LEGRES Case Digests

LEGAL RESEARCH

I.

Plagiarism/ Other unethical conduct

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM ETC AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO (A.M. NO. 10U7U17USC) DOCTRINE: Rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies. Emergency Digest: (recitLready, condensed digest) 

Supreme Court issued a decision, which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books to support the assailed decision.



As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence. Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated. No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies



ISSUE: WON Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, plagiarize the published works of authors Tams, Criddle N Descent, and Ellis

HELD: NO, Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, did NOT plagiarize the published works of authors Tams, CriddleNDescent, and Ellis. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.  

Their duty is to apply the law as it is written. This is the basic reason why judges reinstate the laws involved in cases do not use original/unique language in reinstating the law is because of stare decisis Rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies

CARPIO - dissenting in every case there is a legal duty ot make the proper attributions when copying passages from copywrited works because the law expressly requires such attribution without exception Violated CANON 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote/misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or text of a decision or authority or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as fact that which has not been proved JUDGES : allowed to plagiarize but cannot misquote or mislead (must have evil intent)

LAWYERS – 2011 Resolution – same rule applies to lawyers. They can invoke the rule as long as they must not misquote based on their sources STUDENTS - can impose a rule prohibiting plagiarism  Academic freedom (based on academic policies)  Even without intent

INTRO TO LEGAL RESEARCH  Searching for authority that can be applied to a given set of facts and issues  Gathering information to support legal theories  HOW? Primary source trumps up secondary cases Dissent v main decisions Obiter v main ration HOW NOT TO CONDUCT RESEARCH PLAGIARISM  Unauthorized use  Without adequate attribution  Of the published ideas, expresions, works of another  With intent/through neglect  To pass the same as his/her own, in any written materials submitted, printed, published in any law school publication in compliance with academic requirements ALS CATALOGUE Notwithstanding any jurisprudence to the contrary, and in accordance with the exercise of the constitutionally recognized “academic freedom”, plagiarism is identified not through intent but through the act itself, the objective act of falsely attributing to one’s self what is not one’s work whether intentional or out of neglect is sufficient to conclude that plagiarism has occurred One who pleads ignorance appeals to lack of malice/alleges poor instruction from teacher/superiors are not valid excuses Plagiarism is unauthorized use, without adequate attribution of the published ideas, expressions, works of another, with the intent or through neglect to pass the same as his or her own in any written materials, submitted printed or published in any law school publication in compliance with academic requirements FUNDAMENTAL RULES ON CITATION - compile citation details while writing body Primary authorities - actual rules of law created by government bodies -laws and codes - case decisions Secondary authorities - books -journal articles - theses -news clips -reliable websites

HIPOS v BAY Petition for Mandamus against the court seeking a reversal of the Order of judge Bay of RTC

which denied the Motion to Withdraw information of the Office of the City Prosecutor

refuses/neglect to evaluate such recommendation and insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already aquired jurisdiction over the cirminal action

FACTS     



Two Informations for the crime of rape and crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, et al Private complainants filed a Motion for Reinvestifation asking Judge Bay to order City prosecutor of QC to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their accused. Judge Bay granted motion and ordered reinvestigation of cases Petitioners then filed a Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case before the City Prosecutor due to no probable cause of holding them liable for the crimes charged Office of the Prosecutor issuesd a resolution on reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners Asst Ciry Prosecutor Lamberto, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the case as an appeal of the Resolution, reversed the Resolution holding that there was lack of probable case. On the same day, City prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order

ISSUE: can the Supreme Court compel respondent Judge Bay to dismiss the case through writ of Mandamus. By virtue of the resolution from the Office of the City Prosecutor of QC finding no probable cause against the accused Mandamus  extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer./person immediately or at some specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust/station/when respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right/office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law  compels an officer to perform ministerial duty, not a discretionary one  will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court 

It appears that that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading the Court in violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, because in the case of People v Montesa, the counsel tried to convince the court that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw informations from the prosecution only when there is GAOD on the part of persecutors moving for such withdrawal and that where there is no GAD on part of prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Informations is void

 The trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court’s order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an INDEPENDENT and COMPETENT assessment of the issue presented in the motion to dismiss The bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assemssment of the merits of such motion A trial court however commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it

ALLIED BANKING v COURT OF APPEALS HELD:  



Preliminary matter: misquoting decisions of the Supreme Court by Atty. Durano The phrase, “refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family” does not appear anywhere in the Dosch v NLRC found in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) o Syllabus – is not part of the court’s decision; a counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the court Rule 10.02 Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly quote or misrepresnt the text of a decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately

Whether Galinda was transferred for just cause :  The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion in rank or dimunition of the employee’s salary, benefits, and other privileges.  In illegal dismissal cases ---the employer has the burden of showing that the transfer is not unnnecessary, inconvenient, and prejudicial to the displaced employee.  Allied bank did not single out Galanida. Galanida was well aware of the bank’s policty of periodically transferring personnel to different branches.  Galanida’s transfer in the nature of a demotion. Galanida did not present evidence showing that the transfer would diminish his salary, benefits, or other privileges -the bank assured Galanida that he wouls not suffer any reduction in rank/grade and the transfer would involve the same rank, duties, and obligations.  There’s no basis that Allied Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing Galanida = the constitutional rights of workers and employee to self-organization Dosch v NLRC - not applicable to present case -Dosch transfer consequential to promotion. Court upheld refusal because no law compels an employee to accept promotion COMELEC v NOYNAY FACTS COMELEC resolved to file a information for violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents for having engaged in partisan political activities. Informations for violation of the Omnibus Election Code were filed with Branch 23 of the RTC. However the presiding judge ordered the records of the case to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Dept to file the cases to the appropriate Municipal Trial Court because RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum impossible penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six-years of imprisonment. The petitioner however filed the special civil action that contends that the public respondent has erroneously miscontrued the provisions of Rep Act in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses. Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, RTC have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action/proceedings for violation of the Code.

The exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial courts, and Municiap Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdicion of RTC and Sandiganbayan regardless of the penalty prescribed, jurisdiction is retained by RTC. Sec 32 of BP Blg 129 as amended by Sec 2 RA No 7691

FACTS Max Schoop seeks admittance to practice law in the Philippine islands under paragraph 4 of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law RULE: Applicants who may be admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines are :

 

1. Those who have been admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the United States/any circuit court of appeal or district court therein, or highest court of any State or territory of the US, which State or territory by comity confers the same privilege on attorney admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands 2. who can show by satisfactory affidavits that they have practiced at least 5 years in any of said courts, may, in the discretion of the court be admitted without examination

“it is obvious that the respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Secton 32 of BP Blg 129 as amended. To remind him as well as other judges, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself. To be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence. Counsel for Atty Balbuena must also be admonished for carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge uan Levilles in the Motion for Reconsideration. He would have known to correct name of the complainant in the case, Alberto Naldeza ALBERTO NALDOZA. The quoted portions were not part of the findings / rulings



The rule of New York states: 1. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced 5 years as member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia 2. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced 5 years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common Law



It seems proper to enter upon the consideration of whether or not under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity is established Admission is in the discretion of the court

Every lawyer shall not knowlingly misquote/misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. Rule 10.02



HISTORY Common Law in the Philippine Islands  SC has not decided upon the extend of the English or Anglo-American Common law in the Philippines  Common law jurisprudence however is used when they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions and are not in conflict with existing laws  Philippine Reports of cases cites Common Law jurisprudence (its rules, principles, and doctrines) in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the legislation enacted for Philippine Islands under American Sovereignty

WEEK 4 and 5 I. The Constitution and Statutory Law Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a) Overview of the Philippine Legal system ; MALCOLM, J IN RE SHOOP (1920)

Review of legislative history  Court said that provisions of legislative enactments which have been borrowed form or modelled upon Anglo-American precedents needs to be reviewed on the basis of its legislative history  For authoritative guide for the interpretation and application of decisions Philippine Statute Law  Philippine reports show an increasing reliance upon English and American authorities in the formation of what may be termed as Philippine Common Law , Shows a great preponderance of jurisprudence of precedents  Expands the remnants of Spanish Codes and written laws History Spanish law – highly codified during 19th century; all laws however not applicable to Philippine Islands, only those were effective here which were extended by royal decree Spanish chief codes Penal Code Code of Commerce

Special laws Mining Law Notarial Law

Code of Criminal Procedure, Code of Civil Procedure Civil Code Marriage Law Mortgage Law Railway Law Law of the Waters    

Spanish Military Code Copyright Law

No common law or case law to accompany statutes Customs however constituted, in a sense, unwritten law Spanish jurisprudence does not consider stare decisis ; a lower court of Spain is at liberty to disregard the decisions of a higher court Partidas –code law, cases which cannot be decided either by local fueros must be decided by provisions of Partidas (codified law)

Manresa, RULES BY WHICH COURTS ARE GOVERNED: 1) Written law 2) Customs of place 3) Judicial decision 4) General principles of law In the Philippines,  Common law is expanded slowly and carefully by judicial decisions based on standard of justice derived from the habits, customs, thoughts of the people  Duty of judges to not make common law but to find it and when found, affix it with official mark by which it becomes more certainly known and authenticated  Anglo-American case law has entered practically every one of the leading subjects in the field of law and has formed sole basis for guidenance of this court in developing local jurisprudence  The Philippine Common Law supplements and amplifies law

