Legal Ethics Reviewer DDT

LEGAL ETHICS A. Practice of law (Rule 138) (*11) A) Concept –

People vs. Villanueva 121 phil 897, 14 scra 110, 112, 14 scra 111 Practice of law is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 scra 210,213 Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. &To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.& (111 ALR 23) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained

legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied) Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

ULEP vs Legal Clinic 223 scra 378 Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are

characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13 In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14 When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18 Re: Letter of the UP Law faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, AM 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011 It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, 134 lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

Olazo vs Tinga AM 10-5-7 SC , December 7, 2010 At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

Borja vs. SULYAP, GR. NO. 150718, March 26, 2003, 399 scra 601, 610 Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited private practice of law by a public official. Private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. [19] Atty. Binalay vs. Judge Lelina, jr. , AM NO. RTJ-08-2132, JULY 31, 2009 (FORMERLY am oca ipi no. 07-2549-Rtj A judge should not permit a law firm, of which he was formerly an active member, to continue to carry his name in the firm name as that might create the impression that the firm possesses an improper influence with the judge which consequently is likely to impel those in need of legal services in connection with matters before him to engage the services of the firm. A judge cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly, in accordance with the legal maxim, quando aliquid prohibitur ex directo, prohibitur et per obliquum or what is prohibited directly is prohibited indirectly.[24]

By allowing his name to be included in the firm name Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing & Associates Law Offices [25] while holding a judicial office, he held himself to the public as a practicing lawyer, in violation of the Rules and the norms of judicial ethics.

Cruz v. Atty. Cabrera AC No. 5737, October 25, 2004 Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus: This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its termination.

When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x. Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.[7]

Ruthie Lim Santiago vs. Atty. Carlos Sagucio, AC No. 6705, March 31, 2006 Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term &practice of law.& Respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for &Retainer’s fee.& 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

Catu v. Rellosa AC NO. 5738, February 19, 2008 * Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees. For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 [12] governs: SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. (b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not: (1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party; (2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office; (3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government. (c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors,members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. [14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior

permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. [16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the

discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PRACTICE OF LAW  Practice of law is not a natural or constitutional right  Practice of law is not a business, but a profession  Practice of law is a profession subservient to the court  Lawyers are administrators of justice  Practice of law is a matter or public interest  Acts of lawyers are always subject to scrutiny (in their professional and private affairs)

Privilege (*1) In re: Al C. Argosino, 246 scra 14 The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to &weed out& lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent &misfits& from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

Bolongalanta vs. Castillo, 240 scra 310, 313 It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue

to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. Floran, et al. Vs. Ediza, A.C. No. 5325, October 19, 2011 The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.2 Mendoza vs. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5338, February 23, 2009 The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. [25] A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar.[26] They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. [27] Yap-Paras v. Paras, A.C. No. 4947, February 14, 2005, 451 scra 94, 202 In Marcelo v. Javier[14], we held: It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.

Artueza vs. Atty. Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354, April 22, 2002 Respondent questions the imposition of a six-month suspension, which he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only source of income.[15] The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance

with the lawyers public responsibilities. [26] The suspension of the respondents privilege to practice law may result to financial woes. But as the guardian of the legal profession, we are constrained to balance this concern with the injury he caused to the very same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness.

Profession, not a business (*6)& Canons 2(*1)(*6) and 3(*5)(*6)

Burbe v. Atty. Magulata, AC NO. 99-634, JUNE 10, 2002 After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorneyclient relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. The Practice of Law -- a Profession, Not a Business In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a business. 11Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money.14 In Re: Sycip, G.R. X92-1, July 30, 1979, 92 scra 1 The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary “money-making trade.” têñ.£îhqw⣠... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a

prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25 In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical impediment. ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names &SYCIP& and &OZAETA& from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such. In Re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; Peoplevs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.) It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens. Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422, jayme v. Bunlan In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of Justice and not a mere money-making trade. Canlas v. Court of Appeals, et al., 164 scra 160 It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows: Art. 2208 ... In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed. Freeman v. Reyes, AC No. 6246, November 15, 2011 (formerly cbd no. 00-730) In Velez v. De Vera,[50] the Court ruled that the relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client. The Canon of Professional Ethics provides that the lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client, or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer, should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used by him. Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.[51] Indeed, lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.[52]

CANON 2 A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION

Rule 2.01 -A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed. Ibp handbook, guidelines governing establishment and operation of legal aid office, art. 1, sec. 1 CANOY V. ORTIZ, 453 SCRA 410 Rule on mandatory legal aid practice

CANOY V. ORTIZ, 453 SCRA 410 FACTS: A Complaint[1] dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City.[2] Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing the complaint ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers. [3] The dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper. The Comment[4] filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the Court that since commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims that for more than ten years, his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorneys Office with its steady stream of non-paying clients in the hundreds or thousands. [5] At the same time, he hosted a legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung

municipalities and reaching the people who need legal advice and assistance.[6] Atty. Ortiz pursued on with this lifestyle until his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, a victory which he generously attributes to the help of the same people whom he had helped by way of legal assistance before.[7] Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. The lawyer was apparently confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved by way of compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case.[8]Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing lawyer. Eventually, his desire to help was beyond physical limitations, and he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services.[9] RULING: Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill afford legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how wellmeaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation. They deserve quality representation as well. The problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as grievous as that of non-representation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortizs legal practice may have been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latters illegal dismissal case leaves much to be desired. Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against the sort of conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoys case. CANON 17A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. ... Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. ... CANON 22A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ... Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the

client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter. Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. [16] If indeed Atty. Ortizs schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended.[17] There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to file the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be avoided. Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortizs election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office. [19] Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors, [20] and in such instance, the attorney-client relationship is terminated.[21] However, city councilors are allowed to practice their profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this case. [22] In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her services. [23] Still,

the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.[24] Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. [25] Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel. Rule 2.02-In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to the safeguard the latter’s rights. Exceptions: canon 14, rule 14.01 and 14.02 Exception to the exception: canon 14, rule 14. 03 Rule 2.03 – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Tan v. David, 126 scra 392 Where in the agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients, the Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers” (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term “malpractice” (Act No. 2828, amending Sec. 21 of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. “The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional” Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, supra FACTS: Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation.

Respondent promised them financial assistance [3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6] Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFFICE CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821 Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back SERVICES OFFERED: CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD. (emphasis supplied)

RULING:

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules. Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides: CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. [14] Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16] Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18] Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. [27] For this

reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a)

lawyers name;

(b)

name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c)

address;

(d)

telephone number and

(e)

special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards. Ong v. Unto, 376 scra 152 FACTS: Essentially, the complainant alleged that the respondent manufactured the criminal and administrative cases against him to blackmail him or extort money from him. He claimed that the respondent solicited for any information that could be used against him in the aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would-be witness a certain percentage of whatever amounts they could get from him. The complainant branded the respondents tactics as highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical, constitutingmalpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer. RULING: The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding [15] and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. [16] In the case of Choa vs. Chiongson,[17] we held: While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end

view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. KHAN VS. SIMBILLO, SUPRA FACTS: This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 5324333/521-2667.[1] Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party.She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered. Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of theManila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2] RULING: Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read: Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the

admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. [12] It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a moneymaking venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. [14] The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. [15]The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money; 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. [16] There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. [18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority. What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. [20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. [21]Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasipublic offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented. The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession. The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied) Rule 138 sec. 27, ROC RULE 15.08 Rule 2.04–A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.

CANON 3 -A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, supra FACTS: Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance [3] and expeditious

collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6] Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFFICE CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821 Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back SERVICES OFFERED: CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD. (emphasis supplied)

RULING: A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. [27] For this

reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a)

lawyers name;

(b)

name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c)

address;

(d)

telephone number and

(e)

special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

Rule 3.01 – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, 223 scra 378 The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation. The pertinent part of the decision therein reads: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that &the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.& It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession

and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. &The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct.& (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.). We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal byproduct of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40 KHAN VS. SIMBILLO, SUPRA FACTS: This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 5324333/521-2667.[1] Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party.She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered. Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of theManila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2] RULING: Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read: Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. [12] It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a moneymaking venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. [14] The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. [15]The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money; 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. [16] There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. [18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority. What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and

decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. [20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. [21]Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22] Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasipublic offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented. The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession. The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied) San jose homeowners v. Romanillos, ac no. 5580, june 18, 2005 FACTS: Respondent used the title Judge in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was erected in several areas within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001. RULING: Respondents continued use of the title Judge violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or

claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. We have previously declared that the use of titles such as Justice is reserved to incumbent and retired members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of the Republic, including those given the rank of Justice. [11] By analogy, the title Judge should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, and not to those who were dishonorably discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title applies only to the aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent. Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[12] It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. [13] Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. [14]

Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased. Dacanay v. Baker & McKenzie We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could &render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment& (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law currently.

Constitution Art. 6, sec. 14 Art. 7, sec. 13 Art. 9, sec. 2 Samonte v. Gatdula, am no. P-99-1292, 303 scra 756 FACTS: In a verified complaint, respondent, RTC Branch Clerk of Court, Quezon City, was charged with grave misconduct in engaging in the private practice of law. Complainant was the representative of her sister, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment pending with the MTC. The execution of that decision in favor of plaintiff was enjoined by Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City where respondent is the Branch Clerk of Court. Complainant alleged that respondent tried to convince her to change his lawyer if she wanted the execution of the judgment to proceed and even gave her his calling card with the name Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City which complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint. Respondent, when asked to comment, claimed that it was complainant who showed him said calling card and asked him if he could handle the case but to which he refused as he was not connected with the law firm, though he was invited to join the firm. RULING: While the respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his name appears on the calling card attached to the complaint which admittedly came into the hands of the complainant.Respondent does not claim that the calling card was printed without his knowledge or consent and the calling card [2] carries his name primarily and the name of &Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City& in the left comer. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with the said law firm. Th inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b) (2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law. NOTE: ALSO A VIOLATION OF RULE 3.03 Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.

Qualifications Sec. 2, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court Rule 138, Sec. 6, Rules of Court Rule 138, Sec. 5, rules of Court Art. XII, SEC. 14 (2) CONSTITUTION Rules of Court, Rule 138, Secs 7-16 Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5), 1987 Constitution RULE 138 Attorneys and Admission to Bar Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Take note: 1) Citizen of the Philippines 2) 21 years of age (at least) 3) Of good moral character (satisfactory evidence of good moral character must be produced before the Supreme Court) 4) Resident of the Philippines 5) No charges involving moral turpitude have been filed or pending in any court in the Philippines

XXXX Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics. Take note: 1) Successfully completed all prescribed courses in law school:  Civil law  Commercial law  Remedial law  Criminal law  Public and private international law  Political law  Labor and social legislation  Medical jurisprudence  Taxation  Legal ethics

XXXX Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics. Take note: Must have completed high school and college education

XXXX Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and

certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship. Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination. Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing). Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone. Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used. The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given. Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon). Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the

members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports. Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court. Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent. Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report. Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school. The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject. Art. XII, SEC. 14 (2) CONSTITUTION Section 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the national benefit.

The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.

Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5), 1987 Constitution Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: XXXX (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. XXXXX

Ulep v. Legal Clinic Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

In Re: Cunanan 94 phil. 554, Leo Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 76, Baguio vendors multi purpose cooperative v. Hon. Cabarto-Cortes, G.R. No. 165922, February 26, 2010, and In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from the payment of filing and docket fees, A.M. No. 05-10-20-Sc, March 10, 2010(Only SC has power to admit candidates in the law profession)

In Re: Cunanan 94 phil. 554 By its declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate

legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge. Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906. Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

Leo Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 76 Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides: Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of

law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that & . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question.& 12 The venerable jurist further ruled: &It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.& By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to &repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court &to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . .& More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided: xxx xxx xxx Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. xxx xxx xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13 The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx xxx xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

Baguio vendors multi purpose cooperative v. Hon. Cabarto-Cortes, G.R. No. 165922, February 26, 2010 The Power of the Legislature vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court to Enact Judicial Rules Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935 [13] and the 1973[14] Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules.[15] The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.[16] This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[17] that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by this Court with Congress:

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII[18] x x x . The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied) Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds.[19] Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence: [T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain.[20] x x x (Emphasis supplied) In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from the payment of filing and docket fees, A.M. No. 05-10-20-Sc, March 10, 2010 On October 27, 2009, however, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC stating that: The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, to DENY the request of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for exemption from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 938. The request appears to run counter to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, in the rule-making power of the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts. Hence, the subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of filing fees and court fees.

Section 22 of Rule 141 reads: Sec. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local government units and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees. (emphasis supplied) Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that the NPC shall remain as a national government-owned and controlled corporation. Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees. The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the Court, citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,[1] stressed that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to promulgate these rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive, thus: Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less the Executive. Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice: Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides: Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning

pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. xxxxxxxxx [T]he 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x. More completely, Section 5(2) [sic] 5 of its Article X provided: xxxxxxxxx Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. xxxxxxxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of case, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. xxxxxxxxx The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: xxxxxxxxx Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. xxxxxxxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also

granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails. With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the Court, it is clear that NPC can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees. Aguirre vs. Rana, BM NO. 1036, June 10, 2003 Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan). On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him. The Courts Ruling We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May

2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed ascounsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies. On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3] Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust [4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. [5]

Alawi vs. Alauya 268 scra 628

As regards Alauya's use of the title of &Attorney,& this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not fullfledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered &counsellors,& in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney”.The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, &counsellor& or &counsellorat-law,& because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of &counsellor& does not warrant his use of the title of attorney. Andres v. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 807

FACTS: The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia F. Andres, Legal Officer II in the Office of the Minister, Ministry of Labor on the ground of lack of good moral character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and in civil language to the extent of being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise, for his proclivity in filing baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases. The citation for contempt against the respondent was issued by the Court following the persistence of the respondent in the use of, abusive and vituperative language despite the Court's admonition implicit in Our previous resolution of June 5, 1979 deferring the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language. RULING: Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now stands at the threshold thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is as much his duty as every attorney-at-law already admitted to the practice of law to ..observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court) and &to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged& (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138). According to the Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office, but for the maintenance of

its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor. This duty is likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a lawyer such as the respondent for the attorney's oath solemnly enjoins him to &conduct myself as a lawyer according to to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the Courts as to my client. Re: 1999 Bar Examinations Mark Anthony A. Purisima, B.M. No. 979 & 986, December 10, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many others he was directed to submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations. Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court disqualified him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void on two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar review course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations; and (b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School (PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered such course since 1967. RULING: It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion extended to Mr. Gingoyon in Bar Matter 890 be given to petitioner. Three years deprivation of the privilege to practice law may be considered an ample penalty, not to mention that petitioner has not been convicted of any crime. As regards petitioners failure to submit within sixty days the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for him to submit another certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga certified not only his enrollment but also his completion of the course, is impressed with truth. The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and kindness, it has acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioners father pleaded that the denial of permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now should be enough penalty. It is time to move on. At this juncture it may be well to note the Courts growing concern over the apparent laxity of law schools in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed that the attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able to comply with the requisite with minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of prebar review course is an additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules

of Court for those who failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times. For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it can be done. We just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is intended to ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar. Cordon v. Balicanta, A.C. No. 2792, October 2, 2002 Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.[13] Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[14] Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. [15] This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.[16] Cojuangco, Jr. V. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, June 30, 2005 The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.[1] Cordova v. Cordova, adm. Case no. 3249, november 29, 1989, 179 scra 680 After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that &the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. & 2 It is important to note

that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes &a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage.& 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred. In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman. In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of &reform& respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large. Soriano v. DIZON, a.c. no. 6792, January 25, 2006 FACTS: The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the

eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano. [8] Thus, a case was filed against respondent/accused. He was later convicted by the trial court. Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit [1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; [2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3] RULING: Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment. Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [14] The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, [15] a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus: x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a

question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied) In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows: x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [17] The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault. Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office. [23]

Philippine Association of Court Employees, etc., v. Alibutdan-Diaz, A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014 FACTS: PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary held its 11th National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005. As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was entrusted with all the money matters of PACE.

The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City2; that during the 12th convention, an election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end bonus for each PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association as a matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;3 and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo conventions.4 In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 11th national convention in Davao in less than a week after the said convention; that it was duly audited by the national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that convention was &fully accounted, liquidated and entirely deposited to PACE accounts;&5 that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national convention on May 22, 2007; that the report, together with the cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola and witnessed by former PACE officers;6 that she denied running for re-election as PACE national treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she had already filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Member of the First District of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that the approval of the P30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather, it was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she never sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong. RULING: This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution. Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.19 Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and

a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.20 It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession which society entrusts with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They are always expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble profession.21 Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election, including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions. WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. This decision shall be immediately executory.

Malhabour v. Sarmiento, 520 phil. 529, 536 Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent failed to comply with the above provisions. Records show and as found by Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed deceit by making it appear that complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him (respondent) to file with the NLRC a Motion for Execution and to collect the money judgment awarded to the former. Worse, after receiving from the NLRC cashier the check amounting to P99,490.00, he retained the amount. It was only when complainant reported the matter to the NBI that respondent paid him P40,000.00 as partial payment of the award. In fact, there still remains an outstanding balance of P10,000.00. Moreover, as correctly found by IBP Commissioner Maala, respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally his lawyers

lien[12] by dividing the money into 60-40 ratio. Obviously, such conduct is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.[13] He was clinging to something not his and to which he had no right. It bears stressing that as a lawyer, respondent is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[14] As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[15] This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession[16] and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.[17] Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.[18] And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.[19] Respondents conduct blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. His conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Accordingly, administrative sanction against respondent is warranted. In Lao v. Medel,[20] we considered a lawyers violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as in this case, as an act constituting gross misconduct. In line with Lao, citing Co v. Bernardino,[21] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr.,[22] and Saburnido v. Madroo[23] which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year sufficient. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective immediately.

Dantes v. Atty. DANTES, A.C. NO. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 scra 582 Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has &good moral character,& and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent1 to the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.& &Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.& &Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.22 To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.24 In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.26 Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.28 Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondent’s commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.

He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.29 In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.34 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. Re: Admin case no. 44 of the RTC branch 4, Tagbiliran City, against Atty. OCCEA, A.C. No. 2841, July 3, 2002 Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[12] His guilt, however, cannot be presumed. [13] It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.[14] All these requirements have been complied with in the case at hand. In fact, it was Atty. Occea who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the administrative case against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded the full measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occea deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations against him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly

immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyers oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty. Occea commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these transgressions, he violated the lawyers oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following duties, thus: I, __________________,of __________________,do (place of birth) solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. As shown by the records, Atty. Occea gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For respondents part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay can only benefit the executor or administrator and the longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorneys fees. But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occea has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law. This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.[15] Clearly, Atty. Occeas conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even for a single moment. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession. [18] Atty. Occea has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession, [19] because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and

confidence.[20] Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occea deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. Ong v. Atty. Unto, A.C. No. 2417, February 6, 2002 Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. We find the respondents action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable. The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[14] It mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.

