Legal Ethics Case Digest

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY INTRODUCTION 1. 2. 3. 4.

Banogan v. Zerna Ledesma v. Climaco Cui v. Cui Alawi v. Alauya

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho Chua v. Mesina Soriano v. Dizon Stemmerik v. Mas De Ysasi III v. NLRC Cordon v. Balicanta

CANON 2 – A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. CANON 3 – A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 11. 12. 13. 14.

In re Tagorda Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo Canoy v. Ortiz Linsangan v. Tolentino

CANON 4 – A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice. CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve highest standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence. CANON 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Suarez v. Platon Ramos v. Imbang Catu v. Rellosa PCGG v. Sandiganbayan

1 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support t he activities of the integrated bar. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

In re Galang In re Arthur M. Cuevas Samaniego v. Ferrer Arnobit v. Arnobit St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz Advincula v. Macabata

CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Reyes v. Chiong Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro Alcantara v. Pefianco Camacho v. Pagulayan Torres v. Javier Linsangan v. Tolentino

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc. Cayetano v. Monsod Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. CIR Aguirre v. Rama Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana

CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon Rivera v. Corral Johnny Ng v. Alar Fudot v. Cattleya Land Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan

CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 42. Berbano v. Barcelona

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 43. 44. 45. 46.

Sebastian v. Bajar Hegna v. Paderanga Plus Builders v. Revilla Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez

CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

69. Angalan v. Delante 70. Santon-Tan v. Robino 71. Somosot v. Lara CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law. 72. Briones v. Jimenez 73. Pena v. Aparicio

CANON 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy. AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER 47. Foodsphere v. Mauricio 48. Suspension of Atty. Bagubayao CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

74. Manalang v. Angeles 75. Garcia v. CA 76. Santiago v. De los Santos CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

Hilado v. David Nakpil v. Valdes Hornilla v. Salunat Northwestern University v. Arquillo Quiambao v. Bamba Heirs of Falame v. Baguio Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez

CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

Licuanan v. Melo Posidio v. Vitan Lemoine v. Balon Re: Atty. Maquera Reddi v. Sersbio De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence in him. CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

Hernandez v. Go PANELCO v. Montemayor Sps. Adecer v. Akut Belleza v. Macasa Overgaard v. Valdez

2 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

Sesbreno v. CA Bautista v. Gonzales Gamilla v. Marino Pineda v. De Jesus Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA

CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

Regala v. Sandiganbayan Pfleider v. Palanca Mercado v. Vitriolo Genato v. Silapan Hadjula v. Madianda Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.

Canon 22 – A lawyer may withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

Wack Wack Gold and Country Club v. CA Venterez v. Cosme Santero v. Vance Francisco v. Portugal Metrobank v. CA Doronila-Tioseco v. CA Sesbreno v. CA

SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 127. In Re: Undated Letter of Louis Biraogo 96. Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza 97. Santos v. Llamas 98. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo 99. Vda. de Barrera v. Laput 100. Barrientos v. Daarol 101. Berbano v. Beltran 102. Tabas v. Malicden 103. Sesbreno v. CA NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 1 – Independence 104. Libarios v. Dablos 105. Go v. CA 106. Sabitsana v. Villamor 107. Tan v. Rosete 108. Dimatulac v. Villon CANON 2 – Integrity 109. Fernandez v. Hamoy 110. Dawa v. De Asa 111. In re judge Marcos 112. Lachica v. Flordeliza 113. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana 114. Olga v. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero CANON 3 – Impartiality 115. Dimo Realty & Development v. Dimaculangan 116. Pimentel v. Salanga 117. Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr. 118. Oktubre v. Velasco 119. Sandoval v. CA 120. The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican, etc. CANON 4 – Propriety 121. J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas 122. Centrum Agri Business Realty Corp v. Katalbas-Moscardon 123. Rizalina v. Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante 124. Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay v. Judge Elias Lelina, Jr. 125. Concerned lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Pornillos, RTC Br. 10 Malolos City 126. Venancio Ino, Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay, etc. Judge Alejandro Canda

3 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

CANON 5 – Equality CANON 6 – Competence and diligence 128. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc. 129. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc v. Judge William Simon P. Peralta 130. Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi v. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen 131. Danilo David S. Mariano v. Judge Jose P. Nacional 132. Atty. Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez 133. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY INTRODUCTION BANOGAN V. ZERNA Facts: The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only “after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.” If anyone was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto. For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. It is shown that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense. Issue: W/N petitioners are already barred by laches. Held: YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a

4 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts. LEDESMA V. CLIMACO Facts: Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before the sala of Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases. Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election registrar, which was still denied. Issue: Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper? Held: No. The respondent judge’s denial was proper. It was observed that there is no real conflict between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The appointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same way, all lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the community that the proper performance of his profession is not contingent upon the payment of his fees. CUI V. CUI Facts: The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)” Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position. Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus. ISSUE Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio? HELD Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio. The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education. The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset. Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

5 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

ALAWI V. ALAUYA Facts: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer. Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney Held: He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. CANON 1 RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an administrative case against Atty Kho, a former clerk of court of an RTC, after an audit by the former found that the latter failed to remit P60K (confiscated cash bonds) and P5K(Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho stated that these amounts were stored in the court’s safety vaults, as his usual practice. The audit team advised him that he should deposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund account and Atty Kho complied with the directives. Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that Atty Kho, along with his common-law wife, a stenographer, was engaged with lending out to court employees money in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit from the interest earned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violating an OCA Circular because he kept the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. The OCA then recommended that its report be docketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine. ISSUE/S: W/N Atty. Kho is liable. HELD: YES. OCA recommendations VALID. RATIO: Dishonesty Conduct Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. And although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was nevertheless liable for failing to immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary funds. Unlawful conduct Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer’s responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct. CHUA V. MESINA Facts: Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses’ legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building

6 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

(Burgos Property) owned by Mesina’s family, and another property (Melencio Property), also owned by Mesina’s family where the Chua spouses constructed their house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, Mesina’s mother, Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty. Mesina convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to settle her obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq. m. The spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesina’s bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as “Felicisima M. Melencio,” in favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as “Felicisima M. Melencio,” in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00. After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses “in the redemption of the MESINA properties,” Mrs. Mesina was found to have “an existing balance” due the spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit “acknowledged such obligation” to be his and undertook to settle it within two years. Complainants were subsequently issued on a title over the Melencio property. Not long after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Tecson filed an Affidavit dated charging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated “to evade payment of capital gains tax.” Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated. Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina. Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 conveying to “Felicisima M. Melencio” the Melencio property for P85,400.00.A new title was accordingly issued in the name of “Felicisima M. Melencio,” the owner’s copy of which was entrusted to complainants. Tecson subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986 alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint “arose out of mere misunderstanding and difference”

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS with herein complainants and their co-respondents and he had no sufficient evidence against them. Some years later, Mesina approached the Chua spouses and told them that he would borrow the owner’s copy of Mrs. Mesina’s title with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants’ favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a written undertaking dated May 2, 1990. In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died “in the early part of 1991.” Despite respondent’s repeated promises “to effect” the transfer of title in complainants’ name, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to the public. The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed a complaint against Mesina for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property.

a. b. c. d. e.

f.

Driven his car under the influence of liquor; Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident; Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery); Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty); Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?); Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)

Issues: (1) Is Dizon’s crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude (2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?

ISSUE Whether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct? Held: HELD This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating. Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty. Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owner’s copy of his mother’s title upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty. As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at “arms length.” In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, Canon 1, Rules. 1.01 and Rules 1.02. SORIANO V. DIZON Facts: A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:

7 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

(1) Yes. Moral Turpitude is “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals…” Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer. (2) Yes. His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to “obey the laws of the land.” The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungrateful person!) Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred. STEMMERIK V. MAS FACTS: Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its beauty. He consulted Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him that he could legally buy such properties. Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of property that he can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted all of the necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as he went back to Denmark. After some time, Atty Mas informed Stemmerik that he found the owner of the big piece of property and stated the price of the property is P3.8M. Stemmerik agreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedly drawing up the necessary paperwork.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property registered in his name, Atty Mas can’t be found. He returned to the Philippines, employed another lawyer, and to his horror, was informed that aliens couldn’t own Philippine Lands and that the property was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a DISBARMENT case against Atty MAS in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD ruled that Atty Mas abused the trust and confidence of Stemmerik and recommended that he be disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted such recommendations.

gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984. During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.

ISSUE/S: W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.

Issues:

HELD: YES! Disbarred. RATIO: Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buying Philippine Lands. Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal. Deceitful Conduct By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately deceived his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Illegal Conduct By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature. DE YSASI III V. NLRC Facts: Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there. Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. His recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute

(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. Held: The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients. In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same. CORDON V. BALICANTA

8 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS FACTS: Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some properties from her husband with the help of Atty Balicanta. Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them to form a corporation to develop the real properties inherited. Such corp. was formed, and the properties were registered in the corp.’s name. Atty Balicanta was the one who singlehandedly ran the corp.’s affairs, by being it’s Chairman, President, General Manager, and treasurer. By being such officers, he made a number of acts: 1) made Cordon sign a voting trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA to sell/mortgage properties; 3) transferred title of some of the properties to other people. And by using spurious Board resolutions, Atty Balicanta also made the following acts: 1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using the properties as collateral; 2) Sold the Corp’s right to redeem the properties to another person; 3) demolished the ancestral home of the Cordon’s and sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty Balicanta did not account for the proceeds coming the sales and dispositions. The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back the properties and to account the proceeds of the loan. When such demands were unheeded, The Cordons terminated Balicanta’s services and filed a complaint for disbarment against the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report, recommended for Balicanta’s disbarment as well. The IBP Board of Governors resolved that Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for such conduct. ISSUE/S: W/N Balicanta be disbarred1. HELD: YES! Disbarred. RATIO: Deceitful Conduct The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. He started his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. He also entered into dishonest transactions under the cloak of sham resolutions. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter. Side Doctrine: Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast

1

By virtue of Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this resolution is automatically elevated to the SC for final action.

9 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.” CANONS 2 & 3 IN RE: TAGORDA Facts: Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to the last election, he admits that he made use of a card written in Spanish containing the fact that he was a candidate for third member of the Province of Isabela & offering services as notary public (such as free consultation, execution of deed of sale, etc.). He also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if his home municipality saying that he will continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to make known to the people of his desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including his services to handle land registration cases for P3/every registration). Issue: W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising Held: Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the Canons of Professional Ethics. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations is unprofessional. His acts warrant disbarment, but because of the mitigating circumstance of his youth and inexperience, he is therefore suspended. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. It is also unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Lastly, solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of the community and integrity of the members of the bar (as it results in needless litigations and in incenting to strife otherwise peaceful citizens). ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO FACTS A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: “Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the prohibition. ISSUE Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01. HELD Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest. Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar. CANOY V. ORTIZ

Held: Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1 month. Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18 and 22. Under Canon 18.03, a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. He owes his entire devotion to the interest of the client. His negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under Canon 18.04, the relationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever present need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark. A lawyer cannot shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire the status about the case as this is one of the lawyer’s duties. The adoption of additional duties due to the election of Atty. Ortiz as councilor does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyer to withdraw his legal service if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office since councilors are not expressly prohibited to exercise their legal profession. LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO Facts: A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”:

Facts: A complaint was filed on April 2001 by Canoy against Atty. Ortiz, accusing him for misconduct and malpractice. It is alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the process of the case. On April 2000, Canoy was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998 for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers. Canoy alleged that Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case. Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and lowincome clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes his failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, “he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing lawyer.”

Front NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFFICE CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821 Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Issue: W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?

10 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Back

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Facts: SERVICES OFFERED: CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD. In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of said calling card. Issue: W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services Held: Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the profession in the public’s estimation). With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes “ambulance chasing” (involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from barratry and champertry. As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number and (e) special branch of law practiced. Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal profession. CANONS 4, 5 & 6 SUAREZ V. PLATON

11 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Suarez was charged with sedition which was subsequently dismissed. He in turn filed a case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais. After the case was handed to Judge Platon following several changes in trial judge and several refusals by fiscals to prosecute the case. Issue: Should mandamus issue to compel the fiscal to reinstate the case? Held: Yes. It is unquestionable that in the proper cases, the prosecutors must reinvestigate in order to properly dispense justice. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that a prosecutor is the representative of a sovereignty; he is interested only in the fact that justice is served, and this also includes his refusing to prosecute if the innocence of the accused is quite clear. He is a servant of the law, and his two-fold aim is not to let the guilty escape nor let the innocent suffer. He is not at liberty to strike foul blows because it is his duty to refrain from doing so as much as it is to use legitimate methods of prosecution. RAMOS V. IMBANG FACTS In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only. The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each “appearance” in court, respondent charged her P350. After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). HELD Attorney Imbang is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: xxx xxx xxx (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function. Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices. In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession. Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Sec. 14. xxx The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary. Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel. Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really

filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his “appearance fees” for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice. There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.

2

3

A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in service

12 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

CATU V. RELLOSA FACTS Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the units in the said building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignored demands to vacate the place. The parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try to settle the issue amicably. Respodent Rellosa as Punong Barangay presided over the conciliation proceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and the petitioner brought the case to court. Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This prompted Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of impropriety. IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated Rule 6.032 and RA 67133. The committee recommended Rellosa’s suspension from practice for 1 month. ISSUE W/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03 HELD No.

Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government service. Rellosa was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 71604, which actually allows him to practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also governed by Revised Civil Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain a written permission from his department head who is the Sec. of DILG. This he failed to do. SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyer’s oath (to uphold and obey law), Rule 1.01 (lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shall uphold integrity and dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys law disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and strongly advised him to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza. __________ Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their profession? Answer: Yes, RA 6713 says “if the constitution or law allows it” Public officers however are subject to Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in private practice of their profession, they should first secure a written permission from their department head. PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent. Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation. After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 4

Local Government Code of 1991

13 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. ISSUE W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza? HELD NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter’ under Rule 6.03. The 'matter’ where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al. The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect. It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no sides.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS CANON 7 IN RE GALANG Doctrine: That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been with, or indicted for an alleged crime, as a ground for revocation of his license to practice law, is well settled. IN RE ARTHUR M. CUEVAS FACTS  Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar examinations, but was precluded from taking the lawyer’s 1996 oath, pending approval from the Supreme Court  This stems from petitioner’s participation in the initiation rites of the Lex Talionis Fraternitas of Sand Beda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as a result of hazing.  Cuevas was charged with Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.  He applied for and was granted probation, then was discharged on May 1995  May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take the lawyer’s oath and attached to his petition certifications attesting to his “righteous, peaceful and law abiding character.” ISSUE May Cuevas take the lawyer’s oath, taking in consideration the certifications attesting to his “righteous, peaceful and law abiding character”? HELD Yes. Though his deliberate participation in the initiation rites indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission into the bar, the court is willing to give the petitioner a chance based on the various certifications: they sufficiently show that he has a righteous, peaceful and civil oriented character; and he has proven that he has taken steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER (Complaint for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to an illegitimate child) Facts: Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer and their lawyer-client relationship became intimate, when Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love. They lived together

14 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

as "husband and wife" from 96-97 and their daughter was born. The affair ended in 2000 and since then he failed to give support to their daughter. Before the IBP Samaniego testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did not think he was already married. Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing since he did not want to see Samaniego. Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter in a position paper. He also reasoned that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with Samaniego. IBP Board of Governors imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of 6 months suspension for his refusal to support his daughter. Atty. Ferrer filed MR with prayer for to reduce the penalty because it will further cause extreme hardship to his family of 10 children. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of morality required of a member of the bar, his prayer for reduced penalty was denied. Held: SC finds Atty. Ferrer guilty of gross immorality and he is ordered suspended for 6 months. Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair and SC considers such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. Although it is true that Samaniego was not entirely blameless for knowing about Atty. Ferrer’s wife, it does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether both are in pari delicto. Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03. ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND STAFF V. ATTY. DELA CRUZ Facts: Disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the SLU-LHS against Atty. Dela Cruz, its principal, on the ff grounds: a. Gross Misconduct: there were pending cases filed against the respondent: criminal case for child abuse; admin case for unethical acts of misappropriating money for teachers; and the labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty for illegal deduction of salary. Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. He was married in 1982 and they separated in-fact a year after. 7 years after, he contracts another marriage, but this was annulled for being bigamous. Malpractice: respondent notarized documents (14 in total), from 88-97 despite the expiration of his notarial commission in 87. Respondent denied the charges in the cases pending against him, but admitted his second marriage and its subsequent nullification. He also admitted having notarized documents when his notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Dela Cruz for 1 year for his bigamous marriage and 1 year also for notarizing without commission (2 years total)

3 months. It averred that an indefinite suspension is not recommended because respondent supports himself through the practice of law and that it would be cruel deny him of this at this time when he is already advanced in age.

