Legal Ethics Digest

[A.C. No. 2597. March 12, 1998] GLORITO V. MATURAN, petitioner, vs. ATTY. CONRADO S. GONZALES, respondent. FACTS: Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V. Maturan (herein petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated November 6, 1981. Said SPA authorized Maturan to file ejectment cases against squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50375, located in General Santos City, as well as criminal cases against the latter for violation of P.D. 772, again in connection with said lot. Respondent, Atty. Conrado Gonzales, prepared and notarized said Special Power of Attorney. Subsequently, Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting several squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd50735. While said lot was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and declaration of nullity against the former, docketed as Civil Case No. 2067. As a consequence of his engagement by petitioner, respondent Gonzales filed Civil Case No. 1783-11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals. On February 18, 1983, a judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through respondent, filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution on March 10, 1983. In the interim, the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered into a compromise agreement, which was judicially approved in a judgment dated March 28, 1983. On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was pending, and without withdrawing as counsel for petitioner, respondent filed, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., Civil Case No. 2746, an action to annul the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 2067. The action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part of petitioner to represent Antonio and Gloria Casquejo, as no such authorization was shown to be on record in Civil Case No. 2067. On August 24, 1983, respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., also filed Special Civil Case No. 161 for injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction, with damages, against petitioner. Aggrieved by respondent’s acceptance of professional employment from their adversary in Civil Case No. 2067, and alleging that privileged matters relating to the land in question had been transmitted by petitioner to respondent in Civil Case 1783-11, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the former for immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment. Respondent, in a comment dated January 25, 1984, denied having committed any malicious, unethical, unbecoming, immoral, or anomalous act against his client. Respondent declared that he was of the belief that filing a motion for issuance of a writ of execution was the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship between himself and petitioner, and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-client relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of employment from Yokingco was for him, an opportunity to honestly earn a little more for his children’s sustenance. The investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in his report dated August 21, 1997, found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommended that he be suspended for three (3) years. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner but recommended that the suspension be reduced from three (3) years to one (1) year. ISSUE: W/N the respondent committed malicious, unethical, immoral or anomalous acts against his client. HELD: This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. [1] That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client’s secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.[2] This Court finds respondent’s actuations violative of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide in part: “It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.” Moreover, respondent’s justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of his client. As to the recommendation that the term of suspension be reduced from three years to one year, we find the same to be unwarranted. In similar cases decided by the Supreme Court, the penalty of two or three years suspension has been imposed where respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests. In Vda. De Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, Sr.,[3] the respondent, who appeared for complainant in a case for revival of judgment, even though he had been the counsel of the adverse party in the case sought to be revived, was suspended for a period of two years. In Bautista vs. Barrios,[4] a suspension of two years was imposed on respondent Barrios, who had drafted a deed of partition for petitioner, but who appeared for the other party therein, when the same was sought to be enforced by petitioner. In PNB vs. Cedo,[5] the Court even suspended the respondent therein for three years, but only because respondent not only represented conflicting interests, but also deliberately intended to attract clients with interests adverse to

his former employer. Finally, in Natan vs. Capule,[6] respondent was suspended for two years after he accepted professional employment in the very case in which his former client was the adverse party. ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to MODIFY the IBP recommendation to suspend respondent for one year and modifies it to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective immediately.

[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998] REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.

FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous circumstances. From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976. In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña. In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.[5] Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. [6] But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her. Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondent’s marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Tupacar should be disbarred based on unlawful, dishonesty and immoral or deceitful conduct. HELD: Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. [9] There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. [10] The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that: Rule 1.01.

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.* As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private – fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly. In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer’s oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent’s character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

[A.C. No. 2387. September 10, 1998] CLETO DOCENA, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, respondent.

FACTS: On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of attorney's oath. It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyers on appeal in Civil Case No. 425 for Forcible Entry. While the appeal was pending before the then Court of First Instance of Eartern Samar, Branch I, respondent required therein defendantsappellants Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision. To raise the required, complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00 from the Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein respondent himself acted as guarantor. The amount ofP4,860.00 was produced by complainant in response to respondent's letter dated September 2, 1979 demanding delivery of the aforesaid amount. On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a decision on the appealed case in favor of the Docena spouses. After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas bond of P10,000.00 but he thereupon discovered that no such bond was ever posted by respondent. When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with such undertaking despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses. In his answer the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his attorney's fees for representing the Docena spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving allegation is belied by the letter (quoted above) of respondent himself demanding from the Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the execution of the appealed decision of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to return the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the money was never his, and that it was only entrusted to him for deposit. ISSUE: W/N the respondent committed gross misconduct and malpractice. W/N the respondent was allowed to received money in behalf of his client. HELD: The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount involved may be small, but the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier sanction. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that: Canon 1. x x x Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 16. x x x Canon 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from the client. Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in the exclusive and honored fraternity. It has been said time and again, and this cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a trade nor a craft but a profession. Its basic ideal is to render public service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. If it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their live, accord continuing fidelity to them. By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his depraved character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He should be disbarred. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent is likewise ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00, the balance of the money entrusted to him by complainant Docena, within one (1) month from the finality of this Decision.

