Legal Ethics Review Complete Case Digest

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TABLE OF CONTENTS CASE TITLE GUARIN v. ATTY. LIMPIN CAYETANO v. MONSOD PAGUIA vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ULEP v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. SPOUSES UMAGUING v. ATTY. DE VERA GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO BENGCO vs. BERNARDO BUNAGAN-BANSIG vs. ATTY. CELERA AREOLA vs. ATTY. MENDOZA Dr. VILLAHERMOSA, Sr. vs. Atty. Caracol FIGUERAS vs. ATTY. JIMENEZ ATTY. CATALAN JR., vs. ATTY. SILVOSA OCA vs. ATTY. DANIEL LIANGCO IN RE: ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN MANIEGO v. DE DIOS ALVIN FELICIANO v. ATTY. CARMELITA LOZADA. RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO IN RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS (ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN) RE: PETITION OF MACARUBBO IN RE: LETTER OF AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ. VELEZ v. DE VERA. PETITION OF DACANAY IN RE: PETITION EPIFANIO B. MUNESES. CHU v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., ANDRES v. ATTY. NAMBI. SOSA v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZ GARCIA, v. ATTY. SESBREÑO PEREZ v. ATTY. CATINDIG AND ATTY. BAYDO TIONG v. FLORENDO GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO BUENO v. RANESES NAVARRO vs. ATTY. SOLIDUM LISANGAN v. TOLENTINO RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRAC PITOGO v. ATTY. SUELLO ESPINOSA., vs. ATTY. OMAA METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. ARGUELLES TENOSO VS. ATTY. ECHANEZ. JANDOQUILE v. REVILLA

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TALISIC v. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN SALITA., vs. ATTY. REYNALDO SALVE ANUDON v. ATTY. CEFRA. HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO v. ATTY. EXAMEN DACANAY v. BAKER & MCKENZIE LORENZANA vs. ATTY. CESAR G. FAJARDO PEOPLE vs. HON. CASTAÑEDA, JR., et.al IN RE: PETITION OF ATTY. MEDADO ENRIQUEZ v. ATTY. DE VERA. IN THE MATTER OF BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE IBP ELECTIONS KELD STEMMERIK VS. ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS IN RE: ATTY. RODOLFO PACTOLIN VILLATUYA v. TABALINGCOS ATTY. LINCO vs. ATTY. JIMMY LACEBAL TUMBOKON v. PEFIANCO TAPAY ET AL v. ATTY. BANCOLO ET AL. ATTY. LACSAMANA VS. ATTY. BUSMENTE SPOUSES AMATORIO v. ATTY. YAP PO1 JOSE CASPE vs. ATTY. AQUILINO MEJICA POBRE v. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO FLORIDO v. ATTY. FLORIDO RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY LANTORIA v. BUNYI CRUZ v. SALVA IN RE: ALMACEN ANGLO v. ATTY. VALENCIA, et.al PACANA JR vs. ATTY. LOPEZ SPOUSES CONCEPCION v. ATTY. DELA ROSA, SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA v. ATTY. OTILIO SY BONGON HEENAN vs. ATTY. ESPEJO BAYONLA VS. ATTY. REYES. FREEMAN v. ATTY. REYES SOLIMAN v. ATTY. LERIOS-AMBOY CARRANZA vida de ZALDIVAR v. ATTY. CABANES SAMSON VS. ATTY. ERA RAMIREZ vs. ATTY. BUHAYANG-MARGALLO MAGLENTE v. ATTY. AGCAOILI, Jr. PENILLA v. ATTY. ALCID

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PICHON v. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON Sr. DAGALA VS. ATTY. QUESADA BRUNET vs. ATTY. GUAREN RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF MERDEGIA DIMAGIBA v. MONTALVO, Jr. ONG v. UNTO BALTAZAR, et.al vs. ATTY. BAÑEZ THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO vs. LACAYA MALVAR v. KRAFT FOODS PHILS., INC., et.al. PALM v. ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, Jr. DE LEON v. CASTELO

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GUARIN v. ATTY. LIMPIN A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015

assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.

FACTS: Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.”

Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for “updating purposes”. The GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President.

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,22Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice.

Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC. Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI.

We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR. CAYETANO v. MONSOD G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting.

FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon C. Aquino as chairman of the COMELEC. Cayetano questioned the appointment for Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD: YES. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR. Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who

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A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”

It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Bar, respondent worked in his father’s law office for a short while, then worked as an Operations Officer in the World Bank Group for about 2 years, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans, and coordinating legal, economic and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank and has subsequently worked either as Chief Executive Officer or Consultant of various companies. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. 2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsod’s appointment.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 197273. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than 10 years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

HELD: 1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court…In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.

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PAGUIA vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT G.R. No. 176278 .June 25, 2010 FACTS: Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria MacapagalArroyo’s nomination of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) pegging the

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mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.

An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law. HELD: No. Petitioner has no standing. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."10 Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. 7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767 It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medicolegal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.

ULEP v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Bar Matter No. 550, June 17, 1993 FACTS: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041 8:30am – 6:00pm 7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged

GUAM DIVORCE DON PARKINSON

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in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

SPOUSES UMAGUING v. ATTY. DE VERA A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015 FACTS: Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman but lost to her rival. Complainants lodged an election protest and engaged in the services of Atty. De Vera. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera moved at a glacial pace; he rushed the preparation of the documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits of material witnesses, which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by the witnesses, they were unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera look for the nearest kin of the witnesses and ask them to sign and he had all the documents notarized. He hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits were falsified. In further breach of his oath, and for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, the complainants withdraw him as their counsel. Complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible. The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. Xxx The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. xxx In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list 2. Use of ordinary simple professional card 3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

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Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath.

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conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence, and has since failed to render much needed financial support. In their defense, they postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet when they committed the supposed immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of a violation of Canon1, Rule 1.01.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not a case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. HELD: Yes. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice in them. xxx The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions constitute a violation of Canon 1, Rule1.01 and thus a good enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense being supposedly committed when they were not lawyers. HELD: Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers, be they academic or moral. In the present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their blatant violation of Canon 1,Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Furthermore, the contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions; good moral character was already required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.

GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO 611 SCRA 508 (2010) FACTS: The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Discipline, charging them with gross immorality, in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complaint arose after the petitioner caught wind through her daughter that her husband was having an affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child with her; and the same information was confirmed when one of her daughters saw that her husband walking in a Robinsons mall with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in tow.

As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and Valencia wereshouldered with the expectation that they would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When they violated the law and distorted it to cater to their own personal needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such actions by themselves, without even including the fact of Garrido’s abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As such, their disbarment is affirmed.

After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yi elded results telling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on June 1993, her husband left their

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BENGCO vs. BERNARDO AC No. 6368

The case was thus referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The investigating officer made a finding that respondent committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such he was recommended by the IBP to be suspended for 2 years from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar. The IBP governor adopted and approved the recommendation

FACTS: Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo Bernardo for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer. The disbarment case was filed because from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Bernardo with the connivance of Andres Magat willfully and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud against complainants Fidela and Teresita Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of land belonging to the Miranda Family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the IBP Resolution is in accord with the rules considering that the complaint was filed for more than 2 years from the alleged misconduct and thus has prescribed? 2) Whether or not Atty. Bernardo is liable?

It started when the respondent convinced the complainants to finance and deliver to him the amount of P495,000 as advance money to expedite the titling of the subject land. He further committed misrepresentation by representing himself as the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the land and that he is the one handling William Gatchalian’s business transaction. He also led complainants to believe that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver the said amount. And after he has possessed the money he did not comply with his obligation to expedite and the titling of the land unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal use and benefit despite demand upon him to return the amount. By reason of his failure and refusal to do so, this constitute deceit, malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of duties and oath as a lawyer.

HELD: 1.) Yes, the IBP Resolution is valid. Th respondent’s defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. 2) Yes, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In defense, respondent averred that he had not deceived both complainants for purposes of getting from them the amount of [P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn sought the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the said money from them. The arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.

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Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read: Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or

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unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

The SC held that there is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchased. He used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount of P495,000.00.

Thereafter, through several resolutions, respondent was required to file a comment on the petition. However, respondent repeatedly failed to comply with the resolutions. After investigation, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. HELD: No. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Accordingly, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. Furthermore, he was ordered to return the amount of P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

BUNAGAN-BANSIG vs. ATTY. CELERA A.C. No. 5581. January 14, 2014 FACTS: Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

On May 8, 1997, Respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), sister of Bansig, entered into a contract of marriage. Nonetheless, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba.

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Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment.

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o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."3

Moreover, respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. His obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof”.

Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and filing motions before the RTC, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Wherefore, respondent is ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys.

Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola. The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areola’s co-detainees as alleged.

AREOLA vs. ATTY. MENDOZA A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014 This refers to the administrative complaint1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary.12 The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.13

In the letter-complaint addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees. He alleged that, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the RTC, where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is liable for giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Yes. The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

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15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."

of Domiciano (Villahermosa). On March 2, 1994, the DARAB issued a decision cancelling all emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT 433 since it was not covered by the agrarian program. The decision became final when it was affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals. It was when Atty. Isidro (Caracol) filed a motion for writ of execution as Addilional Counsel for the Plaintfiff’s with the DARAB, as well as the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition where he signed as counsel for Efren Babela that started the ball rolling in this administrative case. Domiciano, the defendant in the DARAB case, alleged that Isidro had no authority to file the motions since he did not have the authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. His real client was Ernesto Aguirre, who had bought the same parcel of land, while Efren was already dead for more than a year. He presented as proof the affidavit of Efren’s widow who alleged that Efren’s signature was different from the “Waiver of Rights” allegedly executed by Efren in favor of Ernesto; that in fact, Efren sold the land to him (Domiciano).

Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for. It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.1âwphi1 To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.23 In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.24 The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyakiyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.

Domiciano also assailed the use of a falsified document (Waiver of Rights) by Isidro that enabled him to secure an execution in the judgment in one of the cases. He then filed cases for falsification and use of falsified document against Isidro. On the other hand, Isidro averred that he was authorized by Efren and Ernesto to appear as additional counsel, and consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. He was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto’s favour. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Isidro be suspended from the practice of law for five years, ruling that held Isidro clearly misrepresented himself as lawyer for Efren to protect the interest of his real client, Ernesto, and failed to substantiate that he was authorized by Efren or Atty. Aquino as additional counsel. Hence he was liable for deceitful conduct since he knew that at the time he filed the second motion, Efren was already dead. The IBP modified too recommended penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.

Dr. Villahermosa, Sr. vs. Atty. Caracol A.C. No. 7325. January 21, 201 FACTS: Fernando and Efren were the heirs of Micael Babela, who in his lifetime was awarded a homestead patent covered by OCT 433. After his death, the lot was divided into two and corresponding transfer certificates of titles issued in their names. After the agrarian reform law was passed in 1972, emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo, alleged tenants of the land. The two in turn sold their lots to Raymunda, wife

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Caracol may appear in court as a counsel for Efren and Ernesto.

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without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction. An attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer. Therefore, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system. Atty. Caracol’s blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced.

HELD: The court ruled that a lawyer is not required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client. Domiciano also assailed the use of a falsified document (Waiver of Rights) by Isidro that enabled him to secure an execution in the judgment in one of the cases. He then filed cases for falsification and use of falsified document against Isidro. On the other hand, Isidro averred that he was authorized by Efren and Ernesto to appear as additional counsel, and consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. He was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto’s favour.

FIGUERAS vs. ATTY. JIMENEZ A.C. 9116, March 12, 2014

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Isidro be suspended from the practice of law for five years, ruling that held Isidro clearly misrepresented himself as lawyer for Efren to protect the interest of his real client, Ernesto, and failed to substantiate that he was authorized by Efren or Atty. Aquino as additional counsel. Hence he was liable for deceitful conduct since he knew that at the time he filed the second motion, Efren was already dead. The IBP modified too recommended penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.

FACTS: Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street. The Law Firm of Gonzalez, Sinense, Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Caracol may appear in court as a counsel for Efren and Ernesto. HELD: The court ruled that a lawyer is not required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client. Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

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Eight years later, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: The petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association. Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the homeowner’s association in Figueras and Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the association before the HLURB. Respondent added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD. Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of merit. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.” In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. ATTY. POLICARPIO CATALAN JR., vs. ATTY. JOSELITO SILVOSA A.C. No. 7360 July 24, 2012 FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Catalan filed a case for disbarment against Respondent Atty. Silvosa on the following grounds: 1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; 2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio for P30,000 and 3) the Sandiganbayan convicted respondent in a criminal case for direct bribery. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

Respondent sought reconsideration but his motion was denied. The IBP Board of Governors noted the motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional responsibility. Atty Catalan alleged that respondent and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name.

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Rule 6.03 which states that “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.”

In a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent. Prosec Toribio testified Atty. Silvosa, while still a public prosecutor, offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of murder.

When he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.”

Atty. Catalan also presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision in a criminal case convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on May 18, 2006. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

While admitting of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan, respondent asserts that “conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code do not involve moral turpitude.

Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.

IBP FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION:

Respondent was dibarred.

Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of reinstatement of bail and denies any relationship between and the accused. Atty. Silvosa dismisses at the same time the allegations of Prosec. Toribio and such allegations were “self-serving” and purposely dug by Atty. Catalan and his puppeteer to pursue persecution.

The IBP ruled that respondent was guilty only of the first charge by appearing and filing a motion to post bail bond pending appeal and thus violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and gave the penalty of reprimand. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation however modifying the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 months.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR., vs. ATTY. DANIEL LIANGCO A.C. No. 5355 December 13, 2011 FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed against Judge Daniel Liangco. Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun was in open and adverse possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years. The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.

ISSUES: Whether or not respondent is guilty? HELD: Yes, respondent is guilty of violating Rule 6.03.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

A petition for declaratory relief was filed before the sala of Judge Liangco. On the very same day the petition was filed, respondent judge issued a resolution,

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reasoning: First, the municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of property within its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive order may order the Philippine National Police or any government law enforcement agency to enforce or implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified. Fourth, squatting in government property is considered a nuisance per se.

Respondent’s Contention: He reasoned that when he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal opinion honestly and in good faith; and that his actions were not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive. He further pleads for compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because the practice of law is his only means of livelihood to support his family.

The complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief. Complainant Gozun learned about the resolution on June 2, 1996,

IBP Report and Recommendation: The investigating commissioner found justification for the disbarment of respondent and recommending that his name be struck off the Roll of Attorneys. She observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and procedures. She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54) cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated 23 September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment operation. The IBP Governor adopted the findings of the investigating officer.

On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school teachers went to the office of the respondent judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered, Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko makisabi (Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him). The agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns house, using respondent judges resolution and the mayors executive order as basis. On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. The Office of the Court Administrator’s evaluation, report and recommendation suggests the dismissal of respondent from the bench. Thus, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty?

Petitioner’s Contention:

HELD: Yes, the evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance of wellestablished rules of procedures.

Petitioner is guilty of gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of wellestablished rules of procedure that challenged his competence to remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

“Gross misconduct is defined as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right

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determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.”

competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes. Contrary to this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be deprived of a right or property without due process of law.

Respondent was disbarred for GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

IN RE: ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN. 670 SCRA 366 (2012)

In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local governments behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions were not attended by malice or bad faith. The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part.

FACTS: In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs Sandiganbayan), affirmed the conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Private Individual). It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and presented said letter as evidence in a court of law, in order to make it appear that his fellow councilor acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of public funds. In said decisions, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate administrative actions against Pactolin.

The excuse of respondent that he simply issued a legal opinion is unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are always in the context of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and always in the context of contested proceedings.

HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

ISSUE: What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin considering his conviction?

As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics confidence in the

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed

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only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. But it has always been held that it is appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolin’s situation is aggravated by the fact that although his conviction has been affirmed, he has not served his sentence yet.

HELD: YES. The Office of the Bar Confidant noted that it was unfortunate that the defendant overlooked the procedure of passing certifications from the IBP that she did not practice law during her suspension. The OBC then recommended that the SC adopt a policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of lawyer from the practice of law. In response to this the SC established the following guidelines: 1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty; 2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory; 3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension; 4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel; 5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the order of suspension; 6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

MANIEGO v. DE DIOS 617 SCRA 142 (2010) FACTS: ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT: Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes de Dios, for engaging in the practice of law despite being suspended by the Court. The petitioner alleged that she filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Hiroshi Miyoshi who was represented by the respondent. Petitioner discovered from a RTC staff that Atty. de Dios has an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001. DEFENSE OF THE DEFENDANT(LAWYER) : She alleges that she had already served her six months suspension and that she informed the Court of her resumption of practice. The problem arose when a judge erroneously issued a directive ordering the defendant to desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for 2 year . There after the respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court with gave the impression that she was not yet allowed to practice law. She avers that at the time she represented Mr. Hiroshi Miyoshi she had already served her suspension. She only failed to pass certifications that she indeed refrained from practicing law during her period of suspension.

ALVIN FELICIANO v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA. A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT’S RESUMPTION OF HER PRACTICE WAS VALID DESPITE FAILURE TO PASS REQUIRED CERTIFICATIONS AND PASSING THROUGH OBC FOR EVALUATION.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

FACTS: Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita BautistaLozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

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convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Plaintiff: However, in Civil Case No. 101 v-07, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.

HOWEVER, this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.

Defendant: Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is SUSPENDED for a period of 6 months from practice of law. RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

Initially, IBP-CBD recommended disbarment. However, such was modified by IBP-Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

FACTS: Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. The trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years. On June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

HELD: Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute practice of law. Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to

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Petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

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However, the father of the victim, Atty. Camaligan, opposed on the said oath taking. Petitioner’s act constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar.

Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during that time. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CAN TAKE LAWYERS OATH, SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS AND PRACTICE LEGAL PROFESSION.

OBC FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION:

HELD: Yes. The lawyer's oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at all times weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine Bar. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED. HELD: YES “Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.

The Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

In cases deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, It should be taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar.”

IN RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS (ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN) 582 SCRA 372

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

FACTS: A Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion was filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioners plea for judicial clemency, and order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar. On February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222 adopting the findings of the IBP Investigating committee to disbar petitioner from the practice of law. The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos &

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Petitioners subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his

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achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted.