Held: SC finds respondent guilty of immoral conduct, and suspended him from the practice of law for 2 years, and another 2 years for notarizing documents. Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous marriage. However, after his failed first marriage, he remained celibate until the 2nd marriage, showed his good intentions by marrying the 2 nd wife, and he never absconded in his family duties. The SC finds that penalty of disbarment is too harsh. As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized documents without the necessary commission, SC stresses notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. For doing such constitutes not only malpractice but also the crime of falsification of public documents. Respondent also violated the Notarial Law for so doing, and this falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 and Canon 7. The other cases against respondent are pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent. ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT FACTS Petitioner Rebecca Arnobit filed this complaint against her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, praying that the court exercise its disciplinary power over him. Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on 1942; that they bore 12 children; that she saw respondent through law school, continuously supporting him until he passed the bar; that several years after their marriage, or in 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and began cohabiting with Benita Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children. Because of this, Rebecca was impelled to file a complaint for legal separation and support, and a criminal case for adultery. Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife but he denied having cohabited with Benita. He also stated that Rebecca was the cause of their separation alleging that she was always traveling for business purposes without his knowledge and consent, thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family. Hearings were conducted before the Office of the SolGen and subsequently, before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Aside from herself, Rebecca presented 2 other witnesses: her sister, who identified a letter sent to her by respondent apologizing for the unhappiness he caused the family; and the other was Melecio Navarro, the husband of Benita, who testified about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress knowing fully well of their marriage. During the hearings, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence. He would also seek postponement, pleading illness, on the hearing dates. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report: The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for

15 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

HELD The Court agreed with the IBP recommendation but ruled that gross immoral conduct was sufficiently proven warranting disbarment of respondent. CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on this fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. It expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. Immoral conduct has been described as conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. Grossly immoral meaning it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. Lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The fact that respondent’s philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save the day from him. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of his license. Respondent has the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. This, he failed to do. He never attended the hearings to rebut the charges against him, irresistibly suggesting that they are true. Undoubtedly, respondent’s act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes gross immoral conduct. He should therefore be disbarred. ADVINCULA V. MACABATA FACTS Atty. Macabata was the counsel of Cynthia Advincula. In two separate incidents, Atty. Macabata turnedthe head of Advincula and kissed her on the lips. These kissing incidents occurred after meetings regarding a case that Advincula was involved

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS in. in both incidents, Atty. Macabata kissed Advincula inside the car, just before dropping her off in a public street. Atty. Macabata apologized to Advincula via text messages immediately after the 2nd kissing incident. Advincula filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Macabata on the ground of grossly immoral character. Atty. Macabata admitted that he did kiss Advincula, but that this was due to his feelings toward Advincula.

supposed irregularities in conducting the investigation. The SC referred the case to the IBP. ISSUE W/N the civil complaint was groundless W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the civil complaint

ISSUE Is Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to merit his disbarment? HELD The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly immoral character. Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to show the common sense of decency. To merit a disbarment, the act must be grossly immoral. Atty. Macabata’s act of kissing Advincula was not grossly immoral. The kiss was not motivated by malice. This was proven by Atty. Macabata’s immediate apology and the fact that it happened in a well-populated place. Advincula failed to prove that Atty. Macabata lured her or took advantage of her. While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty. Macabata was reprimanded and given a stern warning. The court described his kissing of Advincula as distasteful. (The Supreme Court also said that greetings like beso are ok.) CANON 8 REYES V. CHIONG

HELD Yes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in said civil complaint. IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa case. There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they were not parties in the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint was improper and highly questionable and the suit was filed to harass both of them. In filing the civil suit, Atty. Chiong violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspension SC: affirmed IBP’s recommendation. In addition, the Court mentioned some alternative remedies Atty. Chiong could have taken if his allegations were indeed true. Chiong could have filed a motion for reinvestigation or motion for reconsideration of Salanga’s decision to file the information for estafa. Motion to Dismiss the estafa case was also available if it was indeed filed without basis. Relevant Provisions: Canon 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Lawyer’s Oath – “not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.”

FACTS Two Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered into a business venture to set up a factory for seafood products. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually, Xu discovered that Pan had not established the factory and asked for his money back. Pan became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged the services of Atty. Reyes, who filed a complaint for estafa against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). The complaint was assigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation. For failure to appear and submit a counteraffidavit, Salanga filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Pan in the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money, damages, and for the dissolution of the business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty. Reyes then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless suit, alleging that it was instituted to exact vengeance. Atty. Chiong alleges that Atty. Reyes was impleaded for conniving with Xu in filing the estafa case. Salanga was impleaded because of the

16 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO Facts: Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire whether the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded to the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of either party in that case. Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the CA decision should first be presented. To this respondent retorted, “You mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy?” Complainant replied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the party he represents. Respondent then replied that complainant should’ve notified him. Complainant explained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered, respondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. He then returned to the office and shouted, “Ukinnam nga babai!” (“Vulva of your mother, you woman!”)

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she won’t appear in the hearing of the case in view of the respondent’s public apology, and that the latter was forgiven already.

CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN FACTS

Held: Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning. Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He violated Rule 8.02, because this was an act of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith. His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of court was not only ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of the complainant’s subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8. The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the complainant and the latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO

AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for expelling some students due to having published objectionable features or articles in the school paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled students filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint was based on the fact that Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelled students and their parents compromise agreements in which the students waived all kinds of claims they may have against AMACC and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. The compromise agreements were procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the consent and knowledge of Atty. Camacho given that he was already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred that the acts of Atty. Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. ISSUE

Facts: Atty. Alcantara (incumbent District Pubic Attorney of PAO in Anitque) filed a complaint against Atty. Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of the bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant. This happened when Atty, Salvani was conferring with his client in the PAO office when the wife of the murdered victim, in tears, came and askef for a settlement. Moved by the plight of the woman, Pefianco, who was standing nearby, scolded and shouted at Salvani to not settle the case and to have his client imprisoned so that he would realize his mistake. As head of the office, Alcantara reproached Pefianco, but this ended up with Pefianco saying that Alcantara was an idiot for sending him out of the PAO. Also, Pefianco tried to attack Alcantara and even shouted at him, “Gago ka!” The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found that Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue: W/N Pefianco is guilty of violating Canon 8 Held: Yes. Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Pefianco’s meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the incident. And although Pefianco was moved by the woman’s plight, what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to scold Salvani and insult and berate those who tried to calm him down. Whatever moral righteousness he had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.

17 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Whether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics HELD YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law for having ciolated the Code of Professional Ethics. In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and effected by Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the students in the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayan still proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without at least communicating the matter with their lawyer even being aware that the students were being represented by counsel. Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar. *In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is also in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel."

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS TORRES V. JAVIER Facts: Atty. Torres and Mrs. Celestino charge Atty. Javier for malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney an/or violation of the lawyer’s oath. This stemmed from the remarks made by Javier in the pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Assoc. (UEFA) as counsel: 1. Motion to Expedite contained false statements with malicious imputation of robbery and theft of UEFA’s funds upon their persons; and 2. In the atty.’s fees case, Javier in his Reply used abusive and improper language, and made a statement demeaning to the integrity of the profession (“not uncommon for trial lawyers to hear notaries asking their family members to sign for them”). Javier explained that he was angry because Torres had been spreading reports and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary. With respect to the atty.’s fess case, he alleged that Torres, in his Answer, did not confront the issues but mocked and made malicious accusations against his wife. The IBP found Javier guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue: W/N Javier is guilty of violation of the Code Held: Yes. For reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motion, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be (must be material and relevant). This privilege does not extend to those matters not related to the controversy. The allegations in the Motion to Expedite fall under this privilege, but not those in the Reply. The SC does not countenance Torres’ incorporation of criticisms against Javier’s wife as past president of UEFA, but this does not justify Javier’s retaliating statements (What kind of lawyer is Torres? He lies through his teeth). Canon 8 instructs that a lawyer’s arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO FACTS Tolentino, with the help of Labiano, was pirating the clients of Labiano by offering, in some instances, a 50K loan. ISSUE Is it an encroachment on the professional practice of Labiano, thereby violating rule 8.02 which provides that, “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer,…”?

18 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

HELD Yes. Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result, or reduced fees for his service. In this case, promise of a loan. CANON 9 MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. FACTS: This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free books on Guam Divorce. Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal support services through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed based on certain US cases decided. ISSUE: W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law. W/N the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements complained of. HELD/RATIO: Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the “practice of law”. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list and use of an ordinary, simple professional card. The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack. Hence, it should be enjoined. CAYETANO V. MONSOD FACTS Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Aquino for the position of COMELEC Chairman in 1991. This nomination was opposed by petitioner Cayetano on the ground that Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Apparently, the Constitution requires that the COMELEC Chairperson be a member of the Philippine Bar who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Despite Cayetano’s opposition, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination. Thus, Cayetano filed an instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, basically challenging the confirmation by the CA of Monsod’s nomination. ISSUE Is Monsod qualified to be COMELEC Chairperson?

intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. The SC, in order to arrive at its decision, presented a brief history of Monsod’s employment. After passing the bar exam, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. From 1963 to 1970, he worked for the World Bank Group, where he was assigned as operations officer in Costa Rica. His job involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic and project work of the bank. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive of an investment bank and a business conglomerate. By 1986, he rendered his services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant and he also worked as a Chief Executive Officer. He was also the Secretary-General and National Chairman of NAMFREL in 1986-1987. His position in NAMFREL required his knowledge in election law. Also, he sat as a member of the Davide Commission in 1990. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. PADILLA, J., dissenting: There are several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." 1. Habituality 2. Compensation 3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls or legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law”. 4. Attorney-client relationship.

HELD YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an

19 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

CAMBALIZA V. CRISTOBAL-TENORIO FACTS Cabliza, a former employee of Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, filed a disbarment complaint on the grounds of deceit, grossly immoral conduct and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. Deceit: represented herself to be married to Felicisimo Tenorio Jr, who has a prior existing marriage Grossly immoral conduct: disseminated libellous affidavits against a Makati City counselor.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Malpractice: allowed her husband, a non-lawyer, to practice by making him a senior partner in her law office. This is evidenced by 1) the law office letterhead which included the husband as a senior partner, 2) an id wherein he signed as an “atty”, 3) appearance in court as counsel. HELD Guilty of malpractice. Violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 Canon 9: a lawyer shall not assist in unauthorized practice of law Rule 9.01: a lawyer shall not delated to any unqualified person the performance of a task that may only be performed by members of the bar in good standing Even though Cabliza later on withdrew her complaint, IBP still pushed through with the investigation because such is a disciplinary proceeding. There is no private interest affected such that desistance of the complainant will terminate the proceedings. The purpose is to protect the bar from those unfit to practice law. AMALGAMATED LABORERS’ ASSOCIATION V. CIR FACTS This case involves a controversy over Attorney’s Fees for legal services in the CIR. On 1956, Arceo + 47 other members of their UNION, ALA and Javier lodged a complaint agains Binalbagan Sugar Central Company (BISCOM) for unfair labor practices, as specified in the Industrial Peace Act. On Nov 1962, the CIR rendered judgement in favor of the workers and it became final on March 1963. On June 1963, the CIR directed the Chief Examiner to go to BISCOM to compute the backwages of the complainant workers Atty. Fernandez filed a “Notice of Atty.’s lien” amounting to 25% of their money claim (PhP79, 755.22). He explained that it was supposed to be 30% but Arsenio Reyes requested him to 25% to satisfy Atty. Carbonell’s lien of 5%. Atty. Carbonell disputed this claim and even said that the verbal agreement entered into by the UNION and its officers is that the 30% Atty.’s Fees shall be divided equally by him, Atty. Fernandez & Felisberto Javier, the UNION’s president. There are other matters in this case regarding Jurisdiction but the one related to Legal Ethics is on the issue on Atty.’s Fees

AGUIRRE V. RAMA FACTS Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar, charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 but ruled that he cannot sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct, alleging that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for Vice Mayoralty candidate George Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate, and filed with the MBEC a pleading as counsel entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. Respondent also signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in her petition to be declared the winning mayoralty candidate. On the charge of violation of law, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body, respondent being a municipal government employee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate). The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (“OBC”) for evaluation, report and recommendation. OBC’s Report and Recommendation The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. Respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Such unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. HELD

ISSUE W/N IT MAY BE STIPULATED THAT THE UNION PRESIDENT MAY SHARE IN THE ATTORNEY’S FEES. HELD NO. The court struck down the alleged oral agreement that the UNION President should share in the Atty.’s Fees. The UNION President is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a UNION President is allowed to share in Atty.’s Fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. Note Rule 9.02.

20 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law and was thus denied admission to the Philippine bar. 1. SC agreed with the finding of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. - Respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and signed as “counsel” in the pleadings - was also retained as counsel of mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and of party REFORMA LM-PPC

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS *all these took place before Respondent took his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys 2. What constitutes the “practice of law” - The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts - all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. - any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. - perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. - render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. * respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. 3. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. - limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. - A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. - although respondent passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. LAQUINDANUM V. QUINTANA Facts: Judge Laquindanum charged Atty. Quintana with the offense of notarizing documents beyond the jurisdiction of his notarial license and with notarizing documents not known to him to be based on actual facts. It was also found that his wife sometimes notarized the documents herself.

Yes. He was found to have assisted in the unauthorized practice of law by negligently letting his wife notarize documents herself in his absence. His contention that he rectified this error by slapping his wife is of no moment because he did not in the first place take the necessary steps to prevent this. He was also charged with violations of the notarial law.

