Legalethics 2015 Edited

Dean’s Circle 2016 University of Santo Tomas Digested by: DC 2016 Members Editors: Tricia Lacuesta Lorenzo Gayya Cristopher Reyes Macky Siazon Janine Arenas Ninna Bonsol Lloyd Javier

LEGAL ETHICS

Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016

Table of Contents Legal Ethics ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 A. Practice of law (Rule 138) ........................................................................................................................ 2 B. Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer ............................................................................................ 3 To Society ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 To the Legal Profession ................................................................................................................................ 5 To the Courts..................................................................................................................................................... 9 To the Clients ................................................................................................................................................. 15 C. Suspension, Disbarment and Discipline of Lawyers................................................................... 33 D. Readmission to the Bar........................................................................................................................... 36 E. Notarial Practice ........................................................................................................................................ 37 Judicial Ethics .......................................................................................................................................................... 41 Discipline of the Members of the Judiciary ............................................................................................ 48 Disqualification of Judges and Justices..................................................................................................... 61 Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers .............................................................................. 63 Retirement of Members of the Judiciary ................................................................................................. 67

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS A. PRACTICE OF LAW (Rule 138) PILAR IBANA – ANDRADE and CLARE, SINFOROSA ANDRADE-CASILIHAN v. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA A.C. No. 8313, July 14, 2015, SERENO, CJ. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Facts: The suspension order was received by Respondent Atty. Moya on July 15, 2008. Despite this, she continued to practice law in various cases, as shown by the pleadings she filed and the certifications noted by the Report. In fact, she continued receiving various fees for her services throughout the duration of her suspension. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Moya engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. RULING: Yes. In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension. Therefore, as the Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from the active practice of law for six ( 6) months with stem warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely in light of this and the jurisprudence already cited, the Supreme Court adopts the recommendation.

RE: DECISION DATED 17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-28361 ENTITLED "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSELITO C. BARROZO" FORMER ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR JOSELITO C. BARROZO A.C. No. 10207, July 21, 2015, PER CURIAM Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, thus, a ground for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an attorney. Facts: Barrozo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery by the Sandiganbayan, which later on became final and executory. Thereafter, a disbarment case was filed against him. Subsequently, upon Order of the Court, the Office of the bar confidant evaluated the case and came up with recommending the disbarment of respondent. Issue:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Whether respondent should be disbarred by reason of his conviction of the crime of direct bribery. Ruling: Yes. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. It must be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime respondent was an assistant public Prosecutor of the City of Dagupan. His act therefore of extorting money from a party to a case handled by him does not only violate the requirement that cases must be decided based on the merits of the parties respective evidence but also lessens the people’s confidence in the rule of law. Indeed, respondent’s conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, especially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tends to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice. Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard of his oath as a government official but is likewise of such a nature as to negatively affect his qualification as a lawyer, respondent must be disbarred from his office as an attorney.

B. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER 1. TO THE SOCIETY ANTONINA S. SOSA v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA A.C. No. 8776, March 22, 2015, BRION, J. The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment. Facts: Atty. Mendoza failed to pay the money he borrowed from Ms. Sosa. The check issued by Atty. Mendoza was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Mendoza ignored several demand letters sent by Ms. Sosa. She filed a complaint for disbarment, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01: “ a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is guilty of misconduct. Ruling: Yes. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment." We find it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and acknowledgement receipt showing he received P500,000.00.19 Although he initially denied getting this amount and claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any evidence to prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without qualification as to the amount.20 Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the postdated check upon Atty.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Mendoza’s request, and based on his promises that he would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the check – when finally deposited – was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not dispute. As a final note, the Court understands the frustration of, and sympathizes with Ms. Sosa in her present situation. However, because the matter is not a civil action for the collection money, the Court cannot order Atty. Mendoza to pay his outstanding loan. The Court can only clarify that the ruling in this case is without prejudice to any future civil or criminal action that Ms. Sosa, if she so decides, may file against Atty. Mendoza in the future.

MARY ANN T. FLORES v. ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR., A.C. No. 7314, August 25, 2015, PER CURIAM The unjustified delay in his actions and his failure to act according to law constituted a breach of his accountability not only to complainant, but also to the public in general. Facts: A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by Jose Roberto Flores (Flores), against JMJB International Services, Inc.. Respondent dismissed the case on a finding that Flores had voluntarily resigned from employment. Flores elevated the case to the NLRC, but the appeal was dismissed. CA set aside the decision. Flores filed before respondent a Motion for Execution of the CA Decision. However, it was not acted upon. When the writ of execution JMJB International Services, Inc. already amended its name to F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc. , it was not acted upon. A complaint was filed against respondent, citing that the latter's act of archiving the records of the labor case and refusal to amend the Writ of Execution constituted a violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical standards. IBP's Investigating Commissioner found that respondent is guilty and recommended his disbarment. IBP Board lowered the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for three years. MR was denied. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mayor, Jr. is guilty of violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical standards. Ruling: Yes. There is a clear neglect of duty and ignorance of the law on the part of respondent on account of his failure to immediately act on the Motion for Execution, as well as his refusal to amend the Writ of Execution despite having been informed of the amendment of the name - but not the dissolution — of the corporation against which the writ was issued. While delay in the processing of documents normally occurs, it was inexcusable and out of the ordinary for respondent to allow a period of more than two years to lapse before acting on the motion. This omission amounts to gross misconduct as the unnecessary delay has caused prejudice to complainant. As defined, gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. As a Labor Arbiter, respondent is a public officer who must at all times be accountable to the people, whom he must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The unjustified delay in his actions and his failure to act according to law constituted a breach of his accountability not only to complainant, but also to the public in general.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 2. TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION DOMINIC PAUL D. LAZARETO v. ATTY. DENIS N. ACORDA A.C. No. 9603, June 16, 2015, PER CURIAM The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoins every lawyer to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the course of his practice of law. Stated differently, any member of the legal fraternity should do nothing that would lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Facts: Lazareto and his family engaged the services of respondent Atty. Acorda to handle the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lazareto’s father who died intestate. They agreed to set the deadline for the filing of the extrajudicial settlement action on May 26, 2004. They also agreed that titles to a parcel of conjugal land (Lots B & E) at Sta. Cruz Manila, left by the deceased, be transferred to Lazareto’s mother, Cleotilde. Lazareto gave Acorda the original duplicate copies of the TCTs for Lots B and E, together with cash representing the acceptance fee of Acorda and initial deposit to answer for extrajudicial transactions. Since then, Lazareto had followed up the developments with Acorda by phone but he could not be contacted until Lazareto received a fax message from Acorda asking for an additional money, which Lazareto gave. The agreed period had passed, but the papers for the extrajudicial settlement were not filed. Lazareto had not heard from Acorda all this time, although the lawyer sent a certain Pacheco, allegedly the liaison officer of the law firm, to get the money asked by Acorda. Subsequently, Lazareto and his family entered into negotiations to sell Lot E with a certain Mrs. Manzano. They then asked Acorda to prepare the deed of sale for the transaction, Atty. Acorda however failed to attend on the matter, because he had lost the TCT covering Lot E. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Acorda was negligent in handling the legal matter entrusted to him. Ruling: Yes, he was. After the family gave Acorda his acceptance fee and provided him with the necessary funds for the undertaking, Acorda became inaccessible and unheard of with respect to his task (except when he was asking for funding), until the agreed deadline for the filing of the extrajudicial settlement papers expired. For some time, he could not even produce the title to one of the lots (Lot E) handed to him by Lazareto, and when pressed to produce it, he admitted he could not find it. The TCT of Lot E was returned to Lazareto only on June 9, 2007, after it was found among the files of the respondent’s former law office, almost a year after the complaint was filed on July 7, 2006, and three years after it was entrusted to him by Lazareto in January 2004. While Acorda might have manifested, in good faith, his intention to complete the task referred to him at the earliest possible time, the results proved otherwise. He did not complete the legal matter referred to him by Lazareto, especially their agreement that titles to Lots B and E were to be transferred to Lazareto’s mother Clotilde. Only the TCT of Lot B was delivered to the Lazareto family in late December 2005. The transfer of Lot E to Clotilde was put on hold because of the respondent’s negligence in the custody of the TCT of Lot E, compelling the family to work on the extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Lazareto on their own. Considering the foregoing, Acorda should be made to answer for his dishonest dealings with Lazareto and his family, as well as for his negligence in the handling of the task Lazareto had entrusted to him. This notwithstanding the layman Lazareto’s desistance, as Acorda’s action was a

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 transgression not only of what is due Lazareto as a client but also of the profession and the nation that expect its lawyers to live up to the highest standards of performance in this noble profession.

JOSEPH C. CHUA v. ATTY. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO A.C. No. 10671, November 25, 2015, REYES, J. Case law provides that non-attendance of previously set engagements with the court, absent a truly good reason to be absent is a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is a ground for disciplinary action. Facts: Joseph Chua (Chua) filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Arturo M. De Castro (De Castro) for allegedly deliberately delaying, impeding and obstructing the administration of justice as regards a civil case for collection of sum of money wherein Chua was the creditor while De Castro was the counsel for the debtor indebted to Chua. In his defense De Castro averred that the delay was for valid grounds. The Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) held that De Castro was administratively liable and meted out the penalty of suspension against De Castro. On appeal with the IBP Board of Governors, the Board affirmed the decision of the CBD. This prompted De Castro to elevate the case to the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the Board. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not De Castro should be held administratively liable. Ruling: Yes, he is administratively liable. Rule 1.03 and Rule 10.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly states: Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.c As shown by the records, Atty. De Castro violated his oath of office in his handling of the collection case against his client. Chua was able to show that through Atty. De Castro's atrocious maneuvers; he successfully delayed the disposition of the case, causing injury and prejudice to Chua. Undoubtedly, Atty. De Castro failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law and justice. He showed his great propensity to disregard court orders. His acts of wantonly employing dilatory tactics show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession.

GABRIELA CORONEL v. ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN A.C. No. 6738, August 12, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 A lawyer should advise his client to uphold the law, not to violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not recommend to his client any recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order, and public morals. Facts: Sometime in October 2003, Coronel engaged the services of Atty. Cunanan to transfer to her name and her co-heirs the parcels of land. Atty. Cunanan advised Coronel that for the registration of the land, the transfer may be effected by two means namely: first, by way of “ordinary procedure”; and second, by way of “direct registration”. It appears that they agreed on the direct registration approach. Complainant paid Respondent 70K pesos. Afterwards, Complainant heard nothing from Respondent. When Respondent refused to her demand to return the 70K, she filed the instant disbarment case charging the former with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. Issue: Whether or not the respondent lawyer was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. Ruling: Yes. Although the respondent outlined to the complainant the “ordinary procedure” of an extrajudicial settlement of estate as a means of transferring title, he also proposed the option of “direct registration” despite being fully aware that such option was actually a shortcut intended to circumvent the law, and thus patently contrary to law. The transfer under the latter option would bypass the immediate heirs of their grandparents (i.e., the complainant’s parent and her co-heirs parents), and consequently deprive the Government of the corresponding estate taxes and transfer fees aside from requiring the falsification of the transfer documents. He assured that he could enable the direct transfer with the help of his contacts in the Office of the Register of Deeds and other relevant agencies of the Government, which meant that he would be bribing some officials and employees of those offices. The proposal of “direct registration” was unquestionably unlawful, immoral and deceitful all at once. He made the proposal despite its patent illegality in order to take advantage of the complainant’s limited legal knowledge of the regular procedures for the transfer of title under circumstances of intestacy. In other words, he made her agree to the “direct registration” through deceitful misrepresentation.

TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA A.C. No. 8330, 16 March 2015, LEONEN, J. Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or professional capacity. Facts. Atty. De Vera borrowed P500, 000.00 from Teresita with interest of P20, 000.00 per month until fully paid. Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded Teresita to borrow the amount from a common friend by mortgaging her property. Thereafter, Atty. De Vera issued a check for P500, 000.00 and two more checks to cover the interest agreed upon. Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment but it bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita encashed them for a second time, but the checks were dishonored because the account was closed. Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera but she failed to

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 settle her obligations prompting the former to file complaints for violation of BP22 and estafa, as well as an administrative complaint for violation of the lawyer’s oath. Issue: Whether or not Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks. Ruling: Yes, a lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. Respondent’s allegation of “lending” her checks to Teresita is contrary to human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to know the consequences of her acts. She issued several post-dated checks for value that were dishonored upon presentment for payment. Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or professional capacity. Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the Legal Profession as a whole. A lawyer may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him. Atty. De Vera is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

SPOUSES BYRON AND MARIA LUISA SAUNDERS v. ATTY. LYSSA GRACE S. PAGANO-CALDE A.C. No. 8708 (CBD Case No. 08-2192), August 12, 2015, SERENO, C.J. The pendency of the criminal case should not be a reason to dismiss the complaint of the client against the lawyer. The Court must make a separate determination of the administrative liability of the lawyer to preserve the integrity of the legal profession. Facts: In view of a conditional sale of a property, complainants Sps. Saunders gave respondent Atty. Pagano-Calde different amounts of money to cover for the expenses. However, the sale did not push through. When they demanded the money, respondent claimed that it had already been turned over to Adelia. She presented an acknowledgment receipt allegedly signed by Adelia. Receipt of the money was, however, denied by the latter. The continued refusal of respondent to return the money prompted complainants to file a criminal case for estafa. Spouses Saunders later filed a complaint with the IBP. However, IBP recommended it be dismissed. The issue of whether the former has in fact misappropriated the funds she held in trust for her client cannot yet be resolved because of the pendency of the criminal case. Issue: Whether or not the complaint before the IBP must be dismissed due to the pendency of a criminal case for estafa. Ruling:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 No. Disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer even if they involve the same set of facts. A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the acquittal does not necessarily exculpate one administratively. While full liability of Atty. Pagano-Calde with respect to the money entrusted to her cannot yet be ascertained, as this proceeding should not pre-empt the outcome of the factual determination of the estafa case, a determination of whether a violation of the lawyer’s oath was committed by respondent may still be made. The supposed Deed of Conditional Sale provided for the forfeiture of the partial payment in favor of the vendor if the vendee failed to pay on or before 31 October 2005. It is worth emphasizing that respondent was representing complainants who were the vendees in the transaction. Had she fulfilled her duty, respondent should have pointed out to her clients that Adelia did not have the authority to sign on behalf of Virgilio as he had already revoked Adelia’s authority as early as December 2004. The Deed of Conditional Sale had therefore no force and effect as far as Virgilio, the registered owner of the subject property, is concerned, and Adelia therefore had no right to demand the money. The revocation of the authority of Adelia and the subsequent filing of a Petition for Partition, in which complainants were also represented by respondent, are clear indications that there were issues in the conditional sale that should have prompted respondent to withhold the money from Adelia to protect the interest of complainants, the former’s clients. Lawyers have the duty to apprise their client of the status and developments of the account they are handling. They must be consistently mindful of their obligation to respond promptly, should there be queries or requests for information from the client. Respondent should know that every case that lawyers accept deserves their full attention, diligence, skill and competence regardless of its importance. It is their sworn duty to protect the interest of their client and to defend it within the authority of the law.