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform. 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

The Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW. FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO. Adm. Case No. 6148. January 22, 2013 FACTS: For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys. Records show that the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character. Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them. Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II. Moreover, he is a parttime instructor. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.

Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition For Extraordinary Mercy seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED: HELD: The Court finds the instant petition meritorious. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

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Respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest, certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further reveal that respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children.

SEC. 5. Disqualification. The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman: 1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases; 2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and 3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency.

From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in this case. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered reinstated to the practice of law.

Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial clemency is granted.

IN RE: LETTER OF AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ. 533 SCRA 534. 2010

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE DIAZ SHOULD BE GRANTED JUDICIAL CLEMENCY.

FACTS: Judge Augustus C. Diaz of MTC branch 37 of Quezon City is seeking judgeship in one of the vacant RTC branches in Metro Manila. During his interview with the Judicial Bar Council, he was suggested to seek Judicial Clemency and in particular to be allowed to again be nominated to one of the vacant RTC branches. In a subsequent letter, He expressed deep remorse for the lapse of which he was administratively held liable in a previous case(Alvarez vs Diaz). In that case he was found to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he granted the following motions: (1) a for execution which was fatally defective for lack of notice to the defendant and (2) a motion for demolition without notice and hearing. His action on the motion for demolition also made him liable for grave abuse of authority. He was fined P20,000.

HELD: Yes. Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable. In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and all personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency: 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent

Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides:

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2. 3. 4.

5.

members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

he had handled involving Julius Wills III, who had figured in an automobile accident in 1986. To settle the case amicably, Atty. de Vera received -- on his client’s behalf -- a $12,000 check, which he then deposited in his personal account. Because of his irregular deposit of his client's funds, respondent was suspended from the practice of law for three years, upon the recommendation of the hearing referee. The case was not decided on the merits, because Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar. Later, his resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California. On the second ground, complainant averred that respondent’s transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) IBP Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter was a circumvention of the rotation rule. Allegedly, Atty. de Vera made the transfer for the sole purpose of becoming IBP national president. Complainant stressed that respondent neither resided in Agusan del Sur nor held office there. A companion case, Bar Matter No. 1227, referred to the letter-request of respondent, asking the Supreme Court to schedule his oath-taking as IBP national president. On the other hand, AM No. 05-5-15-SC referred to the letter-report of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, furnishing the Court with the May 13, 2005, IBP Resolution removing Atty. de Vera from the latter’s positions as IBP board member and executive vice-president, for committing acts inimical to the board and the IBP in general.

In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for him.

The controversy in these two consolidated cases started when the IBP board approved the withdrawal of a Petition docketed at the Supreme Court as “Integrated Bar of the Philippines et al v. Senate of the Philippines et al. - SCR165108. Subsequently, during the plenary session held at the 10th National IBP Convention, respondent allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos, and blatant lies in connection with the IBP board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition

VELEZ v. DE VERA. 496 SCRA 345. 2006 FACTS: In AC No. 6697, Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez sought the suspension or disbarment of Respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera (1) for misrepresentation through his concealment of the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and (2) for violation of the “rotation rule” enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491.

On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A. Rivera wrote to IBP National President Cadiz, praying for the removal of the IBP board membership of Atty. De Vera, who had allegedly committed acts inimical to the board and the IBP in general. The following day On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A.

The first ground concerned an administrative case filed against Atty. de Vera before the State Bar of California. The action arose from an insurance case

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Rivera wrote to IBP National President Cadiz, praying for the removal of the IBP board membership of Atty. De Vera, who had allegedly committed acts inimical to the board and the IBP in general.

ISSUES: 1. WHETHER THE JUDGMENT IN AC NO. 6052 CONSTITUTED A BAR TO THE FILING OF AC 6697 2. WHETHER, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW, RESPONDENT ATTY. DE VERA COMMITTED MALPRACTICE AMOUNTING TO MORAL TURPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES

On June 13, 2005, the IBP board took note of the vacancy in the EVP position, brought about by the removal of Atty. de Vera. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as EVP. On June 20, 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished that position. Thus, on June 25, 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar.

HELD: As to the first issue, The Court unanimously held in a per curiam Decision that AC No. 6052 did not constitute a bar to the filing of AC No. 6697. The two administrative cases involved different subject matters and causes of action. In AC No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run for the position of IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present Administrative Complaint, the subject matter was his privilege to practice law. The two aforementioned cases did not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent respondent from assuming his post as IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao; the cause of action referred to his alleged violation of IBP bylaws. In the second case, what was principally sought was his suspension or disbarment; the primary cause of action was his alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On June 28, 2005, IBP National President Cadiz requested the Supreme Court's approval of Atty. Salazar's election and assumption of office as national president, in the event that Atty. de Vera would be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law; or should his removal from his positions as member of the 2003-2005 board of governors and as EVP of the IBP be approved by the Court. Protesting the election of both Atty. Santiago and Atty. Salazar, Atty. De Vera vehemently insists that there is no proof that he misappropriated his client's funds as the elder Willis gave him authority to use the same and that the latter even testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." He also questions his removal from the IBP Board on the ground that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. He protest the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Governor Rivera, and the latter voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time.

In resolving the second issue, the Court cited Maquera, according to which a judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines, only if the basis of the foreign court’s action included any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in our jurisdiction. The Court opined that by insisting that he was authorized by his client’s father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera was impliedly admitting his use of the Willis funds for his own personal use. Undoubtedly, his unauthorized use of his client’s funds was highly unethical.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this matter. The conduct of Atty. de Vera -- holding on to the money of his client

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without the latter’s acquiescence -- was indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.

HELD: As a general rule, NO.

It was clear that by depositing the $12,000 check in his own bank account and using it for his own benefit, respondent was guilty of malpractice, gross misconduct, and unethical behavior. He violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client. Nevertheless, the Court decreed that, where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. Considering the amount involved in this case, the Court considered the penalty of suspension for two years appropriate.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

On the other hand, The Court found that the transfer by Atty. de Vera of his membership to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter was within his rights. He could not be deemed to be guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility nor the Lawyer’s Oath punished lawyers for aspiring to be the IBP national president or prohibited them from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing that goal.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY B.M. No. 1678. 530 SCRA 424. December 17, 2007

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.[18] Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

FACTS: Petitioner BENJAMIN M. DACANAY was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program which was later approved. Year 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax; (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

ISSUE: MAY A LAWYER WHO HAS LOST HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP STILL PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES?

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(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.3

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

It can not be overstressed that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES (EPIFANIO B. MUNESES. 677 SCRA 364. 2012

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

FACTS: Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses filed with (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES.

FERNANDO W. CHU v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., A.C. No. 10573. January 13, 2015.

HELD: YES. The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

FACTS: Fernando W. Chu filed a disbarment complaint against his former lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr., whom he has accused of gross misconduct. Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC). Atty. Guico’s legal services included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal brought against

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CVC. On September 7, 2006, Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo rendered a decision adverse to CVC. Atty. Guico filed a timely appeal in behalf of CVC.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete with lies and inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only meant for harassment. He denied demanding and receiving money from Chu, a denial that Nardo corroborated. He further denied handing to Chu a draft decision printed on used paper emanating from his office, surmising that the used paper must have been among those freely lying around in his office that had been pilfered (stolen) by Chu’s witnesses in the criminal complaint he had handled for Chu.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty. Guico’s residence in Commonwealth, Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. On June 10, 2007, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had raised P300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty. Guico told him to proceed to his office at Times Street, Quezon City, and to give the money to his assistant, Reynaldo (Nardo) Manahan. Chu complied and delivered the money to Nardo. Subsequently, Atty. Guico instructed Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007. Atty. Guico handed Chu a copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. The draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper apparently emanating from the office of Atty. Guico. On that occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu could only produce P280,000.00, which he brought to Atty. Guico’s office on July 10, 2007. However, it was Nardo who received the amount without issuing any receipt.

IBP FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION: IBP Commissioner found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu; and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of his act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt for the legal profession. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of IBP Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty of disbarment to three years suspension. ISSUES:

Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in December 2007. However, Atty. Guico referred him to Nardo who in turn said that he would only know the status after Christmas. Chu again called Nardo and was invited by Nardo to meet for lunch. Chu asked Nardo if the NLRC Commissioner had accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the negative and simply told Chu to wait. Nardo assured that the money was still with Atty. Guico who would return it should the NLRC Commissioner not accept it.

1) WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. GUICO VIOLATED THE LAWYER’S OATH AND RULES 1.01 AND 1.02, CANON I OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEMANDING AND RECEIVING P580,000.00 FROM CHU TO GUARANTEE A FAVORABLE DECISION FROM THE NLRC? 2) WHETHER THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE IBP WAS COMMENSURATE BASED ON THE ACTS OF THE RESPONDENT?

On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC. Chu confronted Atty. Guico, who in turn referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, Atty. Guico caused the preparation and filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as legal counsel on May 25, 2009.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

HELD: 1) YES

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“In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish respondent attorney’s liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed, this Court has consistently required clearly preponderant evidence to justify the imposition of either disbarment or suspension as penalty.”

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession.

The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses, especially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision that had been printed on used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office, sufficed to confirm that he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the allegations in his defense, but such denial did not overcome the affirmative testimony of Chu. The SC cannot help but conclude that the production of the draft decision by Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable result in the labor case. As such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to establish his complaint against Atty. Guico. In this administrative case, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law. “Grave misconduct is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.”

In taking the Lawyer’s Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to: x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x delay no man for money or malice x x x.

Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. There is no question that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.

The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit: CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

2) NO

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The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he should be disbarred, for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership in the legal profession. As the Court has reminded in Samonte v. Abellana:

funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent’s liability. x x x The Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S. GUICO, JR. GUILTY of the violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.

YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI. A.C. No. 7158. March 09, 2015. FACTS: This is a Complaint for Disbarment filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi (respondent) on the ground of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of Execution against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its incorporators, the herein complainants, who are not parties to the case.

Additional ISSUE on Restitution: Whether or not Atty. Guico can be ordered to return the amount of money to Chu in a disbarment case?

On December 10, 2003, respondent rendered a Decision in labor case against M.A. Mercado Construction and Spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado. Then, Sps. Mercado interposed an appeal which was dismissed for failure to post an appeal bond. Thus, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued to implement the Decision. Thereafter, the complainants in the labor case filed an Ex Parte Motion for Amendment of an Alias Writ of Execution. They claimed that they could hardly collect the judgment award from M.A. Mercado Construction because it allegedly transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. They thus prayed that the Alias Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators/stockholder as additional entity/personalities against which the writ of execution shall be enforced. Respondent granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution.

HELD: YES. The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be ordered to return the amount of P580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That amount was exacted by Atty. Guico from Chu in the guise of serving the latter’s interest as the client. Although the purpose for the amount was unlawful, it would be unjust not to require Atty. Guico to fully account for and to return the money to Chu. It did not matter that this proceeding is administrative in character, for, as the Court has pointed out in Bayonla v. Reyes: “Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about the respondent lawyer’s legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the client’s

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

An Amended Alias Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the monetary judgment amounting to P19,527,623.55 against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators. By way of special appearance, M.A. Blocks Work, Inc.,

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together with three of its stockholders who are the complainants in this administrative case, namely Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and Elito P. Andres, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Amended Alias Writ of Execution, contending that they are not bound by the judgment as they were not parties to the labor case. In an Order, dated March 13, 2006, however, respondent denied the Urgent Motion to Quash.

7, 2006 Resolution directing him to file his Comment. He also failed to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice. Neither did he file his Position Paper. As a former Labor Arbiter, respondent should know that orders of the court “are not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely.” “He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession ‘to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities.’ x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court.”

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. This was adopted and approved with modification by the IBP Board of Governors.

Considering that this appears to be respondent’s first infraction, we find it proper to impose on him the penalty of reprimand with warning.

ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND OF VIOLATING THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

ANTONINA S. SOSA v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA A.C. No. 8776. March 22, 2015

HELD: As a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law, there must be a showing that the error was gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the actor was so moved with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty.

FACTS: On July 28, 2006, Antonia Sosa extended a loan of P500,000.00 to Atty. Mendoza at an interest of P25,000.00 to be paid not later than September 25, 2006. They agreed that a penalty or collection charge of 10% per month shall accrue in case of default. To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00.

The court ruled that based from the Decision rendered by respondent, the respondent did not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith. His conclusion was reached after an examination of the documents presented and evaluation and assessment of the arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on the issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted efforts to weigh the positions of the contending parties. In any event, we hold that respondent should not be held accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error in the appreciation of the facts of the case before him.

Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand to pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated check. She acceded and deferred the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendoza’s promise that he would later pay. The check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited it sometime in October 2006; it was “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Ms. Sosa, thru her lawyer Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera, sent a letter to Atty. Mendoza demanding payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored the demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. Likewise, he did not, in any

Based from the foregoing, the court have no basis to hold respondent administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. However, the court note that respondent had consistently and obstinately disregarded the Court’s and IBP’s orders. It is on record that respondent totally ignored the Court’s June

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manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to pay. In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law. Any wrongdoing, whether professional or nonprofessional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action.” Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Atty. Mendoza admitted the existence of the loan and that it is a valid obligation. However, he alleged that he only received One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) from one Elenita Cruz (Elenita), a friend of the complainant. Atty. Mendoza did not attach an affidavit from Elenita nor any evidence proving that he only received P100,000.00.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

IBP FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION: The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only administratively but also civilly. The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner ruling that the respondent is guilty of misconduct for his failure to pay a just and valid debt thus, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months and Ordered to Return the amount of P500,000.00 to the complainant with legal interest.

The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong conduct as the failure to pay the loan was willful in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment. It is undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and acknowledgement receipt showing he received P500,000.00.19 Although he initially denied getting this amount and claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any evidence to prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without qualification as to the amount. Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the postdated check upon Atty. Mendoza’s request, and based on his promises that he would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the check – when finally deposited – was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not dispute.

ISSUES: 1) WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. MENDOZA SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE? 2) WHETHER THE COMPLAINANT CAN COLLECT THE AMOUNT OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE LOAN IN A DISBARMENT CASE?

Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the hearing with the IBP Investigating Officer. He allegedly failed to deliver the amount to Ms. Sosa or her counsel because he arrived late. The Court found that Atty. Mendoza’s excuse to be flimsy. It could have been very easy for him to deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had the real intention to pay. Atty. Mendoza was also not candid with the IBP Investigating Officer when he

HELD: 1) YES. “Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment

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claimed he had P600,000.00 and that he was ready to pay his obligation. What is clear is that his obligation remains outstanding after all these years.

IBP’s recommendation to order the erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from the complainant, to wit:

Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle his obligation, Atty. Mendoza also failed to explain why he failed to pay despite his admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may be, dire financial condition does not justify non-payment of debt.

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainant. [Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.]

The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendoza’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only his personal integrity but his profession as well. To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty. Mendoza’s act of interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to pay a valid and just debt

MELVYN G. GARCIA, v. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 03, 2015

2) No. The SC differ with the IBP’s recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount of the loan plus legal interest because the instant case is solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is not a civil action for collection of a sum of money.

FACTS: Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño. Garcia alleged that he married Virginia Alcantara and they had two children. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. Garcia alleged while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing complainant’s children, filed an action for support against him and his sister. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño, alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases alone prevents the court from agreeing with the IBP’s order to pay; the administrative complaint only requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of liability, while a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. In the recent case of Heenan v. Atty. Espejo (A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013, 711 SCRA 290), The SC En Banc did not agree with the

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Sesbreño alleged that, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before the IBP and Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie

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Ruth. Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase “with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude.

was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge18 stated that “[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist.” Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbreño has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral character. A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MORAL TURPITUDE IS INVOLVED IN A CONVICTION FOR HOMICIDE. HELD: YES, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO. A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. xxx Moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

FACTS: Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-infact to institute a divorce action under its laws.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. There was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.

On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbreño. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbreño’s crime

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by

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Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed”. On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

engaged in the assembly and repair of motor vehicles in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. In 1991, they engaged the services of respondent Atty. George M. Florendo not only as legal counsel but also as administrator of their businesses whenever complainant would leave for the United States of America (USA). Sometime in 1993, complainant began to suspect that respondent and his wife were having an illicit affair. His suspicion was confirmed in the afternoon of May 13, 1995 when, in their residence, he chanced upon a telephone conversation between the two. Listening through the extension phone, he heard respondent utter the words "I love you, I'll call you later". When confronted, his wife initially denied any amorous involvement with respondent but eventually broke down and confessed to their love affair that began in 1993. Respondent likewise admitted the relationship. Subsequently, at a meeting initiated by respondent and held at the Salibao Restaurant in Burnham Park, Baguio City, respondent and complainant's wife, Ma. Elena, confessed anew to their illicit affair before their respective spouses.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. CATINDIG AND ATTY. BAYDO SHOULD BE DISBARRED. HELD: Only Atty. Catindig should be disbarred. The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

On May 15, 1995, the parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio City and, in the presence of a Notary Public, Atty. Liberato Tadeo, respondent and Ma. Elena executed and signed an affidavit attesting to their illicit relationship and seeking their respective spouses' forgiveness.

With regards to Atty. Baydo, there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between her and Atty. Catindig. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim were mere allegations, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Complainant instituted the present suit for disbarment on May 23, 1995 charging respondent of gross immorality and grave misconduct. In his Answer, respondent admitted the material allegations of the complaint but interposed the defense of pardon. Finding merit in the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and Recommendation dated September 21, 2007 for the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October 19, 2007. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration there from was denied in the Resolution dated June 26, 2011.

TIONG v. FLORENDO. 662 SCRA 1. 2011 FACTS: Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife, Ma. Elena T. Tiong, are real estate lessors in Baguio City. They are likewise

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Respondent, however, maintains that he cannot be sanctioned for his questioned conduct because he and Ma. Elena had already been pardoned by their respective spouses in the May 15, 1995 Affidavit.

order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE PARDON EXTENDED BY COMPLAINANT IN THE AFFIDAVIT DATED MAY 15, 1995 IS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE DISMISSAL OF THE PRESENT DISBARMENT CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT FOR GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT.

Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.

HELD: NO. The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide, thus: "CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxxx CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. xxxx

However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months, instead of one (1) year as recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of respondent.

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Immorality and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in

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GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO 611 SCRA 508 (2010)

lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Furthermore, the contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions; good moral character was already required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.

FACTS: The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Discipline, charging them with gross immorality, in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complaint arose after the petitioner caught wind through her daughter that her husband was having an affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child with her; and the same information was confirmed when one of her daughters saw that her husband walking in a Robinsons mall with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in tow.

As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and Valencia wereshouldered with the expectation that they would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When they violated the law and distorted it to cater to their own personal needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such actions by themselves, without even including the fact of Garrido’s abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As such, their disbarment is affirmed.

After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yi elded results telling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on June 1993, her husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence, and has since failed to render much needed financial support. In their defense, they postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet when they committed the supposed immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of a violation of Canon1, Rule 1.01.

BUENO v. RANESES. 687 SCRA 711. 2012 Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Rañeses filed on March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. GARRIDO’S AND VALENCIA’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF CANON 1, RULE1.01 AND THUS A GOOD ENOUGH CAUSE FOR THEIR DISBARMENT, DESPITE THE OFFENSE BEING SUPPOSEDLY COMMITTED WHEN THEY WERE NOT LAWYERS.

FACTS: Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to represent her in Civil Case. In consideration for his services, Bueno paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer fee paid.

HELD: Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers, be they academic or moral. In the present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their blatant violation of Canon 1,Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that a

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Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings. On several occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late. Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00. This amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing Civil Case No. 777, so that they would not lose the

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case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Rañeses. In addition, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December 1988, because the amount she had previously given was inadequate. Bueno then sold her sala set and colored television to raise the demanded amount, which she again delivered to Atty. Rañeses. Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case, but Atty. Rañeses failed to comply with the court’s directive. Atty. Rañeses concealed this development from her. In fact, she was shocked when a court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute the decision against them. She went to Atty. Rañeses office to ask him about what happened to the case. Atty. Rañeses told her that he had not received any decision. Bueno later discovered from court records that Atty. Rañeses actually received a copy of the decision on December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty. Rañeses about her discovery and showed him a courtissued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply denied any knowledge of the decision

HELD: Yes. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain from any impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of influencing, the court. In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As shown, he committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the case. The Court supports the Investigating Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed: By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily take place in secrecy with only respondent Atty. Rañeses and complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in hearings held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his part, has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much less appear in any hearings scheduled in this investigation.

Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed to attend the hearings scheduled and was declared in Default on October 2, 2000. However, On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint and Supporting Papers" filed by respondent. He asked in his motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be reset to sometime in December 2000, as he had prior commitments on the scheduled day. He also asked for copies of the complaint and of the supporting papers, claiming that he had not been furnished with these. In the interest of justice, hearings were scheduled thereafter. Nonetheless, Atty. Rañeses failed to attend.

Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners reveals his propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno’s affidavits depict him to be. Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer’s relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.

IBP Board of Governors recommended indefinite suspension from the practice of law. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT IS WARRANTED FOR DISBARMENT.

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First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent.1âwphi1 It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.

Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for P1,000,000 but he later sold it for only P150,000. RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: Respondent, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that it was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed the money. He alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the property because the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro was valuable and it was actually worth more than P8,000,000. Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was unable to continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because Presbitero did not help him.

From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all – to all lawyers, their clients and the general public – that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar. WHEREFORE, Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the respondent. NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO vs. ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR. A.C. No. 9872 January 28, 2014

IBP DECISION:

FACTS: This case originated from a complaint for disbarment filed by Natividad P. Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts: (1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account; (2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;

COMPLAINANTS’ ALLEGATIONS:

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(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-squaremeter lot he mortgaged to her; (4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants; (5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and (6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were already closed.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received from complainants and violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully protected or the client is given independent advice.

Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: HELD: YES. The Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed P1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero. In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession. Instead, respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to secure undue gains for himselft hat warrants his removal from the practice of law.

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

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Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. If the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his client. Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must return the full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to P50,000.

Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. IBP FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION: The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 and other canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

LISANGAN v. TOLENTINO. A.C. No. 6672, September 04, 2009 FACTS: A complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

ISSUES: 1) WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS GUILTY IN VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY? 2) WHETHER THE PENALTY OF THE IBP IS COMMENSURATE TO THE CONDUCT OF THE RESPONDENT?

Complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.

HELD:

Complainant also presented respondents calling card:

1) YES

Front

Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino is guilty of violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFFICE CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

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“Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known.”

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In this case, although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing. Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. Lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Rule 8.02 provides:

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.

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Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

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The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

(d) (e)

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.

However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards. 2) NO The sanction recommended by the IBP, which is a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of antisolicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

The SC SUSPENDED respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner, A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015 FACTS: The complaint was filed by the commissioned notaries public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty. Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. for notarizing documents without a commission. The complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a) lawyers name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address;

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telephone number and special branch of law practiced.

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was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City. Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority to his secretaries, Mina Bautista and Mary Ann Arenas , who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.

Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such act. The SC stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times. The Court permanently barred Atty. Siapno from being commissioned as a notary public and was suspended from the practice of law for two years.

Erring lawyer’s defense: Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and averred that the law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and Arenas were not his secretaries.

CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO v. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO, A.C. No. 10695, March 18, 2015

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. SIAPNO VIOLATED THE RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE.

FACTS: Crescenciano M. Pitogo (Pitogo) purchased a motorcycle from Emcor, Inc. The motorcycle was eventually registered in Pitogo’s name based on three (3) documents notarized by respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello (Suello). The documents indicate that they are registered in Suello’s notarial register.

HELD: Yes.A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:

Pitogo obtained a copy of the three (3) documents from the Land Transportation Office. He went to Suello’s office to have them certified. Pitogo claims that when he called Suello the next day to tell him about the importance of these documents to his civil case, Suello “disowned the documents.” Suello instead ordered his secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his notarial register.

Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.

Pitogo reiterated to Suello that the documents were important in his civil case pending before the Regional Trial Court. He requested Suello to certify the authenticity and veracity of the three (3) documents he obtained from the Land Transportation Office. He wanted to determine if the documents were duly notarized by Suello or were merely fabricated. Pitogo did not receive a reply from Suello.

Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in

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Pitogo filed his Affidavit-Complaint against Suello before the IBP. Pitogo alleges that there were discrepancies between the three (3) documents notarized by Suello and Suello’s entries in his notarial register.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with such substantial public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. For this reason, notaries must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.32

RESPONDENT: Suello denies having notarized the three (3) documents obtained from the Land Transportation Office.He denies the allegation that he disowned the documents. He admits that he certified the documents as true copies. Suello explains that it was his secretary who certified Pitogo’s documents. Pitogo called Suello the next day to ask for a certification. Suello told Pitogo that his secretary was not given such authority.

Hence, when respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the three (3) documents on his notarial register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of complainant’s documents. He also cast doubt on the credibility of the notarial register and the notarial process. He violated not only the Notarial Rules but also the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect for law and legal processes.

IBP: Recommended Suello’s suspension from the active practice of law for six (6) months, as well as the revocation of his commission as a notary public. He also recommended Suello’s disqualification as notary public for (4) years.

Later, in his Position Paper, he passed the blame to his secretary. This violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers from engaging in dishonest and unlawful conduct. Respondent’s secretary cannot be blamed for the erroneous entries in the notarial register. The notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be further delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally responsible for the correctness of the entries in his or her notarial register. Respondent’s apparent remorse may assuage the injury done privately, but it does not change the nature of the violation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable for his negligence in keeping and maintaining his notarial register. HELD: The SC finds respondent Atty. Joselito Troy Suello GUILTY of violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. His notarial commission is immediately revoked if presently commissioned. He is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for one (1) year.

RODOLFO ESPINOSA., vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011

Failure to properly record entries in the notarial register is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission.

FACTS: Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Notarial acts give private documents a badge of authenticity that the public relies on when they encounter written documents and engage in written transactions. Hence, all notaries public are duty-bound to protect the integrity of notarial acts by ensuring that they perform their duties with utmost care.

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Petitioner’s Contention: Complainants alleged that Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and

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dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa then prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay (contract).

The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaa who first claimed that it was her parttime staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found that respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit. Hence, The IBPCBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as a notary public. ISSUE: Whether or not Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay?

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during their union. Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Respondent’s Contention:

HELD: Yes, in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her parttime office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. Omaa presented Marantals Sinumpaang Salaysay (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority.

Omaa knew fully well that the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy. Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Supreme Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.

Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay stating that Omaa arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her office when the contract was notarized.

The Supreme Court held that it cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. The High Court agreed with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. A notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve

Commission on Bar Discipline Ruling:

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Respodent’s defense:

himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff.

The Trinidads claimed that they paid for the land by installments, completing the payment on June 24, 1986 with the result that the Arguelleses executed the deed of sale in their favor. For its part, Metrobank filed a cross-claim against the Trinidads for litigation expenses, alleging that the Trinidads were answerable for such expenses under the mortgage contracts.

Atty. Julieta A. Omaa was suspended from the practice of law for ONE YEAR and her commission as a notary public is REVOKED and she is SUSPENDED as a notary public for TWO YEARS. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. ARGUELLES 679 SCRA 348, 2012

ISSUE: WON, the subject document is valid.

FACTS: Respondent brothers, Servando and Claudio Arguelles (the Arguelleses ), were registered owners of a parcel of land in Imus, Cavite. The Arguelleses entered into a conditional sale of the land to Edgardo Trinidad and his wife Marilou. The Trinidads occupied and began developing the property in 1986. They paid the real estate taxes due on it from 1987 to 1997. With a deed of sale in their favor, the Trinidads eventually had the land titled in their names. In that same year, they applied with Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank) for a loan, offering the land as collateral. Satisfied that the Trinidads owned the property, Metrobank accepted it as collateral and lent them money. Subsequently, Metrobank granted the couple several more loans, totaling more than P 11 million, all secured by the land.

HELD: RTC’s Decision: The RTC ruled in favor of the Arguelleses and cancelled both the title in the name of the Trinidads and the mortgages in Metrobank’s favor. The primordial issue, said the RTC, was whether or not the Trinidads paid the balance of the agreed purchase price by installments. It found that they did not since they could not present proof of the payments they supposedly made. CA’s decision:

The Arguelleses filed a complaint against the Trinidads with the RTC of Imus, Cavite for the cancellation of their title in the latter’s names. Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Metrobank and sought the cancellation of the real estate mortgages over the property in its favor.

The CA affirmed that of the RTC but reduced the award of moral damages to P50,000.00 each in favor of Servando and Claudio Arguelles. As for Metrobank, the CA held that it was not a mortgagee in good faith as it appears that Metrobank compelled the Trinidads to acquire title over the property before the initial loan could be approved.

The Arguelleses denied having executed a deed of sale in favor of the Trinidads. They alleged that they entrusted their owner’s duplicate copy of title to Atty. Alejandro Saulog, Sr., who assisted the parties in executing a conditional sale covering the land. The Trinidads used a fictitious deed of sale, notarized by a certain Atty. Saulog, Jr. to effect the transfer of title in their names.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

The SC ruled in favor of the Trinidads. Both the RTC and the CA held that the presumption of regularity of a public document did not attach to the subject deed of sale, given that the notary public, Atty. Saulog, Jr. failed to establish the authenticity of the signatures on it. He could not remember if the Arguelleses, present in court as he testified, were the same persons who appeared and acknowledged the document before him. But it is too much to expect a notary public who had but a brief time with the Arguelleses during

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the notarial ceremony to remember their faces 12 years later. What matters is Atty. Saulog, Jr.’s testimony respecting the ritual of notarization that he invariably followed. He gave unbending assurance that he ascertained the identities of the parties to documents who appeared before him, including the Arguelleses, by requiring them to show documentary proofs of the same and to sign the documents in his presence. Besides, the theory of the Arguelleses is that it was Atty. Saulog, Jr. who facilitated the preparation of the falsified deed of sale for the benefit of the Trinidads. But, if this were so, it would have made more sense for Atty. Saulog, Jr. to testify in defense of the genuineness of the transaction by claiming that he recalled the faces of those who appeared before him 12 years ago and that they were no other than the Arguelleses.

meant to harass or intimidate [him]”. Also, the documents were “tampered and adulterated,” or that “[s]omebody might have forged [his] signature.” IBP: Recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law and disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can be administratively liable. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez is guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission, and be Suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and be Disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years.

EFIGENIA M. TENOSO VS. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ. A.C. No. 8384, April 11, 2013

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that “a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court.” Accordingly, “[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.”

FACTS: Efigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) filed a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez (respondent) alleging that respondent was engaged in practice as a notary public in Cordon, Isabela, without having been properly commissioned by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela. To support her allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her pleadings: a. documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City Executive Judge bearing the names of commissioned notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction, respondent's name does not appear on the list; b. documents that appear to have been notarized by respondent; and c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a jointaffidavit notarized by respondent in 2008 could not be “authenticated as to respondent's seal and signature as NO Notarial Commission was issued upon him at the time of the document's notarization.”

Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. “[N]otarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.” In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed partylitigants, courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. As noted by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the

RESPONDENT: denied the allegations saying, “I have never been notarizing any document or pleadings” and added that he has “never committed any malpractice, nor deceit nor have violated [the] lawyers (sic) oath”. He dismissed such allegations as being “preposterous, full of lies, politically motivated and x x x

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high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that he be sanctioned.

the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the document.

JANDOQUILE v. REVILLA A.C. No. 9514, April 10, 2013

As to requiring the affiants to present valid identification, the Court ruled that he cannot be liable. . If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer requiring them to show valid identification cards.

FACTS: Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Petitioner: Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial act per Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards. Defendant: Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted Jandoquile’s material allegations. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the livein houseboy of the Brosas family.

Let it be impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the disqualification rule. However, Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground for disbarment.

Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr., the court ruled that a punishment less severe than disbarment would suffice.

HELD: No Indeed, section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies respondent from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary public,

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for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his disqualification has lapsed.

transaction of the parties." Notarial fees paid by the parties were also covered by a receipt issued by the Treasurer of the Municipality of Real, Quezon. After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III (Commissioner Abelita) issued the Report and Recommendation8 dated November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty. Rinen’s notarial commission and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one year.

WILBERTO C. TALISIC v. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014 FACTS: This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Wilberto C. Talisic (Wilberto) against Atty. Primo R. Rinen1(Atty. Rinen), charging the latter with falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale2 which allowed the transfer to spouses Benjamin Durante and Eleonor Lavifia (Spouses Durante) of a parcel of land formerly owned by Wilberto's mother, Aurora Corpuz (Aurora). The property, measuring 3,817 square meters and situated in Barangay Langgas, Infanta, Quezon, was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4875 under Aurora's name.3After Atty. Rinen filed his comment on the complaint, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, for investigation, report and recommendation.4

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rinen should be removed from being a notary public. HELD: YES. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct."13 "The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree.

Wilberto claimed that his mother Aurora died on May 7, 1987, leaving behind as heirs her spouse, Celedonio Talisic, and their three children, namely: Arlene Talisic Villarazo, Wilberto and Alvin Corpuz Talisic. It was only after his father’s death on November 2, 2000 that Wilberto and his siblings knew of the transfer of the subject parcel via the subject deed. While Wilberto believed that his father’s signature on the deed was authentic, his and his siblings’ supposed signatures were merely forged. Wilberto also pointed out that even his name was erroneously indicated in the deed as "Wilfredo".

In the present case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained unspecified in the subject deed’s acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex-officio. The lapses he committed in relation to such function then justified the recommendations presented by the IBP.

Respondent denied the charge against him and explained that it was only on April 7, 1994 that he came to know of the transaction between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when they approached him in his office as the then Presiding Judge of the MunicipalTrial Court, Real, Quezon, to have the subject deed prepared and notarized. His clerk of court prepared the deed and upon its completion, ushered the parties to his office for the administration of oath.6 The deed contained his certification that at the time of the document’s execution, "no notary public was available to expedite the

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court REVOKES the notarial commission which Atty. Primo R. Rinen may presently have, and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public for one year, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe

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sanction. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable it to determine when the revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as notary public shall take effect.

Aggrieved, Salita filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents against Rodriguez and Atty. Salve. Salita likewise filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Salve. Respondent’s Contention:

MELANIO S. SALITA., vs. ATTY. REYNALDO SALVE A.C. No. 8101 February 4, 2015

In his defense, Atty. Salve vehemently denied that he falsified the Deed of Absolute Sale. He averred that the said document was regular on its face except the month of sale, i.e., August 12, 2007 instead of September 12, 2007, which is a mere clerical error due to “sheer” inadvertence on the part of his secretary. Atty. Salve claimed that the date stamp accidentally slid to August instead of September as it was also being used by three (3) other office clerks and two (2) lawyers for other office documents. Atty. Salve further narrated that both Salita and Rodriguez went to him and brought the PN and other loan documents executed by Salita himself. He also clarified that the PN was notarized in their presence on December 12, 2002 and both got a copy right after. Atty. Salve then inferred that it was Salita who erased the PN’s machine printed numbers using his own handwriting and thereafter photocopied it to make it appear that the document was not among the notarial documents he submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tagum Cityfor the year 2002. Finally, Atty. Salve averred that the certified electronic copies of the PN in the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tagum City and the ones in his law office are identical and the same, while Salita’s alleged falsified photocopy is totally different.

FACTS: Complainant Melanio S. Salita (Salita) filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Reynaldo T. Salve (Atty. Salve) in connection with the latter’salleged falsification of public documents. On November 15, 2006, Salita paid his loan in full as evidenced by a Release of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Rodriguez before Notary Public Buenaventura Melendres, which was later duly entered in the Register of Deeds of Davao Del Norte. Notwithstanding such full payment, Rodriguez, on September 17, 2007, instituted an ejectment complaint against Salita in furtherance of his cause the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale and the two (2) REM instruments signed by the latter. Upon checking the said documents, Salita discovered that the Deed of Absolute Sale had already been notarized by Atty. Salve and his Community Tax Certificate Numbers were allegedly falsified.