Tak Ng v. Republic, 106 phil. 730 “Moral turpitude” has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man (Traders 7 General Ins. Co. vs. Rusell, Tex. Civ. App., 99 S.W. [2d] 1079) or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals (Marah vs. State Bar of California, 210 Cal. 303, 219 P. 583).chanr

In Re: Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

Rodolfo Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael Mejia, Adm. CASE NO.. 2984, august 31, 2007 Velez v. Atty. De Vera A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006 Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing reforms in the Bar Examinations through amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, B.M. No. 1153, March 9, 2010 Re: Proposed reforms in the Bar examinations, BM NO. 1161, September 3, 2013 B.M. No. 850, August 22, 2000, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) In Re: Petition for leave to resume practice of law, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY 540 SCRA 424 REQUIREMENTS for a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 to resume practice of law Petition to re-acquire the privilege to practice law in the Philippines, Epifanio B. Mimeses, B.M. No. 2122, July 24, 2012 Petition for leave to resume practice of law, BM NO. 1678, DECEMBER 17, 2007 Cui v. Cui 11 scra 755 Terre v. Terre, A.C. No. 2349, July 3, 1992 Rolly Pentecostes v. Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, A.M. No. P-07-2337, August 3, 2007 GSIS V. Hon. Vicente Pacquing, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831, FEBRUARY 2, 2007

Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007 Re: Petition of Al Argosino to take the lawyers oath, BM NO. 712 (1997) Re: Petition to take the lawyers oath of Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., B.M. No. 810, January 27, 1988 In Re: Petition to disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera, AC NO. 6052, December 11, 2003 IRRI V. NLRC, GR NO. 97239, May 12, 1993 IN re: integration of the Philippine Bar, 49 scra 22 In Re: Atty. MARCIAL EDILLON, a.m. no. 1928, August 3, 1978 Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo jr., BM NO. 1370, may 9, 2005 Santos vs. LLAMAS, A.C. NO. 4749, January 20, 2011 In the matter of JAMES JOSEPH HAMM, 211 ARIZ 458, 123 p. 3d 652 Tucson Rapid Transit Co. V. Rubiaz, 21 ARIZ, 221, 231, 187, P.568, 572 (1920)

APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS  Law Student practice (Rule 138-A)  Non-lawyers in courts  Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals  Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing Catimbuhan v. Cruz, 126 scra 144, 145 Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co. V. NLRC, 279 scra 337 In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 scra 405 Art. 3, Sec. 1 (2) Philippine Constitution Law student practice rule

RULE 138-A Law Student Practice Rule Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic. Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986).

BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997 Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997. IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730). The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings. Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound

discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2 For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides. Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3 1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own; 2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and 3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law. The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5 Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of

the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent. The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law student appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar. The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides; Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar. IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his appearance. Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.

Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 Bar matter no. 730 Non- lawyers in courts Sec. 7, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Court Sec. 34, Rule 138 Revised Rules of Court Sec. 33, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court Laput v. Bernabe, 55 phil. 621 Bulacan v. Torcino, 134 scra 258 Rule 116, sec. 7 of the Rules of Court RULE 116 Arraignment and Plea

Section 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused. (7a)

Sec. 34, Rule 138 Revised Rules of Court Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Sec. 33, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.

Non-lawyers in administrative agencies Art. 222 Labor Code of the Philippines Art. 222. Appearances and Fees. 1. Non-lawyers may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only: 1. If they represent themselves; or 2. If they represent their organization or members thereof. 2. No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union: Provided, However, that attorney’s fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null

and void. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1691, May 1, 1980) Sec. 9, Act No. 2259, Cadastral Act Sec. 9. Any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands, whether named in the notice or not, shall appear before the Court by himself, or by some person in his behalf and shall file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court. The answer shall be signed and sworn to by the claimant or by some person in his behalf, and shall state whether the claimant is married or unmarried, and, if married, the name of the husband or wife and the date of the marriage, and shall also contain: (a) The age of the claimant. (b) The cadastral number of the lot or lots claimed, as appearing on the plan filed in the case by the Director of Lands, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be. (c) The name of the barrio and municipality, township, or settlement in which the lots are situated. (d) The names of the owners of the adjoining lots as far as known to the claimant. (e) If the claimant is in possession of the lots claimed and can show no express grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors in interest, the answer shall state the length of time he has held such possession and the manner in which it has been acquired, and shall also state the length of time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession. (f) If the claimant is not in possession or occupation of the lands, the answer shall fully set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition. (g) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value. (h) The encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of the adverse claimants as far as known.

Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing Sec. 16, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Rules of Procedure on Small Claims Cases Section 415, Republic Act No. 7160 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (katarungang pambarangay) Urbano v. Chavez, 183 scra 347 De Guia v. The Auditor General, 44 scra 169

Municipality of Bocaue et al. V. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173 Enriquez jr. V. Honorable Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932 Province of Cebu vs. IAC, 147 scra 447 Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals, et al. 233 scra 484, 491 Sec. 9 (EO no. 292) Administrative Code of 1987, sec. 9 SANCTIONS FOR PRACTICE OR APPEARANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY  Lawyers without authority  Persons not lawyers Rule 71, The Revised Rules of Court Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co, 42 scra 302 Beltran vs. Abad, 132 scra 492 US vs. Durban, 36 phil. 797 Without authority Sec. 21 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court CPR Canon 10 Rule 10.01 Balisalisa v. Hon. Montesa, CA-G.R. NO. 36896-R, April 26, 1966 ROC Rule 38, Sec. 22 Rule 138, sec. 27, ROC RULE 71, Sec. 3 (a) Rule 71, Sec. 7 Not lawyers Sec. 3(e) Rule 71 of ROC Sec. 3 (d), ibid In Re: Elmo S. Abad, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee, 121 scra 217 Tan v. Sabandal, 126 scra 60 Manangan v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, branch 28, 189 scra 217 RPC Art. 315, no. 2 (a) PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PRACTICE OF LAW  Prohibition of disqualification of former government employees  Public officials who cannot practice law or with restrictions Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys CPR canon 6, rule 6.03 Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, etc. A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009, 596 scra 378, 390-391 Republic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, sec. 7 CPR Canon 6, Rule 6.03 ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 CPR Canon 21 Rep. Act No. 910 Olazo v. Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7 SC, December 7, 2010 Aquino-Simbulan v. Zabat, A.M. No. P-05-1993, April 26, 2005, 457 scra 23

PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 151809-12, April 12, 2005, 455 scra 526, 579 Public officials who cannot practice law or with restrictions Republic Act 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Sec. 7(b)(2) CPR CANON 1 AND RULE 18.01 Ramos vs. Imbang, a.c. no. 6788, August 23, 2007 Revised Civil Service Rules, Rule XVIII, SEC. 12 Yumol v. Ferrer, a.c. no. 6585, april 21, 2005 Magat v. Santiago, et al, G.R. Nos. L-43301-45665, April 1, 1980, 97 scra 1 Memorandum No. 17 of the Executive Department Abella v. Atty. Cruzabra, A.C. No. 5688, June 4, 2009 Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, Philippine Constitution Sec. 54 (3) chapter 7, Title 1 (a), Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 94 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 Lorenzana vs. Fajardo, a.c. no. 5712, June 29, 2005 Members of the Executive Department 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 13 Members of Congress 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VII, Sec.14 CPR Canon 1 Members of the Judiciary ROC Rule 138, Sec. 35 NCJC Canon 5, Rule 5.07 Query of Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe Local Government Officials Section 90(b)(2) of the Local Government Code Section 90 (A), ibid Other disqualifications Philippine Constitution, Art. IX-A, Section 2 Philippine Constitution, Article XI, Section 8 LAWYERS AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT Polloso v. Hon. Gangan, etc., et al., G.R. No. 140563, July 14, 2000 De Guia v. The Auditor General, 44 scra 169 Municipality of Bocaue, et al. V. Manotok, 93 phil. 173 Enriquez v. Honorable Gimenez, 107 phil. 932 E.O. 292 Section 1679 of the Administrative Code Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals, 233 scra 484, 491 Province of Cebu v. IAC, 147 SCRA 447 Non lawyers authorized to appear for the government ROC Rule 138, sec. 33 LAWYERS OATH (memorize)

I, __________________,of __________________,do (place of birth) solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

Sps. Olbes v. Deciembre, AC NO. 5365, April 27, 2005 Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.16 It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. 17 &A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader.&18 By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.19 Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession. 20 Masinsin v. Albani, gr no. 86421, may 31, 1994 Sebastian v. Calis, ac no. 5118, sept. 9, 1999 Read the article of Justice Sabio regarding the lawyer’s oath. Sps. Masinsin et al. V. Hon. Albani, et al. GR NO. 86421, MAY 31, 1994 Sebastian v. Calis, A.C. No. 5118, September 9, 1999 In Re: Argosino, 270 scra 26 Sps. Olbes v. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5365, April 27, 2005 Businos v. Atty. Ricafort, 347 phil. 687, 283 scra 407, December 22, 1997 Richards v. Asoy, AC NO. 2655, October 12, 2010

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER

ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. Bohol v. Florido, AC NO. 5736,June 18, 2010 1. To society/community  Respect for law and legal processes(canon 1)  Efficient and convenient legal services (canon 2)  True, honest, fair, dignified, and objective information on legal services (canon 3)  Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system (canon 4)  Participation in legal education program (canon 5) CPR CANON 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Roa v. Moreno, AC NO. 8382, APRIL 21, 2010 Ronquillo v. Cezar, AC NO. 6288, 16 JUNE 2006, 491 SCRA 1 Poon v. Sig-Chua, AC NO. 6549, SEPTEMBER 22, 2006 RE: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 178 scra 398, 418 In the matter of the brewing controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, AM NO. 09-5-2-SC, DECEMBER 14, 2010 Floran, et al. V. Ediza, AC NO. 5325, OCTOBER 19, 2011 A1 Financial Service, Inc. V. Valerio, AC NO. 8390, FORMERLY CBD 061641, JULY 2, 2010 Wong v. Atty. Moya, AC NO. 6972, October 17, 2008, 569 scra 256 CPE, CANON 18 CANON 28, IBID CANON 15, IBID CANON 21, IBID ROC, Rule 138, sec. 20 (a) CPR CANON 1–A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES Cojuangco v. Palma, supra FACTS: Without knowing by complainant Cojuangco, during tutoring sessions between his 22 year old daughter and respondent, a married man in his 40’s with 3 kids, the latter succeeded in inducing the former to marry him in Hong Kong. RULING: At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life.This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality

so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[17] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[18] Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law. While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer, [19] however, professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement. The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification[20] from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage[21] from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family friend.[22] Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[23] This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have somehow come up with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. [24] Measured against this definition, respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land. The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This is founded on the lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the

enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:[37] Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is allowed to practice. In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment. Philippine Association of Court Employees, etc., v. Alibutdan-Diaz, A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014 FACTS: PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary held its 11th National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005. As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was entrusted with all the money matters of PACE. The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City2; that during the 12th convention, an election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end bonus for each PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association as a matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;3 and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo conventions.4 In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 11th national convention in Davao in less than a week after the said convention; that it was duly audited by the national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that convention was &fully accounted, liquidated and entirely deposited to PACE accounts;&5 that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national convention on

May 22, 2007; that the report, together with the cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola and witnessed by former PACE officers;6 that she denied running for re-election as PACE national treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she had already filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Member of the First District of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that the approval of the P30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather, it was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she never sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong. RULING: This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution. Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.19 Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.20 It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession which society entrusts with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They are always expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble profession.21 Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election, including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. This decision shall be immediately executory.

RONQUILO V. CEZAR, SUPRA Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that &A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.&&Conduct,& as used in this rule, does not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases7that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him.

Malhabour v. Sarmiento, 520 phil. 529, 536 Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent failed to comply with the above provisions. Records show and as found by Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed deceit by making it appear that complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him (respondent) to file with the NLRC a Motion for Execution and to collect the money judgment awarded to the former. Worse, after receiving from the NLRC cashier the check amounting to P99,490.00, he retained the amount. It was only when complainant reported the matter to the NBI that respondent paid him P40,000.00 as partial payment of the award. In fact, there still remains an outstanding balance of P10,000.00. Moreover, as correctly found by IBP Commissioner Maala, respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally his lawyers lien[12] by dividing the money into 60-40 ratio. Obviously, such conduct is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.[13] He was clinging to something not his and to which he had no right. It bears stressing that as a lawyer, respondent is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[14] As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[15] This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession[16] and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.[17] Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.[18] And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.[19] Respondents conduct blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. His conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Accordingly, administrative sanction against respondent is warranted. In Lao v. Medel,[20] we considered a lawyers violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as in this case, as an act constituting gross misconduct. In line with Lao, citing Co v. Bernardino,[21] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr.,[22] and Saburnido v. Madroo[23] which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year sufficient. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective immediately.

Dantes v. Atty. DANTES, A.C. NO. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 scra 582 Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has &good moral character,& and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent1 to the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: &Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.& &Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.& &Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.& The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.22 To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.24 In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.26 Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the practice of law or

disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.28 Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondent’s commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.29 In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.34 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

ROC RULE 138, SEC. 20 (B) CPR CANON 12 Rural bank of calape bohol v. Florido, AC NO. 5736, JUNE 18, 2010 Guarin v. Atty. Limpin, AC NO. 10576, JANUARY 14, 2015 SUICO industrial Corp. V. Lagura-Yap, GR NO. 177711, SEPTEMBER 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 145, 162 Donton v. Atty. Tansingco, 526 Phil. 1, 5 (2006)

NESTLE Phil. V. Sanchez, 154 scra 542 (1987) Cojuangco v. Palma, 438 scra 306 Financial Audit of books of account of Atty. Raquel Kho, p-0602177, april 19, 2007 Chua vs. Mesina 436 scra 149 Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. COJUANGCO V. PALMA , see p. 38 this reviewer Soriano v. Dizon, ac no. 6792, january 25, 2006 see p. 32 this reviewer Docena v. LIMON, a.c. no. 2387, September 10, 1998 FACTS: It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyer on appeal in Civil Case No. 425 for Forcible Entry. While the appeal was pending before the then Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, Branch I, respondent required therein defendants-appellants Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision. To raise the required amount complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00 from the Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein respondent himself acted as guarantor (tsn, Session of July 8, 1983, pp. 33-34). The amount of P4,860.00 was produced by complainant in response to respondent's letter dated September 2, 1979 (Exh. &C&, tsn, p. 26, ibid.) demanding delivery of the aforesaid amount. On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a decision on the appealed case in favor of the Docena spouses. After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas bond of P10,000.00, but he thereupon discovered that no such bond was ever posted by respondent. When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with such undertaking despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses. In his answer to the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his attorney's fees for representing the Docena spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving allegation is belied by the letter (quoted above) of respondent himself demanding from the Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the execution of the appealed decision of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to return the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the money was never his, and that it was only entrusted to him for deposit. RULING:

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that: Canon 1. xxx xxx xxx Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 16. xxx xxx xxx Canon 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from the client. Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in character that exclusive and honored fraternity (Villanueva vs. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana , 245 SCRA 707 [1995]). It has been said time and again, and this we cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a trade nor a craft but a profession (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is to render public service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. [Mayer vs. State Bar, 2 Call2d 71, 39 P2d 206 (1934), cited in Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. (Agpalo, id.) By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his depraved character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He should be disbarred. Ui v. Bonifacio, adm. Case no. 3319, june 8, 2000 Figueroa v. Barranco, sbc case no. 519 276 scra 445 Barrios v. Martines, AC NO. 4585, 442 scra 324 Tapucar v. Atty. Tapucar, AC NO. 4148, JULY 30, 1998 Acejas III V. Pp, GR NO. 156643, JUNE 27, 2006 Financial Audit Atty. Raquel Kho, p-062177, april 19, 2007 Lizaso v. Amante, 198 scra 1 Cordon v. Balicanta, 290 scra 299 Rural bank of silay v. Pilla, 350 scra 138 Samala v. Luciano, ac no. 5439, january 22, 2007 Alejandro vs. Alejandro, 422 scra 527 St. Louis university high school faculty and staff v. Atty. Rolando dela Cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Advincula v. Macabata, ac no. 7204, march 7, 2007 Wilson cham v. Atty. Eva Patta, ,ac no. 7494, june 27, 2008 Lao v. Medel, 405 scra 227 Belleza v. Atty. Macasa, ac no. 7816, july 23, 2009 Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, ac no. 1481, october 17, 2008 Samaniego vs. Atty. Ferrer, ac no. 7022, june 7, 2008 Heirs of the late sps. Lucas & francisca villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, ac no. 6270, january 22, 2007 Lee v. Tambago, ac no. 5281, feb. 12, 2008

RULE 1.02 Donton v. Dr. Tansingco, AC NO. 6057, JUNE 27, 2006 VELEZ V. ATTY. DE VERA, AC NO. 6697, JULY 25, 2006 IN RE: Terrell 2 phil 266 (1903) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 416 scra 465, 2003 In re: 1989 Ibp elections, 178 scra 398 Samala v. Palana, 451 scra 100, Rule 1.03 Saburnido v. Madrono, AC NO. 4497, 366 SCRA 1 Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, AC NO. 6672, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009 Atty. Vitriolo, et al. V. Atty. Dasig, AC NO. 4984, APRIL 1, 2003 Collantes v. Renomeron, 200 scra 284 Ong v. Grijaldo, 402 scra 1 Rule 1.04 Sa Si III v. NLRC, GR NO. 104599, ,MARCH 11, 1994 Castaneda v. Ago, GR NO. L-28546, 65 SCRA 505 Nilo v. Ca, 174 scra 418 Municipality of pillilla v. Marave, 233 scra 484 Flores v. Chua, 306 scra 465 Cordova v. Cordova, 179 scra 680 = 1989 Guevarra v. Eala, 529 scra 1 = 2007 Soriano v. Dizon, AC NO. 6792, JANUARY 25, 2006 CALUB V. SULLER, AC NO. 1474, JANUARY 28, 2000

 Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system (canon 4) Re: request of national committee on legal aid to exempt legal aid clients from paying filing, docket and other fees, august 28, 2009 Olazo v. Tinga, a.m. 10-5-7 sc, december 7, 2010 Vitriolo v. Dasig, ac no. 4984, april 1, 2003, 400 scra 172, 178 Ali vs. Bubong, ac no. 4018, march 8, 2005, 453 scra 1, 14 Chan v. Go, ac no. 7547, september 4, 2009, 598 scra 145, 155 PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN, Gr no. 151809-12, april 12, 2005, 455 scra 526, 579 Cayetano vs. Monsod, g.r. no. 100113, september 3, 1991 Huyssen v. Gutierrez, ac no. 6707, march 24, 2006, 485 scra 244, 258 Igoy v. Soriano, am no. 2001-9-sc, october 11, 2001, 367 scra 70, 79, 81 ROC RULE 110, SEC. 5 (1), as amended by A.M. NO. 02-2-07 Santa Maria v. Tuason, ac no. 396, july 31, 1964 St. Louis university laboratory high school faculty and staff v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Collantes vs. Renomeron, 200 scra 584 Dinsay v. Cioco, 264 scra 703

Penticostes v. Ibanez, 304 scra 281 Article VIII, SEC. 5 (5) PHIL CONSTITUTION CANON 5 B.M. NO. 850, October 2, 2001 Fajardo v. Dela torre, 427 scra 127 Santiago v. Rafanan, 440 scra 91 Dela cruz v. Golar maritime services, 478 scra 173 Sps. Williams v. Enriquez, ac no. 6352, february 27, 2006 DULALIA V. Atty. Pablo cruz, ac no. 6854, april 7, 2007 Rule on MCLE CANON 6 RA 6713 SEC. 4 (CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES) Santiago v. Sagucio, 486 scra 10 Pimentel v. Fabros, 501 scra 346 Olazo v. Tinga, a.m. 10-5-7 sc, december 7, 2010 Vitriolo v. Dasig, ac no. 4984, april 1, 2003, 400 scra 172, 178 Ali vs. Bubong, ac no. 4018, march 8, 2005, 453 scra 1, 14 Chan v. Go, ac no. 7547, september 4, 2009, 598 scra 145, 155 PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN, Gr no. 151809-12, april 12, 2005, 455 scra 526, 579 Cayetano vs. Monsod, g.r. no. 100113, september 3, 1991 Huyssen v. Gutierrez, ac no. 6707, march 24, 2006, 485 scra 244, 258 Igoy v. Soriano, am no. 2001-9-sc, october 11, 2001, 367 scra 70, 79, 81 ROC RULE 110, SEC. 5 (1), as amended by A.M. NO. 02-2-07 Santa Maria v. Tuason, ac no. 396, july 31, 1964 St. Louis university laboratory high school faculty and staff v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Collantes vs. Renomeron, 200 scra 584 Dinsay v. Cioco, 264 scra 703 Penticostes v. Ibanez, 304 scra 281 Re: request of national committee on legal aid to exempt legal aid clients from paying filing, docket and other fees, august 28, 2009 Article VIII, SEC. 5 (5) PHIL CONSTITUTION Ramos v. Imbang, ac no. 6788, august 23, 2007 Ruthie lim-santiago v. Atty. Carlos sagucio, supra PEO. V. PINEDA, 20 SCRA 748 MISAMIN V. SAN JUAN, 72 SCRA 491 Rule 6.01 Cuenca v. CA, GR NO. 109870, DECEMBER 1, 1995 Suarez v. Platon, 69 phil. 556 RULE 6.02 ALI V. BUBONG, SUPRA OLAZO V. TINGA SUPRA Huyssen, supra Ramos v. Imbang, supra Catu v. Rellosa, ac no. 5738, feb 18, 2008

RULE 6.03 HUYSSES, SUPRA TINGA OLAZO, SUPRA Pcgg v. Sandiganbayan, april 12, 2005, 455 scra 526, gr no. 151809 PNB V. CEDO, AC NO. 3701, 243 SCRA 1 RA 6713 SEC. 7 (B) RA 3019 SEC. 3 (D) 2. To the legal profession -canon 7  INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (RULE 138-A)  Membership and dues  Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession  Courtesy, fairness, and candor towards professional colleagues  No assistance in unauthorized practice of law

To the legal profession-canon 7 RA 6397 In re: 1989 elections of the ibp, 178 scra 398 Santos v. Llamas, 322 scra 529 Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo, 458 scra 209, bm 1370, may 9, 2005 Foodsphere v. Mauricio, ac no. 7199, july 22, 2009 Young v. Batuegas, 403 scra 123 In re: parazo, 82 phil. 230 Zaguirre v. Castillo, 398 scra 659 Tapucar v. Tapucar, 293 scra 331 Re: 2003 bar examinations bm 1222, feb. 4, 2004 Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, ac no. 5148, july 1, 2003 Ng v. Atty. Alar, 507 scra 465 Rule 7.01 Bernardo v. Mejia supra In re: purisima, 393 scra 584 Leda v. Tabang, 206 scra 395 7.02 7.03 Dantes v. Atty. DANTES, A.C. NO. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 scra 582 Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of

law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has &good moral character,& and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent1 to the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.& &Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.& &Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.22 To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.24 In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.26 Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.28

Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondent’s commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.29 In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.34 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. Zaguirre v. Castillo, supra Sanchez v. Somoso, 412 scra 569 Guevarra v. Eala, ac no. 7136, august 1, 2007 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (RULE 138-A)  Membership and dues In re: edillon, 84 scra 554 By laws of the integrated bar ROC RULE 139-A, SEC. 9, SEC. 10, sec. 11, sec. 13 Santos v. Atty. Llamas, ac no. 4749, january 20, 2000 ROC RULE 139-A, SEC. 5, 6, 7, 8 IBP BY-LAWS, ARTICLE V, SECTION 31 AND 33, 42, 39, 47as amended in the matter of the brewing controversies in the election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a.m. no. 09-5-2-SC, DECEMBER 14, 2010

CANON 8 Camacho v. Pagulayan, et al. AC NO. 4807, march 22, 2000 Reyes v. Chiong, jr. 405 scra 212 Laput v. Remotigue, am no. 219 Que v. Atty. Revilla jr., ac no. 7054, december 4, 2009 Atty. De la rosa v. Court of Appeals Justices Sabio, Jr., et al., AM NO. CA03-35, JULY 24, 2003 Barandon jr. V. Ferrer, Sr., AC NO. 5768, MARCH 26, 2010 Rule 8.01 Cornejo v. Tan, 65 phil. 772 In re: Almacen, 31 scra 562 Andres v. Cabrera, 94 scra 513 Alcantara v. Pefianco, 393 scra 247 Rule 8.02 Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, supra Likong v. Lim, 235 scra 416, 414 Camacho v. Pagulayan, 328 scra 631 Dalliong-Galiciano v. Castro, 474 scra 1 Reyes v. Chiong, 405 scra 212 CANON 9 Pp v. Hon. Maceda, GR NO. 89591-96, JANUARY 24, 2000 ZETA vs. MALINAO, am no. P-220, December 20, 1978 Tan and pagayokan v. Balajadia, gr no. 169517, march 14, 2006 AGUIRRE V. RANA, 403 SCRA 342 Camabaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio, 434 scra 288 Alawi v. Alauya, 268 scra 639 Ulep v. Legal clinic, supra People v. Villanueva, 14 scra 109 Rule 138 sec. 1, ROC OCA v. Ladaga, 350 scra 326 Rule 138 , sec. 34, ROC, PEOPLE V. SIN BEN, 98 PHIL. 138 GUBALLA V. CAGUIOA, 78 SCRA 302 ECO V. RODRIGUEZ, 107 PHIL. 612 ROBINSON V. VILLAFUERTE, 18 PHIL. 121 Amalgamated laborers assoc. V. CIR, 22 SCRA 1266 Tan tek beng v. David, 128 scra 389 Halili v. CIR, 136 scra 113 Five J taxi v. Nlrc, 235 scra 556 Republic v. Kenrick development corporation, gr no. 149576, august 8, 2006 Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 phil. 755 RULE 9.01 Guballa v. Caguioa, 78 scra 207 Pp v. Hon. Maceda, GR NO. 89591-96, JANUARY 24, 2000 ZETA vs. MALINAO, am no. P-220, December 20, 1978 Tan and pagayokan v. Balajadia, gr no. 169517, march 14, 2006

RULE 9.02 Lijuaco v. Atty. Terrado, ac no. 6317, august 31, 2006 Plus builders vs. Atty. Revilla jr., ac no. 7056, september 13, 2006 CANON 10 Wicker v. Arcangel, 252 scra 444 Cruz v. Gingoyon Mupas, gr. No. 170404, september 28, 2011 People v. Cuaresma, 254 phil. 418 Ouan v. PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORP., 434 PHIL 28, 34 VERGARA SR. V. JUDGE SUELTO, 240 PHIL. 719, 733 PEOPLE V. AZARRAGA, ET AL., GR. NO. 187117 AND 187127, OCTOBER 12, 2011 ROMERO V. VALLE, 147 SCRA 201 LUGUE V. KAYANAN, 29 SCRA 165 IN RE: ALMACEN, 31 SCRA 562 HILADO V. DAVID, 84 SCRA 569 IN RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL SORREDA, AM NO. 0503-04-SC, JULY 22, 2005 IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THE PLUNDER LAW CASE HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, AM NO. 01-12-03-SC, 385 SCRA 285 ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 123698, AUGUST 5, 1998 MACIAS V. UY KIM, GR NO. 31174, MAY 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 251 GABRIEL V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 43757, JULY 30, 1976 IN RE: SORIANO, GR NO. 24114, JUNE 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 801 COBB-PEREZ V. LANTIN, GR NO. 22320, MAY 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637 CASTANEDA V. AGO, GR NO. 288546, JULY 30, 1987, 65 SCRA 505 Maligaya v. Doronilla, jr., AC NO. 6198, SEPTEMBER 15, 2006 LARUCOM VS. JACOBA, AC NO. 5921, MARCH 10, 2006 CONLU V. AREDONA, AC NO. 4955, SEPTEMBER 12, 2011 VILLAHERMOSA VS CARACOL, AC NO. 7325, JANUARY 21, 2015 THE HEIRS OF THE LATE F. NUGUID VDA. DE HABERER V. CA, ET AL., 192 PHIL. 61 ERECTORS VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. 166 SCRA 728 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS V. NOYNAY, GR NO. 132365, JULY 9, 1998 BONGALONTA V. CASTILLO, 240 SCRA 310 PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. GR NO. 117817, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION V. HON. NITAFAN, GR NO. 118437, JULY 9, 1998 Re: letter complaint of concerned citizens against Solicitor Agnes VST Devanadera, et al., am no. 07-11-13-sc, june 30, 2008 Young v. Batuegas, 403 scra 123 Rule 138, sec. 20 (d), Garcia v. Francisco, 220 scra 512 Gomez v. Presiding judge, 249 scra 432

Director of lands v. Adorable, 74 phil. 488

RULE 10.01 Samala v. Valencia, ac no. 5439, january 22, 2007 Maligaya v. Doronila, ac no. 6198, september 15, 2006 Rivera v. Corral, ac no. 3548, july 4, 2002 Manuel sebastian v. Atty. Amily bajar, ac no. 3731, september 7, 2007 Young v. Batuegas, supra Canon 32, cpe RULE 10.02 Allied banking v. Ca, 416 scra 651 Insular life employees co. V. Insular life association, 37 scra 7 RULE 10.03 Sps. Donato v. Asuncion, ac no. 4914, march 3, 2004 Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, 424 scra 42 Rule 138, sec. 20 (d), ROC CANON 11 TOLEDO V. BURGOS, GR NO. 75466, DECEMBER 19, 1988 ROC RULE 138, SEC. 20 (B) RHEEM OF THE PHILS. V. FERRER, 60 SCRA 234 RODIL V. GARCIA, 104 SCRA 362 PEOPLE V. CARILLO, 77 PHIL. 580 ADVENTO V. MIJARES, 120 SCRA 48, 49 GIL V. TABUNDA, 96 PHIL 32, 34 ROXAS V. ZUZUARREGUI, JR., GR NO. 152072 & 152104, JULY 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 446 BACULI V. BATTUNG, AC NO. 8920, SEPTEMBER 28, 2011 HABAWEL, ET AL. V. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION, GR NO. 174759, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011 Lacurom v. Jacoba, ac no. 5921, march 10, 2006 Berbano vs. Barcelona, 410 scra 258 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 416 scra 465 In re: sotto, 82 phil. 595 De garcia v. Warden of makati, gr no. L-42032, january 9, 1976 Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 scra 645 In re: almacen, 31 scra 562 Sanggalang v. Iac, 177 scra 87 Go v. Abrogar, 485 scra 457 1987 constitution, art. Viii, sec. 6 Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 scra 464 Ang v. Castro, 136 scra 453 Judge madrid v. Atty. Dealca, ac no. 7474, september 9, 2014, In re: suspension of Atty. Rogelio z. Bagabuyo, former senior state prosecutor, adm case no. 7006, october 9, 2007, 535 scra 200, 214 Reyes v. Chiong, jr. , ac no. 5148, july 1, 2003, 405 scra 212, 217

Acme shoe and rubber v. Court of appeals, 260 scra 714 Monticalbo v. Maraya, am no. Rtj-09-2197, april 13, 2011 Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 22 scra 132, 135 Garayblas v. Ong, gr no. 174507-30, august 3, 2011 People v. Godoy, 243 scra 64, 94-95 Go v. Court of appeals, 221 scra 397, 419-420 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, et al., zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 scra 316 Montecillo v. Gica, 60 scra 234 Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 phil. 724 In re: laureta, 148 scra 421, 422 In re: jacinto, 159 scra 471 Surigao mineral reservation board v. Cloribel, 31 scra 1 People v. Venturanza, 52 official gazette 769 Medina v. Rivera, 66 phil.151 De joya v. Cfi rizal, L-9785, september 19, 1956 Sison v. Sandejas, L-9270, april 29, 1959 Lualhati v. Albert, 57 phil. 86 People v. Carillo, 77 phil. 580 In re: francisco, 61 phil 729 Paragas v. Cruz, 14 scra 809 Tiongco v. Aguilar, 240 scra 589 Go v. Court of appeals, 221 scra 397, 419 Baculi v. Battung, ac no. 8920, september 28, 2011 Garcia v. Alconel, 111 scra 178 Sulit v. Tiang co, 115 scra 207 Castillo v. Padilla, 127 scra 745 In re: kelly, 35 phil. 944, 950-51 Re: letter of the UP law faculty, entitled “restoring integrity: a statement by the faculty of the university of the philippines college of law on the allegations of plagriarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, am no. 10-10-4-SC , october 19, 2010, march 8, 2011 Ethics case of Justice del Castillo, am no. 10-7-17-sc Pobre v, defensor santiago, ac no. 7399, august 25, 2009 Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot, 329 scra 78 Andamo v. Larida, am no. Rtj-11-2265, september 21, 2011 De vera v. Pelayo, 335 scra 281

RULE 11.01 RULE 11.02 People v. Gagui, 2 scra 752 RULE 11.03 Re: letter dated 21 february 2005 of atty. Noel s. Sorreda, 464 scra 32 Johnny ng vs. Alar, ac no. 7252, november 22, 2006 Roxas v. De zuzuarregui, gr no. 152072-152104, july 12, 2007 Montecillo v. Gica, 60 scra 235 Sangalang v. IAC, 177 SCRA 87

RHEEM OF THE PHIL. V. FERRER, 20 SCRA 441 In the matter of proceedings for disciplinary action against Atty. ALmacen, gr no. 27654, february 18, 1970 Atty. Barandon v. Atty. Ferrer, ac no. 5768, march 26, 2010 RULE 11.04 GO V. JUDGE ABROGAR, GR NO. 145213, ,MARCH 28, 2006 Judge lacurom v. Atty. Jacoba, ac no. 5921, march 10, 2006 Asean pacific planners v. City of urdaneta, gr no. 162525, september 23, 2008

RULE 11.05 ZALDIVAR VS. GONZALES, 166 SCRA 316 WICKER V. ARCANGEL, 252 SCRA 445 CARMELITA FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND, GR NO. 171008, OCTOBER 24, 2008 Constitution art. Viii, sec. 6 and 11 In the matter of proceedings for disciplinary action against Atty. ALmacen, gr no. 27654, february 18, 1970 RULE 11.06 MACEDA V. OMBUDSMAN, 24 SCRA 464

CANON 12 Rule138, sec. 20 (g), ROC 1987 CONSTITUTION, ART III, SEC. 6 VILLASIS V. CA, 60 SCRA 120 SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 ROC, RULE 7, SEC. 5: ACHACOSO V. CA, 51 SCRA 424 MANILA PEST CONTROL V. WCC, 25 SCRA 700 ART. 184 OF RPC US V. BALLENA, 18 PHIL. 382 RULE 132, SEC. 3 PD 1829-PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

RULE 12.01 Rule 18.02 De espino v. Atty. Presquito, am no. Ac 4762, june 28, 2004 RULE 12.02 Lim vs. Montano, ac no., february 27, 2006 Prieto v. Corpuz, ac no. 6517, december 6, 2006 Alcantara, et al. Vs. De vera, ac no. 5859, november 23, 2010 Judge Madrid v. Atty. Dealca, ac no. 7474, september 9, 2014

Vitriolo v. DASIG, ac no. 4984, april 1, 2003, 400 scra 172, 179 Sebastian v. Calis, ac no. 5118, september 9, 1999, 314 scra 1, 7 Cervantes v. Sabio, ac no. 7828, august 11, 2008, 561 scra 497, 501 Dayag v. Gonzales, am no. Rtj-05-1903, june 27, 2006, 493 scra 51, 61-62 Ong vs. Atty. Unti, ac no. 2417, february 6, 2002 Arnado v. Suarin, am no. P-05-2059, august 19, 2005, 467 scra 402, 408 FORUM SHOPPING – ligon v. Ca, gr no. 127683, august 7, 1998 Sps. Diu v. Ibajau, ,gr no. 132657, january 19, 2000 First Philippine international bank v. Ca, gr no. 115849, january 24, 1996 Gatmaytan v. Court of appeals, gr no. 123332, february 3, 1997 Ruby industrial corp. V. Court of Appeals, gr no. 124185-87, january 20, 1998 First Philippine international bank v. Ca, 252 scra 259 New pangasinan review inc. V. NLRC Earth minerals exploration v. Macaraig, 194 scra 1 Collado v. Hernando, 181 scra 639 Spouses Aguilar v. The manila banking corporation, gr no. 157911, september 19, 2006 Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, etc, am no. 08-6-352-rtc, august 19, 2009 Lim v. Montano, ac no. 5653, february 27, 2006 Benguet electric cooperative, inc. Vs. NEA, ,193 SCRA 250

RULE 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extension of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Nunez vs. Atty. Ricafort, a.c. no. 5054, May 29, 2002 FACTS: There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of

paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation. RULING: All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent’s claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates. By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra). Respondent’s act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold. To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001). Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.1âwphi1.nêt Atty. Vaflor-fabroa v. Atty. Paguinto, ac no. 6273, march 15, 2010 Mattus v. Villaseca, ac no. 7922, october 1, 2013 Fil-garcia v. Hernandez, ac no. 7129, july 16, 2008

RULE 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.