CANONS 10 & 11 FERNANDEZ V. DE RAMOS-VILLALON FACTS This is an administrative case filed by petitioner Fernandez against Atty. Villalon. It started from a case filed by a certain Carlos Palacios against Fernandez to nullify a Deed of Donation. Atty. Villalon represented Palacios in the early part of the case against Fernandez. In 2004, Palacios, owner of a lot in Makati, sought the help of Fernandez to help him in a case against a land-grabbing syndicate. Palacios won the case with the help of Fernandez. In Sept 2005, Palacios bumped into a Mrs. Lirio who expressed interest in buying Palacios’ Makati property. It turns out that it was being sold by Fernandez who allegedly had a Deed of Donation which Palacios executed in his favor. This Deed of Donation was registered. Palacios, with the help of Atty. Villalon, filed an action tto nullify the Deed against Fernandez. However, Fernandez answered that the title transfer in his name was proper, citing a Deed of Absolute Sale as basis. He furthered alled that it was actually Palacios who forged the Deed of Donation to cheat in taxes. In 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01, 7.03, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3. He claims that Atty. Villalon has suppressed and excluded in the complaint filed by her knowledge about the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was by the way, unregistered. He says that no mention of it was made in the petition for the annulment of thee Deed of Donation. Commissioner of IBP recommended the dismissal of the case. Sustaining Atty. Villalon’s argument that she, as counsel for Palacios, was under no duty to include the fact that the Deed of Sale existed because only the client’s operative facts, and not other evidentiary facts, need to be included in the complaint. The Deed of Sale was a matter of a defense that Fernandez as defendant can freely point out during the trial. Fernandez appealed the case. ISSUE W/N there was grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. HELD

Issue: Is Atty. Quintana guilty of violating Canon 9? Held:

21 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

None. Case against Villalon is dismissed. A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the duty to be truthful in all his dealings. However, this duty does not require that the lawyer advance matters of defense on

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS behalf of his or her client’s opponent. She (Villalon) is not duty bound to build the case for her client’s opponent, Fernandez. The cause of action chosen by Palacios was for the annulment of the Deed of Donation. Client Palacios informed her that the Deed of Sale was void for lack of consideration. Also, it was not registered and was not the basis of the transfer of title of Palacios’ property to Fernandez. Therefore, it is not a necessary evidence/fact to their case. RIVERA V. CORRAL Facts: Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging Atty. Corral with malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment case was received by Atty. Corral’s secretary on February 23, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed by Atty. Corral on March 13, 1990. Next day, he went to the clerk of court and changed the date February 23 to February 29 without the court’s prior knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral later on filed a reply to plaintiff’s manifestation claiming that he received the decision on February 28, not 29 (because there is no Feb 29). Issue: W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for changing the date when he received the decision of the court without the court’s prior knowledge of decision

findings of fact and that Commissioner Dinopol acted in the same manner with malice thrown in when he adopted the findings of the labor arbiter. That the retiring commissioners of NLRC circumvent the law and jurisprudence when the money claim involved in the case is substantial. According to respondent, such acts constitute grave abuse of discretion. Because of the MRMI, complainant filed a disbarment case with IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent wherein it was alleged that the latter violated certain codes and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Specifically, respondent allegedly violated Canons 8 and 11 wherein a lawyer is prohibited from using scandalous, oppressive, offensive, and malicious language against an opposing counsel and before the courts. In his defense, respondent argues that he did not violate any of the canons found in the Code because 1) the NLRC is not among the courts referred to in the rules; 2) the Commissioners therein are not judges; and 3) the complainants in labor cases are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger. Attached to respondent’s countercomplaint is an affidavit made by the union president Batan alleging that the lawyers of the complainant are the ones who violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when they filed multiple suits arising from the same cause of action and when they deliberately lessened the number of complainants in the labor case. The findings of the Commission on Bar discipline led the IBP to conclude that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 8 and 11, while the lawyers of the complainant did not violate any canons of the Code. It recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case a similar conduct will be committed again.

Held: No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year. The correction of date by Atty. Corral was made not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court in believing that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period. Because if the decision was received on Feb 22, the notice of appeal filed on March 13 is filed out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, Atty. Corral altered the date he received the court’s decision. By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, Atty. Corral committed an act of dishonesty. Dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct. JOHNNY NG V. ALAR FACTS The case stemmed from a labor case filed by the employees of the Ng Company against its employers. The employees alleged that they did not receive their service incentive leave pay from their employers due to the latter’s claim that the employees conducted a strike at the Company’s premises which hampered its ingress and egress. The case was referred to the labor arbiter and the latter found that the employees have been paid their service incentive leave pay. The employees appealed to NLRC but the latter affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. In reaction to this, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI) where respondent used scandalous, offensive, and menacing languages to support his complaint. He said that the labor arbiter was cross-eyed in making his

22 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

ISSUE W/N respondent violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD YES. Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the public’s perception of the legal profession. The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not admit any justification. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration. However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondent’s violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00. Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against the lawyers of complainant, the Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do so. FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND FACTS De La Serna a requested for the inhibition of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga claiming that Justice Tinga, who was the ponente of the decision, received P10 Million from Mr. Johnny Chan in exchange for a favorable decision. De la serna alleges JOHNNY CHAN curtly told him that Chan already given out 10M to JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA in exchange for a favorable Decision in the case between Fudot and Catltleya land(Mr. Chan is a representative of Cattleya land). Atty. De La Serna said that Justice Tinga abandoned the doctrine in the case Lim v, Jorge to accommodate Mr. Chan. He also said that the case was prioritized for resolution and that Mr. Chan had prior knowledge of the outcome of the case before the decision was promulgated. However, Mr. Chan related that he approached De La Serna for the purpose of amicably settling their case with Cattleya, and offered him to be their retainer in Bohol. However, he denied having said to De La Serna that he had already spent so much money for the Supreme Court ISSUE W/N Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt. HELD Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt. Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders but such conduct that tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice has also been considered to constitute indirect contempt. A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. Corollary to his duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers is to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice, as it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice” As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in court which tend to corrode the judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon him to report the matter to the Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission or even a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the public's trust in, the judicial system.

23 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

This is not to say, however, that as an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the court. It is a long recognized and respected right of a lawyer, or any person, for that matter, to be critical of courts and magistrates as long as they are made in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. In this case, Atty. De La Serna's statements bear the badges of falsehood while the common version of the witnesses who disputed his statements is imbued with the hallmarks of truth. De La Serna's declarations were maliciously and irresponsibly made. They exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. The libelous attack on the integrity and credibility of Justice Tinga tend to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded to it. BONDOC V. JUDGE SIMBULAN FACTS There was a case for corruption in the judges sala. the private prosecutors representing the government were repeatedly absent or unprepared. This led to the case being dismissed. the lawyer/private prosecutor was unhappy with the dismissal and accused the judge of favoritism and gross ignorance of the law. The lawyer went to the congressman in their district and through him filed a case against the judge. this subsequent reached the supreme court. HELD The supreme court found the judge innocent and the lawyer was found to be the one behind the case (against the judge) not the congressman. The lawyer was found guilty of indirect contempt and given a stern warning as well as fined for 2500php by the court. Lesson: if you file a case against a judge file it within the justice system (ie office of the court administrator / IBP) not with your congressman or other non-judicial people. CANON 12 BERBANO V. BARCELONA FACTS Felicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty-infact for their pending casevwith the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (regarding their Ayala lot being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty. Daen was subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo looked for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Berbano was recommended to Atty. Barcelona (by a certain Naty Sibuya). After the first visit of Atty. Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail, they learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told Berbano that if they could produce P50K, he will cause the release of

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Atty. Daen the next day. Since it was already late in the evening, Berbano could only produce P15,700 by asking from relatives who were with her. There were several subsequent meetings between Berbano and Atty. Barcelona regarding the “grease money” to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. Berbano made another payment via a “pay-to-cash” check for P24,000; and, in another occasion, went to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000. Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daen’s nephew while Berbano gave him P1000 for gasoline expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure Atty. Daen’s because the check had not been encashed. By this time, the total amount given to Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000. For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden disappearance, Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP. Commissioner Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility recommending him to be disbarred and ordering him to return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer and to appear before the Commissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors adopted the Commissioner’s findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 years. ISSUE W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred HELD Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred. Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Berbano’s Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the finding that respondent committed the acts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Hence, the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating Commissioner’s judgment. Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule 16.01). Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having connections with a Member of the Court (to secure the release of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not the first time Atty. Barcelona has been charged and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer (The previous case also involved misrepresentation and Atty. Barcelona also did not appear before the IBP despite due notice.). Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections (related to Canon 12). SEBASTIAN V. BAJAR

24 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

FACTS Bajar was a lawyer or the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the DAR who represented Fernando Tanlioco in numerous cases which raised the same issues. Tanlioco was an agricultural lessee of a land owned by Sebastian’s spouse and sisterin-law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to residential. The RTC rendered judgment ordering Tanlioco’s ejectment subject to the payment of disturbance compensation. This was affirmed by the CA and SC. Bajar, as counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to produce the conversion order. RTC dismissed this due to res judicata and lack of cause of action. Bajar again filed another case for Maintenance of Possession with the DAR Adjudication Board which raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance compensation. Manuel S. Sebastian filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar (respondent) for “obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme Court, and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics.” The Court issued a resolution requiring Bajar to comment on the complaint lodged against her. After a 2nd Motion for Extension, Bajar finally submitted her Comment which was alleged to not confront the issues raised against her. The Court required Bajar to submit a Rejoinder but failed, and was later ordered to show cause why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for such failure. The Court referred the case to the IBP for hearing and decision. The IBP ruled that Bajar be “SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law for Unethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of law.” However, Bajar continued to practice law despite the decision claiming that she did not receive a copy of the order. ISSUE Whether Bajar violated the Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD YES. Respondent’s act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that “an important factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the partieslitigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.[72] Indeed, “while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice.” It is evident from the records that respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in theEjectment case. In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. Bajar was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. HEGNA V. PADERANGA FACTS Hegna was the lessee of a portion of land owned by the Baclayon spouses for 10 years but during this period the Panaguinip spouses by means of force, threat, intimidation, stealth and strategy (FISTS) entered upon the vacant portion of the lot and constructed a shop for which he filed a forcible entry case. Hegna won and the Panaguinip spouses were sentenced to vacate the leased premises and to pay complainant compensatory damages for illegal occupation. When the MTCC of Cebu issued a writ of execution and the Sheriff levied certain properties of the spouses they sent a letter dated Dec 2001 to Hegna for a possible amicable settlement which he denied. Then Atty. Paderanga filed a Third Party Complaint alleging that he bought the lot and the vehicle during November and December of 2001 which caused the failure to levy the properties by the Sheriff. Hegna then filed a letter complaint to the Office of the bar confidant for “deliberately falsifying documents, causing delay and a possible denial of justice.” He also filed criminal charges against Atty. Paderanga & Atty. Madarang (notary public) for falsification of public documents and the Panaguinip spouses for false testimony and perjury. His grounds were (1) the lot had no record of transfer with the Register of Deeds, (2) the registration of the vehicle didn’t reflect any change of ownership & (3) the Notarial Register Book showed tampering and erasures. The City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of prima facie evidence of guilt but referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Atty. Paderanga’s defense alleged that for ESTATE PLANNING purposes, he intentionally left these properties in the name of the previous owner and that he alleged discrepancies in the notarization were made to correct mistakes so that entries will speak the truth. The Investigating Commissioner found that the dismissal was improper in light of the letter handwritten by Respondent’s clients, written in Cebuano, asking for mercy and forgiveness in relation to the forcible entry case. Such letter was no longer necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE transfer of ownership of properties. In addition, there were several instances where Atty. Paderanga will meet with Hegna offering settlement and it was only when he denied them that he received the Third Party Complaint. ISSUE W/n there was indeed a genuine transfer of the lot and vehicle to Atty. Paderanga? HELD

25 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Commissioner is convinced that there was indeed an anomaly which constitutes a violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility so given 1 year suspension. His non-registration of the sale transaction so it would not appear in the records of the BIR, the City Assessor or the Register of Deeds, on the Land Registration Office so that he would not pay for the expenses of the sale and transfer twice, once he decided to sell; or place them in his children’s name, and avoid paying estate and inheritance taxes upon his death. Art. 1491 A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the property of his client which is in litigation.  violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.  violated the Lawyer’s Oath, which mandates that he should support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has also failed to live up to the standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The act of nonregistration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal per se; but, as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an exemplar for others to emulate. PLUS BUILDERS V. REVILLA FACTS In the case of PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., , En Banc, A.C. No. 7056, February 11, 2009, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court, finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court, misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor of complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al., who were the clients of respondent Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainant’s rights over the land. Continuing to pursue his clients’ lost cause, respondent was found to have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law – holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm. Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of action he took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated November 19, 1999, but were based on his serious study, research and

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his clients in the DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were valid and proper legal theory designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. He stresses that he was not the original lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to listen to them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his interview. They maintained that they had been in open, adverse, continuous and notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years. Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was resorted to in order to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject property. He avers that he merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled under the law, considering that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary eviction by the complainant. He posited that he was only being protective of the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective of his own family, and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono.

It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter’s cause to succeed. In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the respondent’s acts complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent should not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice. This is the criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. FIL-GARCIA, INC. V. HERNANDEZ FACT Filomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after losing his case in the CA for a sum of money, secured the serviced of Atty. Fernando Hernandez, who received the denied resolution for Garcia as counsel, and was given 15 days to appeal. Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for a Motion for Extension the day before the expiration of the period to file the appeal,, alleging that he was counsel for a mayoralty candidate and a senatorial candidate, and he was also needed in the Justice Hofilena

ISSUE Is Hernandez liable for malpractice, gross misconduct, tantamount to violation of his oath as a lawyer, which warrant his disbarment?

HELD

26 | Block C 2012

canvassing of votes, so the urgency of the nature of his work will not allow him the limited time to file the appeal, thus asked for 30 days extension. 30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2 nd Motion for Extension, this time, because he fell ill, and his physical state will not allow him to file the appeal on time, thus asking for 20 days extension. 20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed, with the grand excuse that because he fell ill the last time, his work load piled up, thus requiring him more time to conclude on the work load he missed when he was ill, plus the appeal, hence the request for 10 days extension, to which 10 days later, he did actually file the appeal. (Finally!) Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all three Motions for Extensions were denied by the court, and to his dismay, received a copy of the resolution denying the appeal all together. However, instead of informing his client, FilGarcia, he decides to forward the resolution of denial of the appeal some 7 months later, which greatly angered his client, pushing him to file for his disbarment.

HELD Yes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment. The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless assumption that each motion will be granted by the Court, and without taking care of informing himself of the Court's action thereon, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Moreover, respondent knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the petition he belatedly filed as an afterthought in his desperate attempt to salvage the appeal. Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court proceedings." While pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer to file a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, he should not presume that his motion for extension of time will be granted. Motions for extension of time to file a pleading are not granted as a matter of course but lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame. A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as counsel should inform the client and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the services of another counsel who can study the situation and work out a solution. To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months from the time he received a copy of the Court's resolution to inform complainant of the same. He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering that respondent humbly admitted his fault in not immediately informing complainant of the status of the case. CANONS 13 & 14

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO

NOTE: The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated.

