Legprof FINAL EXAM Digests _1

Legprof digests: (yellow yung kulang, bale ito lang yung sa last 12 cases, for the other  digests, consult the one uploaded by max sa facebook group) 1. In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 581) page 1 2. Zaldival v. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316) page 2 3. Maceda v. Ombudsman (GR No. 102781) page 4 4. Wicker v. Archangel 252 SCRA 445 page 5 5. Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo 36 SCRA 137 -> can’t fi nd online. page 5 (slight comment lang, wag pagkatiwalaan kung may orig copy kayo) 6. People v. Cawili 34 SCRA 728 – relationship page 6 7. Mejia v. Reyes 4 SCRA 648 page 6 8. Uychico v Unionlife Assurance page 7 9. Regala v. Sandiganbayan 262 SCRA 125 page 8 10. Hilado v. David 84 Phil 571 page 12 11. Nakpil v. Valdez March 4, 1998 page 13 12. De Jesus v. Hon. Tan 106 Phil 560 wala

1.) IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562 2/18/70) 2/18/70) FACTS:

Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme Supreme Court”. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled by men who are ca lloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.” His client, he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the cause of his client ”in the people’s forum,” so that “ people may know of the silent injustices inj ustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever  mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed committed must never be repeated.” repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer that: “………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.” The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains agains his client. On June 15, 1966 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he he moved for its reconsideration but but did not notify the latter of the time and plce plce of hearing on said motion. motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof proof of  service, ‘the trial court denied both both motions. To prove that he did serve serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty.

Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful te rms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

2.) 166 SCRA 316 – Legal Ethics – Contemptuous Language – Duty of a Lawyer  Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for  violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of  the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he  proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course”. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six

 justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt. HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute

contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their  oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the s ystem of administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of  the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer. Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be  bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar  case. The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

3.)Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781)

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of 

the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for  a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months. Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an

encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the

SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its  personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running

afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint  and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court  employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

4.) Kelly R. Wicker et. al vs. hon. Paul T. Arcangel G.R. No. 112869. Jan. 29, 1996. 252 SCRA 444

PONENTE: Mendoza FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent Judge Arcangel from the case. Respondent judge found offense in the allegations on the motion for inhibition filed  by complainants, and in an order, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of Dec 17, 1993. HELD: The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to  preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangel's f inding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His cli ent came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client. Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case." 5.) Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo, 36 SCRA 137 The aim of the lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rulesare precisely designed to accomplice such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. Rule 10.03 ng canon (Rule 10.03.A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice) -> basically, the case was already convincingly decided but gusto pa ring ipaglaban,

or at least yun pagkaintindi ko.

6.) People vs Cawili (Duty of diligence)

Failure to submit brief by counsel de parte within the reglementary period was the occasion of a reprimand in People v. Cawili.27 The lawyer in this case sought to minimize his non-feasance by alleging that his client was in a state of indigence, resulting in the non-payment of his services and his assumption of part of the expenses entailed in the defense e.g., printing of the brief. He als o advanced the cavalier opinion that a mere review of the case will readily show that the lower court's decision is contrary to law and the evidence, This explanation did not warrant full exculpation, according to the Court's measure, since the lawyer could have sought  permission to file a mimeographed brief, or at the very least informed thecourt of his difficulties. Sympathizing on the other hand inhis travails, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded respondent and admonishedhim to be more careful in the fulfillment of  his obligations to hisclients and to the Court. 7. Mejia vs Reyes Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case (Cantorne vs. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23 and In re: De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258). The respondent's act of  appearing and acting as counsel for the complainantsJose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him  bank attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice. However, it does not appear  satisfactorily proventhat during the pendency of their case the complaints did not know of the respondents connection with the bank as attorney and notary public. On the other hand, it appears that notwithstanding the letter dated 21 July 1955 written by Mr. L.D. Herrera, manager of the BaguioBranch, quoting a part of a previous letter  sent to him (Herrera) by attorney Ramon B. de los Reyes, chief legal counsel of the Philippine National Bank, stating that —  We note that the complaint is signed by our Bank Attorney and Notary Public, Atty. Francisco S. Reyes, in behalf of the Law Office of Reyes and Cabato. Needless to say, it is unethical for Atty. Reyes, who is presently the attorney of the Bank, to represent the plaintiffs here whose interest are diametrically opposed to those of the Bank. As this is certainly embarrassing both for Atty. Reyes and for the Bank, it is requested that you please take this matter with Atty. Reyes with the end in view of advising him to desist from representing the plaintiffs in this case, otherwise, we will be compelled, much to our regret, to recommend severance of his official connection with this Bank,. which shows that the Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was appearing as counsel for the complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and notary public; that i n the civil case the respondent did not appear as counsel for the Bank which was represented by at torneys Ramon B. de los Reyes and Nemesio P. Libunao; that no appeal was taken from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio, because the complainants had chosen to pay the principal of their loan on or before 31 December 1956 in order t hat