Bugaring and RBBI v. Hon. Espanol, gr no. 133090, january 19, 2001 Manila pest control vs. Wcc 25 scra 700 Malonzo v. Principe, 447 scra 1 PLUS BUILDERS V. REVILLA, AC NO. 7056, SEPTEMBER 13, 2006 Sambajon v. Atty. Suing, ac no. 7062, september 26, 2006 Castaneda v. Ago, 65 scra 505 Cobb perez v. Lantin, 23 scra 637

RULE 12.05 Sambajon v. Atty. Suing, ac no. 7062, september 26, 2006 PD 1829 PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE RULE 12.06 Sambajon v. Atty. Suing, ac no. 7062, september 26, 2006 SAME RULE 12.07 Sambajon v. Atty. Suing, ac no. 7062, september 26, 2006 SAME RULE 12.08 PNB V. UY TENG PIAO, 57 SCRA 337 RULE 3, SEC. 16, ROC SANTIAGO V. RAFANAN, 440 SCRA 91 Canon 13 – reliance on the merits of his cause Nestle phil. V. Sanchez, 154 scra 542 In re: de vera 385 scra 285 Austria v. Masaquel, 20 scra 1247 13.01 13.02 Cruz v. Salva, 105 phil 1151 Martelino v. Alejandro, 32 scra 106 In re: request radio tv coverage, 360 scra 248 Foodsphere inc. V. Atty. Mauricio jr., ac no. 7199, july 22, 2009 In re: aLmacen, 31 scra 562 Re: suspension of atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, former state prosecutor, ac no. 7006, october 19, 2007 13.03 Maglasang v. People, 190 scra 306

Bumanlag v. Bumanlag, 74 scra 92 Canon 14 LEDESMA V. CLIMACO, 57 SCRA 473 BLANZA V. ARCANGEL, 21 SCRA 1 Rule 2.02 Cf sharp crew management v. Torres, ac no. 10438, september 23, 2014 Baynola v. Reyes, ac no. 4808, november 22, 2011, 660 scra 490, 499 Navarro v. Solidum, ac no. 9872, january 28, 2014 Belleza v. Macasa, ac no. 7815, july 23, 2009, 593 scra 549, 561 Arellano university inc. V. Mijares iii, ac no. 8380, november 20, 2009, 605 scra 9 Freeman v. Reyes, ac no. 6248, november 15, 2011, 660 scra 48 Celaje v. Soriano, 561 phil. 341, 347 Adrimisin v. Javier, 532 scra 639, 645-646 Garcia v. Manuel, 443 phil. 479 Sps. Olbes v. Deciembre, 496 phil. 799, 812 Hernandez v. Go, 490 phil. 420, 427 Castillo vs. Taguines, 254 scra 554 Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 scra 122 Nator v. Ramolete, 101 scra 716 CREATION OF LAWYER CLIENT RELATION Virgo v. Amorin, ac no. 7861, january 30, 2009 Dalisay v. Mauricio, ac no. 5655, january 23, 2006 Plus builders v. Atty. Revilla, ac no. 7056, february 11, 2009 RELATION CREATED BY CONTRACT (EXPRESS OR IMPLIED OR FACIO UT DES) Fajardo v. Kapisanan ng mga manggagawa, 8 c.a.r. (25) 1156 Accepting money from client creates lawyer-client relationship Dalisay v. Mauricio, supra Freeman v. Reyes, ac no. 6248, november 15, 2011, 660 scra 48 Villafuerte v. Cortez, ac no. 3455, april 14, 1998 Created by implied agreement Corpus v. Court of Appeals, 98 scra 424 Sps. Rabanal v. Atty. Tugade, ac no. 1372, june 27, 2002 Prado v. Razon, 131 scra 277 Javellana v. Lutero, 20 scra 717 (duty of lawyer in implied agreement) Lawyer’s employment need not be in writing Santos v. NIRC, 264 scra 673 Villafuerte v. Cortez, ac no. 3455, april 14, 1998 RELATION CREATED BY MERE CONSULTATION Hilado v. David, 84 phil. 569 Pacana jr. V. Pascual lopez, ac no. 4243 july 24, 2009

14.01 Rule 138, sec 20, ROC, (i) FRANCISCO V. ATTY. PORTUGAL, AC NO. 6155, MARCH 14, 2006 Enriquez v. Hon. Gimenez, 107 phil. 933 People v. Sta. Teresa, 354 scra 697 Navarro vs. Meneses III, CBD ac no. 313, january 30, 1998 People v. Deniega, 251 scra 626, 637-638 People v. Juanario, 267 scra 608, 632 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 scra 198, 213

14.02 Ledesma v. Climaco, 57 scra 473 FACTS: According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counselde oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. RULING: What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 &There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio.

The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled.& Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: &It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest.& 12 RULE 138, SEC. 31, 20 (H), RULES OF COURT RULE 116, SEC. 6-8 RULE 124, SEC. 2 PD 543 RA 6033 RA 6034 RA 6035 IN RE: ATTY. ADRIANO, GR NO. L-26868, FEBRUARY 27, 1969 A LAWYER SHALL NOT DECLINE APPOINTMENT BY THE COURT OR BY THE IBP Leviste v. Court of appeals, gr. No. L-29184, JANUARY 30 , 1989 RECTO V. HARDEN, 100 PHIL. 1472 US V. LARANJA, 21 PHIL. 500 Separate opinion of justice isagani cruz – people v. Mendoza, gr no. 80845, march 14, 1994, 231 scra 264, 271 Villahermosa vs. Caracol, ac no. 7325, january 21, 2015 Concurring opinion of Justice Cruz in people v. Cierbo, 143 scra 699

14.03 (VALID GROUND FOR REFUSAL) PEREZ V. ATTY. DELA TORRE, AC NO. 6160, MARCH 30, 2006 CANOY V. ATTY. ORTIZ, AC NO. 5485, MARCH 16, 2005 People v. Daeng, 49 scra 222 Nakpil v. Valdez, 288 scra 75

14.04 SAME STANDARD FOR PAYING AND NON PAYING CLIENTS IN RE: ATTY. ADRIANO, SUPRA CANON 15

RULE 138, SEC. 3, RULES OF COURT AROMIN V. BONCAVIL, AC NO. 5135, SEPTEMBER 22, 1999 Jardin v. Villar, ac no. 5474, august 28, 2003 RPC ART. 209 RULE 130, SECTION 24 (B), OF THE RPC PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR NO. 115439-41, JULY 16, 1997 REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 262 SCRA 122 DEE V. CA, 176 SCRA 651 NAKPIL V. VALDEZ, 286 SCRA 758 RULE 15.01 (conflict of interest) Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, ac no. 5303, june 15, 2006 Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, ac no. 5804, july 1, 2003 Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, ac no. 6836, january 23, 2006 San jose homeowners v. Romanillo, ac no. 5580, july 15, 2005

RULE 15.02(privileged communication) Diana Ramos v. Atty. Imbang, supra Ma luisa hadjula v. Atty. Roceles f. Madianda, ac no. 6711, july 3, 2007 Mercado v. Vitriolo, adm case 5108, may 26, 2005 Comments of the committee on responsibility, discipline and disbarment of the IBP People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 scra505 Regala et al v. Sandiganbayan, 262 scra 122 Pfleider v. Palanca, adm case no. 927, september 28, 1970, 35 scra 75 Uy chico v. Union life assurance, 29 phil. 163, 165 Exception to confidentiality rule People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 scra 505 Mercado v. Vitriolo, supra Uy chico v. Union life assurance, supra Palm v. Atty. Iledan, ac no. 8242, october 2, 2009 Barton v. Leyte asphalt, 46 phil. 938 Orient insurance v. Revilla, 54 phil. 919 Air philippine v. Pennswell, 540 scra 25 RULE 15.03 (conflict of interest) SAN JOSE VS. ROMANILLOS, SUPRA It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.

Northwestern university v. Arquillo, ac no. 6632, august 2, 2005 Gonzales vs. Atty. Cabucana, ac no. 6836, january 23, 2006 Hornilla v. Dalunat, ac no. 5804, july 1, 2003 Heirs of falame v. Baguio, ac no. 6876, march 7, 2008 Maturan v. Gonzales, ac no. 2597, march 12, 1998 Pormento v. Pontevedra, ac no. 5128, march 31, 2005 Gonzales v. Cabucana, ac no. 6836, january 23, 2006 Hilado v. David, 84 phil. 571 Buehs v. Atty. Bacatan, ac no. 6674, june 30, 2009 Palm v. Atty. Iledan, ac no. 8242, october 2, 2009 Pacana v. Pascual lopez, ac no. 4243, july 24, 2009 Santos v. Beltran, 418 scra 220, 223, july 1, 2003 Daging vs. Davis, ac no. 9395, november 12, 2014 Nuique v. Sedillo, ac no. 9906, july 29, 2013, 702 scra 317, 325 Nakpil v. Valdes, ac no. 2040, march 4, 1998 Lorenzana food corporation v. Daria, ac no. 2736, may 27, 1991 Phil. National bank v. Cedo, 243 scra 1, 6 Gesuden v. Ferrer, 128 scra 359 Rosacia v. Bulalacao, 248 scra 664, 666 Sumangil v. Santo roman, 84 phil. 777 San jose v. Cruz, 57 phil 792 Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, 505 phil. 126 , 133 Daging v. Atty. Davis, ac no. 9395, november 12, 2014 Orola v. Ramos, ac no. 9860, september 11, 2013, 705 scra 350, 358-59 Heirs of lydia “terry” falanme v. Atty. Edgar baguio, ac no. 6876, march 7, 2008 Maglasang v. People, gr no. 90083, October 4, 1990 RULE 15.04 Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, supra RULE 15.05 Rollon v. Atty. Naraval, ac no. 6424, march 4, 2005 Yu v. Bondal, ac no. 5534, january 17, 2005 Ochoa v. Chiongson, 253 scra 371 De Ysasi III V. NLRC, 231 SCRA 173 RULE 15.06 Reddi v. Atty. Sebrio jr., ac no. 7027, january 30, 2009 RULE 15.07 Rural bank of calape v. Atty. Florido, ac no. 5736, june 18, 2010 BIASCAN V. ATTY. LOPEZ, AC NO. 4650, AUGUST 14, 2003 RULE 15.08 Dr. Gamilla vs. Atty. Marino jr., ac no. 4763, march 20, 2003

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSESSION CORDON V. BALICANTA, SUPRA Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.[13] Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[14] Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. [15] This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.[16] Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. [18] He is bound to account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.[19] The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.[20] This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to absolve him from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him by complainant. He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate fiction. The massive fraud perpetrated by respondent on the complainant leaves us no choice but to set aside the veil of corporate entity. For purposes of this action therefore, the properties registered in the name of the corporation should still be considered as properties of complainant and her daughter. The respondent merely held them in trust for complainant (now an ailing 83-year-old) and her daughter. The properties conveyed fraudulently and/or without the requisite authority should be deemed as never to have been transferred, sold or mortgaged at all. Respondent shall be liable, in his personal capacity, to third parties who may have contracted with him in good faith. Garcia vs. Atty. Manuel, a.c no. 5811, january 20, 2003 A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides: Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the complainant. Respondent Manuel fully knew that the jurisdictional requirement of demand to vacate had to be complied with before an ejectment case could be filed,[8] and yet he asked complainant to raise the filing fee of P10,000 as early as 17 February 1999. [9] He likewise cannot take refuge behind his claim that he did not file the ejectment case because he had not yet received the registry return card. The records reveal that despite Atty. Manuels receipt of the registry return card on 24 March 1999,[10] he still did not file an ejectment case. Finally, if indeed respondent was in good faith in dealing with complainant, he should have informed or advised the complainant of the status of her case or, at the least, responded to her inquiries. Canon 18, Rule 18.04 provides: Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within reasonable time to the clients request for information. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being defended. It is only thus that the trust and faith in the counsel may remain unimpaired. [11] Respondent also failed to comply with the norms embodied in Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P10,000 specifically for filing fees in the ejectment case. Thus, he was under the obligation to render an accounting of the same. The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client requires that the lawyer should promptly account for all the funds received from, or held by him for, the client. [12] Moreover, a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due or (b) upon demand. [13] In the instant case, respondent failed to account and return the P10,000 for the filing fees despite complainants repeated demands. We find untenable respondents claim that since complainant was already in arrears with his fees, it was proper for him to apply the filing fees to his attorneys fees. It has been held that an attorneys lien is not an excuse for a lawyers non-rendition of accounting.[14] And while a lawyer is allowed to apply so much of the clients funds as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, the lawyer is however under the obligation to promptly thereafter notify his client.[15] Nothing on record supports respondents claim that complainant was adequately notified as to the application of the P10,000 (for the filing fees) to her arrears.

ART. 1491 OF THE CIVIL CODE Ordonio v. Eduarte, 207 scra 229 Tuazon v. Tuazon, 88 phil. 42 Daroy v. Legaspi, am no. 936, july 25, 1975 Rule 138, sec. 37 Vda. De Caina vs. Victoriano, Gr no. L- 12905, february 26, 1959 Retaining v. Charging lien Licuanan v. Melo, 170 scra 100 Docena v. Limon, ac no. 2387, september 10, 1998 Navarro v. Meneses III, cbd ac no. 313, january 30, 1998 Medina v. Bautista, 12 scra 1 Burbe v. Atty. Magluta, ac no. 99-634, june 10, 2002 Meneses v. Macalino, ac no. 6651, february 27, 2006 Dalisay v. Mauricio, ac no. 5655, january 23, 2006 on the motion for reconsideration Nakpil v. Valdes, supra

RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

POSIDIO V. VITAN, AC NO. 6051, APRIL 2, 2007 ADRIMISIN V. JAVIER, AC 2591, SEPTEMBER 8, 2006 ALMENDAREZ V. LANGIT, AC NO. 7057, JULY 25, 2006 CRUZ V. Jacinto, 328 scra 636 ATTY. SALOMON JR. V. ATTY. FRIAL, AC NO. 7820, SEPTEMBER 12, 2008 CHUA AND HSIA V. ATTY. MESINA JR., AC NO. 4904, AUGUST 12, 2004 RULE 16.02 Velez v. De vera, 496 scra 345 HERNANDEZ V. GO., 450 SCRA 1 TAROG V. ATTY. RICAFORT, AC NO. 8253, MARCH 15, 2011 RULE 16.03 Lemoine vs. Balon,jr., 414 scra 511 In re: suspension from the practice of law in the territory of guam of Atty. Leon G. MASQUESRA, 435 SCRA 417 BUSINOS V. RICAFORT 283 SCRA 40 QUILBAN V. ROBINOL, 171 SCRA 786

RULE 16.04 BARNACHEA V. QUICHO, 399 SCRCA 1 RUBIAS V. BATILLER, 51 SCRA 120 Sps. Concepcion v. Atty. Dela rosa, ac no. 10681, february 3, 2015

Junio v. Atty. Grupo, 423 phil. 808, 816 Frias v. Atty. Lozada, 513 phil. 512, 521-22, ac no. 6656, december 13 2005 Sps. Soriano v. Atty. Reyes, 523 phil. 1, 16 Roa v. Atty. Moreno, 633 phil. 1, 8 Suzuki v. Atty. Tiamzon, 508 phil. 130, 142 Hernandez v. Go, 450 scra 1 CANON 17 -FIDELITY TO CLIENT’S CAUSE KOREAN AIRLINES V. CA, 247 SCRA 599 DE YSASI V. NLRC, 231 SCRA 173 MILLARE V. MONTERO, 246 SCRA 1 LIBIT V. OLIVA, 237 SCRA 375 PEOPLE V. IGNACIO, 233 SCRA 1 MAGLASANG V. PEOPLE, GR NO. 90083, OCTOBER 4, 1990 PEOPLE V. PAGARO, GR NO. 93026-27, JULY 24, 1991, MINUTE RESOLUTION SOLIMAN V. ATTY. LERIOS-AMBOY, NO. 10568, JANUARY 13, 2015 FERNANDEZ V. ATTY. NOVERO, AC NO. 5394, DECEMBER 2, 2002 PEOPLE V. NADERA, SCRA 490 PEOPLE V. BERNAS, 306 SCRA 293, PEOPLE V. STA. TERESA, 354 SCRA 697 CANTILLER V. POTENCIANO, 180 SCRA 246 SANTIAGO V. FOJAS, 248 SCRA 68 STEIMMARK V. MAS, AC NO. 8010 Zabaljauregui pitcher vs. Atty. Gagate, ac no. 9532, october 13, 2013 Alisbo v. Jalandon, 199 scra 321 Ngayan v. Tugade, 193 scra 779 In re: suspension of atty. Maquera from the practice of law, bm 793, july 30, 2004 Hernandez v. Go, 45 scra 1 Overgaard v. Valdez, ac no. 7902, september 20, 2008

CANON 18 Parinas v. Atty. Paguinto, ac no. 6297, july 13, 2004 Cantiller v. Potenciano, 180 scra 246 Santiago v. Fojas, 248 scra 68, AM NO. 4103, SEPTEMBER 7, 1995 Steimmark v. Mas, AC NO. 8010 Islas v. Platon, 47 phil 162 Legarda v. Ca, gr no. 94457, march 18, 1991 Uy v. Tansinsin, ac no. 8552, july 21, 2009 Garcia v. Bala, ac no. 5039, 2005 Soliman v. Atty. Lerios-Amboy, no. 10568, january 13, 2015 Conlu v. Aredona, ac no. 4955, september 12, 2011 De Zuzuaregui v. Soguilon, adm. Case no. 4495, october 8, 2008

Fil-garcia v. Hernandez, ac no. 7129, july 16, 2008 Eduquival v. Ferrer, ac no. 5687, february 3, 2005 Del rosario v. Court of appeals, 144 scra 159 Tolentino v. Mangapit, 124 scra 745, Parel v. Abaria, 80 scra 128 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 267 scra 543 People v. Cabodoc, 263 scra 187, 198 Jose v. Court of appeals, 70 scra 257, 264-265 Republic v. Arro, 150 scra 630, Manila electric co. V. Court of Appeals, 187 scra 200 B.R. Sebastian Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, 206 scra 28, 39 Sps. Regalado v. Regalado, gr no. 134154, february 28, 2006 Sps. Williams v. Enriquez, ac no. 6353, february 27, 2006 Soliman v. Atty. Lerios-amboy, supra Sencio v. Atty. Calvadores, 443 phil. 490, 494 Alcoriza v. Lumakang, am no. 249, november 21, 1978 Gonzales v. Presiding Judge of Branch 1, RTC OF BOHOL, GR NO. 75856, JUNE 4, 1990 MARIVELES V. MALLARI, AM NO. 3294, FEBRUARY 17, 1993 GONE V. GA, AC NO. 7771, APRIL 6, 2011 ADRIMISIN V. ATTY. JAVIER, 532 PHIL. 639, 645-46 FRANCISCO V. PORTUGAL, 484 SCRA 57, 2006