FACTS

SUSPENSION OF ATTY. BAGUBAYAO

Foodsphere, Inc. is the owner of CDO grocery products. One day, a Mr. Cordero bought canned goods from a grocery store, one of them being a CDO liver spread canned good. When Mr. Cordero and his family ate the liver spread, they found that it tasted sour and subsequently discovered that the canned good was infested with a colony of worms. A complaint was filed with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD) and a subsequent investigation confirmed the presence of the parasites. BFAD ordered a hearing between Foodsphere and the Corderos, where the latter demanded P150k. Foodsphere refused, resulting to the Corderos threatening to bring up the matter to the media. Meanwhile, Atty Mauricio faxed Foodsphere a sample front page of a tabloid he was involved with, which contained articles discrediting the latter, and threatened to publish it if they didn’t pay the amount the Corderos wanted. Foodsphere refused as well. Atty Mauricio thus proposed a ‘Kasunduan’ between the two, where Foodsphere agreed to settle the matter for a lower amount, but added that Foodsphere advertise in Mauricio’s tabloids and tv shows, in exchange for the withdrawal of the complaint. The Corderos withdrew their complaint and BFAD dismissed the complaint against Foodsphere. Mauricio then sent Foodsphere an ‘Advertising Contract’ asking the latter advertisements of various media (which were a lot…and expensive!) owned by Mauricio. As a sign of goodwill, Foodsphere offered to patronize some advertisements only. Mauricio was disappointed with this and threatened to proceed with the publications. And a few weeks later, Mauricio, in his radio talk show (Batas ng Bayan) held a guessing contest with questions that asked which company had worms in its liver spread. He also wrote in his columns and aired in his tv shows about the same topic. Foodsphere filed criminal and civil complaints against Mauricio about the discrediting remarks that he has been making against the company. Foodsphere also filed the present administrative complaint against Mauricio to the IBP, where he was ordered not to make any more statements on the matter. Notwithstanding the pending cases against him, Mauricio continued to publish articles against Foodsphere and discredit them in his tv shows. Because of this, the IBP ordered that Mauricio be suspended for 2 years. Mauricio now challenges the validity of the suspension. ISSUE/S W/N Mauricio’s suspension was valid. HELD YES! Mauricio suspended for 3 years. Continued Attacks Despite Pending Cases = Violation Of Rule 13.02 Despite the pendency of the case against Mauricio, and IBP’s orders that he discontinue with his actions, he still continued with his attacks against Foodsphere and its products. This is a clear and conscious violation the Code of Professional Responsibility which is an improper conduct of a member of the bar.

27 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

FACTS Administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5144: People v. Luis Plaza. Plaza was accused of murdering a policeman. Criminal case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser. Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that evidence presented was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide but not murder. Counsel for Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail, but Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo (who was in charge of the case) objected thereto on the ground that the original charge of murder was not subject to bail (Rules of Court). Judge Buyser inhibited himself from trying the case because of the “harsh insinuation” of Bagabuyo that he “lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate” by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail. Case was transferred to Judge Tan, who fixed the amount of bail at P40k. Instead of availing of judicial remediess, Bagabuyo caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting the bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, “Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out.” In the article, Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is non-bailable, but admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak. He claims that the former judge found the evidence to be strong. He stated that he was not afraid to be cited for contempt because it was the only way for the public to know that there are judges displaying judicial arrogance. RTC directed Bagabuyo (and the writer of the article) to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court with its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentations. Bagabuyo refused to explain and the RTC held him in contempt of court, sentencing him to 30 days in jail (he posted a bail bond and was released). Despite this, Bagabuyo presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS and again, attacked the integrity of Judge Tan. In the radio interview, Bagabuyo called Judge Tan a liar, ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law. RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and show cause why he should not be held in contempt and be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 11.05 and Rule 13.02). Bagabuyo denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed. He said that he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order. He justified his response to the interview (at the instance of his friend) as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was made without malice. RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, and suspended him from the practice of law for 1 year. In accordance with the Rules of Court, the case was

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS o

transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which recommended the implementation of the RTC’s order of suspension. ISSUE W/N Bagabuyo should be held in contempt and suspended for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – YES HELD Canon 11 mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Bagabuyo violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the published article and when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of the law. Rule 11.05 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities. Bagabuyo violated Rule 11.05 when he caused the holding of a press conference and submitted to a radio interview to air out his grievances against Judge Tan. Rule 13.02 states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Bagabuyo violated Rule 13.02 when he made statements in the article, which were made while Criminal Case No. 5144 was still pending in court. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. CANON 15 HILADO V. DAVID FACTS Mrs. Hilado filed an action against Assad to annul the sale of several house & lot between Assad and her now deceased husband, during the Japanese occupation Assad’s counsel is Atty. Francisco Mrs. Hilado’s counsels are the following: Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo Atty. Dizon wrote Atty. Francisco to discontinue representing Assad because Mrs. Hilado consulted her about the case and even turned over some documents to Atty. Francisco Atty. Francisco even wrote a legal opinion/letter addressed to Mrs. Hilado regarding the same case, which states that Atty. Francisco will not represent Mrs. Hilado in the case and he thinks that the action against Assad will not prosper Mrs. Hilado’s counsel filed a motion to DISQUALIFY Atty. Francisco Atty. Francisco’s version of the story:

28 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

-

Mrs. Hilado came to see Atty. Francisco about the case, but he refused to become her counsel because he thinks that the action will not prosper o Days later, Atty. Francisco’s assistant, Atty. Agrava, informed him that Mrs. Hilado left some expediente in the firm. Atty. Francisco instructed Atty. Agrava to return the expediente because they will not handle the case of Mrs. Hilado o Later, the firm’s stenographer showed Atty. Francisco a letter allegedly dictated by Atty. Agrava which explains to Mrs. Hilado why they refuse to take the case o Atty. Francisco allegedly signed the letter without reading it o Later on, Assad went to Atty. Francisco’s office. Afterwards, Atty. Francisco accepted the retainer fee Lower Court Held: no other information was transmitted to Atty. Francisco other than those in plaintiff’s complaint and there was no attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado. Hence, motion to disqualify is denied.

ISSUE W/N there was an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado HELD Yes, there was an attorney-client relationship because the purpose of Mrs. Hilado was to obtain Atty. Francisco’s personal service as a lawyer Retainer and frequency of consultation is not needed , so long as the purpose is to obtain professional advice or assistance and the attorney permits, then an attorney-client relationship is established Formality is not essential Even is no secret communication was given, as long as there is an attorneyclient relationship which precludes accepting opposite party’s retainer in the same litigation regardless of what type of information was received Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance to administration of justice Even if the information was only received by an assistant, it is still considered as professional service, besides an information imparted to a member of a firm is made available to the entire firm Hence, Atty. Francisco is disqualified as Assad’s counsel Ratio: Rule 15.02 – a lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client NAKPIL V. VALDES FACTS  Valdes is Jose Nakpil’s accountant, consultant and lawyer.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS      

Nakpil got interested in the purchase of a summer residence in Baguio but due to lack of funds, he asked Valdes to buy it for him and hold it in trust. Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he bought the land and had the title issued in his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became the administratrix of Jose’s estate. And, Valdes’ law firm filed for the settlement of Jose’s estate. Baguio property became an issue because the property was not included in Jose’s inventory of estate, but the loans used to purchase the property were charged under his name. The title to the property was transferred from Valdes to Caval Realty, Valdes’ family realty corp. Valdes’ accounting firm handled the inventory of Jose’s estate but also, handled the claims of Jose’s creditors- Angel Nakpil and ENORN, INC.

ISSUE w/n Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the code of professional ethics HELD Yes. The proscription applies no matter how slight the adverse interest is. Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only upon full disclosure of the facts among all concerned parties, as to the extent of conflict and probable adverse outcome. The preparation of claims of the creditors against the estate is obviously improper because he had to fight for one side, the claims he was defending against for the other side. The defense that he had already resigned from the law firm was not supported by evidence. His resignation from the accounting firm only shows that he was absent for quite some time but returned to work during the tenure of the litigation of claims. Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the case. The test of impropriety of representation of conflicting interests is not the certainty of such existence but mere probability for it to exist. Even though he could have committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant, the court is not divested of jurisdiction to punish a lawyer for misconduct committed outside the legal field, as the good moral character requirement is not only a requisite for entrance to the bar but a continuing requirement for the practice of law. A lawyer should always act to promote public confidence to the legal profession. HORNILLA V. SALUNAT FACTS Complainants in this case are members of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) who filed an intra-corporate case against its members

29 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

of the Board of Directors for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of the real properties of PPSTA corporation. Attorney Salunat is the counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) and at the same time the counsel of the PPSTA Board of Directors. Hence, complainants now aver that Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest. ISSUE Can a lawyer, engaged by a corporation, defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? HELD No, a lawyer cannot. Hence, Atty. Salunat is guilty of representing conflicting interest and is admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. The Court in this case explained the nature of a derivative suit. Where corporation directors have committed a breach, ultra vires acts, or negligence… a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation. In this suit therefore, the corporation is the real party in interest, while the stockholder who files a suit for the corporation’s behalf is only the nominal party. The test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. A situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY V. ARQUILLO FACTS Northwestern University filed an administrative case against Atty. Arquillo for representing conflicting interests in a NLRC case. The complaint alleges that Atty. Arquillo appeared as counsel for both the petitioner and the respondent (Castro) in the labor case. Atty. Arquillo, as a defense, contended that the petitioners and respondent he represented in the labor case belonged to the same side as the latter party was absolved from liability. Hence, there was no conflict of interests. ISSUE W/N Atty. Arquillo represented conflicting interests. HELD YES. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty. Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that there was an obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in which Castro was one of the respondents.

FACTS

Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.

Plaintiffs, heirs of the late Lydio Falame, allege that their father engaged the services of respondent Atty. Baguio to represent him in an action for forcible entry (in which Lydio and his brother Raleigh were one of the defendants). As counsel, Atty. Baguio used and submitted evidence of: 1.) A special power of attorney executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing him as his attorney-in-fact; and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed before the respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the case. Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorable ruling for the defendants in the said case, Lydio still retained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser and counsel of his businesses until his death in 1996. However, in October of 2000 Atty. Baguio, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, filed a compliant against the plaintiffs involving the same property that was the subject matter in the first case. Said complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, TCT issued as a consequence of the registration of the sale and the real estate mortgage. Plaintiffs in turn, filed an administrative case against Atty. Baguio alleging that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second case, wherein they were impleaded a defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. They contend that the spouses Falame’s interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio. The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Winston Abuyuan’s report and recommendation for the dismissal of this case.

Held:

ISSUE

Yes, Atty. Bamba is guilty. Suspended for 1 year. At the time Atty. Bamba filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB, he was still the counsel of record of Quiambao in the pending ejectment case. Under Rule 15.03, “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.” This is founded on the principles of public policy because it is the only way that litigants can be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

W/N Atty. Baguio violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

QUIAMBAO V. BAMBA Facts: Quiambao charges Atty. Bamba with violation of CPR for representing conflicting interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time representing her in another case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Allied Investigation Bureau (AIB) and its president and managing director (Quiambao). Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Quaimbao in an ejectment case. Later on, Quiambao resigned from AIB. While the ejectment case was still ongoing, Atty. Bamba, as the counsel of AIB, filed a replevin case against Quiambao. Issue:

3 Tests of Conflict of Interests: 1. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client 2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty 3. Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment HEIRS OF FALAME V. BAGUIO

30 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

HELD Yes, he violated the rule. Rule 15.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to contest that which his duty another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. The rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client’s confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS employment. The protection given to a client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for. As defense counsel in the first civil case respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase respondent’s rights as co-owner. The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio’s death or through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to the of Lydio. And while plaintiffs have never been respondent’s clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydio’s ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil case.

when Pacana went to the states, they continued communicating and he continued sending her money for the case. Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

PACANA V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ

When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned P12,500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. This never happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacana’s repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him. Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopez’s disbarment. The IBP disbarred her.

FACTS Pacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. Pacana earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed its name to Precedent. Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also active members. From then on, they constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedent’s relation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that time. There was an attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didn’t push through. After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by Lopez’s clients in Multitel. Lopez explained that she had to send it so that her clients – defrauded investors of Multitel – would know that she was doing something for them and assured Pacana that there was nothing to worry about. Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts, first 900,000; then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even

31 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Dear Butchie, Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer. -----------I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. ----------Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! ---Candy

ISSUE Whether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting interests. HELD Yes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ratio: Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with Pacana, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC. Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have done was either to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer since

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest. Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacana’s hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon Pacana that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. CANON 16 LICUANAN V. MELO

distribution. He convinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged undeclared properties and demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees. After several months, however, respondent failed to institute any action. Complainant decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for the return of the P100,000.00, but respondent refused despite repeated demands. The lower court ruled in favor of Posidio and ordered Vitan to return the Php 100,000.00 and pay an additional Php 20,000.00 as interest and damages. In compliance, Vitan issued a Prudential Bank check that was dishonored later on. Despite being sent a notice of dishonor and the repeated demands to pay, Vitan refused to honor his obligation. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report finding Vitan guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in defrauding his client and issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same. The IBP penalized Vitan with a reprimand with stern warning that a similar misconduct will warrant a more severe penalty.

Facts: Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach of professional ethics. Atty. Melo was Licuanan’s counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant. Atty. Melo failed to remit to her the rentals collected nor did the said lawyer report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after a year from actual receipt that Atty. Melo turned over his collections to Licuanan because a demand made by the latter. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Melo should be penalized for failure to remit rentals collected Held: Yes! Atty. Melo is disbarred. Ratio: The actuations of Atty. Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a 1 year period, the mount of P5,220 received by him on behalf of his client, Licuanan is deprived of its use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by her, I a breach of the Lawyer’s Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of the CPR. Due to Atty. Melo’s professional misconduct, he has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. Atty. Melo’s unprofessional actuations considered, the SC find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. POSIDIO V. VITAN FACTS Posidio engaged the services of Vitan in a Testate Proceeding of the deceased Nicolasa Arroyo to which she paid Php 20,000.00 as legal fees. However, Vitan withdrew his appearance in the said case thus, Posidio had to engage the services of another lawyer. Six years after, Vitan contacted Posidio and told her that he has with some tax declarations and other documents purportedly forming part of the estate of Nicolasa Arroyo, but was not included in the inventory of properties for

32 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

ISSUE Whether or not Vitan should be penalized? HELD The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the IBP. However, they find that the penalty of reprimand is not commensurate to the gravity of wrong committed by Vitan. In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as legal fees for filing additional claims against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. However, he failed to institute an action, thus it was imperative that he immediately return the amount to complainant upon demand. Having received payment for services which were not rendered, respondent was unjustified in keeping complainant’s money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusal to do so despite complainant’s repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not to delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand. The lawyer’s failure to return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. LEMOINE V. BALON

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS FACTS  Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan Insurance.  His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balon’s services as his counsel  Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered payable upon successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee.  Since he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoine’s claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments  Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoine’s claim and Balon confirmed his acceptance of the offer  December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon  When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation  December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon.  Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the check as attorney’s lien pending Lemoine’s payment of his attorney’s fee equivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has good network with the mentioned agencies.  Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of Lemoine, however, he gave no evidence to such turnover

The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien, as provided for in Rule 16.03, presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorney’s fees to be charged. In case of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees, but rather he can file the necessary action with the proper court to fix the fees. And in the present case, Lemoine never gave his consent on the proposal of Balon. It must be noted as well that before receiving the check, Balon proposes a 25% attorney’s fees, after receiving the check, he was already asking for 50%. SC found Balon guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, and ordered disbarred. IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY LEON G. MAQUERA Facts: Atty Maquera was counsel for a certain Castro who was indebted to Edward Benavente who obtained judgment in a civil case. Castro’s propery was sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation, but Castro retained the right to redemption over said property. In consideration for Maquera’s legal fees, Castro and Atty Maquera entered into an oral agreement that he would assign his right of redemption to Maquera. Maquera purchased the property from Benavente for $525.00 then sold it for $320,000. He was suspended in the practice of law in Guam for two years for  Obtaining an unreasonably high fee for his services  Did not comply with Guam’s “Model Rules” by entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing” Issue:

ISSUE W/N Atty. Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD YES. According to the SC, Atty. Balon violated Canons 1, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21. Specifically, Canon 16 which provides that “a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” Balon violated this and committed misconduct, when he failed to render an account upon receipt of the money and further, when he failed to deliver such amount to Lemoine. It is also the duty of the lawyer to surrender such money collected when demanded upon him. Balon violated this duty when he refuses to return the amount to Lemoine contending that he has a lien on the fund.

