Legal Ethics Case Digest

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965 FACTS: On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino vs. Blanco, that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of City Fiscal, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." On January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice RULING: Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action. Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It was affirmed that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party. RENATO CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965 FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Monsod possesses the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. RULING: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23). Atty.

Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo). In addition, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor, verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement, that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).

MAURICIO C. ULEP v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

FACTS: Mauricio Ulep prays this Court "to order to The Legal Clinic, Inc. to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law." The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner involves the advisory on Secret Marriage, Divorce, Guam Divorce, Annulment of Marriage, Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res & Special Retiree's Visa, Declaration of Absence, Remarriage to Filipina Fiancées, Adoption, Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed. ISSUE: Whether or not the services offered by respondent constitute practice of law and should be allowed. RULING: Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. The canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent from issuing the publication of any advertisement which is of similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics. SALLY D. BONGALONTA v. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995 FACTS: In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed a separate civil action where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases. During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case for collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary

responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon. It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88. Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility RULING The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. The Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995 FACTS: Criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. Eleven days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was. The period of probation was set at two years. Less than a month later, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten months. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Argosino may take attorney’s oath

RULING: The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. Mr. Argosino participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office. Mr. Argosino must, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE v. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA FACTS: Dominador Burbe, petitioner engaged the services of the Atty. Alberto Magulta, respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case. A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day. Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed. Petitioner confronted respondent where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be disbar. RULING: Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money. Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty. The court did not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Respondent then is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007 FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act 9225, petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship. RULING: RA 9225-"all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions."Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; the payment of professional tax; the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and

responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION v. JUDGE ELIZA B. YU A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1813 November 22, 2016 (Pili kayo ng gusto niyong gamiting facts) FACTS (1): The following are administrative cases that respondent Judge Eliza B. Yu was involved: a. ( A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813) where the respondent does not want to comply A.O. No. 19-20113 issued by the court; b. (A.M. No. MTJ-13-1836) the respondent protested against the appointment and refused to administer oath of Ms. Leilani A. Tejero-Lopez as Clerk of Court III; c. (A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815) the respondent protested against the appointment of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman as Clerk of Court III; d. (A.M. No. 12-109-METC); e. (A.M. No. 11-2399-MTJ); f. (A.M. No. 11-2378MTJ) three complaints concerned the conduct of Judge Yu in relation to her staff, fellow Judges and other officers of the Supreme Court, her disobedience of the Court's issuances, and her manner of disposing cases; g. (OCA iPI No. 12-2456-MTJ) charging the respondent with oppression in issuing the order dated December 1, 2011 in Criminal Case No. M-PSY-09-08592-CR. The Pasay City MeTCs; h. (OCA IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ) respondent’s unjustified refusal to sign Noel Libid’s application of leave, who had served as Utility Worker at the MeTC Branch 47; and i. (A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821) about respondent’s conduct unbecoming of a judge for constantly sending alarming messages with sexual undertones via Facebook and electronic mail to Judge Emily L. San. FACTS(2): The following administrative cases were filed against Judge Eliza B. Yu: A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 On January 27, 2011, the Court issued A.O. No. 19-20113 expeditiously hear and try cases involving nighttime apprehensions, special cases under the Rule on Summary Procedure, and criminal cases involving tourists. Respondent Eliza Yu was assigned to the duty, however, did not desire to comply. The OCA submitted a memorandum to the Court be docketed as an administrative complaint against her. Judge Yu denied the charges. A.M. No. MTJ-13-1836 On July 9, 2010, Judge Yu requested to fill the position of Clerk of Court III in her sala. s Ms. Tejero-Lopez's appointment was approved. Judge Yu expressed her protest against the appointment. Judge Yu refused her request to administer her oath and questioned the integrity of the selection process. Ms. Tejero-Lopez executed a “sinumpaang salaysa” charging Judge Yu with refusal to obey court order. The Court dismissed Judge Yu's protest. A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815 The Court appointed Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman as Clerk III of Branch 108 of the RTC in Pasay City. Apparently, Ms. Lagman's appointment did not sit well with Judge Yu. OCA received a letter of complaint from Judge Yu. The OCA filed a memorandum denouncing the misconduct and insubordination of Judge Yu relative to the appointments of Clerks. Judge Yu denied the allegations. A.M. No. 12-109-METC; A.M. No. 11-2399-MTJ; and A.M. No. 11-2378-MTJ The common issue in the three complaints concerned the conduct of Judge Yu in relation to her staff, fellow Judges and other officers of the Supreme Court, her disobedience of the Court's issuances, and her manner of disposing cases. OCA iPI No. 12-2456-MTJ This administrative matter concerned the letter dated January 12, 2012 charging Judge Yu with oppression in issuing the order dated December 1, 2011 in Criminal Case No. M-PSY-09-08592-CR. The Pasay City MeTCs, the Court suspended Judge Yu from office effective February 1, 2012. Judge Yu maintains that she validly issued the subject order by virtue of the inherent contempt powers of the court, and that the complainants should have availed of the appropriate relief in questioning the order instead of filing the administrative complaint; and that the OCA could not rule on the propriety of issuing the subject order because doing so was beyond the OCA's power and prerogative. OCA IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ This administrative matter stemmed from the complaint filed by Mrs. Josefina G. Labid charging Judge Yu with oppression, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct unbecoming of a judge in connection with the fate of her son, Noel, who had served as Utility Worker at the MeTC Branch 47. Mrs. Labid believed that Judge Yu's unjustified refusal to sign Noel's application for leave had been motivated by malice and ill-will, arising from the administrative complaint against her that Noel had signed and joined. In her comment, Judge Yu denied the imputations of Mrs. Labid. A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821 This administrative matter emanated from the Letter-Complaint of Judge Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito of MeTC Branch 20, whereby the latter imputed to Judge Yu conduct unbecoming of a judge for constantly sending alarming messages with sexual undertones via Facebook and electronic mail. ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross insubordination, oppression, and conduct unbecoming of a judge RULING: A judge embodies the law; she cannot be above it. She should not use it to advance her personal convenience, or to oppress others. She should be obedient to the rules and directives enunciated by the Supreme Court for the effective administration of justice; otherwise, she becomes an arrogant tyrant. Being a magistrate of the law, she must comport herself in a manner consistent with the dignity of her judicial office, and must not commit any act that erodes public confidence in the Judiciary. In these consolidated administrative proceedings, we resolve the several charges of gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross insubordination, oppression, and conduct unbecoming of a judge leveled by various complainants, some of them her fellow Judges, against. The court finds and pronounces and dismisses her from the service effective immediately. ANGEL L. BAUTISTA v. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