IBP Report and Recommendation:

Petitioner’s Contention:

It dismissed Salita’s complaint for lack of merit. He found that Salita was not able to obtain the required quantum of proof to hold Atty. Salve administratively liable, especially considering that Salita’s criminal complaint was dismissed for lack of probable cause. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation dismissing the case for lack of merit. However, upon reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution dated March 8, 2014 setting aside its December 29, 2012 Resolution and recommended the suspension of Atty. Salve’s notarial

Salita noticed that one copy of the Deed of Sale was purportedly notarized on August 12, 2007, while another was notarized a month later, or on September 12, 2007. Thus, Salita went on to conclude that because of the foregoing events, it appeared as if he had sold the subject property to Rodriguez and executed the same before Atty. Salve.

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commission for a period of three (3) months. It, however, failed to state the reasons for imposing the suspension.

voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (e) they acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Salve should be held administratively liable?

Respondent Atty. Reynaldo T. Salve was found GUILTY of gross negligence in his conduct as a notary public. His notarial commission, if still existing, was REVOKED and he was DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Salve’s act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without requiring the personal appearance of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.

JIMMY ANUDON AND JUANITA ANUDON v. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA. A.C. No. 5482. February 10, 2015

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same.

FACTS: Complainants Jimmy Anudon and Juanita Anudon are brother- and sister-in-law. Complainants and Jimmy’s brothers and sister co-own a 4,446square-meter parcel of land located in Sison, Pangasinan Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is a distant relative of Jimmy and Juanita. He was admitted to the bar in 1996. He practices law and provides services as notary public in the Municipality of Sison, Pangasinan. Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over a land owned by the petitioners. The names of petitioners appeared as vendors, while the name of Celino Paran, Jr. appeared as the vendee. Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified. They alleged that they did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, they did not sign it before Atty. Cefra. The National Bureau of Investigation’s Questioned Documents Division certified that Jimmy and Juanita’s signatures were forged. This is contrary to Atty. Cefra’s acknowledgment over the document. Moreover, it was physically impossible for Jimmy’s brothers and sister to have signed the document because they were somewhere else at that time. Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, with Jimmy and Juanita as witnesses, filed a case of falsification of public document against Atty. Cefra and Paran.

To recount, records reveal that Rodriguez used, among others, the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by Atty. Salve to file an ejectment complaint against Salita. However, it must be remembered that Salita was merely made to sign such document as collateral for his loan and that he had already fully paid the same, as evidenced by the notarized Release of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Rodriguez herself. Considering the circumstances, it is simply unfathomable for Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have the said document notarized, as it will be detrimental to his own interests. Hence, the Court finds that Atty. Salve notarized the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale without Salita’s presence before him. The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. In doing so, Atty. Salve,as borne from the records of this case, effectively proclaimed to the world that: (a) all the parties therein personally appeared before him; (b) they are all personally known to him; (c) they were the same persons who executed the instruments; (d) he inquired into the

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Defendant Defense: In his defense, Atty. Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the sale of the property and that Juanita and Jimmy’s wife Helen Anudon went to his residence to consult him on how they could sell the land. Atty. Cefra

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claimed that he assisted in the preparation of the documents for the sale, which included the deed of sale and the acknowledgment receipts for payment. Paran’s relatives, , brought the Deed of Absolute Sale to the residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnny’s son, Loejan Anudon to have the document signed. Paran’s relatives informed Atty. Cefra that they witnessed Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign the document. Loejan affixed the signatures for his father, Johnny, and his uncle and aunt, Alfonso and Benita. Atty. Cefra admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita “with the full knowledge and permission of the three. He allowed this on the basis of his belief that this was justified since Loejan needed the proceeds of the sale for the amputation of his mother’s leg.

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and (c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further: SEC. 2. Prohibitions.— . . . (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document— (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Cefra guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 1 of Code of Professional Responsibility? HELD: The IBP’s finding: Respondent violated the Notarial Law and Canon 1. That his notarial commission be revoked, his notarial practice suspended for 2 years and that he be suspended from practice of law for 1 year.

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document.

The SC agreed and adopted the findings of fact of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility in notarizing a document without requiring the presence of the affiants. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states:

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires a lawyer “to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—“Acknowledgment” refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete instrument or document;

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than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes.

not actually his but the residence certificate number of Florentina. Atty. Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses personally appeared before him when they did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities of these documents, Atty. Examen introduced these documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.

The Court SUSPENDED him from the PRACTICE OF LAW for TWO YEARS, REVOKED his incumbent NOTARIAL COMMISSION , and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED him from being COMMISSIONED as a NOTARY PUBLIC. Respondent was also sternly warned that more severe penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Defendant: In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition under the Revised Administrative Code for a notary public to notarize a document where one of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and affinity. With regard to the use of Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen said that he was in good faith and that it was office practice that the secretary type details without him personally examining the output. In any event, he reasoned that the use of another’s residence certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is barred by prescription

HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO v. ATTY. ROBERTO E. EXAMEN A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015 FACTS: Petitioner: Complainants were the holder of Original Certificate of Title of a land located in Sultan Kudarat. It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale were executed by the Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife, Edna. Both documents were notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of the vendee. Sometime in September 1984, Spouses Examen obtained possession of the property.

IBP: On MR, the IBP imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year and disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. ISSUE: W/N atty. Examen violated the notarial code. HELD: Yes.

On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and Atty. Roberto Examen. It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen introduced into evidence the March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale.

At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was Sections 231-259, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code and there was no prohibition on a notary public from notarizing a document when one of the interested parties is related to the notary public within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity.

Complainant stated that Atty. Examen allegedly violated the notarial law when he notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited from notarizing a document when one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil degree. It is also alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the documents knowing that the cedula or residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen was

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds of sale since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might have still applied had the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law.

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However, following the Court’s ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was the Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed. Atty. Examen was not incompetent to notarize the document even if one of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother.

for a disbarment proceeding. We disagree. In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the his oath as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court By his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal processes thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal system. If anything, his acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. A lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over documents presented to them typed or transcribed by their secretaries.

As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law. Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate number. Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type up the details of the documents and requirements without him checking the correctness of same.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this Decision. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely

A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary public is personal. The Court note that the error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions: personally checked the correctness of the documents. To say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who personally acknowledges the document. He was behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were presented and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct details. This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act. It is imbued with substantive public interest owing to the public character of his duties.

ADRIANO E. DACANAY v. BAKER & MCKENZIE ADM. CASE NO. 2131, May 10, 1985 FACTS: Respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the proper notation of cedulas can only be a ground for disqualification and not the proper subject

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RESPONDENT:

In 1980, Dacanay filed a verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

Respondent countered that his membership in the PLEB of Quezon City, representing the NGO, was without fixed compensation. As regards his designation as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the same is authorized under Section 406 of the Local Government Code of 1991; and his monthly allowance/honorarium is allowed under Section 393.mWhile he received allowances, honoraria and other emoluments as member of the PLEB and of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, even as he is in the government service, the same is authorized by law. Hence, there was no double compensation. He admitted having appeared as private counsel in several cases. However, his clients were his relatives and friends, among them were complainants father and brother Ricardo. He emphasized that his services were pro bono.

ISSUE: W/N Baker and McKenzie can practice law in the Philippines HELD: No. The Court held that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines. Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law in the country.

IBP:

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

found that respondents appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa while concurrently employed as a legal officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office is not unlawful. Such appointment is in accordance with the Local Government Code of 1991. Nor could respondent be found liable for receiving honoraria as a Lupon member, since the Local Government Code of 1991 authorizes Lupon members to receive honoraria, allowances, and other emoluments. With respect to respondents appointment as PLEB member, IBP Commissioner Aguila stated that the same is not an exception to the prohibition against dual appointments or employment of government officials or employees. IBP Commissioner Aguila found that respondents court appearances as counsel for litigants do not constitute private practice of law since complainant failed to show that he received compensation.

FRANCISCO LORENZANA vs. ATTY. CESAR G. FAJARDO A.C. No. 5712. June 29, 2005 FACTS: Francisco Lorenzana, complainant, charges respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo with violation of the Civil Service Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and seeks his disbarment from the practice of the law profession. Complainant alleged that respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila, until his retirement, was a member of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). He was also a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

However, respondent should still be held liable for violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations since he failed to show that he was permitted by his Office to appear as counsel for his clients.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice of law. He lives in a house and lot owned by complainants family without paying any rental and refuses to leave the place despite the latters demands.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the civil service law and be administratively liable. HELD: For accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while concurrently employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in turn contravene his Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

We now determine whether respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed as Legal Officer V in the Manila Urban Settlement Office. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes has been interpreted as customarily habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.

The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, from concurrently holding any other office or position in the government is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

In the case at bar, respondents appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence presented by complainant shows that he had an extensive practice of law. While employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained a law office. The pleadings he signed as counsel for his clients filed with the courts indicate his office address as Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, Quezon City. Following is the letter head appearing on the letters and envelopes[9] sent to his clients

It is clear that this provision pertains only to the compensation of PLEB members. It cannot be construed as an exception to the Constitutional and statutory prohibition against dual or multiple appointments of appointive public employees.

Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the Manila Urban Resettlement) is not really strict when it comes to appearing in some private cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to render service even on holidays without additional compensation. At most, he should have asked written permission from his chief as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules that (n)o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department.

Respondent also failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office allow his appointment as PLEB member, an exception to dual appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes. Indeed, respondent, in accepting such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Local Government Code of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Attorneys Oath.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES., vs. HON. JUANITO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., et.al G.R. No. 28290 December 11, 2013

On respondents appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa while serving as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlements Office, we agree with the IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in order, being allowed by law.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

FACTS: Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr.(VestidasJr.)were charged before the CTA for violation of Section 3602 in relation to Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended.

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According to the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was presented by the prosecution showing that the certified true copies of the public documents offered in evidence against both accused were in fact issued by the legal custodians." It cited Section 26, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that "when the original of a document is a public record, it should not generally be removed from the office or place in which it is kept." As stated in Section 7, Rule 130, its contents may be proven using secondary evidence and such evidence may pertain to the certified true copy of the original document issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Hence, the CTA wrote that the certified true copies of the public documents offered in evidence should have been presented in court.

Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise was charged of conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to defraud the government, and willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently importing into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, subject to customs duties, by misdeclaration, filed with the Bureau of Customs (BOC),covering One Forty Footer (1x40) container van shipment which was falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case. In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and Vestidas Jr .pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.

Anent its offer of private documents, the prosecution likewise failed to comply with Section 27, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody." Considering that the private documents were submitted and filed with the BOC, the same became part of public records. Again, the records show that the prosecution failed to present the certified true copies of the documents.

Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on January 21, 2013,which was granted by the CTA. Thereafter, they filed the Demurrer to Evidence, claiming that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following reasons:

The CTA noted that, in its Opposition to the Demurrer, the prosecution even admitted that none of their witnesses ever positively identified the accused in open court and that the alleged misdeclared goods were not competently and properly identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses.

a)The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in court; b)The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and

The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CTA, stressing, among others, that to grant it would place the accused in double jeopardy.

c)None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive identification of the two accused as the ones responsible for the supposed misdeclaration.

On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case.

Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr, for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

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Hence, this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA when in ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to positively identify the accused as responsible for the misdeclaration of goods.

The Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the Bureau of Customs that the canons embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, RATS lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. IN RE: PETITION OF ATTY. MEDADO TO SIGN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

ISSUE: Whether or not there was failure on the part of the prosecution to present the certified true copies of the documentary evidence as provided under Section 7, Rule 130 and Section 127, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court?

FACTS: Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979and passed the same year’s bar examinations.cOn 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA. The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to suspect that the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by design from the start. The failure to present the certified true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently and properly identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and,worse, the failure to file the petition for certiorari on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs of a reluctant and subdued attitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Court will not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the government’s goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar activities.

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”; and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”

Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA displays gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a criminal case and the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen in prosecuting the respondents, it would have, in the first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in strict compliance with the Rules.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

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About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Medado may sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.

HELD: The OBC Decision: The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September 2012 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013. The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oathtaking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

After a judicious review of the records, the SC granted Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law. At the outset, the Court noted that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that the Court has reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar. In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted. For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law, which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima

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the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation since she' did not have the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint.

TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA. A.C. No. 8339, March 16, 2015

Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or] abused her position against the interests of the complainant. Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused.

FACTS: An administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan. According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De Vera. The latter borrowed money from Teresita and issued postdated checks in favor of Teresita.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the] records[.]"The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law.

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks "bounced" for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a second time. However, the checks were dishonored because the account was closed.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations, prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable cause for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial court.

HELD: After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment";47 it is serious or gross when it is flagrant. A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 1 -A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent: Atty. De Vera presented her version of the facts. She claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points out that the proceedings before

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....

IN THE MATTER OF BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE IBP ELECTIONS (A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, A.C. No. 8292, April 2013)

CANON 7 -A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITYAND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. ....

The Court, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), resolves this matter of the election of the Executive VicePresident (EVP) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the 20112013 term.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

This administrative matter was triggered by the Petition for Intervention filed by petitioner-intervenor IBP-Southern Luzon Region (IBP-Southern Luzon), seeking a declaration that the post of EVP-IBP for the 2011-2013 term be held open to all regions and that it is qualified to field a candidate for the said position.

The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to know the consequences of her acts. She issued several post-dated checks for value that were dishonored upon presentation for payment.

FACTS: In 1973, the Philippine Bar was integrated1 to elevate the standards of the legal profession, to improve the administration of justice and to enable it to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.2 Governing the IBP was the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), consisting of the governors from each of the nine (9) geographic regions of the archipelago,3 namely: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Greater Manila, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao, and Western Mindanao.4 The governors of the IBP-BOG are, in turn, elected by the House of Delegates which consists of members duly apportioned among the chapters of each region.5

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a whole."56 A lawyer "may be removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him.'" WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

At the helm of the IBP is the IBP National President (IBP-President),6 who is automatically succeeded by the EVP. When the Philippine Bar was first integrated, both the IBP-President and the EVP were elected by the IBP-BOG from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar,7 with the right of automatic succession by the EVP to the presidency for the next succeeding full term. The presidency rotated among all the nine regions in such order as the IBP-BOG had prescribed.8 Both the IBP-President and the

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EVP held a term of one (1) year, with the presidency rotating from year to year among the regions.9

respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. (As amended pursuant to Bar Matter No. 491)

On November 1, 1974, the IBP By-Laws took effect, providing that the IBPPresident and the EVP be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.10 It was also provided that the IBP-President and the EVP hold office for a term of two (2) years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.11

The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions. On January 27, 1999, in Velez v. de Vera,18 reasoning that the rotation system applied only to the EVP, the Court considered the election of then EVP Leonard De Vera (De Vera), representing the Eastern Mindanao region, asone completing the first rotational cycle and affirmed the election of Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Salazar) of the Bicolandia region as EVP. The Court explained that the rotational cycle would have been completed with the succession of EVP De Vera, representing Eastern Mindanao as IBPPresident. For having misappropriated his clients’ funds and committing acts inimical to the IBP-BOG and the IBP in general, De Vera was removed as governor of Eastern Mindanao and as EVP, and his removal was affirmed by the Court.

. In Bar Matter No. 287, dated July 9, 1985, the Court approved the recommendation allowing the IBP-President, the EVP and the officers of the House of Delegates to be directly elected by the House of Delegates.12 Unfortunately, history recalls that this mode of electing the IBP national officers was marred with unethical politicking, electioneering and other distasteful practices. Thus, on October 6, 1989, the Court in Bar Matter No. 491, dated October 6, 1989, ordered: 1] the annulment of the just concluded national elections; 2] the abolition of the system of election of national officers by direct action of the House of Delegates; 3] the restoration of the former system of having the IBP-President and the EVP elected by the IBP-BOG from among themselves, with right of succession by the EVP to the presidency and subject to the rule that "the position of Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions;"13 4] the holding of special elections for the election of the first set of IBP-President and EVP;14 and 5] the appointment of a caretaker board to administer the affairs of the IBP pending the holding of special elections.15

Thus, Salazar became IBP-President for the 2005-2007 term with Feliciano Bautista (Bautista) of Central Luzon as EVP. The term of Salazar was the start of the second rotational cycle. Bautista eventually succeeded to the IBP presidency with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan (Vinluan) as his EVP. In 2009, however, the national and regional IBP elections were again tainted with numerous controversies, which were resolved by the Court in the following manner: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:

In the same Bar Matter No. 491, the Court ordered the amendment of Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-laws, to read:

1. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42, and 43, Article VI and Section 47, Article VII of the IBP ByLaws as contained in the Report and Recommendation of the Special Committee, dated July 9, 2009, are hereby approved and adopted; and

SEC. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their

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The Court issued a resolution24 addressing the issues with respect to the election of governor for IBP-Western Visayas. In clarifying that the rotational rule was one by exclusion, the Court explained that in the election of governor of a region, all chapters of the region should be given the opportunity to have their nominees elected as governor, to the exclusion of those chapters that had already served in the rotational cycle. Once a rotational cycle would be completed, all chapters of a region, except the chapter which won in the immediately preceding elections, could once again have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of governor of their region. The chapter that won in the immediately preceding election, under the rotational cycle just completed, could only vie for the position of governor after the election of the first governor in the new cycle.

5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of the IBP shall continue, unless earlier revoked by the Court, but not to extend beyond June 30, 2011. Despite Bar Matter No. 491 and Velez,21 which recognized the operational fact that the rotation was from the position of President to that of the EVP, Section 47 was not immediately amended to reflect the official position of the Court. It was only amended through the December 14, 2010 Resolution.22 Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws now reads:

ISSUES:

Sec. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The Executive Vice President shall be elected on a strict rotation basis by the Board of Governors from among themselves, by the vote of at least five (5) Governors. The Governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors. The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in the IBP.

HELD:

The Motion for Intervention Should be Allowed and Admitted

In the special elections that were held thereafter, Roan I. Libarios (Libarios), representing IBP-Eastern Mindanao Region, was elected EVP and he later on succeeded as president.

