Legal Profession - Digested Cases

201 SCRA 210, 1991 FACTS Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. HELD: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.” Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. *************************

Adelino H. Ledesma vs Hon. Rafael C. Climaco (GR No. L-23815, June 28, 1974 Facts: Petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Provinceof Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte forone of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such.Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for thetwo defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed towithdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full timeservice as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him fromhandling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied saidmotion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.The SC found the petition without merit. As stated in the assailed order of the respondent judge, even beforethe petitioner accepted the appointment to the Comelec, he knew that the case was going to resume onthat day, that the case has been delayed eight times at the instance of the petitioner, and that hiswork as anelection registrar will not be in conflict with his serving as counsel de oficio for the said accused. The high courtdescribed the petitioner as unmindful of his work as counsel de oficio and reminded him that membership in thebar is a privilege burdened with conditions including that of being appointed counsel de oficio which makeseven more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade.In the end, the Court challenged the petitioner to “exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defensecounsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only toerase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing” and added that “the admonition is ever timely for those

enrolled in theranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takesprecedence over the promptings of self-interest.” ************************* In re Cunanan 16 07 2010 In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN Resolution March 18, 1954 Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Issue: WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid? NO Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. ************************* Legal Profession- In re: Cunanan

Resolution Cunanan, et. al 18March1954 FACTS OF THE CASE: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%). Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.  An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.  The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.  The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.  Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.  Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void. HELD: Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or

not.) I hope this helps. Jeff David POSTED BY JEFFDAVID1986 AT 12:10 AM LABELS: LEGAL PROFESSION ************************* Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Benjamin Dacanay 16 07 2010 PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007 Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. Issue: WON petitioner may still resume practice? YES Held: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: o the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues; o the payment of professional tax; o the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

o the retaking of the lawyer’s oath. DECISION: GRANTED. ************************* RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR. VICENTE D CHING, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011 Bar Matter. No. 914, October 1, 1999 (Constitutional Law – Citizenship) FACTS: Petitioner, who resided in the Philippines since his birth during the 1935 Constitution, is a legitimate son of a Filipina married to a Chinese citizen. Subsequently, petitioner elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after he reached the age of majority. OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase “reasonable period” and the allowance of the petitioner to elect Philippine citizenship due to circumstances like petitioner having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino. ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he has reached the age of majority. HELD: No, despite the special circumstances, Petitioner failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement “upon reaching the age of majority.” In addition, there was no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. ************************* Fernandez vs Grecia A.C. No. 3694 Disbarment Cases Facts: Fernandez et al filed a disbarment case against Atty Grecia for theft of documents pertaining tothe latters case against the petitioners. A certain Fe Linda Aves was admitted and diagnosed of having a mild pre-eclampsia on December 20, 1990. Five days later, he was discharged to celebrate Christmas with her family, unfortunately on December 26, 1990, the said patient died with her unborn child, prompting the Aves family to brought an actgion for damages against the doctors and the hospital. (Fernandez et al.) During the litigation in the lower court, Atty Grecia, allegedly asked the clerk of court the medical chart of the aforementioned patient which was at that time in the court's possesion, and thereafter tore two pages identified as pages 72 and 73. In view of Atty Grecia's unprofessional conduct, the petitioners filed the case for disbarment. Issue: WON the disbarment case is meritorious. Held: To quoute the Supreme Courts decision, they say that "by descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR." Atty Grecia was then ordered disbarred, his license to practice law in the Philippines cancelled and his name was ordered to be stricken out of the Roll of Attorneys.

The Supreme Court cited Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 in the Rules of Professional Responsibility being violated by Atty Grecia, notwitsanding that he was once disbarred to practice law on November 12, 1987 for his 'unholy alliance' with a judge in Quezon city to rip off banks and Chinese business firms. And that 8 months after the Supreme Court heeding his pleas for compassion and promise to mend his ways, it was just eight months after that he is faced with yet another disbarment case. ************************* Case Digest on Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000 Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC and held the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board of Candidates. The respondents helped conduct and oversee the 1995 elections. Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes received by them by either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative complaint for their disbarment. Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest mistake, oversight and fatigue. Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had already exonerated them from any offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed in time. Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.” The Court found the respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern warning that similar conduct in the future will be severely punished. ************************* LUIS G. CONSTANTINO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PRUDENCIO G. SALUDARES, respondent. Case filed by complainant Luis G. Constantino against Atty. Prudencio S. Saludares for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan from complainant's son Luis Constantino, Jr. Facts: Respondent borrowed P1,000.00 from complainant's son Luis, Jr. but failed to pay as promised and he unjustifiably refused and still refuses to pay despite repeated demands from the complainant and his wife after the son has left the country. As a result a complaint was filed against Saludares for unbecoming an officer of the court and for violation of respondent's oath of office. Saludares in reply, reasoned out that he was unable to pay because Luis, Jr. failed to appear at the appointed place of the payment because he was out of the country. The complaint was forwarded to Sol. Gen for investigation who rendered a report that Saludares be charged with

violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and his Lawyer's Oath and that he be suspended for 1 year from the practice of law. Ruling: The Court ordered the Suspension of Attorney Prudencio S. Saludares from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Grounds for ruling: It has been held that when a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him, he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which is at all times expected of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967] ). The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably establish respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics and that from the very beginning, respondent had no intention to honor and/or pay his just debt which is a conduct of unbecoming, thereby degrading not only his person but his profession as well. While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant, it is well-settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, showing him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him (Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991] ). It is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Saludares in failing to honor his just debt to complainant's son constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by respondent's act of interjecting paltry excuses for his unwarranted refusal to pay a valid and just debt. ************************* Arrieta vs Llosa - A case digest A.C. No. 4369 November 28, 1997 PIKE P. ARRIETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA, respondent. Facts; A disbarment case was filed against the respondent for allegedly notarizing a Deed of Absolute sale, wherein, vendors noted were already dead prior to its execution. However, in a later date, the respondent sought to dismiss the disbarment case admitting to the fact that he committed a mistake and notarized the documents in an urgent request of his clients, and that said acts are now clear to him and that no further damage was done anyways. Issue; WON Atty. Joel A. Llosa be disbarred or suspended from practice of law. Ruling; The Supreme Court did not agree to the recommendation of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines who approved the initial dismissal of the disbarment case against the respondent. Instead, they ordered the SUSPENSION of the respondent for 6 months with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. The court further emphasized and quoted the lawyer's oath which the respondent failed to adhere.

************************* St. Louis vs. dela Cruz 16 07 2010 ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY vs. ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ A.C. No. 6010 August 28, 2006 Facts: This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, for: (a) pending criminal case for child abuse and a labor case against him in the NLRC (b) contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage (c) notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission Issue: WON Atty. Dela Cruz must be disbarred? NO, SUSPENSION ONLY Held: A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the judgment of annulment of respondent’s second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof – clear preponderance of evidence – in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment. Immoral conduct is “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community” and what is “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.” Yes, there was immoral conduct. But, it was not as gross as to warrant his disbarment because: (a) His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife (b) He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child (c) After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman (d) Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. DECISION: 4 YEARS SUSPENSION ONLY. ************************* Victoria Barrientos v. Transfiguracion Daarol Adm. Case 1512 29 January 1993 FACTS:Complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student,and was about 20 years and 7 months old during the time(July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, whilerespondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married, GeneralManager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41years old at the time of the said relationship.Respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom behas a son; that the marriage ceremony was solemnized onSeptember 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by aCatholic priest, Rev. Fr.

Anacleto Pellamo, and that saidrespondent had been separated from his wife for about 16years at the time of his relationship with complainant.Respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quitesometime, having been a former student of complainant'sfather in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963and eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her residence; that healso befriended complainant and who became a close friendwhen he invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of theusherettes during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, DipologCity from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the morning and took her home from theconvention site after each day's activities;Respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7,1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant withher parents' permission was respondent's partner during theChamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in theDipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they leftthe place but before going home, they went to the airport atSicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach, wherethere were no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries,they consummated the sexual act and at about midnight theywent home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used tohave joy ride with complainant which usually ended at theairport where they used to make love twice or three times aweek; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant became pregnant;That after a conference among respondent, complainant andcomplainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant woulddeliver her child in Manila, where she went with her mother onOctober 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and,stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong,Manila; that respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th and28th of October 1973, and again in February and March 1974;that later on complainant decided to deliver the child in CebuCity in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there inApril 1974 and her sister took her to the Good ShepherdConvent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, shedelivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in CebuCity and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the lastweek of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that duringher stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondentdefrayed some of her expenses; that she filed an administrativecase against respondent with the National ElectrificationAdministration; which complaint, however, was dismissed; andthen she instituted the present disbarment proceedings againstrespondent.In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfullyrecommend that after hearing, respondent TransfiguracionDaarol be disbarred as a lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daarol is grossly immoral HELD:Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed loveand marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he didnot have the required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having carnalrelations with complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child.Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires,respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, hisremoval for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceitand grossly immoral conduct is in order. Good moral conduct is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar and is not dispensed with upon admission there. It isa continuing qualification to which all lawyers must possess. Otherwise, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred. ************************* 58 TIONGCO v AGUILAR (Canon 10Morada)Facts:  Atty. Tiongco filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a review of a lower court’s decision.  The petition contained malicious and intemperate language. Tiongco stated that the decision of the trial court Judge was “crafted to fool the winning party,” “a hypocritical judgment in plaintiff’s favor,” “it was the devil whodictated it,” “the Judge was confused, being born and raised amongst the non-propertied class”  Tiongco also filed a pleading with the SC stating that “it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read thepetition and hold that the same failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed grave abuseof discretion.” 