3. TO THE COURTS ATTY. ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR. v. ATTYS. E. HANS A. SANTOS and AGNES H. MARANAN A.C. No. 9868, April 22, 2015, BRION, J. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he misled by any artifice. Facts: Atty. Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr. filed a complaint for disbarment against Attys. Hans Santos and Agnes Maranan on the ground that in a civil case for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC Pasig), the latter used a deceptive ploy to prevent the payment of the proper docket fees. Knowing that the complaint was actually one for damages, the respondents allegedly disguised the complaint as an action for specific performance and injunction (where the amount involved is incapable of pecuniary estimation) and deliberately omitted to specify the damages prayed for amounting toP68,000,000.00 in the prayer of the complaint in order to avoid paying the proper docket fees. According to the complainant, this intentional omission to specify the amount of damages was specifically declared by the Court in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals as grossly unethical, and thus constitutes a valid ground for disbarment. Atty. Santos and Atty. Maranan denied that they deceived the court by making it appear that the case was an action for specific performance and injunction. They claimed that at the time the complaint in the said civil case was, twelve (12) out of fifteen (15) checks were not yet due and demandable, clearly indicating that the complaint was really an action for specific performance and injunction, rather

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 than an action for sum of money or damages. IBP Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes found that Attys. Santos and Maranan did not commit any violation of the code of professional ethics. Hence, Commissioner Reyes recommended that the disbarment case be dismissed for lack of merit which was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari was filed. Issue: Whether or not the attorneys’ omission of the specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the complaint is unethical, and thereby violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ruling: No. The Court agreed with the respondents that they did not deceive the court in Civil Case No. 70251 in its assessment of the correct docket fees. Contrary to the complainant’s allegation that the respondents had defrauded the court, the element of "deceitful conduct" or "deceit" was not present in this case. First, the prayer in the complaint clearly showed that there was a clear and express reference to paragraph 2.27 of the complaint, which listed and described in detail the date of the checks, the check numbers, and their corresponding amounts. Second, there was also an express mention in the prayer of the amount of P9.5 Million representing the value of the checks that had already become due. Third, despite the complainant’s move for the dismissal of Case No. 70251 on the ground that the proper docket fees were not paid, the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court neither reassessed the filing fees, nor required the plaintiff in that case to pay additional filing fees. Fourth, even as of this date, the Court in Civil Case No. 70251 has not issued an order requiring the reassessment, recomputation, and/or payment of additional docket fees, signifying that the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court did not make any mistake in the assessment of the docket fees. Fifth, an examination of the allegations of the complaint and the prayer in Civil Case No. 70251 shows that the case is really an action for specific performance and injunction. The complaint sought to judicially require the complainant to deliver the actual and physical checks enumerated in paragraph 2.27 of the complaint; to compel him to account for the checks that he may have had already encashed; and to restrain him from negotiating, transacting, and encashing the checks in his possession. Clearly, the complaint was an action for specific performance, rather than for a sum of money. Even assuming that the respondents' mere reference to paragraph 2.27 of the complaint does not fully comply with the Manchester doctrine, the Court still found that it was not a sufficient ground for disbarment. There is no clear showing that the respondents defrauded or misled the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court. Neither was there any proof that the respondents have maliciously disguised their complaint as an action for specific performance and injunction so as to evade the payment of the proper docket fees. Further, the respondents did not violate Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The record of the case did not show that the respondents had committed misconduct, dishonesty, falsehood, or had misused the rules of procedure. In the absence of such proof, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer remains and the complaint against him must be dismissed. Viewed in these lights, the disbarment complaint against the respondents Attys. E. Hans A. Santos and Agnes H. Maranan should be dismissed for lack of merit.

ROLANDO TOLENTINO v. ATTY. RODIL L. MILLADO AND ATTY. FRANCISCO B. SIBAYAN A.C. No. 10737, November 09, 2015, REYES, J. While lawyers are free to criticize judges, criticism sans fair basis, grossly violates the duty to accord respect owing to the courts. Further, the use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Facts:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Tolentino filed an election protest against one Manalo represented by Atty. Millado and Atty. Sibayan. In his petition for certiorari before the COMELEC, Atty. Millado alleged that that the MTCC, with partiality, disregarded on the basis of mere observation and nothing more, the findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Atty. Sibayan made the same allegation in his Extremely Urgent Manifestation/Motion for Issuance of Injunctive Relief and/or Status Quo Ante Order with Entry of Appearance also before the COMELEC. Now, Tolentino filed the instant disbarment case against Atty. Millado and Atty. Sibayan for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue: Whether unfair attribution of lack of expertise and experience, and impartiality to the MTCC warrants disbarment. Ruling: No. However, the respondents are reprimanded for falsely attributing the MTCC with partiality. In the case at bar, the MTCC amply explained the reasons why it had accorded more credence to the testimony of the NBI expert witness. Nonetheless, counsels recklessly alleged not only the MTCC's lack of expertise and experience, but bias as well, in violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Again, the Court reiterates that the use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Further, while lawyers are free to criticize judges, criticism sans fair basis, grossly violates the duty to accord respect owing to the courts.

TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ v. ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR. A.C. No. 5686, June 16, 2015, PER CURIAM A lawyer’s blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the court’s lawful orders. Facts: Enriquez engaged the services of the law office of Atty. Lavadia for a forcible entry case against him. Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in Enriquez being declared in default. Atty. Lavadia filed a Notice of Appeal but the court dismissed the appeal on the ground that Atty. Lavadia failed to file the appeal memorandum after more than 71 days. Enriquez then filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Lavadia. The latter filed several motions for extension of time to file his Comment, yet he still failed to submit the same. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Lavadia is administratively liable. Ruling: Yes. Atty. Lavadia has clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR in failing to file his client’s position paper rendering his client in default. While he filed a Notice of Appeal and several motions for extensions of time to file the appeal memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower court, he ultimately neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Also, in repeatedly asking for extensions of time without actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is liable under

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Rule 12.03 of the CPR. Lastly, a lawyer’s blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the court’s lawful orders. The disbarment case has dragged on for years while the court gave Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted to him, he continued to fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court’s orders merits disciplinary action. Atty. Lavadia is disbarred.

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES v. ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA A.C. No. 8261, 11 March 2015, BERSAMIN, J. JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA A.C. No. 8725, 11 March 2015, BERSAMIN, J. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. Facts. Complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio in a civil action they brought to seek the annulment of a TCT registered in QC. Complainants withdrew the civil action after entering an amicable settlement with the other party. After the RTC order was issued in relation to the settlement, complainants could no longer locate Atty. Victorio. Upon verification, complainants found out that new annotations were made in their subject TCT, appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens. They submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced. Issue. Whether or not there is merit in the disbarment proceedings filed by the complainants. Ruling: No. Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts and omissions are insufficient to establish any censurable conduct against them. The Court underscores that registration is a merely ministerial act of the Register of Deeds. In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 examine documents presented for registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the documents.

VICTOR D. DE LOS SANTOS II v. ATTY. NESTOR C. BARBOSA A.C. No. 6681, June 17, 2015, BRION J. As an officer of the court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. A lawyer should not only help attain the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of cases and prompt satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that may impede, obstruct, or prevent the realization of a speedy and efficient administration of justice. Facts: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed by Victor De Los Santos II (De Los Santos II) herein complainant, against Atty. Nestor Barbosa (Barbosa) herein respondent allegedly for unlawfully obstructing and delaying the proceeding in a prior Criminal case. Sometime in 2002, information was filed against Rosie Canaco (Canaco) for violating PD 651 specifically for having wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly making false statements in the Certificate of Live Birth of one Victor P. De Los Santos. Barbosa was the counsel for the defense of Canaco. During the pendency of the criminal case, Barbosa caused sending of letters to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, stating that Victor P. De Los Santos has never authorized anybody to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth and hence therefore, no Certificate of Live Birth should be issued to anyone. Because of this, the complainant in the above mentioned criminal case was unable to secure a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth. This prompted De Los Santos II to file a complaint for disbarment against Barbosa for delaying unlawfully the criminal proceeding, citing Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not Barbosa is guilty of unlawfully delaying the criminal proceeding Ruling: Yes, Barbosa is guilty. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Rule 1.03 also provides that "[a] lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause." Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise states that "[a] lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes." In the present case, in disregard of the METC's intent to expedite the proceedings through its Order of October 19, 2004, the respondent sent letters to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke's Hospital to prevent the prosecution from obtaining a certified true copy of the birth certificate of Victor Canaco Delos Santos. The preliminary conference of May 24, 2004 was precisely postponed to allow the prosecution to secure this certified true copy. Thus, the respondent committed willful disobedience to a lawful order of the court intended to avoid any further delay of the proceedings in the criminal case.

PATROCINIA H. SALABAO v. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL, JR. A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court processes, employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court. Facts: The case stemmed from a complaint filed by Patrocinia H. Salabao (Salabao), against Elmer Lumberio for taking her property. Atty. Andres C. Villaruel Jr., herein respondent was the counsel of Lumberio. Salabao complained that Atty. Villaruel had made her suffer because of his abuse of processes and disregard for her rights as a litigant. Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for four months. IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendations of the IC. MR was denied. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Villaruel violated the CPR? Ruling: In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory by July 27, 2005. Respondent however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12) motions and cases in various courts subsequent to the Entry of Judgment. From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's intention was to delay the execution of the final judgment. It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court processes, employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court. He has breached his sworn duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules of Court. In so doing, he is administratively liable for his actions.

DAVID WILLIAMS v. ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ A.C. No. 8319/8329/8366 September 16, 2015, MENDOZA, J. A lawyer's primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice, such as the commission of forum shopping, contravenes this obligation. Facts: A complaint for forcible entry was filed against Sps. Williams before the MTC by Briones Ventolero, et al., represented by Atty. Rudy Enriquez. The case involved a certain parcel of land in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The MTC ruled for Briones, et al., but was reversed on appeal to the RTC. Atty. Enriquez, knowing that the MTC decision was set aside on appeal, drafted another complaint for forcible entry involving the same property. Atty. Rudy thereafter prodded another person with the same interests as Briones Ventolero, et al. to file the new complaint against Spouses Williams. The new complaint was never signed by Atty. Rudy, but contained an almost word-forword similarity with the earlier complaint. Issue:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Whether or not Atty. Rudy is administratively liable for committing forum shopping. Ruling: Yes. Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. By committing forum shopping, counsels not only abuse the court processes, but also clogs the court dockets which may result in conflicting rulings. Atty. Rudy should know that a lawyer's primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation. In engaging in such malpractice, Atty. Rudy violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for the law and the legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes.

4. TO THE CLIENTS MABINI COLLEGES, INC. v. ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J The rule prohibiting conflict of interest also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigations in which he appeared for the former client. Facts: Complainant Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided in to two opposing factions; the Adeva Group and Lukban Group. Atty. Pajarillo, herein respondent was appointed as its corporate secretary. Adeva authorized the Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the complainant to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP) which was however opposed by Lukban because the Adeva appointed Guerra and Echano, who were allegedly not registered as stockholders, as members of the Board of Trustees. RBP granted the loan application. Thereafter, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) nullified the appointment of Guerra and Echano. Thus, RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP’s legal counsel, herein respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP. Consequently, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage. Thus, a complaint was filed. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP. Later on, Mabini Colleges, Inc. filed the present complaint for disbarment against the respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pajarillo is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Ruling:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Yes. The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Pajarillo was compensated by complainant for his retained legal services is supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent’s former client. And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent failed to show any written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests. The court also note that the respondent acted for the complainant’s interest on the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant when he sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of the complainant, his former client. Moreover, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of interest.

MABINI COLLEGES, INC. v. ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J The rule prohibiting conflict of interest also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigations in which he appeared for the former client. Facts: Complainant Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided in to two opposing factions; the Adeva Group and Lukban Group. Atty. Pajarillo, herein respondent was appointed as its corporate secretary. Adeva authorized the Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the complainant to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP) which was however opposed by Lukban because the Adeva appointed Guerra and Echano, who were allegedly not registered as stockholders, as members of the Board of Trustees. RBP granted the loan application. Thereafter, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) nullified the appointment of Guerra and Echano. Thus, RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP’s legal counsel, herein respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP. Consequently, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage. Thus, a complaint was filed. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP. Later on, Mabini Colleges, Inc. filed the present complaint for disbarment against the respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pajarillo is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Ruling: Yes. The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Pajarillo was compensated by complainant for his retained legal services is supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent’s former client. And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent failed to show any written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests. The court also note that the respondent acted for the complainant’s interest on the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant when he sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of the complainant, his former client. Moreover, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of interest.

MARILEN G. SOLIMAN v. ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY, AC No.10568, JANUARY 13, 2015, REYES, J. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. FACTS: Atty. Amboy was the retained counsel of Soliman for a partition case which later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer institute since the other co-owners of the property were amenable to the partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the titles to the said property from the co-owners to the individual owners. Subsequently Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was a delay in the issuance of the titles to the property because of the failure of the other co-owners to submit certain documents. Atty. Amboy then told Soliman that someone from the Register of Deeds (RD) can help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee of 80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that her contact in the RD agreed to reduce the amount to 50,000.00. Hereafter, Soliman deposited the amount of 50,000.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as payment for the latter’s contact in the RD. Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking Atty. Amboy for any update on the release of the said titles, but the latter was not responding to her queries. On July 7, 2010, Soliman and Atty. Amboy’s secretary went to the office of a certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman asked Atty. Marasigan if he received the 50,000.00 as payment for the release of the said titles. Atty. Marasigan denied having received any amount to facilitate the release of the titles and claimed that the reason why the same could not be processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to file certain documents. Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy thereafter refused to release the pertinent documents she gave to her for the processing of the titles to the property or give back the 50,000.00 that was already paid to her. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Amboy is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility? RULING: Yes. Atty Amboy is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. "A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.” Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she asked from Soliman the amount of 50,000.00 to be paid to her “contact” inside the office of the RD in order to facilitate the release of the said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the payment of 50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of the said certificates of title. Instead of procuring the release of the certificates of title as she promised, Atty. Amboy asked for an additional 10,000.00 from Soliman. Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in dealing with a client. Atty. Amboy’s acts undermined the legal processes, which she swore to uphold and defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty. Amboy bound herself to respect the law and legal processes. The Court further found improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the amount of 50,000.00 which she paid in order to facilitate the release of the

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 certificates of title. To reiterate, upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of Manila, denied having received any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not returning the money to Soliman after a demand therefor was made following her failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client upon demand.

JUN B. LUNA v. ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA A.C. No. 10662 (Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2654), July 7, 2015, LEONEN, J. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when entering into a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation. Any money collected for the client or other trust property coming into the lawyer's possession should promptly be reported by him or her. Facts: Jun Luna retained the services of Atty. Dwight Galarrita in a foreclosure complaint against one Jose Calvario. Atty. Galarrita, allegedly by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, entered into a compromise agreement in behalf of his client. The agreement, which was approved by the court, provided that Calvario would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment for his mortgaged land and, in turn, Luna would cause the removal of the encumbrance annotation on the land title. Luna filed a disbarment case against Atty. Galarrita. He alleged that Atty. Galarrita never informed him of the Compromise Agreement, and that Atty. Galarrita did not deliver to him the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds he had received. The IBP Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Galarrita violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the Commissioner but recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six months and ordered the return of P100,000 to complainant without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer’s fee against complainant. Issue: Whether or not respondent Atty. Galarrita should be held administratively liable for entering into a Compromise Agreement without his client complainant Luna's consent, then refusing to turn over the settlement proceeds received. Ruling: Yes. Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "[s]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired[.]" The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when entering into a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation. Section 23, Rule 138 provides that “Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.” The court has held that "any money collected for the client or other trust property coming into the lawyer's possession should promptly be reported by him [or her]." Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” Rule 16.03 further states that “A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.”

ADELITA B. LLUNAR v. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015, PER CURIAM A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Facts: On behalf of Severina Banez, Llunar hired Atty. Ricafort to file a case against Ricardo and Ard Cervantes for the recovery of a parcel of land. Atty. Ricafort received from Llunar PhP95,000.00 for all the expenses including the filing fees and attorney’s fees. Three years later, Llunar learned that no case involving the subject property was ever filed by Atty. Ricafort. Thus, Llunar demanded that Atty. Ricafort return the money. The latter refused to return the whole amount arguing that a complaint had actually been filed in court, thought not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Abitria. Atty. Ricafort was willing to return only what was left of the Php95,000.00 after deducting what he paid to Atty. Abitria. Llunar also discovered that Atty. Ricafort had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law since 2002. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension Ruling: Yes. Atty. Ricafort committed several infractions making him liable for grave misconduct. First, Atty. Ricafort did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming the complainant's property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. Under these facts, Atty. Ricafort violated Rule 18.03 of the CPR, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Second, he failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the complainant for handling the latter's case. Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates every lawyer to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession" and to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." In addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Third, he committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Canon 15 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients." Atty. Ricafort lacked the candor expected of him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case despite knowing that he could not and should not practice law. Lastly, he was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would have been justified, but Atty. Ricafort is not an ordinary violator of the profession's ethical rules; he is

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 a repeat violator of these rules. SC had previously adjudged him liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his other client and in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by the court in the case for violation of BP Blg. 22 filed against him by his client. Hence, Atty. Ricafort is disbarred.

SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION v. ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA A.C. No. 10681, February 3, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. Facts: Atty. Dela Rosa, a retained lawyer of Sps. Concepcion, borrowed from the latter the amount of P2,500,000.00, which he promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. However, despite demands when it fell due, he failed to pay the spouses. In his Reply, he denied borrowing any money from the spouses and claimed that a certain Nault was the real debtor. In a letter-complaint to the IBP, Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Dela Rosa guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Hence, he was recommended to be placed in indefinite suspension. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Dela Rosa should be held administratively liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ruling: Yes. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Considering the greater amount involved in this case and respondent’s continuous refusal to pay his debt, the Court deems it apt to suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the IBP’s recommendation to suspend him indefinitely.

ALFREDO C. OLVIDA v. ATTY. ARNEL C. GONZALES A.C. No. 5732, June 16, 2015, PER CURIAM

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Facts: Olvida engaged the services of Atty. Gonzales in the filling and handling of a case for Termination of Tenancy Relationship against a tenant who was no longer praying the rentals. Olvida paid Atty. Gonzales, among others, his acceptance fee. After fruitlessly going back and forth Atty. Gonzales’ office for information about the position paper, Olvida contacted Atty. Gonzales’ secretary, Marivic Romero. Romero told him that the position paper had already been filed. When he asked for a copy, Romero replied that there was none as it was Atty. Gonzales himself who prepared the position paper on his computer. Nine months after the expiration of the period for the filing of the position paper, Olvida received a copy of the DARAB decision dismissing the case for lack of merit. Olvida discovered that Atty. Gonzales failed to submit a position paper. Issue: paper.

Whether or not Atty. Gonzales is administratively liable for failing to submit a position

Ruling: Yes. He grossly violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. As the records show, Atty. Gonzales gave the complainant the run-around for an unreasonably long period of time; the latter had to repeatedly inquire about and follow up the filing of the position paper in the DARAB case. On the matter alone of keeping complainant posted on the status of the case, Atty. Gonzales failed to comply with his duty under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 that "a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of the case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information." Atty. Gonzales was not only grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as the complainant's lawyer; he was also downright dishonest and unethical in his dealings with the complainant. For the injury he caused to the complainant and his family because of his malpractice, Atty. Gonzales is suspended from the practice of law for 3 years.

JESSIE CAMPUGAN and ROBERT TORRES v. ATTY. FEDERICO TOLENTINO, JR., et al. A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015, BERSAMIN, J. JESSIE CAMPUGAN and ROBERT TORRES v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT QUILALA A.C. No. 8725, March 11, 2015, BERSAMIN, J. Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established by clear and convincing evidence. FACTS: In a civil case involving a TCT that was, as allegedly owned by the complainants, unlawfully cancelled and replaced by a TCT issued in favor of the Ricaforts, it appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during its pendency. Here, the complainants agreed to sell the property and the proceeds to be equally divided between the parties. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, Atty. Daniel Victorio, Jr., the complainants’ counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint which the RTC granted. The complainants alleged that from that time, they could no longer locate or contact

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Atty. Victorio, Jr. and that a new annotation on the letter-request seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens has been filed by the same. Feeling aggrieved by the discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority assailing the unlawful cancellation of their notices. The records do not disclose whether or not this case was already resolved or remained pending. Due to the facts that they have paid Atty. Victorio, Jr. for his services and despite such, they are unable to contact the same, they filed the present disbarment case against him together with Attys. Federico Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Elbert Quilala (the Chief Registrar), and Atty. Renato Cunanan (the Acting Registrar and Signatoryof the new annotations), ISSUE: Whether or not the Attys. Victorio, Jr. and Tolentino, Jr. conspired with each other to guarantee that the parties would enter into an amicable settlement. RULING: No. Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established by clear and convincing evidence. The complainants failed in this regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the annotations, they presented no evidence to support their allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated their own active participation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in the civil case. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had themselves entered into. Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated and participated in the settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement, in fine, subsists.

EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE v. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR. A.C. NO. 10672, March 18, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of the client, he is duty bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Facts: Complainant Eduardo Maglente, as President of "Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III, Incorporated'', alleged that he engaged the services of respondent Atty. Agcaoili for the purpose of filing a case and in connection therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount of P48, 000.00 intended to cover the filing fees for the action to be instituted. However, the respondent failed to file an action in court on the ground that the money given to him was not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in court. Thus, complainant asked for the return of the money, but respondent claimed to have spent the same and even demanded more money. Hence, complainant filed this administrative complaint seeking the return of the full amount he had paid to respondent.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 The IBP Board of Governors, adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, found that respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he was suspended from the practice of law for three months and was ordered to return the said money. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Agcaoili should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of. Ruling: Yes. A lawyer’s neglect of legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR. In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of the respondent for the purpose of filing a case in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of P48, 000.00 to answer for the filing fees. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse that the money he received from complainant was not enough to fully pay the filing fees. Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of P48, 000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands. Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client. A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust resposed in him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case. Accordingly, Atty. Agcaoili, Jr. is suspended from the practice of law for a period of 1 year.

DAVAO IMPORT DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. ATTY. JOHNNY LANDERO A.C. No. 5116, 13 April 2015, Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. He is duty-bound to handle the same with zeal and due diligence. Facts: Davao Import Distributors engaged the services of Landero for the recovery of a split type air-conditioner. On the scheduled date of pre-trial, Atty. Landero failed to appear. Thus, the opposing party was able to present ex-parte his evidence in support of his counterclaim. The MTCC ordered complainant to pay damages. The case was affirmed by the RTC. Complainant gave Atty. Landero money so that he may file a petition for review with the CA. After filing a motion for extension of time to file said petition, he failed to file the same, which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal. Hence, complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Landero. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Landero displayed unprofessional behavior and misconduct and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Ruling: Atty. Landero displayed unprofessional behavior and misconduct and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he did not appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference despite notice and when he did not file a petition for review after receiving from his client the payment for docket fess and after being granted by the CA an extension of time to file the same. As complainant’s counsel, Atty. Landero is duty-bound to handle the same with zeal and due diligence. Even assuming that he and complainant already agreed to abandon the case, he should have still attended the scheduled pre-trial to formally move for its withdrawal. However, despite his awareness that his absence in the pre-trial would result to a dismissal of the case with prejudice and to a declaration of his client’s default with respect to the counterclaim filed, Atty. Landero still deliberately did not appear. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.

FRANCISCO CAOILE v. ATTY. MARCELINO MACARAEG A.C. No. 720, June 17, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J. In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it dismissed the administrative case against therein respondent and no longer imposed any sanction against him in view of his death during the pendency of said case. Facts: Sometime in 1962, Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg (Macaraeg) herein respondent, represented Francisco Caoile (Caoile) herein complainant, in a case for recovery of ownership of title over a parcel of land before the CFI of Pangasinan. Thereafter, Caoile decided to appeal the case to the CA retaining Macaraeg as his counsel, however, because failure to file his respective pleading after numerous extensions given by the CA in favor of Macaraeg, the CA dismissed the case of Caoile. After discovering the adverse decision against him, Caoile in 1966, filed an administrative case for disbarment against Macaraeg for neglect and dereliction of duty with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court forwarded the case to the SolGen for investigation. Sometime in 1972, the SolGen summoned both parties to appear before it. Notably, the return of the subpoena served to Macaraeg contained a notation that Macaraeg is now deceased. Subsequently the case was transferred with the IBP. The IBP recommended that Macaraeg be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 2 years for violating Rule 12.03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that: A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether Macaraeg should be held liable for neglect and dereliction of duty. Ruling: No. While the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the imposition of a penalty, supervening circumstances call for the dismissal of this administrative case. The Supreme Court Law List shows that Atty. Macaraeg was admitted to the Bar on November 6, 1933. Records reveal that he was already 60 years old when the hearings in this disbarment case were held in 1967. Hence, he would have been 108 years old by this time. It is also noteworthy that the subpoena issued by the Solicitor General in 1972 contains a handwritten note that Atty. Macaraeg had already died. Thereafter, nothing more was heard from either party despite notice. Under these circumstances, it is safe to

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 assume that the complainant had already lost interest in pursuing this disbarment case against Atty. Macaraeg and that there is truth in the handwritten notation in the return of the subpoena that Atty. Macaraeg had already passed away. In Apiag v. Cantero, the Court dismissed the administrative case against therein respondent and no longer imposed any sanction against him in view of his death during the pendency of said case

ROBERTO P. NONATO v. ATTY. EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN, JR. A.C. No. 10138 (Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1876), June 16, 2015, PER CURIAM A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. Facts: Roberto Nonato’s father, Restituto, was represented by Atty. Fudolin in an ejectment case. Roberto alleges that Atty. Fudolin failed to fully inform his father of the status and developments of the case. He also failed to furnish his father copies of the pleadings and other documents filed with the court hence, they were completely left in the dark. MTC dismissed Restituto’s complaint due to the failure of Atty. Fudolin to submit the position paper. Atty. Fudolin argued that his failure to file was due to his undetected stroke. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Fudolin could be held administratively liable for negligence in the performance of duty. Ruling: Yes. A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. Even assuming that Atty. Fudolin was then suffering from numerous health problems, his medical condition cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the omission to file the necessary court pleadings. Atty. Fudolin could have requested an extension of time to file the required position paper, or at the very least, informed his client of his medical condition. Hence, Atty. Fudolin is suspended from the practice of law for two years.

FELICISIMA MENDOZA VDA. DE ROBOSA v. ATTORNEYS JUAN B. MENDOZA AND EUSEBIO P. NAVARRO, JR. A.C. No. 6056 September 9, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J. A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence; a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable Facts: Eladio Mendoza sought the registration of two parcels of land located in Laguna. However, he passed away before the application for registration was completed. So his heirs sought to pursue the application. One of the heirs is Felicisima Mendoza (Felicisima), to whom the heirs executed a special power of attorney (SPA) to pursue the application. She engaged the services of Atty. Juan Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) as her counsel. Upon the behest of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima signed a Contract for

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 services stipulating that in the event of a favorable judgment, Felicisima shall convey to Atty. Mendoza 1/5 of the lands subject of the application or 1/5 of the proceeds should the same property be sold. A judgment was then issued granting the registration of only one of the two parcels of land. Subsequently, the land was sold to Greenfield Corporation. As a result, Atty. Mendoza filed with the RTC a claim to 1/5 of the proceeds of the sale of the land by virtue of the Contract for services. Felicima contended that Atty. Mendoza is not entitled to the claim since they failed to register the other land. At this juncture, Felicima hired the services of Atty. Eusebio Navarro (Atty. Navarro). The RTC ruled in favor of Atty. Mendoza, but Atty. Navarro filed an appeal to the CA. To counter, Atty. Mendoza filed an execution pending appeal. Since no opposition by Atty. Navarro was filed, RTC granted the execution pending appeal which resulted in the levy and transfer of the land to Atty. Mendoza. Meanwhile, in the CA Atty. Navarro failed to file an appellant’s brief so the CA dismissed the appeal. Felicisima then filed disbarment cases against Atty. Mendoza and Atty. Navarro. According to her, Atty. Mendoza induced her to sign the Contract for services which she does not truly understand. As to Atty. Navarro, her case before the CA was neglected despite repeated follow-ups on her part. She also points out that Atty. Navarro abandoned her case before the RTC when the latter failed to file an opposition to Atty. Mendoza's motion for execution pending appeal, which resulted in the loss of her properties. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza and Atty. Navarro should be held administratively liable. Ruling: Yes, Atty. Navarro should be held administratively liable, but not Atty. Mendoza. As regards Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima failed to present evidence of deceit by Atty. Mendoza that the latter induced her to sign the Contract for services. Besides, a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. As to Atty. Navarro, the facts on record clearly established his failure to live up to the standards of diligence and competence of the legal profession. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.

MICHAEL RUBY v. ATTY. ERLINDA B. ESPEJO and ATTY. RUDOLPH DILLA BAYOT A.C. No. 10558 February 23, 2015, REYES, J. To establish the [attorney-client] relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. Facts: Ruby filed an administrative case against Attys. Espejo and Bayot. He engaged their services and gave Atty. Espejo 50,000 as filing fee but the real amount was only 7,561. Atty. Bayot then

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 received 8,000 as part of the balance on their retainer agreement. Ruby then deposited 4,000 in the account of Atty. Bayot as appearance fee for the hearing on the motion to serve summons through publication. However, Atty. Bayot allegedly did not appear and merely met and assured Ruby that the motion will be granted. Thereafter, the lawyers allegedly failed to update him as to the status of his case. Atty. Bayot claimed that he was not counsel of Ruby and that he merely assisted Atty. Espejo in drafting the complaint as the same was signed by Atty. Espejo. He further claimed that he had no part in the retainer agreement. The IBP dismissed the case against Atty. Espejo in view of her demise. Atty. Bayot was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. Before the SC, Atty. Bayot argues that there was no attorney-client relationship. Issue: Whether or not an attorney-client relationship exists between Atty. Bayot and Ruby and if so, should Atty. Bayout be held administratively liable. Ruling: Yes, an attorney-client relationship exists. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession." Further, acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Atty. Bayot was the one who prepared the complaint that was filed with the RTC and the motion to serve summons through publication. He appeared as counsel and advised the complainant on the status of the case. He also received P8,000.00 as part of the acceptance fee indicated in the retainer agreement. “Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. Atty. Bayot owes fidelity to the cause of the complainant and is obliged to keep the latter informed of the status of his case. He is likewise bound to account for all money or property collected or received from the complainant. Atty. Bayot may not be held liable for the failure to account for and return the excess of the P50,000.00 which was paid by the complainant for the filing fees. It was Atty. Espejo alone who received amount. However, Atty. Bayot is not entitled to the P4, 000.00 appearance fee deposited to his account as there was no hearing on that day. Accordingly, Atty. Bayot is obliged to return the said amount to the complainant. However, there was no neglect on the part of Atty. Bayot. The complainant merely alleged that, after the hearing on the motion to serve summons through publication, the respondents had "made themselves scarce" and failed to update him on the status of the case. However, other than his bare allegations, he failed to present evidence that would show that Atty. Bayot was remiss in his duties to the complainant. However, Atty. Bayot is not entirely without fault. This administrative complaint was brought about by his intervention when the complainant sought the legal services of Atty. Espejo. Atty. Bayot undertook to prepare the complaint to be filed with the RTC and the motion to serve summons through publication, attended the hearings, and advised the complainant as to the status of the case without formally entering his appearance as counsel of record. He was able to obtain remuneration for his legal services sans any direct responsibility as to the progress of the case. Atty. Bayot is reminded to be more circumspect in his dealings with clients. Atty. Bayot is admonished to exercise more prudence and judiciousness in dealing with his clients.

CELINA F. ANDRADA v. ATTY. RODRIGO CERA, A.C. No. 10187, July 22, 2015, BRION, J. When a lawyer takes a case, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his client's rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed by his client, and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts, and society.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Facts: An affidavit-complaint was filed by Celina F. Andrada against Atty. Rodrigo Cera for allegedly engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Investigating Commissioner Antiquiera found that the respondent had engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct against his client's interest in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. The Investigating Commissioner also found the respondent guilty of misappropriating the funds entrusted to him by his client and of failing to account for and to return his client's money upon demand, in violation of Canon 16 of the CPR. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Cera violated the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility. Ruling: Yes. It is apparent that the respondent did not exert any effort on his client's case and completely reneged on the obligations due his client. The respondent lied to the complainant that he had made the necessary application and payment with the NSO for the issuance of the birth certificates of the complainant's children. Despite the complainant's repeated requests, the respondent failed to comply with their agreement to provide a psychologist to administer the necessary psychological tests, thus causing further delay in the proceedings of the complainant's annulment case. Clearly, these actions show the respondent's negligence and lack of zeal in handling the complainant's case, for which he should be made administratively liable. He violated not only Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, but also Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the same Code, which provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Moreover, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer when he unlawfully withheld the complainant's money. The respondent, likewise, violated Rule 16.039 of Canon 16 (which provides that "a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand") when he failed to return the complainant's money upon demand.

