: "We are inclined to excuse a lot, to close our eyes about a lot, when the matter concerns so-called personal life. 'You can't do anything about a given act from the point of view of communist ethics,' we often say. 'Where is it written that {p. 62} a communist can have only one wife, and not several?' ... And not a little more is heard and said in such cases. We are apprehensive lest we fall into dogmatism, carry on like the priests, and so on." It was not long, however, before some among the party leaders came to the conclusion that "freedom in private life" was easily interpreted by the masses as an invitation to sexual misbehavior. Arguments were soon put forth in favor of "interference in private life": "It is not hard to see which is socially more expedient - to treat 'personal life' as an inseparable part of some whole, defining a person in all his manifestations, or to close our eyes on 'personal life,' supposing that one or another Morgunov, Romanov [noted sexual exploiters of the times], and others can't be avoided." The cases used as a basis to urge interference in private life all center on young women who are exploited by men. Interestingly, what was at stake here was essentially the "mutuality problem" so glaringly overlooked by Engels in his formulation of sex love. These young women continued to love their masculine partners after the latter had grown tired of them, thus making themselves liable to exploitation. By 1927 even Lunacharski, who in 1923 had justified sex freedom in the name of natural man ("The slogan, Back to nature! Back to the animal! is quite appropriate."), was in a much more sober mood: "That which until the present has been called private life cannot slip away from us, because it is precisely here that the final goal of the Revolution is to be found." The best-known defender of sexual freedom, Alexandra Kollontai, differed from her fellow communists in her willingness to follow to their logical ends the implications of current thinking about such matters and thus to arrive at conclusions which seemed incorrect, but could not be refuted within the limits of marxist theory. First of all a feminist, she devoted considerable effort to writing about the equality of men and women and in proposing ways to achieve it. Throughout her polemical and fictional writings, polygamous sex interests are defended as a right of women as well as men. She became best known, however, as a champion of love as a feeling, to be distinguished from the sex act. Writing in 1923, she drew this picture of the proper communist approach to the question: "The morality of the working class, insofar as it has already crystallized ... consciously discards the external form in which the love relation of the sexes is cast. For the class problems of the working class it is completely a matter of indifference whether love

{p. 63} takes the form of a prolonged and formalized union or is expressed in the manner of a transient tie." This clear denial of the validity of institutional forms was carried out in the name of "full, many-sided love" or, to dramatize the concept, the "winged Eros." Kollontai's basic idea was clearly that love is to reign supreme, and sex is to be its servant. Sex without love is taboo: "The ideology of the working class does not place any formal limits upon love. But on the other hand the ideology of the toiling class already thoughtfully takes a stand on the content of love, toward the shades of feelings and experiences which tie the two sexes. And in this sense the ideology of the working class will persecute the 'wingless Eros' (vice, one-sided satisfaction of the flesh with the aid of prostitution, transformation of the 'sex act' into a self-oriented goal from the pool of 'easy pleasures') much more strictly and mercilessly than bourgeois morality did. 'The wingless Eros' contradicts the interests of the working class." Along with feminism and the enshrinement of love, another major strand in Kollontai's thought was the notion that love was eventually to change its form, was to be generalized to the collective: {quote} In the achieved communist society, love, "the winged Eros," will appear in a different, transformed, and completely unrecognizable form. By that time the "sympathetic bonds" between all members of the new society will have grown and strengthened, the "love potential" will have been raised, and solidarity-love will have become the same kind of moving force as competition and self-love are in the bourgeois order ... the stronger the new humanity is linked together by the firm ties of solidarity, the higher will be its spiritual-mental ties in all regions of life, creativity, and the smaller the place which will remain for love in the contemporary sense of the word. Contemporary love always sins in that, absorbing the thoughts and feelings of "the two loving hearts" it at the same time isolates, separates off the loving pair from the collective. Such a separation of "the loving pair," the moral isolation from the collective, in which the interests, tasks, aspirations of all members are interwoven in a thick network, will becomenot only superfluous, but psychologically unrealizable. In this new world the recognized, normal and desirable form of relations of the sexes will probably rest upon a healthy, free, natural (without perversions and excesses) attraction of the sexes, on a "transformed Eros." {endquote} It is not hard to imagine the effect that this sort of argument had on meetings of factory workers, peasants, and young Komsomol groups. More widely shared was the much simpler notion that the old sex {p. 64} morality was part of the corrupt bourgeois superstructure. In the words of Preobrazhenski: "How about the so-called spontaneous amoralism, quite widespread among a part of ourproletarian youth? If one looks upon it as a

negation in practice of bourgeois and petit bourgeois morality and practice, and a dispersing of the 'non-class' fog over class norms, then this 'amoralism' is, in essence, marxist, the historical-materialist relation to the morality of other classes." In any case, the permissive aura of these theories presaged the trouble ahead. Regarding sexual life itself, in 1920 an article published in a nationally distributed party journal asserted that "an unimaginable bacchanalia is going on," and that "the best people are interpreting free love as free debauchery." The actual extent to which sexual promiscuity seized the country is not known, but there was no shortage of persons ready to point to various bits and shreds of evidence and to draw the conclusion that disorder prevailed. Smidovich reported a conversation with a Komsomol member who asserted that he found it unnecessary to visit prostitutes: "I don't have to, because I can have any Komsomol girls I know whenever I want them." Another defender of feminine virtue reported the existence of a "League of Free Love" in the Ukraine. Demyan Bedny, poet of the Revolution, wrote a satire, "Seriously ... and Not for Long or The Soviet Wedding," and "Young Correspondent" Koltso wrote to a newspaper about how "sleeping" had become a profession and that one Ivanchuk had a record of 80. In any event, there was wide agreement that an extraordinary amount of pre- and extra-marital sexual activity was taking place. At the Fourteenth Party Congress, N. I. Bukharin felt called upon to denounce what he referred to as "decadent and hooligan groups with names such as 'down with innocence' and 'down with shame.'" That such sentiments were prominent among communist youth themselves is also suggested by the title of a popular Komsomol song of the times, "Away, Away, with the Monks." On the other hand, if those who believed in sexual freedom represented a left wing, there was also a right-wing deviation. Among this group one could find ascetics, "people taking it as a duty to deny themselves the satisfaction of their sexual needs." Though the fight for communism twenty-four hours a day could lead to a radical separation of sex from love, for which there was no time left, and thus to a matter-offact promiscuity, it might also lead, quite logically, to a complete denial of sexuality as well as other forms of self-expression, such as drinking, {p. 65} dancing, games, recreation in general. The latter tendency produced an interesting social type who was "dreadfully serious; he does everything according to the program. He even sleeps according to the program [and] in him everything cheerful, alive, hides itself underground; he and the Komsomol, too, ... have begun to freeze over." One writer characterized this as a professional disease of the Komsomol activists, who consequently became "onesided in their outlook on life." Again, this trend was reflected in organizational rules. One young woman, in organizing a party

cell, decided, along with several comrades, that the Program of the Communist Party prescribed an "ascetic mode of life." Several years later it was reported that a newly organized youth commune had prohibited its members the right to a sexual life. Finally, still another unacceptable variant of the conduct of sex life was the return to bourgeois marriage. Weak-willed "philistines" retired to the narrGw family circle and gradually left their circle of comrades. When, soon after the Revolution, some of the party leaders began to feel troubled about the situation, they had only minimal factual information. Lunachaski pointed out in the mid-1920's that he could rely only on indirectly derived impresisons received from individual observations, events reported by others, and "reflections of life in literature." Thus even the question of who exactly was being promiscuous was not clearly settled. It was taken for granted, naturally, that it was primarily the young people, but writers differed about whether worker youths were more unrestrained than peasant youths, Komsomol members more promiscuous than nonmembers, and so on. University students tended to be in the ideological vanguard, and more independent of the control of traditional communities. They were also scrutinized more frequently because of their accessibility, and surveys showed that not only behavior but opinions and theories about sex were showing a luxuriant proliferation among them. Such theories and opinions have considerable interest as examples of the popular culture of the day. They were primarily justifications for sexual freedom, ranging from the most transparent and unadorned to the most sophisticated and disguised of rationalizations. The simplest, most traditional, and probably most widespread had little to do with marxism or the Revolution; it was simply the view that sexual abstinence was injurious to the health: "This is for some reason considered an indispensable truth ... (I will not try to judge how we in the North have developed these African passions. ) ... Somebody heard it somewhere, where {p. 66} he doesn't know!" The likelihood is, it would seem, that concern for health is also a rationalization - working in the service of a still deeperlying factor, the sex identity of the Russian male. As the same writer tells it, in another place: "Often a raw youth, to show he isn't 'some kind of girl' drinks up for bravery in the company of those who are like him, then goes to visit the prostitutes and starts the shameful page of his life." Most of the theories about sexual freedom sprang up in connection with marxist thought and with the Revolution; and a good proportion of them share the axiom that communism and greater sexual freedom went hand in hand. Thus at Saratov in 1918, the "right of private ownership of women" was abolished by decree, and in a remote part of one of the Ukrainian provinces the "League of Free Love" was said to

have "hid itself under what were supposed to be 'principled motives of the Communist Program,' requiring complete freedom, and in the first place, 'sexual freedom.' Eight more or less distinct varieties of this popular subject of everyday folklore may be identified. 1. A gift of the Revolution. The view that sexual freedom was simply a pleasure to be enjoyed to the full, as a gift of the Revolution, was found among at least some of the simple peasantry. It is revealed, for example, in a chastushka (popular verse) of the time: "Now there are new rights and you don't have to get married. Just stand at a table in the committee room and sign up." And some of the university students believed that "a correct communist life ... will be to live with one woman, and at the same time both she and I ought to feel free in relation to each other." 2. The glass-of-water theory. A slightly more sophisticated and much better known outlook had a respectable position among many nineteenth-century socialists and was outlined most succinctly by Bebel. Sexuality was elevated in a relative sense. That is, it was separated off from love and accorded independent legitimacy. Love in turn tended to be denied completely or to be regarded as a "physiological phenomenon of nature," as a Komsomol organization's circular put it. At the same time, however, this theory also devalued sexuality as a simple and inconsequential action akin to drinking a glass of water. This view was connected with a certain tendency to link material property and sexual property; that is, sharing the wealth tended to include, by generalization, the latter kind of property as well as material property. Apparently the notion was widespread. Lunacharski spoke of {p. 67} the "extraordinarily broad currency of the glass-of-water theory," and a 1927 poll of students in ten institutions of higher learning at Odessa revealed that in answer to the question, "Does love exist?" only 60.9 per cent of the women and 51.8 per cent of the men answered yes. Moreover, opposition to the theory often seemed suspiciously conservative and could easily be associated with bourgeois morality, and philistinism (meshchanstvo). 3. Elemental nature. Closely related to the glass-of-water theory was the more defensive stress on sex as one of the aspects of daily life that cannot be changed or controlled. As described by Smidovich, "It is put in me by nature. I have to satisfy my instincts." This approach is, of course, perfectly legitimate for any careful reader of Marx and Engels, who exalted natural man, as did at least some of their authoritative followers.

4. A symbol of opposition to the old order. Among the more politically conscious members of the population there was a strong tendency in the first two decades of Soviet history to equate sexual restraint with the bourgeois and aristocratic classes, along with polite manners, personal cleanliness, and fineness of language, to say nothing of neckties, jewelry, and elegant clothing. Sexual promiscuity, then, took on a certain aura of patriotism, so to speak, as a revolt against the moral vestiges of the old way of life, as a "revolutionary protest against the former philistine morality." A variant of this theme concerned the patronage of prostitution. For the Komsomol member, visits to prostitutes were in violation of marist dogrna. In consequence, sexual freedom with his feminine comrades assumed a virtue of its own. 5. The heroic soldier of the Revolution pose. A more pragmatic basis for justifying sexual freedom was linked with the crusading ideal of serving the cause of the Revolution and communism: "We have no tirne to settle down with a family; we are too busy ... Fatigue, the overstraining of forces suffered during the time of the Revolution, has made us prematurely old. The usual confines of age and all kinds of norms are not suitable for us." A variant stressed the maintenance of ideological purity: "How can I enter a permanent union with a girl when she might turn out to be a philistine after a time?" 6. Poverty justifies promiscuity. The study of Odessa students revealed that 19 per cent of those analyzed (some 2,328 respondents out of 3,500 given questionnaires) did not have a private bed to themselves, {p. 68} and that 52 per cent of the men and 45.5 per cent of the women asserted that they did not get enough to eat. Hence, if it was true that seual promiscuity was most pronounced among university students, they could explain their devotion to sexual freedom as a purely practical response to poverty and the inability to establish a family, and as "ideologically" quite justified. Some of them were likely to quote Marx: "It is not the consciousness of people that defines their existence, but the contrary, their eistence defines the forms of their consciousness." 7. Free love as part of the new way of life. In the marist lexicon "free love" is an ambiguous notion. In the writing of Marx and Engels it is best interpreted as referring to the separation of love from economic concerns - in which case a more adequate expression would be "freed love." But it can also literally mean, as it has to many interpreters, that the old ethical norms do not apply to the relations between the sexes and that love follows nothing more than mutual inclination. The latter view, which can also be justified by reference to the marxist classics, particularly to The Origin of Engels, was of course very popular among those who were interested in justifying

sexual freedom. Their thinking was picturesquely paraphrased by Lunacharski in 1927: dquote} Husband, wife, children - husband and wife who bear and rear children, this is a bourgeois business. A communist who respects himself, a soviet person, a leading member of the intelligentsia, a genuine proletarian ought to be on his guard against such a bourgeois business. "Socialism," say such 'marxists,' "brings with it new forms of relationship between man and woman - namely free love. A man and a woman come together, live together while they like each other - and after they no longer like each other - they part. They are together for a relatively short period, not setting up a permanent household. Both the man and woman are free in this relationship. This is the transition to that broad public society [obshchesvennost] which will replace the small philistine nook, that little philistine apartment, that domestic hearth, yes that stagnant family unit which separates itself off from society! "A genuine communist, a soviet person," they say, "must avoid a pairing marriage and seek to satisfy his needs by changez vos dames, as they said in the old cadrille, with a definite changing, a freedom of the mutual relations of the husbands, the wives, fathers, children, so that you can't tell who is related to whomand how closely. That is social construction. {endquote} Such views, reflecting a liberal but on the whole not inaccurate interpretation of a tendency in Engels' thought, were supported by argu{p. 69} ments that sometimes took a direction that calls to mind the implicit invitations to analogy of marxist theory. A recent Soviet discussion recalls how "back in those days" partisans of the "free love" theory argued that if private ownership of the means of production corresponded with monogamy (understood as private ownership of women), public ownership of the means of production should correspond with free love, that is, public ownership of women. 8. Sex and love as base and superstructure. The more inventive minds among the youth, attracted simultaneously to the marxist way of thinking and to the appeals of the flesh, soon began to propose a sophisticatedly "marxist" formulation of the whole problem. Rather than being parallel to the drinking of a glass of water, and hence without further significant consequence, the sexual attraction of two humans was said to constitute the "base" of love. And since sexual love between man and woman enjoyed a high moral position in the thought of Marx and Engels, the marxist could easily conclude that the determining, and therefore truly important, aspect of the matter was sex. A student observes: "The basis of love is the sexual attraction of two individuals for one another. If some 'misunderstanding' enters into the seual relationship, then the whole poetic superstructure falls to pieces." Of course, the ultimate result in terms of personal behavior was not dissimilar to that of those who

preferred their sex without any poetry. An even more liberal adaptation to the spirit of marxism was found in the theory that "eroticism defines consciousness," one of several "alien theories" about sex referred to by Iaroslavski. It is clear that the effort to define the nature and origin of love brought, as it still does, much interesting discussion but no very solid conclusions. The older generation tended to see it as more closely related to reproduction and childrearing, while the younger theorists were likely to connect it more closely with sexuality as a materialistic and hence proper pleasure of the individual. In any event, the most consistent marxists were sure that sex was not a base for the family, for any reader of Engels' last book could see that in primitive times the family did not exist (and, consequently, perhaps would not in the communist future. The justification of sexual freedom in the name of marxism aroused considerable indignation among some of the party leaders. They suspected the obvious existential basis of such theorizing. Lunacharski paraphrased the young man wooing the reluctant virgin as follows: {p. 70} "'Well,' she says, 'what if I do, and you leave me, and I get a baby. What do I do then?' He answers, '... what philistine thoughts! What philistine prudence! How deeply you are mired in bourgeois prejudices! One can't consider you a comrade.'" Lunacharski continues, "the frightened girl thinks she is acting like a marxist, like a leninist, if she denies no one." Most of the population, one suspects, and a good proportion of the inner circle of the older comrades themselves urged the youth to abstinence or at least to moderation in sex behavior. But it is most revealing that no good marxist theoretical arguments immediately at hand could provide a reasoned and principled underpinning to the case for self-discipline in sex, especially in a land where the old social order had been overturned and where the canons of Marx and Engels were supposed to guide the way to communism. It was increasingly clear that sex had become a complex social problem. There were not only the continued presence of prostitution and the usual transgressions and indiscretions of youth, but also a good number of mature adults, including many party members, who were "enjoying the new freedom." Stories circulated about sexual exploits of herculean proportions, about men with twenty wives, each with a baby. This problem was of the sort most painful to serious marxists, for it involved exploitation of the weak by the strong. In fact, the parallel between the individual freedom and sexual exploitation of the female of these times and the individual freedom and economic exploitation of the proletarian worker described in classical marxism is quite striking. Both freedoms were purely formal.

As early as 1923 the essential facts of the case were recognized in this frank analysis: {quote} The new quality of all social relations, the new style of life, already created under capitalism and not at all by us long ago made the new forms of marriage indispensable. They are characterized by our freedom, by the absence of any restraint whether that be juridical restraint or the power of economic relations. In principle we separated marriage from economics; in principle we destroyed the "family hearth," in which was centered the power of economics, which independently of juridical norms, transformed marriage into an externally forced union and sentenced woman to a many-sided slavery. We destroyed the hypocrisy of the family hearth. We said that marriage ought to be a union of love, and not a juridically or economically {p. 71} required union. We said that marital ties must not be converted into marital "bonds," that is, into marital chains which connect the husband with the wife like one chain gang member to another. But we carried out the resolution on marriage in such a manner that only the man benefited from it, and the woman was left in a tragic position ... the woman remains tied with chains to the destroyed family hearth, to the ruins of the family hearth. The man, happily whistling, can leave it, abandoning the women and children. {endquote} If women were forced to conceive and then were abandoned by husbands who wanted to live according to the new way of life, opinion studies showed quite clearly that the two sexes actually held different views about sex and love. It was mainly the men who wanted sexual variety, or at least sexual gratification, whereas the women tended much more to be interested in love. Thus the double standard continued to prevail, and writers began to stress the fact that "the girl is the person who suffers." There were two main views on the role of the new regime in these unfortunate developments. One group held that the law itself was at fault: it did not accord sufficient protection to the woman. The other side put responsibility not upon the law, which was plainly well intentioned, but upon people's abuses of the law. The anticipated assumption by the state of responsibility for childrearing, they believed, would clear up the problem. Finally, while only a minority of the population indulged in the new sex freedom, they were sufficiently numerous to be troublesome and many were in social positions of high visibility. The attitude of the majority of the population varied from one individual to another and from social group to social group, of course, but it seems fair to say that the main response was widespread moral indignation. Freedom of divorce and abortion, for instance, seemed to many an open invitation to sex debauchery. Attitudes about sex and family attitudes were very deeply rooted, and the "good intentions" of the party leaders were rarely recognized. In fact, quite the

contrary was true. The average citizen was apt to see the communist and his way of life not as a model of virtue and principle, but as purely and simply licentious. As a sociologist reported in a book published in 1929, "A reaction has been observed in our country against such ... sexual anarchism, at times reaching as far as the resurrection of the fine morality of the priests." {p. 72} The Plight of the Children As I have already shown, among the Soviet communists it was a foregone conclusion that parenthood was a declining occupation that was to be replaced by social rearing. Upbringing of children by the state would not only free the women for work but also provide a more effective means for rearing better citizens. The "program maximum" of the early years was expressed by Z. I. Lilina, wife of G. E. Zinoviev, in 1918, in words which were to become famous: "We must rescue these children from the nefarious influence of family life. In other words we must nationalize them. They will be taught the ABC's of communism and later become true communists. Our task now is to oblige the mother to give her children to us-to the Soviet State." That this was not idle talk was proved by an immediate legal measure, the prohibition of adoption by childless couples in article 183 of the original family code of 1918. The Bolshedid not wish to support the creation of new families and thus reinforce the parental role. The assumption that state rearing of children would be widely established was not actually borne out by subsequent events. Instead, during the turmoil and chaos of the Civil War the young society's resources proved inadequate. The need for state institutions was in fact growing because of the tide of children rendered homeless by the death, destruction, and mobility of the times, but there were too few children's homes, creches, and kindergartens, and in those few that were set up conditions were very bad. Lack of space soon led to restrictive admission policies. Creches and kindergartens became in effect emergency care institutions, into which only "complete orphans" or the children of the poorest workers were taken. Apparently facilities were so poor and personnel in such short supply that it proved impossible to stop the alarmingly high death rate of babies entrusted to the care of the state. In the city of Moscow, as early as 1924, babies were being farmed out to private families by arrangement with the Moscow Soviet, although party representatives showed little enthusiasm for the idea. But the head of the Department of Motherhood and Infancy of the Commissariat of Health stated that health was more important even than the "principles of social training." She explained that collective education could be only partial because funds were lack-

{p. 73} ing, because methods had not been worked out to organize it, and because the population was not ready for it. In Izvestiia of January 2, 1926, it was announced that "many homeless children" were being "settled" amongst the peasantry. The realities of the early years after the Revolution forced a quick retreat from principles. Poverty forced the organizations responsible for children to settle them in private families, and adoption was again legalized in the 1926 family code. But such actions did not strike at the roots of the evil. They could not, of course, prevent the extended period of revolution and civil war that produced so many orphans, but even after those social convulsions had ended, they could do nothing to restrict the number of orphans already present. Another problem, which seemed potentially more permanent but was basically more susceptible to ameliorative action, was abortion. The figures for Moscow, Leningrad, and other large cities were pronounced "massive" and "horrifying" by some of the more respected older party members. Smidovich wrote that she had seen young women who had undergone four or five abortions within a year. While abortion was of course regrettable, it was also "understandable" to the same writers who were dedicated to social equality between the sexes. Vinogradskaia wrote in Pravda, July 26, 1923, quite reasonably, that women turned to abortion so they could stay at work and "keep up with their husbands." Existing conditions made motherhood a handicap, and many Soviet wives in those days, as today, were forced to choose between motherhood and social equality. A corollary of the rise in the abortion rate was the fall in the urban birth rate. As early as 1926 Lunacharski expressed anxiety that this would be a decisive factor in reducing the enthusiasm of those who still favored the abolition of the family forthwith. He argued that it was only thanks to the peasantry, not yet touched in such degree by "pseudo-revolutionary ideas" so as to reflect them in their family life,that the birth rate had not suffered even more. {In the West - the USSA - there is no peasantry, because farming has been mechanised (powered by fossil-fuels). As a result of following the path pioneered by the Soviet Union, it is reliant on immigration from "third world" countries where family life is still traditional: where girls know how to be mothers, and want to be mothers} A problem with long-run implications was abandonment. A "constant chain of wanderers" through the undermanned and numerically scanty state institutions created a feeling of helplessness among the personnel assigned to deal with them. Although no tallies of the number of homeless children are reliable, estimates for the year

1922 ranged as high as 9,000,000, and the number was obviously great enough to cause {p. 74} serious concern. Not only did the homeless children present a pitiful spectacle, become diseased, and die, but they gradually became a public menace, roaming the streets in gangs andcommitting every crime and violent act. Among the peasantry in the countryside, where there were practically no government institutions or other responsible agencies, abandonment often took place in the forest and was in fact infanticide. It was nevertheless a lesser evil in the eyes of the village peasants, who were intolerant of illegitimacy. Dislocation and poverty were major factors here, but there were clear indications that the problem of abandoned children might become permanent. A writer presented this vignette of the situation: "As has been rightfully indicated already in the press, there exists among our youth a licentious, an irresponsible, attitude to woman and the consequences of marriage. He marries several times and produces babies, but who is going to rear them and what will happen to them - about that who cares, for we are 'growing into the future,' for 'we are communists, and in communist society there is no family.' This is an abscess, bourgeois depravity of its own kind turned upside down." Of course, nonsupport was illegal, but only in a formal way, not as a part of the ethos supported by party at the time. "Support" was legally defined for divorced persons as a proportion, depending on the number of children, of the wage earner's income, and even this responsibility was often disregarded. Solts wrote in 1926, "Right now there are among us many party members who refuse to support their children." Easy divorce, a matter of firm principle, was beginning to show its seamy side. In about 1925 a Communist's wife wrote a dramatic letter to the newspaper concerning her husband's behavior. He had another woman, had already left his family several times, and now wanted to go for good. But, wrote his wife, his sick son worshipped him and needed a father. She continued: "If the matter concerned me alone, I would have left long ago. But there is a sick child involved. I have really worn myself out. But you can't allow the child to see that his father is carrying on with another woman right in front of his eyes. The child loves his mother and his father, too. Tell me, in what way are children guilty in all these dramas? If there were social rearing, then it would be another matter. But there is not enough room for even the full orphans ... Later on things will be fine. But now, in the transition period-what can one do?" What seemed to many the best way out of the impasse, contracep-

{p. 75} tion, was not suitable for a number of reasons. The methods and devices available were often ineffective; the people, especially the peasantry, per cent of the population, were not used to them; and, as a matter of principle again, it did not seem right to manufacture and distribute birth control devices and information. For one thing the birth control practiced by the bourgeois pair in capitalist society had been scornfully derided by Lenin as defeatism. For another, government sponsorship of contraception would have struck the population as still another effort to introduce sexual libertinism. To the party leadership, things seemed bad enough already on the home-life front. As a result little was done to produce or publicize contraceptives. All in all, individual sex love was proving an inadequate support for a lasting tie between husband and wife, to say nothing of that between father and children. And it was becomingincreasingly evident that fathers, about which Marx and Engels had little good to say, were very important. The social problems of the early years were a fitting prelude to the new family policy of the 1930's and thereafter, in which the major legitimate function of the family became that of rearing the children. {p. 76} FOUR | NEW THOUGHTS AND POLICIES: REVISING THE MARXIST THEORY OF THE FAMILY BY THE MIDDLE of the 1920's public as well as private expressions of concern about the social problems connected with family life were becoming more frequent. In discussions held at the highest levels of the party and government, divorce and abortion figures were cited and references were made to such further problems as the link between the growing number of orphans and the "current sex ethic," which was believed to be associated with the "disintegration of the family." In 1926 a publication based on letters written to Pravda by women readers about their personal problems was aptly titled "Painful Questions," for that phrase expressed both its content and the author's conclusion: "The human documents presented below produce a painful impression. There is an aura of inconsolability about them. They invariably end in urgent questions to which it is not easy to give a simple and satisfactory answer." At about the same time, such Bolshevik leaders as Iaroslavski and Lunacharski began to assert that there was great interest in and desire for new advice about moral problems, especially sexual ones, among the youth: "Each of us has been repeatedly approached by students, by Komsomolites, with an invitation to give a report on the subject of 'the sexual question,' 'sexual relationships,' 'marriage and the family,' 'the problem of sex,' etc." Among some of the people, it was argued, there was a growingdissatisfaction not only with the current arrangements of marriage and family life, but also with the formulations of Marx, Engels, and their more orthodox Soviet followers. A recurrent complaint was that the communists gave

no answers to the concrete questions asked of them. One of Trotsky's respondents, for instance, told of a lecturer on the subject "Marriage and the Family" who began by announcing, to the general chagrin of his audience, that he would talk about nothing but Engels' Origin of the Family. Another reported that the workers "think that we [communists] are deliberately silent on the question, and we really are." Several years later the problem was still pressing. "Current problems need current answers," argued the young, {p. 77} "and we have had enough of the prescriptions of the future." A sharply worded example appeared in an "Open Letter to Comrade Smidovich": "When the new base is laid, then relations of the sexes will be wonderful. That's true. But what do you say we should do while waiting for the 'new base'? ... Iet us not argue about principles; here we are in agreement with everything. Let us speak instead about the earthly utilization of heavenly principles." Such reactions marked the beginning of the end of the first phase of the regime's policy toward the family. By and large it was, for almost the entire first decade, an era of individual freedom, and the party's policy remained one of hands-off. During the first five years, there simply was no explicit and concrete line about the conduct of daily life, for relatively little attention was paid to it. As Trotsky wrote in 1923, the fact was that "the party did not and could not accord specific attention to questions of the everyday life of the working masses. We have never thrashed out these questions concretely as, at different times, we have thrashed out the questions of wages, fines, the length of the working day, police prosecution, the form of the state, the ownership of land, and so on. We have as yet done nothing of the kind in regard to the family nor in general the personal, private life of the worker." As a result, it must have seemed to many that since the communists had no answers, such questions were being solved quite simply by the youth themselves. Theoreticians in Debate As the party became aware of the growing dissatisfaction, it came to see that the first step toward a more active party role in everyday life was recognition of the existence of social problems; the second was explanations of what had happened that would put the growing difficulties into some kind of marxist perspective. The writings of Marx and Engels were unfortunately of little help, but Soviet theoristsnevertheless made occasional efforts to show that Marx and Engels had not really meant to say that the "family in general" would disappear but only the "bourgeois family," or that they had opposed "sexual communism," which some writers sought to equate with what was now called "disorderly sexual relations."

In 1927 a work that purported to be a thorough coverage of the views of Marx and Engels on the sexual question was published by D. B. {p. 78} Riazanov, Director of the Marx-Engels Institute, whose ideas had also been presented earlier in the course of the prolonged discussions carried on in 1925 and 1926 about the new code of law on the family and marriage. Riazanov's central argument was that Marx, in his early writings, opposed sexual promiscuity. He asserted that in a manuscript unpublished until 1927 Marx referred to: "the sanctification of sexual intercourse by its exclusiveness, the linking of intercourse with legal norms, the moral beauty transforming the demand of nature into a force of spiritual unity, the spiritual essence of marriage." However convincing this statement was at face value, Riazanov had to admit lamely that it was written by Marx in his presocialist days when "Marx was not a communist and undoubtedly not a marxist." Riazanov attempted nevertheless to surmount such a substantial obstacle by pointing to later work in which Marx attacked "vulgar communism": "Fina]ly, this government [vulgar communism] seeking to contrast general private property with private property, is expressed in a completely bestial form when it contrasts marriage (which is, of course, a recognized form of exclusive private property) and the communal ownership of women; when, as a consequence, the woman becomes for it social and undervalued property." There is nothing in common, continued Riazanov, between satisfaction of a need such as for food with a need for sexual intercourse. Satisfaction of the latter involved another human being directly, and "man is the highest being for man." Marx saw, he said, that "human feelings become more and more humanized and include spiritual and practical feelings (will, love, etc.) which arise thanks only to the being of their object-humanized nature." Riazanov also pointed out that some forty years later Engels came to the same conclusions: that individual sex love was an emergent in the process of historical development, that it was "by its nature exclusive," and that it was an indication of "the greatest moral progress." Though Riazanov made about as much effective use as anyone could of materials left by Marx and Engels, he himself seemed to realize that his position was weak, for as often happens in the absence of a really convincing argument his ideas were buttressed by name-calling and an appeal to the living authority of Lenin and Kautsky. He stated that "Lenin shared fully his exposition" of their views and cited Kautsky to the effect that "economic development will make the carrying on of the individual household more and more unnecessary, will more and more undermine the economic basis of the family. Does this mean that the {p. 79} family itself will disappear? No. There is already a new, higher basis for it individuality ... Together with individualism, a type of individual sex love will grow which will find satisfaction only in a union and mutual life with one definite individual of the opposite sex."