[A.C. No. 3046. October 26, 1998] REGALADO DAROY, complainant, vs. ATTY. ESTEBAN ABECIA, respondent.

FACTS: This refers to the complaint for malpractice filed by Regalado Daroy (now deceased) against Esteban Abecia, a member of the Bar. Complainant Daroy accused respondent Abecia of having forged his signature in a deed of absolute sale by means of which the latter was able to transfer a parcel of land in Opol, Misamis Oriental, first to Jose Gangay and eventually to his (respondent’s) wife Nena Abecia. Respondent Abecia was counsel of complainant Daroy in a case for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court of Opol, Misamis Oriental.[1] Judgment was rendered in favor of complainant as plaintiff in the ejectment case, ordering the defendants to pay damages, attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff sold at public auction on March 25, 1971 a parcel of land belonging to one of the defendants to complainant Daroy as highest bidder for P1,250.00. Upon failure of the defendants to redeem the land, its ownership was consolidated in complainant Daroy. Complainant Daroy claimed that respondent Abecia forged his signature in a deed of absolute sale, dated March 31, 1971, transferring the subject parcel of land to Jose Gangay purportedly for the sum of P1,250.00 and that in a fictitious deed of absolute sale, dated April 17, 1971, it was made to appear that Gangay in turn conveyed the land to Nena Abecia, wife of respondent Abecia, for the sum of P1,350.00.[2] Complainant alleged that he entrusted the title to the land (TCT No. T-315) to Abecia as his counsel and allowed him to take possession of the land upon the latter’s request. By means of the forged deed of sale, Abecia was able to obtain new transfer certificates of title, first in the name of Gangay and then in that of Mrs. Abecia, from the Registry of Deeds of Misamis Oriental.[3] Daroy claimed he discovered the fraud only in 1984. Daroy submitted in evidence a report of the National Bureau of Investigation, which had examined the deed of sale in favor of Jose Gangay, showing that Daroy’s signature in the deed of sale had been written by a different hand. In addition, Daroy presented the affidavit, executed on August 10, 1988, of Anita Gangay, wife of Jose Gangay, in which she retracted an earlier affidavit executed on June 5, 1985. In the first affidavit, she stated that she had bought the land in question from Regalado Daroy and then sold it to her sister Nena Abecia, wife of respondent Esteban. Now, in her present affidavit, it is stated that she did not buy the land from Daroy nor later sell it to Nena Abecia and that she really did not know anything about the controversy between Regalado Daroy and Esteban Abecia, both of whom are her brothers-in-law. (It appears that Mrs. Conchita Daroy, Mrs. Anita Gangay, and Mrs. Nena Abecia are sisters, although Conchita Daroy and Regalado Daroy are not married but lived together in a common-law relationship.) A complaint for falsification of public document was also filed against respondent Abecia in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro which, however, dismissed the same. [4] On appeal, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III reversed on May 6, 1988 the findings of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro and consequently ordered the filing of the corresponding information in court.[5] Accordingly, City Prosecutor Rodolfo R. Waga filed an information for falsification of public document, dated June 30, 1988, with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. [6] Respondent Abecia was unable to attend the hearings. He asked for their transfer to Cagayan de Oro on the ground that he did not have the means to travel, but his request was apparently denied sub silencio as the Commission continued the hearings in Pasig, Metro Manila. As a result only his counsel was present at the hearings. [7] As respondent reiterated his request for the transfer of venue, it was agreed at the hearing of January 30, 1989 that respondent’s answer, dated August 3, 1987, and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as his own would be considered as their direct testimonies.[8] ISSUE: W/N the respondent forged the signature of his client in the deed of absolute sale. HELD: Indeed, what appears to have happened in this case is that the parties thought that because the land had been acquired by complainant at a public sale held in order to satisfy a judgment in his favor in a case in which respondent was complainant’s counsel, the latter could not acquire the land. The parties apparently had in mind Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which provides, in pertinent parts, as follows: ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: .... (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession It is true that the NBI found the signature of Regalado Daroy on the deed of sale made in favor of Jose Gangay to have been forged. But Erasmo Damasing, the notary public who notarized the deed, affirmed that Daroy and his wife appeared before him on March 31, 1971 and, in his presence, signed the document in question. [19] Daisy Felicilda likewise stated in an affidavit executed on February 17, 1986 that she was a witness to the execution of the deed of sale and that she saw Daroy signing the deed of sale.[20] Daroy never denied these claims of the notary public and a witness to the execution of the deed of sale. Nor was the NBI writing expert ever called to testify on his finding that the signature of Daroy in the deed of sale appeared to have been signed by a different hand. The finding that the deed of sale was forged was simply implied from the report of the NBI writing expert. As complainant, Daroy had the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat he and his wife never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be their voluntary act.