FACTS: A complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts: a.) Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent of the value of the property in litigation. b.) acting as counsel for conflicting parties c.) Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients, which properties are the subjects of the litigation in Civil Case, while the case was still pending; d.) Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case, claiming that he acquired fifty percent interest thereof as attorney's fees from the his clients, while knowing well that the said property was already sold; e.) Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City; f.) committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client; g.) harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis; h.) deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings; i.) filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either." ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent committed acts of malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath RULING: In executing the document transferring one-half of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process". The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, that the land development agreement was entered into already been sold. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm.]Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Anent the first charge of complainant, the Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that it is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Respondent committed serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months.

ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON v. ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, A.C. No. 6968 August 9, 2006 FACTS: The killing on December 8, 1994 of UP student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council, drew to then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the NBI. Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force. As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, the suspects’ lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, opposed the turn-over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, despite the latters claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to make warrantless arrests, after a heated discussion, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories. Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the IBP, for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of CPR, Atty. Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the CPR. ISSUES: 1. 2.

Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of CPR Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects constitutes violation of the CPR

HELD: Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the turnover of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest and therefore illegal. Atty. Dizons administrative complaint against her must then be dismissed. Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court, also in Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that for the failure of the NBI agents to comply with the constitutional and procedural requirements, their attempt to arrest the two student-suspects without a warrant was illegal. RA 157 does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The RA 157 clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be in accordance with existing laws and rules. To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with existing laws and rules. By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the CPR which provides: canon 1 a lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. WHEREFORE, Case against Atty. Marichu C. Lambino is DISMISSED. Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is found guilty of violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED. ROSITA C. NADAYAG v. ATTY JOSE A. GRAGEDA A.C. No. 3232 September 27, 1994 FACTS:

In a letter-complaint dated April 15, 1988, Rosita C. Nadayag charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a "Pacto de Retro" transaction. Complainant's affidavit, alleged that respondent prepared and notarized a PACTO DE RETRO sale with the petitioner as the Vendee-a-Retro using Original Certificate of Land Title stolen, as a result of which the petitioner was swindled in P108,000.00 because the said land sold to the petitioner by Pacto de Retro was already sold ahead of time to another party, using the owner's duplicate copy of the title. That during the pacto de retro sale, the petitioner was already suspicious of the appearance of the OCT, when the petitioner brought the matter to the attention of respondent, notarizing the same, he simply answered that the title was all right and that the petitioner further not to worry as the respondent is an attorney and besides he knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro whose business transactions especially notarial matter has been and in fact always handled by him. Respondent filed his counter-affidavit; pertinently alleging that he was shown a copy of the title and found out the title was clear and told them that the title can be the subject of the Pacto de Retro; that the petitioner insisted to notarize the document, the respondent also translated the document to a dialect that the petitioner could understand; That respondent told the petitioner to sign the document which they did and witnessed by the other person with them who were present. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of misconduct RULING: Respondent first admits that he was consulted by the vendor-a-retro and the complainant (vendee-a-retro) on the matter of the title when he was asked to notarize the Deed of Sale a Retro. He admits that he rendered an opinion based on the title that was presented to him. It turns out that the title presented to him is the Original Certificate of Title which only the Register of Deeds has custody of and he should have sensed foul-play or irregularity. As a lawyer and officer of the court, he should have been alerted and should have reported the irregularity of an Original Certificate of Title, which should be in the exclusive safekeeping of the Register of Deeds, in the possession of unauthorized persons. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier). A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr). Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Jose A. Grageda from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months LILIA TABANG and CONCEPCION TABANG v. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT A.C. No. 6490 September 29, 2004 FACTS: Lilia, petitioner alleged that she sought the legal advice of then incumbent Judge Eustaquio Gacott, father of herein respondent, regarding her desire to buy agricultural land in Palawan. Judge Gacott informed petitioner that she is prohibited from acquiring vast tracks of agricultural land but then advised her to put the title of the lands in the names of fictitious persons which she followed. Later on, petitioners decided to sell the parcels of land. On a promise to help, respondent borrowed the land titles. However, in span of a year, respondent failed to sell the properties and told them that he lost all land titles. Agreeing to the advice of the defendant, the petitioner filed re-issuance of title however decided withdraw because the public prosecutor noticed that the signatures of the alleged owners in the seven individual Special Power of Attorney (SPA) appear to have been signed by the same person due to similar strokes. Subsequently, petitioner filed a new re-issuance of title case, changing the signatures of the fictitious owners. Upon knowing, respondent executed several documents, among which were Revocation of SPA and Affidavits of Recovery. Respondent caused the publication of a notice representing himself as the owner of the subject parcels of land and sold the lands, none of the proceeds was remitted to complainants. Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed their complaint directly with the IBP. In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" 20% from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused petitioner had threatened to defame him and seek his disbarment. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility RULING: This Court is led to no other reasonable conclusion than that respondent committed the acts of which he is accused and that he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing." Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners

to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others. WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is hereby REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings.

WELLINGTON REYES v. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995 FACTS: On March 30, 1971 complainant reported to the NBI that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall. An entrapment was set up by the NBI. Complainant furnished the NBI agents P150.00 for marking for the use in the entrapment. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, they had a little talk. Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility RULING: When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals).Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya). The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna,), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]). WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.