None of this seemed very relevant by the mid-twenties, however, for the feeling was developing that some problems were urgently in need of solution and that life itself, coupled in the view of some with "the best from the inherited past," would have to show the way. This attitude opened the door, if not to "anti-marxist" ideas, at least to approaches that were outside the scope of Marx's and Engels' theory of the family. In dealing with contemporary social problems, some of the older party leaders tended to ascribe the sex problem, which was at the head of the list, to the natural impulsivity and impatience of youth. Iaroslavski wrote: "No matter how much many Komsomolites want to quickly transform all of life into communist harmony (and such moods-give us the commune immediately, give us a communist way of life immediately-are found among our youth), we must not forget that the social system in which we are living is a transition one." In the same sentence, however, Iaroslavski put his finger on the most significant factor: not only were young people naturally impatient, but the transition period in Soviet Russia was assuming certain properties not foreseen in classical marxist writings. "The transition period in our economy and in all of our construction has thrown a significant part of our youth off the rails. They have been torn away from the customary conditions of existence, but have not yet become strong in the new ways." Any good marxist could see that economic backwardness and poverty were the roots of such difficulties. "We need socialist accumulation," wrote Trotsky. "Only under this condition will we be able to liberate the family from all the functions and cares which now oppress and destroy it." A solution to the sex problem, wrote Iaroslavski, is linked with a "new type of family" and an improvement in the position of women, but, he continues, "here we must say quite plainly that without a radical reconstruction of our entire economy, we cannot solve this question properly." As it also became evident that the transition period would last for some time, the issue was seen to be not merely economic. Family life and sexual attitudes change very slowly, and if some of the youth were too far ahead of the times, most of the rest of the population seemed too far behind. As one writer put it, "superstructures (and of course {p. 80} daily life is a superstructure) are very sluggish, tightly organized." Preobrazhenski even argued that older people, even party members, were not able to change, that they were "too spoiled by capitalism" to be able to live under communism. Such sober reassessments pointed up the fact that communism was still distant, but the ideal image of a communist society continued to induce many to overlook the limited

possibilities of the present. Critical voices were ranged against these attitudes however. Already in 1923 one writer analyzed the sex problem in this way: "Our youth are struggling with the contradictions between our principles and our institutions. They are crippling them. We must act!" And, in 1926 Solts complained that many proposals made at the discussion of the draft law on marriage and the family were "based on idealistic principles, that is, upon conditions which are conceivable only in a communistic society: people are free, the sex union is free, we do not interfere. But we are marxists. We know that without taking account of th material base nothing can come of it." Once this point had been understood, it was not difficult to conclude also that the monogamous family was still needed. Lunacharski, thinking better of some of his earlier thoughts, went through a revealing metamorphosis. In 1927 he wrote that yes, there will be a great amount of individual freedom later, but "not now!" He continued: "People can come together, and then part. This depends upon circumstance and upon temperament. One person finds another who will be a friend for his entire life, but the next does not; one person has one kind of temperament, a kind of personality such that he gets an especially great joy out of the serious building-up in life of a deep and specially chosen union with another individual, but the next prefers a flashing, fleeting transition from one to the next. Both the first and the second are possible in socialist society, but in our society of the transition period? No. In our society the only proper form of family is the prolonged pairmg family. To Lunacharski, a man of principle, the concessions to the realities of the transition period were obviously unpleasant. The right to divorce, for instance, was very important to him: "We consider that both man and woman ought to be free in their fate." But, he continued, it ought to be a rare occurrence, "perhaps once in a lifetime, perhaps twice, if you are really so unhappy." He who made a mockery of the freedom to divorce was to be shamed by public opinion as a person who is a {p. 81} "daily life counterrevolutionary." The question of abortions was approached in the same manner: the watchword for many people in arranging their sex life should be restraint, but "we are not hypocrites, and sometimes abortions are necessary." Other writers, such as Smidovich and Iaroslavski, argued that not only would the family continue to be important for some time, with new and stronger bonds being created between man and woman, but that the promised freedoms were too costly for the proletariat. "Individual sex love," it appeared, was foundering in the mire of sex debauchery, and the latter term (raspushchennost) was becoming more and more popular. As Smidovich said, "The transition period is a period in which the proletarian

state, socialist elements, and public society, will become manifest, and not laxity and all sorts of 'freedoms,' the cost of which the proletariat well knows." The idea of natural man was becoming less popular, and already by the midtwenties some well-known party members wanted, as apparently Lenin had, to see less freedom and a little more responsibility. For a considerable period, until Stalin ended intellectual controversy in Russia, the rightists attacked the leftists for "refusing to modify their principles," for their "spontaneous surrender to nature," and for "waiting for manna from heaven." The following is a sample of statements reflecting the latter flaw: "The new man will come by himself, will come about on the basis of the new socialist system. Without a new economy you can't build a new man in any case. What is there, then, to get excited about? The time will come and all the filth, all the force of habit will disappear by itself." The rightists, in turn, were accused by the leftists of wanting to give up the gains of the Revolution, of bourgeois philistinism and the like. N. V. Krylenko's statements rebutting opposition to the legal recognition of de fcto marriage, a topical question in the year 1926, provide a good eample: "We hear arguments from the lips of our opponents, and accusations about us that we want to 'destroy marriage,' 'destroy the family,' 'legalize polygamy.' How these arguments smell! And won't the more acute readers catch in them the smell of other arguments, which once were spread against us from the core of the most reactionary strata? Isn't it desirable by custom to add to these accusations for company also the accusations that we want to 'destroy religion' or 'destroy the state'?" The antagonists on either side found it difficult to sustain a high level {p. 82} of debate, and the discussion frequently declined to the level of simple namecalling. A vicious attack against Kollontai's theories about the winged and wingless Eros by a member of the editorial board of the journal in which her article was published took her to task for an unmarxist preoccupation with love. It labeled her an idealist, a petty bourgeois feminist, and a "socialist intelligentsia philistine," in addition to the less serious charges of being a sloppy thinker and an irresponsible writer: "How is it possible, considering oneself a marxist and a revolutionary, to talk so much about the Eros of love and sexual morality ... The problem of love does not have in our life one tenth of the significance that Comrade Kollontai wants to give it in her articles, vainly wasting here her pathos and enthusiasm. It is really shooting at sparrows with a cannon." A later apology in the pages of the same journal sought to soften the condemnation of Kollontai herself, but it confirmed the theoretical differences: "Differing from Comrade Kollontai in the solution of questions of morality, sex, and daily life posed

by the Soviet scene, the editorial board considers it indispensable to emphasize that Comrade Kollontai remains a distinguished fighting comrade." Even Riazanov, the party's expert on marxism, buttressed his scholarly position by calling his radical opponents lowbrows, "on as low a cultural level as the passionatesweet baboons from the nobility or the bourgeoisie, or those mobile types from the working class whom the workers neatly call 'factory bulls.' Preobrazhenski summed up the whole first phase of argumentation in a much quoted passage: {quote} Concretely, is it possible to pose an answer from a point of view of proletarian interests to the question, what forms of relationship of the sexes will be most compatible, if not with the present social relations and social interests, then with the relationship of socialist society: monogamy, transitory ties, or the so-called disorderly sexual intercourse? Until the present the defenders of one or the other point of view in this question have been more likely to base all manner of arguments upon their personal tastes and habits in this area, rather than to give a correct sociological and class-based answer. He who liked more the somewhat philistine personal family life of Marx, and he who, by inclination, preferred monogamy attempted to dogmatize the norm of the monogamous form of marriage, selecting medical and social arguments. Those who incline to the opposite attempt to hand out "temporary marriages" and "sexual communism" as the natural form of marriage in the future society and moreover sometimes the carry{p. 83} ing into practice of this type of relations between the sexes is proudly viewed as a "protest in fact" against the bourgeois family morality of the present. In fact such a posing of the question shows that people are recommending their own personal tastes to communist society and representing objective need in terms of their own personal sympathies. {endquote} Such, it seemed likely, would often become the lot of disputation when marxism could not point the way to the proper conduct of life in the transition period. Preobrazhenski was quite correct. Personal tastes, along with deeper lying impulses, did seem important factors in calling forth opinions. Even Lenin took a strong stand against the glass-of-water theory, though he also asserted that it was "repulsive to poke around in sexual matters." He vitiated the effect of his conservative views even more by contending that questions of sex and marriage were simply not very important at the time (1920) and admitting that he had been "accused by many people of philistinism in this matter although that is repulsive to me." Presumably, among his accusers were some whose opinion was important; Iaroslavski noted in 1926 that in the views he expressed on this subject at the Third Congress of the Komsomol in 1920, Lenin "somewhat differed from other communists."

The arguments eventually centered around two major substantive emphases. The leftists in the party tended toward the humanistic side of marxism, and the leninists sought to elevate the success of the Revolution, the class struggle, and the building of communism into the supreme value of the time and to deduce maxims of personal conduct from that value. Among the defenders of the first emphasis was Lunacharski, who had early argued that the only normative restriction on complete freedom in sex life should be the precept that "it is necessary to defend the weak [the child and the woman] in that unique type of struggle ... in the soil of love." Within the wing of social theorists who gave precedence in their hierarchy of values to the Revolution, to the party, to the cause, several subthemes were emphasized. One of the earliest stressed eugenics and was proposed by Preobrazhenski, ordinarily ranked as a leftist, but in this respect occupant of a transitional position between left and right. In his book, Morality and Class Norms (1923), he argued that once sex life is separated from the family "it becomes a social question first and foremost only from the point of view of the physical health of the {p. 84} race." From this argument he drew the conclusion that the norrns of sex conduct ought to be left to medical science. He insisted, however, that in principle society had the right to regulate sexual life in the interests of improving the race through artificial sexual selection. But this eugenicist approach had no practical consequences, for the shortage of facilities and medical personnel made it impossible even to take the simple step of requiring a medical test for marriage. Other arguments in favor of interference on behalf of society were more down-toearth, stressing restraint in sex, as in the use of tobacco and alcohol, as a factor in the conservation of health. Further, excessive sexual activity took time and strength which then were not available for work and for the party. From this argument it was only a short step to the most coherent post-marxist theory developed in the realm of sex The Theory of Revolutionary Sublimation Lenin was the prime mover in the view that the Revolution demanded more discipline and less freedom. It was understandable, if regrettable, Lenin wrote, that sexual relations were problematic: "The desire and urge to enjoyment easily attain unbridled force at a time when powerful empires are tottering, old forms of rule breaking down, when the whole social world is beginning to disappear." But, he continued, the Revolution "cannot tolerate orgiastic conditions ... no weakening, no waste, no destruction of forces. Self-control, self-discipline, is not slavery, not even in love." Lenin also argued that sexual promiscuity was not simply a "personal and private affair," but a social matter because "a new life arises. It is that which gives it its social interest, which gives rise to a duty toward the community." This hardly

profound but fundamental reminder was to become the cornerstone of the new family policy. Finally, as mentioned above, Lenin did not hesitate to express his own personal tastes. He disposed of the glass-of-water theory by pointing out that the normal man prefers not to drink out of the gutter, nor out of a glass "with a rim greasy from many lips." Though Lenin set the tone for the most forceful principled argument against sexual freedom, it remained for Aaron B. Zalkind, a Sverdlovsk professor, to translate it into more explicit and concrete terms. In a {p. 85} series of articles and books publishcd between 1923 and 1930 Zalkind presented a reasoned case for conservatism in sex. He claimed that his argument had three most immediate goals: the welfare of posterity, the proper distribution of "class energy," and orderly mutual relations within the (proletarian) class. The theoretical novelty of his proposals centered in the notion of energy. Defending the view that both sexual activity and social activity drew from the same pool of energy, he argued that where socially constructive activity was not possible, energy tended to flow into sexual interests and activities. Hence all of bourgeois society was suffused with sex, for in the exploitative capitalist system, the rich develop great sensitivity to sexual affairs and spend a great part of their time and energy on sex. The poor follow suit, for they are unable to spend excess energy constructively, and the results are the sexual poisoning of the human organism, the "sexual inflation" characteristic of capitalism, and the symptoms of excessive sexuality among children: onanism, extreme curiosity about sex, and early amorousness. To the "opium of religion" corresponded the "dope of sex." On the other hand, continued Zalkind, under the dictatorship of the proletariat excessive preoccupation with sexual matters could not be tolerated, for it was "robbing the Revolution." It was necessary that sexual interests give way to a return of social interests, that that which had been stolen from the working class be given back to it. In fact, argued Zalkind, in a manner reminiscent of Kollontai, one must draw closer to the social collective than to the love partner. Indeed, in designating sex activity as energy stolen from the working class and the Revolution, Zalkind went further than Kollontai, who had argued that people were not yet able to center all their love interests on the social collective, and that therefore individual sex love, purified of any economic aspect - her winged Eros - was for the time quite permissible. Zalkind, less generously, contended that it was necessary to take back from sex all it had stolen from human creativity, and to give it its rightful due, which was a "serious affair," but ranking far from first place.

Zalkind asserted that his theory of revolutionary sublimation, in which he made selective use of the ideas of Freud, was a logical result of the basic principles or criteria of proletarian morality: collectivism, organization, dialectical materialism, and activism. In the service of these basic principles - and their operational equivalent, "revolutionary ex{p. 86} pediency" - sexuality had to take second place. Most important, sex was not a private affair; the proletarian class had the right to interfere with the sex life of its members. In fact, Zalkind informed his readers that "every joy must have a productive purpose," and "a genuine citizen of the proletarian revolution should not have unnecessary sexual feelings." Zalkind did not leave things at this abstract level. He presented a list of twelve "norms of sexual behavior" that included such standards as sexual life should not start early, continence should be observed before marriage, and the sex act should not be repeated frequently. These norms were claimed to be deductions from the more general principles of collectivism, organization, and the like, and from the principle of "revolutionary expediency." Zalkind also looked ahead and argued that sex life in the future communist society would have many of the same characteristics as the life he recommended to his contemporaries. Sexual relations would be richer, more tender, more modest, more organized, and would involve less frequent repetition of the sex act and less variety of partner. In his enthusiasm for applying the principle of revolutionary expediency, Zalkind arrived at a position about the feeling of jealousy that did not displease the radical leftists. With his concluding recommendation, "Struggle against the feeling of jealousy," there was general agreement, but Zalkind's rationale was less acceptable. Instead of opposing sexual jealousy as a form of the property motive or the spirit of bourgeois possessiveness, or as a transgression against the right of the individual to his own freedom, which were the orthodox views, he placed the class struggle first. "If my partner leaves me for a person more valuable to the class struggle, my protest is anti-class, shameful." This view was apparently too extreme, and he was taken to task for it. Bukharin, for example, mocked this particular idea as "scum from the cauldron of philistinism." In general, however, Zalkind's revolutionary norms of sex conduct received widespread attention in the twenties as a serious effort to come to terms theoretically with a situation that was becoming more and more disturbing to the party leadership. Zalkind did not argue his case purely from abstract principles; he strengthened it by pointing to the problems connected with undesired pregnancies and births. Moreover, his appeal to another aspect of revolutionary expediency, authority ("Lenin and others

among the best party members are with me") was doubtless correct. The theory of revolutionary sublimation presented two features attractive to the Soviet {p. 87} leaders, several of whom went on record in favor of it. Iaroslavski, for example, wrote in 1926: "The youth are not attracted to the laws of nature, to the fact that these elements of inner sexual secretion, generally speaking, signify the same things as the elements of our nervous energy. And since the line of satisfaction of sexual needs at times seems both the most pleasant and the easiest, for it is the line of least resistance, this energy - extraordinarily precious nervous energy - is spent precisely on sexual life and not for the intellectual work of the brain, for current business, for the huge struggle awaiting the young generation which will, in the opinion of all of us, build communism; for this they have few powers left." The revolutionary sublimation theory seemed to offer a solution not presented in established marxism, one which struck at the root of some of the most pressing social problems of the day. Thus, it seemed an important starting point in the struggle to work out some kind of ethical system for the everyday life of the transition period, to which Marx and Engels had devoted little attention. In his writing Zalkind did not refer to the marxist classics, and with good reason, for he proposed the overthrow of two of Engels' most important principles. Engels had written of the moral superiority of individual sex love; it would "engender a feeling stronger than for life itself." Equally central was the principle of no interference in private life. All in all, Zalkind's approach represented an application of the bolshevik tendency to reverse the traditional marxist view of the role of base and superstructure: "The proletariat, attempting now to build a social economy in organized fashion, cannot fail to interfere also in a different social disorder, because a badly adjusted superstructure (even the sexual part of the same daily life superstructure) often can be reflected in a crudely negative fashion on the healthy development of the base itself (that is, the economy)." Zalkind's theory was also an elaboration on the clearly emerging Machiavellian ethic of Lenin. In Lenin's own words: "We say that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. We deduce our morality from the facts and needs of the class struggle of the proletariat." To go from the "facts and needs of the class struggle" to the concrete rules of proper conduct in private life seemed for some time an unbridgeable gap, but Zalkind's concept of a limited pool of energy, which could be drained in the service of social or personal goals, provided the crucial link. {p. 88} It remained only to add the positive side to the act of sexual sublimation. As a proper channel for the expression of the excess of youthful energy, the party

leadership recommended sports, exercise, the cultivation of intellectual and cultural interests, and, of course, participation in organized political life. Apparently the theory of sexual sublimation also fitted in well with the inclination of some in the party, including Stalin, to undertake a task of such proportions that the ascetic heroism of the Revolution, its sense of sacrifice and self-denial, would be again repeated. From this point of view,the Five Year Plan era was a massive project in sublimation, for after an inverse relationship had been postulated between progress and sexuality, between heroic struggle and unhealthy preoccupation with the realm of private pleasure, the sex problem could fade into the background - in a word, take care of itself. And, quite consistently, during the entire five years of the First Five Year Plan virtually no attention was paid by Stalin's regime to it or to other problems linked with family life. By 1934, however, new developments suggested that the theory of revolutionary sublimation had not been enough to turn the course of events in the desired direction. The New Family Policy In family policy there were some minor retreats from principle during the very first years of the regime's life, such as the exception made of estates worth 10,000 rubles and less in the law prohibiting inheritance and the repeal in 1926 of the prohibition against adoption. It was also generally recognized that some in the party and many in the population never approved of the radical marxist ideas about family life. Finally, a slow but unmistakable shift can be discerned in the tenor of most of the published materials during the second half of the 1920's. Nevertheless, during the first half of the 1930's policy continued as before, until the great turning point came, between 1934 and 1936, when official propaganda directed its attention to the family with vehemence. The press filled with editorial and didactic material, posters appeared, party members were told to set a good example, and laws were passed that explicitly represented a new policy. On the theoretical plane the tolerant and future-oriented nature of the earlier writing now gave way to a more exhortatory and moralistic tone, which represented for the first time a {p. 89} very definite and unified line. The accumulation of fifteen years of experience had led to a decision at the highest level. At this time a new figure, Anton S. Makarenko, with the obvious blessings of Stalin, rose to national prominence. School teacher, camp director, writer, and educational philosopher, he spent the years from 1920 to 1935 working with the abandoned, neglected, homeless waifs (bezprizorniki). This task was not easy, for many of his charges had become thoroughly criminal and depraved. But he was remarkably successful in helping them organize their thoughts and behavior, raise their hopes and self-respect, become economically productive and independent, and often return to

society as useful citizens. The story of his experiences was told with considerable literary skill in two books, Pedagogicheskaia Poema (An Epic of Educaion or, as most commonly translated, The Road to Life) and Flagi na Bashniakh (Flags on the Battlements or Learning o Live), first published in 1933-1935 and 1939, respectively. As director of camps for homeless children, first under the auspices of the Kherson Regional Department of Education, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and later (1927-1935) under those of the Soviet secret political police, Makarenko instituted a demanding and strict - even martial - camp regimen. The young people, he found, usually responded with relief and pleasure to the end of their previous selfdestructive anarchism and to incorporation into highly organized, militaristic yet self-governing groups or collectives, which performed under his own close supervision and active participation. Makarenko's faith in his method, his unusual patience and skill, and his considerable warmth and charismatic leadership eventuated in Soviet society's most genuine, even dramatic, example of the creative power of the organized collective. His pragmatically oriented conquest, at least in principle, of one of the new society's greatest social problems together with his unconcealed contempt for the "progressive," "child-centered," and experimental pedagogical theories of the 1920's and early 1930's, and for the olympian "bureaucrats" who sought to give life to such "abstract ideas and principles" brought him into continuing conflict with educational officials. By 1935, however, experimentalists had been repudiated, the new party line supported discipline and traditional pedagogy, and fame with honor came to Makarenko. Since his death in 1939 his influence has continued to grow to the point where, like Marx, Engels, and Lenin, {p. 90} an institute has been established to carry out research on him and his work. Makarenko also became the most authoritative writer on the family to emerge in the Soviet period. A Book for Parents, written in 1937 and published in 1940, presents in the form of short stories and instructive episodes with commentary the thesis that "in moulding their children, modern Soviet parents mould the future history of our country and, consequently, the history of the world as well." The main themes have a familiar ring. The family is, or should be, a collective in which the parents, with loving but strict authority, prepare their children for life in Soviet society. Among the principles Makarenko recommended were consistency, unanimity of parental requirements, orderliness, and great respect for the children coupled with high expectations placed before them. By learning to accept and carry through ever more difficult tasks willingly, the children would learn discipline, and by coming to accept the values imposed upon them by their parents, delegates of the larger society, they would become properly dutiful. The content of

duty was made up of official Soviet values: heroic work effort, faith in the party and its ideas, and, of course, collectivism. The parents' responsible leadership was all-important; they had to unswervingly and devotedly set themselves before their children as examples by, for instance, firmly pursuing worthy goals. Makarenko recommended large families because the true collective spirit could not develop with only one child in the family. In general, Makarenko's ideal Soviet family was close to a mirror image of the total society, thus "every attempt it [the family] makes to build up its own experience independently of the moral demands of society is bound to result in disproportion, discordant as an alarm-bell." The eager acceptance of Makarenko's ideas is symptomatic of both the type of social problem and the characteristic solution of the Stalin era. Discipline, duty, and subordination of the individual to group values as defined by unquestionable authority was exactly to the taste of Stalin, who was, moreover, quite ready to look upon his peoples as delinquents and moral defectives. But as a man of his era, Makarenko merits appraisal in his own right. In some ways he was a paradox: a man who was intensely involved, protective, and warmly human with his bezprizorniki, who at the same time took as ideal types the officers of the dreaded and detested secret police; a strict disciplinarian in his camps {p. 91} who was nevertheless in constant feud over his authoritarian methods with his superiors in the educational field and in the higher administrative echelon; a Soviet writer on the family whose books carryhardly a reference to the views of Marx, Engels, or Lenin; and a man of creative literary capacity who was remarkably antiintellectual, in this respect much like his spiritual father, Maxim Gorky. In the present context, however, Makarenko's ideas about the family are most interesting. Focusing on the difficult task of combating individualism in order to produce citizens who would find no contradiction between their needs and society's, he supported and rationalized the authority of Soviet parents at a time when it had become increasingly clear that some kind of authority was badly needed. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the suspicion that he continued to feel distrustful toward the family and probably would have preferred to find some other solution to the organization of life in his ideal Soviet society. His field experience with delinquent and homeless children could well have suggested that a social collective other than the family could adequately perform the function that the family in the hard times after the Revolution had failed to perform. Probably as a matter of practical politics, Makarenko saw that no matter what future policy would bring, the family was going to have to rear a lot of children in the years

ahead. His work also made him very conscious of the defects and failures of Soviet parents. In this sense, then, the man who showed how effective the nonfamilial social group can be in forming and changing the human personality had no alternative other than to recommend the family for the job. As other Soviet writers began to refer to the family as a basic cell, the foundation of Soviet society, or, following Makarenko, a small collective, it was urged upon the populace that strengthening of the family had become one of the basic rules of communist morals. The urge to domesticity, previously regarded as something of a social crime, as petty bourgeois philistinism, was now praised. Soviet wives and mothers could hear and read that achieving a "comfortable home life" was a legitimate and even praiseworthy goal. By the late 1940's points of view were published that even more directly contradicted Marx, Engels, and Lenin. For instance, household work, described by Lenin as petty, drudging, and monotonous was now redefined as "socially useful labor." The activities of father and mother in the role of parents, instead of being dominated by the "exploitative attitude," "ignorance," and "individualism" of the {p. 92} traditional marxist view, now became socially important - and hence matters of patriotism. For the children, love for parents became an ethical absolute; in contrast to the earlier conditional love urged upon them, Soviet boys and girls now were told to love and respect their parents, even those who were old-fashioned and did not like the Komsomol. To fortify the newly recognized importance of parenthood and set the tone for his subjects, Stalin's propagandists began to laud the sober and stable family lives of such great examples as Marx, Lenin, Liebknecht, and Chernyshevski. Stalinhimself engaged in a most unbolshevik act in 1934 when, to the accompaniment of full publicity, he visited his old mother in the Caucasus; previously the Soviet press had published virtually nothing about his personal life. On the legal side, parents were accorded specific new liabilities. In the spring of 1934 a decree was passed denouncing hooliganism and urging parents and teachers to supervise their children more rigorously. Parents became liable under criminal law for the delinquent acts of their children and also were made subject, by legislative enactment, to considerable social pressure for lack of adequate supervision of their children. The militia were empowered to fine neglectful parents up to two hundred rubles without court action, parents were to be financially responsible for their children's misdemeanors, parental neglect cases were to be reported to the place of parent's occupation, and a procedure was set up to transfer children into childrens homes if parental supervision could or would not be exerted. The pressure on the children themselves was also increased. Minors from the age of twelve were to be held accountable for criminal acts such as larceny, violence causing bodily injury,

and murder, and from the age of fourteen, jointly liable with their parents for civil damages. The new responsibility of parenthood was even refiected in a reduction in scheduled operation of creches for preschool children, which were opened each day only for the period that covered the mother's work shift and the time she required to deliver and call for her children. The change in attitude could also be traced in fictional literature, for unsuitable ideas expressed in earlier editions of novels were changed or left out in editions published after the new family policy. For example, in Bruski, volume IV, by F. I. Panferov, the original sentence, "I know the party is not concerned with family matters," disappeared in later editions, along with similar passages. The rehabilitation of parenthood went hand in hand with a new pro{p. 93} priety in marriage and sexual life. While previously the terms marriage and man and wife had been indiscriminately used to apply to the most casual and temporary alliance, the Soviet propaganda machine now began to distinguish between sexual frivolity and marriage, the latter being "in principle a lifelong union with children." Instead of seeking to separate marriage from the family, which had been the tendency earlier, the joys of motherhood and fatherhood now were closely tied to marriage. {Either Stalin saved his people or, as the Trotskyists, say, was reactionary and counter-revolutionary} Again, the new policy was reflected in both legal measures and less explicit changes. One of the main problems in the domestic law of the first fifteen years concerned the recognition of a state of marriage in the event of litigation about the disposal of property, alimony suits, and so on. The 1926 code, passed after considerable discussion, gave legal status to de facto or common law marriage, and was widely considered for this reason to be a more radical code than the first one promulgated by the new Soviet government in 1918. From the mid-thirties, however, the balance of relative significance attached tode facto and to registered marriage began to shift back, and finally in 1944 only the latter was recognized as legally binding. The seriousness with which Stalin wanted his people to regard permanent, registered marriage was manifested in the un-marxist sanction imposed by the law upon a child born outside such a union: he was to be without the right to claim the name or estate of his (biological) father and thus could easily be identified as illegitimate. In combination with the natural tendencies of men and women, and the abolition of legal abortion, the 1944 law thus introduced the likelihood that many Soviet citizens would in the future occupy this unfortunate status and help reinstitute a concept -

illegitimacy - which Soviet and other marxists previously had considered a bourgeois prejudice. Efforts were also made to stress the positive side. The locale of marriage registration, the ZAGS or civil registry office, was to be brightened up, and local officials were urged to see that the registration procedure took on some of the solemnity of the marriage ceremony. Local industries were authorized to manufacture wedding rings, and presumably the venereal disease posters occasionally to be found in ZAGS offices were also removed. The new sacredness of marriage had several corollaries. It implied a fresh attitude toward sexual expression, one opposed to the original attitude which had been very rationalistic. Since, for example, medical science could not prove that incest was physiologically harmful, the {p. 94} criminal code had said nothing about it. Similarly, homosexuality had not been illegal for the first seventeen years of Soviet rule. According to the prevalent official attitude adultery was entirely a private matter, and hence hardly cause for concern. Even bigamy was punishable only in the Moslem areas of Central Asia where the bolsheviks wanted to stamp out polygamy as a "survival of the past." Actually, earlier Soviet justice had not been entirely unresponsive to sexual deviance. Defined in a very special way, it was closely associated with the concept of exploitation. The conditions under which rape could occur, for example, stressed the regime's desire to give legal support to sex equality. A husband could (and still can) be prosecuted for the rape of his wife, and in the days of easy marriage, a man who entered into that state solely to gain sexual access, and with intent to divorce subsequently, could also be prosecuted for rape. Similarly, article 154 of the criminal code provided for the conviction of an employer who forced a female employee into sexual relations. But, after marriage had been made newly important, the regime took a much more stern position toward sexual deviance, especially that which could destroy a marital union. Homosexuality was made a criminal offense in 1934, and an energetic nationwide campaign against sexual promiscuity, quick and easy marriage, bigamy, adultery, and the exploitative approach toward women was carried on during most of 1935 and 1936. On August 11, 1935, Pravda printed a story about a drunkard with three wives and another about a woman who quarreled with her new husband on the way from the ZAGS, and returned there, within an hour of the marriage, to divorce him. Bigamists, exploiters, deserting husbands and fathers, and the more innocent but still wayward young persons too easily mistaking infatuation for love were all busily exposed. One can imagine the rueful feelings of Iaroslavski, that veteran counsellor