Rule 18.01 De Juan v. Atty. Baria III, ac no. 5817, May 27, 2004 Rollon v. Atty. Naraval, supra

Rule 18.02 Fernandez v. Atty. Novero, ac no. 5394, December 2, 2002 Rule 18.03- NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose, Ac no. 3569, February 23, 2007 Sps. Soriano v. Reyes, ac no. 4676, May 4, 2006 Sps. Adecer v. Akut, ac no. 4809, May 3, 2006 Pangasinan Electric Cooperative v. Montemayor, ac no 5739, september 12, 2007 Arma v. Montevcilla, ac no. 4839, July 21, 2008 Solatan v. Inocentes, 466 scra 1 Barbuco v. Atty. Beltran, ac no. 5092, August 11, 2004 Endaya v. Oca, 410 scra 344 Dalisay v. Mauricio, ac no. 5655, April 22, 2005 RAMOS V. ATTY. DAJOYAG, AC NO. 5174, FEBRUARY 28, 2002 GOMEZ V. MONTALBAN, GR NO. 174414, MARCH 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 693, 708 REGALADO V. REGALADO, GR NO. 134154, FEBRUARY 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 473, 484

TRUST INTERNATIONAL PAPER V. PELAEZ, GR NO. 164871, AUGUST 22, 2006 GRAND PLACEMENT AND GENERAL SERVICES V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 142358, JANUARY 31, 2006 DE ZUZUARREGUI V. SAGUILON, ADM CASE NO. 4495, OCTOBER 8, 2008 Mapua v. Mendoza, 45 phil. 424 Filinvest land v. Court of Appeals, 182 scra 664 Joven-de jesus v. PNB, 12 SCRA 447 PEOPLE v. Cawili, 34 scra 728 Gaerlan v. Bernal, gr no. L-4049, january 28, 1952 Agravante v. Patriarca, 183 scra 113 Ventura v. Santos, 59 phil. 123 Alcoriza v. Lumakang, adm. Case no. 249, november 21, 1978 Capulong v. Alino, 22 scra 491 INSTANCES WHEN THE CLIENT IS NOT BOUND BY COUNSEL’S NEGLIGENCE Republic v. Arro, 150 scra 630 Legarda v. Ca, 195 scra 418 PHHC V. TIONGCO, 12 SCRA 471 ESCUDERO V. DULAY, 158 SCRA 69, 78 BLANZA V. ARCANGEL, AC NO. 492, SEPTEMBER 5, 1967 DIONA V. BALANGUE, 688 SCRA 22 RAMIREZ V. PEOPLE, 706 SCRA 667 DEL MAR V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 139008, MARCH 13, 2002 JUABAN V. BANCALE, GR NO. 156011, JULY 3, 2008 PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINEZ V. CA, GR NO. 126620, APRIL 17, 2002, GCP MANNY TRANSPORT SERVICES V. PRINCIPLE, ETC., GR NO. 141484, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 FRIEND ET AL. V. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR NO. 165767, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 LEGARDA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 195 SCRA 418 AND LEGARDA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 280 SCRA 642 Milla v. People, 664 scra 309 San miguel corp. V. Laguesma, 236 scra 595, 601 Villa rhecar bus v. De la cruz, 157 scra 13 Chua v. Total office products, 664 scra 613, Sofio v. Valenzuela, 666 scra 55 Aguilar v. Ca, 250 scra 371 Bayog v. Natino, 258 scra 378 Villa v. Heirs of enrique altavas, gr no. 162028, july 14, 2008, Maquilan v maquilan, gr no. 155409, june 8, 2007, 524 scra 166, 180 Bibas v. Office of the ombudsman, gr no. 172580, july 23, 2008, Aguilar v. Ca, 320 phil. 456, 462, 250 scra 371, 375 SALONGA ET AL. V. CA, 269 SCRA 534, 545

NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL BINDS CLIENT GOMEZ V. MONTALBAN, GR NO. 174414, MARCH 14, 2008 VILLA V. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ALTAVAS, GR NO. 162028, JULY 14, 2008 SULIMAN V. PEOPLE, GR NO. 190970, NOVEMBER 24, 2014 BEJARASCO V. PEOPLE, GR NO. 159781 FEBRUARY 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 328 LEGARDA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 280 SCRA 642 Republic v. Arro, supra Manila electric v. Ca, 187 scra 200, B.R. SEBASTIAN V. CA, 206 SCRA 28, 39 PANAY RAILWAYS V. HEVA MANAGEMENT, 664 SCRA 1 SALONGA ET AL. V. CA, 269 SCRA 534, 545 TUAZON V. CA, 256 SCRA 158 CASOLITA ET AL. V. CA, 275 SCRA 257, 264-266 ANTONIO V. RAMOS, 2 SCRA 731 AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE V. NLRC, 252 SCRA 202 MAGO V. BOTE, AC NO. 1450, DECEMBER 2, 1987 FIVE STAR BUS CO. V. CA, 259 SCRA 520 CABALES V. NERY, 94 SCRA 374 VALERIO V. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, 7 SCRA 719 DEL MAR V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 139008, MARCH 13, 2002 GCP MANNY TRANSPORT SERVICES V. PRINCIPLE, ETC., GR NO. 141484, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 FRIEND ET AL. V. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR NO. 165767, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE ISAAC V. MENDOZA, 89 PHIL. 279 IN RE: FILART, 40 PHIL. 205 SPOUSES VILLALUZ V. JUDGE ARMENTA, AM NO. MTJ-98-1397, JANUARY 26, 1998 GUIANG V. ANTONIO, 218 SCRA 381 DIONA V. BALANGUE, SUPRA RAMIREZ V. PEOPLE, 706 SCRA 667 REONTOY V. IBADLIT, AC NO. 190, JANUARY 28, 1998, LEGARDA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 195 SCRA 418 NIDUA V. LAZARO, 174 SCRA 581 PHILIPPINE SUBURBAN DEV. V. CA, 100 SCRA 109 Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within reasonable time to the clients request for information. Garcia vs. Atty. Manuel, a.c no. 5811, january 20, 2003 A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all

lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides: Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the complainant. Respondent Manuel fully knew that the jurisdictional requirement of demand to vacate had to be complied with before an ejectment case could be filed,[8] and yet he asked complainant to raise the filing fee of P10,000 as early as 17 February 1999. [9] He likewise cannot take refuge behind his claim that he did not file the ejectment case because he had not yet received the registry return card. The records reveal that despite Atty. Manuels receipt of the registry return card on 24 March 1999,[10] he still did not file an ejectment case. Finally, if indeed respondent was in good faith in dealing with complainant, he should have informed or advised the complainant of the status of her case or, at the least, responded to her inquiries. Canon 18, Rule 18.04 provides: Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within reasonable time to the clients request for information. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being defended. It is only thus that the trust and faith in the counsel may remain unimpaired. [11] Respondent also failed to comply with the norms embodied in Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P10,000 specifically for filing fees in the ejectment case. Thus, he was under the obligation to render an accounting of the same. The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client requires that the lawyer should promptly account for all the funds received from, or held by him for, the client. [12] Moreover, a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due or (b) upon demand. [13] In the instant case, respondent failed to account and return the P10,000 for the filing fees despite complainants repeated demands. We find untenable respondents claim that since complainant was already in arrears with his fees, it was proper for him to apply the filing fees to his attorneys fees. It has been held that an attorneys lien is not an excuse for a lawyers non-rendition of accounting.[14] And while a lawyer is allowed to

apply so much of the clients funds as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, the lawyer is however under the obligation to promptly thereafter notify his client.[15] Nothing on record supports respondents claim that complainant was adequately notified as to the application of the P10,000 (for the filing fees) to her arrears.

Ruiz v. Santos, gr no. 166386, January 27, 2009 Sps. Soriano v. Atty. Reyes, ac no. 4676, May 4, 2006 Somosot v. Atty. Lara, ac no. 7024, January 20, 2009 Sps. Aguilar v. The manila banking corporation, gr no. 157911, september 19, 2006 Banting v. Sps. Manlapaz, gr no. 15867, august 22, 2006 Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, ac no. 5811, january 20, 2003 AVELINO V. PALANA, AM NO. 405, MAY 31, 1971 Duty of clients regarding a case Sps. Zarate v. Maybank, gr no. 160976, june 8, 2005, Greenhills airconditioning v. NLRC, GR NO. 112850, JUNE 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 384 CANON 19– A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW ONG VS. UNTO, SUPRA FACTS: The records show that the complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent, in the latters capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian. The full text of respondents letter[3] reads: Dear Mr. Ong: This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you for your only child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which Miss Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two months that you have abandoned your legal and moral obligations to support your only child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and up to this moment you have not given said financial support. I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so that you will not be dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal and moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian. May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return to her house her television and betamax which you got from her house during her absence and without her knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand, this office will be constrained to file the proper action in court against you.

I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at the above address or you may send your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about the preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss Garganian against you. I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your intentional failure or refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our office might be construed as your absolute refusal really. Expecting you then. Very truly yours, ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian Dumaguete City WITH MY CONSENT: NEMESIA GARGANIAN A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses of action that he would take against the complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son. It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants brother and that the complainant merely assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against him. Thus, various cases were filed by respondent against complainant. RULING: Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. We find the respondents action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable. The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[14] It mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of

his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. SAMBAJON V. ATTY. SUING, SUPRA RURAL BANK OF CALAPE V. FLORIDO, AC NO. 5736, JUNE 18, 2010 MILLARE V. MONTERO, AC NO. 3283, JULY 13, 1995 RULE 19.01 RULE 138, sec. 20 (D), 23 PENA V. ATTY. APARICIO, AC NO. 7298, JUNE 25, 2007 QUE V. ATTY. REVILLA, SUPRA ATTY. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO, AC NO. 6691, APRIL 27, 2007

RULE 19.02 PENA V. ATTY. APARICIO, SUPRA DALISAY V. ATTY. MAURICIO, SUPR Donton v. Dr. Tansingco, supra In re: Laureta, 148 scra 405 RULE 19.03 Atty. Solidon v. Atty. Macalalad, ac no. 8158, february 24, 2010

CANON 20 ATTORNEYS FEES Concept of attorney’s fees A. Ordinary Concept Tolosa v. Employees Compensation Commission, 136 scra 343 Traders royal bank employees union v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 733 B. EXTRA ORDINARY CONCEPT Damasen vs. Hernando, 104 scra 111 Traders royal bank vs. Nlrc, supra PCL shipping phils. V. NLRC, gr no. 153031, december 14, 2006

Urban bank v. Pena , gr no. 145817, october 19, 2011 RA 5185, SEC. 6 RULE 138, SEC. 23, 24, 32, RULES OF COURT Masmud v. Nlrc, gr no. 183385, february 13, 2009 Atty. Orocio vs. Angulan, gr no. 179892-93, january 30, 2009 Quirante v. IAC, 169 SCRA 769 METROBANK V. CA, 181 SCRA 367 RESEARCH SERVICES V. CA, 266 SCRA 731 Fajardo v. Bugaring, 440 scra 160 Corpuz v. Ca, gr no. L-40424, june 30, 1980, 98 SCRA 424 Albano v. Coloma, 21 scra 411 Traders Royal Bank Employees Union v. NLRC, GR NO. 120592, MARCH 14, 1997, 269 SCRA 733, 743 DE GUZMAN v. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT, 68 PHIL. 643 WOLFSON V. ANDERSON, 48 PHIL. 672 NOCOM V. CAMERINO, GR NO. 182984, february 10, 2009 Dominguez jr. V. COURT OF APPEALS, 135 SCRA 109, PACIFIC MERCHANDISING CORPORATION V. CONSOLACION INSURANCE, 73 SCRA 564 SARILE ET AL. V. RESEARCH AND SERVICE REALTY, CA-GR. CV NO. 44839, MARCH 31, 1995 CORPUS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 98 SCRA 424 DEARING V. FRED WILSON & CO., 98 SCRA 758 MEDCO INDUSTRIAL V. CA, GR NO. 84610, NOVEMBER 24, 1988 BACHARAC V. GOLINGCO, 39 PHIL. 138 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK VS. SOBRERO, 111 SCRA 696 Jesalva v. Hon. Bautista, 105 phil. 348, 352 Jureidini v. Court of Appeals, L-39958, May 11, 1978 COURT AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES Ballesteros v. Abion, gr no. 143361, february 9, 2006 Buning et al. V. Santos, gr no. 152544, september 19, 2006 United planters sugar v. Ca, gr no. 126890, november 28, 2006 Sps. Vizarra v. Rodriguez, gr no. 148014, december 5, 2006 Sps. Tamayo v. Heirs of Rodriguez, gr no. 133429, august 10, 2006 Villanueva v. Sps. SALVADOR, gr no. 139436, january 25, 2006 Francisco v. Co, gr no. 151339, january 31, 2006 Benedicto v. Villaflores, gr no. 185020 , October 4, 2010 Mindez resources v. Morillo, 428 phil. 934, 948-49, 379 scra 144 Scott consultants and resources development v. Court of appeals Chung v. Ulanday, gr no. 156038, october 11, 2010 PCL shipping v. NLRC, gr no. 153031, december 14, 2006 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 422 phil. 334, 356-357, 371 scra 27, 46-47 ACCEPTANCE FEES Research and services realty v. Ca, 266 scra 731, 742 Hilado v. David, 84 phil. 579 Polloso v. Hon. Gangan, gr no. 140563, july 14, 2000

Yu v. Bondal, ac no. 5534, january 17, 2005 Curimatmat v. Gojar, 308 scra 123, 128 Delgado v. De la rama, 43 phil. 419 Panis v. Yangco, 52 phil. 499 De guzman v. Visayan Rapid Transit, gr no. 46396 september 30, 1939 Haussermann v. Rahmeyer, 12 phil. 350 Bachrach v. Teal & teal motor, 53 phil. 631, 634 Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation v. Funk, gr no. 131260, december 6, 2006 UNCONSCIONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES Roxas et al. V. De zuzuarregui, gr no. 152072, january 31, 2006 Medco industrial v. Ca, gr no. 84610, november 24, 1988 Bacharach v. Golingco, 39 phil. 138 Borcena v. IAC, 147 SCRA 120 GOROSPE V. GOCHONGCO, L-12735, OCTOBER 30, 1959 MAMBULAO LUMBER CO. V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, 22 SCRA 359, 371 SESBRENO V. CA, 245 SCRA 30 DELOS SANTOS V. PALANCA, 8 SCRA 764 SANTOS V. DIMAYUGA, 3 SCRA 919 TANADA V. CA, 139 SCRA 424 Aircon inc. V. Yao, 59 O.G. 1430 Licudan v. Ca, gr no. 91958, january 24, 1991 Pineda v. De jesus, gr no. 155224, August 23, 2006 QUANTUM MERUIT DELGADO V. DE LA RAMA, 43 PHIL. 419 PANIS V. YANGCO, 52 PHIL. 499 DE GUZMAN VS. VISAYAN RAPID CO., 68 PHIL. 643 POLYTRADE V. BLANCE, 30 SCRA 187 ARO V. NANAWA, 27 SCRA 1090 MAMBULAO LUMBER V. PNB, 22 SCRA 359 GUERRERO V. TAN, 14 SCRA 451 FRANCISCO V. MATIAS, 10 SCRA 89 TEERTHDASS V. POHOOMOL BROTHERS, 15 SCRA 607 Pineda v. De jesus, gr no. 155224, August 23, 2006 RILLORAZA V. EASTERN TELECOMS, 308 SCRA 566 Kinds of attorneys fees arrangements Taganas v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 133 Research and services realty vs. Ca, 266 scra 731, 742 CONTINGENCY FEE ARRANGEMENTS Roxas v. De zuzuarregui, gr no. 152072, january 31, 2006 Sesbreno v. Ca, supra Leviste v. Ca, gr no. L-29184, january 30, 1989 Recto v. Harden, 100 phil. 1472

Taganas v. NLRC, SUPRA Director of lands v. Ababa, gr no. L-26096, FEBRUARY 27, 1979, 88 SCRA 513 CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT Bautista vs. Gonzales, 182 scra 151, am no. 1625, february 12, 1990 RULE 20.01 Gamila v. Marino, 399 scra 308 Lijauco v. Terrado, ac no. 6317, august 31, 2006 Roxas v. De zuzuarregui, ac no. 152072, january 31, 2006 Law firm of tungol and tibayan v. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 169298, JULY 9, 2008 PINEDA V. DE JESUS, GR NO. 166224, AUGUST 23, 2006 ATTORNEY’S LIENS Miranda v. Carpio, ac no. 6281, september 26, 2011 Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, ac no. 5811, january 20, 2003 CHARGING, SPECIFIC, OR NONPOSSESSORY LIEN Supreme Caina v. Victoriano, 105 phil. 194, peralta vda. De caina v. Hon. Victoriano, 105 phil. 194 Metropolitan bank v. Court of appeals, 181 scra 367 Sesbreno v. Court of appeals, 551 scra 524 ATTORNEY’S FEES WHERE CLIENT TERMINATES LAWYER’S SERVICES Republic Act no. 686, An Act to amend Section numbered twenty-four of Rule numbered one hundred and twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, sec. 1, now rule 138, sec. 26 INSTANCES WHERE CLIENT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO PAY FEES ORIZCO V. HERNAEZ, 1 PHIL. 77 Instances where attorney’s fees may be limited Pacific banking corp. V. Clave, 128 scra 112 Rep. Act no. 145 (US veterans claims) RULE 20.02 URBAN BANK V. PENA, 364 SCRA 597 RULE 20.03 RULE 138, SEC. 20 (E) RULE 20.04 RULE 138, SEC. 24, 32, RULES OF COURT RAMOS V. ATTY. NGASEO, AC no. 6210, december 9, 2004 CUETO V. JIMENEZ, AC NO. 5798, 449 SCRA 87 Pineda v. De jesus, gr no. 155224, august 23, 2006

Perez v. Scottish union, 42 OG 2803 CANON 21 – PRESERVATION OF CLIENT’S CONFIDENCES People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 scra 505 Hilado v. David, 84 phil. 569 ROC, RULE 130, SEC. 21 (B) RULE 138, SEC 20 (E) ART. 208-209 REVISED PENAL CODE Genato v. Silapan, 453 phil. 910 Regala v. Sandiganbayan, gr no. 105938, september 20, 1996 Bun Siong Yao v. Atty. Leonardo aurelio, ac no. 7023, march 30, 2006 Junio v. Atty. Grupo, ac no. 5020, december 18, 2001

Rule 21.01 Rule 21.02 Uy v. Atty. Gonzales, ac no. 5280, march 30, 2004 Rule 21.03 Hickman v. Taylor 329 us 485 People v. Sy Juco, 64 phil. 66 Rule 21.04 Trust international corp. V. Pelaez, 499 scra 552 Solatan v. Inocentes, 466 scra 1