Conclusions 1) The Philippine Islands is an unorganized territory of the US, under a civil government established by Congress 2) In interpreting and applying the bulk of written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decision in cases not covered by the letter of the written law,  

3) 4)

this court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases  where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions Jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the English Common Law in its present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exlusive extent New York rule, given a reasonable interpretation, permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in the ISSUE Whether Max Shoop may practice law in the Philippines? HELD GRANTED

PRIMARY AUTHORITIES

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES

-not always mandatory -Constitution -Codes and Statutes -Cases Court opinions – lower court opinions are not binding – ONLY SC -Legislative Materials

- all are persuasive -Executive and Administrative materials -Rules of Procedures -Ordinances

Sec 7, CIVIL CODE Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)

ANGARA v ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS LAUREL, J.: I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935. Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion. II.

THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? III. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition.] NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx. [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. IN THE MATTER PETITIONS IN THE BAR FACTS In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 19501953 – 75%). Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.  An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.

 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.  The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.  Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.  Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void. HELD: Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (19531955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.) 1935 – The NA has power to repeal, alter in the admission of the practice of the law in the Philippines Always check statement of the court and laws cited If congress passes a law, then you say unconstitutional, do you a say on its unconstitutionality? 1. 2. 3.

LAWS ARE CONSITUTIONAL ON THE FF GROUND Congress exceeded powers Law establish arbitrary methods and forms Purposes and effects of the law violates the constitution and basic principles

Constitutional Supremacy – when a statute /law is contrary to constitution, consti will prevail; unless it is declared by supreme court as unconstitutional it is presumed valid Supreme Court Art 8 - Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. (n) If SC interprets constitution its above the statute SERRANO v GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC FACTS

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages. The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for damages as prayed was awarded. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995. Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads: Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano. ISSUES

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on nonimpairment of contracts; 2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector. HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto. As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998.Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042. But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare. On the second issue. The answer is in the affirmative. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law. Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances. Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class. There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that

the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels: First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more; Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers. Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals. Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment. The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means. What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern. In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve. In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause. Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLAREDUNCONSTITUTIONAL Note:

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of theacts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity; and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case, otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other ground. ---As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment. Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides: Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence. Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts. While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit: Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the contract

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT V CABILES FACTS





Decide on a petition for review on certiorari assailing CA’s decision. The decision partially affirmed National Labor Relations Commission resolution declaring respondent’s dismissal illegal, directing petitioner to pay respondent 3-month salary equivalent to New Taiwan Dollar Petioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, is a recruitment and placement agency where respondent Joy Cabiles submitted her application to work in Taiwan MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS FACTS



The Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued.



In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,



Manila Prince Hotel, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution “Filipino first policy” and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.



Manila Prince also said that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its businesses also unquestionable part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm for the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares, GSIS may offer this to the other qualified bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these qualified bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share

ISSUE Whether or not the provisions of Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing or non self executing



Non-executory provisions  Some constitutions are merely declaratory that requires legislative enactment to be carried out  Provision which lays down general principle such as those found in Art II of the 1987 Constitution are not self executing Executory provisions  Provisions that are complete in itself and has operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation or that which supplied sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected  Legislative may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution: - further the operation of such provision -prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement - provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured -place reasonable safeguards to secure a right Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of selfexecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic GR: In case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when / whether they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinate to the will of the law making bodies In case at hand, Sec 10, Art XII is self-executing and judicially enforceable. There I 

As the Filipino first policy was deemed self executing, the court ruled that the qualified Filipino entity must be given preference by granting it the option to match the winning bid because the provision. The Supreme Court, therefore, directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.



The rule is that (from Agpalo) in the case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self executing rather than non self executing. Such is the case with Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “in grant of rights and privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipino”. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.



Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary meaning the term patrimony pertains to heritage . the constitution speaks of national patrimony , it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the constitution could have very well used the term natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos and

If self executing: the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy (Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution) and is therefore null and void. HELD The Constitution  System of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute, unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates from the people.  The fundamental and paramount law of the nation  Prescribes a general framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded  Supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority is administered Doctrine of Constitutional supremacy  Since constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract

If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void

therefore an example the Manila hotel which has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage 

The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners, and this is not to be taken lightly as Nationalism is inherent in the concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

HOW A BILL BECOMES A LAW PHIL CONSTI art. VI Sec. 26 [PARA 2] No bill passed by either House Shall become a law unless :  it has passed 3 readings on separate days and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its member 3 days before its passage except When President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet: (ground for certification) a) public calamity b) emergency Upon last reading of the bill , - No amendment thereto shall be allowed - Vote thereon shall be taken immediately after - Yeas and nays entered in the journal

It shall become a law In all cases, the votes of each House shall be determined By yeas or nays and Names of Members voting for or against shall be entered in its journal 2)

The President Shall have the power to veto any particular item/items in an :  appropriation,  revenue, or  tarrif bill, BUT veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object

EFFECTIVITY CIVIL CODE Art 2. Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. (As amended by EO 200) TANADA v TUVERA (1986) FACTS: petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

SEC 27 : VETO POWER OF PRESIDENT 1) Every bill passed by Congress Shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to President [AT OP]  If he approves the same: he shall sign it  Otherwise: he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to House where it originated [AT THE HOUSE]  Which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it  If after such reconsideration, 2/3 of all the members of such House Shall AGREE to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with objections,  to the other House by which it shall like wise be considered, and If APPROVED by 2/3 of the Members of that House

In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official Gazette is a requirement for its effectivity. HELD: YES

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.  Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.



While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President.  without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.  the publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. 

It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents

 The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. 

A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.



All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.



Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. J. Cruz:

CIVIL CODE Art 3: Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith Art 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided Art 5: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity ADMIN CODE Chapter 5 OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided. Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided. Sec. 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted. Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise Sec. 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith Chapter 6 OFFICIAL GAZETTE Sec. 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by

law; and such documents or classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time to have general application or which he may authorize so to be published

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority Sec. 25. Editing and Publications. - The Official Gazette shall be edited in the Office of the President and published weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be sold and distributed by the National Printing Office which shall promptly mail copies thereof to subscribers free of postage.chanrobles virtual law library

TAWANG MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE v LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT (2011)

ISSUE SPOTTING

FACTS:

IRAC FORMULA (divide matter into four variables) - Issue -Rule -Analysis -Conclusion

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application, arguing that its franchise is exclusive as provided under PD 198. A CPC is however granted. LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by NWRB. LTWD then appealed to the RTC where it court set aside the NWRB decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition may be granted HELD: Yes. RTC Decision Set Aside. Political Law- No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorizationbe exclusive in characteror for a longer period than fifty years. Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that,"nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character."There is no exception. When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly. In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.

ISSUE 1. 2. 3. 4.

Check fact first Key to issue spotting is being able to identify facts raised Disregard unnecessary facts Focus on facts may the parties go to court; having issues with

Question of fact v Question of law QOF: the parties are in dispute over what happened  Facts of the case QOL: the court is unsure which rule to apply to these facts RULE What is the law Is it applicable to the facts presented? Guide questions: Are there exceptions to the rule? Scope What are the elements From what authority does the rule come?  Ordinance , Constitution, Law ANALYSIS “Lawyering” - compare the facts to the rule to the form of Analysis For every relevant fact, ask whether fact prove or disprove the rule - check fact and law together - you may NOT end with a recital of the rule. YOU SHOULD APPLY IT CONCLUSION Take a stand Based on analysis, come to a conclusion as to whether rule applies Make sure that whatever you conclude is supported by your analysis Limit the scope  Only answer the question being asked

Recognize uncertainties Conclusion should always be stated as a probable result

TITLE

For each conclusion, there are different analysis

ENACTING CLAUSE  Written immediately after title which state

Ex. Force upon things ISSUE RULE  Elements of robbery (299)  Theft = reached out; not theft no entrance ANALYSIS  Apply rule to facts

BODY Declaration of policy – purpose Sanctions – complex laws Sanctions – penal laws Transitory provision – interim measures, law requires enactment of IRR SEPARABILITY CLAUSE  Provision that if any provision of act is declared uncocnsituttional, the remained shall not be affected thereby; not remain valid  Court can otherwise declare whole law unconstitutional REPEALING CLAUSE Law repealing another law Law of supreme court declaring a law unconstitutional – prevail over the law

PARTS OF A STATUTE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Preamble Title Enacting statute Body Separability clause Repealing clause Effectivity clause

PREAMBLE  Prefatory statement, explanation or finding of facts reciting  Basis why law was enacted

Express and implied repeal Example: SEC 8 Repealing clause – all laws,executive orders, or administrative order, rules o EFFECTIVITY CLAUSE  Provision when law takes effect CC – General rule : 15 days after publication in OG and newspaper of general circulation * publication not dispensed with *publication will not be sufficient if it were published in tabloids