who only a few years earlier had pointed out that it was unbolshevik to be forever "looking under the bedsheets." Many, we may be sure, inside the party and out, still held to the view that sex activity was part of private life and no concern of the party's. If "so-called free love and loose sexual life are altogether bourgeois and have nothing in common either with socialist principles and ethics or with the rules of behavior of a Soviet citizen," and if "marriage is the most serious affair in life," as Pravda commented in 1936, then it seemed logical to introduce a new conception of love. The priority given by Engels to individual sex love had already been devalued by some {p. 95} writers even before the new family policy. One line of thought sought to play down the natural, presumably sexual, basis of love as described by Engels, and to substitute common work, participation in building communism, and shared cultural interests as a basis for marital love. A variant of this trend was simply to reduce or even deny the importance of love as an experience and as a unifying bond. During the First Five Year Plan the almost complete lack of attention given to the family in the official mass media was paralleled by the expression in the literature of the time of such sentiments as "It's work that matters, not wives," and by such period types as Uvadiev, a party secretary in Leonid Leonov's novel, Sot (1930), who banished smoking, drinking, and tenderness from his life, looking upon love as "merely a fuel to treble his strength on the next day's path." Even later, when love had again become more legitimate, it still occupied a low rank on the scale of officially recommended priorities. It was not as important as, say, labor and struggle. More significant was the effort to introduce a distinction, completely overlooked by Engels, between love and infatuation. Operationally, it was a simple distinction to make: love was a lasting tie, and infatuation was not. Mutual sexual attraction, so central in Engels' scheme of things, was thus newly labeled, and natural man's freedom was defeated by the rule of discipline and responsibility. For the first two decades after the Revolution the regime used only advice and persuasion, but by 1935 Stalin was ready to resort to more concrete inducements. For men and women who insisted upon "mistaking infatuation for love," penalties were assigned. The laws of 1935-36 provided relatively mild sanctions, fees of 50, 150, and 300 rubles for first, second, and subsequent divorces, and, probably more important, required entry of the fact of divorce in the personal documents of those involved. Though considerable success in lowering the divorce rate was claimed immediately, even heavier sanctions were introduced in 1944. A judicial process of divorce was instituted, and the fees for divorce raised to at least 500 rubles and at most 2,000 rubles. In the judicial process the lower court was required to make every

effort to effect a reconciliation; if this proved impossible, the case was to be carried to a higher court, which was the one that could actually grant the divorce. Consequently, the Soviet citizen who wished to divorce was faced with substantial ideological, financial, and judicial obstacles. Freedom of divorce, to many communists one of the most prized achieve {p. 96} ments of the Revolution, had become for the majority of the Soviet population little more than a formal right without content. Another achievement of the Revolution, equally dear to feminists and to large sections of the poorly housed urban population in the USSR, was the right of women to legal and free abortion. The 1920 enabling decree referred to the "gradual disappearance of this evil" and pointed to "moral survivals of the past" and "difficult economic conditions" as the main reasons why women still felt compelled to resort to abortion. By 1936 the "survivals" and "difficult conditions" had hardly been wiped out, and it was also clear that the Soviet State was not preparing seriously to take responsibility for childrearing upon its own shoulders. Nevertheless, after a nationwide discussion in which many expressed opposition, abortions were made illegal in that year. All in all, this move seemed a crushing blow to the idea of sex equality, and also to one of the few areas of personal freedom remaining to Soviet citizens. To be sure, provisions were added to grant material aid allowances to mothers of large families and provide more maternity services, and the people were promised that within eighteen months the number of nursery beds for children would double and the number of permanent kindergartens increase threefold. The exposed position of the Soviet mother was further recognized by raising to two years' imprisonment the penalty for divorced fathers' refusal to pay alimony in judgments awarded for the maintenance of their children. In 1944 the responsibility of unmarried fathers was curtailed, but at the same time assistance to mothers was made more generous, and also extended to unmarried mothers. To sum up, all these measures make it clear that responsibility, reproduction, and childrearing were in favor and that stable marriages, large families, and self-discipline were now more important to the regime than individual freedom, sex equality, and ideological consistency. Equally as fascinating as the story of how Stalin's regime decisively changed its position on the family is the question of why it did so. A great deal has been written on the subject, and many writers have concluded that the Soviet experience proves that the family cannot be dispensed with. This conclusion is certainly too strong, but it is difficult to establish a definitive interpretation. Perhaps all the evidence on why the

new position was adopted will never come to light, for it may be that Stalin simply made a personal decision which he never bothered to explain to his colleagues or to justify in any other form. Inter{p. 97} pretations of the new family policy offered by both Soviet and Western analysts are often overly monistic, assigning exclusive weight to only one condition or reasonable cause. It is more likely that the switch in policy was overdetermined, and that at least five sets of conditions were at work: (1) the specific and concrete social problems of the kind described in the preceding chapters, which called for attention to the family's function of social control; (2) the concessionary mood of Stalin's regime, anxious to gain a measure of popular unity and loyalty among the people, who were by and large in favor of the new, more conservative family policy; (3) a new international situation with a reassessing of the Soviet Union's immediate future on the world political scene and the link between family life and birth rate; (4) the general shift in Soviet policy toward discipline and control over individual freedom, which may simply have swept the family, as it did other institutions of social control and indoctrination, back into a more legitimate status; and (5) a significant and explicit reorientation in Soviet marxism, stressing the active role of the superstructure in inducing social change. {p. 99} Evidence from refugees suggests the general unpopularity of the central plank of the original bolshevik program for the family, free divorce. Three out of four among those questioned recorded their approval of the legislation which made the procurement of divorce considerably more difficult. Reactions to some of the more detailed provisions of the law are significant. While it is not possible to vouch for the representativeness of these views, they suggest prewar attitudes. As to the substantial expense involved: "(It costs a lot of money to get a divorce.) That is good. There will be less prostitution" (296 B 20). As to the long and difficult court process: "People just say, 'Right now we are not getting along, so let's get a divorce.' It brings depravity to the people. It should go to the court, to make a person think. If not, he just pays a couple of rubles and gets a divorce. That is not good" (279 B 41). To be sure, proof that most features of the new family policy met with approval, even if it could be found, would not indicate that such a fact had been taken into account by Stalin. {p. 102} When the policy did change, with official dogma supporting the monogamous husband, the responsible father, and the joyous mother, who set aside leisure time to spend with the family, and so on, it was possible for an official apologist to claim that the leftist theories of the early years had gone uncriticized. Though this is not strictly accurate, after Stalin's accession to power, we must remember, "criticism" had taken on a new meaning; it was now equivalent to condemnation.

{p. 103} No authoritative writers attempted to find justification for the new family policy in Marx, Engels, or Lenin, and the efforts that were made by little-known persons seem quite clumsy, internally contradictory, and embarrassed. Evading theoretical argumentation of any sophistication, they relied on indoctrination, and especially upon that peculiar Soviet form that has been aptly termed the "imperativeindicative." Clearly, the truth was too awkward to be faced, and had to be covered up. {p. 104} Use of scapegoats also became common: "The enemies of the people, the vile fascist hirelings - Trotsky, Bukharin, Krylenko and their followers - covered the family in the USSR with filth, spreading the counter-revolutionary 'theory' of the dying out of the family, of disorderly sexual cohabitation in the USSR, in order to discredit the Soviet land." ... The list of taboos was widely advertised, and the Soviet citizen was left in no doubt about what was expected of him. {p. 106} ... To give one recent example, it has become quite usual to blame Soviet juvenile crimes upon the irresponsibility and mistakes of the delinquent's parents, and the conclusion which emerges might be expected: "In connection with this, the interference of public organizations into family upbringing must be considered an appropriate and beneficial phenomenon." Post-Stalin Problems and Trends The new family policy began in the mid-thirties and was brought to full scope in the legislation of 1944. In the decade following there were no significant changes, but since the death of Stalin some momentous new developments have occurred. Illegal abortion was the first portion of the new policy to fall. In 1954 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet annulled criminal responsibility of women for obtaining an abortion, and in 1955 rescinded the rest of the law originally passed in 1936. ... A second development, of the greatest consequence for family policy {p. 107} as well as for all of Soviet society, was the denigration of Stalin and the cult of personality, which led the way to sharp social commentary and criticism of a kind that had not been possible since the 1920's. ... Even the law itself, promulgated in the name of people, party, and the sacred cause of communism, lost its untouchable quality. A 1960 newspaper discussion of the 1944 law on the family referred to it as "obsolete" and as containing "decayed norms." Indeed, one of the most popular topics concerning family and married life in the daily press in the 1954 to 1963 decade was the lack of correspondence between the 1944

law and the code of morality and actual life of the Soviet people. The main target of criticism was the heavy administrative and financial barrier to divorce, which forced a great part of the population into evasions of the law and de facto marriages. Some of the writing shows a remarkable degree of indignation and concern over social justice - remarkable, that is, within the framework of the usual practices of the Soviet press. Especially attacked has been one of the main instrumentalities of the new family policy, that which made thc woman entirely responsible for the support and rearing of children born out of legal wedlock. "A bitter feeling arises when one realizes that certain provisions of the law of July 8, 1944 ... aid in the revival of the shameful view that women are the guilty parties in the 'fall from grace' of man. They aid in spreading narrow views that indiscriminately brand any woman who has dared to have a child 'without a husband.'" ... {p. 108} An equivalent measure of antagonism has been directed against the stigmatization by the 1944 law of millions of Soviet children as illegitimate. The children of mothers who were literally without husbands as well as those who had husbands but had to live with them in de facto or unregistered marriage were identified in their personal documents with a dash in the place of the father's name. Moreover, they had neither the right nor the opportunity to take their father's names. The man on the street, it seems, considered both categories as illegitimate, and school children were to be heard addressing certain of their peers as, "Hey you, fatherless." ... Finally, ardent adherents of social logic discovered a corollary set of most distressing anomalies. From time to time the Soviet organized public found it necessary to heap scorn on unmarried fathers who had, by refusing to marry, incurred no legal responsibility whatsoever. This practice, it appeared, was giving a "'legal' right to sexual promiscuity for some and the responsibility for it to others," and the 1944 law prolonged the helpless and exposed position of the Soviet mother which had been one of the most unsavory consequences of the earlier, easydivorce policy. There was also the tragicomic spectacle of the mass adoption by men of their own children, who were otherwise "illegitimate," born to them by their own "wives," whom they could not marry because of inability to get divorces from their previous (legal) wives. ... {p. 109} All in all, the time was indeed ripe when, "in response to many letters of inquiry," a new law on marriage and the family, several years in preparation by a representative subcommittee of the Supreme Soviet, was revealed in February 1964 and went into effect on December 10, 1965. It was admitted that the existing (1944) legislation contained "certain flaws." Readers who were not already well familiarized with them could discover what they were by studying the changes. In the future birth certificates issucd for children born out of wedlock would no longer show a line

drawn through the place for the father's name; paternity outside marriage would be made subject to voluntary admission and, "in certain cases," to the determination of the court; obligatory public announcements in the newspapers of the filing of a divorce action would be ended; and divorce cases would be heard and decided only in the people's courts. The changes clearly represent a compromise position; the post-revolutionary pendulum has come to a vertical rest. There is apparently to be no complete "return to the principles of Lenin," that is, absolute free divorce as some have urged, but the most pressing sources of injustice and trouble appear to be at an end. A third development of the post-Stalin years may prove in the long run to be the most significant of all: the growing fund of accurate information about family life, and the rise of new methods and personnel to gather more such information in the future. {p. 252} In the years from 1917 to 1936 divorce was legally easier to bring about than marriage in the USSR, for the consent of two was required for marriage, whereas one partner could divorce the other without the latter's consent and without any court process, at least from 1926 to 1936. It is now the generally accepted view inside the USSR, as it always has been in the outer world, that such a policy is a seriously disruptive influence on the stability of marriage. {p. 255} Divorce was free and easy from 1917 to 1935. In 1936 a new code was issued which required a graduated set of fees for divorce: 50 rubles for the first, 150 for the second, and 300 for the third and any subsequent divorces. Since average monthly earnings of workers and employees amounted to 238 rubles in 1936, it is obvious that these fees must have acted as a powerful deterrent to registration of more than one divorce, at the least, and to any registration of divorce, particularly among the peasants, at most. Also, both parties were henceforth required to appear at the registry office, and the divorce was to be registered in the personal passport. Even though no court procedure was required, a continuing campaign of agitation and propaganda was waged against thoughtless marriage, frivolous divorce, foolish girls, and licentious rakes. Toward the last years of World War II the now famous "law of 1944" was promulgated, introducing not a single but a double court procedure. It imposed a fee of 500 to 2,000 rubles for those couples who wanted a divorce badly enough, could get judicial approval, and had enough money to pay the cost. In addition to the fee, payable upon issuance of the divorce decree, applicants had to pay 100 rubles to the court when filing for divorce and to pay a similar sum for the publication in the local newspaper of the intention to seek a divorce. The lower or people's court then could hear the case, but all such courts were instructed to do everything in their power to

reconcile the couples, a mission fortified by the code's failure, to provide a specific list of grounds for divorce. Although the lower court was empowered to conduct a thorough investigation, the divorce itself could be granted only if {p. 256} reconciliation failed and another application was made to a higher, city or regional court. It is evident without further details that the new procedure was indeed a radical change from the past, a departure from the socialist attitude toward divorce, and an extremely tough divorce policy. Its intention was made maximally clear by the further proviso that no legal claim or right was to be extended to a wife or children resulting from an unregistered marriage, thus introducing for the first time since the Revolution an officially sponsored concept of the illegitimate child. Furthermore, "the decree was directed primarily at women; it said to them, 'If you wish to establish a sound and stable family and if you wish your interests and the interests of your children to be protected, do not be casual about intimate relations.'" {p. 259} A Soviet legal specialist estimated that there were 11,000,000 illegitimate children in the USSR in 1947, a year in which 3,312,000 unmarried mothers were receiving grants for support of their children. {p. 304} The Decline of Parental Influence Everyday encounters sometimes illustrate dramatically basic social patterns. The writer Sergei Mikhalkov tells of a Soviet family in which the father was trying to reason with his five-year-old son: "Look how badly you are behaving - you don't obey Mama and Papa. We do everything for you - we show you every concern." The son answers: "It is not you who show concern for me. It is the party and the government that show concern for me." Mikhalkov comments: "He listened to the radio and watched television. And, being a child, he absorbed like a sponge everything he heard and saw." Probably no generalization about trends in the Soviet family finds more support from all sources than that of a decline in parental influence over children. Among the refugees in the Harvard Project, the younger generations were less influenced by their parents than the latter had been by theirs, even when seeking a model for their own roles as {p. 305} parents. Often the point is made by stressing the new qualities of Soviet youth. The precise adjectives and phrasings used by parents to describe the younger generation varyÑ"quite fearless," "raised in a new spirit," "more developed," "get

about easily by themselves" - but their common meaning is summed up by the word independence. As a Soviet analyst put it in 1964, young people in the USSR have a veritable "greed" for independence, a need which is nourished in part by the tendency of their parents to accord considerable importance to the autonomy of their children's "personal life." However, Soviet parents confronting this pattern display a mixture of feelings, as if they are a little amazed, a little disgusted, a little proud, a little fearful at what they see in their children. Why have Soviet parents, even those most in opposition to the Revolution and regime, lost so much ground in the shaping and control of their children? {p. 306} Even though the family was looked on with more favor in 1935 than it had been in the two previous decades, it continued to be an institution of relatively low priority. The more actively involved, successful elements in the population were likely to include in their political orthodoxy the view that society comes before family. They would subscribe, at least in principle, to the assertion of a twenty-nineyear-old sports instructor: "The Soviet Union does not need a closely knit family. It needs people who are ready to part with their life for the goals of the world revolution. In the Russian family you had the authority of the father. In the Soviet family you have the authority of the party" (189 A 44). In families where all subscribe to this view, it has seemed quite proper for parents to entrust the task of childrearing to the state. They are apt to share some of the official contempt toward the family as expressed, for instance, in the continued use of the derogatory term semeistvenny (family-like) to describe the illegal informal relations of mutual benefit and protection which tend to develop in Soviet bureaucratic structures. Even the main responsibility of the Soviet parent recognized in the exhortatory literature - childrearing - is a delegated responsibility. Parental influence is always conditional. First, it is stressed thatthe leading role in the rearing of children belongs to the school. Secondly, parents are expected to refrain from exerting influence in a direction contrary to the interests of the state. They are strongly urged, or ordered, for example, not to give religious instruction. Furthermore, the whole context of the parent-child relationship is affected by the still lively ideological premise that the future will bring an even greater diminution in the influence of individual parents and a correspondingly greater increase in the influence exerted by special state institutions and society as a whole. Soviet discussions of the family still carry occasional references to that future time when the state will be able to take over all responsibility for childrearing, although the 1961 party Program promises that the ultimate decision is to be made by the parents, not the state. The attitude of the regime is now more moderate than it was be

{p. 307} tween the Revolution and the mid-1930's, but it still upholds the children's position above that of the parents. Finally, if the Soviet parent's enthusiasm for the Revolution and zeal for communism fail completely, if he stubbornly persists in contradicting the party line in his childrearing practices, he can be reminded of Pavlik Morozov, who had his father arrested. Statues and posters still admonish the Soviet people that no sacrifice is too great for the cause. The Soviets reverse the roles in the Old Testament story of Abraham, who stood ready to offer up his son Isaac as a measure of his love for God, and it is the boy hero-martyr who makes a sacrifice similarly commendable, and whose action is even now recommended as a symbol of proper priorities for a well-trained child. Pavlik Morozov may serve as a model to Soviet children; to parents he functions as a warning. In fact this epic story has contributed greatly to the popular image of what typically happens in the Soviet parent-child relationship, and what, by inference, could easily happen in one's own family. A girl received the following impression while living in the USSR: "Films and books always showed us these things - that children tore themselves away from their parents and went their own way. But I cannot say that everyone did it. I do not know how many did it, but this was the popular kind - this was what people talked about and this is what we learned" (258 A 72). The whole question of official policy on the family raised the issue of loyalty to a problematic status within the family. Soviet parents were often deeply concerned about this uncertainty of position. An institute instructor discusses the problem in respect to his son: "I would not say that my son always agreed with me, but he was always loyal to me. Once during the Finnish War, I said in his presence, 'How can one believe that a small country like Finland could attack the USSR?' He spoke up and said that he thought it was entirely possible. Then during the German War, I came home on leave and told my wife and son that the Soviet soldiers did not want to fight for the regime. My son immediately wanted to know how it was possible that soldiers would not fight for their fatherland. I imagine that, had I remained in the USSR, my son and I would have had many sharp conflicts of opinion. And perhaps, like so many of the Soviet youth, he would have left his family and gone to live in a dormitory" (307 A 17). If feelings became too divisive the two sides could separate. Such a serious step was most likely at a time when not just opinions but a {p. 308} decision about educational career or job choice had to be made. The theme cropped up repeatedly, almost in a matter-of-fact way, as in the case of a young

woman whose occupational choice differed, just as did her political and religious outlook, from that of her father and mother. They had arguments, she reports, but: "I always won the arguments because I knew my parents could not do anything about it. I had my own passport and the full right to leave my parents if I wished" (85 A 16). At times Soviet parents played a role in the minds of their children similar to the one they often seemed to play in the eyes of the Soviet leaders. They were simply obstacles to progress. Inasmuch as home and a good life were in direct opposition, leaving home became a prerequisite for personal advancement. A young worker narrates his feelings at age fourteen: "My primary intention was to become a cultured man. As a boy I was afraid of factory work. When I looked at my brother, who was still young but already disgusted with life, I always intended to run away from home and to get to school. I was convinced that school was the only means of elbowing my way into life" (1582 A 29). In consequence, leaving home also became a special weapon for Soviet youth, and another echo in youthful behavior of the official policy of urging young people to leave home in spirit. However, even children too young to leave home exerted a disproportionate influence. Alongside the air of self-righteous independence and vigilance so encouraged in the school was a trait that appeared to parents as political naivete. One of the most salient norms of parental behavior during the Stalin era, when there was maximum antagonism between regime and people, called for the exercise of great care in expressing political sentiment openly in front of young children. A girl tells us: "Everyone was afraid of his children. A small child can betray his parents unwittingly and therefore my parents were always careful in what they said before me and my brother" (1684 A 14). A doctor and administrator reports that: "A father couldn't be free with his son. I never spoke against Stalin to my own boy. After the story of Pavlik Morozov you were afraid to drop any kind of unguarded word, even before your own son, because he might inadvertently tell it in school, the directorate would report it, saying to the boy, 'Where did you hear this?' and the boy would answer, 'Papa says so and Papa is always right,' and before you know it you would be in serious trouble" (40 A 15-16). {p. 309} We may conclude that feelings of helplessness and alarm were common among Soviet parents. They conformed to the dictates of the regime's policy, especially while their children were young, because they felt they could not do otherwise, even if they wished, for fear of punitive sanction. These feelings corresponded to the regime's policy toward the family, especially toward the role of parent, and explain why the policies were successful in persuading parents to reduce the extent of their influence over their children.

2. New opportunities for children. In the meantime there developed opportunities for children which their parents could not give them on their own. First came school and associated extra-curricular activities. As the country advanced, education became more and more important, and the state had a monopoly on its control. Even the most rabidly anti-Soviet of parents were faced with this fact. As an old Cossack said of his children and their attitude toward school: "Since the upbringing at home in the family circle differed greatly from a moral standpoint, they could not feel any special love for the school, but they had to study" (626 B 12). From their earliest years, Soviet children are impressed by the widely publicized (though not always true) assertion that: "There is no dependency of the son on father's position and on father's ability to pay for his education out of his wage" (136 B 9, 7). This claim applies to chances for occupational success as well as education. As a consequence a political police officer-father believes that responsibility, not only for education in a narrow sense, but for the whole "upbringing of a child and a young man" rests with the school, the Komsomol, and the party: "The family influence is not predominant because the parents, due to the existing atmosphere, try to bring up their children in the spirit of the school and of the party. The parents are really the supporters of the Komsomol education, maybe not always according to their own wishes but because they have no other choice. The choice of a profession, of an activity depends more on the party. There might be a sudden campaign on. Young men are needed for military schools ... After that a son would not listen to his father. He would say, 'Papa, you are old-fashioned, I shall attend a military school.' There could be campaigns for other professions as well" (136 B 9, 7). {p. 311} 3. Circumstantial incapacity. Some features of Soviet family life foster the trend toward early juvenile independence. Foremost is the large number of incomplete families, in which the guiding hand of a parent is missing because there is no father and the mother has to earn a living. Even in complete families it is hard to be a good parent. Although indulgent and careless mothers receive some attention in Soviet writings on the subject of childrearing, complaints about fathers are more frequent. Too often fathers are not properly concerned about their children and their own responsibilities as a parent, a fact that has given rise to the view that not only manifest but covert fatherlessness (skrytaia bezotzsovshchina) is a major problem in the life of Soviet families. ... These circumstances result in the development of a pattern previously mentioned, the grandmother who is assigned the role of mother. A striking example is reported by the young son of an army officer and party member. He declares that the most important person in his life as a child was babushka, grandma: "I spent my whole day with my grandmother. In fact, I called her 'Mother.' She was always the one who asked where I went and why I went. She took the place of my mother. This is very

characteristic in Russia. Mothers are usually young, they want to go out and often they want to work. But the grandmother always stays home to take care of the children" (110 A 41-42). ... {p. 317} Taking a larger view, such as that from a window in the Kremlin, the decline in the infuence of the Soviet parent has helped to shape Soviet youth to the desired mold, but it has brought its own new problems with it. Youthful independence means that some boys and girls will join the Komsomol and become patriotic Soviet citizens, but it also means that some will choose other paths. There is good evidence that juvenile misbehavior is common in the USSR, and it is obvious that Soviet authorities are very concerned about what we might term the "control gap" in which parents have relinquished more responsibility for the conduct of youth than the society as a whole is able to assume. The main official reaction to wayward youth is to blame the family: "It is the family which is most responsible before the state and society for the bad conduct of children." However, many Soviet parents, it seems, feel that society should be held responsible ... {end} Trotsky advocates abolishing the Family; Stalin its restoration: trotsky.html. Bronislaw Malinowski debates Robert Briffault on Marriage. Malinowski, an Anthropologist who specialised in Sex-life and Marriage, condemns the attempt to abolish Marriage as a "disaster". Briffault puts a Marxist view: marriagemalinowski.html. Alexis de Tocqueville observed of family life among slaves, "The Negro has no family: woman is merely the temporary companion of his pleasures, and his children are on an equality with himself from the moment of their birth." (Democracy in America, Vintage Books, NY 1945, p. 545). Is this not what Trotskyism made of family life in the early Soviet Union, and what Feminism has wrought in the West in recent decades? The Murder of Josef Stalin: (1) from Stuart Kahan & Lazar Kaganovich: kaganovich.html (2) from Edvard Radzinsky: radzinsk.html. Trotskyism's role in the West, Destroying the Family: engagement.html. Trotskyists have been promoting Free Trade, to destroy the independence of economies: xTrots.html.

Stalin's restoration of Marriage was not anti-sex, but anti-anarchy. Trotskyism reduces people to the condition of anomic isolated individuals. We do not need a new era of repression; but pornography, factory-style prostitution, and "Gay Marriage" are not "liberation". Freud and the Bolsheviks: freud-bolsheviks.html. Freud as Jewish Avenger: freud.html. Ferdinand Mount's book The Subversive Family, about the Marxist-Feminist attack on Marriage and the Family: mount.html.

The CIA infiltrating the Left? Peter Myers, January 15, 2003; update May 24, 2007. My comments are shown {thus}; write to me at contact.html. You are at http://mailstar.net/cia-infiltrating-left.html. (1) Robert Fulford's column about the CIA's covert cultural sponsorship (2) 'The CIA and the Cultural Cold War', by Frances Stonor Saunders (3) Carroll Quigley on Walter Lippman (4) Walter Lippmann and the Mont Pelerin Society (5) Marxist AntiCommunism (6) Trotskyism to Anachronism: The Neoconservative Revolution (7) Max Shpak on The Fraud of Neoconservative "Anti-Communism" (8) Mick Hume unmasked as a Neo-Con (9) Robert Manne unmasked as a Neocon (10) Karl A. Wittfogel and the Frankfurt School: Neocons (11) Convergence between the USSR and the West (12) Another Jewish Communist comes out as a Neocon ... in the Murdoch press (13) A Trotskyist Website Responds (14) Trotsky's ghost wandering the White House (15) Michael Lind vs Alan Wald on the Trotskyist tie to the Neocons (16) Noam Chomsky and the Trots as Gatekeepers for the Jewish lobbies (15) William Pfaff: The philosophers of chaos reap a whirlwind (16) Neocons - meet the 'Marxist Right', by Justin Raimondo (17) Richard Kostelanetz, The End of Intelligent Writing The Communist movement was irretrievably split by the Trotsky/Stalin divide. Jewish communists, over time, moved increasingly to the Trotsky camp, with its ambivalence about the Soviet Union. At first they were inclined to preserve it - hopefully with Trotsky back at the helm. Later they turned against it. Some co-operated with the CIA, and the CIA used them to drive a fatal wedge into the Communist camp. While Stalin's murder of Trotsky is widely publicised, Stalin's own murder is hushed up - probably because it happened within two months' of the Doctors' Plot being announced, which suggests that Stalin was right about the plotters: death-ofstalin.html.

After Stalin's murder, the Soviet Union turned "revisionist", and - under Beria and Gorbachev - oriented to "convergence" with the West (see convergence.html), but Mao remained pro-Stalin. This was a substantial contributor to the Sino-Soviet split. Communism has "fallen", yet it seems to reign in our universities and courts. Open Borders, Gay Marriage, Political Correctness ... these are the signs. The secret: what has fallen is Stalinism; that's all. Trotsky's backers have not gone away. Many, "coming out" as Zionists, are now "Neocons". And the New Left is largely Trotskyist in inspiration. The Frankfurt School (devoted to Marx and Freud; opposed to Stalin as much as Hitler) has had a great impact. And perceptions of the Left have been largely shaped by Isaac Deutscher, a Jewish Trotskyist: deutscher.html. Despite New Left intellectuals' thinking of themselves as oppositionist "outsiders", Deutscher's material was published by such establishment bodies as The Economist and the BBC. The winners of the Deutscher Prize are announced in the London Review of Books, and the Deutscher Memorial Lecture is presented at the London School of Economics. Isaac Deutscher's central role in New Left Review: newleft.html. (1) Robert Fulford's column about the CIA's covert cultural sponsorship (The National Post, April 25, 2000) http://www.robertfulford.com/CIA.html. ... It began in the early years of the Cold War, when many European intellectuals admired the Soviet Union more than the United States. In Paris, even in Stalinist days, it was considered eccentric to be passionately anti-communist; if you were also proAmerican, you were considered an outright loon. In England, things weren't all that different. A soon-to-be-famous journalist, Malcolm Muggeridge, said that the New Statesman magazine had somehow established "the proposition that to be intelligent is to be Left, whereas almost the exact opposite is true." Muggeridge urged the Americans to get into high-level propaganda. ... The intellectuals who turned up at CIA-sponsored conferences and appeared in CIA-sponsored magazines were usually democratic socialists. That could never have been explained to Senator Joseph McCarthy and his sympathizers. But the CIA, its budget a black hole, was the one agency that never had to explain anything.

Eventually, a member of Congress began to expose the program. In 1964 Congressman Wright Patman, analyzing tax-free foundations, discovered that some were mainly mail drops. Journalists finally picked up on this a couple of years later, and by 1967 the secret was out. In the 1970s the CIA abandoned culture entirely (so far as we know). Melvin J. Lasky, who had started the whole program in 1950 and coedited Encounter from 1958, kept the magazine flickeringly alive till 1991. When it died, hardly anyone mourned; the real Encounter had been gone a long time. The story is still not entirely known (the CIA seldom obeys the Freedom of Information Act) but over the years it has emerged slowly from the shadows. The most thorough history has recently appeared: Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (Granta), by Frances Stonor Saunders. Aside from offering a vigorously researched account of these remarkable events, she delivers great lashings of gossip, some of which may fall into the too-good-to-be-true category. She tells us, for instance, that the CIA acquired the right to make George Orwell'sAnimal Farm into a film by promising his widow an introduction to Clark Gable. ... (2) 'The CIA and the Cultural Cold War', by Frances Stonor Saunders MONTHLY REVIEW Volume 51, Number 6 November 1999 www.monthlyreview.org The CIA and the Cultural Cold War Revisited by James Petras Who Paid the Piper: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War by Frances Stonor Saunders, (London: Granta Books), £20. This book provides a detailed account of the ways in which the CIA penetrated and influenced a vast array of cultural organizations, through its front groups and via friendly philanthropic organizations like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. The author, Frances Stonor Saunders, details how and why the CIA ran cultural congresses, mounted exhibits, and organized concerts. The CIA also published and translated well-known authors who toed the Washington line, sponsored abstract art to counteract art with any social content and, throughout the world, subsidized journals that criticized Marxism, communism, and revolutionary politics and apologized for, or ignored, violent and destructive imperialist U.S. policies. The CIA was able to harness some of the most vocal exponents of intellectual freedom in the West in service of these policies, to the extent that some intellectuals were directly on the CIA payroll. Many were knowingly involved with CIA « projects, » and others drifted in and out of its orbit, claiming ignorance of the CIA connection after their CIA sponsors were publiclyexposed during the late 1960s and the Vietnam war, after the turn of the political tide to the left.