Rule 21.05 Rule 21. 06 Rule 21. 07 Hadjula v. Madianda, ac no. 6711, july 3, 2007 Rule 15.01, rule 14.03 CANON 22 withdrawal of services Montano v. Ibp, 358 scra 1, ac no. 4215, may 21, 2001 Obando v. Figueras, 322 scra 148 Aro v. Nanawa, gr no. L-24163, APRIL 28, 1969 RUSTIA V. THE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, 44 PHIL. 62 RECTO V. HARDEN, 100 PHIL. 440 REP. ACT NO. 636 NOW ROC, RULE 138, SEC. 26 Guanzon v. Argon, L-14436, march 21, 1960 Baquiran v. Ca, L-14551, july 31, 1961 SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

YU V. CA, 135 SCRA 186 SANTANA-CRUZ V. CA, GR NO. 120176, JULY 20, 2001 ELBINA V. CENIZA, GR NO. 154019, AUGUST 10, 2006 PIONEER INSURANCE SURETY V. DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION, GR NO. 147010, JULY 18, 2003 GCP-MANNY TRANSPORTATION V. PRINCIPE, GR NO. 141484, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 DEATH OF A LAWYER OR CLIENT Villahermosa v. Caracol, ac no. 7325, january 21, 2015 Borlongan v. Atty. Buenaventura, gr no. 167234, february 27, 2006 The heirs of the late f. Nuguid vda. De haberer v. Ca, 192 phil. 61

Rule 22.01 Domingo v. Aquino, 38 scra 472 Eliza venterez v. Atty. Rodrigo Cosme, ac no. 7421, october 10, 2007 Montano v. Ibp, 358 scra 1, ac no. 4215, may 21, 2001 In re: Atty. David Briones, ac no. 5486, August 15, 2001 Lim jr v. Atty. Villarosa, supra Santero v. Avance, 418 scra 6 De juan v. Baria III, 429 SCRA 188

Rule 22.02 Obando v. Figueras, 322 scra 148 SESBRENO V. CA, GR NO. 161390, APRIL 16, 2008 SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS (RULE 139-B, RULES OF COURT) ONG VS. UNTO, SUPRA The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the importance of the legal profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in Noriega vs. Sison.[13] We then held: In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court. The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court when he said: On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On

the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised. The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.  NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS  Sui generis In re: Montagne and Dominguez, 3 phil. 557 Calo v. De gamo, 20 scra 1162 In re: Laureta, 148 scra 422 Atty. De Vera v. Pineda, 213 scra 434 Cojuangco, jr. V. Palma, 488 scra 306 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 scra 1 Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 166 scra 316 In re: Almacen, 31 scra 564 EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 Bolivar v. Simbal, 16 scra 623 Gonzales v. Cabucano, ac no. 6836, January 23, 2006 Mercado v. Vitriolo, admn. Case no. 5108 may 26, 2005 St. Louis universiy laboratory high school v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Bautista v. Bernarbe, ac no. 6963, february 9, 2006 Reontoy v. Abadlit, ac cbd no. 190, january 28, 1998 Rayos-ombac v. Rayos, 285 scra 93 NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY DE jesus-paras v. Vailoces, ac no. 439, april 12, 1961 Garrido v. Garrido, ac no. 6593, february 4, 2010 Wilkie v. Limos, ac no. 7505, october 24, 2008, 570 scra 1, 8 Pimentel v. Llorente, 393 phil. 554, 551, 339 scra 154, 159 In re: del rosario, 52 phil. 399, 400 Calo v. Degamo, ac no. 516, august 30, 1967, 20 scra 447, 450 In re: lanuevo, 160 phil. 935, 981, 66 scra 245 Agripino v. Brillantes, 166 phil. 449, 461, 76 scra 1 Pangan v. Ramos, 194 phil. 1, 8, 107 scra 1 Cham v. Paita-Moya, ac no. 7494, june 27, 2008, 556 scra 1, 9 Tomlin v. Moya, ac no. 6971, february 23, 2006, 483 scra 154

Zaguirre v. Castillo, ac no. 4921, march 6, 2003, 398 scra 658, 664  Prescription Calo v. Degamo, 20 scra 1162 Heck v. Santos, 423 scra 329 Frias v. Bautista-Lozada, 489 scra 349 Isendhart v. Real, ac no. 8254, february 15, 2012 Salamanca v. Bautista, 8 scra 450 Murillo v. Superable, adm. Case no. 341, march 23, 1960, in re: abistado, 57 phil. 668 Tan v. Ibp commission on bar discipline, gr no. 173940, september 5, 2006

 GROUNDS

Re: Admin case no. 44 of the RTC branch 4, Tagbiliran City, against Atty. OCCEA, A.C. No. 2841, July 3, 2002 Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[12] His guilt, however, cannot be presumed. [13] It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.[14] All these requirements have been complied with in the case at hand. In fact, it was Atty. Occea who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the administrative case against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded the full measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occea deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations against him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyers oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession. [18] Atty. Occea has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly

stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession, [19] because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.[20] Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occea deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. St. Louis university laboratory high school v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Velez v. De vera, ac no. 6697, july 25, 2006 Re: atty. Maquera, 435 scra 417 GROSS MISCONDUCT Cham v. Atty. Paita-moya, ac no. 7494, june 27, 2008, 556 scra 1 Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [15] In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial and legal system is ensured. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court. [16] The Court stresses that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. [17] It demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.[18] In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of her as a guardian of law and justice. [19] Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her professional or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege. [20] The Court has held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, [21] for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of law,[22] or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation.[23]

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct. The case at bar merely involves the respondents deliberate failure to pay her just debts, without her issuing a worthless check, which would have been a more serious offense. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months, a penalty which this Court finds sufficient. WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Philippine amusement and gaming corporation v. Carandang, ac no. 5700, january 30, 2006 Yumol v. Atty. Ferrer, ac no. 6585, april 21, 2005 Sps. Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, sr., ac no. 4914, march 3, 2004, 424 scra 199 Spo2 Jose B. Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, am no. MTJ-021431, MAY 9, 2003, 403 SCRA 141 Tomlin v. Moya, ac no. 6971, february 23, 2006, 483 scra 154 St. Louis university laboratory high school v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 MALPRACTICE Tak Tek Beng v. David, ac no. 1261, december 29, 1983 Act. No. 2828, amending section 21 of act no. 190 In re: Tagorda, 53 phil. 37, 42 Jayme v. Bualan, 58 phil. 422 Arce v. Philippine National Bank, 62 phil. 569

GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT Quincera v. Puno, adm. Case no. 389, february 28, 1967, 19 scra 439 St. Louis university laboratory high school v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Dantes v. Atty. Dantes, ac no. 6486, september 22, 2004, 438 scra 582 Reyes v. Wong, ac no. 54, january 29, 1975, 63 scra 667 Royong v. Oblena, ac no. 376, april 30, 1963, 7 scra 859, 869 Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, ac no. 7214, november 30, 2006 Quingwa v. Puno, admn. Case no. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 scra 439 Cf. Tanjanco vs. Ca, gr no. L-18630, december 17, 1966 Soberano v. Villanueva, admn. Case no. 215, december 29, 1962 Reyes v. Wong, admn. Case no. 547, january 29, 1975, 63 scra Soberano v. Villanueva, 6 scra 893, 895 Mortel v. Aspiras, december 28, 1956, 100 phil. 587, 591-593 Bolivar v. Simbol, april 29, 1966, 16 scra 623, 630 Co v. Candoy, october 23, 1967, 21 scra 439, 442 Garrido v. Garrido, ac no. 6593, february 4, 2010

Cojuangco v. Palma, adm. Case no. 2474, september 15, 2004, 438 scra 306, 314 Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, 424 scra 42, 54 Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 phil. 313, 314 In Re: Atty. Rovero, 189 phil. 605, 606, 101 scra 799, 801 Tapucar v. Tapucar, ac no. 4148, july 30, 1998, 293 scra 331, 338, 339 Joselano guevarra v. Atty. Jose Mauel Eala Mecaral v. Velasquez, ac no. 8392, june 29, 2010 Mendoza v. Deciembre, ac no. 5338, february 23, 2009, 580 scra 26, 36 Yap-paras v. Paras, ac no. 4947, february 14, 2005, 451 dcra 194, 202 Narag v. Narag, ac no. 3405, june 29, 1998, 291 scra 451, 464 Arnobit v. Arnobit, ac no. 1481, october 17, 2008, 569 scra 247, 254 CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE

In Re: Basa, 41 phil. 276 Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1 The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that &A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . .& The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude. &Moral turpitude,& it has been said, &includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.& (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In reHopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.) Soriano v. Dizon, ac no. 6792, january 25, 2006 De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces, ac no. 439, april 12, 1961 Garcia v. Sesbreno, ac no. 7973, and ac no. 19457, February 3, 2015

International Rice Research v. NLRC, GR NO. 97239, 12 MAY 1993, 221 SCRA 760, 768 FILING OF AND CONVICTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE RE-Agripino Brillantes, adm. Case no. 1246, march 2, 1977, 76 scra 1 In re: del rosario, 52 phil. 399 EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE Jimenez v. Jimenez, ac no. 6712, february 6, 2006 St. Louis university laboratory high school v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Pangan v. Ramos, 107 scra 1 In re: Terrel, 2 phil. 266 In re: felipe del rosario, 52 phil. 399 OTHER GROUNDS/NON-PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT (PRIVATE AFFAIRS) St. Louis university laboratory high school v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Santa maria v. Tuason, ac no. 396, july 31, 1964 Quingwa v. Puno, admn. Case no. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 scra 439 Velez v. De vera, ac no. 6697, july 25, 2006 In re: pelaez, 44 phil. 567, 572 In re: basa, 41 phil. 275 In re: atty. Tranquilino Rovero, ac no. , october 24, 1952 People v. Tuanda, 181 scra 692 Cabrera v. Agustin, 106 phil 256 Soriano v. Dizon, ac no. 6792, jan. 25, 2006 Stemmerick v. Mas, ac no. 8010, june 16, 2009 Cordon v. Balicanta, 390 scra 299 Advincula v. Macabata, ac no. 7204, march 7, 2007 Hernandez v. Go, ac no. 1526, january 31, 2005 Belleza v. Macasa, ac no. 78815, july 23, 2009 Overguard v. Valdez, ac no. 702, september 30, 2008 Angalan v. Delante, ac no. 7181, feb. 13, 2009 DISOBEDIENCE TO LAWFUL ORDERS Gone v. Ga, ac no. 7771, april 6, 2011 Ong v. Grijaldo, ac no. 4724, 30 april 2003, 402 scra 1 Sencio v. Calvadores, ac no. 5841, 20 january 2003, 395 scra 383 Ngayan v. Tugade, ac no. 2490, 7 february 1991, 193 scra 779, 783 Tomlin II v. Moya II, ac no. 6971, February 23, 2006 Toledo v. Atty. Abalos, 315 scra 419

ACTUATIONS AGAINST JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES THAT MAY BE A GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION Bugaring v. Hon. Espanol, gr no. 133090, january 19, 2001 NONPAYMENT OF DEBTS In re: pelaez, 44 phil. 569 Lizaso v. Amante, 198 scra 1 Toledo v. Atty. Abalos, 315 scra 419 Constantino v. Saludares, 228 scra 233 Cham v. Atty. Paita-moya, ac no. 7494, june 27, 2008, 556 scra 1 Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [15] In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial and legal system is ensured. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court. [16] The Court stresses that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. [17] It demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.[18] In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of her as a guardian of law and justice. [19] Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her professional or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege. [20] The Court has held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, [21] for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of law,[22] or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation.[23] Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct. The case at bar merely involves the respondents deliberate failure to pay her just debts, without her issuing a worthless check, which would have been a more serious offense. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months, a penalty which this Court finds sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. A-1 financial service, inc. V. Valerio, ac no. 8390, july 2, 2010 Barrientos v. Libiran -meteoro, 480 phil. 661, 671, 437 scra 209, 216-217 Ngayan v. Tugade, ac no. 2490, february 7, 1991, 193 scra 779, 784 Lao v. Medel, 453 phil. 115, 121, 405 scra 227, 232-33 Co v. Bernardino, 285 scra 102 Rangwani v. Dino, 486 phil. 8, 443 scra 408 Yuhico v. Gutierrez, ac no. 8391, november 23, 2010, Philippine amusement and gaming corporation, etc. V. Carandang, ac no. 5700, january 30, 2006 Tomlin II v. Moya II, ac no. 6971, February 23, 2006 Nakpil v. Valdes, 350 phil. 412, 430 Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, 390 phil. 1, 10 National bureau of investigation v. Judge reyes, 382 phil. 872, 886 Barrios v. Martinez, ac no. 4585, november 12, 2004, 442 scra 324, 338 Whitson v. Atienza, ac no. 5535, august 28, 2003, 410 scra 10, 15 Jesena v. Onasa, 211 phil. 543, 546 Arrieta v. Llosa, 346 phil. 932, 939 Litigio v. Dicon, 246 scra 9

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN DISBARMENT IN RE: RUSTE, 70 PHIL. 243 Munoz v. People, 53 scra 190 Atty. Santos v. Atty. Tan, 196 scra 16 Rheem of the phil. V. Ferrer, L-22979, june 26, 1967, 20 scra 441 LIABILITIES OF A LAWYER Barandon v. Ferrer, ac no. 5768, march 26, 2010 Soriano v. Dizon, ac no. 6792, january 25, 2006 Racines v. Morallos, am no. Rtj-08-1698

 PROCEEDINGS In re: Laureta, 148 scra 422 In re: Almacen, 31 scra 562 1987 Phil. Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5) Andres v. Cabrera, 127 scra 807 In re: Cunanan, 94 phil. 534 Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 221 scra 133, 135 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan; zaldivar v. Gonzales, 166 scra 316 In re: Brillantes, am no. 1245, march 2, 1977, 76 scra 1, 15 Tejam v. Cusi, supra In re: Severina lozano and anastacio quevedo, 54 phil. 801, 807 Lagunzad v. Vda. De gonzalez, 192 scra 476

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine blooming mills co, 51 scra 191 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835, 858 CADALIN V. POEA’S ADMINISTRATOR, 238 scra 721 Cojuangco v. Palma, ac no. 2474, june 30, 2005 Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, gr no. L- 16263, july 26, 1960, 108 phil. 1147 In re: problem of delays in cases before the sandiganbayan, am no. 00-8-05-sc, january 31, 2002, 375 scra 339 Re: letter of the UP law faculty entitled “restoring integrity: a statement by the faculty of the university of the philippines college of law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, am no. 10-10-4-sc, march 8, 2011 Supreme Court Minute Resolution, January 3, 1989 in reply to a query of then Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, Rodolfo Nocon Ibanez v. Vina, 107 scra 607 Morfel v. Aspiras, 100 phil. 586 Po cham v. Pizarro, 467 Samaniego v. Atty. Ferrer, 555 scra 1 Zaguirre v. Castillo, adm case no. 4921, march 6, 2003, 398 scra 658 Calo v. Degamo, 20 scra 1162 Tomlin II v. MOYA II, AC NO. 6971, FEBRUARY 23, 2006 Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools inc. Vs. Naldoza, 315 scra 406, 413 Vecino v. Ortiz, ac no. 6909, june 30, 2008, 556 scra 518, 521 Nunez v. Astorga, ac no. 6131, feb. 28, 2005, 452 scra 353, 361-362 In re: conviction of judge adoracion g. Angeles, am no. 06-9-545-rtc, january 31, 2008 Dalisay v. Mauricio, ac no. 5655, january 23, 2006 Bugaring v. Hon. Espanol, gr no. 133090, january 19, 2001 Gonzales v. Cabucano, ac no. 6836, january 23, 2006 Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, ac no. 7214, november 30, 2006 Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 phil. 724 In re: Vicente Sotto, 82 phil. 595 Choa v. Chiongson, 329 phil. 270 Rheem, supra In re: rafael climaco, 55 scra 107 Yangson v. Salandanan, 68 scra 42 Baja v. Macandog, 158 scra Phil. Public school teachers association v. Quisumbing, gr no. 76180 Ceniza v. Sebastian, 130 scra 295 Sangalang v. IAC, 177 scra 87 Saberon v. Larong, ac no. 6567, april 16, 2008, 551 scra 359 In the matter of the petition for declaratory relief re: constitutionality of republic act 4880, gonzales v. Commission on elections, 137 phil. 471 Cayetano v. Monsod, gr no. 100113, september 3, 1991, 201 scra 210, 214 Minister of justice opinion no. 89 DUE PROCESS Cojuangco v. Palma, ac no. 2474, june 30, 2005 Montemayor v. Bundalian, gr no. 149335, july 1, 2003, 405 scra 264

Letter of UP law faculty, supra In re: montagne and dominguez, gr no. 1107, april 2, 1904, 3 phil. 557 Boyboy v. Atty. Victorino yabut, 401 scra 622, 631 Sarangani v. Asdala, et al. Adm. Case no. 4929, january 26, 2009 Query of Atty. Karen Silverio-buffe, 596 scra 378 Prudential bank v. Castro, Richards v. Asoy Rivera v. Atty. Coral, ac no. 3548, july 4, 2002 Placido v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GR NO. 180888, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 Pena v. Aparicio, ac no. 7298, june 25, 2007, 525 scra 444 Atty. Vicente raul almacen, gr no. L-27654, FEBRUARY 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562 INGLES V. DELA SERNA, AC NO. 5763, DECEMBER 2, 2002 Re: admin case no. 44 of the rtc branch 4, tagbiliran city, against atty. Occena, ac no. 2841, july 3, 2005 Artezuela v. Atty. Maderazo, ac no. 4354, april 22, 2002 Dalisay v. Mauricio, ac no. 5655, january 23, 2006 QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, ac no. 7214, november 30, 2006 Sinott v. Judge barte, 423 phil. 522, 536 Concepcion v. Atty. Fandino, 389 phil. 474, 481 Ocampo v. Ombudsman, 379 phil. 21, 28 Santos v. Cacho-calicdan, ac no. 5395, september 19, 2006 Siao aba v. Atty. De guzman, ac no. 7649, december 14, 2011 In re: atty. De guzman, 154 scra 127 De guzman v. Tadeo, 68 phil. 554 In re: tiongko, 43 phil. 191 Acosta v. Serrano, 166 phil. 257 Santos vs. Dichoso, 174 phil. 115 Noriega v. Sison, 210 phil. 236 Lim v. Ca, 324 phil. 400, 413 Manalo v. Roldan-confessor, gr no. 102358, 19 november 1992, 215 scra 808 Habagat grill v. Dmc urban property developer, 494 phil. 603, 613 Bpi vs. Reyes, gr no. 157177, 11 february 2008, 544 scra 206, 216 Republic v. Bautista, gr no. 169801, september 11, 2007, 532 scra 598, 612 ROC, RULE 133, SEC. 1 RIVERA V. CA, 348 PHIL. 734, 743 MARUBENI CORP V. LIRAG, 415 PHIL. 29 PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. CASTRO ANONYMOUS COMPLAINTS In re: echiverri, 67 scra 467 In re: araula, 81 scra 483 Concerned citizens v. Elma, 241 scra 84 IMPOSABLE PENALTIES OR DISCIPLINARY PENALTIES Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 221 scra 132, 135