(IV) DUTY TO APPRISE CLIENT JESSIE CAMPUGAN and ROBERT TORRES v. ATTY. FEDERICO TOLENTINO, JR., et al. A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015, BERSAMIN, J. JESSIE CAMPUGAN and ROBERT TORRES v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT QUILALA A.C. No. 8725, March 11, 2015, BERSAMIN, J. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Facts:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 In a civil case involving a TCT that was, as allegedly owned by the complainants, unlawfully cancelled and replaced by a TCT issued in favor of the Ricaforts, it appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during its pendency. Here, the complainants agreed to sell the property and the proceeds to be equally divided between the parties. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, Atty. Daniel Victorio, Jr., the complainants’ counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint which the RTC granted. The complainants alleged that from that time, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. and that a new annotation on the letter-request seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens has been filed by the same. Feeling aggrieved by the discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority assailing the unlawful cancellation of their notices. The records do not disclose whether or not this case was already resolved or remained pending. Due to the facts that they have paid Atty. Victorio, Jr. for his services and despite such, they are unable to contact the same, they filed the present disbarment case against him together with Attys. Federico Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Elbert Quilala (the Chief Registrar), and Atty. Renato Cunanan (the Acting Registrar and Signatoryof the new annotations), Issue: Whether or not the Attys. Quilala and Cunanan should be held administratively liable. Ruling: Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit: “CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.”, “Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” “Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.” There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in the said civil case. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment. Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to the termination of the civil case. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time during the engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s alleged failure to respond to the complainants’ calls or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in the civil case did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued to come under the professional obligation towards them after the termination of the said case.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 CORAZON DALUPAN v. ATTY. GLENN GACOTT A.C. No. 5067, June 29, 2015, Villarama, Jr., J. It is well-settled that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. Facts: Corazon Dalupan was a defendant in a criminal case as well as her son, Wilmer Dalupan in a separate criminal case. Both were represented by Atty. Glenn Gacott with a P10,000 acceptance fee. They paid P5,000 as initial payment. Corazon requested Gacott to draft a Motion to Reduce Bail Bond which the latter denied claiming that it was beyond the scope of his retainer services. Thus, Corazon caused Roily Calbentos to draft the same which was signed by Gacott. Corazon paid the remaining balance and when she asked for an OR, Gacott refused as there was no need for the issuance of a receipt. Corazon also paid P500 for Gacott’s appearance fee in the preliminary conference and arraignment. Corazon alleged that Gacott neglected his duties as counsel and failed to attend any of the hearings. Hence, Corazon filed a complaint for disbarment against Gacott. All allegations were denied by Gacott. The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the complaint. Although there was no evidence that Corazon paid the balance of P5,000 as acceptance fee and an appearance fee of P500, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to an OR which proved that Corazon paid Gacott P5,000. However, the Investigating Commissioner found that Gacott did not do any substantial legal work for Corazon. Hence, he recommended to return the attorney’s fees. Issue: Whether or not Gacott should return the payment of the attorney’s fees to Corazon Dalupan. Ruling: No. It is well-settled that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner referred to the attorney's fee in its ordinary concept. On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, he incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered. In the present case, based on a simple reading of the Official Receipt dated August 20, 1996, the parties clearly intended the payment of P5,000 to serve as acceptance fee of the respondent, and not attorney's fee. Moreover, both parties expressly claimed that they intended such payment as the acceptance fee of the respondent. Absent any other evidence showing a contrary intention of the parties, the Court found that the Investigating Commissioner gravely erred in referring to the amount to be returned by the respondent as attorney's fee. Secondly, the respondent did not commit any fault or negligence which would entail the return of the acceptance fee. Other than her bare allegations, the complainant failed to present any evidence to support her claim that the respondent committed abandonment or neglect of duty. Thus, the Court is constrained to affirm the factual findings of the Investigating Commissioner that the presumption of regularity should prevail in favor of the respondent. Absent any fault or negligence on the part of the respondent, the Court saw no

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 legal basis for the order of the Investigating Commissioner to return the attorney's fee (acceptance fee) of P5,000.

ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO v. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING G.R. NO. 194825, October 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. When the services rendered by counsel constitute the normal and usual duties required of a lawyer to render to his client and the issues involved in the case were not novel and did not require extensive research on the part of the counsel, a 35% contingent fee is excessive and unreasonable. In such case, the principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may serve as a basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Facts: Rosario and Atty. Suing entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) wherein the latter agreed to represent the former in exchange of 35% of the net proceeds from the judgment of the case as contingent attorney’s fees. Later, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Rosario, and a writ of execution was subsequently issued. Meanwhile, Atty. Suing filed a Notice of Lien and prayed that his attorney's lien be satisfied accordingly. Thereafter, in a letter, Rosario informed Atty. Suing that the attorney's fees sought were clearly excessive and unjustified, and that she was discharging him. She also prayed before the RTC that Atty. Suing be required to prove the amount of attorney's fees due him on the basis of quantum meruit. The RTC reduced the attorney’s fees to 10%. The CA, however, deemed it proper to give effect to the clear terms of the MOU regarding the stipulated attorney's fees since Atty. Suing rendered legal service for Rosario for a total of 12 years. Issue: Whether the award of 35% contingent attorney's fees is contrary to the juris prudentially established guiding principles in determining attorney's fees on quantum meruit basis. Ruling: Yes, stipulated attorney's fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client. The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract, will not however, preclude recovery. It merely justifies the court's fixing a reasonable amount for the lawyer's services. On this note, the principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may serve as a basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Atty. Suing have rendered at least twelve (12) years of legal service in favor of Rosario. Said length of time, however, should not be the sole consideration in determining the reasonableness of their attorney's fees. The character of the service should primarily be considered. In this case, the services rendered by Atty. Suing constitute the normal and usual duties required of a lawyer to render to his client, which duties do not warrant the payment of such a hefty premium on the part of Rosario. Moreover, the issues involved in the reconveyance case were not novel and did not require extensive research on the part of the counsel therein. On the contrary, Atty. Suing could rely on a wealth of jurisprudence on the matter. Without doubt, the Court finds the 35% contingent fee award excessive and unreasonable under the particular circumstances of this case.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 EDMUNDO NAVAREZ v. ATTY. MANUEL ABROGAR III G.R. No. 191641, September 2, 2015, BRION, J. As in the exercise of any other right conferred by law, the lawyer - and the courts -must avail of the proper legal remedies and observe the procedural rules to prevent the possibility, or even just the perception, of abuse or prejudice. Facts: Petitioner Edmundo Navarez engaged the services of Atty. Manuel Abrogar III as collaborating counsel of Atty. Perfecto Laguio in the case that involved the settlement of the estate of Avelina Quesada-Navarez that was then pending before the RTC of Quezon City. Navarez filed a Manifestation with the RTC that he was terminating the services of Atty. Abrogar. The latter manifested that the Firm was withdrawing as counsel effective upon the appointment of an Administrator of the estate from the remaining proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Avelina Quesada-Navarez. Navarez wrote to Atty. Abrogar offering to pay his attorney’s fees in accordance with their Retainer Agreement minus the latter’s cash advances – an offer that Atty. Abrogar had previously refused. Atty. Abrogar filed a Motion to Enter into the Records his attorney’s lien pursuant to Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court. The RTC directed the petitioner to pay Atty. Abrogar’s attorney’s fees. The CA dismissed the petition and held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Issue: Whether or not the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the payment of attorney’s fees. Ruling: Yes. In the present case, the RTC ordered the registration of Atty. Abrogar’s lien without a hearing even though the client contested the amount of the lien. The petitioner had the right to be heard and to present evidence on the true amount of the charging lien. The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion because it denied the petitioner his right to be heard, i.e., the right to due process. A motion for the enforcement of the lien is in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his clients for attorney’s fees. As in every action for a sum of money, the attorney-movant must first pay the prescribed docket fees before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction to order the payment of attorney’s fees. Under this situation, the RTC had not yet acquired jurisdiction to enforce the charging lien because the docket fees had not been paid. The payment of docket fees is mandatory in all actions, whether separate or an offshoot of a pending proceeding. The RTC again abused its discretion in this respect because it prematurely enforced the lien and issued a writ of execution even before the main case became final; no money judgment was as yet due to the client to which the lien could have attached itself. Execution was improper because the enforceability of the lien is contingent on a final and executory award of money to the client. This Court notes that in CA-G.R. SP No. 108734, the CA nullified the "award" to which the RTC attached the attorney’s lien as there was nothing due to the petitioner. Thus, enforcement of the lien was premature.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 C. SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS (RULE 139-B, RULES OF COURT) INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR WILSON UY v. ATTY. PACIFICO M. MAGHARI III A.C. NO. 10525, September 01, 2015, LEONEN, J. Signing a pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken occasion to decry the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Facts: Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a Petition before the Bacolod City RTC praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate of her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. The RTC designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy's estate. In other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. NatuEl (Atty. Natu-el). Based on the records, there appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy and the other heirs of Jose Uy. In the course of the proceedings, Magdalena Uy, through Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III (Maghari), her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum. Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar examinations. He learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the professional details indicated in the pleadings he signed and has been copying the professional details of Atty. Natu-El. Wilson Uy filed before this court the present complaint for disbarment. Pointing to Maghari's act of repeatedly a changing and using another lawyer's professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer's Oath and acted in a deceitful manner. Issue: Whether or Atty. Maghari engaged in unethical conduct and of what proper penalty may be meted on him. Ruling: Yes. The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors are manifest and respondent admits their existence. Respondent did not merely commit errors in good faith. The truth is far from it. First, respondent violated clear legal requirements, and indicated patently false information. Second, the way he did so demonstrates that he did so knowingly. Third, he did so repeatedly. Fourth, the information he used was shown to have been appropriated from another lawyer. Not only was he deceitful; he was also larcenous. Fifth, his act not only of usurping another lawyer's details but also of his repeatedly changing information from one pleading to another demonstrates the intent to mock and ridicule courts and legal processes. Respondent toyed with the standards of legal practice. His insolent and mocking violation of statutory and regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to society and to courts. His swiping of another lawyer's information is a violation of his duties to the legal profession. Thus, respondent did not only act in a deceitful manner and violate the solemn oath he took to be admitted into the legal profession; he also violated every single chapter of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is as clear as the entries themselves that respondent acted in a manner that is woefully unworthy of an officer of the court. He was not even a good citizen. As respondent has fallen short of the ethical standards apropos to members of the legal profession, we find it proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 NELSON P. VALDEZ v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR. A.C. NO. 7353, November 16, 2015, PER CURIAM Any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. Facts: Nelson P. Valdez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Antolin Allyson Dabon when the former found out of the illicit relationship between his wife, Sonia and the latter. Nelson averred that his wife Sonia confessed the illicit relationship but contended that her relationship with Atty. Dabon was tainted with sexual abuse, threat and intimidation. Atty. Dabon contended that Sonia had been his close friend and the fact that Sonia had been sending food and cards to his office contradicts Sonia’s allegations of sexual abuse, threat and intimidation. The investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) rendered a report and recommendation finding that the charge against Atty. Dabon had been sufficiently proven. The IBP board of governors adopted, approved the recommendation and ordered the disbarment of Atty. Gabon. Hence, this petition was filed. Issue: Whether or not the findings and recommendations of IBP-CBD should be upheld. Ruling: Yes. Morality in our liberal society today is probably a far cry from what it used to be. Notwithstanding this permissiveness, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. Indeed, those who have taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the consciousness and the will to overcome the weakness of the flesh. It has been repeatedly held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife showed his moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, he has fallen below the moral bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside of marriage are considered disgraceful and immoral as they manifest deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's misconduct and unrepentant demeanor clearly showed a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to the sanctity of marriage and marital vows, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril. Accordingly, the Court finds the need for the imposition of the extreme administrative penalty of disbarment.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 ATTY. ROY ECRAELA v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND PANGALANGAN A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015 PER CURIAM Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. Facts: Atty. Ecraela filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan. He alleged that while formerly married to Sheila Jardiolin, Atty. Pangalanagan engaged in a series of adulterous and illicit relations with five married and unmarried women from 1990 to 2007, 2 of whom he misrepresented that he was a bachelor. He also claimed that as a lawyer of the OGCC representing MIAA in a case against Kendrick Dev’t. Corp, Atty. Pangalangan conspired with KDC’s counsel to sabotage MIAA’s case for which he was rewarded a Toyota Corolla. In a Senate inquiry in the MIAA case, the Blue Ribbon Committee recommended that Atty. Pangalangan be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman for graft and corruption. During the Senate inquiry, Atty. Pangalangan even attempted to hide the car at the residence of Atty. Ecraela’s parents who refused to do so. Atty. Pangalangan did not present any counter-statement but merely argued that the complaint suffered from procedural and substantive infirmities. The IBP Board of Governors recommended his disbarment. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pangalangan should be disbarred. Ruling: Yes, he should be disbarred. Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered. The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent. Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted. In engaging in such illicit relationships, he disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 D. READMISSION TO THE BAR RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015, PER CURIAM When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice. Facts: Complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali, sister-in-law of respondent, administratively charged ROLANDO S. TORRES for "presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery. The Court found Torres guilty which resulted in his disbarment. MR was denied. More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, respondent filed the instant Petition once more seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys. Issue: Whether or not judicial clemency should be granted in favor of Torres? Ruling: No. The Court finds that the instant petition is not meritorious. While more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on April 14, 2004, respondent's present petition has failed to show substantial proof of his reformation as required in the guideline set by the Court. The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Thus the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable." More significantly, it should be discerned that the root cause of respondent's disbarment was his fraudulent acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein. However, no proof was presented to show that he had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with her so as to show remorse for his previous faults. The dismissal of the criminal complaint against him for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, filed by complainant is no proof of remorse since the same was based on lack of probable cause. Likewise, its dismissal,' could not prove that he was actually innocent of the administrative charges against him, since the parameters and considerations of an administrative case are evidently different from that in a criminal case. As in this case, the lack of probable cause against respondent as found by the prosecutor does not negate his administrative liability already adjudged by this Court. That the prosecutor found that respondent "merely rendered legal services to the Ting siblings" does not mean that he rendered the same in accordance with the lawyer's oath and ethical canons.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 E. NOTARIAL PRACTICE (A. M. NO. 02-8-13-SC, AS AMENDED) JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON v. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015, LEONEN, J. Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty. Facts: Complainants Jimmy Anudon (Jimmy) and Juanita Anudon (Juanita) are brother- and sisterin-law. Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra (Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy and Juanita. Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject land. The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso Anudon (Alfonso), Benita Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared as vendors, while the name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as the vendee. Complainants now assailed that the deed of sale was falsified alleging that they did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale and also they did not sign such document before respondent. They also alleged that it was impossible for Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign the document for they were in the US on the day the deed was executed. Thus, complainants initiated a disciplinary action against respondent. Issue: Whether or not Respondent is still fit to practice law. Ruling: No. Atty. Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility in notarizing a document without requiring the presence of the affiants. The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally. Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee.