In a previous resolution, the SC required Atty. Jose B. Tiongco to show cause why he should not be dealt withadministratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  In Tiongco’s Compliance, he alleges that the SC failed to mention that he also called the judge a “robber,” “arotten manipulator,” and “abetter of graft and shady deals.”Issue:W/N Tiongco must be held administratively liable.Held: YES  Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively. While Tiongco tried to justify as true his descriptions of the Judge as “liar,” “thief,” “perfidious,” and “blasphemer,” he did not offer anyexcuse for the other intemperate words and phrases he used. Neither did he show their relevance to the petition.  By insinuating that this Court did not at all read the petition, Tiongco exhibited gross disrespect and attempted todiscredit the Members of the First Division. He charged them with violating their duty to render justice, and hethereby promoted distrust in judicial administration.  He also showed disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public confidence inthe latter and in the judiciary.  Although a lawyer has the right—even the duty—to criticize the courts, this right must be exercised responsibly. The criticism must be bona fide, without using language that would tend to create or promote distrust in judicialadministration and undermine the people’s confidence in the integrity of the members of this Court. ************************* VILLAFLOR VS. SARITA 308 SCRA 129 Saturday, February 21, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Legal Ethics FACTS: Complainant filed a case for disbarment against respondent before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The Commissioner assigned to investigate the case issued an order directing respondent to file his answer or comment to the complaint. The period of time alloted to answer the complaint lapsed without respondent submitting his comment. An order was issued requiring the parties to attend the hearing of the case but the respondent failed to appear. A notice of hearing was sent to respondent but again he failed to attend the proceeding. After giving the respondent enough opportunity to face the charges against him, which the latter did not avail, the case was submitted for resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not failure to obey notices from the IBP investigators constitutes an unethical act. HELD: Yes. As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The highest form of respect to the judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to court orders and processes. ************************* DALISAY v MAURICIO Facts:  This is the case against “Batas” Mauricio, the TV host.  Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and received exorbitant attorney’s fees but did not take any action on ValerinaDalisay’s case. 

Initially, she paid P25T as acceptance fee.  In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) the balance might be acombination of the ff: o Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a discount should she pay incash. o P3,000.00 as appearance fee  notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service. She terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents. Mauricio refused.  The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case Issue:  W/N the case against Mauricio should be dismissed.Held:  No. He should be suspended for 6 months.When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up thelatter’s case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of himto serve complainant with competence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion.  But there is nothing on record that Mauricio entered his appearance as counsel of record.He did not even followup the case which remained pending up to the time she terminated his services.Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docket fees for other cases): “ there was no evidence nor any pleadingssubmitted to show that respondent filed any case considering that the filing fee had to be paidsimultaneously with the filing of a case. ”  when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights.  Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, he should chargeonly a reasonable amount of fees. ************************* VILLAFLORES vs. LIMOS (AC 7504)[2007]) Respondent’s conduct in failing to file the appellant’s brief for complainant before the Court of Appeals falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their client’s cause. The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained.To establish the professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession. It must be noted that as early as 8 September 2004, respondent already agreed to take on complainant’s case, receiving from the latter partial payment of her acceptance fee and the entire records of complainant’s case. The very next day, 9 September 2004, complainant paid the balance of respondent’s acceptance fee. Respondent admitted her receipt of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee for the legal services she is to render to complainant and P2,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses she is to incur in handling the case, and the subsequent execution of the employment contract between her and complainant. Hence, it can be said that as early as 8 September 2004, respondent’s rendition of legal services to complainant had commenced, and from then on, she should start protecting the complainant’s interests. No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.

A lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner; and he should provide a quality of service at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his client’s counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the client’s interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor, and his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations diligently. Respondent has obviously failed to measure up to the foregoing standards. ************************* Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC March 3, 1923 In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ, attorney, Juan Sumulong for respondent. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. MALCOLM, J.: Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance Wislizenus for a period of one year, the case has been elevated to this court as provided by law, for full investigation of the facts involved, and for the rendition of the appropriate order. The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar, residing at Cebu, Cebu. On March 20, 1918, he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. As such guardian, he came into possession of certain property, including twenty shares of the E. Michael & Co., Inc., and ten shares of the Philippine Engineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor, he borrowed P2,800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National bank. Shortly thereafter, to guarantee the loan, Pelaez, without the knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, deposited with the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to the guardianship. On April 13, 1921, Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank, pledging, without the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the shares of stock in question, to guarantee the payment of the loan above referred to. These are the facts, taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on behalf of the respondent, which caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession. To quote counsel for the respondent, "the misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty consist of having pledged the shares belonging to his ward, to guarantee the payment of his personal debt." Two questions present themselves for the resolution. The first question is this: Are the courts in the Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the statute? The second questions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional misconduct? Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein enumerated. It will be noticed that our statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. It does not provide that these shall constitute the only causes for disbarment, or that an attorney may not be disbarred or suspended for other reasons. It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment is not to be taken as a limitation of the general power of the court in this respect. Even where the Legislature has specified the grounds for

disbarment, the inherent power of the court over its officer is not restricted. The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer. Passing now to the second point — as a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown, through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court requires for such admission the possession of good moral character. The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. vs. Appleton ([1883], 105 Ill., 474). Here it was held, by a divided court, that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust, without his professional advice, and he mortgages the same, for the purpose of raising a sum of money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the trustee afterwards sells the property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use, the relation of client and attorney not being created by such trust, his conduct, however censurable as an individual occupying the position of a trustee, is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys, but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit. The Illinois court, however, admits that although the general rule is, that an attorney-at-law will not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity, but as an individual, there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his disbarment. The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906], 73 Kan., 743). In the opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Johnston, it was said: It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall within the cause for disbarment named in the statute. As will be observed, the statute does not provide that the only cause for which the license of an attorney may be revoked or suspended are those specified in it, nor does it undertake to limit the common-law power of the courts to protect themselves and the public by excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of the law. It merely provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. (Gen. Stat., 1901, sec. 398.) In the early case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan., 398, 404), it was held that this statute is not an enabling act, but that the power of the court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; that "it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; that it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases, unless positively prohibited by statute; and that it may be exercised in any manner that will give the party to be disbarred a fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard.' If there is authority in the Legislature to restrict the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute causes for disbarment, or to limit the inherent power which they have exercised from time immemorial, it should not be deemed to have done so unless its purpose is clearly expressed. It is generally held that the enumeration of the grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of the court, but that attorneys may be removed for common-law causes when the exercise of the privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due administration of justice . . . . The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound. The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual maintenance of the utmost good faith in his dealings with the estate of the ward. The bond and the oath of the guardian require him to manage the estate of the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward, and faithfully to discharge his trust in relation

thereto. Moreover, it has not escaped our attention that in the petition by Vicente Pelaez, asking the court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera, he begins his petition in this manner: "El abogado que subscribe, nombrado tutor testamentario, etc." (The undersigned attorney, appointed testamentary guardian, etc.) which indicates that petitioner might not have been named the guardian in this particular case had he not at the same time been a lawyer. Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been suspended by the lower court is single and isolated. "It forms," he says, "the only blot upon the escutcheon." We feel, however, that the trial court has been extremely considerate of the respondent, and that were we sitting in first instance, we would probably incline to a more severe sentence. Judgment affirmed. So ordered. Araullo, C. J., Street, Avanceña, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions JOHNS, J., dissenting: Upon the facts shown the period of suspension should be for the period of two years. ************************ Priscilla Orbe vs Atty. Adaza Legal Ethics – 428 SCRA 567 – Gross Misconduct – What “Conduct” Means In November 1996, Attorney Adaza went to Priscilla Orbe to borrow P60k. Orbe loaned Adaza the said amount. As security, Adaza issued Orbe two checks to cover the loan plus interest. The checks however bounced (the second check was even post dated by Adaza to bear the date January 24, 1996- many months before November 1996 when the loan was made). Subsequently, because of Adaza’s failure to pay despite notices and demand from Orbe, the latter filed a complaint for grave misconduct against Adaza. Orbe alleged that Adaza is unfit to be a member of the bar. Eventually, the case was referred to the respective Integrated Bar of Philippines chapter. Despite notices, Adaza failed to appear in any of the proceedings. The IBP chapter then recommended Adaza’s suspension for one year. ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza should be suspended. HELD: Yes. Adaza’s issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to comply with his just obligation for nearly eight years (from SC’s date of decision [2004]) is appalling. The Supreme Court also elucidated on the following: A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in office. The word “conduct” used in the rules is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties but it also refers to any misconduct, although not connected with his professional duties, that would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct, including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. Such misdeed puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to continue in the advocacy of law, in serious doubt.