Yu v. Palana, ac no. 7747, july 14, 2008, 558 scra 21, 28 Soriano v. Reyes, ac no. 4676, may 4, 2006, 489 scra 328, 339 Barrios v. Martinez, ac no. 4586, november 12, 2004, 442 scra 324, 335 DISBARMENT Soriano v. Dizon, ac no. 6792, january 25, 2006 St. Louis university laboratory high school v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Diaz v. Gerong, 141 scra 49 Daroy v. Legaspi, 65 scra 304 Amaya v. Tecson, 450 scra 510 Lim v. Montano, ac no. 5653, february 27, 2006 Spouses williams v. Enriquez, ac no. 6353, february 27, 2007 Sampana v. Angara, ac no. 5839, august 22, 2006 Punla vs. Soriano, 124 scra 356 Deles v. Aragona, 27 scra 633 Tapucar v. Tapucar, ac no. 4148, july 30, 1998 Yuchico v. Gutierrez, ac no. 8391, november 23, 2010 Sampana v. Angara, ac no. 5839, august 22, 2006 Cuenco v. Fernan, 158 scra 29 SUSPENSION ROC, RULE 138, SEC. 28 RULE 138-B, SEC. 16 Maligaya v. Doronilla, ac no. 6198, september 15, 2006 CONTEMPT Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 phil. 27 In re: Kelly, 35 phil. 944 Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel, 20 scra 1241 Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 scra 1 Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 scra 135 De Guia v. Guerrero, 234 scra 625 Paredes-garcia v. Court of appeals, 261 scra 693, 704-705 People v. Godoy, 243 scra 64 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan; zaldivar v. Gonzales, 166 scra 316 People v. Flores, 239 scra 83 Medina v. Rivera, 66 phil. 155 Roc, rule 71, sec.1 In re: letter dated 21 feb. 2005 of atty. Noel s. Sorreda, am no. 050304-sc, july 22, 2005 Ang v. Castro, 136 scra 453 Ceniza v. Sebastian, 130 scra 295 Carag v. Warden of the jail of cagayan, 53 phil. 85 Sulit v. Tiangco, 115 scra 207 Wicker v. Arcangel, 252 scra 444 Delima v. Gallardo, 77 scra 290 ROC, RULE 71, SEC. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Ang v. Castro, 136 scra 453 Guerrero v. Hon. Villamor, am no. RTJ-90-483 Carlos v. Hon. Villamor, am no. RTJ-90-617, ,SEPTEMBER 25, 1998

EVANGELISTA V. SEPULVEDA, 121 SCRA 686 FR. Guillen v. Judge Canon, am no. MTJ-01-1381, JANUARY 14, 2002 MONTECILLO V. GICA, 60 SCRA 234 Garayblas v. Ong, gr no. 174507-30, august 3, 2011 Pimentel v. Salonga, 21 scra 160 People v. Villanueva, 14 scra 110, 112 Alawi v. Alauya, 268 scra 628 FINE REPRIMAND Tobias v. Veloso, gr no. L-40224, SEPTEMBER 23, 1980, 100 SCRA 184 Letter of the UP LAW FACULTY, SUPRA ADMONITION Tobias v. Veloso, gr no. L-40224, SEPTEMBER 23, 1980, 100 SCRA 184 WARNING Tobias v. Veloso, gr no. L-40224, SEPTEMBER 23, 1980, 100 SCRA 184 NO DISMISSAL EVEN IF OATH TAKEN DISMISSAL SHOULD AFFECT STATUS ONLY AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR Esquivias v. Court of appeals, gr no. 119714, may 29, 1997, 272 scra 803 Roa v. Moreno, ac no. 8382, april 21, 2010 Suzuki v. Tiamson, ac no. 6542, september 30, 2005, 471 scra 129 A-1 financial service v. Valerio, ac no. 8390, july 2, 2010 Solidon v. Macalalad, ac no. 8158, february 24, 2010 Yuhico v. Gutierrez, ac no. 8391, november 23, 2010 Barcenas v. Alvero, ac no. 8159, april 23, 2010 AGGRAVATING OR MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES Samaniego v. Atty. Ferrer, ac no. 7022, june 18, 2008, 555 scra 1 Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, supra Bustamante-alejandro v. Alejandro, ac no. 4256, february 13, 2004, 422 scra 527, 532-533 Guevarra v. Eala, ac no. 7136, august 1, 2007, 529 scra 1, 21 Zaguirre v. Castillo, ac no. 4921, august 3, 2005, 465 scra 520 EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE PARDON IN RE: LONTOK, 43 PHIL. 293 IN RE: GUTIERREZ, ADM CASE NO. 363, JULY 31, 1962 EFFECT OF CONDITIONAL PARDON IN RE: GUTIERREZ, ADM CASE NO. 363, JULY 31, 1962 In re: avancena, 20 scra 1012 In re: vailoces, 117 scra 1

 DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS PRACTICING ABROAD ROC, RULE 138, SEC. 27 VELEZ V. DE VERA, AC NO. 6697, JULY 25, 2006 IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAGUERA, 435 SCRA 417

READMISSION TO THE BAR  LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED In re: rovero, 101 scra 799 Magat v. Santiago, 97 scra Maniago v. Atty. De dios, march 30, 2010 Tan v. Sabandal, bar matter no. 44 Cabigon v. Sabandal, bar matter no. 59, Agasis v. Sabandal, sbc no. 624, february 10, 1989  LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN DISBARRED In re: rusiana, ac no. 270, march 29, 1974 In re: juan t. Publico, 102 scra 721 Prudential bank v. Grecia, ac no. 2756, december 18, 1990, 192 scra 381 In re: adriatico, gr no. L-2532, NOVEMBER 17, 1910 In re: vailoces, 117 scra Andres v. Cabrera, 127 scra 802 Cui v. Cui, gr no. L-182727, august 31, 1964, 11 scra 755 In re: edillon, 101 scra 612 Richards v. Asoy, ac no. 2655, october 12, 2010  LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED Petition for leave to resume practice of law of benjamin m. Dacanay, bm no. 1678, december 17, 2007, 540 scra 424 BM NO. 112, IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, JULY 24, 2012

Reinstatement Re: 2003 bar examinations, b.m. 1222, april 24, 2009 Maniago v. Atty. De dios, ac no. 7472, march 30, 2010 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION  Purpose  Requirements  Compliance

 Exemptions  Sanctions  Bar Matter 2012, Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service Rule 141, sec. 19 of thE ROC Algura v. The local government unit of the city of Naga, gr no. 150135, october 30, 2006, 506 scra 81

NOTARIAL PRACTICE (A.M. NO. 02-8-13-SC)

SANTIAGO VS. RAFANAN, A.C. No. 6252

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.[21] They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.[22] Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.[23] These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements. In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows: The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest. It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry. Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija. We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law. Father Ranhilio Aquino, et al. V. Atty. Edwin Pascua, A.C. No. 50595, november 28, 2007 In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows: (1) He made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, datedDecember 10, 1998. (2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, datedDecember 10, 1998. Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998. RULING: A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public

in the fidelity, honesty and integrity (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).

of

the

legal

profession

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties. In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document without affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public. In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the respondents first offense. In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended for six months from the practice of law. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[4] The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.[5] The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,[6] wherein Atty. Joel A.Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act constitutes misconduct and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[7] we revoked thenotarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,[8] however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubiafor making a false declaration in the document she notarized. In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of

law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him. Espinosa v. Omana, october 12, 2011 Linco v. Lacebal, ac no. 7264, october 17, 2011 Caalim-verzonilla v. Pascdua, ac no. 6655, october 11, 2011  Qualifications of Notary Public  Term of office of Notary Public  Powers and limitations Vda. De rosales v. ATTY. RAMOS, AC NO. 5645, july 2, 2002 Villarin v. Sabate, ac no. 3324, february 9, 2000 Solarte v. Atty. Pugeda, ac no. 4751, july 31, 2000 Vda. De bernardo v. Atty. Restauro, ac no. 3849, june 25, 2003  Notarial register  Jurisdiction of Notary Public and place of notarization Sales v. Court of appeals, gr no. L-40145, july 29, 1992 Ramirez v. Ner, adm. Matter no. 500, september 27, 1967, 21 scra 207 Castillo v. Castillo, L-18289, january 22, 1980, 95 scra 40 Gonzales v. Court of appeals, L-37453, may 25, 1979, 90 scra 185 Yturalde v. Azurin, L-22158, may 30, 1969, 28 scra 407 Chilianchin v. Coquinco, 84 phil. 714  Revocation of commission

 Competent evidence of identity  Sanctions Flores-alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, ac no. 4738, february 5, 2002 Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 scra 408 Flores v. Chua, 306 scra 465 Roces v. Aportadera, 243 scra 108 Vda. De bernardo v. Atty. Restauro, ac no. 3849, june 25, 2003 Vda. De rosales v. ATTY. RAMOS, AC NO. 5645, july 2, 2002 Bautista v. Bernabe, ac no. 6963, february 9, 2006 Mallari v. Asol, gr no. 150866, march 6, 2006 Laquindandum v. Atty. Quintana, ac no. 7036, june 29, 2009 Sps. Santuyo v. Hidalgo, ac no. 5838, january 17, 2005 Tan tiong bio v. Gonzales, ac no. 6634, august 23, 2007. 530 scra 748 Zoreta v. Simpliciano, ac no. 6492, november 18, 2004, 443 scra 1 St. Louis university laboratory v. Dela cruz, ac no. 6010, august 28, 2006 Ramirez v. Ner, adm. Matter no. 500, september 27, 1967, 21 scra 207 Nadayag v. Grageda, 237 scra 202

NOTARIZATION OF DOCUMENTS WITH IMMORAL RECITALS OR IMMORAL AGREEMENTS Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 phil. 367 Biton v. Momongon, L-2555, september 3, 1935, 62 phil. 7 In re: santiago, ac no. 932, june 21, 1940, 70 phil. 661 Albano v. Municipal Judge Gapusan, am no. 1022-mj, may 7, 1976, 162 phil. 884 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

JUDICIAL ETHICS  SOURCES  NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY (BANGALORE DRAFT) A.M. NO. 02-9-02-SC, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 -automatic conversion of some administrative cases against justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT  QUALITIES General guidelines, office of the chief justice, circular no. 13, dated july 1, 1987 De la Llana v. Alba, 112 scra 294 Guidelines for trial courts, office of the chief justice, circular no. 13, july 1, 1987 De la paz v. Inutan, 64 scra 540 Arban v. Borja, 143 scra 642 Lim, et al. V. Sequiban, adm. Matter no. R-612-MTJ, MARCH 10, 1988 Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 scra 210  Independence Ramirez v. Corpuz-macandog, a.m. no. R-351-rtj, september 26, 1986, 144 scra 462 Libarios v. Dabalos, a.m. no. Rtj-89-286, july 11, 1991, 199 scra 48 Garcia, et al. V. Valdez, am no. Mtj-98-1156, july 13, 1998 Vidal v. Dojillo, 463 scra 264 In re: Demetria, a.m. no. 00-09-ca, march 27, 2001 Office of the Court Administrator v. De guzman, 267 scra 291 Yulo-tuvilla v. Judge balgos, a.m. no. Mtj-98-1149, march 31, 1998 Cuaresma v. Aguila, 226 scra 73 Dadole v. Commission on Audit, 393 scra 262 Leynes v. Commission on Audit, 418 scra 180 Tahil v. Eisma, 64 scra 378 Contreras v. Solis, 260 scra 572 Romero v. Valle, 147 scra 197 Galman v. Sb, 144 scra 197

Lorenzo v. Marquez, 162 scra 546 Salud v. Alumbres, 404 scra 411 Go v. Ca, 206 scra 165 Sabitsana v. Villamor, 202 scra 445 Alfonso v. Alonzo-legato, 388 scra 351 Bagatsing v. Herrera, 65 scra 464 Suspension of clerk of court jacobo, 294 scra 119  Integrity Cabrera v. Pajares, 142 scra 135 Quiz v. Castano, 107 scra 196 Montemayor v. Collado, 107 scra 258 Paderanga v. Azura, 136 scra 269 Office of the Court administrator v. Judge Bartolome, 203 scra 328 Medina v. Judge de guia, a.m. no. Rtj-88-216, march 1, 1993 City of Tagbiliran v. Hontanosas, 375 scra 1, 8 Alfonso v. Juanson, 228 scra 239 Castillo v. Calanog, 199 scra 75 In re: sotto, 82 phil. 595 Sibayan-joaquin v. Javellana, 368 scra 503  Impartiality Office of the court administrator v. Judge jose m. Estacion, rtc, branch 44, dumaguete city, 181 scra 33 In re aguas, 1 phil 1 Cabulisan v. Pagalilauan, 297 scra 593 Paredes v. Abad, 56 scra 522 Facundo v. Berjamen, 180 scra 235 Aparicio v. Andal, 175 scra 569 Gandionco v. Poaranda, 155 scra 725 Lorenzo v. Marquez, 162 scra 54 Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 scra 160 Ty v. Banco filipino, 422 scra 649 Paco v. Quilaal, 43 scra 364 Montemayor v. Bermejo, 425 scra 403 Parayno v. Meneses, 231 scra 807 Martinez v. Gironella, 65 scra 245 Chavez v. Public estates authority, 403 scra 1 Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 252 scra 641 Villapando v. Quitain, 75 scra 24 Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 scra 18 Austria v. Masaquel, 20 scra 1247 Oktubre v. Velasco, 434 scra 636 Sandoval v. Ca, 260 scra 283 Villaluz v. Mijares, 288 scra 494 Jurtado v. Judalena, 84 scra 41 Perez v. Suller, 249 scra 665 Garcia v. Dela paz, 229 scra 766

 Propriety

                       

Marces v. Arcangel, 258 scra 502 Vedana v. Valencia, 295 scra 1, 15 Magarang v. Judge jardin, am no. Rtj-99-1448, april 6, 2000 Lao v. Hon. Abelita, am no. Rtj-96-1359, september 10, 1998 Panganiban v. Guerrero, 258 scra 502 Moreno v. Bernabe, 246 scra 120 De la paz v. Inutan, 64 scra 540 Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60 scra 27, 31 Dia-anonuevo v. Beracio, 68 scra 81, 89 Association of Court Employees of panabo, davao v. Tupas, 175 scra 292, 296 National intelligence and security authority v. Tablang, 199 scra 766, 776 Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 scra 690 Concerned employees of the rtc of dagupan city v. Judge Erna Falloran-Aliposa, a.m. no. Rtc-99-1446, march 9, 2000 Ortigas & co., ltd. V. Velasco, 277 scra 34 Garciano v. Sebastian, 231 scra 588, 612-13 Palang v. Zosa, 58 scra 776, 778 Dysico v. Dacumos, 262 scra 275, 283 Ignacio v. Valenzuela, 111 scra 12 Marcos v. Pinto, am no. Rtj-09-2180, july 27, 2010 Belen v. Belen, am no. Rtj-08-2139, august 6, ,2010 Oktubre v. Velasco, 478 phil. 803, 434 scra 636, 646-647, 815816 Rosauro v. Kallos, am no. Rtj-03-1796, 10 february 2006, 482 scra 149, 160 Ladigon v. Garong, am no. Mtj-08-172, 20 august 2008, 562 scra 365, 369-71 Application to be admitted to the new york bar, bar matter 429, march 24, 1988 Paguirigan v. Clavano, 61 scra 411, 415 Heck v. Santos, am no. Rtj-011630, april 9, 2003 Padilla v. Zantua, 237 scra 670 Salunday v. Labitoria, am no. Ca-01-31, july 25, 2002, 385 scra 200 Macariola v. Asuncion, am no. 133-j, may 31, 1982, 114 scra 77 The director of lands v. Ababa, 88 scra 513, 519 Rosario vda de laig v. Court of appeals, 86 scra 641 People v. Meneses, ca 40 og 11th Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 scra 710, 713 Ang-angco v. Castillo, 9 scra 619 Dionisio v. Escano, am no. Rtj-98-1400, february 1, 1999, 302 scra 411 Luque v. Kayanan, 29 scra 165 Conde v. Superable, 29 scra 727 Otero v. Esguerra, 57 scra 57

Jakosalem v. Judge cordovez, 58 scra 11 Bautista v. Costelo , 254 scra 148 Almarves v. Paas, a.m. no. Mtj-01-1363, april 4, 2003 Nellie kelly austria v. Judge singuat guerra Circular no. 3-92 dated august 31, 1992 prohibition against use of halls of justice for residential and commercial purposes Balderama v. Judge alagar, a.m. no. Rtj-99-1449,, january 18, 2002 Albos v. Alaba, 231 scra 68 Re: Issuance of subpoena to prisoner nicanor de guzman, 278 scra 18 Lapena v. Marcos, a.m. no. 1969-mj, june 29, 1982 Mendoza v. Navarro, am no. P-05-2034, september 11, 2006 Douglas v. Judge lopez, am no. Mtj-96-1076, february 9, 2000 Supreme Court circular 1-90 Ellert v. Judge galapon, am no. Mtj-00-1294, july 31, 2000 De castro v. Capulong, am no. 2739-cfi, november 2, 1982, 118 scra 5 Abadilla v. Tabiliran, am no. Mtc-92-716, october 25, 1995 In re: solicitation of donations by Judge Benjamin H. Virrey, mtc polillo, quezon, adm. Matter no. 90-7-1159-Mtcc, october 15, 1991 Montemayor v. Judge collado, am no. 2519-mj, september 10, 1981 Jereos v. Reblando, 71 scra 126 In re: query of the municipal trial judge league zamboanga del norte, am no. 86-11-3690, november 17, 1986 Talens v. Arceo, 259 scra 354 Liwanag v. Lustre, 306 scra 55 People v. Maceda, 188 scra 532 Javier v. De guzman, 192 scra 434 OCA v. Judge Floro, 486 scra 66 Aquino v. Lontok, 184 scra 177 Umale v. Villaluz, 51 scra 84 In re: manzano, 166 scra 246 Tuazon v. Purugganan, 370 scra 511 Ompoc v. Torrez, 178 scra 14 Co v. Plata, march 14, 2005 Hadap v. Lee, 114 scra 559 Vidal v. Dojillo, am no. Mtj-05-1591, july 14, 2005 Martinez v. Gironella, gr no. L-37635, july 22, 1975 Padilla v. Zantua, 237 scra 670 Ubarra v. Mapalad, 220 scra 226 Cabagan v. Barte, 455 scra 1 Javier v. De guzman, rtj-89-380, december 19, 1990 Vistan v. Nicolas, 201 scra 524 Manansala v. Asdala, am no. Rtj-05-1916, may 10, 2005 Dionisio v. Escano, 302 scra 411 Centrumagri business v. Katalbas-moscardon, 247 scra 145 Gordon v. Lilagan, 361 scra 690 In re: justice badoy, 395 scra 231