33 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also be admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? Ruling: It is not automatic suspension or disbarment, but is prima facie evidence only. The power of the Court to disbar/suspend a lawyer for acts an omission committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court: “[…]The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.” Also, he violated Article 1492 in relation to 1491 of the civil code which prohibits a lawyer from acquiring by assignment the client’s property which is the subject of litigation. It extends to legal redemption. Most particularly, Canon 17 which states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and be mindful of the trust and confidence In him; and rule 1.01, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. HOWEVER, there is a need to ascertain Maquera has the right to explain why he should and should not be suspended/disbarred on those grounds. Suspension/disbarment is NOT automatic NEVERTHELESS, the Court rules that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for the non-payment of his IBP dues from 1977. REDDI V. SERBIO, JR. Facts: Reddi, an Indian national, is a philanthropist. She decided to put up a hospital in the Philippines and acquired, with the help of Atty. Serbio, some properties to help speed up generation of funds. It was later found out that some of the properties did not in fact belong to the ‘owners’ she paid. Issue: Is respondent guilty of violating Canon 16? Held: Yes. Said canon requires that a lawyer should properly account for all amounts in his custody which pertain to the client and return the same upon demand. This the respondent plainly failed to do even after repeated demands made by Reddi. DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY. EUGENIA J. MUÑOZ V. ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG, JR.

Complainant was informed by respondent that he had sold only one lot and remitted the proceeds to complainant. Respondent further told complainant that the other lots remained unsold due to the presence of squatters. After few years, complainant discovered that more than one lot was sold. Complainant then sent a demand letter to respondent directing him to remit and turn over to her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties. Complainant also averred that the Special Power of Attorney, which respondent had used to sell the lots is a forgery and a falsified document, as the signature therein were not the real signatures of complainant and her spouse. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Lumasag, Jr. is guilty of deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct. HELD: Yes. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides: Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the complainant and her spouse. Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent, however, taking advantage of the absence of complainant and her spouse from the Philippines and their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in a letter that he had sold only one. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.— A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to so do. WILSON CHAM V. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant de Chavez-Blanco against respondent Atty. Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct. Complainant and her husband was a resident of USA. They both owned parcels of land in Quezon City, registered in complainant’s name. Complainant authorized respondent Atty. Lumasag [being the 1 st cousin of her husband] to sell the lands.

34 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya. Complainant Cham alleges that Atty. Paita-Moya committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the same without paying the rentals due. Respondent stayed at the leased premises up without paying her rentals. She also failed to settle her electric bills. Later on, a report reached complainant's office that respondent had secretly vacated the apartment unit, bringing along with her the door keys.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Paita-MOya is guilty of gross misconduct. HELD: Yes. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one month. A review of the records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just debt. Complainant is able to fully substantiate that respondent has existing obligations that she failed to settle. Hence, when respondent backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such act already constituted a ground for administrative sanction. Respondent's abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which explicitly state: "CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. "Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

The IBP-CBD denied the motion to dismiss and required him to file an answer. Atty. Moya filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. He then filed for an extension to file his answer which was granted but with a warning that no further extension requests will be entertained. When the time to elapse was near he filed a Very Urgent Motion for Extension to File Answer but the IBP-CBD did not accept this hence he was declared in default after failing to file his answer. The IBP-CBD ordered both parties to file their position papers because a complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in 2years from the date of the professional misconduct which in this case occurred in 2002 and that it was already 2005. Atty. Moya did not file any pleadings at all. The IBP recommended that Atty. Moya be suspended for 1year. The IBP Board of Governors modified this and suspended Atty. Moya for 2years. ISSUE Whether or not the suspension of 2years is justifiable? HELD 1)

JERRY T. WONG V. ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II FACTS Jerry Wong as owner of a business selling agricultural and veterinary products retained the services of Atty. Moya for the purpose of collecting due and demandable debts in favor of the company. Sometimes also, Atty. Moya handled personal cases of Wong and his wife. Later, Atty. Moya asked financial help from Wong for the construction of his house and the purchase of a car. Wong purchased a car on installment basis for Atty. Moya. Wong issued postdated checks to cover the payment of the car while Atty. Moya issued checks in favor of Wong to reimburse him for purchasing the car. The checks issued by Wong were encashed by Transfarm (car seller) however, the checks issued by Atty. Moya in favor of Wong were dishonored for the reason “account closed”. Despite repeated demands, Atty. Moya refused to replace the dishonored checks. Atty. Moya also introduced Wong to Quirino Tomlin from whom the construction materials for his house was obtained. He bought this on credit but Atty. Moya filed to pay this indebtedness causing embarrassment to Wong. Atty. Moya also handled a case of the Wong spouses against Berting Diwa. Judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses and as satisfaction of the judgment, Diwa paid P15, 680.50. Atty. Moya as the counsel of the spouses received the payment but did not inform them. The Wongs only found out about the payment of money when they got hold of the Manifestation with Prayer to Terminate Proceedings. The IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Moya to file his answer to the complaint for disbarment filed by Wong. Atty. Moya filed 3motions for extensions (after the 1 st motion was granted and the time had elapsed, he filed another one and so on and so forth). Subsequently, he filed a Motion to Dismiss.

35 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

2)

3)

4)

5)

Yes! Atty. Moya was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks. He did not deny these allegations. Rule1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyers shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It has been held that the issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this rule and constitutes a gross misconduct. The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by his dire financial conditions. He should not have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he suffered financial reverses he should have explained this with particularity and not though generalized and unsubstantiated allegations. Atty. Moya is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum of money due to his client. His failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his bare allegation that the same had already been transmitted to the complainant. His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of serious concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several extensions of time to file his answer. His failure to attend the hearings and belated plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the contrary, show a callous disregard of the lawful orders which caused undue delay in the IBP proceeding. This conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyer's oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. It is stressed that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal Profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 6)

As to the penalty, failure to pay debts and issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with 1year suspension. However, in this case, Atty. Moya is suspended for 2years because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, he also seriously breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings. CANONS 17 & 18 HERNANDEZ V. GO

FACTS  Sometime in 1961, Hernandez’s husband abandoned her and her son  Shortly thereafter, creditors of Hernandez ‘s husband demanded payment of his loans  Hernandez, fearful of mortgage foreclosures and aware of a impending claim suit, engaged the legal services of Atty. Go  Atty. Go advised Hernandez to give him land titles covering three lots in Zamboanga City belonging to her, so that he may sell them to enable her to pay the creditors  Also, Atty. Go persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration  Hernandez owns three more lots in Zamboanga City which were mortgaged to creditors. When the mortgages fell due, Atty. Go redeemed the lots and persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor covering the said lots  Atty. Go became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to Hernandez  In 1974, Hernandez came to know that Atty. Go did not sell her lots as agreed upon, but instead he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of real property worth millions  Hernandez filed a complaint with the IBP  IBP: Atty. Go violated Canon 17 and should be suspended for 3 years ISSUE W/N Atty. GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED HELD YES, for violating Canons 16 and 17 Atty. Go violated Canon 16 His acts acquiring for himself Hernandez’s lots entrusted to him are acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment Such conduct on the part of Atty. Go not only degrades himself but also the honor of the legal profession Atty. Go violated Canon 17 which provides that “a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.”

36 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Records show that Hernandez reposed high degree of trust and confidence in Atty. Go and when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell the same Atty. Go, however, abused this trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself without giving any monetary consideration to Hernandez, thus depriving Hernandez the real worth of her properties Atty. Go is duty bound to render a detailed report to Hernandez on how much he sold the lots and the amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled lawyers from the practice of law in similar circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is too light Atty. Go was ordered disbarred. PANELCO V. ATTY. JUAN AYAR MONTEMAYOR FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I (PANELCO I) charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with negligence. Some of the omissions of Atty Montemayor were: Atty. Montemayor failed to serve and file the required Appellant's Brief despite the lapse of the two extensions of time granted, hence the Court of Appeals considered the appeal Abandoned The records also show that respondent Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor did not even bother to answer the complaint nor present his defense Hence, PANELCO I prays that the court impose sanctions on Atty. Montemayor’s gross negligence as counsel for complainant which resulted [in] the damage of PANELCO I. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in mishandling complainant’s cases on appeal, which eventually led to their dismissal, to the prejudice of the complainant. HELD: Yes. WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from the practice of law. As counsel for complainant, respondent had the duty to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect his client. When he undertook his client’s cause, he made a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion.He should undertake the task with dedication and care. CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW. ADECER V. AKUT FACTS: Originally, there was a Criminal Case in which complainants were charged with committing a crime (Other deceits) punishable under the Revised Penal Code (Other Deceits). Respondent, Atty. Akut was their legal counsel in the criminal case. Complainant accuses Atty. Akut for being negligent. First, despite Atty. Akut’s receipt of a copy of the Decision and the consequent running of the fifteen (15)-day period to file a petition for probation, respondent went out of town without contacting complainants to give them proper legal advice. Furthermore, Atty. Akut’s admission that complainants were [1] under the impression that they first had to pay off their civil liabilities prior to filing a petition for probation and [2] unaware that they had only fifteen (15) days from their counsel’s receipt of a copy of the decision to file their petition, proves that Atty. Akut failed to give complainants timely legal advise. Atty. Akut explained that he was out of his office most of the time because, he and his wife were always out of town looking for faith healers to cure the malignant brain tumor of his wife, who eventually succumbed to the cancer. Allegedly, after attending the "important" hearings, he immediately went out of town seeking faith healers. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Akut is guilty of negligence.

On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondent’s legal services in connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000. The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt. On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainant’s) son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court. Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainant’s son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorney’s Office for her son’s defense. Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). In an order dated July 13, 2005, the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005, simply brushed aside the complaint for being "baseless, groundless and malicious" without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer. Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for second and third extensions of time praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.

HELD:

HELD

Yes. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Emmanuel A. Akut is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of his impression that one case or hearing is more important than the other. We commiserate with respondent for the loss of his wife, however, failure of an attorney to file a timely motion for reconsideration or an appeal renders him liable for negligence. By agreeing to be his client’s counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the client’s interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary

Respondent Grossly Neglected The Cause of His Client, Atty. Macasa is disbarred Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainant’s son. Such undertaking imposed upon him the following duties: CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx xxx xxx Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. xxx xxx xxx CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

BELLEZA V. MACASA FACTS

37 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied. A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his client with competence and diligence. He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his client’s cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his client’s interest. A lawyer’s negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyer’s lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical. If his client’s case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case. The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. However, this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer: The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.

38 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainant’s son and receiving his attorney’s fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondent’s continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorney’s Office. Respondent’s lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainant’s son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainant’s son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latter’s constitutional right to bail. OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ FACTS Overgaard is a Dutch national who engaged the services of Atty. Valdez. They entered into a retainer agreement, providing that for 900K, Valdez would represent Overgaard as counsel in 2 cases filed by him (Estafa and a mandamus case) and 2 cases filed against him (Other Light threats and violation of the Anti-Violation against women and their children act). Overgaard sent $16, 854 to Atty. Valdez via telegraphic bank transfer. 4 months after, Overgaard demanded for a report on the status of his cases. In spite of many phone calls and emails, Valdez couldn’t be reached. Hence, Overgaard inquired on his own, and discovered that Valdez didn’t file his entry of appearance in any of the cases, that a counter-affidavit was required from him, and that the criminal cases against him have already been arraigned and warrants were issued for his arrest. He was constrained to find a new lawyer. Overgaard then wrote again and tried to locate Valdez to demand the return of documents entrusted to the latter, as well as the $16K payment. No word was heard from Valdez. Overgaard filed a case with the IBP for Valdez’s dismissal for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct. The IBP required Valdez to file an answer, but he did not comply. He also failed to attend the hearing and was declared in default. Later, a clarificatory hearing was set, but Valdez never showed. IBP found him guilty of violating canons 1, 15, 16, 17, and 18 and his penalty was a 3-year suspension and he was ordered to return Overgaard’s money. HELD SC agrees with the findings of IBP, but declared that Valdez be disbarred for falling below the standards required of lawyers. Canon 18 provides that a lawyer must serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 requires a lawyer to not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence will make him liable. Valdez should indeed be liable because he was not just incompetent, he was useless; not just negligent, he was indolent; and rather than helping his client, he prejudiced him. He abandoned his client and left him without any recourse. It was a clear evasion of duty. Also, his failure to act on the disbarment case against him, without any explanation, is a clear evidence of negligence on his part.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Rule 18.04 requires that a lawyer keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within reasonable time to the client’s request for information. Despite Overgaard’s efforts, Valdez avoided his client and never bothered to reply. Clearly, the rule was violated. ANGALAN V. DELANTE

the Philippines anymore so he authorized Atty. Delante to have the property in his name upon refund of the purchase price. Complainants filed a complaint dated with the Court charging respondent with gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababag of the IBP found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Board of governors approved but increased the penalty from a 6-month suspension to 1-year.

FACTS This is a complaint filed by the heirs of an illiterate couple belonging to the Samal Tribe against Atty. Delante for gross violation of professional responsibility particularly Canons 16 and 17. The couple owned a property in Samal, Davao del Norte. On 15 April 1971, Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000 from Spouses Eustaquio. To secure the loan, Angalan and complainants mortgaged their property and surrendered the title to the Spouses Eustaquio. When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover the title from the Spouses Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the document which the Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and which complainants signed, was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They also learned that Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the property to his name. Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property. Respondent lawyer filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property. Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the amicable settlement, the complainants offered the spouses the sum of P30K as repurchase price which the spouses accepted. However, complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the property. Respondent Delante advanced the P30,000 and, in return, complainants allowed respondent to possess the property and gather its produce until he is paid. When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover the property from respondent, respondent refused. Complainants learned that respondent transferred the title of the property to his name. Complainants filed a complaint praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and signed by the complainants be declared void, (2) title issued in the name of Atty. Delante be declared void, and (3) respondent be made to pay damages. As defense, respondent alleges that: 1. The complainants only borrowed money from him without any intention to pay him back or at least offer an explanation as to how they would be able to repay him 2. That the couple did not really engage his services as counsel for an annulment suit against Navarro Eustaquio 3. The sale between Eustaquio and the complainants was a valid sale and not a mortgage 4. The actual buyer of the property was Atty. Delante’s former client who is now residing in New York. But after 11 years, the buyer did not return to

39 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

ISSUE Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their knowledge, consent and against their will? HELD YES. The Court is not impressed with Atty. Delante’s defenses. Angalan and complainants went to respondent’s office not to seek advice about borrowing money but to engage his services for the purpose of recovering their property.  First, after Angalan and complainants went to respondent’s office, respondent filed a complaint with the CFI praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the property to Angalan and complainants.  Second, in the complaint, respondent stated that, "by reason of unwarranted refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel."  Third, respondent issued a receipt to complainants stating that he "RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal)."  Fourth, in respondent’s letter dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer of complainants.