There is no dispute that the Constitution has empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning "the integrated bar."41 Pursuant thereto, the Court wields a continuing power of supervision over the IBP and its affairs like the elections of its officers. The current controversy has been precipitated by the petition in intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon, praying that the election of the EVP for the 2011-2013 term be opened to all and that it be considered as qualified to field a candidate for the said position.

the IBP-BOG, acting on the letter of then Gov. Erwin M. Fortunato (Fortunato) of IBP-Western Visayas requested that the Court provide guidance on how it would proceed with the application of the rotational rule in the regional elections for governor of IBP-Western Visayas.23

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A. Whether the motion for intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon can be allowed and admitted. B. Whether the first rotational cycle was completed with the election of Atty. Leonard De Vera. C. Whether IBP-Southern Luzon has already served in the current rotation. D. Whether the IBP-Western Visayas has already served in the current rotation.

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In the exercise of its continuing supervisory power, the Court is allowing the matter to be raised as an issue because it has not yet been squarely settled, as will be pointed out later on.Moreover, it is not only an exercise of its constitutional and statutory mandated duty, but also of its symbolic function of providing guiding principles, precepts and doctrines42 for the purpose of steering the members of the bench and the bar to the proper path.

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

It should be noted that this is merely an administrative matter, a bar matter to be specific, where technical rules are not strictly applied. In fact, in administrative cases, there is no rule regarding entry of judgment. Where there is no entry of judgment, finality and immutability do not come into play. On several occasions, the Court has re-opened administrative cases and modified its decisions that had long attained finality in the interest of justice.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the nonassumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.

At any rate, granting that technical rules are strictly applied in administrative matters, the Court can exercise its power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires it. "The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final."46

The notion that the ruling in Velez50 should not be considered at all by the Court because it is barred by the Omnibus Motion Rule deserves scant consideration. It may have been earlier overlooked, but the Court is not barred from motu propio taking judicial notice of such judicial pronouncement, pursuant to its continuing supervisory powers over the IBP.

The First Rotational Cycle Already Completed

The Second Rotational Cycle

From the above, it is clear that the amendment was effected to underscore the shift of the rotation from the position of president to that of EVP. The purpose of the system being to ensure that all the regions will have an equal opportunity to serve as EVP and then automatically succeed as president.

While there may have been no categorical pronouncement in Velez that the second rotational cycle started with the election of Salazar as EVP, it cannot be denied that it was so. With the Velez declaration that the election of De Vera as EVP completed the first cycle, there can be no other consequence except that the term of EVP Salazar commenced a new rotational cycle. As there were only four (4) regions which had served as EVP, there are still five (5) other regions which have not yet so served. These regions are:

As previously mentioned, in Velez,48 the Court stated that the rotation system applies to the election of the EVP only and considered the service of then EVP De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao region, as having completed the first rotational cycle. For said reason, the Court affirmed the election of Salazar of Bicolandia as EVP. The Court explained that the rotation cycle with respect to the presidency would have been completed with the succession of EVP De Vera as IBP-President. The specific words used in Velez49 were:

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1. Northern Luzon 2. Greater Manila Area 3. Eastern Visayas 4. Western Visayas

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5. Western Mindanao

Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive VicePresident for the 2009-2011 term. The one who is not chosen for this term, shall have his turn in the next (2011-2013) term. Afterwards, another rotation shall commence with Greater Manila in the lead, followed by Southern Luzon, Eastern Visayas, Western Mindanao, Northern Luzon, Bicolandia, Central Luzon, and either Western Visayas or Eastern Mindanao at the end of the round.54

Needless to state, Western Visayas is not the only region that can vie for EVP for the 2011-2013 term. This answers the query of Fortunato. With respect to IBP-Southern Luzon, following the ruling in Velez,51 it is clear that it already had its turn to serve as EVP in the Second Rotational Cycle. The Special Committee failed to take into account the Velez ruling

Apparently, the report of the Special Committee failed to take into account the ruling in Velez55 that the service of then EVP Leonard De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao region, completed the first rotational cycle.

the Court then was confronted with limited issues. Among those were: 1] the validity of the election of Nasser A. Marohomsalic as governor of the IBPWestern Mindanao Region; 2] the validity of the election of Manuel M. Maramba as governor for the Greater Manila Region for the term 2009-2011; 3] the validity of the election of Erwin M. Fortunato as governor for Western Visayas Region for the term 2009-2011; and 4] the validity of the elections for EVP for the 2009-2011 term presided by then IBP-President Bautista. The four issues were intertwined since the validity of the elections presided by IBPPresident Bautista was questioned on the alleged lack of quorum, as it was attended by Marohomsalic, whose own election was then also being questioned.

Thus, it committed two inaccuracies. First, it erroneously reported that "only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President." Second, it erroneously considered Central Luzon and Bicolandia as having had two terms each in the First Rotational Cycle, when their second services were for the Second Rotational Cycle. The unfortunate fact, however, is that the erroneous statements of the Special Committee were used as bases for the recommendation that "either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive Vice-President for the 2009-2011 term."

With those limited issues resolved, the Court directed that special elections should be held for the election of EVP for the remaining 2009-2011 term "to heal the divisions in the IBP and promote unity by enabling all the nine (9) governors-elect to elect the EVP in a unified meeting called for that purpose."53 In ordering the special elections to be conducted, the Court took into account the report of the Special Committee as follows:

Worse, they were cited by IBP-Western Visayas as bases to oppose the Petition in Intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon, arguing that it would be contrary to Section 2, Rule 19, it being filed following the finality of the December 14, 2010 Resolution56 of the Court.

Only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President cum next IBP President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia have had two (2) terms already.

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At any rate, the statement of the Court in its December 14, 2010 Resolution57 that "only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President," did not pertain to the lis mota of the case. Thus, it did not settle anything so as to be deemed a precedent-setting ruling. Those statements, therefore,

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could not be considered as overturning, vacating and setting aside the ruling in Velez58 that the service of then EVP De Vera completed the first rotational cycle.

letter-complaint to the Chief Justice, with favoritism or discrimination in the hiring of officers and employees in the IBP and with extravagant and irregular expenditure of IBP funds. The Court found the acts of Eugene Tan as constituting grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office, which would have warranted his removal from office. Considering that he had earlier tendered his resignation as IBP-President and his term of office already expired on June 30, 1991, the Court imposed on him the penalty of severe censure only.63

The election of Eugene Tan As IBP President Much has been said about the election of Eugene Tan as IBP-President. IBPSouthern Luzon argues that with his election and service as IBP-President from January 29, 1990 to April 1991, the IBP-Western Visayas should no longer be allowed to field a candidate in the forthcoming elections for the EVP.59 IBP-Western Visayas counters that his election could not be considered as part of the current rotation as he was elected following the special elections held as a result of the October 6, 1989 Resolution of the Court. It has also been argued that he merely served as Interim President.

Moreover, in A.M. No. 491, the Court stressed that: "One who has served as President of the IBP may not run for election as EVP-IBP in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regionsshall have completed; whereupon the rotation shall begin anew." Rotation by Exclusion

As Velez60 declared that the election of EVP De Vera completed the first rotational cycle, it could only mean that all regions had their respective turns in the first rotational cycle. Thus, in this second rotational cycle, issues as to the nature of his election and service as IBP-President during the First Rotational Cycle are inconsequential.

As clarified in the December 4, 2012 Resolution of the Court, the rotation should be by exclusion. In said resolution, it was stated: Resolution of the Court

At any rate, Eugene Tan could not be considered as an interim president. It was Justice Felix Antonio who was designated by the Court as Interim Caretaker until the election of the IBP-President by the elected IBP-BOG. The election of the new President and Executive Vice-President was directed by the Court itself and in no way can it be said that they served on an interim basis. Besides, at that time, under Section 47, the rotation concerned the presidency only. Section 47 was ordered to be amended only in the December 14, 2010 Resolution,61 despite Bar Matter No. 491 and Velez,62 which recognized the operational fact that the rotation was from the position of President to that of EVP.

Re: IBP-Western Visayas Region After an assiduous review of the facts, the issues and the arguments raised by the parties involved, the Court finds wisdom in the position of the IBP-BOG, through retired Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, that at the start of a new rotational cycle "all chapters are deemed qualified to vie for the governorship for the 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the rotation." Stated differently, the IBP-BOG recommends the adoption of the rotation by exclusion scheme. The Court quotes with approval the reasons given by the IBP-BOG on this score:

If Eugene Tan served only up to April, 1991, it was not because he served merely in the interim. He served up to that time only because he resigned. As reflected in Bar Matter No. 565, dated October 15, 1991, Tan resigned as IBP-President when he was charged by several staff members of the IBP in a

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2. After due deliberation, the Board of Governors agreed and resolved to recommend adherence to the principle of "rotation by exclusion" based on the following reasons:

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sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the rotation.

a) Election through "rotation by exclusion" is the more established rule in the IBP. The rule prescribes that once a member of the chapter is elected as Governor, his chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion.

The Court takes notice of the predictability of the rotation by succession scheme. Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the elections would be more genuine as the opportunity to serve as Governor at any time is once again open to all chapters, unless, of course, a chapter has already served in the new cycle. While predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one chapter remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court "the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot."

b) Election through a "rotation by exclusion" allows for a more democratic election process. The rule provides for freedom of choice while upholding the equitable principle of rotation which assures that every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation cycle.

Thus, as applied in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, initially, all the chapters shall have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of Governor for the next cycle except Romblon, so as no chapter shall serve consecutively. Every winner shall then be excluded after its term. Romblon then joins the succeeding elections after the first winner in the cycle.64

c) On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained sequence, or election based on the same order as the previous cycle, tends to defeat the purpose of an election. The element of choice – which is crucial to a democratic process – is virtually removed. Only one chapter could vie for election at every turn as the entire sequence, from first to last, is already predetermined by the order in the previous rotation cycle. This concept of rotation by pre-ordained sequence negates freedom of choice, which is the bedrock of any democratic election process. d) The pronouncement of the Special Committee, which the Supreme Court may have adopted in AM No. 09-5-2-SC, involving the application of the rotation rule in the previous election for GMR may not be controlling, not being one of the principal issues raised in the GMR elections.

As stated therein, it would be without prejudice to the regions entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle, provided each region would have its turn in the rotation. As noted by the Court in its December 4, 2012 Resolution, there is a sense of predictability in the rotation by the pre-ordained scheme. Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the elections will be more genuine, as the opportunity to serve at any time is once again open to all, unless, of course, a region has already served in the new cycle. While predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one region remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court "the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot."65

3. Thus, applying the principle of ‘rotation by exclusion’ in Western Visayas which starts with a new rotation cycle, all chapters (with the exception of Romblon) are deemed qualified to vie for the Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained

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The December 14, 2010 Resolution

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That the Court, in its December 14, 2010 Resolution,66 ordered the election of the EVP-IBP for the next term based on the inaccurate report of the Special Committee, is a fact. That cannot be erased. As a consequence thereof, Libarios of IBP-Eastern Mindanao is now the IBP President. He, however, is part of the second rotational cycle because 1] in Velez67 it was categorically ruled that the service of then EVP De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao region, completed the first rotational cycle; and 2] he could not be part of the first rotational cycle because EVP de Vera of the same region had already been elected as such.

the IBP "to start on a clean and correct slate, free from the politicking and the under handed tactics that have characterized the IBP elections for so long." Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws should be further amended

It is to be noted that in the December 14, 2010 Resolution,68 the Court did not categorically overturn the ruling in Velez.69 It merely directed the election of the next EVP, without any reference to any rotational cycle.

Whatever the decision of the Court may be, to prevent future wranglings and guide the IBP in their future course of action, Section 47 and Section 49 of the IBP By-laws should again be amended. Stress should be placed on the automatic succession of the EVP to the position of the president. Surprisingly, the automatic succession does not appear in present Section 47, as ordered amended by the Court in the December 14, 2010 Resolution. It should be restored. Accordingly, Section 47 and Section 49, Article VII, are recommended to read as follows:

To declare that the first rotational cycle as not yet completed will cause more confusion than solution. In fact, it has spawned this current controversy. To consider the service of current president, Libarios, as part of the first rotational cycle would completely ignore the ruling in Velez.70

Sec. 47. Election of National President Executive Vice President. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The Governors shall be ex-officio Vice President for their respective regions.

The Best Option: Open to All Regions

The Board of Governors shall elect the President and Executive Vice President from among themselves each by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Upon expiration of the term of the President, the Executive VicePresident shall automatically succeed as President.

How then do we treat the turns of those who had already served in the second rotational cycle? Shall we treat them as anomalies? As aberrant developments,

Each region, as enumerated under Section 3, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, shall have the opportunity to have its representative elected as Executive Vice-President, provided that, the election for the position of Executive Vice President shall be on a strict rotation by exclusion basis. A region, whose representative has just been elected as Executive Vice President, can no longer have its representative elected for the same position in subsequent elections until after all regions have had the opportunity to be elected as such. At the end of the rotational cycle, all regions, except the region whose representative has just served the immediately preceding term, may be elected for another term as Executive Vice-President in the new rotational cycle. The region whose representative served last in the previous rotational cycle may be elected Executive Vice-President only after the first

A remedy is to reconcile the conflicting decisions and resolutions with nothing in mind but the best interest of the IBP. It appears from the pleadings, however, that the differences are irresoluble. To avoid the endless conflicts, confusions and controversies which have been irritably plaguing the IBP, the solution is to start another rotational round, a new cycle, open to all regions. At any rate, all regions, after the election of Libarios, would be considered as already having its turn in the presidency. This is not to detract from the fact that under Section 47, as amended, and from the pertinent rulings, the position of EVP-IBP is the one being actually rotated, but as stated in the December 14, 2010 Resolution,71 it will enable

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Creation of a permanent Committee for IBP Affairs

term of the new rotational cycle ends, subject once more to the rule on exclusion. The order of rotation by exclusion shall be without prejudice to the regions entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each region will have its turn in the rotation.

To further avoid conflicting and confusing rulings in the various IBP cases like what happened to this one, the December 14,2010 Resolution and Velez,72 it is recommended that the Court create a committee for IBP affairs to primarily attend to the problems and needs of a very important professional body and to make recommendation for its improvement and strengthening.

A violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in the IBP.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to: 1] GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Attached Petition In Intervention; 2] DECLARE that the election for the position of the EVP for the 2011-2013 term be open to all regions. 3] AMEND Section 47 and Section 49, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws to read as recommended in the body of this disposition. 4] CREATE a permanent Committee for IBP Affairs.

SEC. 49. Terms of office. - The President and the Executive Vice-President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. His tenure as such shall not be considered a new turn in the rotation.

KELD STEMMERIK VS. ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS A.C. No. 8010, June 16, 2009 FACTS: Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. Complainant expressed his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable.

In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of the Executive Vice President, the Board of Directors shall elect among the regions qualified to be elected as Executive Vice President to serve the unexpired portion of the term or period of disability. In the event of the death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability. Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.

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Complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant returned to Denmark, entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent. Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant, represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa. After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch with respondent to inquire about when the property could be

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registered in his name. However, respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainant's calls and e-mail messages.

dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and confidence reposed by complainant in him. Recommended the disbarment of respondent.

When complainant visited the Philippines again, he engaged the services of another lawyer to ascertain the status of the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens could not own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation.

ISSUE:

Thereafter, complainant, exerted diligent efforts to locate respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts but the respindent was nowhere to be found. He had already abandoned his law office in Olongapo City. Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. He deplored respondent's acts of serious misconduct and for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for maliciously absconding with complainant's P3.8 million.

HELD:

1. Whether or not the respondent was respondent properly given notice of the disbarment proceedings against him. 2. Whether or not the respondent can be administratively liable.

1. Yes. The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address, his law office in Olongapo City, after he committed the embezzlement. Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Court's jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and processes on respondent's office was sufficient notice to him.

RESPONDENT: Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last known address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this connection, the CBD found that respondent abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after his transaction with complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges against him.

Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does not require that the impossible be done. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or their respective chapters of any change in office or residential address and other contact details. In case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against him.

IBP: Ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on the matter of land ownership by a foreigner. He even went through the motion of preparing falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he collected P400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million and absconded with it. The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his professional status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with complainant's money. Respondent was

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2. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas be DISBARRED.

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Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.

IN RE: ATTY. RODOLFO PACTOLIN A.C. No. 7940 April 24, 2012 FACTS: Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team. Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy OmbudsmanMindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of P10,000.00 in public funds.

All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehood. That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Lawyers are servants of the law and the law is their master. They should not simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal. Respondent's misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.

Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case a complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.

A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that the legal profession stands for.

Atty. Pactolin appealed to the SC but affirmed his conviction. The Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.

The Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article 172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick the Butcher's call, "Kill all lawyers!" A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be purged from the bar.

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VILLATUYA v. TABALINGCOS 676 SCRA 37 (2012)

Pactolin’s Contention:

FACTS: Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.

Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement. He also claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral to the IBP was factually infirmed and contained factual exaggerations and patently erroneous observation, and was too adventurous.

In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, complainant and his counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position papers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification? HELD: Yes, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted

In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he was employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.

The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. The Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

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Defendant’s Defense: In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them

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regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women

The IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

ISSUES: 1. WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant; 2. WON respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and 3. WON respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law. It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

HELD: The Commissioner’s Recommendation: Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.

The IBP Board of Governors’ Decision:

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What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting.

(Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainants husband died on July 29, 2003. Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58. The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent’s Contention: Respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo. He was invited by Atty. Linco, through an emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence and was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along with the witnesses. However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same. On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.

ATTY. FLORITA LINCO vs. ATTY. JIMMY LACEBAL A.C. No. 7241 October 17, 2011 FACTS: An administrative Complaint was filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their property. Complainant is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements in Cainta. Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation allegedly executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor.

IBP Ruling and Recommendation:

Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. and issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.

The IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years.

Petitioner’s Contention: She claims that respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the notarial law. The notarial acknowledgment stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo

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The IBP-Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year. TUMBOKON v. PEFIANCO 678 SCRA 60 (2012)

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Notarial Law? HELD: Yes, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

FACTS: An administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

As a rule, a lawyer engaged in notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.

Complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission which respondent ignored.

It is established that Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation. Respondent notarized the document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation. However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

Respondent: Explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.

For breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. And he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating IBP

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Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document for insufficiency of evidence. The administrative case for dishonesty was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). HELD: YES. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.

Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof. TAPAY ET AL v. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO ET AL. A.C. No. 96604, March 20, 2013 FACTS: Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office

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Defendant’s Defense:

suspended for 1 year. The charge against Atty. Jarder shall be dismissed for lack of merit.

Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the SC agreed with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA VS. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE A.C. No. 7269, November 23, 2011 FACTS: Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso) in an ejectment case. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibiliy. HELD: IBP’s Recommendation: Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

RESPONDENT: Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso and that his signature in the Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.

BOG’s Decision: The Board of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Atty. Bancolo shall be

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IBP:

pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. ISSUE: Whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

HELD: We agree with the IBP.

We SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

SPOUSES AMATORIO v. ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015 FACTS: The complainants said that they are clients of Atty. Paras in cases which were filed against them by the respondents to compel them to pay their indebtedness. At the time of the filing of the answer, Atty. Paras was suspended from the practice of law.

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.

Complainants decided to seek an out-of-court settlement and asked that they be allowed to pay their obligations by way of installment. The parties agreed on the terms. When Aida asked the respondents if they should still attend the pre-trial conference scheduled, the latter told them they need not attend anymore as they will be moving for the dismissal of the cases. Subsequently, they were surprised to receive copies of the decisions of the trial court declaring them in default for non-appearance. The decision however did not mention the out-of-court settlement between the parties.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmente’s staff. As

Nonetheless, the complainants continued tendering installment payments to the respondents upon the latter’s assurance that they will disregard the decision of the trial court since they already had an out-of-court settlement

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before the rendition of said judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

There is substantial evidence that Respondent Francisco Yap ha[s] deliberately neglected, at the very least, offered and/or pleaded inaccurate allegations/testimonies to purposely mislead or confuse the civil courts. Francisco Yap failed to controvert the existence and the authenticity of the Acknowledgment Receipt which bore his signature and written in a “Yap Law Office” letterhead.

This prompted them to seek legal advice to another lawyer who referred the complainants to Atty. Paras, who had just resumed his practice of law after his suspension. Atty. Paras proceeded to file a disbarment case against the respondents with the IBP.

The complainants filed a Manifestation, terminating the services of Atty. Paras as their counsel and executed a Judicial Affidavit, disclaiming knowledge and participation in the preparation of the complaint and the pleadings filed on their behalf by Atty. Paras in connection with the disbarment case. They claimed that they merely signed the pleadings but the contents thereof were not explained to them. They likewise expressed lack of intention to file a disbarment case against the respondents and that, on the contrary, they were very much willing to settle and pay their indebtedness to them. Further, they asserted that it was not the respondents, but Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-trial conference of the cases which eventually resulted to a judgment by default against them.

As foretold by Atty. Paras, the complainants experienced unpleasant backlash which were allegedly instigated by the respondents who come from a very powerful and affluent clan. They received threats of physical harm and Aida’s continued employment as a public school teacher was put in jeopardy. Also, suspicious-looking individuals were seen loitering around their house. When they refused to yield to the respondents’ intimidation, the latter resorted to the filing of charges against them. RESPONDENTS ALLEGATIONS: Respondents denied having resorted to deceitful means to obtain favorable judgments. They admitted that they agreed to an out-of-court settlement, but denied that the complainants ever tendered any installment payment. They claimed that Atty. Paras merely employed cajolery in order to entice the complainants to file the instant case to retaliate against them. They asseverated that Atty. Paras resented the fact that the respondents served as counsel for his former wife, who previously filed the administrative case for immorality, abandonment of family, and falsification and use of falsified documents which resulted to his suspension.

ISSUE: Whether the statements of the complainants, specifically contesting the truthfulness of the allegations hurled against the respondents in their own complaint for disbarment necessarily results to Francisco’s absolution. HELD: The answer is in the negative. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Francisco Dy Yap is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months for deliberately misleading the Court. It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.

Atty. Paras clearly defied the authority of this Court when he represented the complainants and filed an answer on their behalf during the period of his suspension from the practice of law. They alleged that he appeared in several cases and filed numerous pleadings despite his suspension. IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline:

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It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to complainants’ change of heart by refuting their own statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint for disbarment they filed be

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dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the lawyer not only hurts the client’s cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be disciplined notwithstanding the complainant’s pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to support any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed “regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.” It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an erring lawyer.

Caspe alleged the controversy started when Atty. Mejica disregarded conflict of interest rules. Caspe said that when he filed a complaint for attempted murder against Antonio Rodriguez, Jr., Atty. Mejica served as Caspe’s counsel. When Rodriguez, Jr. filed his counter-affidavit, it was Atty. Mejica who counseled and represented him. Caspe brought separate suits for damages and disbarment: one for conflict of interest and the present complaint. Atty. Mejica tried to negotiate a settlement but Caspe refused. Atty. Mejica allegedly then threatened Caspe that “he will help file cases after cases against the complainant until he kneels before [him]. He will ‘put down’ complainant so much so that he will be removed from the service.” From then on, Caspe alleged, Atty. Mejica maliciously encouraged the filing of suits against him.

Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability against the respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or settle matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The complainants’ forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence.

In the present complaint, Caspe narrated that on December 21, 2007, Romulo Gaduena, a barangay tanod, harassed Jan Mark Busa and Marcelino Jataas with a gun. Caspe, who was on duty, together with PO1 Onofre Lopeña responded. They recovered a caliber 0.357 revolver which was turned over to the Can-avid Police station. The incident was recorded in the police blotter. Gaduena evaded arrest with the help of barangay captain Prudencio Agda and other barangay tanods who allegedly clobbered Caspe and took his gun. In the interest of peace and harmony, the Chief of Police called and requested that Caspe desist from filing charges against the barangay captain and tanods, specifically Gaduena. Caspe acceded.

The complainants’ belated claim that the respondents were faultless and that the allegations stated in the disbarment complaint were just fabricated by their former counsel cannot stand against the clear and preponderant evidence they earlier presented. What clearly appears is that the facts material to the violation committed by Francisco are well-established notwithstanding Atty. Paras’ supposed fabrication of some insignificant particulars.

However, Gaduena, with Atty. Mejica as counsel, filed a complaint for serious slander by deed against Caspe, which was supported by a joint affidavit of two barangay tanods. It was alleged that Caspe kicked, collared and slapped Gaduena’s face. This prompted Caspe to disregard the agreement with the Chief of Police and he filed cases against the tanods. Suspecting that Atty. Mejica encouraged Gaduena to file the case against him, Caspe filed the cases for damages and disbarment against Atty. Mejica before the IBP.

PO1 JOSE CASPE vs. ATTY. AQUILINO MEJICA A.C. No. 10679 March 10, 2015 FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by PO1 Jose B. Caspe against Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica for alleged violation of Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) specifically Rules 1.03, 1.04, and 10.01.

Atty. Mejica failed to appear at the Mandatory Conference. He filed manifestation that he never received a copy of the complaints against him.

Petitioner’s Contention:

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He asked that the hearing be postponed and rescheduled and that copies of the complaint be furnished to him. The hearing was thus rescheduled to January 13, 2009 and a copy of the complaint was sent to him via a private courier, LBC. It appeared however that he did not claim the mail.

CBD thus recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

On December 9, 2008, Atty. Mejica once more manifested that he did not receive any notice from LBC of any mail to be claimed. He also expressed misgivings on the shift from registered mail to the use of a private courier to send copies of the complaint. He requested that a copy of the complaint be sent to him via registered mail.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable?

The IBP BOG adopted the Report and Recommendation of the IBP CBD.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Mejica further violated Canon 1145 of the CPR which calls for a lawyer to observe and give due respect to courts and judicial officers. The Supreme Court adopts the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.

Atty. Mejica failed to appear in the January 13, 2009 hearing. Again, Atty. Mejica failed to appear for the February 3, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD ordered the case submitted for decision.

The IBP CBD concluded that there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica to file the cases against PO1 Caspe other than to get back at him. The High Court agrees that the confluence of circumstances points to Atty. Mejica’s corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing cases against Caspe, in violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR.

Respondent’s Contention: Atty. Mejica maintains that he was not afforded due process. He stated that he received a Notice of Preliminary Conference for October 21, 2008 but did not appear since he did not receive a copy of the complaint and was not ordered to answer. For the scheduled February 3, 2009 Conference, Atty. Mejica reasoned that it was impossible for him to attend the meeting since he received the Notice in the afternoon of February 3, 2009.33 Furthermore, he was not given the opportunity to answer. Atty. Mejica also maintained that he never threatened Caspe because he was not present during the preliminary conference where he allegedly uttered the threatening words.

With respect to Atty. Mejica’s claim that he was not afforded due process, i.e., he was not able to receive a copy of a complaint which in turn was the reason for him not to have attended the mandatory conference, This contention is untenable. Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the Philippines provides that:

IBP Ruling and Recommendation:

SEC. 5. Non-appearance of Parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings. a) Non-appearance at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall be deemed a waiver of right to participate in the proceeding. Ex parte conference or hearings shall then be conducted. Pleadings submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating Commissioner.

The IBP CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR. It stated that Atty. Mejica was corruptly motivated in encouraging the filing of suits against Caspe making good his threat to file case upon case against the latter until he kneels before him. Notice was taken that this was Atty. Mejica’s second infraction for a similar offense. In Baldado v. Mejica, he was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months. The IBP

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Atty. Mejica during the course of these proceedings has missed all four scheduled hearings supposedly since he was not furnished any copy of the complaint. Records suggest however that a copy of the complaint was sent to him on August 25, 2008, a mail which he did not claim. He submitted two manifestations in response to notices he received. He was thus placed on notice that there was an action against him.

Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. Defendant’s Defense: Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

It is the Court’s opinion that Atty. Mejica’s attitude toward the proceedings before the IBP indicates a lack of respect for the IBP’s rules and procedures. respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS. ANTERO J. POBRE v. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009 FACTS: In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:

ISSUE: WON Sen. Miriam Santiago may be disbarred or be administratively liable.

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

HELD: This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly,

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action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO v. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, A.C. No. 5624, January 20, 2004 FACTS: An administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Natasha V. HeysuwanFlorido, the complainant, averred that she was the legitimatespouse of the respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido, the respondent, but because of theestranged relation, they lived separately. They have two children whom the complainant has thecustody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage; meanwhile there, wasanother related case pending in the Court of Appeals.Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.[7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.

in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children besurrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by theCourt of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motionfor temporary child custody filed by respondent.Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court ofAppeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolutionclosely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensingsomething amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent. The complainantverified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution. But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter

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[from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.

of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.

Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT" A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

HELD: Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.

FACTS: The ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:

Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:

I.

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason

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Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party.

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Corona). Thereafter, various authors wrote the Court regarding the alleged plagiarism of their works.

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.

ISSUE: W/N the professors violated the Code of Professional Responsibility Whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.

Counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."

HELD: The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

The Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

A statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website and on Atty. Roque’s blog. A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV and the Sun Star sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 2010 and at said college’s website. On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice

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To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

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On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.

3. Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors. It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134 lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

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In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is

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certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.

mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. (4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory. (2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. (3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

LANTORIA v. BUNYI A.M. Case No. 1769, June 8, 1992 FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas. Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur

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Respondent admitted the existence of the letter but explained the contents thereof as follows: a) the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, b) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid); c) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases involved

The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court. Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows: 3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A selfrespecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench and bar.

The Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent.

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:

In his answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bunyi is guilty of unethical conduct. HELD: We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case.

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WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.

Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.

CRUZ v. SALVA G.R. No. 12871, July 25, 1959, 105 Phil. 115

Thereafter, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation.

FACTS: Petitioner: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office to testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On the dates of preliminary investigation, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. Moreover, it has been observed that the investigation was conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, it also appeared in the records that the respondent allowed the media to ask questions to the witness in the course of the investigation.

Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence. Pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. Intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy, With that, Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang.

Respondent:

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the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista.

Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him. ISSUE: 1. W/N the act of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation is correct 2. W/N petitioner may be compelled to attend preliminary investigation 3. Is the respondent’s act of publicizing the case correct

The duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.

HELD: (1) As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.

(2) However, with respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.

In the present case, respondent has, in this Court’s opinion, established a justification for his reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

(3) The newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the

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IN RE: ALMACEN G.R. No. 12871, February 18, 1970

lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent,

FACTS: Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution. This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”

The members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable. In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

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HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were terminated upon the agreement of both parties. A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms, represented by the law firm, which handled complainant's labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they violated the rule on conflict of interest. RESPONDENTS: Admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia Law Office, but explained that their association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements."

On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.

According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own professional fees exclusively. As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively. They averred that complainant's labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Penalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of complainant's labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination thereof.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

IBP's Report and Recommendation:

WILFREDO ANGLO v. ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, et.al A.C. No. 10567, February 25, 2015

IBP Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be reprimanded.

FACTS: Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm of the respondents, for labor cases. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was

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The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, having been retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.

As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.

ROLANDO PACANA JR vs. ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL LOPEZ A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court found respondents GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said violations.

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties received by her from complainant.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). Sometime in July 2002, MCC changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation (Precedent). According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent. From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time. A Retainer Agreement dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent.

As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.

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Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon, a telecommunications company based in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within his means. Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.

When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return to the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and that complainant may later on be implicated in Multitels failed investment system. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order had been issued against him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages from respondent updating him of the status of the case against Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter discreetly with government officials she can closely work with in order to clear complainants name.

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from respondent asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondents clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry about.

In two separate e-mail messages, respondent again asked money from complainant, P200,000 of which was handed by complainants wife while respondent was confined in Saint Lukes Hospital after giving birth, and another P700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against complainant. On these occasions, respondent impressed upon complainant that she can closely work with officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and Deportations (BID), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to resolve complainants problems. Respondent also convinced complainant that in order to be absolved from any liability with respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel.

Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants legal problems, respondent was able to convince complainant who was still in the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories stored in complainants house and inside a warehouse. He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper. Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal problems, complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. Respondent thru email advised complainant to stay put in the US. But on July 4, 2003, contrary to respondents advice, complainant returned to the country. On the eve of his departure from the United States, respondent called up complainant and conveniently informed him that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID.

Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount of P900,000.00 which was received by respondent herself. Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave respondent P1,000,000.00. Said amounts were all part of Precedents collections and sales proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the companys properties.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife and told them that she has already accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told complainant that without

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his help, she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved, complainant accepted respondents offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind and told complainant that she would instead invest the P2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture. Complainant declined and explained to respondent that he and his family needed the money instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed. Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise.

In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time. Respondent’s Contention: Respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her and complainant. She claimed that she merely helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance because she personally knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious organization.

By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him. Respondent would either refuse to return complainants call or would abruptly terminate their telephone conversation, citing several reasons. This went on for several months. In one instance, when complainant asked respondent for an update on the collection of Benefons obligation to Precedent which respondent had previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered that she was very busy and that she would read Benefons letter only when she found time to do so.

Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also averred that the results of the settlement between both parties were fully documented and accounted for. Respondent believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents arrogance and evasiveness, complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the latter. Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated December 20, 2004. When complainant found respondents explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a latter expressing his confusion about the accounting. Complainant repeated his request for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will be constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent. Respondent replied, explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who had money claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure quitclaim documents clearing complainant from any liability. Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.

IBP Ruling and Recommendation: The IBP Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent and complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended her disbarment. The IBP Board of Governors issued a Recommendation denying the motion for reconsideration and adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

Petitioner’s Contention:

ISSUES:

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1.) Whether or not there exist a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and respondent? 2.) Whether or not respondent is administratively liable?

with Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the latters help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with complainant. Clearly, respondents act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but also toyed with decency and good taste.

HELD: 1.) Yes, a lawyer – client relationship exists between petitioner and respondent.

Respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of friendly accommodations, precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC

SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION v. ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, A.C. No. 10681, February 03, 2015 FACTS: This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross misconduct for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Complainants alleged that from 1997 until August 2008,3 respondent served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize. Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from their failed business venture, respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow money. The checks were personally encashed by respondent. Demanded the return of payment but failed to do so.

Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant. This argument all the more reveals respondents patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. 2.) Yes, respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Respondent denied borrowing P2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that Nault was the real debtor.18 He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.

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The IBP Report and Recommendation

A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.

In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the IBP-CBD. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated interest.

As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money plus interest within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR. HELD: The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive to return the amount of P2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants. the complainants and incurring the same obligation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this Decision, with a stern warning that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected: CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into his possession.

SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA v. ATTY. OTILIO SY BONGON A.C. No. 8826, March 25, 2015

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”

FACTS: Petitioner: Complainant alleged that on March 1, 2000, she engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, situated in the Municipalities of Camalig and Guinobatan, both in the province of Albay. In connection therewith, she claimed to have given the aggregate amount of P112,499.55 to respondent. However, respondent failed to update complainant regarding the status of the matters referred to him. Thus, complainant terminated her

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.46 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.

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engagement with respondent and demanded for the return of P112,499.55, but to no avail.

various amounts to respondent, of which the latter admitted the receipt of only P55,000.00. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and offered the excuse that the reconstitution of the titles and the preparation of the Deed were delayed due to the Deed’s several revisions; and that Bernabe Olayta’s surviving heirs were living in different places, making it difficult to secure their presence, much less obtain their signatures to the said Deed.

Respondent: Respondent asserts that he only received P55,000.00 and that the rest of the money was received by a certain Rowena Delos Reyes-Kelly who was not an employee of his law firm. Furthermore, he averred that he had already offered to return the amount of P30,000.00 to complainant, claiming that he already earned the fees for legal services in the amount of P20,000.00 for having studied the matter entrusted to him and drafted the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition (Deed) that underwent several revisions.

Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of P55,000.00 that he personally received from complainant despite repeated demands.