the interests thereon be condoned as provided for in Republic Act No. 1286 (Exhibits 13 to 17); and that the respondent was deeply devoted to his duties as counsel for the complainants and collected a very small attorney's fees of P90, the malpractice committed by the respondent is not so serious. He is just admonished and warned not to repeat it.

Canon 21 !!!!! (yung uy chico) 8.) Uy Chico vs. The Union Life Assurance Society, Limited G.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915 Facts: In 1897 petitioner’s father died. He continued the business still in the name of  his father after buying the share of his brother in the said business. Petitioner filed a case seeking therecovery of the proceeds of 2 insurance policies on stock of dry goods that was destroyedin a fire. These policies were surrendered by the petitioner’s lawyer  to the administrator of his father’s estate, who had compromised with the defendant for ½ of the face value of theinsurance that was paid to the court. He alleged that said  policies belong to him and that hewas not bound by the compromised agreement made by the administrator. The companyintroduced evidence showing that the  petitioner had agreed to the settlement of the policieswhen his lawyer surrendered the same to the estate’s administrator. Petitioner, on thewitness stand had been asked if he had any objection as to his lawyer testifying concerningthe surrender of the policies to which he negatively replied. Whereupon, the lawyer of the petiti oner formally withdraw the waiver given by the petitioner and objected to thetestimony on the ground of privileged communication. Issue: Whether or not instruction of the client to be delivered to a third person is considered privilege Held: No. A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the same Act. It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for theinformation of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising theclient as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its  being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistentwith the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a t hird person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.

9. Regala vs Sandiganbayan

REGALA ET AL. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR NO. 105938, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 FACTS : Clients consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn,  petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought,i.e the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.

1. July 31, 1987 – complaint before the Sandiganbayan of PCGG vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., (principal defendant) et al. for recovery of  alleged ill-gotten wealth, i. e., s hares of stocks in named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "R. P. v. Cojuangco, et al." 2. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners (plus private respondent Raul S. Roco) - then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm). 3. ACCRA Law Firm –  acquired info on assets of clients, personal and  business circumstances; assisted in organization and acquisition of   business associations and/or organizations (companies listed in Civil Case 0033), where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders etc; delivered documents which substantiate the clie nt's equity holdings,i.e(1) stock certificates endorsed in blank  representing the shares registered in the client's name, and (2) a  blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares; acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings (as office practice) 4. August 20, 1991 - respondent PCGG’s "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" excluded private respondent Raul Roco from complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 because of  his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for  whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 5. Third Amended Complaint – said defendants conspired i n helping set up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, UCPB, UNICOM,

COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than 20 other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San MiguelCorporation shares 6. ACCRA Investments Corporation - became the holder of  approximately 15 million shares (roughly 3.3%) of total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987; 44 among the top 100  biggest stockholders of UCPB (about 1,400,000 shareholders); a wholly-owned investment arm

7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately3,744shares as of February, 1984 ofUCPB 8. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA – said that is only in legitimate lawyering; became holders of shares of s tock in the corporations listed but do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock; said Avelino V. Cruz an incorporator in 1976 of  Mermaid Marketing Corporation but for legitimate business purposes and already transferred shares. 9. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini - denied being involved in the alleged ill-gottenwealth. 10. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion of ACCRA – moving that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants)as accorded Roco. 11. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely (PCGG’s Comment): (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) deeds of assignments petitioners executed for clients covering shares 12. PCGG’s supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of his the counsel reiterating previous request for reinvestigation; (b) Affidavit as Attachment; (c) Letter of  the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence of PCGG against Roco 13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal identity of the client, nor undertook to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 14. March 18, 1992 - respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated Resolution herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners for  their refusal to comply with the conditions by PCGG 15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict application of the law of agency; absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, disclosure not constitute a substantial distinction for equal protection clause, favoritism and undue preference; not holding that, under the facts of t his case, the attorney-client privilege

 prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their  client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG; unreasonable or unjust ISSUE: Privileged Information Whether or not the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei) may beasserted in refusing to disclose the identity of clients [name of   petitioners' client(s)] under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case HELD: The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their  clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not  privileged information. Sandiganbayan resolution annulled and set aside. Petitioners excluded from complaint.