U.S. and European anticommunist publications receiving direct or indirect funding included Partisan Review, Kenyon Review, New Leader, Encounter and many others. Among the intellectuals who were funded and promoted by the CIA were Irving Kristol, Melvin Lasky, Isaiah Berlin, Stephen Spender, Sidney Hook, Daniel Bell, Dwight MacDonald, Robert Lowell, Hannah Arendt, Mary McCarthy, and numerous others in the United States and Europe. In Europe, the CIA was particularly interested in and promoted the « Democratic Left » and ex-leftists, including Ignacio Silone, Stephen Spender,Arthur Koestler, Raymond Aron, Anthony Crosland, Michael Josselson, and George Orwell {end} More at http://www.monthlyreview.org/1199petr.htm. (3) Carroll Quigley on Walter Lippman: Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in our Time, Macmillan New York 1966 {p. 938} More than fifty years ago the Morgan firm decided to infiltrate the Leftwing political movements in the United States. This was relatively easy to do, since these groups were starved for funds and eager for a voice to reach the people. Wall Street supplied both. The purpose was not to destroy, dominate, or take over but was really threefold: (1) to keep informed about the thinking of Left-wing or liberal groups; (2) to provide them with a mouthpiece so that they could "blow off steam," and (3) to have a final veto on their publicity and possibly on their actions, if they ever went "radical." There was nothing really new about this decision, since other financiers had talked about it and even attempted it earlier. What made it decisively important this time was the combination of its adoption by the dominant Wall Street financier, at a time when tax policy was driving all financiers to seek tax-exempt refuges for their fortunes, and at a time when the ultimate in Left-wing radicalism was about to appear under the banner of the Third International. The best example of this alliance of Wall Street and Left-wing publication was The New Republic, a magazine founded by Willard Straight, using Payne Whitney money, in 1914. Straight ... became a Morgan partner ... He married Dorothy Payne Whitney ... the sister and co-heiress of Oliver {p. 939} Payne, of the Standard Oil "trust." ... The New Republic was founded by Willard and Dorothy Straight, using her money, in 1914, and continued to be supported by her financial contributions until March 23, 1953. The original purpose for establishing the paper was to provide an outlet for the progressive Left and to guide it quietly in an Anglophile direction. This latter task

was entrusted to a young man, only four years out of Harvard, but already a member of the mysterious Round Table group, which has played a major role in directing England's foreign policy since its formal establishment in 1909. This new recruit, Walter Lippmann, has been, from 1914 to the present, the authentic spokesman in American journalism for the Establishments on both sides of the Atlantic in international affairs. His biweekly columns, which appear in hundreds of American papers, are copyrighted by the New York Herald Tribune which is now owned by J. H. Whitney. It was these connections, as a link between Wall Street and the Round Table Group, which gave Lippmann the opportunity in 1918, while still in his twenties, to be the official interpreter of the meaning of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points to the British government. {end} More at tragedy.html. Walter Lippmann for World Government: wells-lenin-league.html. Walter Lippmann on Wilson and House: lippmann.html. (4) Walter Lippmann and the Mont Pelerin Society Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic CounterRevolution, HarperCollinsPublishers, London 1995. In 1920, Lippmann lampooned "the Red hysteria" in his article An Early Estimate of Mr. McAdoo: lippmann.html. But in the wake of Stalin's defeat of Trotskyism, he came to the support of Liberalism. {p. 9} Keynes and the Crisis of Liberalism, 1931-1939 From the 26th to the 30th of August 1938, but one month before the Munich conference which seemed to bring the triumph of totalitarianism in Europe an important step closer, an obscure conference took place in Paris to discuss what its participants called the 'crisis of liberalism' in Europe. The conference was convened and organized by a French academic, Professor Louis Rougier, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Besancon, and held at the Institut International de Cooperation Intellectuelle. The twenty-six who attended the Conference were all academics, with one notable exception, the American columnist Walter Lippmann. Indeed, the gathering was named in his honour 'Le Colloque Walter Lippmann' in an attempt by Rougier to unite the disputatious academics around the central importance of Lippmann's book The Good Society, published in 1937. For Rougier, Lippmann's book was, simply, 'la meilleure explication des maux de notre temps'. 'Le Colloque Walter Lippmann' was, naturally, dominated by Frenchmen;

their number included the prominent political philosopher Raymond Aron, and the economist Jacques Rueff. Amongst the other Europeans were two Austrians of particular significance - Friedrich von Hayek, then a lecturer at the London School of Economics, and his mentor and teacher Ludwig von Mises, then resident in Geneva at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. Also from Geneva came another exiled central European economist, Wilhem Ropke, later architect of Germany's post-war Social Market Economy. They were all drawn to Paris by a shared concern at the apparently inexorable decline of liberalism in Europe. 'Le Colloque Walter Lippmann' represented the first coherent attempt to analyse the reasons for that decline and to suggest ways in which that decline might be reversed. Lippmann's The Good Society was but one of a number of books published during the mid-1930s which warned of the seemingly {p. 10} unstoppable advance of 'collectivist' ideologies and governments throughout the world since the end of the First World War. Lippmann himself acknowledged the contributions of two of the academics at the Paris Conference Hayek and von Mises - to the intellectual development of this theme at the beginning of his own book. The first chapter of The Good Society described the contemporary situation in stark terms, describing 'Collectivism' as 'the dominant dogma of the Age': {quote} Throughout the world, in the name of progress, men who call themselves Communists, Socialists, fascists, nationalists, progressives, and even liberals, are unanimous in holding that government with its instruments of coercion must, by commanding the people how they shall live, direct the course of civilization and fix the shape of things to come ... [so] Universal is the dominion of this dogma over the minds of contemporary men that no one is taken seriously as a statesman or a theorist who does not come forward with proposals to magnify the power of public officials and to extend and to multiply their intervention in human affairs. Unless he is authoritarian and collectivist, he is a mossback, a reactionary, at best an amiable eccentric swimming hopelessly against the tide. It is a strong tide. {endquote} In what was then a comparatively novel intellectual formulation, anticipating George Orwell by almost a decade, Lippmann identified the two most powerful ideologies of the age, Fascism and Communism, as being no more than similarly extreme versions of the same collectivist impulse. Furthermore, collectivism could also be seen as an increasingly important ideology in countries which were supposedly opposed to those very extremist collectivisms, such as the United States of America (then in the throes of the collectivist 'New Deal') and Great Britain (where the virtues of Keynesian ideas about governmental intervention in the economy were being proclaimed to an increasingly sympathetic audience). The philosophy of individual

freedom - classical liberalism - was, according to Lippmann, all but dead, and had been supplanted by collectivism. For Lippmann, the 'liberal philosophy' had stagnated during the mid-nineteenth century, when it had become 'frozen in its own errors', a 'great tradition that [had] become softened {p. 11} by easy living ...' Only with the failure of liberalism as a coherent progressive philosophy was it conceivable that men 'should be tempted to regard the primitive tyrannies in Russia, Italy or Germany as the beginnings of a better life for mankind ...' Lippmann, like his fellow participants at the Paris conference, might acknowledge that collectivism was indeed the new intellectual orthodoxy, but to him this was 'little short of a disaster in human affairs'. In his opening remarks to the published proceedings of Le Colloque Walter Lippmann on 26 August 1938 Professor Rougier spoke of the evils of Communism, which after the Stalinist purges of the army and bureaucracy from 1936 to 1938 were especially evident in the West, but also argued that those people who thought there was some 'middle way' betweenthe extreme of Fascist/Communist collectivism and the pure theoretical individualism of classical liberalism were labouring under the most dangerous illusion of all: {quote} Le drame moral de notre epoque, c'est, des lors, I'aveugle- ment des hommes de gauche qui revent d'une democratie politique et d'une planisme economique, sans comprendre que le planisme economique implique l'Etat totalitaire et qui un socialisme liberal est un contradition dans les termes. Le drame moral de notre epoque, c'est l'aveuglement des hommes de droite qui soupirent d'admiration devant les gouvernements totalitaires, tout en revendiquant les avantages d'une economie capitaliste, sans se rendre compte que l'Etat totalitaire devore la fortune privee, met au pas et bureaucratise toutes les formes de l'activite economique d un pays. {endquote} In a long paper on 'The Urgent Necessity of Re-orientation of Social Science' written for the Conference, Ropke and Rustow argued against thinking that there was any easy solution to the manifest economic dislocation and unemployment of the l930s, and that any attempt to solve these problems by 'monetary tricks and public works will only end in disaster, or to be more specific, in the totalitarian state, where all policy of giving coherence to society without giving it inherent and spontaneous stability must inevitably end'. All the participants in the conference agreed that liberalism as a coherent philosophy was at its lowest ebb, discredited and neglected, tarred with the brush of {p. 12} Dickensian, Manchester School laissez-faire, just as they all agreed that the future of liberalism, as Rustow and Ropke understood it 'in the widest sense of antitotalitarianism', depended on people like themselves. They wanted to develop a new, revitalized interpretation of liberalism: 'the combination of a working competition not only with the corresponding legal and institutional framework but also with a re-

integrated Society of freely co-operating and vitally satisfied men is the only alternative to laissez-faire and to totalitarianism which we have to offer'. In his closing address, Rugier outlined various areas where liberalism thus needed to be reexamined, and he proposed to set up the 'Centre International d'Etudes pour la renovation du Liberalisme' for this purpose. The proceedings of the conference were published as 'Le Compte-Rendu des seances du Colloque Walter Lippmann', which Rougier rather grandly called the 'Magna Carta of Liberalism', and the twenty-six academics, intellectuals, journalists and others returned to their own countries at the beginning of September, with Lippmann, Hayek and Ropke charged with founding American, British and Swiss sections of the new organization. However, it was, of course, an inauspicious moment to start founding new international organizations of ambitious intentions, and this was to remain the first and last time that 'Le Colloque Walter Lippmann' ever met, the war intervening only a year later. Rougier had, nonetheless, given an institutional focus to 'La Renovation du Liberalisme', and had started an intellectual movement for the revival of economic liberalism that would come to fruition nearly half a century later. But to understand why economic liberalism had reached such a low ebb by the 1930s, and why these philosophers and economists found the selves gathering in Paris on the eve of war to launch their intellectual counter-revolution against collectivism, it is necessary to examine the decline of liberalism as an ideology and to reflect, in the British case in particular, on the impact made by the thinking of one man - John Maynard Keynes - who had done more than any other single individual to bring Hayek, Rougier, Ropke, Aron, von Mises and the others together in Paris to mourn the end of liberal, even civilized, society as they understood it. The rise of collectivism in Britain has been chronicled by several historians, the first, and perhaps most famous, of them being A. V. Dicey. Indeed, it was Dicey who first identified the nineteenth century {p. 13} as an 'age of individualism', giving way towards the end of the century to an 'age of collectivism'. More recently, and most exhaustively, W. H. Greenleaf has published his two large volumes on The Rise of Collectivism and The Ideological Heritage. As Rougier and Lippmann had in Paris in 1938, Greenleaf identifies the two great currents of the British political tradition as the opposing ideological positions of 'libertarianism' and 'collectivism'. For Greenleaf, this represents the 'basic contrast' in British political thought and practice, between 'on the one hand, the growth of a natural harmony in society achieved without recourse to state intervention [what Hayek called the state of 'spontaneous order'] and, on the other, the idea of an artificial identification of human interests resulting from legislative or other - political regulation'. All the major 'Party' ideologies in Britain - Socialism, Conservatism and Liberalism - have reflected both strands of thought in their separate historical

traditions; libertarianism and collectivism have been the two fixed poles on the compass by which since the early nineteenth century, politicians have, in practice, navigated their way across the legislative map. Economic liberalism, of course, was very much an economic expression of the 'libertarian' tradition, and reached its peak as an ideological and practical economic concept in the 1870s and 1880s, tracing its ideological roots back to Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, which was published a century before, in 1776. Economic liberalism was the governing principle of both the Liberal Party, under Gladstone, and the Conservative Party, particularly under Disraeli, up to 1880. The point has often been made that for all Disraeli's purple prose about Young England and Tory Democracy, as Prime Minister from 1874 to 1880 he was as frugal in his conduct of the country's finances as Gladstone had always been. However, at the same time as the liberal tradition seemed to reach the peak of its influence, 'collectivism' had gradually been making inroads on the liberal state, beginning with such legislation as factory reforms and public health reforms, which, to varying degrees, compelled people to carry out laws laid down by Westminster in the name of what came to be called 'social justice'. The Times was later to name this steady erosion of individual liberty, orchestrated by an ever more intrusive State, the 'Silent Revolution', which meant that even before anybody had formulated a coherent intellectual case for collectivism, Government had started to intervene in such matters as industrial relations and national education - areas where it had previously {p. 14} feared to tread. Greenleaf has written of this general drift towards collectivism - or 'creeping collectivism' as some have called it - a process which was {p. quote} not, at least initially, deliberately induced. Rather it rested for a long time on what Sidney Webb used to call the unconscious permeation of an overtly individualist society by a contrary principle ... He said, the 'advocates of each particular change intend no further alteration, the result is nevertheless an increasing social momentum' in the collectivist direction. The cumulative, incremental effect of these piece-meal reforms was indeed considerable. {endquote} However, if, by the end of the nineteenth century, the increase in State powers was only small, the result of pragmatism rather than ideology, this all changed with the foundation of the Fabian Society in 1884, the creation of Beatrice and Sidney Webb, and George Bernard Shaw. The Fabian Society was the first British organization to formulate and aggressively and successfully promote a coherent intellectual justification for the extension of the power of the State in pursuit of certain specific aims, such as the creation of a 'national minimum' standard of living. In Shaw's phrase, commending the original Fabian programme, the Fabian Society sought to replace the existing 'scramble for private gain' with 'the introduction of design, contrivance, and co-ordination' in the conscious pursuit of 'Collective Welfare'

. The Fabians, through their tactics of 'gradualism' and 'permeation, sought to persuade all political parties of the virtues of their programme, particularly the Liberal Party and, after 1900, the nascent Labour Party. The Fabians were sowing their seeds on extremely fertile ground, for, as the memory of the old century receded, the certainties of the Victorian, liberal free-traders seemed to slip away, too. The old shibboleth of 'free trade' came under vehement attack from the politician Joseph Chamberlain with the Tariff Reform Campaign, which, though it split the Conservative Party in the process, was eventually vindicated by the gradual erection of Tariff Barriers from 19l5 onwards, culminating in the Ottawa agreements of l932. In signing these, Britain, in protectionist mood, finally created the system of'Imperial Preference' that the Tariff Reformers had been pressing for since the first years of the century. Furthermore, the Liberal Party, {p. 15} under the guidance of its economic mentors J. A. Hobson and L. T Hobhouse, adapted the ex-German Chancellor Bismarck's social insurance system (which had created, for instance, the first modern state-financed pension system) and applied it to Britain during Asquith's great Liberal administrations of l908 to 19l5, thus ushering in the age of'New Liberalism'. Asquith's governments embraced the new Fabian model of collectivism, and introduced old-age pensions social insurance, school meals and other 'welfare' measures. For the first time, the State took it upon itself to tax its citizens in order to fulfil a specific collectivist, social aim, that of 'social welfare'. The 'National Efficiency' movement, which embraced politicians of all parties, also supported the Fabian arguments for the increase of State powers, in order to increase 'national' defence against the rising power of Bismarckian-Wilhelmine Germany. All the legislation passed in the fourteen years before the First World War, by politicians of both the Conservative and Liberal Parties - whether in the name of 'Social Welfare, 'National Efficiency' or 'Industrial Rationalization' - represented a distinct and accelerating step towards the Fabian collectivist State, and, as Shaw later put it, 'the Fabian policy was to support and take advantage of every legislative step towards Collectivism no matter what quarter it came from, nor how little its promoters dreamt that they were advocating an instalment of Socialism.' The 'New Liberals' were in the vanguard of this movement, led by Lloyd George, whilst the old Liberals, loyal to the Party's Gladstonian roots of free-trade lassez-fare and minimum governmental intervention, were, like the libertarian political philosopher Herbert Spencer, left to lament the withering of the Victorian liberal ideological tradition. It is ironic that Spencer's greatest exposition of the liberal creed, Man Verss the State, was published in 1884, the same year as the Fabian Society was founded. As early as 1894, a Fabian, William Clarke, could say of old 'classlcal liberals' like Spencer, with only a touch of hyperbole, that

{quote} His political ideas are already as antiquated as Noah's ark. I do not know a single one of the younger men in England who is influenced by them in the slightest degree, though one hears of one occasionally, just as one hears of a freak in a dime museum. {endquote} This steady march of collectivism was, of course, given a tremendous {p. 16} fillip by the First World War, when the demands of war saw the final buckling of the Victorian liberal State, giving way to an unprecedented degree of central control and central economic planning, measures which were, again, supported and carried through by politicians of all parties, barring the initial resenations of the Asquithian Liberals. The coal industry was virtually nationalized in 1917 and the McKenna duties of 1915 saw the first break with the tradition of free-trade, a measure introduced by a Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer. The war witnessed the proliferation of new Whitehall departments, such as the Ministry of Munitions and the Ministry of Foods. Moreover, the very success of Britain's 'collectivist' war effort seemed to many to vindicate the claims of the Fabians that 'collectivism' was not only the route to a more just and equitable society, but that it was also a more efficient way of running a modern economy. It was no coincidence that in 1918 the Fabians persuaded the Labour Party to accept a new, specifically Socialist constitution, with its commitment in Clause IV to the nationalization of what would later be termed the 'commanding heights' of the British economy. It was thus not surprising that collectivist measures did not end with the War; the Consenative-dominated Lloyd George coalition government founded the Ministry of Health and passed the Housing Act of 1919, which for the first time committed the Government to subsidizing local authority housing so that rents could be fixed at below the market price, at a level those needing to be housed could afford. Furtherrnore, the government also intenened in the economy as never before, instituting formal machinery for arbitration in industrial disputes in the form of the Whitely Councils; and in the name of 'rationalization', substantial state assistance was given to certain industries, such as the railway companies, to amalgamate. With the creation of the Central Electricity Board in 1926, the first state industrial monopoly was established and in the early 1930s loans were given to ailing industries such as the ship building industry. When British broadcasting began in 1926, it was created, in unprecedented fashion, as a newly born state monopoly - the British Broadcasting Company. All this entailed a considerable increase in government expenditure; total government expenditure as a percentage of Gross National Product rose from a low of nine per cent in 1870-90, to twenty-six per cent by 1926, and to sixty per cent by 1940. As Greenleaf has pointed out, increasing governmental expenditure was common to all political

{p. 17} parties. In terms of state spending, it became impossible to distinguish between a high-spending and a low-spending party. As Greenleaf concludes, {quote} Taken together, then, these policies of national efficiency, tariff reforrn, and rationalization, as they emerged over the early decades of this century, invited substantial steps towards a collectivist economy. Their introduction was piecemeal but was none the less cumulatively significant. Moreover, they intimated, even if they did not overtly entail, the further notion of the planned economy itself, the idea of government intervention to attempt nothing less than the systematic management of life as a whole. {endquote} Thus, by the time of the economic deluge of the 1930s, which effectively started with the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the ideological course towards collectivism was firmly set, not least by the Liberal Party of Lloyd George which was in the forefront of demanding an ever-increasing extension of governments' power and the spending of governmental money to alleviate Britain's economic problems. The famous Liberal 'Yellow Book' with which the Party launched its 1929 election campaign was but the culmination of decades of 'progressive' thinking, starting with Hobson and Hobhouse, that had produced a more collectivist vision. As early as 1903, Herbert Spencer had already noted how far the Liberal Party had strayed from its original principles: {quote} I do not desire to be classed among those who are in these days called Liberals. In the days when the name came into use, the Liberals were those who aimed to extend the free- dom of the individual versus the power of the State, whereas now (prompted though they are by desire for popular wel- fare), Liberals as a body are continually extending the power of the State and restricting the freedom of the individual. {quote} Spencer's gloomy prognosis for the future of classical liberalism was famously echoed by Hilaire Belloc in his book The Servile State, published in l902. Belloc predicted that 'Collectivism' would not lead to the fulfilment of the Socialists' dream of 'social justice' but to a new condition of slavery, in which the people would be completely subordi{p. 18} nated to the demands of a central state authority. It was a prescient book, and an early rehearsal of the arguments that Hayek would deploy thirty-two years later in The Road to Serfdom. However eloquent Belloc and Spencer might have been in their warnings about the dangers of collectivism for individual liberty, they both, nonetheless, acknowledged that they were fighting against a current that was running strongly against them.

{p. 100} The publication of The Road to Serfdom by Routledge brought Hayek the kind of intellectual celebrity that his rival Laski had been used to for a decade or more. Invitations to lecture before guest audiences, both lay and academic, began to flood in. In April 1945, he embarked on a lecture tour of North America, after publication of The Road to Serfdom by the University of Chicago Press had created the same sort of intellectual ferment in the USA as it had in Britain. The book was actually turned down - on political grounds - by three American publishers, before the Chicago economist Aaron Director secured a contract with his University Press. The book sold out within a day of publication, and the University of Chicago Press had to fight a similar battle with the paper-rationing authorities in the United States as Routledge had done in Britain to satisfy public demand for the book. The connection with the University of Chicago was to be an important one in Hayek's life, as the economics faculty there, under the direction of Frank Knight, was already fertile ground for the Hayekian view. The University sponsored and organized his tour of America in 1945 and created a special chair for him as Professor of Social and Moral Sciences in 1950 when he left the LSE. However, the publicity that his ideas received in printed form courtesy of Routledge and Chicago was dwarfed by the condensed version of The Road to Serfdom published in the Reader's Digest of April I945. Their editions sold in the hundreds of thousands. The publication of a condensed version of the book in the Reader's Digest was arranged by Henry Hazlitt, and gave Hayek an exposure to a far larger audienct than he had expected. Propitiously, it was published on the eve of his American visit, thus altering his schedule considerably. As he later recalled: {quote} While I was on the ship, the Reader's Digest published a condensation and when we docked in New York I was told all our plans were changed; I would be going on a nationwide {p. 101} lecture tour beginning at NY Town Hall ... Imagine my surprise when they drove me there the next day and there were 3,000 people in the hall, plus a few score more in adjoining rooms with loudspeakers. There I was, with this battery of microphones and a veritable sea of expectant faces. {endquote} During the course of his lecture tour, he found that The Road to Serfdom had divided opinion in America much as it had done in Britain, with the Rooseveltian New Dealers attacking it ... With the historian Sir {p. 102} John Clapham in the chair, Hayek proposed the idea of an 'Acton Society', in honour of the British historian whom Hayek revered as the greatest exponent of the

principles of a liberal society. Hayek suggested that such a society could be a forum allowing British, German and other European intellectuals to meet and to publish ... Quite independently, and at the same time, another economist who had been at the 'Colloque Walter Lippmann' was also suggesting a revival of Rougier's original idea of an international liberal forum. ... Wilhem Ropke, the German economist, suggested that such a forum was urgently needed to challenge the reigning intellectual fallacies of Western Europe. Ropke suggested that an international meeting of liberal scholars should be convened at regular intervals; it should publish an international periodical, appealing to the 'upper intellectual classes'. Ropke circulated his paper amongst his colleagues and to members of the 'Colloque Walter Lippmann', and raised a small amount of money for the projected periodical. It was a Swiss businessman, involved in the work of the Institut d'Etudes Internationales at Geneva, Dr Hunold, who brought the ideas of Ropke and Hayek together. Hunold invited Hayek to address the students of the University of Zurich in November 1945 and afterwards Hunold dined with Hayek and a group of Swiss industrialists and bankers, at which point Hayek told them of his own plans for a gather{p. 103} ing of those intellectuals who shared his views to discuss and redefine liberalism. Hayek proposed that it would be 'an enormous help' if these people 'could come together and meet for about a week somewhere in a Swiss Hotel in order to discuss basic ideas'. {p. 108} So, it was Hayek's international liberal society which now became the focal point of international efforts, and the delegates invited by Hayek to his inaugural Conference assembled at the Hotel du Parc on the slopes of Mont Pelerin overlooking Lac Leman on 1 April 1947. The Conference lasted until 10 April. As well as the funding secured for the Conference by Dr Hunold's Swiss backers, the participation of a large American contingent was ensured by the financial contribution of the William Volker Charities Trust. Apart from the British academics such as G. M. Young and E. L. Woodward who could not attend the meeting other prominent absentees included Walter Lippmann and Jacques Rueff. The former never became involved with what became known as the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS), whilst the latter became a regular attendee from the second meeting onwards. These absentees, added to {p. 109} the fact that Hayek's natural contacts lay within the field of academic economics, ensured that from the start the membership of the Mont Pelerin Society was composed largely of economists. Hayek himself regretted that he could not have included more historians and political philosophers at the inaugural meeting.

This first meeting of the MPS was attended by thirty-eight people, and amongst their number were almost all those academics and intellectuals who were to be most important in the revival of economic liberalism in the post-war era. As has already been mentioned, Hayek himself identified three main intellectual centres of the revival of contemporary liberal thought, and the composition of the MPS reflected the intellectual influences of those three centres - London (the LSE), Chicago and Vienna. ... The American contingent from Chicago included the doyen of American economists, Frank Knight, Aaron Director, George Stigler and the young Professor Milton Friedman. There were also three economists from the Foundation of Economic Education in New York, F. A. Harper (Professor of Economics at Cornell University, 1928-46), Leonard Read and V. O. Watts. Another important American was Henry Hazlitt, the financial journalist, who had spent most of his life on the New York Timesbefore switching to Newsweek in 1946, for which he wrote an influential business column. He was a prolific and fluent author and an unforgiving and relentless critic of Keynes. He was a very important publicist for economic liberalism and, for instance, had much to do with putting the Institute of Economic Affairs on the map by referring to their first publication in his Newsweek Column. The most prominent Austrians were, naturally, Hayek, von Mises and Popper, but they were also joined by Fritz Machlup, then a Professor at the State University of New York at Buffalo and later atJohns Hopkins, Dr Karl Brandt, then a Professor at the Food Research Institute at Stanford University, and at subsequent meetings their numbers were swelled by the presence of Gottfried Haberler, also based in America. One of the main aims for Hayek at this conference was to reintegrate the German liberal tradition into the mainstream of European thought, and so he was careful to complement the Austrian contingent with several members of what was later to be called the {p. 110} 'Freiburg' School of Economics, the pioneers of the 'Soziale Marktwirt slaft', the 'Social Market economy'. Present at the first meeting of the MPS was Walter Eucken, the leader of the 'Freiburg School', who died in 1950 in the middle of five lectures in London on the subject of the bitter lessons which Europe still had to learn from the collectivist economic policies of the Nazis. Wilhem Ropke was also a founder-member; born in 1899, he had taught in both Germany and Austria before the Nazis had come to power, and from 1948 onwards he was an economic adviser to the Adenauer administration in Bonn The man most closely identified with this school, Ludwig Erhard, joined the MPS at the second meeting; which meant that the most constructive and celebrated school of post-war economic thought was well represented at the MPS. {p. 118} Amongst British politicians who attended MPS meetings in the 1960s and 1970s were Geoffrey Howe, Enoch Powell, John Biffen, Keith Joseph and Rhodes

Boyson as well as a clutch of journalists (such as William Rees-Mogg of The Times) and members of free-market 'think-tanks' in Britain. With the international revival of economic liberalism in the period 1960 to 1980 the membership of the MPS ballooned, so that by 1980 six hundred members and guests attended a Conference at the Hoover Institute, Stanford University. Indeed, so popular had it become by that time that in his capacity as President of the MPS in 1972, Milton Friedman argued that the Society should end because its original function, as a mutual support organization for like-minded people in an intellectually hostile world, had long since been fulfilled. However, Friedman was thwarted and the MPS survives to this day. {end} (5) Marxist Anti-Communism Arthur Koestler against the USSR: koestler.html. In Australia, the CIA is said to have funded the anti-Communist Quadrant Magazine, edited by Robert Manne. But since the fall of the Soviet Union, Manne, writing in The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald, has consistently taken a "New Left" line ... promoting open-border migration, and that part of the aboriginal movement which blames "White Australia" for its plight (contrary to aboriginal leader Noel Pearson, who blames "progressive" policies on alcohol, drugs etc. for destroying aboriginal family life). Many of those named in Who Paid the Piper? are Jewish intellectuals of the type of Lippmann and Manne, Left-wing but anti-Stalinist - "Marxist anti-Communist" - as Richard Kostelanetz put it: kostel.html. Might one extend Saunders' argument, and say that the CIA funded the Trotskyist Left against the Stalinist Left? Even Orwell was a Trotskyist: burnham.html (this item, by James Burnham, deals with the appeal of Communism and National Socialism in the 1930s. Burnham, a Trotskyist, became an opponent of both). More exactly, since some Trotskyists (mainly Spartacist) wanted to preserve the USSR, does Saunders' argument lead to the hypothesis that the CIA funded that part of the Trotskyist Left which wanted to bring down the USSR? These same Trotskyists were promoting Free Trade and opposing national sovereignty: xTrots.html. (6) Trotskyism to Anachronism: The Neoconservative Revolution

by John B. Judis, Foreign affairs, Volume 74 No. 4, July/August 1995. {This is a review of The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994, by John Ehrman, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995} {p. 123} For 14 years, from the 1973 Jackson-Vanik amendment until the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a group of intellectuals known as neoconservatives shaped, and sometimes dominated, American foreign policy. They wrote for Commentary, The Wall Street Journal, and later The National Interest. They acted through organizations like the Committee on the Present Danger and the Committee for the Free World. ... {p. 125} The other important influence on neo-conservatives was the legacy of Trotksyism - a point that other historians and journalists have made about neoconservatism but that eludes Ehrman.Many of the founders of neoconservatism, including The Public Interest founder Irving Kristol and coeditor Nathan Glazer, Sidney Hook, and Albert Wohlstetter, were either members of or close to the Trotskyist left in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Younger neoconservatives, including Penn Kemble, Joshua Muravchik, and Carl Gershman, came through the Socialist Party at a time when former Trotskyist Max Schachtman was still a commanding figure. What both the older and younger neoconservatives absorbed from their socialist past was an idealistic concept of internationalism. Trotskyists believed that Stalin, in trying to build socialism in one country rather than through world revolution, had created a degenerate workers' state instead of a genuine dictatorship of the proletariat. In the framework of international communism, the Trotskyists were rabid internationalists rather than realists and nationalists. In 1939, as a result of the Nazi-Soviet pact, the Trotskyist movement split, with one faction under James Burnham and Max Schachtman declaring itself opposed equally to German Nazism and Soviet communism. Under the influence of an Italian Trotskyist, Bruno Rizzi, Burnham and Schachtman envisaged the Nazi and Soviet bureaucrats and American managers as a new class {burnham.html}. While Burnham broke with the left and became an editor at National Review, Schachtman remained. The neoconservatives who went through the Trotskyist and socialist {p. 126} movements came to see foreign policy as a crusade, the goal of which was first global socialism, then social democracy, and finally democratic capitalism. They never saw foreign policy in terms of national interest or balance of power. Neoconservatism was a kind of inverted Trotskyism, which sought to "export democracy," in Muravchik's words, in the same way that Trotsky

originally envisaged exporting socialism. It saw its adversaries on the left as members or representatives of a public sector-based new class. The neoconservatives also got their conception of intellectual and political work from their socialist past. They did not draw the kind of rigid distinction between theory and pratice that many academics and politicians do. Instead they saw theory as a form of political combat and politics as an endeavour that should be informed by theory. They saw themselves as a cadre in a cause rather than as strictly independent intellectuals. and they were willing to use theory as a partisan weapon. ... In 1973 Jackson and the neo-conservatives who worked with him, including Wohlstetter protege Richard {p. 127} Perle, began a campaign to link trade concessions to the Soviet Union to explicit Soviet concessions on Jewish emigration. ... They rejected Kissinger's realism ... Jackson and the neo-conservatives insisted on passing Jackson-Vanik. The Soviets then baulked at complying with its terms, and detente, from that moment, was dead. ... They laid the basis for the massive and at least partly unnecessary American arms buildup, which may have accelerated the decline of the Soviet Union but also contributed to the decline of the American economy - leading, among other things, to the crippling deficits of the 1980s. ... {end of quotes} (7) Max Shpak on The Fraud of Neoconservative "Anti-Communism" Shpak points out that many Trotskyists are today known as "neo-Conservatives". They are "Conservative" because they opposed the Soviet Union, but still Marxist. [Original Dissent] The Fraud of Neoconservative "Anti-Communism" by Max Shpak May 15, 2002 http://www.originaldissent.com/shpak051502.html