1. 2.

3.

As to his claim regarding his former client purchasing the property Amicable settlement  there was an agreed repurchase price to which both parties agreed to Letter to the barrio captain  the lawyer stated that complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio. (This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978.) Insufficient proof  Respondent did not give any detail or proof to substantiate his story — the name of the alleged client, an affidavit of the alleged client, the old passport of the alleged client showing immigration stamps, or any form of correspondence between him and the alleged client. The Court agrees with

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS the observation of Commissioner Hababag that respondent’s "vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts [is] too flimsy to gain belief and acceptance." Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name. Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross misconduct. A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer. The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. SANTOS-TAN V. ATTY. ROMEO R. ROBISO FACTS Complainant Santos-Tan charged respondent with malpractice for grossly neglecting his duties and responsibilities as counsel for complainant and for issuing a bouncing check. Complainant found out that her case had not progressed and that the only pleading that respondent had filed was his notice of appearance. ISSUES: (1) Whether respondent was negligent in handling complainant’s case (NO); and (2) Whether respondent should be disciplined for issuing a bouncing check (YES). RATIO: On the issue of negligence on the part of respondent in handling complainant’s case, the Court agrees that based on the facts presented there was nothing that he could have done to expedite the resolution of the motion for reconsideration then pending before the RTC. The RTC had already ordered that the motion for reconsideration be submitted for resolution. Respondent could not be faulted if the acting presiding judge did not want to act on the motion until the regular presiding judge return. Regarding the other issues, as a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially Bouncing Check Law. By issuing a check in violation of the provisions

40 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

of this law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. The act of a lawyer in issuing a check which is drawn against insufficient funds constitutes deceitful conduct or conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. The Court has held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. As such, we have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Respondent violated the Attorney’s Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws. The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically provides: CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Romeo R. Robiso is ORDERED SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) month. SOMOSOT V. LARA FACTS  Atty Gerardo Lara represented Ofelia Somosot in a collections case against Golden Collections Marketting Corp.  Golden Collections filed “interrogatories and request for Admission”  Atty Lara objected, stating that such interrogatories and admission should be sent directly to Mrs. Somosot  At this point, we should take note that Atty Lara is already sensitive about the P27,000 in unpaid atty’s fees  Nov. 2001, Atty Lara was appointed as a consultant in the Board of Investment, a government position  Lara tried to locate Somosot about the fees in her office in Greenhills; office was locked and according to the security guard, they had moved office without leaving a forwarding address. Lara also attempted to call Mr and Mrs Somosot, but they couldn’t be reached  Lara filed his Withdrawal of Appearance in court, without the required conformity of his client, Somosot, because she could be located. This was denied.  Dec. 2001, upon learning that Somosot’s new office was in Pasig, he called her where he advised that she should find another Lawyer. She informed her that she already did.  September, 2005. Lara receives a letter from Somosot giving him “one last chance to give her a reason not to instigate a disbarment suit” against him. ISSUE W/N Atty Lara, from the facts stated, is deemed incompetent in his services to Mrs. Ofelia Somosot.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS HELD Yes. Atty Lara’s services were insufficient. His neglect (or refusal) to reply to the Interrogatories and Request for Admissions himself eventually caused the court to rule against Mrs. Somosot. Records do not show how exactly he tried to address the Interrogatories issue or whether he appealed the case or not. He did not mention how he tried to locate Mrs. Somosot to inform her about the Interrogatories and Request for Admission. He only took the initiative when he learned that he had been appointed into a government position. Lara was very much sensitive about his unpaid billings, and this shouldn’t be a reason for him not to inform his client about the case’s development He had two valid reasons for withdrawing as her Atty. One, his appointment in a government office; and two, Somosot’s refusal to pay his fees. He could have secured her “conformity” to the withdrawal of appearance when they talked on December 2001, but because he failed to do so, he remain as counsel of record. CANON 19 ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ FACTS: The complainant in this disbarment case is Atty. Briones. The respondent is Atty. Jimenez. Complainant Briones is the Special Administrator of the Henson Estate, while respondent Jimenez is the counsel for Heirs of Henson. The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment is an RTC Order (2002). The RTC Order directed complainant Briones to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. Complainant Briones did not reply to the demand, so respondent Jimenez opted to file a criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court. Complainant Briones now claims that respondent Jimenez is guilty of violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional responsibility by filing the unfounded criminal complaint against complainant to obtain an improper advantage: Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case of proceeding.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyer’s performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state – the administration of justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. PENA V. APARICIO FACTS Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged dismissal case before the NLRC against Pena, President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio prayed that his client be given separation pay. Peña rejected the claim. Thereafter, Peña sent notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty. Aparicio replied with a letter reiterating the claim of his client. The letter also contained threats against the company stating that if the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file multiple charges such as, criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification of documents, and for the cancellation of the company’s business license. Peña filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Aparicio with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for violating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Aparicio in turn filed counterclaims for the defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed the complaint because Peña had allegedly failed to file his position paper and the certification against forum shopping. The IBP transmitted the records of the case to the SC. Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating his claim for damages against Peña in the amount of P400M for filing false, malicious, defamatory, fraudulent suit against him. Peña likewise filed this Petition for Review alleging that he submitted his position paper and that the dismissal denied him of due process. ISSUE W/N Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01? HELD

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Jimenez should be administratively liable. HELD: Yes. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED [since no evidence of malice or bad faith] for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.

41 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Yup! First of all, the SC found that Peña actually submitted his position paper. In addition, disbarment proceedings are sui generis, hence, the requirement of a certification of forum shopping is not to be strictly complied with in such a case. At any rate, Peña actually submitted a certification against forum shopping after Atty. Aparicio filed the motion to dismiss, curing the supposed defect in the original complaint. Now to the merits… Canon 19, “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” this shows that a lawyer’s duty to his client is subordinate to his duty in the administration of justice.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Rule 19.01, “a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under such Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file baseless criminal cases against the adversaries of his client to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield to the claims of the lawyer’s client. This is exactly what Atty. Aparicio did in this case. Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, but they amounted to blackmail – extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure in the public prints. Blackmail and extortion would not only entail disbarment but also possible criminal prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio actually admitted and even found it his obligation to tell the truth of the offenses he imputed against Peña. He also stated that the writing of demand letters is standard practice. SC ruled that Atty. Aparicio’s assertions are misleading because the fact of the matter is, he used such threats to gain leverage against Peña and force the latter to accede to his client’s claims. The letter even implied a promise to “keep silent” about the said violations if the claim is met. While it is true that writing demand letters is standard practice in the profession of law, such letters must not contain threats such as those found in this case. Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a penalty considering that Atty. Aparicio wrote the letter out of his overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Therefore, the SC reprimanded him with a stern warning.

42 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS POST MIDTERM CASES AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER: CONDUCT OF LITIGATION MANALANG V. ANGELES FACTS: Manalang and Cirillo alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and separation pay filed against their employer, the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, before the National Labor Relations. Respondent was their counsel. Judgment was rendered in their favor, in the amount of P6,500. After the decision became final, a writ of execution issued. However, without authority from his clients, respondent compromised the award and was able to collect P5,500 only. Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn over to them the amount collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent (30%), but Atty. Angeles refused and offered to give them only the sum of P2,650. Respondent counsel stated that he offered to give complainants their money, but they insisted that he "deduct from this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000, representing the amount discounted by the counsel of the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, together with sheriff legal fees and other administrative expenses." Respondent claimed that to accept complainants' proposition meant that he "would not be compensated for prosecuting and handling, the case.” ISSUE: Whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law because of grave misconduct related to his clients' funds. HELD Where a member of the bar stands charged with malpractice, the proceedings are not meant solely to rule on his culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concerned is possessed of that good moral character, which is a condition precedent to the privilege of practicing law and continuing in the practice thereof. Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or compromise effected by counsel without the consent of the workers concerned . A client has every right to expect from his counsel that nothing will be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law validly applied. By compromising the judgment without the consent of his clients, respondent not only went against the stream of judicial dicta, he also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well as want of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. In so doing, he violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. In the instant case, the records clearly and abundantly point to respondent's receipt of and failure to deliver upon demand, the amount of P4,550 intended for his clients. This is a clear breach of Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

43 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Moreover, his excuse in his answer, that he should be allowed to deduct sheriff's fees and other administrative expenses before delivering the money due his clients, is unsatisfactory. Respondent clearly failed to comply with the Rules of Court in the enforcement of an attorney's liens. The records of this case are barren of any statement of respondent's claims for lien or payment of his alleged disbursements. Nor did respondent present any showing that he caused written notices of his lien on the money judgment to be served upon his clients and to the losing party His act of holding on to his clients' money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something which was not his, and to which he had no right. He appears oblivious of the admonition that a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. This is the first case on record against him, a fact which could be taken into account by way of mitigation. Considering further the amount involved, the penalty of six (6) months suspension appears to us in order. GARCIA V. CA FACTS: Guevara spouse seeks recovery of a lady's diamond ring which they bought from Rebullida. Guevara claims that while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakeña restaurant, she recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. Garcia and asked where she bought it, which Garcia answered from her comadre. Guevarra told Garcia that a ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952. Garcia handed the ring to Guevara and it fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at the request of Guevarra, her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, Garcia and her attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question. Mr. Rebullida examined the ring and after consulting the stock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to Garcia who despite a written request failed to deliver the ring to Guevara. Garcia refused to deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was lost. Garcias’s defense was that they denied having made any admission before Guevara or Mr. Rebullida or the sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring was purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner, Aling Petring, who was boarding in her house; that the ring she bought could be similar to, but not the same ring plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida which was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big diamond was never dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to weigh 2.57 cts, unlike the one claimed by Guevara spouse. Apparently Garcia’s own counsel admitted through an answer that the ring in question was the same ring, which is being claimed by the Guevara spouse.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS ISSUE: Whether or not a lawyer needs an SPA to admit the truth of certain facts HELD: NO. Garcia is contradicted by her own extra-judicial admissions, although made by her counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act such, has the authority to manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make admission for the purpose of the litigation... Garcia’s proffered explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is futile because the liability to error as to the identity of the vendor and the exchange of the ring with another ring of the same value, was rather remote. The ring’s identification was confirmed by Mr. Rafael Rebullida, whose testimony is entitled to great weight, with his 30 years experience behind him in the jewelry business Indeed, Garcia made no comment when in her presence Rebullida after examining the ring and stock card told Guevara that that was her ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of demand,asserting ownership. None of the people whom she mentioned, was able to corroborate the story of how she bought the ring.

oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos as not being entitled to recognition as there was a general order of default except as to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, not lifted as to her, and that she had no interest to oppose the application of the registration of her land, although admittedly there was a claim on her part under a pasture lease agreement in her favor. Hence the plea for the order of dismissal being set aside and plaintiff being allowed to present evidence. What purpose, it may pertinently be asked, would be served thereby if, after the time-consuming effort, it would clearly appear that plaintiff could not in truth show that there was such an open, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner? Nor is it to be forgotten that in the motion to dismiss of oppositor de los Santos, it was stated: "That the son of applicant Luis Santiago, namely Juanito S. Santiago, was one time the Lessee of the aforesaid timber area sought to be registered by him under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 182 on April 18, 1955, which Lease Agreement was cancelled by the Government on August 18, 1958 for failure of Lessee Santiago to make the improvements and comply otherwise with the terms and conditions of the Lease Contract; ... ." There was no denial of such allegation. An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not.

SANTIAGO V. DELOS SANTOS CANON 20 Facts: Plaintiff, now appellant, applied for registration of a parcel of land. In a motion to set the case for hearing, he attached documents indicative of the land being public in character, thus lending support to the opposition of the Director of Forestry, the Director of Lands, and a certain Pacita V. de los Santos. The then Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma, now an Associate Justice of this Court, dismissed the suit. Its reversal is sought in this appeal. Issue: Was the counsel negligent in the preparation of the pleadings? Yes. Held: Attached to such pleading were the documents, which, in the language of the then Judge Palma, "show that the land object of this registration proceeding is part of the public domain ... ." Former counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on his client's case of such an admission. If it were his intention to demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiff to the claim that he had been in open, public, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner from July 26, 1894 up to the present, he could not have succeeded any better. What was so categorically therein set forth as to such parcel of land being a part of a public forest, although thereafter released by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes, is conclusive and binding. How did the present counsel for plaintiff, the law firm of Luna and Manalo, seek to extricate him from a predicament of his own making? It would rely on certain procedural doctrines; more specifically, it would insist on the motion to dismiss of

44 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

SESBRENO V. CA Facts: Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued the province of Cebu for reinstatement and back wages. They signed 2 documents whereby the employees agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 30% as attorney’s fees and 20% expenses to be taken from their back salaries. The trial court rendered a decision in favor the employees and fixed Atty. Sesbreno’s attorney’s fees at 40% of back salaries, terminal leave, gratuity pay and retirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. The court later on modified the attorney’s fees to 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the CA, which decided that the attorney’s fees should be reduced to 20% of the back salaries awarded to the employees. Atty. Sesbreno appeals to the SC on the ground that attorney’s fees amounting to 50% of all monies awarded to his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being consistent with prevailing case law and the contract of professional services between the parties. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Atty. Sesbreno, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by the client Held: Yes! The CA has the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees. A lawyer may charge and receive as attorney’s fees is always subject to judicial control.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS In the case at bar, the parties entered into a contingent fee contract, wherein Atty. Sesbreno will get 50% from the employees money claims if they will win the case. However, the court finds the 50% fee as unconscionable. Stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client. Contingent fee contracts are under the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The court held that a fee of 20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement. BAUTISTA V. GONZALES Facts: Atty. Gonzales is the lawyer of the Fortunados in a civil case wherein Atty. Gonzales agreed to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in litigation. Issue: Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Forunados is valid Held: No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados. However, the agreement between Atty. Gonzales and the Fortunados is contrary to the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between Atty. Gonzales and Fortunados does not provide for reimbursement to Atty. Gonzales of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public policy. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions. GAMILLA V. MARINO Facts: Atty. Eduardo Marino Jr. was the president of the UST Faculty Union. There’s a long history of collective bargaining agreement between UST and UST Faculty Union. During the series of agreements between UST and the UST Faculty Union, Atty. Marino was removed from his position but continued to serve as a lawyer for the UST Faculty Union. In the end, the UST Faculty won and was awarded 42 million pesos for back wages, salaries, additional compensations, etc. Complainants are members of the UST Faculty Union questioning the lack of transparency in the disbursement of the monetary benefits (42M) for the faculty members, and prays for the expulsion of Atty. Marino for failure to account for the balance of 42M ceded to them by UST and the attorney’s fees amounting to 4.2M which he deducted from the benefits allotted to faculty members.