1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. Reasons: 1. Court has a right to knowthat the client whose privileged information is sought to  be protectedis flesh and blood. 2. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclientrelationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. 3. Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter  of the relationship. 4. Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. 2. BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the client's name itself  has an independent significance, such that discl osure would then reveal client confidences 1. A strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. (Baird exception for freedom of consultation) 2. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability. (case at bar) 3. Government's lawyers have no case a gainst an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (case at bar – BAIRD EXCEPTION) 4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance (case at bar) 5.Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential 3. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients, after the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance — the names of their clients in exchange for 

exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG Mario Ongkiko) - "so called client i s Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients) 4. No valid cause of action. It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services  performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. 5. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires themwithout reference to the object of which the services are to be  performed. Their services may be compensated by honorarium or forhire, andmandato(contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. 6. OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws Applicable a. Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 "forbids counsel, without authority of  his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment."  b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: “Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: “An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of…” c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: “duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept ept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.” d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.” e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," 7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides a wall of   protection against uneven application of status and regulations. In the  broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven applicationof legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment.

8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incriminationand subverts the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. 10.) 74 HILADO v DAVID

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Blandina Hilado (ganda ng pangalan!) brought an action against Selim Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot exected by Hilado’s husband. Delgado et al. was counsel for Hilado, while Ohnick et al filed an answer for  Assad. Later on, Atty Vicente Francisco entered his appearance for Assad substituting Ohnick et al. The firm of Delgado urged Atty Francisco to stop representing Assad since there exists an atty-client relationship between him (Francisco) and the other   party (Hilado) in the same case. It was alleged that Hilado consulted Francisco regarding the case and that the former turned over papers to the latter. From such documents, Francisco sent a written opinion to Hilado. Since makulit si Francisco, Delgado et al. sought to disqualify Francisco from representing Assad in the case. Francisco’s defense was that he only met Hilado once and this was when the latter informed him about the case. He added that when Hilado left documents in their office, he told his assistant to tell Hilado that their firm would not handle her case. And that the written opinion was made by his assistant, which he signed without reading, and only for t he purpose of explaining to Hilado why his firm rejected the case. David is the judge trying the case who dismissed the complaint for  disqualification against Francisco. Said judge reasoned that no attorney-client relationship existed between Hilado and Francisco.

Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado? Should Atty Francisco be disqualified from representing Assad? Held: The firm of Francisco mailed a written opinion to Hilado on the merits of the case (with Francisco’s signature); this opinion was reached on the basis of papers submitted at his office; and that Hilado’s purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Francisco’s professional services. From these ultimate facts, an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado can be said to have ensued. To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. When a person consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view of obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney

voluntarily permits or acquiesces in s uch consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. The existence of attorney-client relationship precludes the attorney from representing (and receiving a retainer from) the opposite party in the same case. An information professionally obtained by an attorney from a client is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it be used in the interest of another, or  in the interest of the adverse party is to strike at the element of confidence which forms the basis of an attorney-client relationship. The rule inhibiting an attorney from acting in behalf of both parties is implied in the Rules of Court (wala pang codified codes of professional responsibility noon). The defense that Francisco never read the written opinion nor the documents submitted by Hilado will not preclude the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The fact remains that his firm did give Hilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the relation. The letter bi nds and estops him in the same manner and degree as if he wrote it personally. And an information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of the firm is information imparted to the f irm. The failure to object to counsel’s appearance does not operate as a waiver of the right to ask for counsel’s disqualification. Motion for disqualification against Attorney Francisco should be a llowed. *A retaining fee (just in case itanong) is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or  counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. 11.) NAKPIL v VALDES

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Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy the  property in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands’ titles were transferred to his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of  Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of  Jose Nakpil. What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans he contracted. What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint for  disbarment against Valdes. The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI. The complaint for reconveyance went up to t he SC and was decided in favor  of Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil.

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W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely: o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil; Including his loans as claims on the estate; and o o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm  prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.

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The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year. The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his  professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. It was clear that Jose  Nakpil and Atty. Came to an agreement that the latter would be buying the  property in trust for Jose. By his act of excluding the property from the estate and including the loans he contracted (and used for his own benefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose and him (they had a close relationship since the 50’s), which was the basis for Imelda’s decision to use his services. As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.