{start} Neoconservatives and their apologists would have the public believe that the neocons were former Leftists who saw the light and came to reject liberal or Marxist ideology as a matter of conviction and principle. Regrettably, this official line has come to be conventional wisdom, no doubt reflecting neocon efforts to hide the fact that their transformation was neither sincerely motivated nor sincerely enacted. To understand the real agenda that drove and continues to drive much of neoconservatism, one needs to look back to the origins of the movement and the cultural backgrounds of those who lead it. It is a well-established fact that many of the early luminaries of neoconservatism (most famously Irving Kristol in the 1940's, a more recent famous example being David Horowitz) came from Marxist backgrounds, and that neoconservatism (like Marxism itself) began and continues to be a largely a phenomenon of Jewish intellectualism. In the early part of the 20th century, Marxism attracted a disproportionate pool of Jewish recruits for a number of obvious reasons. There are a number of complex psychological and social reasons for the attraction, all of which largely stem from the fact that Marxist internationalism is an ideology which by its very nature finds disciples among a rootless, anti-religious urban intelligentsia. More important for the purposes of this analysis, however, are the practical reasons for Jewish sympathy with Bolshevism. European and American Jews alike carried deep-seated hatreds for the traditional regimes and religions of the European continent, particularly Czarist Russia and various Eastern European nations due to (real and imagined) "persecution" and "pogroms" that occurred there. Thus, when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Czar, destroyed the hated Orthodox Church, rendered powerless the landed religious peasantry, and replaced traditional Russian authority with a largely Jewish Commissariate, world Jewry (including alleged "capitalists" like the Schiffs and Rothschilds) embraced the Revolution and Marxist ideology alike. With Russia becoming an effective Jewish colony where "anti-Semitism" was an offense punishable by death and the native gentile culture was effectively stamped out (thanks to a leadership consisting mainly of Jews such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Severdlov, held together under the stewardship of the obsequious philosemite Lenin), Jews throughout the world put their hopes in the possibility ofsimilar revolutions elsewhere. Indeed, their comrades in arms were hard at work affecting similar changes in Hungary (Kuhn), Austria (Adler) and Germany (Eisner). The rise of Fascist and Nazi movements only served to further polarize Jewish support in favor of international communism. This near unanimity would change as a result of two developments: a shift in the character of Soviet Communism on the one hand and the foundation of the State

of Israel on the other. Stalin's purges of many of his former Bolshevik colleagues (including Trotsky, who was assassinated while in exile), his 1939 pact with Hitler, and rumors of Stalin's own anti-Jewish prejudices gave many would-be supporters pause. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, it became clear the Russian masses would not fight for the sake of Bolshevism, an ideology that brought them so much misery, but rather forthe sake of Russian blood and soil. From then on, the Soviet leadership had to court the very Russian nationalist elements that the early Bolsheviks had worked so hard to stamp out. This lead to an increasing tolerance towards the Russian Orthodox Church and a decreased Jewish presence in the Soviet politburo and KGB. Thus, the USSR was "betraying" the very elements that made it attractive to the Jewish establishment to begin with. Perhaps even more significant a factor in the origins of neoconservatism was the emergence of an independent Israeli state. While many Jewish Marxists eagerly supported the Zionist state, the more intellectually consistent Left opposed Zionism on the grounds that all nationalisms, including Jewish ones, are enemies of global proletarian revolution. Thus, Jewish leftists who once advocated internationalism for gentile nations were forced to come to terms with the implications of this ideology for their own nationalist sentiments. Thus, they needed an ideology which would let them have their cake (opposing gentile nationalism) and eat it too (by supporting Israel), and they found just such a worldview with neoconservatism. At the same time, although the Soviet Union initially courted Israel during the 1948 wars of independence, it became clear to the Israeli government that in world polarized between the United States and the Soviet Union the former would be wealthier and more pliant cash cow to milk. By the 1950's and the coming of the Suez Wars, regardless of residual Jewish loyalties to Communism, the battle lines were already drawn, with Israel in the US/Western camp and the Arab nations forced to make alliances of convenience with the Soviet Union. It is hardly a coincidence that the changing character of Soviet Communism and the status of Israel as a US ally came at the same time that neoconservatism was becoming an influential political movement. For all of their talk about "capitalism," "democracy," "freedom," and "free markets," the fact that so many Jewish leftists turned on a dime to back the US in the Cold War because America could serve as a life support system for Israel and a bulwark against resurgent Russian "antiSemitism" makes their real agenda entirely transparent. One can witness an identical phenomenon taking place today, as many Jewish liberal Democrats switch party ranks and join the GOP because of the latter's stronger support for Israel and harder line with the Arab nations. All of the window dressing about their newfound "patriotism"

and "Americanism" is a sham designed to mask the fact that the question for the neocons has always been and will always be "is it good for the Jews?" The different agendas driving neocon Cold Warriors as opposed to their erstwhile Old Right allies could be seen on any number of fronts. The most obvious one has been the different reactions in the two camps to Russia after the end of the Cold War. While paleoconservative leaning Cold Warriors such as Pat Buchanan have pushed for normalized relations with Russia, the neocons continue to fight on the Cold War, enthusiastically supporting Chechen separatists as "freedom fighters" and advocating NATO expansion. The reasons for this difference are entirely obvious: the Old Right's enemy was Communist ideology, while neoconservative Jews nurtured a hatred for Russian nationalism. Thus post-Communist Russia is still very much a threat to the latter, particularly with resurgent Russian "ultranationalism" and "anti-Semitism," while in the absence of Communist rule the above are of little concern to the Old Right. For all their talk about "anti-Communism," the real engine driving neocon Cold Warrior instincts was punishing the hated Russian goyim for the sin of "antiSemitism," not any opposition to residual or latent Marxism. As further evidence that this is the case, one need only consider the fact that while the Old Right championed Christian dissidents such as Solzhenitsyn, to the neocons the only legimate"dissidents" were Zionists like Natan Sharansky, just as the only "refugees" championed by the neos were invariably Jewish (including today's shady Odessa Mafiosi). Solzhenitsyn represented the Russian nationalism and Orthodox Church that made so many of the neocons' predecessors embrace Bolshevism, thus Solzhenitsyn and the plight of Christian dissidents were relegated to obscurityin neocon publications, while Zionist noise-makers in the USSR were given a hero's welcome. In this regard, the neocons are the true heirs to Leon Trotsky, who condemned Stalin and his followers not so much for their brutality (as commander of the Red Army and overseer of Lenin's terrorist CHEKA, Trotsky was no stranger to brutality and sadism) but for their "anti-Semitism" and "betrayal of the Revolution." Trotsky's main critique of Stalinism seemed to be that Stalin was moving Russia in a nationalist direction rather than working towards the establishment of an international "proletarian" vanguard. The fact that the intellectual ancestors of neoconservatism had not an unkind word to say about Bolshevism while Leninist-Trotskyite goals were being fulfilled suggests that it was not so much ideological reconsideration as tribal self-interest that drove these most unlikely conversos.

Because their move from the Left to a pseudo-right was insincere, one would expect to find a whole range of issues where the neocons retain leftist instincts and remain true to their Trotskyite heritage. Indeed this is the case. In their portrayal of the Cold War as a struggle between "capitalism" on the one hand and "socialism" on the other, the neocons try to minimize the fact that in many ways the conflict between the Bolsheviks and the West was over much more than economic systems. To most on the Old Right, the economic issues were at best peripheral: Marxism was opposed because it wasmaterialistic, atheistic, and because it rejected nationalism and patriotism in the name of global revolution. Most neocons came from a culture that was every bit as materialistic and cosmopolitan as the early Bolshevik leaders, so it is rather unlikely that they would have any quarrel with these aspects of Communist doctrine. The fact that neoconservatism is an ideology which is materialistic in nature and internationalist in focus (with its talk of "global democracy" and "global markets") makes it obvious that the fundamental underpinnings of the Marxist Left are alive and well among the scribblers of Commentary and The Weekly Standard. Their "conservative" pretenses seem limited to the fact that they oppose "socialism" (of the nationalist variety) in the name of "capitalism" (of the internationalist variety), and for all too many naïve people that seems to be sufficient and believable. Understanding the true nature of the neoconservatives illuminates the essence of the struggle between the Right and the Left. It was never a struggle between "capitalism" and "socialism" as neoconservative or Communist progaganda would have one believe. Rather, it was always a conflict between spiritualism and materialism, between nationalism and globalism, between tradition and subversion, between the defenders of Western Civilization and its enemies. With the battle lines drawn as such, it is abundantly clear where the neocons stand. Many "capitalists" understood that economic means are not significant, only the desired end. Jacob Schiff understood it when he financed the Bolsheviks, just as Rupert Murdoch, Ted Turner, Marc Rich, Boris Berezovsky, and George Soros understand that their form of "capitalism" is fully compatible with the essence of the Left, and that they can find friends and allies among the ostensibly conservative neocons. Unfortunately, many Rightists are not nearly as perceptive in their choice of allies. May 15, 2002 {end} (8) Mick Hume unmasked as a Neo-Con

Living Marxism (LM Magazine), was a "Marxist" magazine which opposed political correctness - ostensibly, anyway. It was edited by Mick Hume. LM said that the Green movement originated in Nazi Germany. A 2-part TV series was broadcast in Britain and Australia on this theme, put together by LM. So LM were anti-Nazi, but anti-Green. They opposed the put-down of men that has occurred under Feminism. Yet they spoke up in favour of refugees (asylum-seekers) being able to enter Britain fairly freely. They opposed censorship, even of pornography, and they supported teenage sex. 8.1 Mick Hume supported fox hunting. The following item shows that, after LM folded, he became a columnist for The Times (hardly a sign of being an "outsider"): The Real Rural Agenda by Mick Hume The Times columnist Mick Hume today writes a thought-provoking and hard-hitting piece ridiculing New Labour's handling of the hunting issue and defending the civil liberties of those who wish to hunt.. ... http://www.countryside-alliance.org/newsextra/001218mick.htm 8.2 Not only did the Trotskyist site http://www.wsws.org support LM; Emperors' Clothes also ran Mick Hume's articles. A common feature of all 3 is that they deny a specifically "Jewish" role in Communism, and repudiate the suggestion of Mossad involvement in 9-11. Mike Ruppert likewise. They want us to blame the Empire; but they divert attention from the Jewish dominance of that Empire. The Zionists' trick has been to "converge" their plans with the Empire's, so that Imperial leaders can't tell the difference. Another Voice, by Mick Hume (on Emperor's Clothes): http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/hume/VOICE.html 8.3 Mick Hume now runs http://www.spiked-online.com and http://www.spikedonline.co.uk (caution: these sites make my computer hang). http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,41406,00.html

by Aparna Kumar ... Among the British intelligentsia and media establishment, Hume has a hard-won reputation as a crusader for free speech at any cost, especially that which offends. In fact, "muckraker" is a badge he wears with pride. "(Spiked) is trying to set a new agenda. It stands for the Right to be Offensive," he wrote in an e-mail. Over the years, Hume's politics have vacillated between the poles of communism and libertarianism, although his critics hail mostly from the left. His notoriety peaked when LM (formerly Living Marxism) -- a small-circulation culture and current affairs magazine where he was a founding editor -- was ordered to pay 375,000 pounds in damages to the British news network ITN in a controversial libel case last year. But for a man who went from Marxist-magazine founder to columnist for the conservative Times (of London), the leap to online publishing threatens to be his biggest splash yet. ... 8.4 Melanie Phillips, another LM contributor, has since come out as a Zionist: The new anti-Semitism The Spectator, 22 March 2003 Melanie Philips http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/870739/posts 8.5 Now Mick Hume has also come out as a Zionist. He says the West is turning against Israel because it is losing confidence in itself: His article at the Times was reproduced on several sites in Israel e.g. the Weizmann site: Mick Hume in The Times. Excerpted from The Times, April 22, 2002 The West is turning on Israel today because it is losing confidence in itself. by Mick Hume ... http://www.weizmann.ac.il/~comartin/israel/hume.html and the Likud site: The West is turning on Israel today because it is losing ... The West is turning on Israel today because it is losing confidence in itself.

By Mick Hume, London Times, April 22, 2002. A few months ... http://www.likud.nl/press189.html Here's Hume's article, reproduced on the Likud site: The West is turning on Israel today because it is losing confidence in itself By Mick Hume, London Times, April 22, 2002 ... As one who has long sympathised with the Palestinian cause, I feel increasingly suspicious of what is behind the anti-Israeli turn in Western opinion. The newfound discomfort with Israeli aggression looks less like a response to events in the Middle East than a symptom of the West's loss of conviction in itself. It is becoming clear that, while the Israelis stand accused of a brutal crackdown in the Palestinian refugee camp at Jenin, there was no massacre of civilians. Yet last week leading institutions and commentators were quick to give credence to the wilder claims of war crimes and secret mass graves. Those who suggest that the horrors of Jenin are unique in the annals of the Arab-Israeli conflict have short memories. Instead, Israel is now being widely condemned for the sort of 'anti-terrorist' action that might have been tacitly condoned in the past. The new mood is strongest in Europe. Yet even in America the Israeli lobby is on the defensive, its columnists and Congressmen making shrill demands for support that would once have been unnecessary. Jewish groups boycotted the LA Times last week after an article compared Ariel Sharon to Slobodan Milosevic. The reaction against Israel is not old-fashioned anti-Semitism, Even prominent Jews are coming out as anti-Israeli. The leading Labour MP Gerald Kaufman - a veteran Zionist - has branded Israel a pariah state and suggested that Sharon might be a war criminal. "Every Jew needs to sob their heart out," says a spokeswoman for one Washington peace group: "We need to build healing mechanisms." In the eyes of many today, Israel's crime is to be the most forceful expression of Western values. The Israeli state is seen as a beachhead of Western civilisation in a hostile world. That used to be its greatest asset. Today, however, Western civilisation has fallen into disrepute even within its own heartlands, and Israel's image has suffered accordingly.

Israel has never been able to accept completely such trends as political correctness, relativism and self-doubt. If it did so, the Israeli state would be finished. Today, however, Israel's unambiguous attitude of 'we're right and you're wrong', and defence of national sovereignty against the intrusions of international bodies, are embarrassing reminders of the kind of conviction that Western elites no longer feel able to express. The Israeli defence of its actions in Jenin: "at least we sent our men in to fight, instead of flattening everything from 50,000ft", is likely to have touched a raw nerve in Washington and Whitehall. ... While Western leaders turn their backs on their old ally, their enemies turn on Israel as a scapegoat for the world's ills. Israel and the Jews have become the targets of a sort of ersatz anti-imperialism. A global consensus against Israel has taken shape among all those who hate the values of Western society, an unholy alliance of Islamic fundamentalists with fashionable anti-capitalists. The 50 Western demonstrators who turned up at Yassir Arafat's besieged Ramallah compound bizarrely included Jose Bove, the French farmer famous for smashing up a McDonald's. ... Sympathy with the terrible plight of Jenin is no reason to endorse the anti-imperialism of idiots. Populist anti-Israeli rhetoric is cheap, but offers no solutions to the longsuffering peoples of the Middle East. And climbing on the backs of the victims to strike moralistic postures is just, as the diplomatic French might say, merde. {end} another Jewish site: EUROPE: HOME OF ANTI-SEMITISM ... a Mick Hume column in the UK Times. The guy is historically a Palestinian sympathizer, but he writes about this phenomenon of piling on Israel - and blames it ... http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/folder/apr_22_europe_hone_of_antisemitism.gu est.html 8.6 Another item by Hume in the same vein: The anti-imperialism of fools By Mick Hume New Statesman (British leftist magazine) Monday 17th June 2002

http://virus.lucifer.com/virus/2499.html Western leftists find themselves in strange company when it comes to the Middle East. Are they really happy to line up with neo-Nazis and Islamic fundamentalists? ... {end} 8.7 Neocons are former leftists - often Trotskyist - who support Zionism, and oppose the Left because it sides with the Palestinians and Arabs in the face of Israeli expansionism. The Neocons therefore joined the "Right-wing" political parties, but retain many "Far Left" social policies, such as favouring pornography, gay rights etc. Neocons support Globalization (Free Trade, i.e. Capitalism), yet endorse most (but not all) of the New Left's cultural policies. The Ayn Rand Institute typifies the Neocon policy mix: (a) "libertarianism" Mar. 19, 2003 Thought Control Government should not have the power to legislate morality. By Onkar Ghate http://www.aynrand.org/medialink/thoughtcontrol.shtml {quote} You are jolted awake at 1:00 a.m. by loud knocking on the door. Alarmed, you and your girlfriend rise to answer. The police barge in and arrest you both on suspicion of having had premarital sex. Sound like something that would happen only in a dictatorship like Iraq's or China's? Next week the U.S. Supreme Court will hear a case that if not overturned will grant legitimacy to such governmental power. ... At issue is not whether a particular sexual practice among consenting adults is in fact moral or immoral. At issue is something much broader: whether the government should have the power to enter your home and arrest you for having sex because it regards your sexual desires as "base," ... At issue is whether the government should have the power to legislate morality. If you want to live in a free society, the answer is: No. ... {endquote} (b) Zionism In Moral Defense of Israel

A Supplemental Issue of Impact, Newsletter of the Ayn Rand Institute, September 2002 http://www.aynrand.org/site/DocServer/israel_sept_2002.pdf?docID=164 We hold that the state of Israel has a moral right to exist and to defend itself against attack - and that the United States should unequivocally support Israel. On televi-sion, on radio, in newspapers, on college campuses - throughout our culture, the Ayn Rand Institute (ARI) has been de-fending the use of retaliatory force against terrorists. This ad hoc publication out-lines our position and illustrates the im-pact of our intellectual activism. We stand for individual rights and freedom. In the name of justice, of defending the good, we support Israel. In a region dominated by despotism and totalitarian dictatorships, Israel alone up-holds rights. Defending Israel - our only true ally in the Mideast - is in America's own self-interest. No Moral Equality Between Israel and Its Enemies Israel and those who attack it are not moral equals. Israel is a free, Westernized country, which recognizes the individual rights of its citizens (such as their right to prop-erty and freedom of speech). It uses military force only in self-defense, in order to protect itself. Those attacking Israel, by contrast, are terrorist organizations, theocracies, dictatorships and would-be dictators. They do not recognize the individual rights of their own subjects, much less those of the citizens of Israel. They initiate force indiscriminately in order to retain and expand their power. In contrast to the state of Israel, such organizations and regimes have no moral right to exist. Israel Attacked for Its Virtues Fundamentally, Israel is the target of these organizations and regimes precisely be- cause of its virtues: it is an oasis of freedom and prosperity in a desert of tyranny and stagnation. If Israel is destroyed, the enemies of freedom attacking it will be able to turn their full attention to the United States. The United States must not let this happen. Israel's War Is America's War In America's war against terrorism, it is imperative that America distinguish friend from foe, good from evil, the opponents of terrorism from the perpetrators. In the name of justice and self-preservation, therefore, America should uncompromisingly encour-age and support Israel in the common fight against the enemies of freedom. ... {end} (9) Robert Manne unmasked as a Neocon

Robert Manne is a regular commentator in the Sydney Morning Herald and the Melbourne Age. The Age published the following article by Manne, for the 50th anniversay of Stalin's death. Manne, professor of politics at La Trobe University, has for years given the impression of being anti-communist. This was the tenor of his book Shadows of 1917; during the Cold War he was co-editor ofQuadrant Magazine, funded in part by the CIA. He had advised the Labor Party to ditch Feminism, but in recent years his articles on ethnic issues have taken a "Far Left" flavour: he takes a "progressive" stance on Aboriginal issues, and open borders (asylum seekers should be able to just turn up, without having to apply to come here). On the Aboriginal issue, he opposes Noel Pearson, the Aboriginal leader who says that "progressive" forces are destroying Aboriginal culture (http://www.abc.net.au/austory/transcripts/s723570.htm; for Manne's opposition see http://old.smh.com.au/news/0111/26/opinion/opinion1.html). Manne is Jewish; Australian Jewish News did a feature on him, in the issue of Friday, February 23, 2003: True to the Inner Manne {quote} POLITICAL historian Robert Manne remembers his bar mitzvah fondly and the years he taught in religion school at Temple Beth Israel, Melbourne. In his office at La Trobe University, where he has been awarded a personal chair, Professor Manne, 55, who has been an associate professor in politics at the university for some years and is now La Trobe's professor of politics, is discussing what makes him Jewish. Yet beyond the gate of teenage memories, the standard interviewer's questions about his involvement with the community do not attract the usual answers that refer to shuls, clubs and associations. Although he has close Jewish friends, he is not communally active. But tap into his sense of values and you find a distinctly Jewish perspective. A sense of a shared heritage of rootlessness, displacement and subsequent passion for social justice have been constants in his life, as has a sense of moderation and reason. ...

With his Cold War-era distaste for communist regimes in Europe and Asia losing much of its relevance after the early 1990s, Manne became caught up in a domestic sea change. ... "And in part, my interest in certain issues has been enlivened since the end of the Cold War, particularly my attitudes to reconciliation and the Aboriginal question, which I spend a lot of time thinking about, and my attitude to Australian multiculturalism, which I was sceptical about until I became convinced it was an important move. Those things have made me appear to be moving to the left." ... In his regular opinion pieces for the Age and Sydney Morning Herald, he has sounded warnings about xenophobia, racism in Australia and the popular backlash against ideas that began in the 1970s the realisation that Australia is answerable to its indigenous population, that it is a multicultural society and that it has a place in the broader Asian region. ... His mother fled Germany and his father fled Austria on the eve of World War II, and later met and married in Australia. Untold numbers of family members perished in the Holocaust. "It's easier for Jewish people to imagine severe forms of powerlessness because of Jewish history, particularly the 20th century. In my own case, it's my family's history and their sense of powerlessness and injustice." When Manne sees asylum-seekers, he sees his own parents running for their lives to a land of opportunity. ... {end of feature on Manne} Not only does Manne's article in The Age (below) fail to mention his Jewish identity; the words "Jew" and "Jewish" do not appear in connection with communism, in the article at all, except as Stalin's paranoia over the Jewish Antifascist Committee and Doctors' Plot. In the following article one notes that, although Manne castigates Stalin, he makes no criticisms of Trotsky. No mention that he wrote a book justifying the Red Terror (worst.html). Nor does he mention that the Bolshevik regime had been created by Jews (lenintrotsky.html); that Stalin turned the tables on them (kaganovich.html).

There's no mention of the plan for a Jewish Crimea, put by the the Jewish Antifascist Committee, which alarmed Stalin (sudoplat.html). No mention of the 1946 Baruch Plan for World Government, crafted by David Lilienthal and Bernard Baruch - both Jews - and put to Stalin by the United States (baruch-plan.html). No mention that Stalin was murdered, shortly after the Doctors Plot issue arose (death-of-stalin.html). One might ask, "Is this the best that Jewish intellect can offer?" But fortunately, Benjamin Ginsberg, also a Jew, and Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University, puts the record straight on the Jewish role in Bolshevism: ginsberg.html. Setting the standard for Manne, one might say. But if Manne is a Neocon - a Trotskyist who switched sides when the Jewish Bolsheviks lost control in the USSR, but retains many Trotskyist ideas - then his seemingly contradictory positions make sense. Manne opposes the war in Iraq, but diverts attention from the Jewish cabal behind it (on this topic see http://www.dailystar.com.lb/05_04_03/art22.asp, http://www.sacbee.com/24hour/special_reports/iraq/bee/story/6408561p7360864c.html, http://www.middleeast.org/launch/redirect.cgi?a=&num=248,http://w ww.nytimes.com/2003/03/26/nyregion/26PROF.html, http://www.israelnationalnews. com/article.php3?id=2125). Man of steel, heart of stone Robert Manne The Age, Melbourne Date: March 5 2003 http://www.theage.com.au/text/articles/2003/03/04/1046540186583.htm He was nothing more than a tyrant, nothing less than evil. Robert Manne examines the legacy of Joseph Stalin, who died 50 years ago today. In November 1940, during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact, Soviet foreign minister Molotov visited Berlin. "I know that history will remember Stalin," Hitler told him, "but it will also remember me."

Hitler was right. Both he and Stalin were destined to be remembered as the 20th century's two most consequential political figures and the two most terrible tyrants known to history. Stalin died 50 years ago today. He was born, as Iosif Dzugashvili, of poorest Georgian peasant stock. The family was not close. Stalin's father was a cobbler, a wife beater and a drunk. From the time he left the Orthodox seminary to join the Bolshevik party in 1904 to the year of her death in 1937, Stalin met his mother on no more than four occasions. With the partial exception of his first wife, who died in 1907, Stalin appears to have experienced throughout his life no attachment to any human being. The Bolshevik party was the most extreme tendency of Russian Marxism. Before the abdication of the tsar in February 1917, Stalin worked as a professional revolutionary, and he was arrested and exiled several times. By the time he was voted onto the Bolshevik Central Committee in 1912, he had become the party's expert on the problem of the empire's non-Russian minority nationalities. While Stalin's personal role in the almost bloodless seizure of power in Russia in October 1917 was considerably less glorious than he would later pretend, he did play a significant part in the military victory over the White Armies in the unbelievably savage civil war of 1918-20. Yet, at that stage, even his more brilliant comrades continued to look down on him as a nonentity, as the "grey blur", or as Leon Trotsky put it, the "outstanding mediocrity". Stalin never forgot a slight. For their condescension, Stalin's comrades would later pay a high price. Lenin suffered a series of strokes between November 1922 and his death in January 1924. During these months his misgivings about Stalin grew, because of his brutal administrative style, and the unheard of insolence he displayed towards Krupskaya, Lenin's wife. In his final political will, Lenin suggested removing Stalin from the general secretaryship. Because they feared Trotsky and not Stalin, and because Lenin had been less than complimentary about all of them, Stalin's colleagues helped to suppress Lenin's will. During the 1920s, the members of the post-Lenin Politburo became absorbed in a fierce and complex political struggle. The stakes were high - not merely the Lenin succession but the very future of the revolution, which all accepted was the most important historical event in the movement towards ending class oppression and emancipating humankind.

In the first phase of the struggle Trotsky was isolated and defeated by all his colleagues. In the second phase the "Right-Centre", led by Bukharin and Stalin, routed the Zinoviev-Kamenev "Left". In the third phase, Stalin detached himself from, and politically destroyed, the Bukharin "Right". Why did Stalin triumph? In part, he triumphed because his opponents took each other far more seriously than they did Stalin, until it was too late; in part because Stalin had an unparalleled capacity to separate questions of power from questions of ideology; in part because, as general secretary, Stalin possessed vast resources of political patronage, which he dispensed with great skill; and in part, it must be said, because in his cunning and unscrupulousness, and also in the sensitivity of his antennae to the mood of the Bolshevik rank and file, Stalin proved to be far superior politically to his more theoretically gifted colleagues. By the late 1920s Stalin's victory over his rivals was complete. Stalin now lurched violently to the policies of the ultra-Left. In the space of a few months in 1929-30, in conditions of indescribable chaos, the Stalin leadership used an iron broom to sweep the entire peasantry from their ancestral communes onto vast state-controlled collective farms. As part of the collectivisation drive, millions of slightly more prosperous peasants, the so-called "kulaks", were either deported for resettlement to the remotest regions or transported, as forced labour, to the Soviet concentration camp system, the Gulag Archipelago. Collectivisation coincided with Stalin's decision to industrialise the Soviet Union at breakneck speed. The most immediate purpose of collectivisation was to force peasants to deliver grain to the regime, either to feed the factory workers, or for the export income needed to pay for the imports of foreign machinery Soviet heavy industry required. In the early 1930s, Stalin collected grain quotas even when there was nothing for the peasants to eat. In his "man-made famine" of 1933, perhaps five million Ukrainian peasants starved to death. The Communist Party celebrated the economic achievements at the Congress of Victors in 1934. Stalin was acclaimed, not merely as the leader of the party, but as a towering, universal genius in every human sphere. Beneath the surface, however, reality was more complex. At the congress, corridor discussions about removing Stalin from his post as general secretary took place. In the secret ballot for the Central Committee, more than 100 of the 2000 or so delegates

crossed out Stalin's name. Only three had crossed out the name of the popular Leningrad party boss, Sergei Kirov. The Congress of Victors marked a turning point in the history of the Soviet Union. Stalin no longer trusted the Communist Party. As an immediate measure he arranged for the assassination of Kirov, whose death he ostentatiously mourned. More important, he decided that there existed inside the Soviet Union a vast anti-socialist conspiracy. Stalin was convinced that the leader of this conspiracy was the man he most feared and loathed, Leon Trotsky. Unfortunately, because he had been sent into foreign exile by Stalin, Trotsky was not available for arrest, trial and execution. However, Stalin was also convinced that the Trotsky conspiracy inside the Soviet Union was led by Zinoviev and Kamenev. Both were arrested and, in 1936, were put on public trial where they confessed abjectly to heinous crimes. They were executed without delay. Stalin soon came to the opinion that the conspiracy had spread to the Right. In 1938 the show trial of Bukharin and his supporters took place. In an atmosphere of hysteria, a Soviet-wide drive to root out the entirely fictitious Trotskyite conspiracy began. In 1937 and 1938 - the most horrific years in Russia's long and terrible history - almost one million "counter-revolutionaries" were executed, while perhaps five million were dispatched to the Gulag Archipelago, where the vast majority died. Stalin personally signed thousands of death warrants. He often took pleasure in taunting former comrades with hints about their impending deaths. In these years, more than half the delegates at the Congress of Victors disappeared. Stalin believed that the conspiracy had reached the Soviet army. Three of the army's five marshals and 15 of its 16 army commanders were executed. As the Soviet dissident historian, Roy Medvedev, puts it: "The shocking truth can be stated quite simply: never did the officer staff of any army suffer such great losses in any war as the Soviet army suffered in the time of peace." During the 1930s, Stalin became the champion of the international anti-fascist movement, and the withering critic of the appeasement of Nazi Germany by the democratic powers, Britain and France. It was because of this that many left-wing intellectuals joined communist parties at this time. By mid-1939, as the German invasion of Poland loomed, Stalin was effectively offered a choice between a military alliance with Britain and France or acceptance of a non-aggression pact with Germany. The West offered Stalin participation in the

front-line of a continental war, while Hitler offered him the mirage of peace, the occupation of eastern Poland and the Baltic states, and more time to arm. Stalin chose Germany. Between August 1939 and June 1941, he was almost fanatical in his determination to do nothing that could be construed as a provocation to Germany. Consequently, when the massive German attack inevitably came, on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Army was militarily and psychologically unprepared. For the only time in his life Stalin's resolution broke. But it soon returned. According to his Russian biographer, General Dmitri Volkogonov, while Stalin was not a brilliant supreme commander of the Soviet armed forces he was highly competent. He listened to his talented generals; he developed a broad strategic grasp; he showed judgement in his refusal to evacuate Moscow and in his appeal to old-style Russian patriotism rather than proletarian solidarity. On the basis of the 1930s industrialisation, the USSR became one of the world's great arsenals. In order to secure victory over Germany, Stalin was unconcerned about how many millions of his soldiers or civilians died. Nazi Germany was essentially conquered on the eastern front. This represents Stalin's one and only contribution to the improvement of mankind. Soon after the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, the Soviet-British-American alliance began to fall apart. The British and Americans encouraged the Soviet Army into eastern Europe. Generally, they were sympathetic to Soviet border claims and demands for the creation of "friendly" governments in the lands between Germany and the USSR. They found it impossible, however, to reconcile themselves to Soviet political methods or the gradual imposition of single-party dictatorship in the areas the Red Army occupied. By 1948 Europe was effectively divided between a Soviet East and an Anglo-American West. Eastern Europe was swiftly Stalinised. In response to the Soviet military threat, NATO formed. In Germany, a dangerous military stand-off over the Soviet blockade of West Berlin arose. The Cold War had arrived. A third world war seemed more likely than not. As always, inside Stalin's mind, morbid suspicions, mirroring the situation in the external world, took hold. Stalin dispatched to the Gulag vast numbers of returned Soviet soldiers who were tainted by knowledge of another, non-Soviet, reality. Then, following the creation of Israel, Stalin's thoughts turned to the Jews. In 1952, he brought the leaders of the wartime Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to trial. A vast antiSemitic action was, most likely, being planned. As his health deteriorated, Stalin's gaze turned towards those around his bed. The organs of Beria's secret police began to investigate what was called "the doctors' plot". On March 5, 1953 - most likely to the

genuine anguish of the Soviet people and the no less genuine relief of the members of his close entourage - Stalin finally died. Stalin left after him nothing but the taste of ash in the mouth. He was not responsible for the creation of the brutal single-party dictatorship in Russia. Credit for that belongs to Lenin. Yet upon the Leninist foundations a number of possible futures none that was likely to be democratic or prosperous - might have been built. That it was Stalin who succeeded Lenin, and not Trotsky or Bukharin or someone else, mattered a great deal. For it was Stalin who was responsible for the needless deaths of perhaps 20 million human beings. And it was Stalin, more than anyone else, who cut the utopian 19th century idea of socialism from its humanitarian moorings and transformed it into a 20th century nightmare of economic irrationality and privation, mind-numbing ideological conformity and hypocrisy, barracks-style social regimentation, primeval leader worship, and universal fear. {end} (10) Karl A. Wittfogel and the (Jewish) Frankfurt School: Neocons 10.1 Karl Wittfogel (1896-1988) http://www.riseofthewest.net/thinkers/wittfogel01.htm "Karl A. Wittfogel was born on 06 September 1896 in Woltersdorf (Germany). ... In 1920-1921, he became a high school teacher in Tinz. In 1920, Wittfogel joined the communist party. ... "Following the Nazi-Soviet Pact, in 1939, Wittfogel broke with the communist party. In the afterwar time, he became an outspoken opponent of the Russian and Chinese communist empires. ... 10.2 The Frankfurt School are the pioneers of Deconstruction and the "political correctness" Culture War raging in the West at present. The leading figures were Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse ... but Wittfogel was in there too. In perspective: Theodor Adorno by DAVE HARKER, Manchester http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/fpm/texte/harker3.htm