ATTY. BENIGNO BARTOLOME v. ATTY. CHRISTOPHER BASILIO A.C. No. 10783, October 14, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Facts:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 In this administrative complaint, Atty. Benigno Bartolome alleged that Atty. Christopher Basilio notarized a document entitled “Joint Affidavit of Non-Tenancy and Aggregate Landholdings” which was purportedly subscribed and sworn to before him, among others, by Loreto Tanedo on January 15, 2006, despite the fact that the latter has already passed away on December 1, 2003. The IBP Investigating Commissioner has found him guilty of gross negligence and of violating the Notarial Rules. The recommendation of his one (1) year suspension from the Notarial commission and his six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law were adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. Issue: Whether or not Basilio is liable for the violation of the Notarial Rules. Ruling: Yes. In the present case, Basilio, as duly found by the IBP, failed to faithfully comply with his duties as a notary public, specifically Section 5(b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules. As the records bear out, Basilio affixed his official signature and seal on the notarial certificate of the Joint Affidavit without properly identifying the person/s who signed the same. His claim that he verified the identities of the affiants through their respective SSS identification cards and driver's licenses cannot be given any credence considering the ostensible lack of their details on the face of the certificate. Neither was he able to provide the fact of identification in any way. On the other hand, it has been established that one of the named signatories to the Joint Affidavit was already dead when he notarized the aforesaid document. Hence, it is sufficiently clear that Basilio had indeed affixed his official signature and seal on an incomplete, if not false, Notarial certificate. Moreover, by the same account, Basilio violated Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules which prohibits the notarization of a document if the person involved is not personally known to the notary public or has not identified himself through competent evidence of identity. To add, Basilio himself admitted that he failed to record his notarial act on the Joint Affidavit in his notarial register, contrary to Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules. Since the notarial register is a record of the notary public's official acts, he is charged with recording therein the necessary information regarding the document or instrument notarized. If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records, doubt as to its nature arises so that the alleged notarized document cannot be considered a public document. It should be clarified, however, that while Basilio had also failed to submit a copy of the Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC, and to retain a copy thereof for his own records, the requirement therefor, as stated under Section 2 (h), 19 Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, applies only to instruments acknowledged before the notary public. Documents like the Joint Affidavit which contain a jurat and not an acknowledgment are not required to be forwarded to the Clerk of Court. Hence, there should be no administrative infraction on this score. Nevertheless, Basilio's afore-discussed violations of the Notarial Rules are grave enough to warrant sanctions from the Court. By failing in this regard, the notary public permits a falsehood which does not only transgress the Notarial Rules but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

FIRE OFFICER I DARWIN S. SAPPAYANI v. ATTY. RENATO G. GASMEN A.C. No. 7073, September 1, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. When acknowledging a document, it is required that the person who signed or executed the same, appears in person before the notary public and represents to the latter that the signature on the document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the document, declaring the same as his free and voluntary act and deed.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Facts: Fire Officer I Darwin S. Sappayani (Sappayani) filed an administrative case against Atty. Renato G. Gasmen (Atty. Gasmen) alleging that Atty. Gasmen notarized a SPA in favor of one Newtrade Goodwill Corporation (NGC) through Romeo N. Maravillas (Maravillas) and an Application for Loan and Promissory Note (loan application) with Air Materiel Wing Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AMWSLAI). Thus, by virtue of said notarized documents, AMWSLAI released to Maravillas a loan amounting to P157, 301.43. Sappayani denied executing said documents, claiming that his signature found on the SPA was forged as he did not know Maravillas. Sappayani added that it was physically impossible for him to personally appear before Atty. Gasmen and execute the documents at the AMWSLAI office in QC, as he was then training as a new recruit at the Bureau of Fire Protection at General Santos City. Atty. Gasmen claimed that the notarization of the SPA and loan application was done only after the release of the proceeds of the loan to Maravillas and he asserted that prior to notarization, Sappayani's signature on the SPA was compared with his signature specimen cards with AMWSLAI, of which he was an honorary member. IBP Commissioner Atty. Albert P. Sordan, EnP (Commissioner Sordan) found Atty. Gasmen guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the CPR. He recommended that Atty. Gasmen be suspended from the practice of law and be disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of 1 year. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation. Issue: Whether or not the IBP correctly found Atty. Gasmen liable for violation of the Notarial Rules and the CPR. Ruling: Yes. The Court notes that both the SPA and the loan application subject of this case were notarized in 2000, during which Act No. 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Chapter 11, otherwise known as the "Notarial Law," in addition to Act No. 2103, governed the rules on notaries public. One of the obligations of a notary public is to authenticate documents acknowledged before him, certifying the truth thereof under his seal of office. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. It is impressed with substantial public interest, and only those who are qualified or authorized may act as such. It is not a purposeless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay fees for notarization. Moreover, notarization of a private document, such as an SPA in this case, converts the document into a public one which, on its face, is given full faith and credit. Thus, the failure of Atty. Gasmen to observe the utmost care in the performance of his duties caused not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and tainted the function of notarization. Further, as a lawyer, Atty. Gasmen is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. By notarizing the subject documents, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct which makes him liable as well for violation of the Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 JOY A. GIMENO v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015, BRION J. Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer the notarial acts that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should perform it. Facts: Complainant Joy Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide’s admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission, Atty. Zaide had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale and that Atty. Zaide made false and irregular entries in his notarial registers. Also, Gimeno engaged the services of Atty. Zaide’s lawfirm in an annulment of a title which involves her husband and her parents-in-law. Despite their pervious lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide appeared against her in an estafa case and violation of RA 3019. On the said cases against Gimeno, she alleged that Atty. Zade called him extortionist and also imputed malicious remarks on her counsel. On the other hand, Atty. Zaide denied all the accusations against him by Gimeno and claimed that it is his former law firm that handles the case of Gimeno personally and not him. The IBP Commissioner found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rule representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting language in his pleadings which recommendation was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but with modification on the penalty. Hence, this petition. Issues: (1) Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by notarizing a document before he was admitted to the bar. (2) Whether or not he violated the Notarial Practice rule by maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial office. Ruling: (1) Yes. The Court noted that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002. This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, lead the Court to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission. (2) Yes. Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time." On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI. Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer the notarial acts that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should perform it. MELANIO S. SALITA v. ATTY. REYNALDO T. SALVE A.C. No. 8101, February 4, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Facts: Melanio Salita obtained a loan from Jocelyn Rodriguez secured by two real estate mortgage agreements and a pre-formed deed of absolute sale as collateral. Salita was able to pay his loan in full as evidenced by a Release of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Rodriguez before a notary public which was later duly entered in the Register of Deeds. Notwithstanding such full payment, Rodriguez instituted an ejectment complaint against Salita presenting the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale and the two REM instruments signed by the latter. Salita found that the Deed of Absolute Sale had already been notarized by Atty. Salve and his Community Tax Certificate Numbers were allegedly falsified. He then filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents against Rodriguez and Atty. Salve and likewise filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Salve. However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, in his report and recommendation, dismissed Salita’s complaint for lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said report and recommendation. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Salve should be held administratively liable. Ruling: Yes, Atty. Salve is administratively liable for gross negligence in his conduct as a notary public. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same. Atty. Salve's act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without requiring the personal appearance of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public. It must be remembered that Salita had already fully paid the loan as evidenced by the notarized release of real estate mortgage executed by Rodriguez herself. Considering the circumstances, it is simply unfathomable for Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have the said document notarized, as it will be detrimental to his own interests. Hence, the Court found that Atty. Salve notarized the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale without Salita’s presence before him.

JUDICIAL ETHICS A. SOURCES JOSEFINA M. ONGCUANGCO TRADING CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY JOSEFINA M. ONGCUANGCO v. JUDGE RENATO D. PINLAC, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 57, SAN CARLOS CITY, PANGASINAN A.M. No. RTJ-14-2402, 15 April 2015, Third Division, REYES, J. The proscription against borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court is imposed on Judges to avoid the impression that the Judge would rule in favor of a litigant because the former is indebted to the latter. In order for the said proscription to operate, it

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 should first be established that the Judge knows that the person or entity from whom he or she is borrowing money or property is actually a lawyer or litigant in a case pending before his or her sala. Facts: Judge Pinlac purchased on credit animal feeds from JMOTC, issuing eight post-dated checks. Upon Judge Pinlac’s request, JMOTC did not deposit the said checks due to lack of funds, but the judge assured JMOTC that he obtained a loan which he will use to pay the debt. However the loan has not been approved. Judge Pinlac executed an acknowledgment for his unpaid obligations, but he failed to fulfill his undertakings. JMOTC averred that Judge Pinlac should be discharged from the service for taking advantage of his position, by availing of credit purchases from a litigant who has cases pending before his sala and his deliberate failure to pay his debts despite repeated demands. Issue: Whether Judge Pinlac should be held administratively liable for violation of Section 8, paragraphs (6) and (7) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and Sections 8 and 13, Canon 4 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary Ruling: The proscription against borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court is imposed on Judges to avoid the impression that the Judge would rule in favor of a litigant because the former is indebted to the latter. In order for the said proscription to operate, it should first be established that the Judge knows that the person or entity from whom he or she is borrowing money or property is actually a lawyer or litigant in a case pending before his or her sala. It would be unjust to administratively penalize Judge Pinlac for obtaining a loan from JMOTC notwithstanding that the latter is not a litigant in any pending case in his sala. Moreover, JMOTC failed to adduce substantial evidence that would establish that Judge Pinlac knew that Ongcuangco, who is a litigant in several criminal cases then pending before his sala, is the majority shareholder of either Legend Feeds or JMOTC. Judge Pinlac is however guilty of impropriety for failure to pay his debt to JMOTC. Judge Pinlac does not deny having obtained a loan from JMOTC on his purchases of animal feeds and that the same has yet to be fully satisfied. Thus, there being no evidence that would establish that Judge Pinlac’s failure to pay his debt was intentional, he could only be held liable for impropriety.

DR. CORAZON D. PADERANGA, DULCE P. GUIBELONDO, PATRIA P. DIAZ, CARMENCITA P. ORSENO, AND DR. AMOR P. GALON v. HONORABLE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, IN MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033, August 17, 2015, BERSAMIN, J. PATRIA PADERANGA DIAZ v. HON. RTC JUDGE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA, AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, IN MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383, August 17, 2015, BERSAMIN, J. The rules on the disqualification of judges, particularly compulsory self- disqualification, are basic legal guidelines that must be at the palm of every judge's hands. Facts:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Hon. Rustico Paderanga, then Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the RTC of Mambajao, Camiguin, was charged in the administrative complaint filed by his sister, Patria Diaz, with ignorance of the law, disregard of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and abuse of authority. The said complaint was based on respondent's finding of probable cause in the criminal case against Patria, and the issuance and the service of the warrant of arrest on Patria in the school where she then worked. It was Patria's submission that he should have disqualified himself early on under the rules on compulsory disqualification of judges. Respondent Judge posits that he merely exercised his ministerial duty as a judge by virtue of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; that he found probable cause for the issuance of such warrant and did not find it necessary to receive further evidence or conduct a preliminary hearing. Issue: Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law. Ruling: Yes. The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice. The respondent's issuance of the warrant of arrest against his own sister was an outright violation of the stringent rules on compulsory disqualification. For him, self-disqualification was absolute and should have been immediate. The rules on the disqualification of judges, particularly compulsory self- disqualification, are basic legal guidelines that must be at the palm of every judge's hands. They are as basic as a rule of thumb. That the respondent disobeyed them should render him fully accountable for gross ignorance of the law or rule.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINSTRATOR v. JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE AND FORMER ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, KAPATAGAN, LANAO DEL NORTE A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325, 14 April 2015, PER CURIAM Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office and every judge is required to observe the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross and patent, deliberate or malicious, or when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud dishonesty or corruption. Facts: Judge Flores was charged with violating the provisions of SC Administrative Circular No. 2395 when he failed to timely resolve several incidents in criminal cases pending before his sala. It is also claimed that Judge Flores neglected to resolve eight criminal cases, and that he rendered favorable decisions in numerous petitions for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in exchange for monetary consideration even if the parties reside in areas outside the territorial jurisdiction. During the investigation, several witness testified that Judge Flores was the one who would ask leading questions to cure the defect of the residency requirement for annulment cases. Another witness testified that Judge Flores would acquit the accused in a criminal case if the accused’s father would

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 give him monetary consideration. Judge Flores merely denied the allegations and pointed out that the testimonies of the individuals were uncorroborated. He also claimed that the delay in resolving the cases pending before him was due to the heavy work load. As regards the improper venue, he claimed that he merely relied on the declarations in the petitions since there were verified and sworn under oath. Issue: Whether or not Judge Flores should be dismissed from the service when he decided cases which are not within his jurisdiction. Ruling: Yes. The OCA report showed an alarming number of pending and decided cases where the actual residence of the parties are obviously not within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts presided by Judge Flores but he nevertheless took cognizance of these cases without even making an inquiry as to their veracity. Judge Flores almost always rejects the public prosecutors’ recommendation of dismissal in their investigation report on the alleged reason that the role of the prosecutor is only to determine if collusion exists between the parties or if the evidence is being suppressed. Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office and every judge is required to observe the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross and patent, deliberate or malicious, or when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud dishonesty or corruption.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINSTRATOR v. JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE AND FORMER ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, KAPATAGAN, LANAO DEL NORTE A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325, 14 April 2015, PER CURIAM Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. Facts: Judge Flores was charged with violating the provisions of SC Administrative Circular No. 2395 when he failed to timely resolve several incidents in criminal cases pending before his sala. It is also claimed that Judge Flores neglected to resolve eight criminal cases, and that he rendered favorable decisions in numerous petitions for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in exchange for monetary consideration even if the parties reside in areas outside the territorial jurisdiction. During the investigation, several witness testified that Judge Flores was the one who would ask leading questions to cure the defect of the residency requirement for annulment cases. Another witness testified that Judge Flores would acquit the accused in a criminal case if the accused’s father would give him monetary consideration. Judge Flores merely denied the allegations and pointed out that the testimonies of the individuals were uncorroborated. He also claimed that the delay in resolving the cases pending before him was due to the heavy work load. As regards the improper venue, he claimed that he merely relied on the declarations in the petitions since there were verified and sworn under oath. Issue:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016

order

Whether or not Judge Flores should be sanctioned for undue delay in rendering a decision or

Ruling: While Judge Flores admitted there were instances of delay and attributed them to the heavy caseload of the courts he was handling, his excuse can only be given a short shrift since he could have asked the Court for extension of time to resolve said incidents, which he never did. The Court is not oblivious to the heavy caseload of the trial courts and usually allows reasonable extensions of time. Given Judge Flores’ failure to ask for an extension to resolve the pending and due incidents before his courts, he is deemed to have incurred in delay. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.