E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN v. ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990 FACTS:

This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro originally stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan with his transaction with Atty Filipe Navarro. Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court , per Resolution dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro. Solicitor General is directed to communicate in the premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas , who on file in Administrative Case has offered to make available documents in their possession showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a total selling price of P75 million and down payments of almost P 0.6 million. On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for suspension or removal from office and for appropriate action". The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. stated that, Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is now again openly selling titled properties of other persons. From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2 hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the twenty-two families squatting thereat. Eleven of these cases were raffled to Judge Emilio Salas, while the other eleven cases were assigned to Judge Pedro Navarro. All the twenty-two defendantssquatters were represented by respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients, respondent NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from which it emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent. The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven cases, Judge Salas rendered a decision sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In the second set of eleven cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in favor of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In the decision of Judge Navarro dated May 26, 1971, dismissed the complaints. After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971. Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties originally covered by Decree 1425 including the parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited and started selling them. ISSUE Whether or not respondent Navarro omitted such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment

RULING: In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to but its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all these pronouncements and his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals. Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority. Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court. WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990 FACTS: On 17 December 1983, one Herminia Marquez gave respondent several jewelry amounting to P36,000 for sale on a commission basis on a condition that the respondent will turn over the sale and unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before February 14,1984. Sometime in February 1984, instead of returning the unsold jewelry amounting to P 26,250, the respondent issued three checks: a.) P5,400 on February 16, 1984; b.) P5,400 on February 23, 1984; and c.) P15,450 on February 25, 1984. Upon presentment for payment within 90 days after their issuance, all three checks were dishonored by the respondent’s bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. Consequently, four cases were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, one for estafa, and three for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which, acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three cases. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was correctly suspended from the practice of law RULING: The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: A member of the bar may be removed or suspended by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the CPR under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral

character of a person convicted of such offense. In (Melendrez v. Decena) this Court stressed that the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.

In Re: Abesamis 102 Phil. 1182 FACTS: On April 5, 1988, the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to order the restoration of the cockpit to Flores. Judge Abesamis of the trial court however only received the mittimus on April 13, 1988 and then the next 2 days, he received subsequent pleadings from Flores and Ligon. Considering this, Judge Abesamis was only able to issue an order favorable Flores on April 20, 1988. But Ligon was able to secure a TRO from the Court of Appeal enjoining Judge Abesamis from restoring the cockpit to Flores on the ground of intervening events because apparently, Ligon was able to buy the property from Flores’s lessors. This was opposed by Flores until it reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court noted that such fact [of the supervening event] should be addressed by the trial court and not the SC. From May 1989 to June 1989, Flores filed criminal and administrative cases against Judge Abesamis, accusing him of partiality, evident bad faith, and gross negligence, as well as of serious misconduct, inefficiency and ignorance of the law, in deliberately delaying action on his motions to obtain possession of the cockpit. The cases were dismissed for lack of merit. In November 1989, Judge Abesamis issued a writ of execution ordering the restoration of the cockpit to him but this was again opposed by Ligon on the ground of the supervening event which should be discussed by the trial court. Judge Abesamis ruled in favor of Ligon. It was ruled by the trial court that Ligon’s lawful acquisition of title to the cockpit and Flores’ continuing failure to pay his debt of about P1.8 million to the former were supervening events warranting Ligon’s retention of the cockpit and precluding its restoration to Flores. This ruling was eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court In 1993, Flores, however, again filed complaints against Abesamis for serious misconduct etc but they were again dismissed for lack of merit. In 1995, Flores once more filed in the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Judge Abesamis, he accused Judge Abesamis of transgressing the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act “for alleged bias and prejudice in granting a party’s motion which caused undue injury to complainant.” The case was again dismissed. The Assistant Ombudsman however ordered Flores to explain why he should not be cited for he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for willful disregard of the judgments and orders of the Ombudsman and those of the Court of Appeals; abuse of the processes of the courts; and forum-shopping. ISSUE: Whether or not Flores is guilty of contempt of court. HELD: Yes. Flores knew that Judge Abesamis cannot restore the cockpit to him because of the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. He also knew that that the specific Orders of Judge Abesamis upon which his criminal complaint was grounded had already been sustained by higher courts, and consequently, his complaint was completely devoid of merit. Flores actually resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges’ orders had caused him “undue injury.” This is impermissible. Flores thus abused the processes of the court. He resorted to the administrative procedure for disciplining Judges prescribed by law, and even to criminal prosecution, notwithstanding that determination of the correctness of the orders of Judge Abesamis. It would appear that improper motives underlay the filing of his complaints: either to vent his wrath against someone, anyone, because of his frustrations in his attempts to regain possession of the cockpit, or to so intimidate the respondent Judges as to make them more malleable in their subsequent actuations with respect to his future motions. Finally, his initiation of the complaint was forum shopping of the most blatant sort, a clear attempt to re-ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed upon and definitively resolved by this Court, affirming action on those same issues by the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court. Flores is thus guilty of contempt; he was ordered to pay a fine by the SC. Medina v. Bautista 12 SCRA 1 FACTS: Loreta Bautista, respondent after agreeing with Marcos Medina, complainant to settle the case amicably prepared a motion for extension of time to file an answer, but instead he filed a motion to declare the latter in default. After being fully aware of the decision rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared two fictitious deeds of sale in the sense that the consideration in either was never in fact received. Then pretending to arrange an amicable settlement of the case, respondent received on different occasions from complainant several sums totalling P500.00. The respondent, taking advantage of the ignorance of his client Maria Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a document wherein it was made to appear that she received P8,000.00 when in truth and in fact she did not receive said amount. Then respondent received from his client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the understanding that the amount was to be deposited in court for the repurchase of the property, but instead of depositing it he misappropriated the money. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred for constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. RULING: Yes, Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission of certain acts constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. The crime of estafa is one which involves moral turpitude within the purview of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court. After the reception of the corresponding evidence, the Solicitor General submitted his report to thE Court finding respondent guilty of the acts of malpractice complained of and recommending his disbarment, formally charging respondent with acts constituting the alleged malpractice as found in his investigation with the prayer that the name of respondent be stricken off from the roll of attorneys.