IBP: The IBP Board of Governors recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. On motion for reconsideration of respondent, his period of suspension was further decreased to one (1) month.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money must be returned immediately to the client.16 As such, a lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.

Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment18 and, hence, must be disciplined accordingly.

HELD: Yes. It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18of the CPR.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Otilio Sy Bongon is found GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. VICTORIA HEENAN vs. ATTY. ERLINDA ESPEJO A.C. No. 10050 December 3, 2013

As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, as well as preparing the Deed, and in connection therewith, allegedly gave

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on Bar

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Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyer’s oath.

(1) scheduled preliminary investigation where she promised to pay her loan obligation.

In January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio (Corazon). Atty. Espejo obtained a loan from Victoria. Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as her godmother’s lawyer, Victoria found no reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria agreed to accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the amount of PhP 250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a check for two hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for the reason that she was still waiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loan to fund the check. However, after a couple of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the check was already funded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000) representing the interest which accrued due to the late payment of the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite Victoria’s repeated demands. Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit to her account the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000, but without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact. However, the said check was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Victoria thereafter became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money. She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand letter dated August 3, 2009.

In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of two hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.). However, to Victoria’s chagrin, the said check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo did not file any counteraffidavit or pleading to answer the charges against her. Victoria thereafter filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Espejo before the CBD. The CBD, issued an Order directing Atty. Espejo to submit her Answer to Victoria’s administrative complaint. Findings and Recommendation of the IBP: The CBD recommended the suspension of Atty. Espejo from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years. The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction. Moreover, respondent[’s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and despite repeated demands [she] failed to comply with her obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for preliminary investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her for Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary action against respondent.

When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.

The Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the CBD with the modification lowering Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five (5) years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP 250,000 within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made.

Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas which she personally received and continued to ignore Victoria’s demands. She attended only one

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

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ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Espejo is guilty of violating the code of professional responsibility?

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complaint but offered no justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his financial obligations to complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrong doing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct. Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide: CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. The Court held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non- professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.

CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.

CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

TERESITA T. BAYONLA VS. ATTY. PURITA A. REYES. A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011

Atty. Espejo did not deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse allegations that she issued unfunded checks to pay her obligation. It has already been settled that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

FACTS: Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who had jointly owned a parcel of land. They died without leaving a will. Their land was thereafter expropriated in connection with the construction of the Bancasi Airport. An expropriation compensation amounting to P2,453,429.00 was to be paid to

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their heirs. Bayonla and her uncle, Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the compulsory heirs of Paz, being, respectively, Paz’s granddaughter and son.

Recommends that the respondent be required to render an accounting or inventory duly confirmed by the complainant of all the collected shares due the complainant and remit to the latter the said amount of P44.582.66;

Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that she and Alfredo had engaged the legal services of Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the expropriation compensation, agreeing to her attorney’s fees of 10% of whatever amount would be collected; Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from the ATO; that Bayonla’s share, after deducting Atty. Reyes’ attorney’s fees, would be P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands; Atty. Reyes had collected the amount of P121,119.11 from the ATO; that Bayonla’s share, after deducting Atty. Reyes’ attorney’s fees, would be P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes had handed her only P56,500.00, and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,507.20; and that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for depriving her of her just share.

Until such time that respondent had complied with the aforementioned, she is suspended from the practice of her legal profession. ISSUE: Whether or not the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors were proper. HELD: Respondent was guilty of violating the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of her client that may come into her possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand, subject to the lawyer’s lien over the funds, or the lawyer’s option to apply so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to the client.

RESPONDENT: Atty. Reyes admitted that Bayonla and Alfredo had engaged her legal services for the purpose of collecting their share in the expropriation compensation; that as consideration for her services, Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed upon a 40% contingent fee for her; that she had given to Bayonla more than what had been due to her; that Alfredo had received from the ATO the check for the second release corresponding to the share of both Bayonla and Alfredo; that Alfredo had gotten more than Bayonla out of the second release; that on June 5, 1995 she had received out of the second release by the ATO only her 40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed to bear the expenses for the collection of their share; that she had incurred travel and other expenses in collecting such share; and that she should be absolved from liability arising from the complaint.

There is no question that the money or property received by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter. Conformably with these canons of professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected for her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client.

IBP:

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

By not delivering Bayonla’s share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned over to the client. The unjustified withholding of money belonging to the client

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warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer. Without doubt, Atty. Reyes’ failure to immediately account for and to deliver the money upon demand was deceit, for it signified that she had converted the money to her own use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It constituted gross misconduct for which the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.

It serves well to mention, lastly, that the simultaneous pendency of an administrative case and a judicial proceeding related to the cause of the administrative case, even if the charges and the evidence to be adduced in such cases are similar, does not result into or occasion any unfairness, or prejudice, or deprivation of due process to the parties in either of the cases.

II

The Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ATTY. PURITA A. REYES guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for a period of two years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with warning that a similar offense by her will be dealt with more severely.

Pendency of other cases not an obstacle to administrative proceeding against respondent The filing of the perjury charge by Atty. Reyes against Bayonla and of the estafa charge by Bayonla against Atty. Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty of Atty. Reyes to render an accounting and to remit the amount due to Bayonla. Nor did the pendency of such cases inhibit this administrative matter from proceeding on its due course. It is indisputable that the pendency of any criminal charges between the lawyer and her client does not negate the administrative proceedings against the lawyer.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Reyes to pay to complainant Teresita T. Bayonla within 30 days from receipt of this Decision the amount of P44,582.67, with interest of 12% per annum from June 22, 1997, and to render unto the complainant a complete written accounting and inventory. MARITES FREEMAN v. ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES A.C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman, seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in obtaining money from her, without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of her deceased husband. Complainant also seeks recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and the insurance proceeds, which was remitted to the latter, with prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages. Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her and her child in pursuing and protecting their rights as heirs of her deceased husband who was a British national, including claiming insurance proceeds due to the complainant and her child, as well as processing visa applications for travel to England. Respondent solicited various sums from the complainant, allegedly for purposes do defraying expenses in connection with the engagement.

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MARILEN G. SOLIMAN v. ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY A.C. No. 10568 [FORMERLY CBD CASE No. 10-2753], January 13, 2015

Respondent: Admitted having received money from complainant but failed to render an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses incurred. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving “grease money” or lagay to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the normal course of conducting official business transactions as a means to expedite the visa applications.

FACTS: Petitioner: Complainant claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy on May 27, 2007 in connection with a partition case. In accordance with the Retainer Agreement between the parties, Soliman agreed to pay Atty. Amboy P50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latter’s engagement, Soliman paid her P25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer institute a partition case since the other co-owners of the property were amenable to the partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the titles to the said property from the co-owners to the individual owners; the P25,000.00 already paid to her was then treated as payment for her professional services.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that respondent violated the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Respondent’s repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking complainant’s finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity required in the practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of exercising the noble legal profession.

Later, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy P16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax. In the second quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was a delay in the issuance of the titles to the property because of the failure of the other co-owners to submit certain documents. Atty. Amboy then told Soliman that someone from the Register of Deeds (RD) can help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee of P80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that her contact in the RD agreed to reduce the amount to P50,000.00. Further, Soliman deposited the amount of P8,900.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as payment for the real property tax for the year 2009. Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as payment for the latter’s contact in the RD.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of gross misconduct and DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let her name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

Later, Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the property were then only awaiting the signature of the authorized officer. However, Atty. Amboy failed to deliver the respective certificates of title of Soliman and her co-owners to the subject property. However, Atty. Amboy’s secretary informed Soliman that their contact in the RD was asking for an additional P10,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said

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certificates of title. Soliman then refused to further pay. Soliman then asked the updates on the release of the said title but respondent did not answer. Thereafter, Soliman and Atty. Amboy’s secretary went to the office of a certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman asked Atty. Marasigan if he received the P50,000.00 as payment for the release of the said titles. Atty. Marasigan denied having received any amount to facilitate the release of the titles and claimed that the reason why the same could not be processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to file certain documents. Upon demand to release the documents and the money given, respondent refused.

competence and diligence; to never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; and to keep his client informed of the status of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Respondent: Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement with Soliman, but denied having received any amount from the latter pursuant to the said agreement. She claimed that the retainer agreement was not implemented since the partition case was not instituted. She claimed that she merely undertook to research, gather and collate all documents required in the partition and in the transfer of the titles from the co-owners to the individual owners. She denied having failed to submit the relevant documents to the RD which caused the delay in the processing of the said titles. She likewise denied having asked Soliman for P50,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said titles.

This is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in dealing with a client. Atty. Amboy’s acts undermined the legal processes, which she swore to uphold and defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty. Amboy bound herself to respect the law and legal processes.

The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving P25,000.00 as payment for her professional services, failed to submit material documents relative to the issuance of separate certificates of title to the individual owners of the property. It was her negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of title.

The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the amount of P50,000.00 which she paid in order to facilitate the release of the certificates of title. To reiterate, upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of Manila, denied having received any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not returning the money to Soliman after a demand therefor was made following her failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.

IBP: IBP Board of Governors recommends Atty. Amboy’s suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to two (2) years and that she was ordered to return the entire amount she received from Soliman.

“A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of. HELD: Yes.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy is foundGUILTY of violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years,

The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and that he should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. A lawyer is mandated to serve his client with

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effective upon receipt of this Resolution. Furthermore, she is ORDERED to return to Marilen G. Soliman the entire amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) she received from the latter, plus legal interest thereon, reckoned from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

Defendant’s Defense: He alleged that upon careful examination of the heirs' unlawful detainer complaint, he noticed a discrepancy between the descriptions of the subject property as indicated in the said pleading as opposed to that which complainant supplied to him. On the belief that the parties may be contesting two (2) sets of properties which are distinct and separate from one another, respondent, at the preliminary conference conducted on October 28, 2003, moved for the suspension of further proceedings and proposed that a commissioner be appointed to conduct a re-survey in order to determine the true identity of the property in dispute. The MTC allowed the counsels for both parties to decide on the manner of the proposed re-survey, leading to the assignment of a Department of Agrarian Reform Survey Engineer (DAR Engineer) for this purpose. The survey conducted by the DAR Engineer revealed that complainant's tillage extended to about 5,000 square meters of the subject property which was determined to belong to the heirs, the rest being covered by the title of Pelagia. Dissatisfied, complainant manifested her intention to secure the services of a private surveyor of her own choice, and promised to furnish respondent a copy of the survey results, which she, however, failed to do. Later, complainant accused respondent of manipulating the DAR Survey Results which caused their lawyer-client relationship to turn sour and eventually be severed. She has since retrieved the entire case folders and retained the services of another lawyer.

JOSEFINA CARRANZA vida de ZALDIVAR v. ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, Jr. A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013 FACTS: Complainant was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, filed by the heirs of one Benjamin Don before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur (MTC), wherein she was represented by respondent. While respondent duly filed an answer to the unlawful detainer complaint, he, however, failed to submit a pre-trial brief as well as to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. Consequently, the opposing counsel moved that the case be submitted for decision which motion was granted in an Order dated November 27, 2003. When complainant confronted respondent about the foregoing, the latter just apologized and told her not to worry, assuring her that she will not lose the case since she had the title to the subject property. The MTC issued a Decision (MTC Decision) against complainant, ordering her to vacate and turn-over the possession of the subject property to the heirs as well as to pay them damages. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 (RTC), reversed the MTC Decision and dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint. Later however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s ruling and reinstated the MTC Decision. Respondent received a copy of the CA’s ruling on January 27, 2006. Yet, he failed to inform complainant about the said ruling, notwithstanding the fact that the latter frequented his work place. Neither did respondent pursue any further action. As such, complainant decided to engage the services of another counsel for the purpose of seeking other available remedies. Due to respondent’s failure to timely turn-over to her the papers and documents in the case, such other remedies were, however, barred. Thus, based on these incidents, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, alleging that respondent’s acts amounted to gross negligence which resulted in her loss.

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ISSUE: WON, Atty. Cabanes was negligent in his duties. HELD: The Investigating Commissioner’s Report: The Investigating Commissioner ruled that respondent failed to exercise ordinary diligence in handling his client's cause, warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. The BOG’s Recommendation: The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioner’s Report.

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RULING:

It took some period of negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them copies of a deed of absolute sale involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them that whether or not the title of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect would no longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he had already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the amicable settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.

The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation. The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code embody these quintessential directives.

When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property they were dismayed to learn that they could not liquidate the property because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation. Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote to him to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues with Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all.

Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.28 Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.

During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group. This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on, however, that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated. Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and praying for Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and respect reposed in him as their counsel.

FERDINAND A. SAMSON VS. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013

RESPONDENT:

FACTS: Ferdinand A. Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS Corporation, a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Emilia C. Sison. Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent him and his relatives in the criminal prosecution of Sison and her group.

Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion of the compromise settlement between Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the other, had terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and Samson and his group; and that he had been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison only for purposes of her arraignment.

Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they received a deed of assignment covering land executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.

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IBP:

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Found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to champion his clients’ cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.

2. The prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal representation; 3. A client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential information; 4. Conflict rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to make a gift to the lawyer; and 5. Some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate presentations to tribunals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting claims. HELD: The Court FINDS Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the CPR; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for 2 years.

In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest in this wise: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous relation.

The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as follows:

The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.

1. The law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty;

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REYNALDO RAMIREZ vs. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO A.C. No. 10537 February 3, 2015

Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary period.

FACTS: Complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) engaged Atty. Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled “Spouses Roque v. Ramirez.” The case was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.

Petitioner’s Contention: Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him as per a referral from a friend of Ramirez’s sister. He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees. It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court appearance.

Respondent’s Contention: By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50% chance of winning the case. She denied ever having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the controversy.

On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez. Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008.14 On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one prepared.

Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had begged her to do so. She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he had been busy. Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and accidentally erased all her contacts.

On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief. Atty. Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief. On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there was still no word from the Court of Appeals.

IBP Findings and Recommendation:

On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. She told him that the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was the basis of his claim. She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

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The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution. It found that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Consequently, the Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

(respondent), praying that the latter be directed to return the amount of P48,000.00 that he received from the former. Complainant, as President of “Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III, Incorporated”(Samahan), alleged that he engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case in order to determine the true owner of the land being occupied by the members of Samahan.2 In connection therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount of P48,000.00 intended to cover the filing fees for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a written acknowledgment executed by respondent himself.3 Despite the payment, respondent failed to file an action in court. When confronted, respondent explained that the money given to him was not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in court.4Thus, complainant asked for the return of the money, but respondent claimed to have spent the same and even demanded more money.5 Complainant further alleged that when he persisted in seeking restitution of the aforesaid sum, respondent told him to shut up because it was not his money in the first place.6 Hence, complainant filed this administrative complaint seeking the return of the full amount he had paid to respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Margallo should be held administratively liable? RULING: Yes, Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the case of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it appear that the case was dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellant’s Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of candor to her client. Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provide: CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Respondent: Denied spending complainant’s money, explaining that he had already prepared the initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when he discovered through the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee was quite costly. This prompted him to immediately relay such information to complainant who undertook to raise the amount needed. While waiting, however, the instant administrative case was filed against him.8

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation In a Report and Recommendation9 dated October 3, 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and accordingly, recommended that he be: (a) meted with the penalty of Censure, with a warning that a repetition of the same will be met with a stiffer penalty; and (b) directed to account for or return the amount of P48,000.00 to complainant.10

EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE v. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, Jr., A.C. No. 10672 March 18, 2015 FACTS: This is an administrative complaint1 dated May 9, 2006 filed by complainant Eduardo A. Maglente (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr.

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year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of. HELD: The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP, except as tothe penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

JULIAN PENILLA v. ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, Jr. A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013

It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18of the CPR, which reads:

FACTS: Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Sps Rey and Evelyn Garin for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses defaulted in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a case for breach of contract against the spouses where he engaged the services of respondent as counsel. Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of complainant’s payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent advised complainant that he would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses. Respondent charged P30,000 as attorney’s fees and P10,000 as filing fees. Complainant turned over the relevant documents to respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Respondent attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the hearing, complainant paid another P1,000 to respondent as appearance fee. Henceforth, complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent events and transactions that transpired.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of P48,000.00 to answer for the filing fees. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse that the money he received from complainant was not enough to fully pay the filing fees. Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client.18 A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.

Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told him that they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a favorable resolution of the case. Complainant claims that despite initial reservations, he later acceded to respondent’s suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for P950 and delivered it to respondent’s office.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), is found GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case against the spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for reconsideration was “needed to have [the resolution] reversed.”

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Respondent then prepared the motion and promised complainant that he would fix the problem. the motion was denied for lack of merit. Respondent then told complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse decision and presented the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the spouses for the refund of the money plus damages. After complainant signed the complaint, he was told by respondent to await further notice as to the status of the case. Complainant claims that respondent never gave him any update thereafter.

ISSUE: W/N respondent may be disbarred. HELD: Yes. Respondent committed professional negligence under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.

Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters conveying his disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the documents in respondent’s possession. Later, complainant learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed but was dismissed. He also found out that the filing fee was only P2,440 and not P10,000 as earlier stated by respondent.

A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under Canon 18 to “serve his client with competence and diligence” when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages before the RTC. The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant. What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling the case of complainant. The civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later turned out to be a basic jurisdictional error.

On the other hand, Respondent denied charging complainant filing fees for the estafa case. He also countered that the payment of P30,000 made by the complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case. Respondent likewise denied the following other allegations of complainant: that he assured the success of the case before the prosecutor; that he asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor; that he promised to fix the case; and that he charged P10,000, as he only charged P5,000, as filing fee for the civil case. Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed to inform petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money and the documents of complainant. What allegedly prevented him from communicating with complainant was the fact that complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would be attending his daily court hearings.

Furthermore, After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly negligent and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He paid no attention and showed no importance to complainant’s cause despite repeated followups. Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack

IBP recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months “for negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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ERMELINDA LAD VDA. DE DOMINGUEZ, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, VICENTE A. PICHON v. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON Sr. A.C. No. 5359 March 10, 2014

of professionalism in dealing with complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be a helpless attempt to solve his predicament, complainant even had to resort to consulting a program in a radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the very least, get his attention.