Theodor Ludwig Wiesengrund-Adorno was born in Frankfurt in 1903 into a wealthy, highly-cultivated, liberal-bourgeois family. His father was an assimilated Jewish wine merchant who had converted to Protestantism, and his mother was the Catholic daughter of a Corsican-French army officer and a German-born singer. ... Adorno... since 1928 he had put a lot of effort into cultivating an old acquaintance, Max Horkheimer, Director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. The Cafe Marx The Frankfurt Institute was proposed in 1923, the same year as the defeat of the German Revolution. The impetus came from Felix Weill, a millionaire and self-styled 'salon Bolshevik' ... By 1937, Horkheimer had announced a systematic shift of emphasis away from a marxist belief in the existence of 'class domination' towards an effectively liberalbourgeois perspective of 'social justice', and away from marxist methods of analysis to what he liked to call 'critical theory'. ... In 1938 Adorno followed the Institute to the USA. Notes 36 Horkheimer became disillusioned after the murders of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebnecht in 1919, though he seems to have remained intellectually optimistic about the Soviet experiment until at least 1927. Marcuse had had some practical political experience in the SPD in 1917-1918, left on account of what he saw as its 'betrayal of the proletariat', but was in touch with Left Oppositionists{Trotskyists} so late as 1927. Langerhaus, Mandelbaum and Biehahn have been characterised as Korschists or Trotskyists, and yet Langerhaus, along with Massing and Gomperz have also been described as either members of (or friendly towards) the KPD up until some point in the 1930s. Grossman and Pollock were KPD members, Wittfogel was a KPD candidate in Reichstag elections ... Wittfogel seems to have given up the struggle inside the KPD by 1934, while Massing was lucky to be allowed to leave Moscow and the Party in 1938. Only Grossmann, a former member of the Polish CP, retained an unreflective enthusiasm for the Soviet Union into the 1940s, though he was already marginalised at the Institute by the time of the first Moscow Trials. 58 ... known communists like Wittfogel and Grossman were not allowed to have offices along with the rest of the staff in New York. Horkheimer and his staff worked hard to counter this left-wing reputation and after the USA entered the war in

1941, they not only took money for research from CBS and the Rockefeller Foundation but also went to work for the US State directly. Neumann went to the Washington-based Board of Economic Warfare, and later the Intelligence Division of the Office of the US Chief of Staff. Kirchheimer worked alongside Gurland as a staff member of the OSS (the precursor of the CIA) at the State Department. Marcuse went to the Office of War Information in the State Department, and then worked with Neumann at the OSS, up to the time of the Korean War. Lowenthal also worked at the Office of War Information before he was appointed Director of the Research Department at the 'Voice of America' in 1949. {end} more at wittfogel2.html. (11) Convergence between the USSR and the West The usual Convergence theory comes via Anatoliy Golitsyn. An ex-Soviet agent, he claimed that Convergence was a Soviet plot: convergence.html. The evidence I have accumulated shows otherwise. It shows that Jews had gradually lost control of the Soviet Union; that there was a genuine non-Jewish Communism there, just as there was in Poland during the 1980s: poland.html. Convergence, my material shows, was a movement by Jews (Trotskyists and/or Zionists) to REGAIN control of the USSR by returning it to its Trotskyist period. At the same time, they would impose Trotskyist social policies in the West, including the destruction of the family: engagement.html. This is the gist of David Ben Gurion's prediction of how the world would be in 1987: bengur50.jpg. For a bigger image see bengur62.jpg. For background on this see tmf.html. To shift the USSR from "Stalinism" to "Trotskyism", they had to loosen the scrwws; in the process, they lost control there. Isaac Deutscher wrote that the Bolshevik Government, in its first years, was run by "emigres had lived many years in the West", who looked down on Russian "backwardness" and pursued "internationalist" politics: "... they were Marxists in partibus infidelium, West European revolutionaries acting against a non-congenial Oriental background, which ... tried to impose its tyranny upon them. Only revolution in the West could relieve them from that tyranny ... "

"No sooner had Bolshevism mentally withdrawn into its national shell than this attitude became untenable. The party of the revolution had to stoop to its semi-Asiatic environment. It had to cut itself loose from the specifically Western tradition of Marxism ... " Beria and Gorbachev attempted to return to this "Western" Marxism: each emphatically rejected Stalin. But Deutscher was a Jewish Trotskytist, and this "Western" Marxism is Trotskyism by another name:beria.html. {end} (12) Another Jewish Communist comes out as a Neocon ... in the Murdoch press. But Albert Langer insists he still represents the "Left" May Day - it's the festival of the distressed By shifting the argument to one about democracy and liberation, Dubya has done the right (Left) thing on Iraq. Meanwhile, the pseudo-Left just about got everything wrong, claims Vietnam War activist Albert Langer The Australian May 1, 2003 {by Albert Langer} THE Left tide that rose worldwide in the 1960s subsided in the '70s, just as the previous tides from the '30s and '40s subsided in the '50s. There was no significant Left upsurge in the '80s or '9Os, partly because reactionary forces were already on the retreat, with the liberation of southern Africa, East Timor and Eastem Europe the creation of the Palestinian Authority and the shift from military to parliamentary rule throughout Latin America, the Philippines and Indonesia. When the left tide is rising, May Day provides an opportunity to sum up past victorles and preview the revolutionary "festival of the oppressed" to come. When the tide is low or dropping, as now, Mayday is just the international distress call - a cry for help. For more than two decades, the genuine Left has been swamped by a, Left whose hostility to capitalism is reactionary rather than progressive. The pseudo-Left opposes modernity, development, globalisation, technology and progress.

It embraces obscurantism, relativism, romanticism and even nature worship. At May Day rallies, the pseudo-Left whines about how things aren't what they used to be. The real Left has been marginalised, debating neither the neo-cons nor the pseudoLeft, simply because there has been no audience for that debate. Incoherent nonsense from complete imbeciles is published as "Left" comment in newspapers just so rightwing commentators can pretend they have something intelligent to say. In fact "Left" is used as a euphemism for "pessimistic", "unimaginative" and just plain "dull". But now there is an audience. The war in Iraq has woken people everywhere - and the pseudo Left has really blown its chance. Millions who marched in mid February stopped marching two months later, as soon as the argument shifted towards democratising and liberating the Iraqi people. Those millions still agree that George W. Bush is an arrogant bully, but they no longer believe the peacemongers have got it right. People want to figure out what is going on and are joining the debate at websites such as www.lastsuperpower. net. For months, the argument was about weapons of mass destruction and the role of the UN. If the demands of the US, and the UN, had been fully met, Saddam Hussein could have lived happily, and the Iraqi people miserably, for ever after. But look at what happened next! Suddenly we were hearing a different song. Bush has been making the argument not for disarming Iraq but for liberating Iraq. Stripped of the "God bless America" stuff, the US President's case now goes like this: "If we devote our resources to draining the swamps, addressing the roots of the 'campaigns of hatred', we can not only reduce the threats we face, but also live llp to ideals that we profess and that are not beyond reach if we choose to take hem seriously." Actually, those words are from Noam Chomsky two days before Bush's UN speech on September 10, 2002. But if Bush had adopted Chomsky's position so early, that would have prevented congressional authorisation. Such a position threatens to destabilise despotic, reactionary regimes everywhere. But those in the US foreign policy establishment have devoted their entire careers to supporting the most corrupt tyrannies in the Middle East, in the name of "stability".

For Chomsky, "draining the swamps" apparently didn't include killing people and blowing things up. Fortunately, Bush is made of sterner stuff. Both Bush and Chomsky know the US cannot be secure from medievalist terrorist mosqitoes while the Middle East remains a swamp. But Bush also knows that modernity grows out of the barrel of a gun. That is a genuinely Left case for a revolutionary war of liberation, such as has occurred in Iraq. The pseudo Left replies: "That's illegal." Well, of course revolutionary war is illegal. Legal systems are created by revolutions, not revolutions by legal systems. The next logical step for the new policy is to establish a viable Palestinian state. Bush has put himself in a position where he can and must take that step. Naturally, he will not admit to the enormous strategic and policy retreat that such a step implies, so he has preceded it with enough triumphalist rhetoric to make even the Fox News team look queasy. The revival of the Left in the '60s only began once it was widely noticed that the remnants of the previous movement were reactionaries obstructing progress. After it tried so hard to preserve fascism in Iraq, even after Bush Jr had wisely given up on Bush Sr's policy of keeping the Iraqi dictator in power, can anyone deny the pseudoLeft is reactionary? Albert Langer is an unreconstructed Maoist (anarcho-Stalinist) ... {end} (13) A Trotskyist Website Responds The historical roots of neoconservatism: a reply to a slanderous attack on Trotskyism By Bill Vann 23 May 2003 http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/may2003/shac-m23.shtml The May 20 edition of the Spanish-language daily El Diario/La Prensa in New York City published a column by the newspaper's political editor Vicky Pelaez entitled "From permanent revolution to permanent conquest." The thrust of the piece is an attempt to trace the current policies of the extreme right-wing clique that dominates

the Bush White House and the Pentagon to the American Trotskyist movement of the 1930s and 1940s. This article is by no means unique. A number of print and on-line publications ranging from the Sunday Times in Britain and El País in Spain to the web site antiwar.com and that of the John Birch Society have featured similar material. In some cases, these articles are motivated by internecine disputes within the American right. In other cases they represent a confused attempt to explain the eruption of US militarism that has developed under the Bush administration, and the role played in it by a tight-knit group of hard-right ideologues centered in the Pentagon. Ms. Pelaez's column is distinguished only by the crudeness of the fabricated details that she employs to further her arguments. After tracing the undoubted influence of the right-wing German-born political scientist Leo Strauss (See: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/mar2003/stra-m26.shtml) upon many of those dubbed neoconservatives in the Bush administration, she proceeds to the alleged Trotskyist connection. Pelaez writes: "But strangest of all is the political position of all those [Bush administration officials] cited above. The investigation reveals that the parents of all of them were Trotskyist militants, anti-Stalinists and belonged to the movement of the 1930s to the 40s that arose when Leon Trotsky abandoned the Soviet Union and denounced Stalin as a revisionist and a dictator. Of course, the United States supported with all its might the Trotskyist movement, which was spread worldwide; this included here in New York the CIA's organizing their congress at the Waldorf Astoria in 1949 (The CIA and the Cultural Cold War, Frances Stonor Saunders.)" She continues: "The children of the made-in-the-USA Trotskyists, their names are Wolfowitz, Perle, Kristol, Feith, David Wurmser, etc., became part of the liberal anticommunist movements between the 1950s and 70s. Later they converted themselves into neoconservatives and transformed Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution into Permanent Conquest based on Strauss. Then they put it into action after taking power, calling it Permanent Expansion, justifying it by saying that Ôeverything that is good for America is good for the world' and that Ôthe United States has the right to attack any country if it perceives the existence of any danger.'" ... {end} (14) Trotsky's ghost wandering the White House Influence on Bush aides: Bolshevik's writings supported the idea of pre-emptive war

Jeet Heer National Post, Saturday, June 07, 2003 http://www.majority.com/news/jeet1.html Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, was paranoid. Perhaps his deepest fears centred around his great rival for the leadership of the Bolshevik movement, Leon Trotsky. Stalin went to extraordinary lengths to obliterate not only Trotsky but also the ragtag international fellowship known as the Left Opposition, which supported Trotsky's political program. In the late 1920s, Stalin expelled Trotsky from the Communist Party and deported him from the Soviet Union. Almost instantly, other Communist parties moved to excommunicate Trotsky's followers, notably the Americans James P. Cannon and Max Shachtman. In 1933, while in exile in Turkey, Trotsky regrouped his supporters as the Fourth International. Never amounting to more than a few thousand individuals scattered across the globe, the Fourth International was constantly harassed by Stalin's secret police, as well as by capitalist governments. The terrible purge trials that Stalin ordered in the late 1930s were designed in part to eliminate any remaining Trotskyists in the Soviet Union. Fleeing from country to country, Trotsky ended up in Mexico, where he was murdered by an ice-pick-wielding Stalinist assassin in 1940. Like Macbeth after the murder of Banquo, Stalin became even more obsessed with his great foe after killing him. Fearing a revival of Trotskyism, Stalin's secret police continued to monitor the activities of Trotsky's widow in Mexico, as well as the farflung activities of the Fourth International. - - More than a decade after the demise of the Soviet Union, Stalin's war against Trotsky may seem like quaint ancient history. Yet Stalin was right to fear Trotsky's influence. Unlike Stalin, Trotsky was a man of genuine intellectual achievement, a brilliant literary critic and historian as well as a military strategist of genius. Trotsky's movement, although never numerous, attracted many sharp minds. At one time or another, the Fourth International included among its followers the painter Frida Kahlo (who had an affair with Trotsky), the novelist Saul Bellow, the poet André Breton and the Trinidadian polymath C.L.R. James. As evidence of the continuing intellectual influence of Trotsky, consider the curious fact that some of the books about the Middle East crisis that are causing the greatest stir were written by thinkers deeply shaped by the tradition of the Fourth International. In seeking advice about Iraqi society, members of the Bush administration (notably Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defence, and Dick Cheney, the Vice-

President) frequently consulted Kanan Makiya, an Iraqi-American intellectual whose book The Republic of Fear is considered to be the definitive analysis of Saddam Hussein's tyrannical rule. As the journalist Christopher Hitchens notes, Makiya is "known to veterans of the Trotskyist movement as a one-time leading Arab member of the Fourth International." When speaking about Trotskyism, Hitchens has a voice of authority. Like Makiya, Hitchens is a former Trotskyist who is influential in Washington circles as an advocate for a militantly interventionist policy in the Middle East. Despite his leftism, Hitchens has been invited into the White House as an ad hoc consultant. Other supporters of the Iraq war also have a Trotsky-tinged past. On the left, the historian Paul Berman, author of a new book called Terror and Liberalism, has been a resonant voice among those who want a more muscular struggle against Islamic fundamentalism. Berman counts the Trotskyist C.L.R. James as a major influence. Among neo-conservatives, Berman's counterpart is Stephen Schwartz, a historian whose new book, The Two Faces of Islam, is a key text among those who want the United States to sever its ties with Saudi Arabia. Schwartz spent his formative years in a Spanish Trotskyist group. To this day, Schwartz speaks of Trotsky affectionately as "the old man" and "L.D." (initials from Trotsky's birth name, Lev Davidovich Bronstein). "To a great extent, I still consider myself to be [one of the] disciples of L.D," he admits, and he observes that in certain Washington circles, the ghost of Trotsky still hovers around. At a party in February celebrating a new book about Iraq, Schwartz exchanged banter with Wolfowitz about Trotsky, the Moscow Trials and Max Shachtman. "I've talked to Wolfowitz about all of this," Schwartz notes. "We had this discussion about Shachtman. He knows all that stuff, but was never part of it. He's definitely aware." The yoking together of Paul Wolfowitz and Leon Trotsky sounds odd, but a long and tortuous history explains the link between the Bolshevik left and the Republican right. To understand how some Trotskyists ended up as advocates of U.S. expansionism, it is important to know something about Max Shachtman, Trotsky's controversial American disciple. Shachtman's career provides the definitive template of the trajectory that carries people from the Left Opposition to support for the Pentagon. Throughout the 1930s, Shachtman loyally hewed to the Trotsky line that the Soviet Union as a state deserved to be defended even though Stalin's leadership had to be overthrown. However, when the Soviet Union forged an alliance with Hitler and invaded Finland, Shachtman moved to a politics of total opposition, eventually known

as the "third camp" position. Shachtman argued in the 1940s and 1950s that socialists should oppose both capitalism and Soviet communism, both Washington and Moscow. Yet as the Cold War wore on, Shachtman became increasingly convinced Soviet Communism was "the greater and more dangerous" enemy. "There was a way on the third camp left that anti-Stalinism was so deeply ingrained that it obscured everything else," says Christopher Phelps, whose introduction to the new book Race and Revolution details the Trotskyist debate on racial politics. Phelps is an eloquent advocate for the position that the best portion of Shachtman's legacy still belongs to the left. By the early 1970s, Shachtman was a supporter of the Vietnam War and the strongly anti-Communist Democrats such as Senator Henry Jackson. Shachtman had a legion of young followers (known as Shachtmanites) active in labour unions and had an umbrella group known as the Social Democrats. When the Shachtmanites started working for Senator Jackson, they forged close ties with hard-nosed Cold War liberals who also advised Jackson, including Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz; these two had another tie to the Trotskyism; their mentor was Albert Wohlstetter, a defence intellectual who had been a Schachtmanite in the late 1940s. Shachtman died in 1972, but his followers rose in the ranks of the labour movement and government bureaucracy. Because of their long battles against Stalinism, Shachtmanites were perfect recruits for the renewed struggle against Soviet communism that started up again after the Vietnam War. Throughout the 1970s, intellectuals forged by the Shachtman tradition filled the pages of neoconservative publications. Then in the 1980s, many Social Democrats found themselves working in the Reagan administration, notably Jeanne Kirkpatrick (who was ambassador to the United Nations) and Elliott Abrams (whose tenure as assistant secretary of state was marred by his involvement with the Iran-Contra scandal). The distance between the Russia of 1917 and the Washington of 2003 is so great that many question whether Trotsky and Shachtman have really left a legacy for the Bush administration. For Christopher Phelps, the circuitous route from Trotsky to Bush is "more a matter of rupture and abandonment of the left than continuity." Stephen Schwartz disagrees. "I see a psychological, ideological and intellectual continuity," says Schwartz, who defines Trotsky's legacy to neo-conservatism in terms of a set of valuable lessons. By his opposition to both Hitler and Stalin, Trotsky taught the Left Opposition the need to have a politics that was proactive and willing to take unpopular positions. "Those are the two things that the neo-cons and the Trotskyists always had in common: the ability to anticipate rather than react and the

moral courage to stand apart from liberal left opinion when liberal left opinion acts like a mob." Trotsky was also a great military leader, and Schwartz finds support for the idea of pre-emptive war in the old Bolshevik's writings. "Nobody who is a Trotskyist can really be a pacifist," Schwartz notes."Trotskyism is a militaristic disposition. When you are Trotskyist, we don't refer to him as a great literary critic, we refer to him as the founder of the Red Army." Paul Berman agrees with Schwartz that Trotskyists are by definition internationalists who are willing to go to war when necessary. "The Left Opposition and the nonCommunist left comes out of classic socialism, so it's not a pacifist tradition," Berman observes. "It's an internationalist tradition. It has a natural ability to sympathize or feel solidarity for people in places that might strike other Americans or Canadians as extremely remote." Christopher Phelps, however, doubts these claims of a Trotskyist tradition that would support the war in Iraq. For the Left Opposition, internationalism was not simply about fighting all over the world. "Internationalism meant solidarity with other peoples and not imperialist imposition upon them," Phelps notes. Though Trotsky was a military leader, Phelps also notes "the Left Opposition had a long history of opposition to imperialist war. They weren't pacifists, but they were against capitalist wars fought by capitalist states. It's true that there is no squeamishness about the application of force when necessary. The question is, is force used on behalf of a class that is trying to create a world with much less violence or is it force used on behalf of a state that is itself the largest purveyor of organized violence in the world? There is a big difference." Seeing the Iraq war as an imperialist adventure, Phelps is confident "Trotsky and Shachtman in the '30s and '40s wouldn't have supported this war." This dispute over the true legacy of Trotsky and Shachtman illustrates how the Left Opposition still stirs passion. The strength of a living tradition is in its ability to inspire rival interpretations. Despite Stalin's best efforts, Trotskyism is a living force that people fight over. {end} (15) Michael Lind vs Alan Wald on the Trotskyist tie to the Neocons 15.1 The Weird Men Behind George W. Bush's War

By Michael Lind New Statesman - April 7, 2003 http://www.rense.com/general37/theweirdmenbehind.htm ... The core group now in charge consists of neoconservative defence intellectuals (they are called "neoconservatives" because many of them started off as anti-Stalinist leftists or liberals before moving to the far right). Inside the government, the chief defence intellectuals include Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defence. He is the defence mastermind of the Bush administration; Donald Rumsfeld is an elderly figurehead who holds the position of defence secretary only because Wolfowitz himself is too controversial. Others include Douglas Feith, the number three at the Pentagon; Lewis "Scooter" Libby, a Wolfowitz protege who is Cheney's chief of staff; John R Bolton, a right-winger assigned to the State Department to keep Colin Powell in check; and Elliott Abrams, recently appointed to head Middle East policy at the National Security Council. On the outside are James Woolsey, the former CIA director, who has tried repeatedly to link both 9/11 and the anthrax letters in the US to Saddam Hussein, andRichard Perle, who has just resigned from his unpaid defence department advisory post after a lobbying scandal. Most of these "experts" never served in the military. But their headquarters is now the civilian defence secretary's office, where these Republican political appointees are despised and distrusted by the largely Republican career soldiers. Most neoconservative defence intellectuals have their roots on the left, not the right. They are products of the largely Jewish-American Trotskyist movement of the 1930s and 1940s, which morphed into anti- communist liberalism between the 1950s and 1970s and finally into a kind of militaristic and imperial right with no precedents in American culture or political history. Their admiration for the Israeli Likud party's tactics, including preventive warfare such Israel's 1981 raid on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, is mixed with odd bursts of ideological enthusiasm for "democracy". They call their revolutionary ideology "Wilsonianism" (after President Woodrow Wilson), but it is really Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution mingled with the far-right Likud strain of Zionism. Genuine American Wilsonians believe in self-determination for people such as the Palestinians. The neo-con defence intellectuals, as well as being in or around the actual Pentagon, are at the centre of a metaphorical "pentagon" of the Israel lobby and the religious right, plus conservative think- tanks, foundations and media empires. Think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provide homes for neo-con "in-and- outers" when they are out of government (Perle is a fellow at AEI). The money comes not so much from

corporations as from decades-old conservative foundations, such as the Bradley and Olin foundations, which spend down the estates of long-dead tycoons. Neoconservative foreign policy does not reflect business interests in any direct way. The neo-cons are ideologues, not opportunists. The major link between the conservative think-tanks and the Israel lobby is the Washington-based and Likud-supporting Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (Jinsa), which co-opts many non-Jewish defence experts by sending them on trips to Israel. It flew out the retired General Jay Garner, now slated by Bush to be proconsul of occupied Iraq. In October 2000, he co-signed a Jinsa letter that began: "We ... believe that during the current upheavals in Israel, the Israel Defence Forces have exercised remarkable restraint in the face of lethal violence orchestrated by the leadership of [the] Palestinian Authority." The Israel lobby itself is divided into Jewish and Christian wings. Wolfowitz and Feith have close ties to the Jewish-American Israel lobby. Wolfowitz, who has relatives in Israel, has served as the Bush administration's liaison to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Feith was given an award by the Zionist Organisation of America, citing him as a "pro-Israel activist". While out of power in the Clinton years, Feith collaborating with Perle, co-authored for Likud a policy paper that advised the Israeli government to end the Oslo peace process, reoccupy the territories and crush Yasser Arafat's government. Such experts are not typical of Jewish-Americans, who mostly voted for Gore in 2000. The most fervent supporters of Likud in the Republican electorate are southern Protestant fundamentalists. The religious right believes that God gave all of Palestine to the Jews, and fundamentalist congregations spend millions to subsidise Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. The final corner of the neoconservative pentagon is occupied by several right-wing media empires, with roots - odd as it seems - in the Commonwealth and South Korea. Rupert Murdoch disseminates propaganda through his Fox Television network. His magazine the Weekly Standard, edited by William Kristol, the former chief of staff of Dan Quayle (vice-president, 1989-93), acts as a mouthpiece for defence intellectuals such as Perle, Wolfowitz, Feith and Woolsey as well as for Sharon's government. The National Interest (of which I was executive editor, 1991-94) is now funded by Conrad Black, who owns the Jerusalem Post and the Hollinger empire in Britain and Canada. Strangest of all is the media network centred on the Washington Times - owned by the South Korean messiah (and ex-convict) the Reverend Sun Myung Moon - which owns the newswire UPI. UPI is now run by John O'Sullivan, the ghost-writer for

Margaret Thatcher who once worked as an editor for Conrad Black in Canada. Through such channels, the "Gotcha!" style of right-wing British journalism, as well as its Europhobic substance, have contaminated the US conservative movement. The corners of the neoconservative pentagon were linked together in the 1990s by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), run by Kristol out of the Weekly Standard offices. Using a PR technique pioneered by their Trotskyist predecessors, the neo-cons published a series of public letters, whose signatories often included Wolfowitz and other future members of the Bush foreign policy team. They called for the US to invade and occupy Iraq and to support Israel's campaigns against the Palestinians (dire warnings about China were another favourite). During Clinton's two terms, these fulminations were ignored by the foreign policy establishment and the mainstream media. Now they are frantically being studied. How did the neo-con defence intellectuals - a small group at odds with most of the US foreign policy elite, Republican as well as Democratic - manage to capture the Bush administration? Few supported Bush during the presidential primaries. They feared that the second Bush would be like the first - a wimp who had failed to occupy Baghdad in the first Gulf war and who had pressured Israel into the Oslo peace process - and that his administration, again like his father's, would be dominated by moderate Republican realists such as Powell, James Baker and Brent Scowcroft. They supported the maverick senator John McCain until it became clear that Bush would get the nomination. Then they had a stroke of luck - Cheney was put in charge of the presidential transition (the period between the election in November and the accession to office in January). Cheney used this opportunity to stack the administration with his hardline allies. Instead of becoming the de facto president in foreign policy, as many had expected, Secretary of State Powell found himself boxed in by Cheney's rightwing network, including Wolfowitz, Perle, Feith, Bolton and Libby. The neo-cons took advantage of Bush's ignorance and inexperience. Unlike his father, a Second World War veteran who had been ambassador to China, director of the CIA and vice-president, George W was a thinly educated playboy who had failed repeatedly in business before becoming the governor of Texas, a largely ceremonial position (the state's lieutenant governor has more power). His father is essentially a north-eastern, moderate Republican; George W, raised in west Texas, absorbed the Texan cultural combination of machismo, anti-intellectualism and overt religiosity. The son of upper-class Episcopalian parents, he converted to southern fundamentalism in a midlife crisis. Fervent Christian Zionism, along with an

admiration for macho Israeli soldiers that sometimes coexists with hostility to liberal Jewish-American intellectuals, is a feature of the southern culture. ... 15.2 Are Trotskyites Running the Pentagon? by Alan Wald http://hnn.us/articles/1514.html 6-23-03: News at Home Mr. Wald is Professor of American Culture, University of Michigan. As a scholar researching for several decades the migration of United States intellectuals from Left to Right, I have been startled by the large number of journalistic articles making exaggerated claims about ex-Trotskyist influence on the Bush administration that have been circulating on the internet and appearing in a range of publications. I first noticed these in March 2003, around the time that the collapse of Partsian Review magazine was announced, although some may have appeared earlier. One of the most dismaying examples can be found in the caricatures presented in Michael Lind's "The Weird Men Behind George W. Bush's War" that appeared in the April 7, 2003 issue of the New Statesman. Lind states that U.S. foreign policy is now being formulated by a circle of "neoconservative defence intellectuals," and that "most " are "products of the largely Jewish-American Trotskyist movement of the 1930s and 1940s...." Moreover, Lind claims that their current ideology of "Wilsonianism" is really Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution mingled with the far-right Likud strain of Zionism." However, I am not aware that anyone in the group of "neoconservative defence intellectuals" cited by Mr. Lind has ever had an organizational or ideological association with Trotskyism, or with any other wing of the Far Left. Nor do I understand the implications of emphasizing the "Jewish" side of the formula, although many of these individuals may have diverse relations to the Jewish tradition--as do many leading U.S. critics of the recent war in Iraq. ... True enough, after World War II, a number of one time Trotskyists, like others of their generation, moved in a conservative direction. The most notable, National Review supporters Max Eastman and James Burnham {see burnham.html}, were neither Jewish nor neoconservative, although they advocated a Bush-like foreign policy. In the Cold War era, Sidney Hook, a sympathizer of Trotskyism in the mid-

1930s, and Irving Kristol, a member of a Trotskyist faction ("Shermanites") in the late 1930s and early 1940s, became militant Cold Warriors. Although both were deradicalized before the 1960s, these two are much identified with the original neoconservatism of the 1970s. However, Kristol's son, William, now editor of the influential Weekly Standard, was never on the Far Left, let alone associated with Trotskyism. Likewise, Elliot Cohen, who founded Commentary in 1946, had been a Trotskyist sympathizer in the early 1930s. But neither his eventual successor, onetime liberal Norman Podhoretz, nor Podhoretz's son, John, had any such Marxist proclivities. Equally misleading is the glib equation of the defense intellectuals' "Wilsonianism" with Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution. Whatever the relevance of Trotsky's theory might be today, the original idea addressed the relationship of class forces in the economically underdeveloped world. It was Trotsky's strategy for escaping from Western domination, not expanding it, and the argument was that poor countries could only become genuinely independent by breaking radically with the "free market," not by embracing it. Any association with current "Wilsonianism" is far-fetched. I certainly agree with Mr. Lind that we need to find out "Who is making foreign policy?" and "what are they trying to achieve?" But his amalgamation of the defense intellectuals with the traditions and theories of "the largely Jewish-American Trotskyist movement " is singularly unhelpful. Editor's Note Several individuals have asked about the relation of "Shermanites" to "Shachtmanites" in Alan Wald's piece about alleged Trotskyists among the "Defense Intellectuals." Wald replies: "Sherman" was the Party name of of PHILIP SELZNICK (born Philip Shachter in 1919). He became a young Trotskyist around 1937 and joined Max Shachtman's Workers Party (WP) when it split from the Socialist Workers party in 1940. Opposed to Shachtman, Selznick immediately organized a faction within the WP known as the "Shermanites." Supporters of the Shermanites included Selznick, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Seymour Martin Lipset, Marvin Meyers, Peter Rossi, Martin Diamond, Herbert Garfinkel, Jeremiah Kaplan, and Irving Kristol--all of whom became well known as historians, social scientists, and publishers. Both the young Irving Howe and Max Shachtman himself vigorously opposed the Shermanites in various debates. Among other things, the Shermanite group considered itself revolutionary but "anti-Bolshevik," which complicates a simple view of them as "Trotskyists."