In Re: De Los Angeles 106 Phil 1 FACTS: Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of his profession. In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court considering that he has six children to support the eldest being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken against him. He made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which he honestly and sincerely deplores. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of moral turpitude by a lawyer should result to one`s dismissal. RULING: Yes, under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment. The Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by section 25 of Rule 127. In Re: Peralta 101 Phil. 313 FACTS: On April 16, 1939, the Hilarion Peralta, respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court. ISSUE: Whether or not Peralta`s criminal case involves turpitude which leads to disbarment as a member of the bar. RULING: The Court finds that the respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar. Leynes v. Veloso 82 SCRA 325 FACTS: Judge Veloso, who is now sixty-eight years old and who was admitted to the bar in 1938, started his judicial career in 1946 as a justice of the peace of Infanta, Quezon. Since 1950, he has been functioning as the incumbent judge of General Nakar. Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had already begotten three children. The respondent admits that the thirty-seven-year old Gloria Tropicales is his mistress. Out of their union, two children, named Juana and Paulo, were born in 1970 and 1972 when the respondent was already a sex-agenarian. * Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, prays for the dismissal of the immorality charge on the ground that his wife, Rosario V. Veloso, condoned his acts of concubinage, as shown in her affidavit of November 21, 1974. In that affidavit, she unabashedly stated that, because her husband's thighbone was broken in a vehicular accident in 1955, she chose Gloria Tropicales to serve her husband, like a real wife. She gave the assurance that she would not prosecute their offspring. ISSUE: Whether or not concubinage could lead to the disbarment from being a member of the bat. RULING: Yes. A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. The absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action by reason of his highly unconventional and censurable behavior. Respondent and his counsel should know that since he had admitted the commission of concubinage, that charge is conclusively established and it does not have to be proven anymore. His admission is a confession . The Court hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by reason of his immoral conduct. His moral delinquency renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and warrants his removal from office .A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or when he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude such as concubinage. If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason that requirement should be exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency . In Re: Avancena 20 SCRA 591 FACTS:

Atty. Jose Avanceña was charged with falsification of public document before the Court of First Instance of Manila and later on was found guilty thereof. The trial court also found that he took advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of falsification of public document to defraud his clients. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter court affirmed the decision of the lower court. On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, the latter Court, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The respondent was committed to prison at the National Penitentiary, and later on the President of the Philippines extended conditional pardon to him. Subsequently, he was discharged from confinement. ISSUE: Whether or not the charges against Atty. RULING: Yes, Atty. Avanceña was disbarred from the practice of law, and his name was stricken out from the roll of attorneys. There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Atty. Avanceña has committed the crime of falsification of public document against his clients with grave abuse of confidence, having been found guilty thereof by final judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts amount to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office as an attorney, which constitute grounds for removal from office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, not to mention conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he had been convicted by final judgment.

In Re: Del Rosario 52 Phil 399 FACTS: Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took it in 1926 and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in which he alleged that there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar. HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario, together with one Juan Villaflor – a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney. ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct. HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del Rosario and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination. But shouldn’t the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again? No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar.

In Re: Basa 41 Phil 275 FACTS: Carlos Basa is a young lawyer convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. He was sentenced to two years, eleven months, and eleven days of imprisonment. The Solicitor General asked for Basa’s disbarment based on his commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime abduction with consent involves moral turpitude. HELD: Yes. Crimes of this character do involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Basa was declared to be suspended for one year immediately after he finished serving his sentence. Arciaga v. Maniwang 106 SCRA 591 FACTS: In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to Arciga’s hometown to tell the latter’s parent about the pregnancy. They also made Arciga’s parents believe that they were already married but they would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license. In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwang’s wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries upon Arciga. Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”. Royong v. Oblena 7 SCRA 757 FACTS: Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex. In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge. ISSUE: Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment. HELD: Ariston Oblena was disbarred. The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment. Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar. Alfonso v. Juanson 228 SCRA 239 FACTS: The case involves a complaint filed by a doctor of medicine, Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso, charging Judge Juanson with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial ethics, alleging that Juanson and his wife Sol were having an affair. The complainant has in his possession love letters written by Sol to prove his claim, provided by Judge Juanson's wife. Sol, however, denied this claim several times. Other evidence for the prosecution includes files of a private investigator hired by Dr. Alfonso's father showing that Sol had met with Judge Juanson on 17 July 1992 in a condominium unit in Mandaluyong and that they stayed there for approximately three hours. Dr. Alfonso confronted Sol about the evidence that was gathered by his father. At first she denied the affair but later in the evening she admitted having an illicit affair with Judge Juanson. Sol also admitted to the Complainant that when she went to Hongkong on December 26, 1989 up to December 29, 1989 she was with Respondent Judge, and records of the Commission on Immigration for said dates show that both Sol Alfonso and Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson departed for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific plane on December 26, 1989 and returned to Manila on December 29, 1989 The Alfonso spouses decided to live in separate house. In defense, Judge Juanson claims that he first knew Sol in 1987 when she engaged his professional services in connection with the criminal cases filed by her office. In June 1992 (while the Alfonso spouses were in the US) he received an overseas call from Sol asking him for advice concerning her problem with her employer. They met up after the return of Sol in the Philippines to discuss her problem. He added that it was impossible for him to have sexual intercourse with Sol because he has been suffering from two debilitating diseases – diabetes mellitus and prostatitis (which have seriously affected his sexual potency). ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Juanson's alleged sexual impropriety is a ground for him to be dismissed from the Judiciary HELD: No. There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between the respondent and the complainant's wife as evidenced by cards or notes (love letters). It is clear that their affair began before Sol and Dr. Alfonso were married on 10 December 1988 and might have blossomed from the attorney-client relationship between respondent and Sol. However, the evidence presented was insufficient to prove that he and Sol continued their extramarital affair after Judge Juanson was appointed to the judiciary. Sol's admission to her husband that she had carnal knowledge with the judge made no reference to specific dates and the side of Dr. Alfonso exerted no further effort to obtain clarifications as to the dates. It cannot be safely presumed that Juanson committed any sexual indiscretion after he became a judge. He is not charged for immorality committed

before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. Judge Juanson may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. However, considering their prior special relationship, the respondent and Sol's meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of either its continuance or revival and the concomitant intimacies expressive of such relationship. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On that date, the respondent left his office at the City Hall of Manila at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A Citihomes thirty minutes later. It is, therefore, clear that on 17 July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours and, considering the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall of Manila and the usual traffic condition, it was impossible for him to have reached his office — if at all he did proceed to it — in time for the commencement of the official session hours in the afternoon, i.e., 2:00 p.m. Thus, for purely personal sessions, he violated the rule regarding the official sentence. Such violation amounted to neglect of duty. It has been said that a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the faith of the people in the judiciary. It is settled that immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. Toledo v. Toledo 7 SCRA 757 FACTS: On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar that they were married on 27 December 1946 while he was still a second year student of law; that she supported him and spent for his studies; that after passing the bar examination and becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present employed in the Bureau of Mines and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children. She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. ISSUE: Whether or not concubinage can lead to disbarment from the bar. RULING: Yes, The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar. The respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.