LUCENA B. RALLOS v. HONORABLE JUSTICES GABRIEL T. INGLES, PAMELA ANN ABELLA MAXINO AND CARMELITA SALANDANAN MANAHAN G.R. No. 202515 September 28, 2015, PERALTA, J. Judges cannot indiscriminately issue writs of execution against the government to enforce money judgments. Facts: Heirs of Rev. Fir. Vicente Rallos, which include petitioner filed a Complaint against the City Government of Cebu for forfeiture of improvements on or payment of fair market value of Lot Nos. 485-D and 485-E. After trial, the RTC ruled that the subject lots are not road lots but are privatelyowned lots which were appropriated by the city government for public use without the benefit of expropriation and without payment of just compensation. RTC ordered for the payment. Cebu City elevated to the appellate court the Decision but the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the assailed decisions and orders of the RTC. A petition for review was then filed by Cebu City before this Court, but it was also denied. Per Entry of Judgment, the decision became final and executory. Cebu City filed a Rule 47 Petition with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in order to annul the RTC Decision asserting that the complainants committed extrinsic fraud for deliberately suppressing a document denominated as Convenio, which contained a stipulation pour autrui whereby Lot Nos. 485-D and 485-E were supposed to be donated by Fr. Rallos or his heirs and assigns in favor of Cebu City. It claimed that it was only in July 2011 that Cebu City learned of the existence of the Convenio, which was duly approved by a CFI \ and of the testate proceeding of Fr. Rallos in a Special Proceeding, which did not include the subject lots among the distributable assets of the decedent. Thus, the CA issued a TRO and hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that respondent justices disobeyed or resisted the judgment and/or unlawfully interfered with the processes or proceedings. Issue: Whether or not CA Associate Justices who granted the TRO are guilty of indirect contempt. Ruling:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 No. The Court finds that respondent justices rightfully exercised prudence and restraint when they resolved to grant the prayer for a WPI. Far from being guilty of contumacious conduct, respondent justices rightfully exercised prudence and restraint when they resolved to grant the prayer for a WPI. The June 26, 2012 Resolution was issued to prevent grave injustice to Cebu City in case the disputed lots will be adjudicated in its favor. Such application of judicial discretion is consistent with the directive of Administrative Circular No. 10-200023 to exercise utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local government units. It bears stressing that the cases before the respondent justices involve public funds, more specifically, city funds to be used in the delivery of basic services to constituents of the City of Cebu. Indeed, to go ahead with the execution when there are matters involving the ownership of the subject properties that need to be threshed out may prove to be detrimental to the interest of the government and public, as well. That is precisely why the courts are directed to proceed with extreme prudence and caution in satisfying judgments involving public funds. Indeed, to go ahead with the execution when there are matters involving the ownership of the subject properties that need to be threshed out may prove to be detrimental to the interest of the government and public, as well. SUGNI REALTY HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN/PRESIDENT, CYNTHIA CRUZ KHEMANI v. JUDGE BERNADETTE S. PAREDES-ENCINAREAL A.M. No.RTJ-08-2102 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2762-RTJ), October 14, 2015, BERSAMIN, J. The basic postulate is for all judges to follow the guidelines set by the Court to ensure the just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. The non-observance of the guidelines inevitably results in unfairness and inefficiency. Facts: The complainant filed an action for unlawful detainer against Spouses Falame in the MTCC. Judgment was rendered in their favor and they promptly filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Instead of resolving the motion, the MTCC elevated the records to the RTC where respondent Judge Paredes-Encinareal was the Acting Presiding Judge. Complainant filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal because of Falames’ failure to post the supersedeas bond and to deposit the monthly rental. However, respondent judge did not resolve the motion but instead issued the September 26, 2005 order which extended the period within which the defendants may post the bond and to deposit the rental. Respondent judge also denied the motion to dismiss the appeal on November 8, 2005. The complainant insists that the order of November 8, 2005 was null and void because respondent Judge had by then been relieved as the Acting Presiding Judge. Complainant charged her with gross ignorance of the law or procedure, bias, and prejudice for issuing the two orders in contravention of the rule on staying the immediate execution of the judgment and in disregard of the guidelines on the conduct of the proceedings by detailed judges. Issue: Whether or not Judge Paredes-Encinareal should be held accountable for issuing the two orders. Ruling:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 No. The failure of respondent Judge to resolve in a timely manner the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal the complainant had filed on June 21, 2005 constituted delay. However, Justice Lloren did not want her to be held to account for the delay because July 18, 2005, the day on which the motion would be heard, had coincided with Law Day, an event that the Court had required the entire Judiciary to observe. She thus felt constrained to cancel not only the hearing of the complainant's motions but also the hearings in other cases set on said date. The non-observance of the guidelines laid down in A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC inevitably results in unfairness and inefficiency. Respondent Judge had been definitely aware of her relief as the detailed Presiding Judge of the issuing court since October 6, 2005, the date she received via fax the copy of Administrative Order 159-2005 dated October 3, 2005 revoking her designation as the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the RTC. She actually conceded in the order of November 8, 2005 that she had ceased "to hold the position" of Acting Presiding Judge by October 6, 2005. Under the aforequoted guidelines, she could no longer competently act in the case once relieved as the Acting Presiding Judge. Her correct course of action would have been to desist from taking any further action in the case, including denying the complainant's Motion to Dismiss Appeal through the order of November 8, 2005, until the specific guidelines set under A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC were first complied with. Nonetheless, respondent Judge's issuance of the order of November 8, 2005 should not be considered as censurable conduct in the absence of the substantial showing of her having done so with malice, or in bad faith, or with fraud or dishonesty, or with a corrupt motive. Considering that her good faith was presumed, the complainant carried the burden to establish her having acted with malice, or bad faith, or with fraud, or with dishonesty, or with a corrupt motive.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. RETIRED JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO A.M. NO. MTJ-10-1760, November 16, 2015 This Court has consistently impressed upon the members of the Bench the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, on the time-honored principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator’s (OCA) audit team conducted a judicial audit at the Municipal trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Calbayog City, Samar, then presided by Judge Felimon S. Tandinco, Jr. prior to his retirement. The memorandum of the Judicial Audit Team revealed that Judge Tandinco failed to resolve numerous motions and incidents in criminal and civil cases; failed to decide several criminal and civil cases submitted for decision. Records showed that Judge Tandinco did not request for any extension of time within which to decide the cases submitted before them. Consequently, the OCA recommended that Judge Tandinco be found guilty of gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence, and dereliction of duty, and be fined P100,000 deductible from his retirement benefits. Issue: Whether or not Judge Tandinco is guilty of gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence, and dereliction of duty. Ruling:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Yes. As frontline officials of the Judiciary, trial court judges should at all times act with dedication, efficiency, and a high sense of duty and responsibility as the delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial system. No less than the Constitution requires that cases at the trial court level be resolved within three (3) months from the date they are submitted for decision, that is, upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. This three-month or ninety-day period is mandatory and failure to comply can subject the judge to disciplinary action. While the rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of our judges and has been understanding of the circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing their businesses. The Court, in several instances, has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request from the Court additional time. In the present case, the record does not show any attempt by Judge Tandinco to request a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the submitted cases and matters before him. Thus, his failure to decide several cases and to resolve the motions and incidents within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence, and dereliction of duty, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions.

DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Alexander Balut A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426, June 16, 2015, PER CURIAM When a judge interferes and borrows from the Court’s Collections, his payment of said borrowings will not shield him from the imposition of Administrative Sanctions. It matters not that these personal borrowings were paid as what counts is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business. Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of cases at the MTCs of Boyombong and Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Balut was the acting presiding judge in both courts. Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was likewise conducted in said MTCs as well as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe. The auditing team found several unremitted amounts representing the courts’ collections. The Clerks of Court of the three courts testified that the shortages were due to the act of Judge Balut of borrowing from the Judiciary funds. They said that they acceded to the orders of Judge Balut out of fear of him. It was likewise found that Judge Balut failed to decide 33 cases submitted for decision and to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglamentary period. Consequently, the Court, in its Resolution dated October 9, 2007, ordered Judge Balut to pay a fine for his failure to decide on the said cases and motions without properly requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given a chance to present his side on the matter. Issue: Whether or not Judge Balut can still be penalized for borrowing money from the Judiciary fund even though he has already been fined by the Court. Ruling:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Yes, he can be. A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The three clerks of court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the court funds and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had been borrowing money from the various funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Antao-Sta. Fe, presented several withdrawal slips where the back portions were signed either by Judge Balut or his court interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash withdrawn from the funds of the court. These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her reminder that the money withdrawn were given to Judge Balut. The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he had borrowed money from the judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its October 9, 2007 resolution is erroneous. In the said resolution, the Court categorically stated that Judge Balut was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and for failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period. The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the consequences of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections deserves administrative sanction and not even the full payment of his accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It matters not that these personal borrowings were paid as what counts is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business."

ELADIO D. PERFECTO v. JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO D. ESIDERA A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417. July 22, 2015. Second Division. LEONEN, J. For purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. Facts: Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera of Catamaran RTC was first married to Richard Tang Tepace but the same was not consummated. Prior to the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, she contracted a second marriage with Renato Verano Esidera on March 18, 1990 as she was already having the child of Renato. The marriage, however, was only under recognized Catholic rites and the priest who officiated their marriage had no authority to solemnize marriages under the civil law. On June 3, 1992, Renato and Judge Alma remarried but this time with all the formalities required by law. Two years after the second marriage, the prior marriage was declared void ab initio. Interestingly, when their first child was born, Renato indicated in the certificate of live birth form that he and Judge Alma was married on March 18, 1990, the date they received the Sacrament of Holy Matrimony. Later, Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative complaint against Judge Desales-Esidera for falsification of public document and dishonesty before the Office of the Court Administrator. In her comment, Judge Alma claimed that she cannot be held liable for falsification of public document as she was not the one who registered the birth of their child. She further claimed that she has every intention to correct the entry but opted not to do so because it will serve the best interest and welfare of their child who could be branded as “illegitimate child” if the records would be rectified. On the issue on her prior marriage, Judge Alma said that the prevailing jurisprudence at the time she contracted the second marriage does not call for a prior declaration of nullity of a former void marriage before one can contract another marriage. The OCA recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of disgraceful, immoral, or dishonest conduct and ruled that Judge Desales-Esidera condoned the misrepresentation made on her child’s birth certificate and that she engaged in an "illicit affair" and contracted a second marriage

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 while another marriage subsisted. Furthermore, the OCA ruled that she contracted the second marriage knowing that there were legal impediments to that marriage. Issues: 1. 2. 3.

Whether or not Judge Desales-Esidera may be held administratively liable for the misrepresentation made on her child’s birth certificate. Whether or not Judge Desales-Esidera is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. Whether or not Judge Desales-Esidera is guilty of bigamy.

Ruling: 1. No. Judge Desales-Esidera’s omission to correct her child’s birth certificate is not sufficient to render her administratively liable under the circumstances. The error in the birth certificate cannot be attributed to her. She did not participate in filling in the required details in the document. The birth certificate shows that it was her husband who signed it as informant. 2. No. Judge Desales-Esidera is not guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility. For purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of Law. The Court also does not find that respondent judge’s acts constitute immorality for purposes of administrative liability. Under the circumstances, respondent judge’s second marriage and her alleged affair with her second husband were not of such depravity as to reduce confidence in the Rule of Law. Moreover, respondent judge’s acts were not intrinsically harmful. When respondent judge married her second husband, no harm was inflicted upon any one, not even the complainant. There was no evidence on the records that the first husband, who was the most interested person in the issue, even objected to the second marriage. 3. No. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a second or subsequent marriage before the legal dissolution of a first marriage. The second or subsequent marriage contemplated under this provision is the marriage entered into under the law. What the law prohibits is not second marriage during a subsisting marriage per se. What the law prohibits is a second marriage that would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage. Under our law, respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing officer’s lack of authority. However, respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code, which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of laws. However, Article 350 may be of doubtful constitutionality when applied to religious exercise and expression insofar as it prescribes upon individuals and religious communities formal requirements for the conduct of their religious ceremonies. Thus, unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage ceremony according to her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and imminent danger to the society, the Court cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable for her participation in her religious marriage ceremony.

RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2015 OF CATHERINE DAMAYO, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER, VENIRANDA DAMAYO, AGAINST HON. MARILYN LAGURA-YAP, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEALS- VISAYAS, CEBU CITY, CEBU A.M. NO. CA-15-53-J. July 14, 2015, PERALTA, J. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded with the stigma of being biased and partial. Facts:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Then Judge and now Associate Justice Yap was charged administratively by complainant Damayo for allegedly rendering a false decision and in promulgating judgement in absentia. However, the claim of false decision was not supported by evidence. Moreover, in defense it was shown that Damayo did not attend the promulgation despite notice and that the complaint was a mere resort in light of the complainant’s lost appeal. Issue: Whether or not Justice Yap should be administratively charged. Ruling: No. It should be emphasized that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded with the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. Indeed, Section 6 of Rule 120 authorizes the promulgation of judgment in absentia in view of Damayo’s failure to appear despite notice. It bears stressing that the rule authorizing promulgation in absentia is intended to obviate the situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment In this case, other than the complainant's bare allegation of fraud, there was no showing that respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in the alleged erroneous judgment. This Court will not hesitate to protect Judges or court personnel against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes when an administrative charge against them has no basis whatsoever in fact or in law. This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon all employees of the judiciary, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.

DISICIPLINE CLERK OR COURTS ANONYMOUS LETTER AGAINST AURORA C. CASTAÑEDA, CLERK III, RTC, BRANCH 224, QUEZON CITY, AND LORENZO CASTAÑEDA, SHERIFF IV, RTC, BRANCH 96, QUEZON CITY. A.M. No. P-113017, June 16, 2015, PER CURIAM Officials and employees involved in the administration of justice to faithfully adhere to their mandated duties and responsibilities. Any act of impropriety - whether committed by the highest judicial official or by the lowest member of the judicial workforce – can greatly erode the people’s confidence in the Judiciary. Facts:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 An anonymous letter was sent to the Court denouncing the misconduct committed by Spouses Lorenzo and Aurora Castaneda, respectively the Deputy Sheriff of Branch 96,RTC QC and the Clerk III in Branch 224 of RTC QC for having been arrested in an entrapment mounted by NBI agents for extorting money from the mother of the accused in a murder case pending in Branch 224. Issue: Whether or not the Castanedas are guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty hence, should be dismissed from service Ruling: Yes. Sec. 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel has enjoined all court personnel against soliciting or accepting “any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.” The SC has incessantly reminded officials and employees involved in the administration of justice to faithfully adhere to their mandated duties and responsibilities. Any act of impropriety - whether committed by the highest judicial official or by the lowest member of the judicial workforce – can greatly erode the people’s confidence in the Judiciary. The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct of its personnel. The arrest of Aurora indicated that the entrapment was a complete success. The ensuing chemistry findings of smudges of fluorescent powder on her left and right hands established beyond all doubt that she had accepted and received, and then handled the P500,000.00 in “boodle” money dusted with the powder. The findings directly incriminated her for extortion, and indicated that her meeting with the mother of the accused at the restaurant had been to receive the bribe money. As for Lorenzo, the fact that he was not formally charged in court along with Aurora for the criminal extortion did not indicate that he was not guilty of gross misconduct like Aurora. He was as guilty as she was considering that his presence in that meeting was neither innocent nor accidental but deliberate and in pursuance of their conjugal conspiracy to extort. Hence, the Castanedas are dismissed from the service.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, v. REMEDIOS R. VIESCA, CLERK OF COURT II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SAN ANTONIO, NUEVA ECIJA A.M. No. P-12-3092, April 14, 2015(Formerly A.M. No. 12-7-54-MTC), PER CURIAM Clerks of Court have the duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody. Facts: The Audit Team alleged that since 2000, Viesca had failed to submit her monthly financial reports concerning the Judiciary Development Fund, Fiduciary Fund, General Fund and Special Allowance to the FMO, despite constant notices and warnings. OCA sought the withholding of Viesca’s salaries which was approved by the Court. However, she still failed to submit the required financial reports. An Audit Team was constituted to conduct a financial audit on the books of the MTC. The shortages were computed in the aggregate amount of P529,738.50, albeit already restituted belatedly. The Audit Team recommended that their Memorandum be docketed as an administrative complaint for Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct against Viesca. The Audit Team also found that she violated OCA Circular No. 32-93 and 113-2004. Viesca averred that she was fully aware of her duties and responsibilities as Clerk of Court and that her only mistake was to authorize her coClerk of Court to receive collections on her behalf. Viesca found out that Hernandez was the one who misappropriated the collections as she used it for her cancer treatment.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Issue: Whether or not Viesca should be held administratively liable for Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct. Ruling: Yes. Clerks of Court are the chief administrative officers of their respective courts; with regard to the collection of legal fees, they perform a delicate function as judicial officers entrusted with the correct and effective implementation of regulations thereon. As custodians of court funds and revenues, Clerks of Court have the duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody. The failure of Clerks of Court to perform their duties exposes them to administrative liability for Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, and also Serious Dishonesty, if it is shown that there was misappropriation of such collections. In this case, Viesca herself admitted that she was fully aware of the duties and responsibilities attendant to her position as Clerk of Court. Despite such knowledge, she still failed to comply with the foregoing directives by failing to timely remit her judiciary collections and submit monthly reports pertaining thereto, resulting in computed shortages as found by the Audit Team. Worse, Viesca admitted to the misappropriation of such shortages for her own personal use, offering the unacceptable excuse that her salaries had been withheld on account of her failure to submit the required financial reports. Viesca’s restitution of the aforesaid shortages did not operate to exculpate her of any administrative liability, since as correctly pointed out by the OCA, her belated remittance of the judiciary collections had effectively deprived the Court of interest such amounts would have earned if they were deposited in a bank. Remedios Viesca is found guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, and Serious Dishonesty, and is thus, dismissed from the service.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. CLERK OF COURT EMMANUELA A. REYES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, BANI, PANGASINAN A.M. No. P-10-2872 February 24, 2015, PER CURIAM Section 4 of OCA Circular No. 50-95 provides that all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other Fiduciary collections shall be deposited by the Clerk of Court concerned, within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt thereof with the Landbank of the Philippines. Facts: It was found that Reyes delayed the remittances of of collections of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), Fiduciary Fund (FF), Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF), Sheriffs Trust Fund (STF), and Mediation Fund (MF) for the years 2004 to 2009. Interests withdrawn from the funds were also not deposited promptly. Reyes reasoned that since no one called her attention, she had presumed there was nothing wrong and that the Landbank branch was 14 kms away such that she would only go to the bank if she needed to withdraw from the court’s account. The audit team found that the delay resulted in the loss of interest that would have been earned. Lack of provision for transportation expenses is a lame excuse for non-remittance of collections, since personal money spent for a valid undertaking would be subject to reimbursement. In another complaint, her books of accounts from 2009 to 2012 were examined and shortages amounting to more than 200,000 were found, as well as unauthorized withdrawals. The OCA recommended that Reyes be dismissed from service. Issue:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Whether or not Reyes should be held administratively liable Ruling: Yes, Reyes is liable for gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. The undeposited collections and delayed remittances resulted to loss of interests that should have accrued had the collections been deposited promptly to their respective fund accounts. Under Section 3-C of the JDF and SAJF procedural guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, as amended, the daily remittance of JDF and SAJF collections is required. In relation to this, Section 4 of OCA Circular No. 50-95 provides that all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other Fiduciary collections shall be deposited by the Clerk of Court concerned, within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt thereof with the Landbank of the Philippines. Indubitably, Reyes violated the trust reposed in her as a collecting officer of the judiciary. The Court cannot tolerate non-submission of financial reports, non-reporting and non-deposit of collections, undue delay in the deposit of collections, unauthorized withdrawal, and non-explanation of incurred shortages and undeposited collections. Reyes failed to fully settle her deficit in the court funds despite the ample time given to her to do so. The request for an extension of time to be able to come up with the amount needed is merely a delaying tactic to evade full responsibility for the violation committed