The Shermanite grouping quickly left the WP and published the magazine ENQUIRY from 1942 to 1945. A full set of the journal has been reprinted, and abundant documentation about the faction exists. Selznick himself became a Professor of Sociology at UC Berkeley and was a supporter of the Free Speech Movement. 15.3 I Was Smeared, By Michael Lind Mr. Lind is Whitehead Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation. http://hnn.us/articles/1530.html Last week HNN published Alan Wald's critique of an article written by Michael Lind for the New Statesman in which Mr. Lind argued that defense policy in the Bush administration is orchestrated by a group of people, many of whom are Jewish, who were allegedly shaped by Trotskyism. This week we publish an exchange between Mr. Lind and Mr. Wald. Below is Mr. Lind's statement. Click here for Mr. Wald's. I thank Mr. Wald for helping to prove my case. Indeed, the details he provides suggest that the existence of the influence of ex-Trotskyists, Shermanite and Schachtmannite alike, on the neoconservative faction within American conservatism was even greater than I and others have realized. It is not every day that an incompetent critic unwittingly undermines his own case in attempting to refute yours. I stand by the observation that there is a distinct Trotskyist political culture, which shows its residual influence even on individuals who renounced Trotskyism or who were never Trotskyists but inherited this political culture from their parents or older mentors. An unusual belligerence in foreign policy combined with a desire to export "revolution" (first socialist, and then, among ex-Trotskyists who move to the liberal center or the Right, the "global democratic revolution" in the phrase of Schachtmannites like Joshua Muravchik) distinguishes these ex-Trots and inheritors of ex-Trot political culture from other kinds of conservatives and liberals--for example, Anglo-Catholic Tories, Rooseveltian New Deal liberal internationalists, and Buchanan-style isolationists. Not only in the U.S. but in Britain and continental Europe, ex-Trots have tended to go from advocating promotion of socialist revolution to promoting liberal or democratic revolution. This is a minor but genuine feature of the trans-Atlantic political landscape that is so familiar, and commented upon so often by members of the foreign policy elite, not only in the U.S. but in Britain and France, that it surprises me to learn that anyone claims it is controversial. ...

Not only I but most students of the political culture of neoconservatism, including many neoconservatives themselves, have described the various influences that distinguish this branch of the Right from others: influences including not only the vestiges of Trotskyist foreign policy activism, but also Straussianism, Cold War liberalism, and a peculiar kind of Anglophilia based on the veneration of Winston Churchill, who is far more popular among American neocons than Franklin Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson. (Even neocons like Max Boot who claim to be "Wilsonians" never quote a line from Woodrow Wilson, and nothing could be less Wilsonianism than their militaristic rhetoric about "empire," which actually derives from their idealized vision of the British empire, not from anything in the resolutely anti-imperial American political tradition). Can one identify individual neoconservatives who were not influenced by Trotskyism, Straussianism, Cold War liberalism, the myth of Churchill, and the mystique of the British empire? Certainly. Does that mean that anyone who mentions any of these influences is therefore an unscholarly conspiracy theorist, of the kind Mr. Wald accuses me of being? Oh, please. The Straussian movement split long ago into "East Coast Straussians" and "West Coast Straussians." In addition, there are a few neoconservatives who know little or nothing about Leo Strauss. A defender of the neoconservatives as intellectually dishonest as Mr. Wald could use these facts in denouncing any scholar or journalist who mentions the influence of Straussianism on the distinctive political culture of the neoconservative faction of the Republican Party. If he were as disingenuous as Mr. Wald, he could argue that since there are East and West Coast Straussians, Straussianism therefore does not exist, and anyone who talks about a distinctive Straussian intellectual culture, or Straussian influence on neoconservatism is a) unscholarly and b) a paranoid conspiracy theorist who probably believes that the Shriners control the Council on Foreign Relations. ... Mr. Wald says not only that neoconservative originated as a pejorative used by Michael Harrington (true, if irrelevant) but that there never really were any selfidentified "neoconservatives" (false). This line that there never really were any neoconservatives has long been used by Irving Kristol in interviews. I used to laugh about it with other of Kristol's employees. The non-existence of neoconservatism, except in the minds of conspiracy-mongers, certainly would have come as news to me and my fellow neoconservatives when I worked for Kristol and attended conferences and dinner parties with Gertrude Himmelfarb, Bill Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Peter Berger, and other self-conscious neocons. Unaware that we were not supposed to exist, according to Mr. Wald, we neocons were well aware of the shared views on the Cold War, race, and other topics that distinguished us from the Buckley Tories and the Buchananite Old Right. If Mr. Wald knew more about the neoconservative intellectual

network of the 1980s and 1990s, as opposed to the long-defunct Workers' Party of the 1930s, he would know that there was a bitter war in the conservative press between "neoconservatives" (many of them former Trotskyists, as he has confirmed) who reluctantly or enthusiastically accepted the term to describe themselves and the "Old Right" of Patrick Buchanan. ... One final point. For pointing out what every history of the subject takes for granted, that the Trotskyist movement was largely though not exclusively Jewish in membership, defenders of the neocons (not, interestingly, any present-day Trotskyists!) have hinted that I am an anti-semite (they don't know, or don't care, that I am partly Jewish in descent). This has come as no surprise to me--anyone who criticizes neoconservative influence on U.S. foreign policy is quickly vilified by the gutter journalists--and the gutter professors--of neoconservatism as an anti-semite, a traitor, an appeaser, an enemy in "the culture war," or a combination of two or more of the four. Since HNN, to its discredit, has seen fit to publish several such smears against me on its website [click here and here ], I would like to make one point, not so much in my defense--I have nothing to be defensive about--but in defense of scholarly freedom from intimidation and selfcensorship, where ethnic or regional sensitivities are concerned. Analysis of the role of ethnic and regional groups in U.S. politics is standard in political science, and it is not evidence of hostility toward the ethnic groups or the regions being analyzed. Indeed, this seems to be accepted by neocons in most cases. Not a single one of the critics who professes to be disturbed by my mention in passing of the Jewish role in American Trotskyism has objected to my repeated observations in print that the Southern Religious Right reflects the political culture of the ScotsIrish, with its historic links to Protestant Northern Ireland. Why not? Aren't both points equally illegitimate, in their eyes? Why has no neoconservative angrily written a screed claiming that "Michael Lind's allusion to a supposed connection between Scots-Irish ethnicity and Southern Protestant fundamentalism proves not only that he is a conspiracy theorist but hates the Scots-Irish as well!" (For the record, I am partly Scots-Irish, as well as partly Jewish, in descent). The list of Shermanites that Mr. Wald gives is disproportionately Jewish in membership, although he does not say so. If Mr. Wald had actually used the phrase the "disproportionately Jewish Shermanite movement," would this have made him, not only a conspiracy theorist (after all, did Shermanism ever really exist, except in the imaginations of conspiracy theorists like Wald?) but an anti-semite as well? What about the mere act of drawing up and publishing a list, the majority of whose members are Jewish? Seems kind of creepy, come to think of it. Is Mr. Wald's creepy list the product of a sinister, conspiratorial imagination? Has he tried to smear all

Jewish-Americans, tarring them by association with a supposed "Shermanite" conspiracy? Perhaps someone should alert the Anti-Defamation League to Mr. Wald's disturbing comments... I encourage interested readers to read my essays and books on the subject of the American Right--essays and books in which my chief focus is on the Southern Protestant Right, without whose electoral clout neocons (including former Schachtmannites and former Shermanites and their progeny) would have no influence at all on U.S. foreign or domestic policy. The readers of HNN should not trust dishonest misrepresentations of my statements and views on the part of apologists for neoconservatism. Oh, I'm sorry, I forgot. Neoconservatism does not exist and never has. And there was no such thing as Trotskyism, either. {end} 15.4 Who Is Smearing Whom? 6-30-03: News at Home http://hnn.us/articles/1536.html Mr. Wald, Professor of American Culture, University of Michigan, is the author of The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left (1987), and other books about radical culture in the United States. After four months, Michael Lind is still unable to produce even one piece of credible evidence to prove the exaggerated and unhelpful claims made in his widely-quoted New Statesman article of April 7th. So he issues a lengthy rant discussing a wide range of other matters. Some of his new arguments are too general to be controversial. Other statements, perplexingly, are attributed to me even though they are nowhere to be found in my critique of his original essay. ... My objection to Mr. Lind's argument is first of all that he gave no evidence that "most" of this "small clique" that is "in charge" of U.S. foreign policy has any significant connection, personal or ideological, to what he calls the "largely JewishAmerican Trotskyist movement." In his answer to my critique, Mr. Lind still refuses to provide documentation of such a sensational charge. Instead, he attributes to himself a different claim: "I stand by the observation that there is a distinct Trotskyist political culture, which shows residual influence on individuals who renounced Trotskyism or who were never Trotskyists but inherited this political culture from

their parents or older mentors." But nowhere does he show us how a single member of the "small clique" either "renounced Trotskyism" or "inherited this political culture" from anyone. I would be the last person to dispute that the political cultures of Trotskyism, Communism, anarchism, New Deal Liberalism, etc., can exist and be transmitted. For example, in regard to Trotskyism, it can be demonstrated that critiques of Stalinism from Marxist premises, a sympathy for the radical potential of literary modernism, and an internationalist view of Jewish identity together comprise a subcultural tradition that might be passed on. One might even write a whole book about the subject. (We might call it, "The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left.") Moreover, such a study would point out that the original group coalescing as "neoconservatives" in the 1970s included a few prominent intellectuals who had passed through a wing of the Trotskyist movement, especially an antiShachtmanite tendency known as the "Shermanites" (led by Philip Selznik, aka Sherman). But even in the 1970s, among the strands of ideological DNA that formed to create "Neoconservatism," Trotskyism was very much a receding one. Now, thirty years later, in regard to a group of mostly younger people that some are also calling "Neoconservatives," it is close to non-existent. What about the claims of influence on foreign policy? In his second paragraph, Mr. Lind cites as his main example the phrase "global democratic revolution," which he attributes to "Schachmanites [sic] like Joshua Muravchik." Well, giving Trotskyism credit for a vague slogan like "global democratic revolution" is about as meaningful as the earlier claim that it was Trotskyists who "pioneered" the technique of sending out public letters. But at least Mr. Lind has now given us the name of an individual, albeit not one of the original "small clique" of "neocon defence intellectuals," to whom he affirms a Trotskyist connection. However, is Mr. Lind accurate in stating so unabashedly that Muravchik, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is currently, or ever was, a "Shachtmanite"? Here is what Muravchik wrote in in the Weekly Standard (Aug. 28, 2000) in his review of Maurice Isserman's biography of Michael Harrington: "Any number of those singled out in Isserman's book as 'Shachtmanites' had never been among them--including Penn Kemble, Bayard Rustin, and me.... To be sure, when in the mid-1960s I joined the Socialist party, I loved Shachtman's lectures, but what I learned from them had nothing to do with the Trotskyite arcana that had once been the substance of Shachtmanism. It had everything to do with the evil nature of communism." This statement is further proof that Mr. Lind is not to be trusted when he starts throwing around political labels, no matter how confident he sounds. Among Lind's "core" list of "neocon defence intellectuals," I doubt that any of them ever had as much personal exposure to Shachtman and his ideas as did Murachivik. Of course, an individual such as William

Kristol may may well have learned about "the evil nature of communism" at the knee of father Irving, but this hardly makes the son a carrier of the Trotkyist virus. The point is that, unless we are to revert to the principle of "guilt by association," the connection between the individual and the political culture of Trotskyism must have some real substance to it. Mr. Lind, fortunately, has now stopped referring to "Permanent Revolution," a theory that turns out to have nothing in common with the definition he originally ascribed to it. But he insists on a connection between a Trotskyist plan to "export 'revolution' " and the Bush foreign policy of invading Third World countries. True enough, following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Trotsky was reluctant to sign an unfavorable peace agreement with Germany because he favored promoting a socialist revolution there, a position that he later repudiated. But when Irving Kristol et al became Trotskyists in the late 1930s, there was no country in the world that that their tendency supported. What was meant by "revolution" was not the attack of one state on another, but bottom up social upheaval of the population. The documents of the Workers Party or the Shermanites make no reference to advocacy of intervention by any states to topple a regime and restructure society. Utopian as their dreams might seem today, they believed the source of revolution to be a "Third Camp" of working people, not warring governments. Moreover, while I think that the Trotskyist movement in the United States has been for all practical purposes dead for decades, and is unlikely to play a part in any future radicalizations, the Trotskyist record of supporting "self-determination" of Palestinians and other oppressed populations is sterling in comparison to "Wilsonians" -- including those who put the mantle of "genuine American" on themselves. Much of Mr. Lind's polemic is directed at issues and arguments never mentioned by me, although he gives no other attributions and cites me frequently. For example, Mr. Lind states with glee that "Mr. Wald says not only that neoconservatives originated as a pejorative used by Michael Harrington...but there never really were any selfidentified neoconservatives (false)." Mr. Lind then devotes a long paragraph to mocking me with anecdotes about his dinner parties with "Bill" Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, et al. The problem is that nowhere in my short article do I mention the name of Harrington or claim that the neocons didn't identify themselves as such! Ditto for all the stuff about whether or not Mr. Lind is an anti-Semite (although his "proof" that he can't possibly be an anti-Semite simply because he is "partly Jewish in descent" is both amusing and unsettling), conspiracy theories, the southern religious Right, and so on.

Mr. Lind defends his unsubstantiated argument about the political history and outlook of the "core group now in charge" of U.S. foreign policy by affirming that "it is impossible ... to write either history or political journalism without generalizations." True enough. But generalizations about "core groups" have to be derived from meticulous primary research into the biographies, ideas, and activities of the individuals about whom one is generalizing. For example, based on careful research, I believe that a generalization regarding "Shachtmanite" influences could be offered in regard to the "core group" that founded a publication such as Dissent magazine. But I do not believe such a generalization can apply to the core group that runs the Weekly Standard, let alone "the neocon defence intellectuals." I think it is questionable to even claim that this particular "core group" is truly "in charge" of foreign policy; and I think it is unconscionable to preach to the American public in potboiler articles the falsehood that there has been an ideological highjacking of their inexperienced president by a "weird" clique whose roots are "Jewish-American" and "Trotskyist." ... {end} (16) Noam Chomsky and the Trots as Gatekeepers for the Jewish lobbies The driving force behind Zionism is not race or nationalism but religion. Even atheistic Jews like David Ben Gurion uphold Jewish messianism, and derive that vision from the Bible: tmf.html. Chomsky and the Trotskyists, by rejecting all motives but materialistic ones, divert from the recognition of the true causes, and thus the means of dealing with them. Israel Shahak's book Jewish History, Jewish Religion discloses the danger of the Jewish religion: shahak1.html. On the front cover of the book is an endorsement by Noam Chomsky: "Shahak is an outstanding scholar, with remarkable insight and depth of knowledge. His work is informed and penetrating, a contribution of great value". Chomsky, on his website, says that Shahak is one of the friends with whom he exchanged newspaper clippings. He also has high praise for Norman Finkelstein. In Chomsky's archive, a search for the word "shahak", and for the word "finkelstein", shows that Shahak and Norman Finkelstein appear in about 5 or 6 essays each.

Chomsky's references to Shahak deal with Shahak's work against American and Israeli imperialism. Chomsky never once mentions Shahak's theory about religion being an important factor. Similarly with Norman Finkelstein, who wrote a book called The Holocauast Industry: finkelstein.html. Chomsky, at his website, despite praising Finkelstein as a Left activist, never once mentions the expression "holocaust industry". Chomsky's archive is at http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/index.cfm. I used to think that the spreading war and chaos in the Middle East would eventually be blamed on Israel, and that as a result Hitler's sins would be relativized, put in perspective. But now it's clear that the Jewish lobbies behind the wars are hiding themselves from view. Thus any wars will be blamed on the Anglo-American Empire, rather than the Jewish lobbies operating as back-seat drivers. In view of the role of Jewish lobbies in promoting the war on Iraq, and the ongoing war on the Palestinians, it seems unfair that "holocaust reparations" are still being paid exclusively, to those lobbies, as a sort of blackmail, whereas the Palestinians get no compensation, likewise the Ukranian victims of the famine get none, the victims of the Rwandan genocide get none ... no-one but Jews get this sort of payment. The European Court of Human Rights has found against Roger Garaudy, a leading French Communist expelled from the Party for criticising the USSR. It found that his anti-Zionist book The Mythical Foundations of Israeli Policy is "racist", seeks to "rehabilitate the National Socialist regime", and "had a clear racist objective": garaudy.html. This is scary, because Garaudy was never pro-Hitler. Who has imposed such laws? Those who regularly complain of "antisemitism" seem responsible for this totalitarian drift. We've been conditioned to react in a Pavlovian way to the word "antisemitic", even though there's no similar reaction to anti-Christian or anti-Islamic speech, nor are there even standardized words for such sentiments. Jeffrey Blankfort shows in the following article that Chomsky is a gatekeeper, diverting attention from the dominance the Jewish lobby exerts over US Governments.

The same applies to the Trotskyists who run the anti-war demonstrations. Even though religion was clearly a factor in Sharon's visit to the Temple site of September 28, 2000, the Trots always omit it at their political rallies. CNN: http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/09/28/jerusalem.violence.02/ The second Intifada Cairo Times, Volume 4, Issue 31, 12 - 18 October 2000 http://www.cairotimes.com/content/archiv04/jerusalem.html "The violence was sparked after Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited the area around Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 28 September accompanied by 1000 armed policemen, including riot forces carrying clubs and plastic shields." The Israel Lobby and the Left: Uneasy Questions By Jeffrey Blankfort Left Curve, No. 27 http://www.leftcurve.org/LC27WebPages/IsraelLobby.html It was 1991 and Noam Chomsky had just finished a lecture in Berkeley on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and was taking questions from the audience. An Arab-American asked him to explain his position regarding the influence of America's Israel lobby. Chomsky replied that its reputation was generally exaggerated and, like other lobbies, it only appears to be powerful when its position lines up with that of the "elites" who determine policy in Washington. Earlier in the evening, he had asserted that Israel received support from the United States as a reward for the services it provides as the US's "cop-on-the-beat"in the Middle East. Chomsky's response drew a warm round of applause from members of the audience who were no doubt pleased to have American Jews absolved from any blame for Israel's oppression of the Palestinians, then in the fourth year of their first Intifada. What is noteworthy is that Chomsky's explanation for the financial and political support that the U.S. has provided Israel over the years is shared by what is generically known as the Israel lobby, and almost no one else. Well, not quite "almost no one." Among the exceptions are the overwhelming majority of both houses of Congress and the mainstream media and, what is equally noteworthy, virtually the entire American Left, both ideological and idealistic, including the organizations ostensibly in the forefront of the fight for Palestinian rights.

That there is a meeting of the minds on this issue between supporters of Israel and the Left may help explain why the Palestine support movement within the United States has been an utter failure. Chomsky's position on the lobby had been established well before that Berkeley evening. In The Fateful Triangle, published in 1983, he assigned it little weight: {quote} The "special relationship" is often attributed to domestic political pressures, in particular the effectiveness of the American Jewish community in political life and in influencing opinion. While there is some truth to this it underestimates the scope of the "support for Israel, "and it overestimates the role of political pressure groups in decision making. (p.13) [1] {endquote} A year earlier, Congress had applauded Israel's devastating invasion of Lebanon, and then appropriated millions in additional aid to pay for the shells the Israeli military had expended. How much of this support was due to the legislators' "support for Israel "and how much was due to pressures from the Israel lobby? It was a question that should have been examined by the left at the time, but wasn't. Twenty years later, Chomsky's view is still the "conventional wisdom." In 2001, in the midst of the second intifada, he went further, arguing that "it is improper - particularly in the United States - to condemn ÎIsraeli atrocities,' "and that the "US/Israel-Palestine conflict" is the more correct term, comparable with placing the proper responsibility for "Russian-backed crimes in Eastern Europe [and] USbacked crimes in Central America." And, to emphasize the point, he wrote, "IDF helicopters are US helicopters with Israeli pilots."[2] Prof. Stephen Zunes, who might be described as a Chomsky acolyte, would not only relieve Israeli Jews from any responsibility for their actions, he would have us believe they are the victims. In Tinderbox, his widely praised (by Chomsky and others) new book on the Middle East, Zunes faults the Arabs for "blaming Israel, Zionism, or the Jews for their problems." According to Zunes, the Israelis have been forced to assume a role similar to that assigned to members of the Jewish ghettos of Eastern Europe who performed services, mainly tax collection, as middlemen between the feudal lords and the serfs in earlier times. In fact, writes Zunes, "US policy today corresponds with this historic anti-Semitism."[3] Anyone comparing the relative power of the Jewish community in centuries past with what we find in the US today will find that statement absurd.

Jewish power has, in fact, been trumpeted by a number of Jewish writers, including one, J. J. Goldberg, editor of the Jewish weekly Forward, who wrote a book by that name in 1996.[4] Any attempt, however, to explore the issue from a critical standpoint, inevitably leads to accusations of anti-Semitism, as Bill and Kathy Christison pointed out in their article on the role of right-wing Jewish neo-cons in orchestrating US Middle East policy, in Counterpunch (1/25/03): {quote} Anyone who has the temerity to suggest any Israeli instigation of, or even involvement in, Bush administration war planning is inevitably labeled somewhere along the way as an anti-Semite. Just whisper the word "domination" anywhere in the vicinity of the word "Israel," as in "U.S.-Israeli domination of the Middle East" or "the U.S. drive to assure global domination and guarantee security for Israel," and some leftist, who otherwise opposes going to war against Iraq, will trot out charges of promoting the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the old czarist forgery that asserted a Jewish plan for world domination.[5] {endquote} Presumably, this is what Zunes would call an example of the "latent anti-Semitism which has come to the fore with wildly exaggerated claims of Jewish economic and political power."[6] And that it "is a naive asumption to believe that foreign policy decision-making in the US is pluralistic enough so that any one lobbying groups can have so much influence."[7] This is hardly the first time that Jews have been in the upper echelons of power, as Benjamin Ginsberg points out in The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State; but there has never been a situation anything like the present. This was how Ginzberg began his book: {quote} Since the 1960s, Jews have come to wield considerable influence in American economic, cultural, intellectual and political life. Jews played a central role in American finance during the 1980s, and they were among the chief beneficiaries of that decade's corporate mergers and reorganizations. Today, though barely 2 % of the nation's population is Jewish, close to half its billionaires are Jews. The chief executive officers of the three major television networks and the four largest film studios are Jews, as are the owners of the nation's largest newspaper chain and the most influential single newspaper, the New York Times.[8] {endquote} {ginsberg.html} That was written in 1993. Today, ten years later, ardently pro-Israel American Jews are in positions of unprecedented influence within the United States and have assumed or been given decision-making positions over virtually every segment of our culture and body politic. This is no secret conspiracy. Regular readers of the New York Times business section, which reports the comings and goings of the media tycoons,

are certainly aware of it. Does this mean that each and every one is a pro-Israel zealot? Not necessarily, but when one compares the US media with its European counterparts in their respective coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the extreme bias in favor of Israel on the part of the US media is immediately apparent. This might explain Eric Alterman's discovery that "Europeans and Americans differ profoundly in their views of the Israel/Palestine issue at both the elite and popular levels, with Americans being far more sympathetic to Israel and the Europeans to the Palestinian cause"[9] An additonal component of Chomsky's analysis is his insistence that it is the US, more than Israel, that is the "rejectionist state," implying that were it not for the US, Israel might long ago have abandoned the West Bank and Gaza to the Palestinians for a mini-state. Essential to his analysis is the notion that every US administration since that of Eisenhower has attempted to advance Israel's interests in line with America's global and regional agenda. This is a far more complex issue than Chomsky leads us to believe. Knowledgeable insiders, both critical and supportive of Israel, have described in detail major conflicts that have taken place between US and Israeli administrations over the years in which Israel, thanks to the diligence of its domestic lobby, has usually prevailed. In particular, Chomsky ignores or misinterprets the efforts made by every US president, beginning with Richard Nixon, to curb Israel's expansionism, to halt its settlement building and to obtain its withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.[10] "What happened to all those nice plans?" asked Israeli journalist and peace activist Uri Avnery. "Israel's governments mobilized the collective power of US Jewry which dominates Congress and the media to a large degree - against them. Faced by this vigorous opposition, all the presidents; great and small, football players and movie stars - folded, one after another."[11] Gerald Ford, angered that Israel had been reluctant to leave the Sinai following the 1973 war and backed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, not only suspended aid for six months in 1975, but in March of that year made a speech calling for a "reassessment" of the US-Israel relationship. Within weeks, AIPAC (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee), Israel's Washington lobby, secured a letter signed by 76 senators "confirming their support for Israel, and suggesting that the White House see fit to do the same. The language was tough, the tone almost bullying." Ford backed down.[12]

We need to only look at the current Bush presidency to see that this phenomenon is still the rule. In 1991, the same year as Chomsky's talk, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked the first Bush administartion for $10 billion in loan guarantees in order, he said, to provide for the resettlement of Russian Jews. Bush Sr. had earlier balked at a request from Congress to appropriate an additional $650 million dollars to compensate Israel for sitting out the Gulf War, but gave in when he realized that his veto would be overridden. But now he told Shamir that Israel could only have the guarantees if it freezes settlement building and promised that no Russian Jews would be resettled in the West Bank. An angry Shamir refused and called on AIPAC to mobilize Congress and the organized American Jewish community in support of the loans guarantees. A letter, drafted by AIPAC was signed by more than 240 members of the House demanding that Bush approve them, and 77 senators signed on to supporting legislation. On September 12, 1991, Jewish lobbyists descended on Washington in such numbers that Bush felt obliged to call a televised press conference in which he complained that "1000 Jewish lobbyists are on Capitol Hill against little old me." It would prove to be his epitaph. Chomsky pointed to Bush's statement, at the time, as proof that the vaunted Israel lobby was nothing more than "a paper tiger. It took scarcely more than a raised eyebrow for the lobby to collapse, "he told readers of Z Magazine. He could not have been further from the truth.[13] The next day, Tom Dine, AIPAC's Executive Director, declared that "September 12, 1991 is a day that will live in infamy." Similar comments were uttered by Jewish leaders, who accused Bush ofprovoking anti-Semitism. What was more important, his friends in the mainstream media, like William Safire, George Will, and Charles Krauthammer, not only criticized him; they began to find fault with the economy and how he was running the country. It was all downhill from there. Bush's Jewish vote, which has been estimated at 38% in 1988, dropped down to no more than 12%, with some estimates as low as 8%.[14] Bush's opposition to the loan guarantees was the last straw for the Israel lobby. When he made disparaging comments about Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem in March, 1990, AIPAC had begun the attack (briefly halted during the the Gulf War). Dine wrote a critical op-ed in the New York Times and followed that with a vigorous speech to the United Jewish Appeal's Young Leaders Conference. "Brothers and sisters,"he told them as they prepared to go out and lobby Congress on the issue, "remember that Israel's friends in this city reside on Capitol Hill."[15] Months later, the loan guarantees were approved, but by then Bush was dead meat.