Obusan v. Obusan 128 SCRA 485 FACTS: Atty. Generoso Obusan Jr., then single, had a relationship with one Natividad Estabillo. In 1972, Estabillo begot a son with Obusan. Obusan later found out that Estabillo was at the time still validly married with one Tony Garcia. Four days after the birth of his son with Estabillo, Obusan married Preciosa Razon. The couple lived more than a year together until one day when Obusan left the conjugal home and never returned. Preciosa searched for Obusan until she found out that the latter has been living with Natividad Estabillo. Preciosa then filed a disbarment case against Obusan on the grounds of gross immorality and adultery. Preciosa presented the testimonies of the neighbors of Estabillo who all testified that Estabillo and Obusan presented themselves as husband and wife in their community. ISSUE: Whether or not Obusan should be disbarred. HELD: Yes. Obusan failed to counter the evidence presented by his wife. He even failed to file responsive pleadings. Hence, on the strength of the evidence against him, he is guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, falls within “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. Dizon v. Cabucanan FACTS: Complainant alleged that he was one of the would-be-buyers of a parcel of land owned by the heirs of the late Florentino Callangan, who were parties in Civil Case filed before the Municipal Trial Court; that, a compromise agreement was executed by the parties in the said case and notarized before Atty. Cabucana on the same date it was signed at the MTCC; that at the hearing conducted regarding the due execution and the veracity of the compromise agreement, the signatories therein testified that they signed the instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public; that because of the irregularity in the due execution of the Compromise Agreement, there was undue delay in the resolution/decision of Civil Case which caused damage and injury to complainant; that Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial Law in notarizing the document in the absence of most of the signatories/affiants; and that he should be sanctioned in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant further alleged that Atty. Cabucana uttered grave threats against him after the hearing of the said case in MTCC. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the code of professional responsibilities RULING: Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states: The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the

officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. The requirement of affiant’s personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that: A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free and voluntary act and deed. In Re: Santiago 70 Phil 661 FACTS: In this administrative case, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque Santiago with malpractice and prayed that disciplinary action be taken against him. The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife for some nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a second marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A) stating that the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the same time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each member’s right against the party marrying. The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the document and declared that they were again single and as such could contract another marriage. Relying on this document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage. The respondent, upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and let them sign the deed of cancellation (Exhibit C) a month later but after the second marriage of Baniquit. ISSUE: 1. Did the lawyer commit malpractice in his acts regarding the dispensation of such advice and preparation of document? 2. Is the document regarding separation (Exhibit A) valid? RULING: 1. Yes. The advice given by the respondent and his preparation and acknowledgment by of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. 2. No. Marriage separation should have should be sanctioned in the proper court and before the separation (see Selanova). Apart from this, the document subverts the vital foundation of the family, marriage, and is contrary to law, morals and public policy. De Roy and Ramos vs. CA [G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988] Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Monday, March 26, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution because the same was not filed within the grace period as enscribed in the present jurisprudence .

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the denied the motion and let the petitioner be bound by the negligence of their counsel

Held: The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. In the instant case, petitioners' motion for extension of time was more than a year after the expiration of the grace period. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglamentary period. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals. People vs. Gacott, Jr. G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment

was

made

by

the

Second

Division

of

the

SC.

Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge

Held: To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary

cases

should

be

heard

and

decided

by

the

whole

Court

since

it

would

result

in

an

absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period

of

more

than

1

year

or

a

fine

exceeding

P10,

000.00

or

both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in theadjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. Canon 6: CANNONS APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICER.A. 6713, Section 4 Prepared by: Michael Joseph Nogoy, JD 1 CASE No. 31[A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991]FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant , vs. ATTY. VICENTE C.RENOMERON respondent .PONENTE: PER CURIAM : FACTS:  Nature of the Complaint: Disbarment against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City 

This is in relation to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, counsel forV& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favorof GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.  Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents with certain “special conditions” between them, which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticketfrom Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieuthereo f, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.  Eventually, Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents. Hehimself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents toAdministrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds RegistrationAdministration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor of theregistrability of the documents.  Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused theregistration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submissionof additional requirements not adverted in his previous denial. ISSUES:  Whether or not Atty. Renomeron, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by theCourt for his malfeasance as a public official.  Whether or not the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to governmentservice in the discharge of official tasks. HELD: Yes to both issues. RATIO DECIDENDI:On Issue No. 1  A lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a vio lation of his oathas a lawyer.  The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to de lay no man formoney or malice.  The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. On Issue No. 2  The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in thedischarge of their official tasks (Canon 6).  The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral ordeceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 1.03). RULING: Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron is disbarred from the practice of law in thePhilippines, and his name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. Pimentel Jr. vs. Llorente and Salayon, A.C. No. 4690, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 154 Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Tuesday, January 31, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while

Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law. Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for

the

Senate

in

that

election.

Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes received by them by either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of votes of particular candidatesin their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative complaint for their disbarment. Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant

could

be

attributed

to

honest

mistake,

oversight,

and/or

fatigue.

Issue: Whether the respondents are held guilty of misconduct.

Held: YES. A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconductalso constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.” It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public

office

is

a

public

trust.

Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein reflects on thelegal profession, in general, and on lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service. Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient and issued a stern warning that similar conduct in the future will be severely punished. BERENGUER vs. FLORINA.C. No. 5119 Facts: Petitioner Berenguers are the registered owners of a 58.0649-hectare land inBibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. The Berenguers applied for the exclusion of their land with the DARand for a notice to lift coverage based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusivelyfor livestock. The DAR Secretary, without acting on the application for exclusion, cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) infavor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative(BARIBAG).The Berenguers filed a notice of appeal with the Secretary of DAR. While the case was pendingappeal, BARIBAG filed a petition for the implementation of the Order before the Regional AgrarianReform Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted by Florin, as RARAD. Florin directed the issuance andimplementation of the Writ of Possession. The Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that they were denied due process as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAG’s petition for implementation. Florin denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.The Berenguers appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). BARIBAG, on other hand,filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. BARIBAG filed a Motion for the Appointment ofa Special Sheriff. DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Nava rro denied the Berenguers’appeal. Florin issued a Resolution, which granted BARIBAG’s Motion for the appointment of a Special Sheriff andordered the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for.The Berenguers filed a motion to set aside the Resolution arguing that: the DARAB alreadyacquired jurisdiction over case when they seasonably filed an appeal before it; and that Florin should havewaited until the DARAB has decided the appeal. Florin denied the said motion prompting the Berenguersto move for her inhibition on ground of partiality. Florin issued on a Writ of Possession23 in favor of BARIBAG. Florin directed the full implementation of the writ of possession in spite of the Berenguers’ protestations. Hence, this petition for the disbarment of respondents Florin, Jornales, in his capacity asAssistant Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Held: Yes. Respondent ATTY.ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of violating the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.Accordingly, she is penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of lawfor three (3) months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty. Marcelino Jornales andAtty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to doinjustice will be administratively sanctioned. In this case, it appears, however, that this is the first timethat Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or bad faithattended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin executedan act that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To SC justices mind, the act of issuing the writ ofexecution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an obstinate disregard ofthe applicable laws and jurisprudence.

LAWYERS VALENCIA V. CABANTINGApril 26, 1991 Facts: • In 1933, petitioner Paulino Valencia and his wife Romana allegedly bout a parcel of land, wherethey built their residential house from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo, theoriginal owner of the parcel of land. • However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names. • Then, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Jovellanos to settle the dispute between Serapiaand the Sps. Valencia. • As a result, Serapia was willing to relinquish her ownership if the Valencias could showdocuments evidencing ownership. • Paulino presented a deed of sale written in Ilocano. Serapia claimed that the deed covered adifferent property. Thus, the parties were not able to settle their differences. • Assisted by Atty. Cabanting, Serapia filed a complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. • The Valencias, on the other hand, engaged the services of Atty. Antiniw, who advised them to present a notarized deed of sale instead of the document in Ilocano.  For the amount of P200 paid by Paulino to Atty. Antiniw, the latter paid a person who wouldforge the signature of the alleged vendor. • The Pangasinan CFI favored Serapia. • While the petition was of appeal, Serapia sold 40 sq. m. to Atty. Jovellanos and the remainingwas also sold to her counsel, Atty. Cabanting. ISSUE: WON Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491, NCC. HELD: YES! • Art. 1491, NCC, prohibiting the sale to counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending. o A thing is said to be in litigation not only if it there is some contest or litigation over it incourt, but also from the moment that it becomes to the judicial action of the judge. • In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment,there was still a certiorari proceeding. o In certiora ri proceedings, the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. o Thus, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491, NCC, that litigation hasterminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while certiorari connectedtherewith is still in progress.

• Thus, the purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice inviolation of Art. 1491, NCC and the Canons of Professional Ethics.  The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-clientrelationship bet. Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos – the latter did not take part as counsel in the Civil Case.  Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale

Generoso Trieste, Sr. vs Sandiganbayan facts: Trieste was the mayor of Numancia, Aklan. In 1980, during his term, the Municipality of Numancia purchased construction materials from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation. Trieste was allegedly the president of said corporation. Trieste was then sued for allegedly violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly for willfully and unlawfully having financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest. Trieste, in defense, said that he already divested his interest from the corporation when he took his office as mayor; that he sold his shares to his sister; he presented evidence to that effect. The Solicitor General doubted said sale because it was not registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission. Further, the advertisement of Trigen in the local rotary club shows that Trieste is the president of the corporation. In time, the old Sol-Gen was replaced by a new one. The new Sol-Gen gave credit to the arguments presented by Trieste as it recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground that Trieste did divest his interest from the corporation by virtue of his selling his shares to his sister; that said sale cannot be doubted simply because it was not reported to the SEC; that sales of stocks are not required to be reported in the SEC. ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation of the Solicitor General is correct.

HOLDING: Trieste acquitted.SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers . - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized byexisting laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection withwhich he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any lawfrom having any interest.The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction;b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity.Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction.Evidence showed that there actually was no bidding conducted. In the absence of public bidding, how can one everimagine that Trieste has awarded the supply and delivery of construction materials to Trigen?By signing the vouchers for the purchase and payment of construction materials, Trieste also cannot be said to have ‘intervened’ in contemplation of RA 3019. The vouchers were signed AFTER payment had already been made, such payment having been authorized by the municipal treasurer.What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one hasfinancial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation. Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: Civil case was filed against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged illegal activities made by Enrile during the Marcos era. Enrirle filed a motion to dismiss and compulsory counter-claim. In the counter-claim Enrile moved to implead Chavez and other PCGG officials on the basis that the casefield agaisnt him was a “harassment suit”. The motion to implead Chavez and others was granted bythe Sandiganbayan.Chavez and the PCGG officials raised the defense that they are immune from suit by virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive Order NO. 1. It was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by Jovito Salonga,the there are no proof linking Enrile with the illegal activities performed by Marcos. It was further averred that the case filed against Enrile was instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez. Sol. Gen. Chavez defended himself by saying that he was acting as a counsel and cannot by made a defendant in a counter-claim. Issue: Whether or not Sol. Gen. Chavez can be made liable for damages in filing the suit agains tEnrile. Held: The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory counter-claim of Enrile was based on the malice or bad faith of Chavez in filing the suit. It was further stated by the court that immunity from suit is granted only because of the fact that the Commission has a multitude of task. Immunity for suit on members of the PCGG and other public officers is available only if such officers are acting in good faith and in the performance of their duty.If the acts done are tainted with bad faith or in excess of authority they can be held liable personally for damages.In the case at bar the Sol. Gen. exceeded his authority and his act is tainted with bad faith by filing baseless suit against Enrile. His office does not give him the license to prosecute recklessly to the injury of another. Thus he is made liable fro his actions in the opinion of the court. Enriquez Sr. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-12817, April 29, 1960] Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: R.A. No. 1383 was passed creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership and control over all existing government-owned waterworks systems. However, Bauan Batangas passed Res. No. 152 stating that it does not desire to submit their local waterworks to the provisions of said R.A. No. 1383.