45 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Issue: Whether or not the 4.2M attorney’s fees is proportionate to the legal services rendered by Atty. Marino Held: No. The record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks union president comprising in all probity the same duties for which he has collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union. Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in Atty. Marino’s dual role a lawyer and president of UST Faculty Union when he obtained 4.2M as attorney’s fees. A simple accounting of the money that he and others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would have enlightened the faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondent’s part and guided them to look for alternative actions to protect their own interests. The objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action. Hence, Atty. Mariño is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client. VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY. MARIANO Facts: Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson Pineda. Aurora proposed a settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was approved by the trial court and their marriage was declared null and void. Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated but they still billed petitioner additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M. Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court. Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a total of P2M. Issues: W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees? W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees? Held: A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident of the main action. RTC has jurisdiction.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value of the properties awarded to Vinson. What respondents were demanding was additional payment for service rendered in the same case. The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by quantum meruit. Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it. In this case, there was no justification for the additional legal fees sought by respondents. It was an act of unconscionable greed! ROXAS V. DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR Facts: The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in the case. This was sealed by a LetterAgreement, wherein it was contained that the attorneys would endeavor to secure just compensation with the NHA and other government agencies at a price of 11pesos or more per square meter, and that any lower amount shall not entitle them to any atty’s fees. They also stipulated that in the event they get it for 11pesos per square meter, their contingent fee shall be 30% of the just compensation. They also stipulated that their lawyer’s fees shall be in proportion to the cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation. […] A Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA. The Compromise Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the RTC, approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 (representing the actual just compensation, although this amount is bigger) in NHA bonds. Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds. On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action. Issue:

46 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

The honorable court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law in holding that the letter-agreement re: contingent fees cannot be allowed to stand as the law between the parties Held: A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them (the Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all the matters which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution and contents were admitted by the Zuzuarreguis themselves. In the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception – that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness. Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable. Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts. In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order. It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor. The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor,

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS on the other. The division must be pro rata. Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for they would still be earning or actually earned attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75 On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for there was no direct showing of bad faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees are not per se prohibited by law. It is only necessary that it be reduced when excessive and unconscionable, which we have already done. LAW FIRM OF TUNGOL & TIBAYAN V. CA AND SPOUSES INGCO Facts: Ingcos hired the petitioner law firm to enforce delivery of a land title. Complaint was filed by the law firm in behalf of the Ingcos before the HLURB against Villa Crista alleging that the Ingcos had paid P5.1M for a lot but Villa Crista failed to deliver the title thereto. The Ingcos and Villa Crista entered into a compromise whereby the latter was bound to refund P4.8M provided that in case of breach of such obligation, an additional P200k would be paid by way of liquidated damages. Villa Crista failed to pay. Writ of execution issued. Sheriff levied and auctioned 10 lots belonging to Villa Crista. The Ingcos bought 3 lots, the payment of which includes P5.1M contract price for the initial lot they primarily bought, P1.35M attorney’s fees and other expenses. The Ingcos then terminated the services of the law firm. The law firm filed with the HLURB to recover 25% of the excess of the existing prevailing selling price or the fair market value of the 3 lots. It also filed for damages in the RTC. The law firm argued that the spouses still owed P4.5M; that in their contract the law firm was entitled to 25% of the excess of the total bid price. HLURB arbiter ruled for the law firm. HLURHB Board reversed. The Office of the President reversed, affirming the HLURB arbiter’s decision. CA reversed the OP. Held: SC ruled that the lawyers are not entitled to additional fees. The spouses acquired the 3 lots as the highest bidder at the auction sale. It can be said that the lots had been acquired not through the recovery efforts of the law firm. Moreover, during the negotiations with Villa Crista, it was Renato Ingco who was actually negotiating, not the lawyers. When the auction sale was made, the attorney-client relationship no longer existed, hence the lawyers are not entitled to the additional fees. CANON 21 REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB), through the Presidential Commission on Good Gov’t (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery

47 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients and in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant, Roco having promised he’ll reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case # 33. Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted, devised, schemed, conspired & confederated w/each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate framework & structures that led to establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB. In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that their participation in the acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG exclude them as parties-defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff. precedent for the exclusion of petitioners: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the same conditions precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco didn’t refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to comply w/ the conditions required by PCGG. It held, “ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.” ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also denied thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, assailing SB’s resolution on essentially same grounds averred by petitioners, namely: SB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict application of the law of agency. SB gravely abused its discretion in not considering petitioners & Roco similarly situated &, thus, deserving equal treatment SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG. SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that dropping of partydefendants be based on reasonable & just grounds, w/ due consideration to constitutional rts of petitioners PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is not w/in the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status. RULING (pulled out only the pertinent sections ): WON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROHIBITS PETITIONERS FROM REVEALING THE IDENTITY OF THEIR CLIENT(S) & THE OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE PCGG YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. An attorney occupies a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court & exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client. Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. Attorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules of Court, Rule 130:

48 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval. This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.”) Canon 15, CPE also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. Thus, the Court held that this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. Reasons advanced for the general rule:  Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.  Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.  Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of relationship  Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. Exceptions to the gen. rule: Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldn’t reveal name of his client as this would expose the latter to civil litigation. Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: “We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to w/c it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.”

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged. Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to gov’t voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, & w/ no gov’t audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability pending Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule:  if the content of any client communication to a lawyer is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance  where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed & it is the identity w/c is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. Instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship). The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself as can be seen in the 3 specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto. From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings. Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. While the privilege may not be invoked for illegal purposes such as in a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney, for illicit purposes, it may be invoked in a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney. Whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to

49 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. What is sought to be avoided then is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution. In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship. We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the facts of the instant case clearly fall w/in recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information. Otherwise, it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in exercise of their duties. IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY PALANCA: WILLIAM PFLEIDER VS. ATTORNEY PALANCA Facts: Palanca was the legal counsel of Pfleider. Pfleider leased an agricultural land to Palanca known as Hacienda Asia. Pfleider filed a civil suit against Palanca for rescission of the lease contract for defaulting in rental payments. He also filed this administrative complaint of gross misconduct against Palanca. Pfleider alleged that in a criminal case for estafa filed against him in which Palanca was his counsel, the latter sought to negotiate the dismissal of the complaint. Pfleider alleged that Palanca informed him through letters that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the complaint and that he had deposited P5k with the court. Issue: W/N Palanca was guilty of gross misconduct? W/N the filing of the civil suit for the rescission of the lease contract terminated the attorney-client relationship? Held: Palanca was not guilty of gross misconduct. The letters relied upon by Pfleider did not show that Palanca stated that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the criminal complaint against Pfleider.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS The civil suit for rescission terminated the attorney-client relationship. While the object of the suit was the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interest became incompatible with the mutual confidence and trust essential to every attorneyclient relationship. MERCADO V. ATTY. VITRIOLO Facts: Atty. Vitriolo was the counsel of Mercado in a case for annulment of marriage filed by the latter’s husband. Vitriolo filed a criminal action for falsification of public documents against Mercado alleging that the latter made false entries in the certificates of live birth of her children which were presented in the annulment case. Mercado filed this complaint alleging that due to the criminal case filed against her by Vitriolo, information relating to her civil case for annulment was divulged. Hence, Vitriolo breached the privilege and confidence reposed within a lawyer-client relationship. Mercado prayed the Vitriolo be disbarred.

Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach? Held: No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him, especially with privileged communication – the protection is only limited to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. Thus, here, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strictest sense. However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapan’s rights as they were not pertinent to the case. It was improper for him to disclose those information as they were not the subject matter of litigation at hand. His professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in the said case. A lawyer must conduct himself with integrity. He is therefore suspended for 6 months. HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA

Issue:

Facts:

W/N Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case against his former client?

Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda. She disclosed confidential information during that period. However, after the confidential information was given by Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another lawyer. Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming the lawyer just wanted to hear her secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public documents and immorality – using the disclosures as basis for the charges. Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?

Held: SC provided the factors which are essential to establish the existence of the communication privilege between an attorney and his client. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication. The client made the communication in confidence. The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. SC ruled that in applying all there rules, the evidence on record fails to substantiate Mercado’s allegations. Mercado did not even specify the alleged communication. all her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN Facts: Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genato’s building. Atty. Silapan handled some of Genato’s cases. After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to buy a car. Atty. Silapan bought the car, and issued a postdated check to Genato. The check was dishonored. Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22. In his defense, he alleged that Genato was in the business of “buying an selling deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals” and that he was also involved in bribery cases. Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship. Issue:

50 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Held: Reprimanded. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda should have kept the information secret and confidential, under the attorneyclient privilege rule. However, the seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that she (Atty. Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that she was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule of confidentiality.

PALM V. ATTY. ILEDAN Facts: Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained counsel. She filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorneyclient privilege and conflict of interests.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the stockholders’ meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality. The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel of Soledad who was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.

Issue: Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests? Held: No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate bylaws may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by “the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a nonstock corporation.”It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.The documents are public records and could not be considered confidential. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders’ meeting could not be considered a violation of his client’s secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtech’s retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated CANON 22 WACK WACK GOLF V. CA, PETRONILO ARCANGEL AND ANTONINO BERNARDO

51 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Facts: Wack-wack was in a labor case against Arcangel. During the pendency of the case, Wack-wack wanted to change their counsel from Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz to the Law Office of Juan Chudian. During the hearing, neither Wack-wack nor their original counsels showed up, so Arcangel was allowed to present his evidence without Wack-wack. The court awarded judgment to Arcangel. The law firm of Chuidian then filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding. This petition was denied by the lower court. Wack-wack assails the denial of the petition. It has to be taken note of that the court did not know of the change of counsel because Chudian only entered his appearance after the judgment was rendered against Wack-wack. Issue: Was the trial court correct in denying the petition to set aside the judgment? Held: Yes. As such counsel of record, Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz must have known that, its impending relief as counself for the defendant notwithstanding, it is still under obligation to protect the client’s interest until its final release from the professional relationship with such client. The court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected. Any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may reach regarding the presentation of the client’s case in court is purely their private concern. Proceedings in court cannot be made to depend on them. VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSME Facts: Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The court rule against Venterez and friends. They wanted to file a motion for reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so. Because of this, Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the MR. Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that he was withdrawing the case from him because he (the son) already engaged another lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme explained that he even turned over the records of the case to the son and thus, ceased to be counsel any longer. Issue: Is Atty. Cosme guilty of culpable negligence in handling the case? Held: Yes. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. An attornery who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination –

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS that is, until the case becomes final and executory. Any dereliction of duty affects the client. The Court cannot accept Atty. Cosme’s defense that he had already withdrawn from the case. A lawyer may retire at any time with the written consent of his client fileed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The application must be based on a good case. What constitutes good cause? See Rule 22.01, Canon 22. There was no proper revocation in this case. He is suspended for 3 months. SANTECO V. ATTY. AVANCE Facts: Santeco got Atty. Avance to handle a case for her in a civil suit. She paid her P12,000 as acceptance money. Losing in the first instance, Atty. Avance made representations that she was going to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. She didn’t. She also didn’t appear during scheduled hearings, causing the case to get dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Held: Yes! 3 month suspension. Atty should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself if he truly wanted to withdraw. At the very least, he should have informed the court. For failure to do so, Atty was negligent. Atty was also negligent in filing the petition out of time. eventually he would have known that the petition was denied but still he failed to informe the convicts and return their calls. One of the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause. After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration. METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA Facts:

Issue: Is Atty. Avance grossly remiss in the performance of her duties? Held: Yes. Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, she abruptly stopped appearing as complainant’s counsel even as proceedings were still pending – with neither a withdrawal nor an explanation for doing so. This violated Canon 22. Suspended for 5 years.

Atty. handled several cases from 1974 to 1983 concerning the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale. Pending resolution in the RTC, Atty filed a motion to enter his charging lien equal to 25% of the market value of the litigated properties as atty fees. The court granted and the atty’s lien was annotated on the TCTs. The cases were later dismissed with prejudice at the instance of the plaintiffs therein. Thus the Bank now had the TCT’s in its name and the atty’s lien was carried over. Atty. filed a motion to fix his Atty Fees based on quantum meruit. RTC granted the motion and fixed the fees at 936K. CA affirmed. Issue:

FRANCISCO VS. PORTUGAL

Is Atty. entitled to a charging lien? Is a separate suit necessary for enforcement of the lien?

Facts: Atty was counsel for complainants in a criminal case. Atty was retained After judgment was rendered convicting appellants. Atty filed an MR and another Motion and Petition for review of the judgment of conviction. But after the filing, Atty disappeared and was nowhere to be found. Later, the complainants found out that their petitions were denied for being filed out of time and for failure to pay the docket fees. The decision became final and warrants of arrest were issued. Atty argues that he had decided to withdraw as counsel. He wrote a letter to one of the complainants giving them instructinos to sign and file with the Court the Notice to Withdraw. But the complainant didn’t file it with the court because they were aware that it would be difficult to find another counsel. Issue: Is Atty guilty of negligence in handling the case?

52 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Held: Yes! Yes! CA reversed without prejudice to proper to the bringing of proper proceedings. A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. Here, there was no money judgment. Thus there is no charging lien. And court has no authority to fix a charging lien. A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS DORONILLA V. CA

SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS V. NALDOZA

Facts: Heirs of Doronilla had a dispute with their counsel over his Atty Lien. The RTC declared that Counsel was entitled to 10% of the shares of the heirs. Counsel filed a motion to annotate attorney's lien on the title of parcels of land of the estate which the heirs had inherited. The RTC granted the motion. Issue: Is the order of annotation proper? Held: No! An attorney's lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation.

Facts: Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the POEA to the SC. Atty asked from complainants $2.5K which he said were to be used for payment of docket fees and that the court could take cognizance of the case. Later, complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the SC consisted only of nominal fees for such kind of appeal. Atty in order to cover up presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of $2.5K. A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted but was held civilly liable for $2.5K. Issue:

SESBRENO V. CA

Should Atty be disbarred? Should the case be dismissed because of his acquittal?

Facts: Atty was hired as counsel by some workers. They agreed that Atty would take 30% of whatever they may recover. The trial court ordered reinstatement and payment of backwages. The employer appealed the decision. Pending appeal, the workers entered into a compromise agreement that they waived their right to be reinstated with the agreement of payment of full backwages at once. The court adopted the compromise and ordered the withholding of the payment of 55% for the lien of the Atty. But instead of withholding, the employer directly paid the workers in full. Thus Atty filed a complaint for collection against the employer and employees. Atty. moved to dismiss the case against the employees. Later the trial court ordered payment of 669K by the employee. The CA reversed. Issue: Is the employer liable for the Atty’s fees?

Held: Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldn’t be dismissed. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burden of proof is clearly preponderant evidence. A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case and vice versa. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.