Now, jump ahead to last Spring, when Bush Jr. forthrightly demanded that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon withdraw his marauding troops from Jenin, saying "Enough is enough!"It made headlines all over the world, as did his backing down when Sharon refused. What happened? Harsh criticism boomed from within his own party in Congress and from his daddy's old friends in the media. George Will associated Dubya with Yasser Arafat and accused Bush of having lost his "moral clarity."[16] The next day, Safire suggested that Bush was "being pushed into a minefield of mistakes"and that he had "become a wavering ally as Israel fights for suvival."[17] Junior got the message and, within a week, declared Sharon to be "a man of peace."[18] Since then, as journalist Robert Fisk and others have noted, Sharon seems to be writing Bush's speeches. There are some who believe that Bush Jr. and Presidents before him made statements critical of Israel for appearances only, to convince the world, and the Arab countries in particular, that the US can be an "honest broker" between the Israelis and the Palestinians. But it is difficult to make a case that any of them would put themselves in a position to be humiliated simply as a cover for US policy. A better explanation was provided by Stephen Green, whose Taking Sides, America's Secret Relations with Militant Israel, was the first examination of State Department archives concerning US-Israel relations. Since the Eisenhower administration, wrote Green in 1984, "Israel, and friends of Israel in America, have determined the broad outlines of US policy in the region. It has been left to American Presidents to implement that policy, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, and to deal with the tactical issues."[19] A slight exaggeration, perhaps, but former US Senator James Abourezk (D-South Dakota) echoed Green's words in a speech before the American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee last June: {quote} That is the state of American politics today. The Israeli lobby has put together so much money power that we are daily witnessing US senators and representatives bowing down low to Israel and its US lobby. Make no mistake. The votes and bows have nothing to do with the legislators' love for Israel. They have everything to do with the money that is fed into their campaigns by members of the Israeli lobby. My estimate is that at least $6 billion flows from the American Treasury to Israel each year. That money, plus the political support the US gives Israel at the United Nations, is what allows Israel to conduct criminal operations in Palestine with impunity."[20]{endquote}

That is a reality that has been repeated many times in many forms by ex-members of Congress, usually speaking off the record. It is the reality that Chomsky and the left prefer to ignore. The problem is not so much that Chomsky has been wrong. He has, after all, been right on many other things, particularly in describing the ways in which the media manipulates the public consciousness to serve the interests of the state.[21] However, by explaining US support for Israel simply as a component of those interests, and ignoring the influence of the Israel lobby in determining that component, he appears to have made a major error that has had measurable consequences. By accepting Chomsky's analysis, the Palestinian solidarity movement has failed to take the only political step that might have weakened the hold of Israel on Congress and the American electorate, namely, by challenging the billions of dollars in aid and tax breaks that the US provides Israel on an annual basis. The questions that beg asking are why his argument has been so eagerly accepted by the movement and why the contrary position put forth by people of considerable stature such as Edward Said, Ed Herman, Uri Avnery and, more recently, Alexander Cockburn, has been ignored. There appear to be several reasons. The people who make up the movement, Jews and non-Jews alike, have embraced Chomsky's position because it is the message they want to hear; not feeling obligated to "blame the Jews" is reassuring. The fear of either provoking anti-Semitism or being called an anti-Semite (or a self- hating Jew), has become so ingrained into our culture and body politic that no one, including Chomsky or Zunes, is immune. This is reinforced by constant reminders of the Jewish Holocaust that, by no accident, appear in the movies and in major news media on a regular basis. Chomsky, in particular, has been heavily criticized by the Jewish establishment for decades for his criticism of Israeli policies, even to the point of being "excommunicated,"a distinction he shares with the late Hannah Arendt. It may be fair to assume that at some level this history influences Chomsky's analysis. But the problems of the movement go beyond the fear of invoking anti-Semitism, as Chomsky is aware and correctly noted in The Fateful Triangle.: {quote} [T]he American left and pacificist groups, apart from fringe elements, have quite generally been extremely supportive of Israel (contrary to many baseless allegations), some passionately so, and have turned a blind eye to practices that they would be quick to denounce elsewhere.[22] {endquote} The issue of US aid to Israel provides a clear example. During the Reagan era, there was a major effort launched by the anti-intervention movement to block a $15 million annual appropriation destined for the Nicaraguan contras. People across the country were urged to call their Congressional representatives and get them to

vote against the measure. That effort was not only successful, it forced the administration to engage in what became known as Contragate. At the time, Israel was receiving the equivalent of that much money on a daily basis, without a whimper from the movement. Now, that amount "officially" is about $10 million a day and yet no major campaign has ever been launched to stem that flow or even call the public's attention to it. When attempts were made they were stymied by the opposition of such key players (at the time) as the American Friends Service Committee, which was anxious, apparently, not to alienate major Jewish contributors. (Recent efforts initiated on the internet to "suspend" military aid but not economic - until Israel ends the occupation have gone nowhere.) The slogans that have been advanced by various sectors of the Palestinian solidarity movement, such as "End the Occupation," "End Israeli Apartheid," "Zionism Equals Racism," or "Two States for Two Peoples," while addressing key issues of the conflict, assume a level of awareness on the part of the American people for which no evidence exists. Concern for where their tax dollars are going, particularly at a time of massive cutbacks in social programs, certainly would have greater resonance among voters. Initiating a serious campaign to halt aid, however, would require focusing on the role of Congress and recognition of the power of the Israel lobby. Chomsky's evaluation of Israel's position in the Middle East admittedly contains elements of truth, but nothing sufficient to explain what former Undersecretary of State George Ball described as America's "passionate attachment" to the Jewish state.[23] However, his attempt to portray the US-Israel relationship as mirroring that of Washington's relations to its client regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, has no basis in reality. US involvement in Central America was fairly simple. Arms and training were supplied to military dictatorships in order for their armies and their death squads to suppress the desires of their own citizens for land, civil rights and economic justice, all of which would undermine US corporate interests. This was quite transparent. Does Israel fit into that category? Obviously not. Whatever one may say about Israel, its Jewish majority, at least, enjoys democratic rights. Also, there were no Salvadoran, Nicaraguan or Guatemalan lobbies of any consequence in Washington to lavish millions of dollars wooing or intimidating members of Congress; no one in the House or Senate from any of those client countries with possible dual-loyalties approving multi-billion dollar appropriations on an annual basis; none owning major television networks, radio stations, newspapers or movie studios, and no trade unions or state pension funds investing billions of dollars in their respective economies. The closest thing in the category of national lobbies is

that of Miami's Cuban exiles, whose existence and power the left is willing to acknowledge, even though its political clout is miniscule compared to that of Israel's supporters. What about Chomsky's assertion that Israel is America's cop-on-the-beat in the Middle East? There is, as yet, no record of a single Israeli soldier shedding a drop of blood in behalf of US interests, and there is little likelihood one will be asked to do so in the future. When US presidents have believed that a cop was necessary in the region, US troops were ordered to do the job. When President Eisenhower believed that US interests were threatened in Lebanon in 1958, he sent in the Marines. In 1991, as mentioned, President Bush not only told Israel to sit on the sidelines, he further angered its military by refusing to allow then Defense Sectretary Dick Cheney to give the Israeli air force the coordinates it demanded in order to take to the air in response to Iraq's Scud attacks. This left the Israeli pilots literally sitting in their planes, waiting for information that never came.[24] What Chomsky offers as proof of Israel's role as a US gendarme was the warning that Israel gave Syria not to intervene in King Hussein's war on the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Jordan in September 1970. Clearly this was done primarily to protect Israel's interests. That it also served Washington's agenda was a secondary consideration. For Chomsky, it was "another important service" for the US.[25] What Chomsky may not be aware of is another reason that Syria failed to come to the rescue of the Palestinians at the time: The commander of the Syrian air force, Hafez Al-Assad, had shown little sympathy with the Palestinian cause and was critical of the friendly relations that the PLO enjoyed with the Syrian government under President Atassi. When King Hussein launched his attack, Assad kept his planes on the ground. Three months later, he staged a coup and installed himself as president. Among his first acts was the imprisonment of hundreds of Palestinians and their Syrian supporters. He then proceeded to gut the Syrian sponsored militia, Al-Saika, and eliminate the funds that Syria had been sending to Palestinian militia groups. In the ensuing years, Assad allowed groups opposed to Yasser Arafat to maintain offices and a radio station in Damascus, but little else. A year after Israel's invasion of Lebanon, he sponsored a short, but bloody intra-Palestinian civil war in Northern Lebanon. This is history that has fallen through the cracks.

How much the presence of Israel has intimidated its weaker Arab neighbors from endangering US interests is at best a matter of conjecture. Clearly, Israel's presence has been used by these reactionary regimes, most of them US allies, as an excuse for suppressing internal opposition movements. (One might argue that the CIA's involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, and Abdel Karim Kassem in Iraq in 1963, had more of an impact on crushing progressive movement in the region.) What Israel has provided for the US to their mutual benefit have been a number of joint weapons programs, largely financed by US taxpayers and the use by the US of military equipment developed by Israeli technicians - not the least of which were the "plows"that were used to bury alive fleeing Iraqi soldiers in the first Gulf War. Since high levels of US aid preceded these weapons programs, it is hard to argue that they form the basis of US support. Another argument advanced by Chomsky has been Israel's willingness to serve the US by taking on tasks which past US administrations were unable or unwilling to undertake due to specific US laws or public opinion, such as selling arms to unsavory regimes or training death squads. That Israel did this at the request of the US is an open question. A comment by Israeli minister Yakov Meridor's comment in Ha'aretz, at the time, makes it unlikely: {quote} We shall say to the Americans: Don't compete with us in Taiwan, don't compete with us in South Africa, don't compete with us in the Caribbean area, or in other areas in which we can sell weapons directly and where you can't operate in the open. Give us the opportunity to do this and trust us with the sales of ammunition and hardware. [26] {endquote} In fact, there was no time that the US stopped training death squads in Latin America, or providing arms, with the exception of Guatemala, where Carter halted US assistance because of its massive human rights violations, something that presented no problem for an Israeli military already steeped in such violations. In one situation we saw the reverse situation. Israel provided more than 80% of El Salvador's weapons before the US moved in. As for Israel's trade and joint arms projects, including the development of nuclear weaponry, with South Africa, that was a natural alliance: two societies that had usurped someone else's land and saw themselves in the same position, "a civilized people surrounded by threatening savages." The relationship became so close that South Africa's Sun City became the resort of choice for vacationing Israelis.

The reason that Israeli officials gave for selling these weapons, when questioned, was that it was the only way that Israel could keep its own arms industry functioning. Israel's sales of sophisticated weaponry to China has drawn criticism from several administrations, but this has been tempered by Congressional pressure. What Israel did benefit from was a blanket of silence from the US anti-intervention movement and anti-apartheid movements, whose leadership was more comfortable criticizing US policies than those of Israel's. Whether their behavior was due to their willingness to put Israel's interests first, or whether they were concerned about provoking anti-Semitism, the result was the same. A protest that I organized in 1985 against Israel's ties to apartheid South Africa, and its role as a US surrogate in Central America, provides a clear example of the problem. When I approached board members of the Nicaraguan Information Center (NIC) in San Francisco and asked for the group's endorsement of the protest, I received no support. NIC was the main group in solidarity with the Sandinistas and, despite Israel's long and ugly history, first in aiding Somoza and, at the time of the protest, the contras, the board votedS well, they couldn't vote not to endorse, so they voted to make "no more endorsements,"a position they reversed soon after our rally. NIC's board was almost entirely Jewish. I fared better with GNIB, the Guatemalan News and Information Bureau, but only after a considerable struggle. At the time, Israel was supplying 98% of the weaponry and all of the training to one of the most murderous regimes in modern times. One would think that an organization that claimed to be working in solidarity with the people of Guatemala would not only endorse the rally but be eager to participate. Apparently, the GNIB board was deeply divided on the issue. Unwilling to accept another refusal, I harassed the board with phone calls until it voted to endorse. Oakland CISPES (Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador) endorsed. The San Francisco chapter declined. (A year earlier, when I had been quoted in the San Francisco Weekly criticizing the influence of the Israel lobby on the Democratic Party, officials from the chapter wrote a letter to the editor claiming that I was provoking "anti-Semitism.") The leading anti-apartheid organizations endorsed the protest but, again, after lengthy internal debate. The protest had been organized in response to the refusal of the San Francisco-based Mobilization for Peace, Jobs and Justice, (Mobe), a coalition of movement organizations, to include any mention of the Middle East among the demands that it was issuing for a march opposing South African apartheid and US intervention in Central America.

At an organizing meeting for the event, a handful of us asked that a plank calling for "No US Intervention in the Middle East" be added to the demands that had previously been decided. The vote was overwhelmingly against it. A Jewish trade unionist told us that "we could do more for the Palestinians by not mentioning them, than by mentioning them," a strange response which mirrored what President Reagan was then saying about ending apartheid in South Africa. I was privately told later that if the Middle East was mentioned, "the unions would walk," recognition of the strong support for Israel that exists among the labor bureaucracy, as well as the willingness of the movement to defer to it. The timing of the Mobe's refusal was significant. Two and a half years earlier, Israel had invaded Lebanon and its troops still remained there as we met that evening. And yet, the leaders of the Mobe would not let Tina Naccache, a programmer for Berkeley's KPFA, the only Lebanese in the large union hall, speak in behalf of the demand. Three years later, the Mobe scheduled another mass march. The Palestinians were in the first full year of their intifada, and it seemed appropriate that a statement calling for an end to Israeli occupation be added to the demands. The organizers, the same ones from 1985, had already decided on what they would be behind closed doors: "No US Intervention in Central America or the Caribbean; End US Support for South African Apartheid; Freeze and Reverse the Nuclear Arms Race; Jobs and Justice, Not War." This time the Mobe took no chances and canceled a public meeting where our demand could be debated and voted on. An Emergency Coalition for Palestinian Rights was formed in response. A petition was drawn up and circulated supporting the demand. Close to 3,000 people signed it, including hundreds from the Palestinian community. The Mobe leadership finally agreed to one concession. On the back of its official flyer, where it would be invisible when posted on a wall or tree, was the following sentence: {quote} Give peace a chance everywhere: The plight of the Palestinian people, as shown by the recent events in the West Bank and Gaza, remind us that we must support human rights everywhere. Let the nations of our world turn from building armies and death machines to spending their energy and resources on improving the quality of life - Peace, Jobs and Justice.{endquote} There was no mention of Israel or the atrocities its soldiers were committing. The flyer, put out by the unions ignored the subject completely.

Fast forward to February, 2002, when a new and smaller version of the Mobe met to plan a march and rally to oppose the US war on Afghanistan. There was a different cast of characters but they produced the same result. The argument was that what was needed was a "broad" coalition and raising the issue of Palestine would prevent that from happening. The national movement to oppose the extension of the Iraq war has been no different. As in 1991, at the time of the Gulf War, there were competing large marches, separately organized but with overlapping participants. Despite their other political differences, what the organizers of both marches agreed on was that there would be no mention of the Israel-Palestine conflict in any of the protest literature, even though its connections to the situation in Iraq were being made at virtually every other demonstration taking place throughout the world. The movement's fear of alienating American Jews still takes precedence over defending the rights of Palestinians. Last September, the slogan of "No War on Iraq - Justice for Palestine!"drew close to a half-million protesters to Trafalgar Square. The difference had been presciently expressed by a Native American leader during the first Intifada. "The problem with the movement," he told me, "is that there are too many liberal Zionists." If there is one event that exposed their influence over of the movement, it is what occurred in the streets of New York on June 12, 1982, when 800,000 people gathered in front of the United Nations to call for a ban on nuclear weapons. Six days earlier, on June 6th, Israel had launched a devastating invasion of Lebanon. Its goal was to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization, then based in that country. Eighty thousand soldiers, backed by massive bombing from the air and from the sea were creating a level of death and destruction that dwarfed what Iraq would later do in Kuwait. Within a year there would be 20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese dead and tens of thousands more wounded. And what was the response that day in New York? In recognition of the suffering then taking place in his homeland, a Lebanese man was allowed to sit on the stage, but he would not be introduced; not allowed to say a word. Nor was the subject mentioned by any of the speakers. Israel and its lobby couldn't have asked for anything more. Twenty-one years later, Ariel Sharon, the architect of that invasion, is Israel's Prime Minister, having been elected for the second time. As I write these lines, pro-Israel zealots within the Bush administration are about to savor their greatest triumph. After all, they have been the driving force for a war which they envision as the first stage in "redrawing the map of the Middle East," with the US-Israel alliance at its fore. [27]

And the Left? Rabbi Arthur Waskow, a long-time activist with impeccable credentials, assured the Jewish weekly, Forward, that United for Peace and Justice, organizers of the February 15th anti-war rally in New York, "has done a great deal to make clear it is not involved in anti-Israel rhetoric. From the beginning there was nothing in United for Peace's statements that dealt at all with the Israel-Palestine issue."[28] Notes 1. Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, South End Press, 1983, p. 13. 2. Roane Carey, Ed., The New Intifada, Verso, 2001, p. 6. 3. Stephen Zunes, Tinderbox, Common Courage Press, 2003, p. 163. 4. J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power, Addison-Wesley, 1996. 5. Bill and Kathy Christison, "Too Many Smoking Guns to Ignore: Israel, American Jews, and the War on Iraq," Counterpunch (online). http://www.counterpunch.org/christison01252003.html 6. J. J. Goldberg, ibid., p. 158. 7. ibid., p. 159. 8. University of Chicago, 1993, p. 1. 9. Footnote, The Nation, Feb. 10, 2003, p.13. 10. The Rogers Plan, introduced by Nixon's Secretary of State William Rogers was accepted by Egyptian President Gamal Nasser but turned down by Israel and the PLO, since at the time the Palestinians had dreams of returning to the entirety of what had been Palestine. Under the plan, the West Bank would have been returned to Jordan and Gaza to Egypt. 11. Ha'aretz, March 6, 1981. 12. Edward Tivnan, The Lobby, Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy, Simon & Schuster, 1988. 13. Z Magzine, December 1991. 14. Goldberg, op. cit. 15. Washington Jewish Week, March 22, 1990. 16. Washington Post, April 11, 2002. 17. New York Times, April 12, 2002. 18. International Herald Tribune, April 19, 2002. 19. Stephen Green, Taking Sides, America's Secret Relations with Militant Israel, William Morrow, 1984. 20. Al-Ahram, June 20-27, 2002. 21. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, Pantheon Books, 1988. 22. Chomsky, op. cit., p. 14. 23. George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball, The Passionate Attachment, America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present, Norton, 1992.

24. Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant, Simon and Shuster, 1995, p. 162-175. 25. The New Intifada, p. 9. 26. Los Angeles Times and Financial Times, August 18, 1981. 27. Bill and Kathy Christison, op. cit.; Robert G. Kaiser, "Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical On Mideast Policy," Washington Post, Feb. 9, 2003; p. A01 28. Forward, February 14, 2003 {end} (15) William Pfaff: The philosophers of chaos reap a whirlwind IHT Saturday, August 23, 2003 Washington's utopians http://iht.com/cgibin/generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&ArticleId=107 407 PARIS The intensification of violence in Iraq is the logical outcome of the Bush administration's choice in 2001 to treat terrorism as a military problem with a military solution - a catastrophic oversimplification. Choosing to invade two Islamic states, Afghanistan and Iraq, neither of which was responsible for the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, inflated the crisis, in the eyes of millions of Muslims, into a clash between the United States and Islamic society. The two wars did not destroy Al Qaeda. They won it new supporters. The United States is no more secure than it was before. The wars opened killing fields in two countries that no one knows how to shut down, with American forces themselves increasingly the victims. This was not supposed to happen. ... The neoconservatives believe that destruction produces creation. They believe that to smash and conquer is to be victorious. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel is an influence, although one would think they might have seen that a policy of "smash and conquer" has given him no victories in Lebanon or the Palestinian territories. They believe that the United States has a real mission, to destroy the forces of unrighteousness. They also believe - and this is their great illusion - that such destruction will free the natural forces of freedom and democracy.

In this, they are influenced by the Trotskyist version of Marxist millenarianism that was the intellectual seedbed of the neoconservative movement. But their idea is also very American, as they arecredulous followers of Woodrow Wilson, a sentimental utopian who really believed that he had been sent by God to lead mankind to a better world. They resemble Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, who in 1997 expressed astonishment at the gangster capitalism that had emerged in the former Soviet Union, and which still exists. He said he had assumed that dismantling communism would "automatically establish a free-market entrepreneurial system." ... (16) Neocons - meet the 'Marxist Right', by Justin Raimondo THE WAR PARTY UNMASKED They're red on the inside, red-white-and-blue on the outside ? meet the 'Marxist Right' by Justin Raimondo August 25, 2003 http://www.antiwar.com/justin/justincol.html The case of Christopher Hitchens is emblematic of so many things: how success can ruin a writer, how far an aristocratic British accent can get you on the American scene, how Trotskyism can morph into Rumsfeld-ism without any visible exertion. The former features editor of the Socialist Worker newspaper is today the Court Polemicist of the War Party, whose jeremiads now grace the glossy pages of Vanity Fair magazine. His evolution, more clearly and interestingly than any other figure, maps the progress of a new ideology, a political phenomenon unique to our time, one that is neither "left" nor "right." It is new because what made it possible is the global primacy of American military power, and Hitchens is its most consistent and articulate spokesman. Up until now, this new ideology has gone under more than a few aliases: neoconservatism, Shachtmanism, the Third Camp, Menshevism, social democracy, New Labour, the New Democrats. But now Hitchens, clever to a fault, has coined a new phrase, one that fits as none of the others ever did. At the end of his review of Eric Hobsbawm's recent memoir, in Sunday's New York Times, Hitchens discusses the decline of the British far left as the dominant force in the Labour Party. He notes that the supposedly unrepentant admirer of the Soviet Union and longtime Communist Party stalwart looked on this development approvingly. The labor movement, Hobsbawm argued, was a relic, its militancy long since dissipated by the rising standard of living. Hitchens writes:

"This was timed with extraordinary, if accidental, deftness. For many people on the existing left, it raised the curtain, not only on the decline of British Labor but also ? and then much less thinkable ? on the corollary ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher. Hobsbawm, in a whole chapter on this episode, makes it clear that he understood and even welcomed the logic of what he had said: the left had to be defeated, and its illusions dispelled, if progress was to resume." In a "dialectical" twist that seems almost a caricature of the concept, however, defeat has turned into victory for the British left. Shorn of illusions and radiating certainty, New Labour has achieved a new ideological synthesis that would have warmed the cockles of old Karl's heart. As Hitchens put it: "After a long and arduous shakeout, this has culminated in the near obliteration of the Tory Party and the rise to power of Tony Blair, at once the most radical and the most conservative of politicians. Very many of Blair's tough young acolytes received their political baptism in what I try to call the Marxist Right, the doctrines of which might be termed Hobsbawmian. Thus a long life devoted to the idea that history was inexorable has, as its summary achievement, the grand recognition that irony outlasts the dialectic." If Hitchens has been "trying" to call it "the "Marxist Right," then certainly libertarians and paleoconservatives ought to help him out. He has coined a very useful and deadly accurate phrase, one that should be immediately expropriated and spread far and wide. It precisely describes the up-until-now nameless creed that glories in the power and majesty of a rising Anglo-American imperium, and is being marketed in both "left" and "right" editions. The "Marxist Right" may be oxymoronic, but then that would make perfect sense in our post-9/11 Bizarro world, where up is down, left is right, and the ghost of Leon Trotsky roams the halls of the White House. In fighting a war, and more to come, to force the Middle East to undergo a "transformation," the U.S., under an ostensibly conservative chief executive, is undertaking a social engineering project beyond the wildest dreams of any Soviet commissar. Even the rhetoric of the War Party has acquired a Soviet lilt, complete with routine references to the "liberation" of Iraq and clumsy propaganda campaigns like the saga of Jessica Lynch. The "Marxist Right" ? that is what the movement ? or, I should say, persuasion ? of the neoconservatives is all about, not only intellectually, but also stylistically and in its methods of operation. It is a movement whose commissars are ruthless in purging

all dissidents, where unconditional support of a foreign power is a fundamental canon, and where power-worship is the secular religion of the intellectuals. Hitchens' brilliant formulation recalls the historical analogy made by Walter Russell Mead, in Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World: differentiating the Wilsonian and Jeffersonian schools of American foreign policy, he wrote that, while "the highest aim of Jeffersonian statecraft" centered around defending and preserving the libertarian legacy of the American Revolution, "This defensive spirit is very far from the international revolutionary fervor of the Wilsonian current in American life. Wilsonians could be called the Trotskyites of the American Revolution; they believe that the security and success of the Revolution at home demands its universal extension though the world. Jeffersonians take the Stalinist point of view: Building democracy in one country is enough challenge for them, and they are both skeptical about the prospects for revolutionary victories abroad and concerned about the dangers to the domestic Revolution that might result from excessive entanglements in foreign quarrels. Wilsonians are reasonably confident that the Revolutionary legacy in the United States is secure from internal dangers. They also believe that the United States, without too much blood or gold, can spread democracy around the world." So that's why all these former fans of the founder of the Red Army are now hailing the "liberating" power of American military might! I knew there had to be a reason. The Marxist Right echoes its leftist antecedents in its sense of historical inevitability. As Mead puts it, the Wilsonians believe "The tide of history is running with American democracy. The American revolution is sweeping the world." The neoconservatives, having once convinced themselves that the End of Ideology was upon us, came up with a new one in the 1990s: the End of History. The philosophy of Alexander Kojeve, who pronounced the United States as the embodiment and instrument of the Marxist vision of a "world homogenous state," was revived. The fall of the Kremlin, and the final victory of liberal democracy, or social democratic capitalism, meant that the battle was over: now it was just a matter of ironing out the details and defeating the last remnants of premodernity. History, it seems, is on the side of the neocons. This is what Irving Kristol, in his recent reaffirmation of the neoconservative faith, meant when he wrote:

"Neoconservatism is the first variant of American conservatism in the past century that is in the 'American grain.' It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic; and its general tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic." While Americans have been optimistic about themselves and their abilities, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that others have the same capacity or desire. Nor does optimism about the ability of individuals to transform the world translate easily into the belief that governments can have the same effect. It will take a triumph of "dialectical" thinking for the Marxist Right to explain how the deep conservative suspicion of government power at home becomes a naïve embrace of state-sponsored utopianism abroad. Hitchens, with characteristic perceptiveness, has homed in on a development both exciting and horrific. The Marxist Right is on the march. Trotsky-cons and Straussians, Israel Firsters and careerists on the make, the ranks of this new movement are varied ? and at times bizarre ? but they serve an essential function in the social economy of Empire. They are the Court Intellectuals, and every Imperial Court needs them: their job is to rationalize the Empire, to make sure it has support not only among the influentials, the cultural leaders and social and academic elites who dominate the national discourse, but also that this sense of fealty trickles down to the great unwashed masses. As an ideological current, the Marxist Right synthesizes the worst aspects of both sides of the political spectrum ? the militant utopianism of the left and the militaristic elitism of the right. It is the marriage of Socialism ? or Social Democracy, at any rate ? and Empire. A more compatible couple could not be imagined: this is a marriage made in Heaven, and Hitchens is their not-so-angelic offspring. The rise of the Marxist Right has to mean, therefore, the divorce of the neocons from their former allies, the traditional conservatives. That the two are parting ways at the crossroads of Empire is increasingly understood by both parties. Certainly it was understood by the late Murray N. Rothbard, the founder of the modern libertarian movement, in his 1992 speech to the John Randolph Club: "Social democracy is still here in all its variants, defining our entire respectable political spectrum, from advanced victimology and feminism on the left over to neoconservatism on the right. We are now trapped, in America, inside a Menshevik fantasy, with the narrow bounds of respectable debate set for us by various brands of Marxists. It is now our task, the task of the resurgent right, of the paleo movement, to break those bonds, to finish the job, to finish off Marxism forever." NOTES IN THE MARGIN

Put Cato Institute President Ed Crane's online interview with readers of the Washington Post in the category of Not to Be Missed. Long-time Crane-watchers such as myself were fascinated to see Ed rationalize waffling on free trade and foreign policy issues by some of his Cato associates on the grounds that we have to believe in "humility," like F. A. Hayek supposedly did. I'm glad to see Crane come out in favor of humility: now if only he could bring himself to experience it. Another question touched on the neocons, and the conservative intramural debate, and I cheered as Crane came out guns blazing: "Neoconservatives, in my view, are a pernicious force with dismaying influence in the Bush administration. On domestic policy they support big government across the board. They were the ones who created the "faith-based initiative" and talked Bush into supporting the greatest federal intrusion in education in American history. They support a massive welfare state. In foreign affairs they are reckless interventionists. The fiasco in Iraq can be laid at their feet. What we need is an alliance of libertarians, traditional limited government conservatives and those few liberals who still support true civil liberties." No humility there, and a good thing too! But the best part of the interview was the following exchange: New York, N.Y.: "You should be ashamed of yourselves. Cato is a big-business sponsored anarchists' club. You advocate denying access to courts, the elimination of all safety and health regulation, and the complete return of society to the dark ages. You are personally and professionally a villain, and the enemy of all civilized people." Edward H. Crane: "Dear Sir: You may well be right." Good old Ed. My hat's off to you ... ? Justin Raimondo {end} (17) Richard Kostelanetz, The End of Intelligent Writing Despite my interest in Religion and Spirituality, I have not been able to discuss these topics with my children. There seems to be a lack of common language with which to do so. Is it because Hollywood has put other thoughts in their minds? Is it because we don't make young people study history?

Richard Kostelanetz gives the answer: Richard Kostelanetz, The End of Intelligent Writing: Literary Politics in America (Sheed & Ward, NY 1974). [p. x] ... Knowledge that is not communicated has a way of turning the mind sour, of being obscured, and finally of being forgotten. C Wright Mills, "The Social Role of the Intellectual" (1944). ... [p. xi] Preface The title of this book announces its argument, which holds that a panoply of growing forces and festering symptoms forecast the likely end of "intelligent writing" or "literature" as we have known those traditions. The reason for this crisis is not that such writing is no longer produced - quite the contrary is true - or that it is not read also untrue - but that the channels of communication between intelligent writer and intelligent reader have become clogged and corrupted. [p. 12] ... Only an ingenue, however, could still think that the ascendancy of the Southern literati was purely serendipitous. ... The same pattern of insurgence was duplicated a decade and a half later by another well-organized literary minority, the Jewish-American writers. Here again was a core of critics and propagandists; a common commitment to MarxianFreudianism which politically branched into the two streams of democratic socialism and neo-liberalism ... {p. 13} What seemed at first surprising was how strongly this group disclaimed any allegiance to religious Judaism or even any interest in Jewish theology. [p. 14] ... none was Sephardic in background. ... The Jewish-American writers also sought to reroute the Western intellectual tradition, generally favoring continental (and often Jewish) precedents over AngloAmerican. Leslie A. Fiedler describes this attempted shift as fully realized: Through their Jewish writers, Americans, after the Second World War, were able to establish a new kind of link with Europe in place of the old pale-face connection - a link not with the Europe of decaying castles and the Archbishop of Canterbury, nor with that of the French symbolistes and the deadly polite Action Francaise - for these are all Christian Europes; but with the post-Christian Europes of Marx and Freud,

which is to say, of secularized Judaism, as well as the Europe of surrealism and existentialism, Kafka, neo-Chassidism. . . [p. 22] Both Jews and Southerners tended to favor, as noted before, certain political views ... and just as the Agrarians frequently refought the Civil War and Reconstruction, so did literary Jews persistently redo the Russian Revolution and the subsequent history of Marxian Socialism. ... [p. 43] Mostly Trotskyist in their sympathies, they had such a decided bias against Stalinism that they also opposed, as "fellow travellers", those intellectuals who were judged to be insufficiently anti-Communist. Through Partisan Review, to quote Fiedler again, "was born of such a marriage of Greenwich Village and [antiCommunist] Marxism" ... By the middle forties, Partisan would garner contributions from such European ex- or anti-Communists as Arthur Koestler {see koestler.html}, Andre Gide, George Orwell, Ignazio Silone (all of whom thus became implicit allies in their strictly parochial literary-political battle with the Jewish Communist writers) ... {end} more at kostel.html. Christopher Hitchens illustrates the path from Jewish Trotskyist to Neocon. Christopher Hitchens For War against Iraq: "It is impossible to compromise with the proponents of sacrificial killing of civilians, the disseminators of anti-Semitic filth, the violators of women and the cheerful murderers of children." Saving Islam from bin Laden, By Christopher Hitchens The Age, Melbourne, September 5 2002: http://www.theage.com.au/handheld/articles/2002/09/04/1031115884039.htm. Hitchens has Jewish relatives. Perhaps the connection between Trotskyism and NeoCons is that many Trotskyists identified as Jews, and with Zionism. How Trotskyists led the Australian Labor Party up the Free Trade path: xTrots.html. The Neocons' trick has been to "converge" their plans with the Anglo-American Empire's, so that Imperial leaders can't tell the difference. Samuel Huntington's book The Clash of Civilizations envisages a clash between the Anglo-American Empire, and Islam and China: huntington.html.

Casper Weinberg's book The Next War (co-authored with Peter Schweizer) envisages future wars against Part One: North Korea & China Part Two: Iran Part Three: Mexico Part Four: Russia Part Five: Japan. In each case, he makes the US nearly lose, but win in the end. Of course, two of these wars might be going on at once. Weinberger was Reagan's Defense Secretary. Although Jewish, he tried to stop Israel from developing its own fighter, the Lavi, by appropriating F16 technology. Note that Iraq does not even appear in Weinberg's candidates for war; the book was published in 1996. But of course, Iraq was on the Neocons' roadmap, and Mossad's. The early Soviet Union - after Lenin and Trotsky, but before Stalin's ascendancy: soviet-union-early.html.