In re: designation of judge rodolfo manzano, am no. 88-71861-rtc october 5, 1988 Borre v. Moya, 100 scra 314 In re: report on audit of mtcc, koronadal, am no. 02—9-233mtcc, april 27, 2005)  Equality Dionisio v. Escano, am no. Rtj-98-1400, february 1, 1999, 302 scra 411 Office of the court administrator v. Myrna Alvarez, am no. Ca98-8-p, march 11, 1998 Young v. Office of the ombudsman, 228 scra 718 Go v. Ca, 221 scra 397 Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 252 scra 541 People v. Ibasan, 129 scra 695)  Competence and diligence Fajota v. Balonso, 105 scra 1, 4 Quizon v. Baltazar, 65 scra 293, 299 In re: petition for the dismissal from the service and/or disbarment of Judge baltazar dizon, presiding judge of the regional trial court of pasay city, branch 113, am no. 3086, may 3, 1989, 173 scra 719 Albert v. Cfi, 23 scra 948, gr no. L-26364, may 29, 1968 Sanchez v. Alaan, am no. Mtj-04-1570, september 5, 2006 Ajeno v. Insierto, 71 scra 166 Abad v. Bleza, 145 scra 6,7 People v. Aquino, L-1857, january 19, 1949 People v. Vera, 65 phil. 56, 82 Martiniano vivo v. Hon. Gaudencio cloribel, L-23239, november 23, 1966 People v. Santos, 56 og 3546, 3552-3552 Revita v. Rimando, 98 scra 619 Ubungen v. Mayo, 99 scra 30 Aducayen v. Flores, 51 scra 78 Vasquez v. Malvar, 85 scra 10 Fr. Guillen v. Judge canon, am no. MTJ-01-1381, JANUARY 14, 2002 Heirs of the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes v. Justice Demetria, am no. Ca-01-32, january 23, 2002 Serafin v. Lindayag, am no. 297-mj, september 30, 1975, 67 scra 166 Carreon v. Flores, adm case no. 111-mj, may 30, 1975 Tadiar v. Caces, 60 scra 215, october 21, 1974 Municipal council of casiguran quezon v. Morales, 61 scra 14 Romeo v. Valle, 147 scra 203 Arban v. Borja, 143 scra 634 Galang v. Santos, am no. Mtj-99-1197, may 26, 1999 Alfonso v. Juanson, 228 scra 239 Alazas v. Reyes, 131 scra 445

Court employees of the rtc, br. 27, gingoog city v. Galon, 265 scra 770 Apiag v. Cantero, 268 scra 47 Panganiban v. Guerrero, 242 scra 11 Nazareno v. Almario, 268 scra 657 RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, AM NO. 10-11-5-SC, JUNE 14, 2011 RE: LIVE TV AND RADIO COVERAGE OF THE HEARING OF PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO’S LIBEL CASE, OCTOBER 22, 1991 PEREZ V. ESTRADA, AM NO. 01-4-03-SC, SEPTEMBER 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 62, 70 Garcia v. Domingo, 52 scra 143 People v. Teehankee, gr no. 111206-08, october 6, 1995, 249 scra 54 Martelino v. Alejandro, L-30894, march 25, 1970, 32 scra 108 In re: anonymoUs letter- dated august 12, 2010, complaining against Judge Ofelia Pinto, Regional Trial Court branch 60, angeles city, pampanga, am no. Rtj-11-2289, 2 october 2012 Office of the court administrator v. Hon. Liberty cataneda, am no. Rtj-12-2316, october 9, 2012 OCA VS. LANSANG, 186 SCRA 646 LONGBOAN V. POLIG, 186 SCRA 547 PEOPLE V. SALAS, 143 SCRA 163 ENRIQUEZ V. CAMINDE, 485 SCRA 98 SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN V. ALBANO, 260 SCRA 561 ROMERO V. VALLE, 147 SCRA 197 Briones v. Ante, 380 scra 40 Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 344 scra 147

 DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY  Members of the Supreme Court  Impeachment  Ethical Lessons from Former Chief Justice Corona’s Impeachment  Lower court judges and justices of the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan (RULE 140) In re: Joaquin Borromeo, 241 scra 408, 460 De vera v. Pelayo, gr no. 137354, july 6, 2000 Magdamo v. Pahimulin, am no. 662-mj, september 30, 1976, 73 scra 110 De vera v. Pelayo, gr no. 137354, j uly 6, 2000  Grounds

Sps. De guzman v. Judge pamintuan, am no. Rtj-02-1736 Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, am no. Ca-02-33, july 31, 2002 Ang v. Judge asis, am no. Rtj-00-1590, january 15, 2002 Mina v. Judge gatdula, am no. Mtj-00-1264, february 4, 2002 Araos v. Judge Luna -pison, am no. Rtj-02-2677, february 28, 2002 Re: complaint of dr. Virata against judge supnet, am no. 02-0212-sc, november 27, 2002 Rondina v. Assoc. Justice eloy bello, am no. Ca-05-43, july 8, 2005 In re: wenceslao laureta, march 12, 1987, 148 scra 282 Audit report on attendance of court personnel of regional trial court, branch 32, manila, am no. P-04-1838, august 31, 2006 People v. Valenzuela, 135 scra 712 Cathay pacific airways vs. Romillo, 142 scra 262 Prudential bank vs. Castro, 142 scra 223 Consolidated bank and trust corporation v. Capistrano, 159 scra 47 In re: petition for the dismissal from service and/or disbarment of judge baltazar dizon, presiding judge of the regional trial court of pasay city, branch 113, am no. 3086, may 3, 1989, 173 scra 719 Rule 140 of the rules of court on the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and justices of the court of appeals and the sandiganbayan, as amended by A.M. NO. 01-8-10 SC DELA CRUZ V. JUDGE BERSAMIRA, AM NO. RTJ-00-1567, JANUARY 19, 2001 Garciano v. Judge Sebastian, am no. Mtj-88-160, march 30, 1994 Dionisio v. Escano, am no. Rtj-98-1400, february 1, 1999, 302 scra 411 Office of the court administrator v. Myrna Alvarez, am no. Ca98-8-p, march 11, 1998 Young v. Office of the ombudsman, 228 scra 718 Go v. Ca, 221 scra 397 Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 252 scra 541  Impeachment (ethical aspects)  Sanctions imposed by the Supreme Court on erring members of the Judiciary Internal rules of the Court of Appeals, rule VI, sec. 5  DISQUALIFICATIONS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES (RULE 137) Amarillo v. People, gr no. 153650, august 31, 2006 Prudential bank v. Castro, ,adm case no. 2756, march 15, 1988 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 phi. 358 Govt of the phil islands v. Heirs of abella, 49 phil. 374 Limsico v. Bautista, 123 scra 23 Latorre v. Ansaldo, am no. Rtj-00-1563, may 31, 2001 Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 scra 160, 167-168

 Compulsory Chin v. Court of appeals, gr no. 144618, august 15, 2003 Juaban v. Bancale, gr no. 156011, july 3, 2008 Hurtado v. Judalena, gr no. L-40603, july 13, 1978, 84 scra 41 People v. Valenzuela, 135 scra 712 Cathay pacific airways vs. Romillo, 142 scra 262 Prudential bank vs. Castro, 142 scra 223 Consolidated bank and trust corporation v. Capistrano, 159 scra 47 Montemayor v. Judge collado, am no. 2519-mj, september 10, 1981 Lawan v. Moleta, 90 scra 579 Flores v. Tatad, 96 scra 676 Geotina v. Gonzales, L-26310, september 30, 1971, 41 scra 73 Austria v. Masaquel, 20 scra 1247, 1255 Query of executive judge estrella t. Estrada, etc., adm matter no. 87-9-3918-rtc, october 26, 1987

 Voluntary Geotina v. Gonzales, L-26310, SEPTEMBER 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 73-74 GUTIERREZ V. SANTOS, 112 PHIL. 184 BAUTISTA V. REBUENO, GR NO. L-46117, FEBRUARY 22, 1978 PEOPLE V. GOMEZ, L-22345, MAY 29, 1967 UMALE V. VILLALUZ, L-33508, MAY 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 84 MATEO V. HON. VILLALUZ, L-34756-59, MARCH 31, 1973 AUSTRIA V. MASAQUEL, L-22536, AUGUST 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 1247, 1255 PIMENTEL V. SALANGA, 21 SCRA 160, 167-168 JOAQUIN V. BARRETO, 25 PHIL. 281 BENUSA V. TORRES, 57 PHIL. 737 DAIS V. TORRES, 57 PHIL. 897 TALISAY-SILAY MILLING V. TEODORO, 91 PHIL. 101 US V. LUMAMPAO, 20 PHIL. 168 TAYCO V. CAPISTRANO, 53 PHIL. 866 PALANG V. ZOSA, L-38229, AUGUST 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 776, 778 Query of executive judge estrella estrada on the conflicting views of Regional Trial Court-judges Masadao and Elizaga, Re: criminal case no. 49540-m Admin matter no. 87-9-3918-rtc, october 26, 1987, 155 scra 78-79 NOT GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION Vda de bonifacio v. BLT BUS CO, INC., 34 SCRA 618 QUERY ESTRELLA ESTRADA, SUPRA Dipatuan v. Mangotara, am no. Rtj-09-2190, april 23, 2010

Webb v. People, july 24, 1997, gr no. 127262, 276 scra 243, 253-54 FILING CASES AGAINST JUDGE NOT A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION Cruz v. Judge Joven, am no. Mtj-00-1270, january 23, 2001 People v. Serrano, 203 scra 171 Medina v. Judge de guia, am no. Rtj-88-216, march 1, 1993 Aparicio v. Judge andal, 175 scra 569, GR NO. 86587-93, -JULY 25, 1989 Sps. Camilo and Doroteo rosello v. Hon. CA, gr no. L-46274 Gaudencia Hoyla v. CA, Gr no. L-46549, DECEMBER 14, 1988 PIMENTEL V. SALANGA, GR NO. L-27934, SEPTEMBER 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 160 MANTARING V. Roman, 254 scra 158 PROCECURE FOR DISQUALIFICATION Geotina v. GONZALES, L-26310, september 30, 1971, 41 scra 73 People of the philippines v. Moreno, 83 phil. 286 Dais v. Torres supra Pimentel v. Salanga supra Paredes v. Hon. GOPENGCO, L-23710, SEPTEMBER 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 688 Albos v. Alava, am no. Mtj-91-517, march 11, 1994 REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION CPR RULE 3.13  POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS (RULE 135) Arban v. Borja, 143 scra 642 De la paz v. Inutan, 64 scra 540 Alonso v. IAC, gr no. 72873, may 28, 1987, 150 scra 259 Manila horse trainers association v. Dela fuente, 88 phil. 60 Go chi v. Go cho, 96 phil. 622 Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 scra 105 Roa v. Collector of customs, 23 phil. 315 Villanueva v. City of iloilo, 26 scra 578 People v. Purisima, 86 scra 542 Us v. Go chico, 14 phil. 128 People v. Soria, L-25175, march 1, 1968, 22 scra 948 Velentin v. Sta. Maria, gr no. L-30158, january 17, 1974, 55 scra 40 Lantoria v. Atty. Bunyi, aM no. 1769, june 8, 1992, 209 scra 528 Artiaga v. Villanueva, 163 scra 638, july 29, 1988 People v. Elesterio, gr no. 63971, may 9, 1989, 173 scra 243 People v. Barabasa, 64 phil. 399 JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE IN PROCEEDINGS People v. Moreno, 83 phil. 286

People v. Galleno, 291 scra 761, 755-776 People v. Malabago, 265 scra 198 People v. Junas, gr no. 144972-73, september 12, 2003 Vdntura v. Judge Yatco, Clarin v. Yatco, 56 og 7042, november 14, 1960 People v. Ferrer, 44 og 112 People v. Bedia, 83 phil 909 People v. Ibasan, 129 scra 712 Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, gr no. 103501-03, february 17, 1997 People v. Exala, 221 scra 494, 503 (dissenting opinion) People v. Olfindo, 47 phil. 1 US V. ABIJAN, 1 PHIL. 83 PEOPLE V. BORBANO, 76 PHIL. 703 PEREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 127 SCRA 636 US V. HUDIERES, 27 PHIL. 45 US V. LIM KUI, 35 PHIL. 504 US V. BINAYAO, 35 PHIL. 23 PEOPLE V. OPIDA, 142 SCRA 295 CAMPANER V. ALANO, CA-GR NO. 2558-R, DECEMBER 15, 1948 PEOPLE V. OPIDA, 142 SCRA 295 PEOPLE V. REYES, 133 SCRA 51 PEOPLE V. JUNAS, GR NO. 144972-73, SEPTEMBER 12, 2003 CASTILLO V. JUAN, GR NO. L-39516, GR NO. L-39516-17, JANUARY 28, 1975 GUTIERREZ V. SANTOS, L-15824, MAY 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 249 MATEO V. VILLALUZ, L-34756, MARCH 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18 Geotina v. GONZALES, L-26310, september 30, 1971, 41 scra 73 Tabora v. Carbonell, am no. Rtj-08-2145 june 18, 2010 Sps. Bautista v. Sula, am no. P-04-1920, august 17, 2007, 530 scra 406 Castelo v. Florendo, 459 phil. 581, 413 scra 219 MAINTAIN ORDER AND DECORUM, PATIENCE, DIGNITY AND COURTESY Chan v. Majaducon, am no. Rtj-02-1697, october 15, 2003 Retuya v. Equipilog, 91 scra 416 Santos v. Cruz, 100 scra 538 In re : Aguas, 1 phil. 1

 COURT RECORDS AND GENERAL DUTIES OF CLERK AND STENOGRAPHER (RULE 136)  LEGAL FEES (RULE 141)  Manner of payment ROC RULE 141, SEC. 1, AS REVISED BY AM NO. 04-2-04-SC, AUGUST 16, 2004  Fees in lien ROC RULE 141, SEC. 2, AS REVISED BY AM NO. 04-2-04SC, AUGUST 16, 2004  Persons authorized to collect legal fees

ROC RULE 141, SEC. 3, 4, 7, 8, 710, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19 22, AS REVISED BY AM NO. 04-2-04-SC, AUGUST 16, 2004 LGU EXEMPT FROM COURT FEE, RA 7160, SEC. 280 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991

Baguio vendors multi purpose cooperative v. Hon. Cabarto-Cortes, G.R. No. 165922, February 26, 2010 The Power of the Legislature vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court to Enact Judicial Rules Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935 [13] and the 1973[14] Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules.[15] The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.[16] This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[17] that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by this Court with Congress: The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII[18] x x x . The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied) Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues

of all kinds.[19] Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence: [T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence , the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain.[20] x x x (Emphasis supplied) In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from the payment of filing and docket fees, A.M. No. 05-10-20-Sc, March 10, 2010 On October 27, 2009, however, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC stating that: The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, to DENY the request of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for exemption from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 938. The request appears to run counter to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, in the rule-making power of the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts. Hence, the subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of filing fees and court fees. Section 22 of Rule 141 reads: Sec. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local government units and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees. (emphasis supplied) Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that the NPC shall remain as a national government-owned and controlled corporation. Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees. The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the Court, citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,[1] stressed that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to promulgate these

rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive, thus: Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less the Executive. Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice: Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides: Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. xxxxxxxxx [T]he 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x. More completely, Section 5(2) [sic] 5 of its Article X provided: xxxxxxxxx Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. xxxxxxxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the

Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of case, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. xxxxxxxxx The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: xxxxxxxxx Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. xxxxxxxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails. With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the Court, it is clear that NPC can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees.

SPOUSES ALGURA vs. LGU OF NAGA, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006 ROC RULE 141, SEC. 18; RULE 3, SEC. 21 . Constitution Art. III, Sec. 11 – Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Sec. 14 (2) - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. The Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) itself, initiated by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., placed prime importance on easy access to justice by the poor as one of its six major components. Likewise, the judicial philosophy of Liberty and Prosperity of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban makes it imperative that the courts shall not only safeguard but also enhance the rights of individualswhich are considered sacred under the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized. When the Rules of Court on Civil Procedure were amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (inclusive of Rules 1 to 71) in Supreme Court Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997, which became effective on July 1, 1997, Rule 3, Section 22 of the Revised Rules of Court was superseded by Rule 3, Section 21 of said 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: SECTION 21. Indigent party.A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any

judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. At the time the Rules on Civil Procedure were amended by the Court in Bar Matter No. 803, however, there was no amendment made on Rule 141, Section 16 on pauper litigants. On March 1, 2000, Rule 141 on Legal Fees was amended by the Court in A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, whereby certain fees were increased or adjusted. In this Resolution, the Court amended Section 16 of Rule 141, making it Section 18, On August 16, 2004, Section 18 of Rule 141 was further amended in Administrative Matter No. 04-2-04-SC, which became effective on the same date. It then became Section 19 of Rule 141, to wit: SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.INDIGENT LITIGANTS (A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES. The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigants affidavit. Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. (Emphasis supplied.) Amendments to Rule 141 (including the amendment to Rule 141, Section 18) were made to implement RA 9227 which brought about new increases

in filing fees. Specifically, in the August 16, 2004 amendment, the ceiling for the gross income of litigants applying for exemption and that of their immediate family was increased from PhP 4,000.00 a month in Metro Manila and PhP 3,000.00 a month outside Metro Manila, to double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the maximum value of the property owned by the applicant was increased from an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00 to a maximum market value of PhP 300,000.00, to be able to accommodate more indigent litigants and promote easier access to justice by the poor and the marginalized in the wake of these new increases in filing fees. In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141that is, the applicants gross income and that of the applicants immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right. However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions, aware that the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court must also guard against

abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement. Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didnt have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their family.[27] In that hearing, the respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to refute the allegations and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21. Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption. The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them. Hence, every statute [or rule] must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. [25]

 COSTS  Recovery of costs (Rule 142)  Prevailing party ROC RULE 142 , SEC. 1  Dismissed appeal or action ROC RULE 142 , SEC. 2  Frivolous appeal ROC RULE 142 , SEC. 3  False allegations ROC RULE 142 , SEC. 4  Non-appearance of witness ROC RULE 142 , SEC. 12,

OTHERS ON COSTS: ROC RULE 142 , SEC. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13