Provincial Fiscal rendered an opinion holding that R.A. No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the NAWASA to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act. Given this, the municipality engaged the services of a special counsel to commence an action challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1383.

The Petitioners are the special counsel seeking reimbursement for initial attorney’s fees, which the Auditor General disallowed citing that the Municipality of Bauan had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel

Issue: Whether municipality of Bauan had authority to engage the services of a special counsel

Held: No. The Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law, which in this case he is not. A fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.

The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees.

Misamin vs. San Juan (Adm Case 1418 August 31, 1976) Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Sunday, March 18, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar’s Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel while holding a government position is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension

orremoval of

attorneys.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should prosper

Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be decided in an administrative proceeding as noted in therecommendation of the Solicitor General. Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent,

in his future actuations as a member of the bar should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membershipin an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied.

. No. 7430 : February 15, 2012] MARTIN LAHM III AND JAMES P. CONCEPCION, COMPLAINANTS, VS. LABORARBITER JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR., RESPONDENT.Facts:On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against the members of the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila which was raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the complainants in the instant case. Subsequently Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The latter’s counsel ask for extension of time to oppose and make a comment to the motion for the Issuance of TRO/Pre. Inj. Thereafter, respondent issued an order which directed the parties to maintain the status quo ante. The complainant sought for a reconsideration. Meanwhile, Toze was reinstated and assumed his former position as Superintendent. The Illegal Dismissal case was not resolved instead respondent issued an order requiring the parties to appear in his office to thresh out Toze’s claim of moral and exemplary damages.Hence, the complainants filed a complainant for the disbarment of the respondent for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Respondent Mayor argues that the complaint should be dismissed for being premature and a subterfurge in order to compel him to inhibit in resolving the said illegal dismissal case. Based on finding, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent to be suspended for a period of six months which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in it’s Resolution. Respondent sought to reconsider but it was denied, hence, this appeal. Issue : Whether nor not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath Ruling:The SC agreed with the resolution of IBP Board of Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath. A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional

obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public. Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases.When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In the case at bench, respondent is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC(.Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC). Wherefore, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, with a Warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the disposition of a more severe penalty.

CANON 6by Joshua Remollo PNB v. ATTY. CEDO (A.C. No. 3701, March 28, 1995)FACTS:After having arranged the sale of steel sheets for Mrs Siy, the latter became implicated ina civil case with the complainant PNB. After having stop employment with PNB, respondentAtty. Cedo appeared as counsel for Mrs. Siy. A similar situation also happene when spousesAlmeda were implicated to a case with complainant PNB counsel for Sps. Almeda is theCedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates. Atty. Cedo was AVP of the Asset Management group of complainant bank, where such loan transaction of Sps. Almeda came under his purview.Respondent asserted that in the former case, he did not participate in the litigation before thecourt, while the latter, it was another partner of the firm that handle the case. IBP made its reportand recommendation for suspension for having deliberate intent to devise ways and means toattract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to seethe legal weaknesses of his former employer. ISSUE:Whether or not respondent Atty. Cedo be held administratively liable. HELD:SUSPENDED. According to Canon 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, ―A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. ‖ Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent sought to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, violated said Canon CATU VS. RELLOSA (A.C. NO. 5738 02/19/2008) case digest FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he committed an act of

impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper. HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection to former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision. Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice of profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession. Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

You are here: Home ∼ 2013 ∼ July ∼ Case Digest: PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN CASE DIGEST: PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN Published by arce on July 29, 2013 | Leave a response PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the

PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.” HELD The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government. Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied. Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo: Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.” Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.

Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749 23JUL FACTS: Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues.He was also cited in the complaint as not paying his professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his pleadings filed in court. It was also an alleged falsity when he included his “IBP-Rizal 259060” where in fact he was not in good standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafabut was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues. RATIO: Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues. Rule 139-A provides: Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Leda v. Tabang Facts: Complainant Evangeline Leda and Respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang contracted marriage performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character. The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies and had taken the Bar examinations, allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife. Complainant, thereafter, filed a Petition for Disbarment against respondent alleging, among others, for having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in hisapplication to take the bar exam and for being not of good moralcharacter contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court. Respondent averred that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code thus he could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife and that when he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single. Issue: Whether or not Respondent lacks of good moral character and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility Ruling: Yes, Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. Hence, respondent is subjected to suspension from the practice of law until further Orders.

In Re: Parazo Facts: Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations. Issue: Whether or not the bar takers violated the CPR Held:

Yes. Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by the Code.

Belo-Henares vs. Atty. Guevarra Facts: This instant administative case arose from a verified complaint for disbarment filed by complainant complainant Maria Victoria G. BeloHenares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws 2 and engaged in the specialized field of cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio ), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009. In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account insulting and verbally abusing complainant. The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause. In defense, respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy, asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part. He also averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed against complainant. He denied that the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred against complainant. He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against her. Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of fair comment. Issues: Whether respondent can validly invoke his right to privacy. Ruling: Respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on his "private account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. The defense is untenable. Before, can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity -in this case, Facebook -it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

Tan v. Sabandal Facts: Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath. Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land since then. The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest. Issue: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.