ASTORGA AND REPOL LAW OFFICES, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. ARNOLD B. LUGARES v. ALEXANDER D. VILLANUEVA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 60, MAKATI CITY A.M. No. P-09-2668 February 24, 2015, PER CURIAM Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours Facts: A writ of execution was issued in favor of FGU Insurance, represented by Astorga and Repol Law Offices against NEC Cargo. Atty. Lugares met with Sheriff Villanueva who allegedly demanded 8,000 to execute the decision. They agreed to meet at a later date to serve the Notices of Garnishment. On that day, Villanueva texted Atty. Lugares demanding that his “legal fees” be sent on lunch time. Atty. Lugares then assumed that since Sheriff Villanueva was not given the amount he demanded, the issuance of the Notices of Garnishment did not take place. Sheriff Villanueva denied extorting money from Atty. Lugares and stated that Atty. Lugares offered him money as a token of gratitude if he would be able to garnish the certificate of stocks of NEC prohibited under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He denied all imputations of bribery alleged by Atty. Lugares. The investigating Judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence, since the Atty. Lugares was unable to present his outgoing messages automatically deleted by his phone. Issue: Whether or not Villanueva is guilty of misconduct due to willful neglect of duty and corruption/extortion Ruling: Yes, he is guilty. Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Atty. Lugares submitted respondent’s calling card that contained the same phone number seen in the text messages. The presentation of text messages that Atty. Lugares sent to respondent is not necessary. Among the text messages presented by Atty. Lugares states that respondent sent Atty.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Lugares the following text message: "Nka pag Shf. return na ako dyan sa kaso na yan, bhala ka sa gusto mo mangyari." The content of the text messages from respondent and the circumstances within which they were made constitute substantial evidence that justify the finding of administrative liability. The text message is evidence that respondent did not undertake his duty to implement the Writ of Execution. A cursory execution of the Sheriff’s Return did not excuse respondent from faithfully implementing the Writ of Execution. A writ of execution continues to be effective during the period within which a judgment may be enforced by motion, which is within five (5) years from the entry of judgment. After the lapse of the five (5) year period, the judgment may be revived and executed before it is barred by the statute of limitations. The failure to execute the judgment could result in years of protracted litigation. Thus, the Sheriff must exert the necessary effort to ensure that the judgment is duly executed. Villanueva’s neglect is evident when the Sheriff tasked to replace him was able to discharge his duties without incident. Special Sheriff Fermin de Castro was able to serve the Notices of Garnishment. Thus, respondent’s failure to show that he did the necessary steps to implement the Writ of Execution in good faith cannot be tolerated by this court. Respondent violated Canon IV, Sections 1 and 6 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel: Sec. 1 - Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours; Sec. 6 - Court personnel shall expeditiously enforce rules and implement orders of the court within the limits of their authority. He is also guilty of extortion. Villanueva merely denied the charge which cannot overcome the positive testimonies of witnesses. The text messages he sent Atty. Lugares were presented as evidence. A refusal to coordinate with Atty. Lugares and a terse proposal to talk to Atty. Astorga regarding the payment of "legal fees" support the conclusion that respondent unjustly refused to implement the Writ of Execution, absent the consideration of settling certain "legal fees" or "colors." He is guilty of gross misconduct and must be dismissed from the service.

COURT PERSONNEL COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND SAFETY, COURT OF APPEALS v. REYNALDO V. DIANCO - CHIEF SECURITY A.M. No. CA-15-31-P, June 16, 2015, PER CURIAM [D]ishonesty, x x x need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. Facts: Respondents Reynaldo Dianco (Dianco), Joven Sorianosos (Sorianosos), and Abelardo Catbagan (Catbagan), together with other members of the CA Security Group went on an excursion at Cainta, Rizal. Catbagan was tasked to head the Food Committee created for said excursion while Sorianosos was assigned to head the Money Collection and Budget and Games Committee. After the excursion, it was discovered that there has been irregularities between the amount of money disbursed for the excursion between the food concessionaire’s initial computation and that indicated in the receipt. According to the food concessionaire’s initial computation, only Php16,850.00 was used out of the funds, while according to the receipt the fund disbursed amounted to Php21,840.00. Furthermore, there were reports that Dianco and Sorianosos allegedly violated the prohibition on the consumption of alcohol in the premises of their place of excursion. Thereafter, the CA Office of the Clerk of Court formally charged Dianco for dishonesty and misconduct, while Sorianosos was charged with simple dishonesty, and simple misconduct, and Catbagan was indicted for simple

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 neglect of duty. After investigation, Dianco, Sorianosos and Catbagan were found liable for the offenses charged against them respectively. Accordingly, a Report containing the findings of the Committee was indorsed to the SC. Issues: 1. Whether or not Dianco should be held Administratively Liable. 2. Whether or not Sorianosos should be held Administratively Liable. 3. Whether or not Sorianosos should be held Administratively Liable. Ruling: 1. Yes, he should. In the present case, the records show that Dianco admitted to the dishonest act of padding the food bill in order to charge the cost of the Fundador (P1,043.00 as reflected in the computer-generated liquidation report) and the bottles of beer (as beverage) on the excursion funds. Dianco, by these acts, clearly committed serious dishonesty and gravely abused his authority and moral ascendancy in order to commit the dishonest act by directing his subordinate to cooperate with his dishonest conduct. Dianco further orchestrated a series of falsifications to cover up his deception. Dianco’s acts do not only carry administrative repercussions, they also have criminal consequences (i.e., falsification of an official document punishable under the Revised Penal Code). Likewise, the Court finds Dianco administratively liable for grave misconduct. In the present case, Dianco’s acts run contrary to the policy of promoting a high standard of ethics in the public service. As the Report correctly pointed out, the excursion of the members of the CA security group was a courtsponsored affair, one imbued with public interest. Foremost of which is to provide respite to our tired guards, up their morale and esprit de corps, and to develop a highly respected and efficient security group. Thus each officer had the duty to act in a proper, dignified and righteous and responsible manner. 2. Yes, he should. The Court believes that the Sorianosos committed a dishonest act by “fixing” the entries in the computer-printed liquidation report. Nonetheless, the Court believes that a finding of serious dishonesty on his part is not justifiable under the circumstances, considering the amount involved and that he merely acted under the compulsion of a superior officer. The fact that Sorianosos initially prepared the computer-generated liquidation report, without any intercalations, demonstrates an absence of bad faith and that he had no prior intent to commit any dishonest conduct. By error of judgment, Sorianosos was persuaded by his superior, Dianco, to commit a dishonest act. 3. Yes, he should. With respect to Catbagan, the Court agreed with the Report that he failed to give due attention to the task expected of him as Food Committee Head. Although Catbagan may have checked the meal stubs, distributed these to the attendees and ensured that the queue was orderly, those acts would not exculpate him from administrative liability. What is clear is that he failed to exercise the responsibility expected of him as Food Committee head, and passed it on to Regala. His indifference thereby demonstrates a lack of any sense of accountability in performing the tasks assigned to him.

EDMAR D. GARCISCO v. ARVIN A. OCA A.M. No. P-09-2705, June 16, 2015, PER CURIAM

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 The dismissal of a criminal case brought against a public employee should not be a ground to dismiss the administrative case stemming from the same set of facts or transactions in view of the distinct standards of proof for the criminal and the administrative cases. Facts: Petitioner Edmar Garcisco (Garcisco) received a text message from respondent Arvin Oca (Arvin), a process server assigned at MTCC, Cebu City, asking him to meet with Arvin. When the two met, Arvin informed Garcisco that there was a pending Application for Search Warrant for violation of R.A. 9165 filed by PDEA 7 awaiting approval at the Court of a certain Judge Belarmino of RTC Cebu City allegedly against Garcisco. During their conversation, Arvin vouched that he could cause the denial of the application all for a fee of P150,000. Believing the existence of the same to be a fact, plus the continued intimidation by Arvin, Garcisco finally sought the assistance of the NBI. Thereafter, during an entrapment operation, Arvin was arrested. Recovered from his person was the marked bills and his Nokia Mobile Phone containing the text messages he received from Garcisco and his replies thereof immediately prior to his arrest. A certification obtained from the sala of Judge Belarmino disclosed that there is no pending application for Search Warrant filed before her sala against Garcisco. Issue: Whether or not Arvin Oca should be dismissed from service. Ruling: Yes, he should. It was sufficiently established that Arvin solicited P150,000.00 from Garciso in exchange for the assistance he could extend towards the withdrawal by the PDEA of its nonexistent application for search warrant, or the denial of the non-existent application for search warrant by Judge Belarmino; and that Arvin was then arrested in the course of the entrapment operation upon accepting the amount he had demanded. Arvin thereby took advantage of his position as an employee of the Judiciary in order to mislead Garciso into believing that the latter was the object of the non-existent application for a search warrant by the PDEA for violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002, and that he could influence Judge Belarmino, before whom the application had been supposedly filed, to deny the application, or he could have the PDEA withdraw the application. Such acts and actuations amounted to extortion, even if based on falsehoods, and his deliberate misrepresentation of his influence and capacity to cause the denial and withdrawal of the application for the search warrant was obviously designed to engender in the mind of Garciso the immediate and sufficient fear to force him to come up with the amount demanded to forestall his arrest and embarrassment. The provisional dismissal of Criminal Case No. CBU-84275 because of Garciso's intervening loss of interest in its prosecution did not bear any impact on the respondent's administrative liability because such dismissal did not yet constitute the determination of the merits of the case. The Court reiterates that the dismissal of a criminal case brought against a public employee like Arvin should not be a ground to dismiss the administrative case stemming from the same set of facts or transactions in view of the distinct standards of proof for the criminal and the administrative cases.

RE: INCIDENT REPORT RELATIVE TO A CRIMINAL CASE FILED AGAINST ROSEMARIE U. GARDUCE, CLERK III, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT (OCC), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC), PARANAQUE CITY A.M. NO. P-15-3391, November 16, 2015, PER CURIAM

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 This Court had emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility of court personnel. They have been constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of their official functions must be avoided. Facts: Rosemarie U. Garduce works as Clerk III of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). Sometime in 2012, Marie Alarilla and Gwen Lachica agreed that Garduce will process the bail bond of their father who has a pending criminal case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196 of Paranaque City. In the morning, they met Garduce at Jollibee whereby the former handed over the amount of P21,000 to the latter. Garduce issued a receipt to Alarilla and Lachico indicating therein the amount of P20,500 only. Late afternoon, Alarilla and Lachica learned that the RTC denied their motion for bail. Hence, they immediately demanded the return of the amount paid to Garduce but the latter refused. As such, they brought Garduce to the Paranaque City Police Station where she invoked her right to remain silent. Thereafter, the city prosecutor conducted an inquest proceeding and found probable cause to indict Garduce for the crime of estafa. The Office of the Court Administrator issued an indorsement directing Garduce to file a comment on the complaint but the latter failed to comply. Consequently, after evaluation, the OCA recommended the re-docketing of the matter as a regular administrative case and that Garduce be found guilty of grave misconduct, and willful violation of this Court’s rules, directives and circulars, and that she be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government office, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Issue: Whether or not Garduce is guilty of grave misconduct and willfull violation of the Court’s rules, directives and circulars. Ruling: Yes. This Court finds the recommendation of the OCA to be proper under the circumstances. the circumstances. The evidence on record, as found by the OCA, shows that Garduce clearly violated these provisions when she accepted money for processing the bail bond of the private complainants’ father. The OCA based its observation from the following facts, to wit: (1) the receipt submitted by the private complainants duly signed by Garduce stating the latter’s receipt of ₱20,500.00 on October 25, 2012; and (2) Garduce’s failure to return the said amount to the private complainants despite her failure to obtain the promised bail bond for the private complainants’ father. In Villahermosa, Sr. v. Sarcia, this Court held that “[t]he sole act of receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a court employee.” In the present case, Garduce clearly violated the above norms of conduct as the allegations against her stood completely uncontroverted.

SHERIFF FELISICIMO R. SABIJON and ZENAIDA A. SABIJON v. BENEDICT M. DE JUAN, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF KABACAN, NORTH COTABATO, BRANCH 22 A.M. No. P-14-3281, January 28, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Simple Neglect of Duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or in difference. Grave Abuse of Authority however, is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. Facts: Felisicimo and PO2 Recto Aquino figured in a vehicular accident. PO2 Aquino filed a civil case for damages and attorney’s fees against Felisicimo. Thereafter, Sheriff Benedict De Juan and PO2 Aquino went to complainants’ residence and, on the strength of the Writ of Execution forcibly took away the subject truck. De Juan explained that he initially went to complainants’ residence but was unable to talk to them since they were away. He went back and levied on execution the subject truck. Subsequently, he issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property setting the public auction. Since nobody participated in the auction the vehicle was awarded to PO2 Aquino. Later on, he readily admitted his failure to submit the Sheriff’s Return and attributed the same to the fact that he is the only Sheriff in the MCTC after his colleagues either retired or went on a leave of absence. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority and Simple Neglect of Duty, mitigated by the fact that it was his first offense in his more than 19 years of service. Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority and Simple Neglect of Duty. Ruling: Yes. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law. Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or in difference. On the other hand, Grave Abuse of Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. In this case, Sheriff de Juan, ought to know that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment debtor, in case he has insufficient cash to pay all or part of the judgment debt, is given the option to choose which among his properties or a part thereof may be levied upon. Moreover, respondent should have known that under Section 14 of the same Rule, he is required to make a return on the writ of execution and make periodic reports on the execution proceedings until either the full satisfaction of the judgment or the expiration of the writ’s effectivity, as well as to furnish the parties copies of such return and periodic reports.

REGISTER OF DEEDS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MA. NIMFA P. DE VILLA G.R. No. 208341, June 17, 2015, MENDOZA, J. A presumption is not sufficient substantial evidence to sustain a finding of administrative liability. Facts:

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Based from an anonymous tip coming from the Registry of Deeds in Las Pinas City, Nimfa De Villa (De Villa), Corazon Chavez (Chavez), Delia Dela Pefia (Pefia), Maribel Barba (Barba), Nimfa Mifia (Mifia) and Beatriz Meneses (Meneses) were charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Official and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service of before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman averred that De Villa et al were administratively liable for registering a fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale which resulted to the issuance of a TCT. Because of this, De Villa et al filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA assailing the decision of the Ombudsman. The CA decided in favor of De Villa et al and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman. Now, the Ombudsman comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA on the ground that De Villa et al were remiss in their respective duties as they failed to see to it that all documents submitted to them were in ordered. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not De Villa et al should be held administratively liable Ruling: No, they cannot be held administratively liable. It cannot be said that De Villa’s performance of her duty constituted willful intent to violate the law. Corruption, as an element of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. No evidence was ever presented by the Ombudsman to show corruption on her part. A presumption or conjecture is not sufficient substantial evidence to sustain a finding of administrative liability.