WHEREFORE, the resolution dated March 26, 1994, of the IBP Board of Governors is RECONSIDERED and the complaint against respondent Esteban Abecia is DISMISSED.

[A.C. No. 1037. December 14, 1998] VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION, complainant, vs. ATTY. CIRIACO C. SAYSON, respondent.

FACTS: In a Complaint-Affidavit, Victoriano P. Resurrecion charged Respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson with acts constituting "malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in his office and a violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer." The Complaint arose from a homicide through reckless imprudence case, in which Complainant Resurrecion was the defendant and Respondent Sayson was the counsel for the offended party, Mr. Armando Basto Sr. The complainant alleged that, pursuant to the amicable settlement previously reached by the parties, he gave P2,500 to the respondent who, however, never gave the money to his client. Thus, the complainant was compelled to give another P2,500 to Mr. Basto as settlement of the case. The complainant then demanded the return of the money from respondent, to no avail. Thus, the Complaint for Disbarment. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Ciriaco Sayson violated his duties and oath as a lawyer. HELD: In the present case, the Court notes that even if respondent's culpability for estafa has been indubitably established, there is no indication that he has served sentence, returned to complainant what was due him or showed any remorse for what he did. The 27year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought against him. Respondent Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. WHEREFORE, Respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

[A.M. No. P-99-1292. February 26, 1999] JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent.

FACTS: The complaint filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court. Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical error was committed in the complaint which stated that the address of defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The mistake was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which was admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for execution. Complainant however, was surprised to receive a temporary restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the Branch Clerk of Court, enjoining the execution of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant alleges that the issuance of the temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the application for preliminary injunction. Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the reason for the issuance of the temporary restraining order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for writing the wrong address in the complaint for ejectment and told her that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law office of respondent at the same time giving his calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that she could not decide because she was only representing her sister. To her consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting the preliminary injunction as threatened by respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Branch 37 had issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision in Civil Case No. 37-14552. The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before the hearing of the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, complainant Samonte went to court "very mad" because of the issuance of the order stopping the execution of the decision in the ejectment case. Respondent tried to calm her down, and assured her that the restraining order was only temporary and that the application for preliminary injunction would still be heard. Later the Regional Trial Court granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The complainant went back to court "fuming mad" because of the alleged unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction. Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned to his office, and informed him that she wanted to change counsel and that a friend of hers recommended the Law Finn of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and asking if he could handle her case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law firm, although he was invited to join but he chose to remain in the judiciary. Complainant returned to court a few days later and told him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall the writ of preliminary injunction, she will file an administrative case against respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated but the respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that the complainant must have filed this administrative charge because of her frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant lessee from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complaint against him. ISSUE: W/N there exists a conflict between the respondents function as a Branch Clerk of Court and him engaging into private practice. HELD: Based on the record of this administrative case, the calling card attached as Annex "B" of complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996 allegedly given by respondent to complainant would show that the name of herein respondent was indeed included in the BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW OFFICES. While respondent denied having assumed any position in said office, the fact remains that his name is included therein which may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not be actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling card as a partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and private practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713. It is to be noted, however, that complainant failed to establish by convincing evidence that respondent actually offered to her the services of their law office. Thus, the violation committed by respondent in having his name included/retained in the calling card may only be considered as a minor infraction for which he must also be administratively sanctioned." and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the minor infraction he has committed. The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name which appears on the calling card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal services. [1] Respondent does not claim that the calling card was printed without his knowledge or consent and the calling card[2] carries his name primarily and the name of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City" in the left comer. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others: "(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions."

Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk. should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must not only be characterized by proprietor and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion.[3] WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.

[A.C. No. 4758. April 30, 1999] VICTOR NUNGA, complainant, vs. ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY, respondent. FACTS: In his complaint, Victor Nunga seeks the disbarment of respondent Venancio Viray on the ground of grave misconduct for notarizing documents without a commission to do so. After issues were joined, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted an investigation. The Investigating Commissioner was Atty. Lydia A. Navarro. Report dated 4 August 1998 reads as follows: Victor D. Nunga, president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Venancio M. Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the time the said documents were executed. Complainant alleged that in May 1996, he was appointed by the board of directors of Masantol Rural Bank after his father’s resignation as its president. A few month thereafter, he allegedly discovered that one of the bank’s assets consisting of 250 square meters house and lot in Kalookan City was sold without proper bidding by its manager Jesus B. Manansala to Jesus Carlo Gerard M. Viray, a minor born February 2, 1969 during the transaction on May 22, 1987. The deed of absolute sale was notarized by the respondent who is not only the father of the buyer minor but also a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank and was not duly commissioned as notary public as of that date. Complainant further alleged that the said minor vendee wasn’t capable to buy the said property at its value of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00) but his parents Atty. and Mrs. Venancio Viray, respondent herein [sic]. Being a minor he must [have been] represented by a guardian in the said transaction. After the title was allegedly issued in the name of the minor vendee Jesus Carlo [M.] Viray, the same title was allegedly used by Respondent and his wife in mortgaging the property to Crown Savings and Loan Association for THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) on July 15, 1991 both by virtue of Special Powers of Attorney annotated at the back of the TCT No. 362813 PR 9907. The annotation of the cancellation of the THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) loan in … favor of Crown Savings and Loan Association under entry number 1226 was allegedly entered in the notarial registry of the Respondent for 1991 when he wasn’t commissioned as notary public. The aforesaid acts of Respondent allegedly constitute not only unprofessional and unethical misconduct unbecoming of a lawyer but also gross and serious malpractice which justifies disbarment. Respondent for his part alleged in his comment that complainant holds no position at the Masantol Rural Bank Inc. [i]n 1987 and 1997, but is facing criminal charges for having plundered the said bank of millions of pesos and [for] trespass to dwelling; while his father is facing a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The sale of the lot by the Masantol Rural Bank Inc. to his son was allegedly done in good faith all the formalities required by law [were] properly complied with and the complaint from all indications is a leverage in persuading him into a possible compromise. From 1965 to date Respondent alleged that he was always commissioned as notary public and the fact that Pampanga is under several feet of floodwaters, he could not annex all the needed documents to support the allegations. According to Respondent, there was no year in his practice of law that he was not commissioned as notary public. In fact, in the alleged documents he had PTR for that purpose [, and] he would not [have obtained a commission without the PTR. The respondent’s contention that he had a PTR for all the documents he prepared is only an indication that the Professional Tax Receipt is a license for him to engage in the practice of his profession as a lawyer but not a commission for him to act as notary public. ISSUE: W/N the ground of grave misconduct for notarizing documents without a commission to do so may prosper. HELD: We concur with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Venancio Viray did not have a commission as notary public in 1987 and 1991 when he notarized the assailed documents. Respondent knew that he could not exercise the powers or perform the duties of a notary public unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to the Notarial Law (Chapter 11, Title IV, Book I, Revised Administrative Code). He tried to impress upon the investigating commissioner that since “1965 to date” he has always been commissioned as a notary public. Yet, he was unable to rebut complainant’s evidence that he was not so commissioned for the years in question. We have emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath

similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting (supra): A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. (Citing Marcelo v. Javier, 214 SCRA 1 [1992]). What aggravated respondent’s unlawful notarization in 1987 was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his son, who was then only eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code, which was the governing law as of 22 May 1987 when the said transaction was made, the age of majority was twenty-one years. Republic Act No. 6809, which reduced the age of majority to eighteen years was approved only on 13 December 1989 and became effective two weeks after publication in two newspapers of general circulation. Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too light. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as a notary public for three (3) years, and suspended from the practice of law for also three (3) years. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission, if any, is revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.

[A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999] MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.

