Legal Ethics Practice of Law

PRACTICE OF LAW: PAGUIA VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESDENT FACTS: Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees. ISSUE: Petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness. Ruling: An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED. Advincula vs. Atty. MacabataAC No. 7204March 07, 2007 Facts: The complainant, Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabataon the grounds of Gross Immorality.The complainant sought for legal advice from the respondent regarding hercollectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours which later failed to settle its accountswith the complainant. Thus, the possibility of filing a case against Queensway Traveland Tours was discussed.After the meeting on February 10, 2005, the respondent gave the complainant a ridehome. As the complainant gets off the car, the respondent allegedly held her arm,kissed her cheek and embraced her tightly.Again, after another meeting on March 06 2005, the respondent offered a ride. Onthe road, the complainant felt sleepy for no obvious reason. The respondentsuddenly stopped the car in the vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.This time, the respondent forcefully held her face, kissed her lips and held her breast.The complainant managed to escape and decided to hire another lawyer for

hercase. They had exchange of messages thru sms where the respondent apologized.The respondent admitted kissing the complainant on the lips however countered thatthere was no harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead everything wasspontaneous. Issues: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or whichconstitute serious moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension fromthe practice of law Decision: The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendship andcamaraderie, form of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of the respondent,though, in turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing her on thelips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable,cannot be considered grossly immoral.The complainant miserably failed to establish the burden of proof required of her.However, her efforts are lauded to stand up for her honor.The complaint for disbarment against the respondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata, foralleged immorality is dismissed. However, he is reprimanded to be more prudent andcautious in dealing with his clients.

JoselanoGuevarra v. Atty Jose Emmanuel Eala, AC No.7136, August 1, 2007 Facts: Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit affair with the respondent. After leaving the conjugal home, petitioner found out that Irene and respondent was living together in a residential house few blocks away from the church they were married. Few months thereafter, Irene gave birth to a baby girl and wrote the name of the respondent as the father in the certificate of live birth. Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage to Irene and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene. Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment before the IBP-CBD on the ground of gross immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath which was dismissed by the IBP Board of Governors due to lack of merit. Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme Court. Issue: Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross immoral conduct? Ruling:

Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal) Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. (Tucay v. Atty. Tucay) Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Rebecca B. Arnobit vs. AttyPonciano P. Arnobit, A.C. No. 1481, October 17, 2008 Facts:

Rebecca B. Arnobit, filed an affidavit-complaint, praying that the Court exercise its disciplinary power over her husband, respondent Atty. PoncianoArnobit, on the grounds of Immorality and Abandonment.

Complainant and respondent were married with 12 children. Several years after passing the bar, respondent left the conjugal dwelling and cohabited with Benita Buenafe, a married woman, who bore him 4 more children. Rebecca filed a complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal case of adultery against respondent and Benita later followed.

Respondent denied the allegation that he cohabited with Benita. Instead, he alleged that it was Rebecca who was the cause of their separation due to her frequent travels around the country without his consent and thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family.

Hearings were conducted before the Office of the Solicitor General and subsequently, before the IBP-CBD. Complainant presented both oral and documentary evidence to support her allegations of abandonment and immorality, 2 witnesses and affidavits from NBI agents to show the existence of prima facie case for adultery. Respondent, however, failed to present evidence to support his claim and failed to personally attend hearings.

The Commission found respondent liable for abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law to the IBP Board Governors for 3 months. It was accepted and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Issues:Does leaving the conjugal home and cohabiting with a married woman a ground for disbarment? Ruling: The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct: CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

The fact that respondent’s philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138,9 of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct x xx of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.

Undoubtedly, respondent’s act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct. And to add insult to injury, there seems to be little attempt on the part of respondent to be discreet about his liaison with the other woman.As we have already ruled, disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED. ELPIDIO TIONG VS ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO Problem Areas in Legal Ethics – Pardon Does Not Bar Sanction Against an Erring Lawyer – Moral Depravity – Grossly Immoral Conduct Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses Elpidio and Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is often times away. For two years, he suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were having an affair. Finally in 1995, he was able to listen to a telephone conversation where he heard Atty. Florendo mention amorous words to Ma. Elena. Atty. Florendo confronted the two and both eventually admitted to their illicit relationship. Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena then executed and signed an affidavit, which was later notarized, stating that they admit of their illicit relationship; that they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective spouse. Elpidio forgave Florendo and Ma. Elena. But nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case against Florendo.

Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because he was already pardoned. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct. HELD: No. A petition for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is a sui generis case. This class of cases is meant to protect the public and the courts of undesirable members of the legal profession. As such, pardon by the offended party of the act complained of does not operate to offset the ground for disbarment or suspension. Florendo’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. He violated the trust reposed upon him by his client (Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility). His illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others. It cannot be also said, as he claims, that their relationship is merely a moment of indiscretion considering that their affair went on for more than two years. Florendo was suspended for 6 months.

Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan vs Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa(A.C. No. 7360) FACTS: Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared asprosecutor. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in CriminalCase No. 10256-00 (Esperon Case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder and later on November 23, 2005, Atty.Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed amotion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgement of the EsperonCase. Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Prosecutor Toribio for 30,000.00php and failed. Prosecutor Toribioexcuted her affidavit onJune 14, 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had itnotarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-BukidnonChapter.On May 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.Silvosa in Criminal Case. 27776 for direct bribery on an NBI set-upentrapment operation, wherein, Atty. Silvosa demanded15,000.00php from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for therelease of Cadinas who was in detention for more than two years.ISSUE:1. Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility.2.Whether or not a delay of the filing for an administrativecomplaint exonerate a respondent.3. Whether or not crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment.HELD:1. Yes, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Silvosa's attempt to minimize his role in saidcase would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed tohave acquainted himself with the facts of the said case.Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case.Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibilitystates "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,accept engagement or employment in connection with anymatter in which he had intervened while in said service." TheCourt agree with Commissioner Funa's finding that Atty.Silvosa violated Rule 6.03, when he entered his appearancein the motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosaconveniently forgot Rule

15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by writtenconsent of concern given after a full disclosure of facts." Atty.Silvosa's representation of conflicting interests merit at leastthe penalty of suspension.2. No, delay of filing for an administrative complaint does notexonerate a respondent.There is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of briberythat occurred more than seven years ago. In this instance,the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. When the integrityof a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that hedenies the charges against him. He must show proof that hestill maintains that degree of morality and integrity which atall times expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.The Court says, mere delay in filing of anadministrative complaint against a member of the bar doesnot automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrativeoffenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time haselapsed from the time of the commission of the act complaintof and the time of the institution of the complaint, erringmember of the bench and bar can not escape thedisciplining arm of the Court. Atty. Silvosa's failed attempt atbribing Prosecutor Toribio also merit at least the penalty of suspension.3. Yes, crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment.Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,vileness, or depravity in the private duties which aman owes to his fellow men, or to society in general,contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. There is nodoubt that the Sandiganbayans' judgement in Criminal CaseNo. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final.Rule 138, Section 27 provides, A member of the bar may be disbarred by reason of his conviction of a crimeinvolving moral turpitude. The crime of direct bribery is acrime involving moral turpitude, as ruled, in MagnovsCOMELEC. The practice of Law is a priveledge, and Atty.Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise his privilege.Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is herebydisbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered. IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, April 11, 2013 Pleadings and practice; election of IBP governors; strict rotation on election of EVP. On December 4, 2012, the Court issued a resolution addressing the issues with respect to the election of governor for IBP-Western Visayas. In clarifying that the rotational rule was one by exclusion, the Court explained that in the election of governor of a region, all chapters of the region should be given the opportunity to have their nominees elected as governor, to the exclusion of those chapters that had already served in the rotational cycle. Once a rotational cycle would be completed, all chapters of a region, except the chapter which won in the immediately preceding elections, could once again have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of governor of their region. The chapter that won in the immediately preceding election, under the rotational cycle just completed, could only vie for the position of governor after the election of the first governor in the new cycle.

As earlier recited, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws was amended in the December 14, 2010 Resolution of the Court to read as follows:

“Sec. 47.National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The Executive Vice President shall

be elected on a strict rotation basis by the Board of Governors from among themselves, by the vote of at least five (5) Governors. The Governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors.

The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in the IBP.”

From the above, it is clear that the amendment was effected to underscore the shift of the rotation from the position of president to that of EVP. The purpose of the system being to ensure that all the regions will have an equal opportunity to serve as EVP and then automatically succeed as president.