JESSIE CAMPUGAN and ROBERT TORRES vs. ATTY. FEDERICO TOLENTINO, JR., et al. A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015, J. Bersamin JESSIE CAMPUGAN and ROBERT TORRES v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT QUILALA A.C. No. 8725, March 11, 2015, BERSAMIN, J. The general duties of the Register of Deeds, are ministerial in nature. It is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of impropriety of the act done. Facts: In a civil case involving a TCT owned by complainants, and that was unlawfully cancelled and replaced by a TCT issued in favor of the Ricaforts, it appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during its pendency. Here, the complainants agreed to sell the property and the proceeds to be equally divided between the parties. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, Atty. Daniel Victorio, Jr., the complainants’ counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint which the RTC granted. The complainants alleged that from that time, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. and that a new annotation on the letter-request seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens has been filed by the same. Feeling aggrieved by the discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority assailing the unlawful cancellation of their notices. The records do not disclose whether or not this case was already resolved or remained pending. Due to the facts that they have paid Atty. Victorio, Jr. for his services and despite such, they are unable to contact the same, they filed the present disbarment case against

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 him together with Attys. Federico Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Elbert Quilala (the Chief Registrar), and Atty. Renato Cunanan (the Acting Registrar and Signatoryof the new annotations) Issue: Whether or not the Attys. Quilala and Cunanan should be held administratively liable. Ruling: No. The general duties of the Register of Deeds, as enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1529, are ministerial in nature. As such, a purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of impropriety of the act done. In Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, the Court explains that “whether the document is invalid, frivolous, or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.” In view of the foregoing, the Court found no abuse of authority of irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on the TCT. Whether or not the RTC order or the letter-request had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letterrequest and the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay. D. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES ARIEL "AGA" MUHLACH v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE MA. ANGELA ACOMPANADO-ARROYO A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439. August 26, 2015, PEREZ, J. To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. Facts: Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and Ferdinand Fernando Felix Monasterio filed a petition before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur praying for the exclusion of Ariel and Charlene Mae G. Muhlach from the list of voters of Precinct No. 1 OA, Brgy. San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur. Counsel for Spouses Muhlach filed with MCTC, San JosePresentacion an Urgent Omnibus Motion: 1) to inhibit the Judge Begino; and 2) to re-raffle and assign the case to another judge. Judge Arroyo issued the assailed order which rendered ineffective the order of inhibition of Judge Begino and directed Judge Begino to continue to hear and decide the case. Judge Arroyo also noted that the counsel for Spouses Muhlach’s oral motion failed to state the grounds to justify the inhibition of the judge. Aggrieved, Spouses Muhlach filed the instant administrative complaint against Judge Arroyo on the ground of having issued the Order dated 16 October 2012 with abuse of authority and with gross ignorance of law and procedure. They contended that Judge Arroyo had no authority to reverse Judge Begino’s order inhibiting himself as such power is vested solely in the Supreme Court. Issue:

Whether or not Executive Judge Aquino shall be administratively liable since he had no authority to reverse Judge Begino’s order inhibiting himself as such power is vested solely in the SC.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 Ruling:

No. The inhibition of Judge Begino is lacking in some elements. Judge Begino simply ruled that he is inhibiting from the case to avoid any doubts as to the impartiality of the court. Although voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge, such should still comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules, that is, it should be based on just or valid reasons. In the subject order, the reason for the inhibition of the judge was not stated. Neither could it be determined from the motion of the Spouses Muhlach’s counsel since the motion was done orally, in violation of Section 213 of the same rule. When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino’s order of inhibition was ineffective, she was in a way, returning the case back to the presiding judge for the latter to either cure the deficiency or take cognizance of the case if he finds no basis for the motion. It was for that reason that she used the word “ineffective.” Tersely put, EJ Arroyo did not reverse the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino. She correctly asked that the Order be completed to comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges .Moreover, to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. Here, it was clearly established that the only intention of EJ Arroyo was to ensure that the case is decided expeditiously and within the period provided under the law. There was no showing that she was moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate existing Court issuances.

ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR. v. HON. AMELIA C. MANALASTAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-PASIG CITY, BRANCH 268, and LEONARDO S. UMALE [deceased] substituted by his spouse, CLARISSA VICTORIA UMALE G.R. No. 171247, July 22, 2015, BRION, J. While a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent in handling the case, this right must be weighed with her duty to decide cases without fear or pressure. Facts: The case stemmed from the complaint filed by respondent Umale against petitioner Villamar, Jr. and others with the RTC. The complaint sought to compel the petitioner to account for, pay, and deliver to the respondent the rental payments allegedly in the petitioner's possession. The respondent argued that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping when he availed of three separate remedies. The petitioner reiterated, on the other hand the propriety of Judge Manalastas's refusal to inhibit herself from hearing the RTC case. Issue: Whether or not Judge Manalastas's decision to continue hearing the civil case was improper. Ruling: No. Judge Manalastas's decision to continue hearing the case was not improper. First, Judge Manalastas's inhibition from the civil case is discretionary. The grounds relied upon by the petitioner do not fall under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which enumerates the grounds for compulsory inhibition. The Court has held that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the case. Second, bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence, to overcome the presumption that a judge

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor. Nothing on record shows that the petitioner ever submitted evidence of bias and prejudice. Because this act is discretionary, Judge Manalastas is in the best position to determine whether or not there was a need to inhibit from the case; thus, her decision to hear the case, in the higher interest of justice, equity, and public interest, should be respected. While a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent in handling the case, this right must be weighed with her duty to decide cases without fear or pressure. In these lights, we see no reason to reverse Judge Manalastas's decision to proceed with hearing the case.

E. POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ANA MARIE ABARENTOS, RECORDS OFFICER IV, COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY A.M. No. CA-12-26-P, August 17, 2015 , DEL CASTILLO, J. Resignation from the service will not extricate court employees from the consequences of their acts. It is settled that the cessation from office neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against the respondents while they were still in the service nor does it render the case moot and academic. Facts: In a letter dated February 9, 2011, Ana Marie Abarientos, former Records Officer IV at the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals, Cebu station, was accused of tampering the date of receipt of a petition for review and the taking of the ATM card of her officemate. On February 14, 2011, she resigned from the CA. The case was re-docketed as a regular administrative case and was referred to the CA. The Investigating Justice of the CA found that the charge of tampering was unsupported by substantial evidence. However, respondent Abarientos was still held liable for unauthorized withdrawal of from the account of her officemate. When the case was referred to the OCA for evaluation, recommendation and report, the OCA opined that Abarientos is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having received a pleading beyond office hours and without authority to do so. She was also found to be guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The SC, in resolving the present case, absolved respondent from the charge of tampering as the same was not supported by evidence. On the other hand, the fact that respondent took the ATM card of her officemate and the manner by which respondent was able to withdraw P10, 000.00 from her account have been duly proven by substantial evidence making her liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty. Issue: Whether or not respondent Abarentos’ resignation absolved her from any liability. Ruling: No. The resignation of respondent from the service on February 14, 2011 is of no moment. Resignation from the service will not extricate court employees from the consequences of their acts. It is settled that the cessation from office neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against the respondents while they were still in the service nor does it render the case moot and academic. “A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 dreadful and dangerous implications," as nothing "would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that they would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties.” The only effect of respondent's resignation is that it rendered moot the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.

GUIAWAN REGINA BALANZA v. ARSENIO P. CRISTE, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, VIGAN CITY, ILOCOS SUR A.M. No. P-15-3321, 21 October 2015, First Division, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. This court has an interest in the conduct and behavior of its officials and employees and in ensuring at all times the proper delivery of justice to the people. No affidavit of desistance can divest this court of its jurisdiction under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and decide complaints against erring officials and employees of the judiciary. Facts: An administrative complaint was filed against Criste for dishonesty when he certified that the photocopy of the decision and certificate of finality he found in his table to be true copies on file. The investigating judge found that Criste got involved because the party to the case was his townmate Roy. During the investigation, the complainant executed an affidavit of desistance, claiming that she was no longer interested to pursue the complaint against Criste. The investigating judge through a resolution refered the administrative complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator for further proceedings. Issue: Whether or not Criste should be held administratively liable despite the desistance of the complainant. Ruling: No. The withdrawal of the complaint or the desistance of a complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint. The issue in an administrative case is not whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employee has breached the norms and standards of the courts. Neither can the disciplinary power of this Court be made to depend on a complainant's whims. To rule otherwise would undermine the discipline of court officials and personnel. The people, whose faith and confidence in their government and its instrumentalities need to be maintained, should not be made to depend upon the whims and caprices of complainants who, in a real sense, are only witnesses. Administrative actions are not made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. Such unilateral act does not bind this Court on a matter relating to its disciplinary power. Criste’s certifications of the photocopies of the Decision and Certificate of Finality gave the false impression that the said decision and certificate were authentic and officially executed by the Judge and the Branch Clerk, and that Criste had the authority to make such certifications, consequently, favoring or benefitting his townmate and acquaintance. Criste’s act of certifying the photocopies of the Decision and Certificate constitute dishonesty. Serious Dishonesty is punishable by dismissal from the service. However, the Court does not believe that the extreme penalty of dismissal should be imposed on Criste. he OCA recommended that Criste be suspended for six (6) months and one (1) day, but since Criste already retired on December 1, 2014, the Court instead imposes upon Criste a fine equivalent to his salary for six (6) months and one (1) day.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. FREDELITO R. BALTAZAR, CLERK OF COURT II, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, ALLACAPAN-LASAM, CAGAYAN A.M. No. P-14-3209, October 20, 2015, PER CURIAM Clerk of courts are judicial officers entrusted to perform delicate functions with regard to the collection of legal fees, and as such, are expected to implement regulations correctly. Facts: A financial audit was conducted by the audit team on the books of account of the MCTC as requested by FMO of the OCA due to failure of the clerk of court, Fredelito Baltazar, to submit monthly financial reports despite the notices sent to him. The audit team reported that there were cash shortages in the funds of the judiciary amounting to P72,376.80. It also noticed discrepancies in the collection and allocation of filing fees, tampering of official receipts, and unexplained withdrawals from the funds. The report stated that in the exit interview, Baltazar admitted that he had tampered with the official receipts. He also admitted that he used court collections for personal consumption with the intent to pay back the total amount misappropriated. Baltazar stated that poor health hampered his ability to accomplish and submit monthly reports. He recounted that he was found to be positive for tuberculosis and was advised not to tax himself. Baltazar appeals to the Court for its compassion, indulgence and humanitarian consideration owing to his financial distress, poor health and work pressures. Issue: Whether or not Baltazar should be held liable for his violations of Supreme Court Circulars. Ruling: Yes. No less than the Constitution mandates that "public office is a public trust." Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 prescribes that clerks of court receive JDF and GF collections. He is tasked to deposit the same to the appropriate bank accounts and render a monthly report for the FMO within the first 10 days of each month. Moreover, it prohibits the use of the JDF fund for the encashment of personal checks. Clerk of courts are custodians of court funds, and that they are to immediately deposit the funds which they receive in their official capacity to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep such funds in their custody. Here, Baltazar neglected to submit monthly financial reports to the FMO, which prompted the request for the audit. After the audit, it was found that there are unexplained cash shortages in the various funds under Baltazar's control which remain to be unrestituted. While this Court sympathizes with his illness, the Court does not see it sufficient reason for the non-accomplishment of the monthly financial reports. Baltazar merely submitted an X-Ray report without a doctor's certification. In his attempt to justify not being able to perform his duties, he inadvertently admitted to have used cash collections of the court in some check rediscounting scheme with his fellow employees despite the clear prohibition against the use of the fund for encashment of personal checks. Indeed, the use of court funds for purposes other than for what it is expected may constitute malversation. Moreover, Baltazar did not satisfactorily address the issue of tampering with official receipts to make it appear that a lower amount had been paid than was actually received. The report of the audit team reveals that he merely reported a collection of P15.00 or P35.00 when he in fact received a bigger amount. Baltazar is guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty and is hereby dismissed from service. He was ordered to restitute the balance of the shortages.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 TERESITA R. MARIGOMEN, CLERK OF COURT, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA v. RONELO G. LABAR, DRIVER, MAILING AND DELIVERY SECTION, COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU STATION A.M. No. CA-15-33-P [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-207-CA-P], August 24, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Facts: Atty. Cad-Enjambre caught Labar, together with two other co-terminous employees of CACebu and an unidentified male person, in the act of playing cards under the staircase located at the back of the office building, adjoining the working area of the maintenance section. As there were some twenty-peso bills and coins on top of the table together with the playing cards, Atty. CadEnjambre deduced that Labar and his companions were gambling. Thus, Atty. Cad-Enjambre issued a Memorandum to Labar, requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be meted against him for his infractions. Atty. Cad-Enjambre issued the letter-complaint and referred the same to Investigating Justice Gabriel T. Ingles (Justice Ingles), Chairperson of the Committee on Ethics and Special Concerns of CA-Cebu. After due investigation, Labar may be held liable for violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and Gambling Prohibited by Law under Section 52 (C) (3) and (5), Rule IV of the RURACCS, respectively, and recommended the penalty of reprimand. In a Resolution, Justice Ingles recommended that Labar be suspended for one (1) month and one (1) day, without pay, for insubordination. Resolution was indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). OCA affirmed in toto. Issue: Whether or not Labar should be held administratively liable for insubordination in violation of the Memorandum. Ruling: Yes. The Court finds that Labar should be held liable for violation of reasonable office rules and regulations under Section 52 (C) (3) of the Revised URACCS for his unjustified presence at the maintenance section of the CA-Cebu without official business thereat or without a valid pass slip from the Assistant Clerk of Court, in direct contravention of the April 14, 2011 Memorandum. Likewise, he should be held liable for the offense of gambling prohibited by law under Section 52 (C) (5) of the same Rules, for having committed gambling on the same incident. As Labar offered his apology and vowed not to commit the same acts again, and considering that his offense would be his first administrative infraction, the Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of reprimand, instead of suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day, as recommended by the OCA. On this score, it bears to stress that no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice.

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Dean’s Circle 2016 RA 910 RETIREMENT OF SUPREME COURT, COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES In Re: Expiration of Fixed Term of Office of Atty. Saaduddin A. Alauya A.M. No. 11238-Ret., August 18, 2015, VELASCO, JR., J. Time and again, the Court has followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon retirement issues and claims, particularly of judges and justices, obviously in keeping with the beneficial intendment of retirement laws which is to reward satisfactory past services and at the same time provide the retiree with the means to support himself and his family in his remaining years. Facts: Atty. Alauya was appointed Jurisconsult in Islamic Law for a term of 7 years by President Ramos. As of August 20, 2003, the then 65-year-old Atty. Alauya had, in all, a total of a little over 33 years of government service behind him. Earlier, he filed an application for retirement, indicating therein his intention to retire under the provisions of RA 910. In terms then of the requirements on age and length of service in government, Atty. Alauya was qualified to retire under Section 1 of that law, as amended. The OCA recommended the denial of Atty. Alauya's application to so retire under that law. However, the Commission en banc, by Resolution resolved to allow Alauya to retire under R.A. 910. Atty. Alauya reminded the Court that he was allowed to and did retire under RA 910 and thus was entitled to a lifetime monthly pension after August 2008, or five years after his retirement but, in a resolution by the court, it was still denied. Issue: Whether or not a Jurisconsult shall have the rank, salary and privileges of a Judge of the RTC. Ruling: Yes. As it were, Atty. Alauya was qualified and allowed retiring, in fact retired, under Sec. 1 of RA 910. There is no reason to deny him lifetime monthly pension, as provided in Sec. 3 since the only requirement to be deserving of the pension, as aptly observed by the OCA, is that one retired under said Sec. 1. Upon the foregoing perspective, the term "privileges of an RTC judge" and the conferment thereof must be considered as covering the retirement benefits under RA 910, meaning a lump-sum payment of five years' salary and a monthly pension until death after the 5-year period contemplated in its aforequoted Section 3. Section 3 cannot be taken in abstract isolation and de linked from the rest of RA 910, particularly from Section 1; otherwise Section 1 would be of little meaning. As the OCA pointed out, said section "is inseparable from R.A. No. 910 and the only requirement to be entitled to [Sec.3] monthly pension is that the claimant should have retired under Section 1:" As a matter of record, certain officers of the Court, i.e., assistant/deputy court administrators and clerks of court, who, although neither justices nor judges or have never served a day as judges, were, by Court Resolution, given judicial ranks and privileges and corollarily allowed to retire under RA 910. And, as in the case of CA justices or RTC judges, these retired Court officers had received the 5-year lumpsum benefit upon retirement and monthly pension 5 years hence. Atty. Alauya has, therefore, a valid point in seeking to be placed on the same level as those officials. Indeed dealing Atty. Alauya a treatment dissimilar to that extended to said officials would verily perpetuate a wrong, but, perhaps worse still, would lend plausibility to Atty. Alauya's outlandish suggestion about the existence of what he termed as "compartmentalized justice" in the Court and that he might be discriminated against "because he is a Muslim. " The grant of the claim of Atty. Alauya shall be treated as pro hoc vice.

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