FACTS: For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment. Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was referred to the respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required for complainant’s trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00). On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was issued. From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the respondent regarding the processing of her travel documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the Commission on Human Rights. On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued Planters Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be asked during interviews. When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the complainant was furnished documents to support her assumed identity. Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the return of her money, however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong. Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee which was paid by complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to her. When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it will be given to her on her departure which was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given her passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were also recruits of the respondent. Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel were apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted the respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore. On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and respondent fetched her from the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took complainant’s passport with a promise that he will secure new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return of her money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00). On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00. On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for the refund of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent. Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife informed her that the respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters. In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that the respondent had transferred to an unknown residence apparently with intentions to evade responsibility. Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by complainant, applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by the complainant together with demand letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent.[2] Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on the complaint, there was no response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was made by the respondent.[3] As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the respondent to comply with the orders of the Commission, the investigation against him proceeded ex parte.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent violated his oath as a lawyer. HELD: “It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no mention of job placement or employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the respondent engaged in illegal recruitment. The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under an assumed name was accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the part of the respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid by the complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a forwarding address indicates his attempt to escape responsibility. In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.[6] The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character.[7] This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.[8] We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9] It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he made her travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondent’s acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration of justice. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. [10] We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. [11] Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant. Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is in order.[12] Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the complainant’s money upon demand, but he stubbornly persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.

[A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999] GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.

FACTS: On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before this Court a Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent, as counsel for complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts that respondent should be disbarred for the following acts: 1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and executory 2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for “cash bond” in the appealed case 3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.[1] “x x x [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of normal filing and docket fees for such kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondent’s misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme court receipt representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00. “Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant corporation revealed that the said receipt issued by the treasurer’s office of the Supreme Court x x x [was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The said verification revealed that what was only paid by the respondent to the Supreme court was the amount of P622.00 as shown by the enumerated legal fees of the Supreme Court Docket-Receiving Section showing the handwritten name of the respondent for purpose of showing that the said computation was requested by and addressed to the respondent.”[5] Meanwhile, a criminal case[6] for estafa based on the same facts was filed against herein respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the amount of US$ 2,555. Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss on July 22, 1996, on the ground that he had already been acquitted in the criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion.[7] On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution, which approved the investigating commissioner’s report[8] and recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his recommendation in this manner: HELD: The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; [17] in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is required.[18] Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.[19] It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.[20] Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. [21] The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to remember the Court’s ruling in In re Almacen,[22] which we quote: “x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x” (emphasis ours) Juxtaposed to the complainant’s evidence, the bare denials of respondent cannot overturn the IBP’s findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt to conceal his misappropriation of his client’s money. We agree with the IBP that “it is unbelievable that the complainant in the person of Rogelio Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure of filing a case before the Supreme court, could spuriously weave such documents which are denied by the respondent. In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of his noble profession. As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson:[35] “[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”

Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya,[36] the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to an execution, viz.: “[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility.” In Obia v. Catimbang,[37] we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the money entrusted to him: “The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal profession." Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.

A.C. No. 5170 November 17, 1999(FORMERLY A.C. CBD-445) LILIA FERRER TUCAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL R. TUCAY, respondent. FACTS: Complainant Lilia F. Tucay, feeling deeply aggrieved by the immoral conduct of her husband Atty. Manuel Tucay, seeks the latter's disbarment in the instant administrative proceedings. Complainant and respondent have long been married, the two taking their vows years back on 14 July 1963 at the St. Ignatius church, Camp Murphy, in Quezon City. For thirty years, the couple have lived together with their children. Just a few days before their thirtieth anniversary or on 07 July 1993 to be exact, with the first marriage still subsisting, respondent lawyer contracted another marriage with one Myrna C. Tuplano, herself married since 1983 to a certain Florante T. Tabilog. Respondent left the conjugal dwelling in July 1993 to cohabit with Myrna Tuplano. Complainant also caused the filing of bigamy charge against respondent lawyer and his second wife, docketed Criminal Case No. Q94-54709, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, of Quezon City, which case still pends. In an attempt to defeat the early prosecution of the criminal case, respondent filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage. The petition was later dismissed due to lack of interest; subsequently, however, respondent filed a second petition for the same purpose, this time with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. In both petitions, he averred that neither he nor the other supposed party to the second marriage was physically present on the date of its alleged celebration thereby rendering void any such marriage, if at all, under the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 3, and Article 6 of the Family Code. HELD: The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so, are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer at no time must be wanting in probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions precedent to his entrance to, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership in, a great and noble profession. The Court concurs with the IBP-CBD and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings and thus accepts their recommendation that respondent lawyer, having ceased to meet and possess the qualifications required of every lawyer, must forthwith be disbarred. ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to disbar respondent Atty. Manuel Tucay immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution. Let a copy hereof be made a part of the records of said respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.