FACTS: Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On three 3 occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) June 3, 1996 P3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 Pl,800.00; and September 2, 1996 -P5,250.00 or a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.

Under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all other information relevant thereto. He must be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly should there be queries or requests for information from the client. In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent is too lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself admitted that he had notice that complainant had visited his office many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance exhibited by complainant, respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Defendant’s Defense:

Respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that “[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.” The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s Oath.

Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received the amount of P10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of P100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the 30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of P10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a MOdIFICATION that respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby found Guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsiblity, as well as the Lawyer's Oath. This Court hereby imposes upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision.

1ST SEMESTER SY. 2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON

ISSUE: WON Atty. Agleron violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: The Investigating Commissioner’s Report:

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The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of four (4) months.

services of Atty. Adquilen, a former Labor Arbiter, who re-filed his labor case. Similarly, the case was dismissed due to the parties' failure to submit their respective position papers. Complainant and Atty. Adquilen re-filed the case for a third time. During its pendency, the representative of Capitol purportedly offered the amount of P74,000.00 as settlement of complainant's claim, conditioned on the submission of the latter’s position paper. Atty. Adquilen, however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint “for lack of interest and failure to prosecute”.

The BOG’s Recommendation: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one 1 month.

Complainant this time assisted by Atty. Picar filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the NLRC dismissed the same for having been filed out of time, adding that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate letters to respondents, informing them that complainant is in the process of pursuing administrative cases against them before the Court. Nevertheless, as complainant remains open to the possibility of settlement, respondents were invited to discuss the matter at Atty. Picar’s office. Only Atty. Quesada responded to the said letter and subsequently, undertook to compensate the damages sustained by complainant in consideration of the non-filing of an administrative complaint against him. Atty. Quesada, however, reneged on his promise, thus prompting complainant to proceed with the present complaint.

RULING: The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty imposed. Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that: Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. In a number of cases, the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from three months to two years. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the practice of law for a period of three months sufficient.

RESPONDENT: Atty. Adquilen failed to comply with the directive and the subsequent showcause resolutions. On the other hand, Atty. Quesada, in his Comment, admitted having accepted and filed the initial labor case for complainant. He, however, explained that he was unable to file the required position paper due to complainant's failure to furnish him with the employment records and other relevant documents. He also claimed that when he was informed of the dismissal of the case without prejudice, he advised complainant to re-file the case with the assistance of another lawyer as he had to attend to his duties as Chairman of union. He later denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant, and claimed that the labor case was handled by another lawyer.

FELIPE C. DAGALA VS. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR. A.C. No. 5044, December 02, 2013 FACTS: Complainant, assisted by Atty. Quesada, filed before the NLRC, a Complaint for illegal dismissal, against Capitol Allied Trading & Transport (Capitol). The said case was dismissed for failure to appear during the mandatory conference hearings.Thereafter, complainant engaged the

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in its November 19, 2011 Resolution which represents the settlement initially offered by Capitol in the dismissed labor case. The return of the said amount partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an administrative-disciplinary proceeding such as this case. In TriaSamonte v. Obias, the Court recently illumined that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is his administrative liability. Thus, matters which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement, such as the liabilities of the parties which are purely civil in nature, should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature, and not during administrativedisciplinary proceedings, as in this case.

Finding that respondents were grossly negligent in handling complainant's case in violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). As such, he recommended that each of them be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Quesada should be held administratively liable for gross negligence in handling complainant’s labor case. HELD: Yes. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be evermindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts. These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code. In the present case, the Court finds Atty. Quesada to have violated the foregoing Rules and Canons.

Respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. On the other hand, the administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Amado T. Adquilen is hereby DISMISSED in view of his supervening death. STEPHAN BRUNET vs. ATTY. RONALD GUAREN A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014

Primarily, Atty, Quesada failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainant’s case by his failure to justify his absence on the two (2) mandatory conference hearings despite due notice, which thus resulted in its dismissal. It bears stressing that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence and not to sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty. Moreover, Atty. Quesada acted with less candor and good faith in the proceedings before the IBP-CBD when he denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant, and claimed that the labor case was handled by another lawyer, despite his previous admission before the Court of having accepted complainant's case.

FACTS: Complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Petitioner’s Contention: Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres. Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding. It was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title. Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave. Atty.

The Court must, however, clarify that the foregoing resolution should not include a directive to return the amount of P74,000.00 as ordered by the IBP

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Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lotcertified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver. On March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave. From 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress. They became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid. Respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.

a case against complainants without a written consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three (3) months only. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Guaren should be held administratively liable? HELD: Yes, in the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC). Respondent’s Contention:

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of P10,000.00, but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of P1,000.00 and P6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

IBP Report and Recommendation:

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of P7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in

Respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren was found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS.

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RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF TOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ETC./RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI NO. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II, IPI No. 12-205-CA-J/A.C. 10300, December 10, 2013

Said case was terminated on June 20, 1958, probating the said will. The oppositors in this case who are the same persons mentioned above appealed this case to the Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by the Hon. Supreme Court of the Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662, affirming the decision of the Lower Court

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. We also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. The Supreme Court held Atty. Adaza II guilty of indirect contempt. Atty. Adaza prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of Merdegia’s case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias. If they doubted the legality of the Resolution, they could have filed a petition for certiorari.

That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties filed on June 5, 1968 Civil Case No. 3677-M with the CFI of Bulacan for annulment of will; this case was filed through their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Centeno. Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970. That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was again dismissed by the Court on December 21, 1971; That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo, filed another case with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of the same property mentioned in the probate of will which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4151. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 11, 1972;

ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers should be administratively liable. HELD: Administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes. Atty. Adaza failed to impress upon his client the features of the Philippine adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before the courts.

Another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty. Montalvo, for specific performance, with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4188-M. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 24,1973. On August 12, 1974, the said case was remanded to the Court of Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan Yet, another case filed by the same persons mentioned above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458.

DIMAGIBA v. MONTALVO, Jr. A.C. No. 1424, October 15, 1991

In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their counsel, Atty. Montalvo, complainant filed this case.

FACTS: A Probate of Will was filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, regarding the same property subject of the annulment of sale and was docketed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No. 831-M.

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Respondnet Montalvo, claims that the case for the interest of justice — certainly never for harassment and that the complainant by filing this instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order to withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted in her erroneous belief that she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes and could not accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the deceased but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned. Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the Supreme Court Decision in G.R. Nos. 5618 and 5620

court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had take their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion. On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath not to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT. WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain the high traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458-M of the CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes of action were again the same as 3677-M and 4188-M. Again, the CFI Bulacan dismissed the cases. Upon study, the Solicitor General recommends that respondent’s misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of Court..

ONG v. UNTO A.C. No. 2417, February 6, 2003

HELD: Yes. Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history of a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended a contentious litigation between the heirs.

FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. They, however, did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client. The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have leverage in his actions against the latter. Defendant’s Defense:

A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left dangling by our legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie could get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba When

There was none. The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the complaint lodged against him. He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG

ISSUE: PENILLA W/N respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the investigation.

Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of assisting them in the preparation of a settlement agreement. Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions against Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then signed a contract of legal services, in which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to respondent, but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties.

It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for postponement. ISSUE: WON Atty. Unto’s acts constitute malpractice.

In preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and notarized an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim of complainants to at least 195 titles in the possession of Fevidal. Unknown to him, the adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal convinced complainants to agree to another settlement.

HELD: Yes. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate, or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.

Respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and revalidation of titles, and damages against Fevidal. Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they terminated the services of respondent and finalized their amicable settlement with him. RESPONDENT: Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition before the RTC, alleging that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been done with the intent of defrauding counsel. He also filed a Motion for Recording of Attorney’s Charging Lien in the Records.

CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, et.al vs. ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR. A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013 FACTS: Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land. They entered into an agreement with Gerry R. Fevidal (Fevidal), a subdivision developer. Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and failed to account for the titles to the subdivided land. Thus, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had previously executed in his favor.

After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter denying the former’s allegation of collusion, complainants sought the suspension/disbarment of respondent. Complainants alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and could not taste the fruits of their properties because the disposition thereof was “now clothed with legal problems” brought about by respondent. In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

COMPLAINANTS:

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:

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It suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year for entering into a champertous agreement.

Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of entering into a champertous contract.

A reading of the contract for legal services shows that respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the expense for the docket fees. He also paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of complainants’ adverse claim.

HELD: We find that respondent did not violate any of the canons cited by complainants. Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against Fevidal to recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of P10,000,000 – a measly amount compared to that in the original agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount of P35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of any prospective client and pursue the ends of justice. Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under the circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a lawyer only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath.

While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling in order to safeguard their client’s rights, it is imperative that the advances be subject to reimbursement. The purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in the client’s cause. Regrettably, nowhere in the contract for legal services is it stated that the expenses of litigation advanced by respondent shall be subject to reimbursement by complainants. In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and transportation allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client relationship. In fact, he admits that the cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he extended to complainants.

Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording of his attorney’s charging lien as the “legal problem” preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their property.

Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the client’s interests with the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding circumstances in this case, an admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire the needs of the clients, a lawyer must always avoid any appearance of impropriety to preserve the integrity of the profession.

Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by the client. We recently upheld the right of counsel to intervene in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien.

Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the litigation expenses in a legal matter he handled for a client without providing for terms of reimbursement and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without fault. Indeed, we find that the contract for legal services he has executed with complainants is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and are thus void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional

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THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO vs. VICTORINO LACAYA G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014

fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases. Ruling of the RTC:

FACTS: Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (Spouses Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a land in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. On April 30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames).

RTC declared the contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. RTC reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining 5.2692 hectares to the spouses Cadavedo. The RTC noted that the agreed attorney’s fee on contingent basis was P2,000.00. The RTC was convinced that the issues involved in the Civil Case handled by Atty. Lacuya were not sufficiently difficult and complicated to command such an excessive award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his time or skill, or to perform extensive research. However, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents were thus entitled to receive its fruits.

Spouses Cadavedo filed an action before the RTC of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of P2,000.00

The respondents appealed the case before the CA.

While Atty. Lacaya was handling the cases of petitioners, Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.

Ruling of the CA: CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and maintained the partition and distribution of the subject lot under the compromise agreement. Consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should guide the determination of the lawyer’s fees), the CA ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him losing other employment resulting from his engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.

Vicente Cadavedo and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry. Vicente and Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement, re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreement. The spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that the RTC

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Petitioner’s Contention: The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional services, especially those contained in the pleadings filed in

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courts, control the amount of the attorney’s fees to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s contingent attorney’s fee was P2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.

1) The written agreement providing for a contingent fee of P2,000.00 should prevail over the oral agreement providing for one-half of the subject lot. An agreement between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the former. Hence, the contingency fee of P2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot.

Respondent’s Contention: Respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They argue that the questioned stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty. Lacaya.

The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of P2,000.00 and not one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor.

The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its possession with the RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally designated administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the partnership and could not have been invalidated by the absence of Benita’s acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.

Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the court would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a representation to the court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his services in the case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the former prays from the court as an incident to the main action. 2) The contingent fee agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, awarding the latter one-half of the subject lot, is champertous.

Issue: Whether or not the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners? HELD: No, the attorney’s fees consisting of the one half of the subject lot is not valid for the following reasons:

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Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the

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latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void. This agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.

The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and expenses for each of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been considered and taken cared of.

“The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause."

4) Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of the one-half portion contravenes Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession. The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.

In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.

While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code. however, this recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation. The payment of the contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.

3) The attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is excessive and unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the services of Atty. Lacaya. Plainly, it was intended for only one action as the two other civil cases had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the absence of any showing that special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case, as observed by the RTC was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.

In the present case, the transfer or assignment of the disputed onehalf portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of the unproved oral contingent fee agreement. 5) Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis

Also, with respect to the two subsequent cases, it did not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot.

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CZARINA T. MALVAR v. KRAFT FOODS PHILS., INC., et.al., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2011

"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as basis for determining a lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees." The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.

FACTS: On August 1, 1988, Kraft Foods (Phils.), Inc. (KFPI) hired Czarina Malvar (Malvar) as its Corporate Planning Manager. From then on, she gradually rose from the ranks, becoming in 1996 the Vice President for Finance in the Southeast Asia Region of Kraft Foods International (KFI),KFPI’s mother company. On November 29, 1999, respondent Bienvenido S. Bautista, as Chairman of the Board of KFPI and concurrently the Vice President and Area Director for Southeast Asia of KFI, sent Malvar a memo directing her to explain why no administrative sanctions should be imposed on her for possible breach of trust and confidence and for willful violation of company rules and regulations. Following the submission of her written explanation, an investigating body was formed. In due time, she was placed under preventive suspension with pay. Ultimately, on March 16, 2000, she was served a notice of termination.

Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled. In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty. Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third (Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.

Obviously aggrieved, Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI and Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a decision dated April 30, 2001,1 the Labor Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal, and ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of her full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, plus attorney’s fees. On October 22, 2001, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but additionally ruled that Malvar was entitled to "any and all stock options and bonuses she was entitled to or would have been entitled to had she not been illegally dismissed from her employment," as well as to moral and exemplary damages. While her appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, she and respondents entered into a compromise agreement, whereby she was paid P40,000,000 in addition to the P14,252,192.12 earlier paid to her. She later filed a motion to dismiss/withdraw case but before it could be acted upon, a motion for intervention to protect attorney’s rights was filed by the law firm of Dasal, Llasos and Associates, through its Of counsel, retired Supreme Court

The Supreme Court ruled that respondents are entitled only to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.

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Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo. The motion sought, among others, that both Malvar and KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly and severally the intervenor’s contingent fees.

International to jointly and severally pay to Intervenor Law Firm, represented by Retired Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, its stipulated contingent fees of 10% of P41,627,593.75, and the further sum equivalent to 10% of the value of the stock option. No pronouncement on costs of suit.

In opposing the motion, Malvar claimed that the intervenor lacked the legal capacity to intervene because it had ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N. Llasos resigned from the intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal became barred from private practice upon his appointment to a position in a government subsidiary. They both personally handled her case. Besides, their dismissal was based on a justifiable cause.

PALM v. ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, Jr. A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009 FACTS: Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of computer software development. From February 2003 to November 2003, respondent served as Comtechs retained corporate counsel for the amount of P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September to October 2003, complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate matters, including potential amendments to the corporate bylaws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003, respondent suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow participation during board meetings, through teleconference, of members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Malvar is tenable. HELD: No. In the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his just fee already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. As a final word, it is necessary to state that no court can shirk from enforcing the contractual stipulations in the manner they have agreed upon and written. As a rule, the courts, whether trial or appellate, have no power to make or modify contracts between the parties. Nor can the courts save the parties from disadvantageous provisions. The same precepts hold sway when it comes to enforcing fee arrangements entered into in writing between clients and attorneys. In the exercise of their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the Court, the courts are bound to respect and protect the attorney’s lien as a necessary means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the Law Profession. Hence, the Court must thwart any and every effort of clients already served by their attorneys’ worthy services to deprive them of their hard-earned compensation. Truly, the duty of the courts is not only to see to it that attorneys act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that attorneys are paid their just and lawful fees.

Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant became uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent effective November 2003. In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy for Gary Harrison (Harrison). teven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members of the Board of Directors, were present through teleconference. When the meeting was called to order, respondent objected to the meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven and Deanna Palm could not participate in the meeting because the corporate bylaws had not yet been amended to allow teleconferencing.

WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise agreement; GRANTS the Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights; and ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and respondents Kraft Food Philippines Inc. and Kraft Foods

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Later, Comtech’s new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to return or account for the amount of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized

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disbursements when she was the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April 2004, Comtech received Soledads reply, signed by respondent. Due to Soledads failure to comply with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a complaint for Estafa against Soledad. Thereafter, dibarment was filed against the respondent.

ISSUE: Is respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21? Is there a conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad? HELD: 1). No

On the other hand, respondent alleged that in January 2002, Soledad consulted him on process and procedure in acquiring property. In April 2002, Soledad again consulted him about the legal requirements of putting up a domestic corporation. In February 2003, Soledad engaged his services as consultant for Comtech. Respondent alleged that from February to October 2003, neither Soledad nor Palm consulted him on confidential or privileged matter concerning the operations of the corporation. Respondent further alleged that he had no access to any record of Comtech. Respondent admitted that during the months of September and October 2003, complainant met with him regarding the procedure in amending the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings.

Canon 21 provides that a lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. The documents are public records and could not be considered confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech President, appointed him as proxy during the 10 January 2004 meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison instructed him to observe the conduct of the meeting. Respondent admitted that he objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm because the corporate by-laws had not yet been properly amended to allow the participation of board members by teleconferencing.

2. No. Rule 15.03 provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in the case for Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he became a consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the criminal case was not related to or connected with the limited procedural queries he handled with Comtech.

The Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. The Court has ruled that what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.

IBP ruled that respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of representing interest in conflict with that of Comtech as his former client. Thus, recommending suspending respondent from the practice of law for two years.

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Court finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.[17]

In his defense, he averred that he was engaged to represent the Lim family by William and Leonardo Lim, the children of Spouses Hio and Dolores Chu. That by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed in their favor by their parents, William and Leonardo had assumed that the TCTs were already transferred to their names. He prepared the initial pleading based on his honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then still living. Had he known that they were already deceased; he would have most welcomed the information and would have moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim as defendants for that reason.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of merit.

HELD: No. The Court found that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings. The records indicated that the respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, and in the clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased.

ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or Lawyer’s Oath.

DE LEON v. CASTELO A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011 FACTS: On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land located in Malabon City then registered in the names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a public callejon and on a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline. De Leon, having joined the civil case as a voluntary intervenor two years later, now accuses the respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants, with the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney. The respondent’s error was allegedly committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu of various pleadings that is, answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in relation to the main complaint; and answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim despite said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.

Even if any of the respondent’s pleadings might have created any impression that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, the Court still cannot hold the respondent guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one, the respondent was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the action as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons

Defendant’s Defense:

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interested in the litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in intervention, bear out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim, and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist that the respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any other party.

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