Ruling: His petition must be denied. Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings. Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness. Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

Melendrez v. Decena

Facts: There was two charged filed against Atty. Decena. First was about a 4k loan obtained by the spouses secured by a real estate mortgage. Ho wever, it appeared on the real estate mortgage document that the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of 4k. He said that the signin g of the documents was just for formality. so, they did. The spouses religiously paid 10% or 500 as interest for only 3months because of financial rev erses. Consequently, Atty. Decena made a second real estate mortgage document and the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00. Again, on the assurance that it was only for formality, the spouses signed the new REM document. After 3 years, they learned that their lot was already sold to someone. So they tried to raise the 10k and went to Atty. Decena’s house but th e latter did not accept the money and instead gave them a sheet of paper indicating that the total indebtedness had soared to 20,400. The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the complainan ts in a criminal case for estafa against accused. It was alleged that Atty. Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of acc used without the consent and approval of the complainants and that he received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment and he did not inform the spouses about this. And even after he was confronted, he still did not turn over the money.

Issue:

Ruling: As to the first charge, the SC held that Atty. Decena indeed deceived the spouses.From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the co mplainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the succe ssive documents was a are formality. While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have at least explained to complainants th e legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants’ attorney-in-fact in th e event of default in payments on the part of complainants. As to the second charge, repondent is presumed to be aware of Section 23 Rule 138 that lawyers cannot “without special authority, compromise their clients’ litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim, but the full amount in cash.” Respondent’s failure to turn over to spouses the par tial payment underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients. The SC reiterated that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law but a continuing requireme nt. Atty. Decena was disbarred.

Vitug v. Roncal

Facts: Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was introduced to her by her former classmate. Complainant asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support case she was going to file against her former lover, Arnulfo Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and respondent started having sexual relationship with each other. According to Vitug, respondent also gave her sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino. On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer which the latter signed without reading the said affidavit. On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a violation of his oathas a lawyer. She filed an administrative case against Rongcal which was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The same was approved by the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not respondent be disbarred for immorality Ruling: NO. One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal actor so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. On sexual relation and on respondent’s subsequent marriage, by his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Court find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage, complainant’s allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel Facts: In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24 SCRA 491; G.R. No. L-27072) which was not favorable to MacArthur International Minerals Co. The latter’s lawyer, Atty. Vicente Santiago then filed a motion for reconsideration. Eventually, a third motion for reconsideration was submitted by him. Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked the 1968 decision of the Supreme Court as false, erroneous, and illegal. In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two Justices: Justice Fred Castro, because allegedly, he is the brother of the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion because immediately after the 1968 decision, his son was appointed to a significant position in the government. (Here Atty. Santiago implied that the justices were not fair and that their decision was influenced). In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the above paragraph and was only included due to inadvertence. But that any rate, he averred that the language he used was necessary to defend his client.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of contempt

Ruling:

Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. Thus, Santiago’s defense is not tenable. A lawyer must avoid language that tend to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief in the judicial system. A lawyer’s duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: ‘To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.’ It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Atty. Santiago was fined for his infractions.

In Re: Almacen Facts: Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution. This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.

Issue: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

Castillo v. Padilla Facts: Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings. Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended. While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. Issue: Whether or not the respondent disrespected the complainant with his remark Ruling: Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C7790 CFI of Caloocan.) The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent’s actuation was triggered by complainant’s own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.

In Re: Clemente Soriano Facts: Atty. Clemente Soriano entered his appearance in the case People’s Homesite vs Mencias and Tiburcio et al. He sought to represent Marcelino Tiburcio. The odd thing is that, when he entered his appearance before the Supreme Court, the case has long been decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then directed Atty. Soriano to show cause why he should not be subjected to disciplinary actions. Atty. Soriano, in his defense, stated that he merely relied on the assurance made by one Atty. Dalangpan who assured him that the case is still pending with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Soriano should be suspended

Ruling: No. But he is severely censured. The only reason why he’s not suspended is that he exhibited candor before the Supreme Court in acknowledging his mistake. He has been negligent in his duty and this violates his duty to be diligent on his responsibility to his client. He should have checked with the former lawyer of Tiburcio as to the status of the case. If not, he could have simply checked with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court instead of relying upon the assurances of Atty. Dalangpan (who even denied before the Supreme Court that he made such assurances).

US v. Ney Facts:

In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such was not qualified for admission to the bar and an order was entered accordingly. In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and with one exception, occuring through an inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado." On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and the practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding. The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the law.

Issue: Whether or not Ney should be suspended or removed from office Ruling: It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably for that reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding. Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of members of the bar. The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the costsde oficio.

Tapay v. Bancolo Facts: Rodrigo Tapay and Anthony Rustia, both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia and declared that the signature in the Complaint was not his. Thus, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying the said signature. This affidavit was used by Tapay and Rustia in filing a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the same, presented as evidence an affidavit byRichard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. The case was then dismissed. Tapay and Rustia then later filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. In their Answer, respondents admitted that due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Ruling: YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Alawi v. Alauya

Facts: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney

Ruling: He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not fullfledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Guballa v. Caguioa Facts: Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. The petitioner was represented by 3 Associates law firm. The first one to represent him was Irineo W. Vida Jr. The petitioner and Irineo W.Vida Jr. failed to attend pre trial, without justifiablereason. In the appeal, it was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. Same was denied. Att y. Isabelo V.L. Santos II learned that Irineo W. Vida Jr was not a member of the Bar, his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. Respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is, "..a clear case of dilatory tacticon the part of counsel for defendant-appellant..."herein petitioner, and, that the grounds relied upon ". On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge acted rightly

Ruling: Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve.

Five J Taxi v. NLRC Facts: Private Respondent Maldigan and Sabsalon was hired by the Petitioner Company as taxi drivers. The contract was composed of a 24 hour shifting schedule on 4 days. They had to made a boundary from 450 non aircon and 700 aircon & (adding to that are car washing expense and deposit for any deficiency in the boundary. Petitioner learned Maldigan has been working for another taxi company (while Sabsalon was held up by armed passengers. Sabsalon went back to work but failed to report on several occasions (even leaving his taxi( and failing to remit his boundary mark. Respondents requested for the reimbursements of their respective deposits (butt petitioner refused because of the repairs incurred by their vehicles. Respondent now files complaint for illegal dismissal and deduction Issue: Whether or not the deductions were illegal Ruling: Yes. Article 114 of the Labor Code provides: Deposits for loss or damage. No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deductions or requiring deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in appropriate rules and regulations.