Held: No! CA affirmed. Atty rightly commenced the action against both his clients and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his differences with them. He maintained the case against employers because, according to him, the computation of the employees money claims should have been based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that the respondents should be made liable for the difference. Atty’s act in withdrawing the case against the employees and agreeing to settle their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien. Even if there was such a breach of the contract, he had waived his right to claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving from liability those who were primarily liable to him.

53 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

SANTOS V. LLAMAS Facts: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that: On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

Issues:

FACTS: W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES

Held: Rule 139-A provides: Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof. Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues. Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension

54 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO AREVALO JR REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUTIES

Atty Arevalo wrote a letter in Sept 2004, asking to be exempted from payment of IBP duties amounting to P12,035 (unpaid duties from 1977-2005). Atty Arevalo was admitted to the Bar in 1961. He was with the Philippine Civil Service from 1962 to 1986. After that, he migrated and worked in the USA until 2003. His main contention was that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the above amount because he was working with the Civil Service then, and the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice of one’s profession while in government service. He also contends that he cannot be assessed for the years he was working in the USA. IBP commented on the letter saying that the IBP membership is NOT based on the actual practice of law. Once a lawyer passes the Bar, he continues to be a member of the IBP, and one of his obligations as member is the payment of annual dues. The validity of such dues has been upheld by the SC in saying that it is necessary to defray the cost of the Integrated Bar Program and no one is exempted from paying the dues. What was allowed was the voluntary termination and reinstatement later on of membership. If membership is terminated, dues wouldn’t be assessed. Basically, the main contention of Atty. Arevalo is that the IBP’s policy of NonExemption in payment of annual membership dues is invalid because it would be oppressive for one who has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. Also, it is a deprivation of property right without due process. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he was inactive in the practice of law, when he was in the Civil Service and abroad? HELD/RATIO: NO. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues. Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS dues subsists for as long as one’s membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued. VDA. DE BARRERA V. LAPUT Gross Misconduct as ground for discipline of lawyer (Lawyer suspended for intimidating his client to sign papers by placing his revolver on his lap when she refused to do so) Facts: Respondent Atty. Laput represented petitioner Vda. de Barrera (Mrs. Barrera) in the estate proceedings of her late husband. Laput presented to her several papers or pleadings for her signature. However, Mrs. Barrera refused to sign the pleadings but requested Laput to leave them so that she may ask somebody to translate the same for her (she was from Cebu). Laput got angry and drew his revolver from its holster and placed it on his lap to intimidate the 72-year-old woman into signing the papers. Mrs. Barrera was compelled to sign them, but is now before the court seeking the disbarment of Laput. Issue:

permission of her parents. They consented and so she served as an usherette, Daarol picking her up and taking her home everyday. In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioner’s house and invited her for a joy ride, with the permission of her mother (who was Daarol’s former classmate). They went to the beach and Daarol proposed his love for Barrientos and told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her within 6 months from her acceptance. After a few days of courting, she accepted the offer of love. Visitations continued and they agreed to get married in Dec 1973. In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party and when they left, he took her for a joy ride to an airport in Sicayab where there were no houses around. There, he pressured her into having sexual intercourse reiterating that he loved her, and that he would marry her and that December was very near anyway they would marry soon. She gave in after much hesitation because she loved him. She cried after the deed. This event happened frequently thereafter during August to October 1973, where she consented because she loved him. Eventually, she became pregnant and informed Daarol. He however suggested that she have the baby aborted. She refused. He told her that she didn’t have to worry because they were getting married soon anyway. In late October 1973, Daarol came to see Barrientos and her mother and told them that he could not marry her because he was already married. He reassured them though that he has been separated from his wife for 16 years and that he would work for the annulment of his marriage and subsequently marry her. So Barrientos waited and delivered the baby but eventually wasn’t able to contact Daarol anymore (he went MIA).

W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct ISSUE: Held:

W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.

Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable, more so considering that they were performed by a man dealing with a 72-year-old woman. The offense is compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the BAR, the offender should have set an example of a man of peace and champion of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom the offender had pledged to defend and protect – his client. He was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against Atty Daarol, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a college student, single. Atty. Daarol went to her house because he was a friend of her sister, hence they also became friends. She knew Daarol to be a single and as a General Manager of ZANECO (electic cooperative). On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos’ house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason’s convention so the latter said he should ask for the

55 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

HELD/RATIO: YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. He is perverted. He says that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." Worse, he even suggested abortion. Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant. As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his selfserving testimony. By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct is in order.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS FELICITAS BERBANO V. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Berbano against Atty. Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment. Berbano was one of the heirs of a certain Hilapo, who owned a lot in Alabang. Said lot was being claimed by FIlinvest Development Corp so Berbano and her co-heirs appointed a certain Mr. Daen as attorney-in-fact. However, Mr. Dane was arrested in Jan 1999 and was detained so he needed the assistance of a law for his release. Someone recommended Atty. Barcelona to them. So later that month, Atty. Barcelona went to see Mr. Daen in jail. The latter engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for his release. Atty. Barcelona told them that they (Berbano and Co.) had to produce P50,000 at that time so that he could secure Daen’s release the following day. Berbano didn’t have enough money and time to immediately come up with such big amount but they were able to come up with P15,700. She handed Atty. Barcelona the money. He said that he would go to the SC to talk to someone regarding the release of Daen, and that they should just meet tomorrow. The day after, they met again. Berbano handed over another check worth P24,000. The day after, they gave another P10,000 to Atty. Barcelona (through his wife and daughter). There were other payments of money, the total amounting to P64,000. After much time wasted, and promises reiterated of the release of Daen, Atty. Barcelona wasn’t seen again and he didn’t return their calls. Daen was still in jail. Atty. Barcelona failed to file an answer. Commissioner on Bar Discipline found Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of CPR. He recommended disbarment and return of the P64,000. IBP Board of Governots adopted such findings but recommended only suspension. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred. HELD/RATIO: Yes. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. Complainant’s evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony before the Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations laid down in her affidavit. The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings

56 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Respondent collected money from the complainant and the nephew of the detained person in the total amount of P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the detainee through his alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme Court. He deserves to be disbarred from the practice of law. Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections. In this case, respondent misrepresented to complainant that he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with a Supreme Court Justice. In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public contempt. He is disbarred. HILDA D. TABAS V. ATTY. BONIFACIO B. MANGIBIN FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Tabas against Atty. Mangibin for allegedly having committed forgery. Tabas claims that in March 2001, a certain Galvan mortgaged to her a piece of real property to secure a P48,000 loan. The deed of the REM was registered and annotated. On October 2001 however, a certain Castillejos, falsely representing herself as Tabas, appeared before Atty. Mangibin and asked him to prepare a discharge of the said mortgage and then notarize it afterwards. Atty. Mangibin prepared the said discharge but he didn’t ask Castillejos for any other document other that a Community Tax Certificate. He later on notarized the said deed. Subsequently, the mortgagor Galvan was able to mortgage the same property again with Rural Bank of Nauilian. When Tabas learned of the cancellation, she promptly informed Atty. Mangibin that her signature in the deed was forged. However, he did not help her. Atty. Mangibin admits of the discharge deed but denies liability for the falsification under a claim of good faith. He says he did not know of Castillejos’ fraudulent intent and so, he cannot be faulted. He claims it is beyond the realm of his futy to investigate the identity of persons appearing before him. And that as a matter of routine, he only requires the CTCs of persons appearing before him. IBP recommended to give respondent merely a warning, to be more careful in the preparation of legal documents so that such situations may me avoided in the future. Bar Confidant however recommended suspension. He was found guilty of gross negligence. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Mangibin is liable for violating the Notarial Law and should be suspended from the practice of law. HELD/RATIO: Yes, suspended for 2 years. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of matters stated in the document. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed. The circumstances in this case indubitably show that respondent did not take even ordinary precautions required in the premises. Respondent’s conduct showed serious lack of due care in the performance of his duties as a notary public. Because of his carelessness, respondent failed to notice the glaring difference in the signature of mortgagee in the deed of real estate mortgage from her purported signature in the questioned discharge of real estate mortgage. Hence, he breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect for the law and legal processes as well as to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. SESBRENO V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the petitioner to prosecute their cases. They had undertaken an an agreement wherein it was stated that Sesbreno will get 30% of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. they may recover. Atty. Sesbreno registered his charhing/retaining lien on the Agreement. The camineros he was representing obtained a favorable judgment. RTC ordered that they be reinstate with back salaries, with privileges and adjustments. The respondent to that case DPWH appealed to the SC where Sesbreno still represented the camineros. Later on, the Governor of Cebu proposed a compromise settlement of the cases. The parties signed a Compromise Agreement wherein it is stated that camineros will be paid full back wages. Also states that the camineros are subject to lawyer’s charging and retaining liens as registered in the lower court. Sespreno was not the counsel anymore after finality of judgment adopting the compromise agreement. The camineros moved for execution however, only 45% of the amount due them was released because the court retained the 55%, holding it was payment of the lawyer’s fees pending determination of such amount. However, instead of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims. Sesbreno now sues for Damages and Attorney’s Fees against respondents and his former clients. RTC ruled in favor of Sesbreno. The court further upheld the petitioner’s status as a quasi-party considering that he had a registered charging lien. CA reversed.

NO. The compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the respondents and the camineros and the same became the basis of the judgment rendered by this Court. Petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees was evidenced by an agreement for attorney’s fees voluntarily executed by the camineros where the latter agreed to pay the former “thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they might recover in the mandamus and other cases that they were filing or have filed.” Clearly, no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their contract nor was a specified rate agreed upon on how the money claims were to be computed. The use of the word “whatever” shows that the basis for the computation would be the amount that the court would award in favor of the camineros. Considering that the parties agreed to a compromise, the payment would have to be based on the amount agreed upon by them in the compromise agreement approved by the court. To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession until what is due him has been paid, but also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been retained by the client. A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the lawyer for services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment. Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation. Considering that petitioner’s claim of higher attorney’s fees is baseless and considering further that he had settled his case as against his former clients, SC did not sustain his right to damages for breach of contract. The attendant circumstances, in fact, show that the camineros acknowledged their liability to the petitioner and they willingly fulfilled their obligation. It would be contrary to human nature for the petitioner to have acceded to the withdrawal of the case against them, without receiving the agreed attorney’s fees.

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 1

ISSUE:

LIBARIOS V. DABALOS (Gross ignorance of the law; close association)

W/N Atty. Sesbreno is entitled to Damages for breach of contract. HELD/RATIO:

57 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Facts:

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Judge Dabalos without conducting any hearing directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against accused and at the same time fixed the bail for accused Calo and Allocod. Held: Judge Dabalos is fined with a warning. It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed. Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary action. Considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded that he should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from concluding that the evidence against him was merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent judge should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.

“I am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without a preliminary investigation despite vigorous and continued objection and reservation of rights of the accused and notwithstanding the recommendation of the prosecutor that said rights be respected… I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz that the trial court has apparently been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice. Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case has received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of complete objectivity in its handling of the case.” SABITSANA V. VILLAMOR Facts: It was discovered that there were 87 cases undecided by respondent judge beyond the 90-day reglementary period. The dismal state of the Courthouse of the respondent judge which was described as bereft of any dignity as a court of law has been noted. Judge Villamor however shifts the blame on his clerk of court, Atty. Jocobo who he claims was inefficient in the management of the court records. Also, in the case of theft by Lipango, Villamor designated Judge Pitao as acting judge of the MCTC. Villamor warned Pitao to acquit Lipango because the case was being backed up by someone powerful. He did this by sending a letter to Pitao through Lipango’s wife. However, Pitao still convicted Lipango because the evidence of guilt was strong. When Pitao was away for some conference, he found out that Villamor revoked his designation and appointed another as judge of the MCTC. And finally, when the case was elevated to the RTC where Villamor was assigned he acquitted Lipango.

GO V. COURT OF APPEALS Held: Facts: Accused presented himself before the police to verify reports that he was being hunted by the police. He was thereafter detained. The prosecutor then informed accused of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provision of Art.125 of the RPC. Accused refused to execute such waiver. The prosecutor filed an information for murder with no recommended bail and a certification that no preliminary investigation was conducted because accused did not sign a waiver of the provisions of Art.125 of the RPC. Counsel of accused however later filed a motion for release and proper preliminary investigation. After the case was raffled to the RTC, Judge Pelayo initially allowed the release of accused on a cash bond and issued an order granting the leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Later on however, Pelayo motu proprio issued an order recalling the granting of bail and proceeded to trial. Accused and his counsel continuously opposed this. Held: (Note: What is related to ethics is actually found in the concurring opinion of Justice Gutierrez)

58 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Villamor violated Canon3 and Canon2 A judge sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides: “A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.” Also, under Rule 3.09 is that: “A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.” Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench inpending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS TAN V. ROSETE Facts: Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant. The staff member told complainant Tan that Judge Rosete was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judge’s decision in the criminal cases, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. Complainant, however, did not accede to respondent’s demand because she believed that she had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by respondent judge. Held: We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court DIMATULAC V. VILLON Note: I’ll skip the facts because its exhaustingly long and complicated (recall: Kenjie’s 40page case. Haha. Note, there are actually a lot of respondents but only Villon is related to us). Basically, there was denial of due process. Judge Villon --- Acting with deliberate dispatch, set the date of arraignment without even perusing the records (otherwise he would’ve known among others, that there was a motion to defer proceedings because of an appeal pending in the DOG, there was an order giving petitioners 10days to file a petition with the CA, the filing of such petition, order of the CA directing respondent accused to comment on the petition to show cause why the application for a write of preliminary injunction should not be granted…etc.,). All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind a cautious attitude as these were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment be precipitately held. While it may be true that he was not bound to await

59 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

the DOJ's resolution of the appeal his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents to initially determine if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he could have directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances, judge Villon should not have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor. IMPORTANT: The judge "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in him. Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. CANON 2 FERNANDEZ V. HAMOY Facts: Despite the lapse of more than 10years, respondent judge failed to render judgment in the case were complainant was counsel to plaintiff. After Hamoy was transferred, complainant learned he brought the records of the case to his new station. Hamoy’s excuse was that his utility aid mixed the records up and because the dockets were congested with so many family-cases his court being the only family court in the area. He also failed to comply with the directives of the OCA. Also, he was able to collect his salary when he claimed in his certification that he had no pending cases. Held: Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from liability for the inefficiency of his court personnel. Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising his court personnel to secure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. More importantly, judges have a duty to decide their cases within the reglementary period. On meritorious grounds, they may ask for additional time. It must be stressed, however, that their application for extension must be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period. Upon his transfer to another post, respondent Judge should have asked the permission of the Court Administrator to bring the records of the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised the parties of his action with respect thereto. Furthermore, respondent Judge should be held liable for his failure to obey directives from this Court and the Court Administrator. Needless to say, judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, much more so this Court from which all other courts should take their bearings

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Respondent Judge must bear in mind that the exacting standards of conduct demanded of judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribed period but collects his salary upon a false certificate is guilty of dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct and deserves the condemnation of all right thinking men. In view of the primordial role of judges in the administration of justice, only those with irreproachable integrity and probity must be entrusted with judicial powers. DAWA V. DE ASA Facts:

Two complaints were filed by Romeo T. Zacarias and a concerned citizen of Gerona, Tarlac. These Complaints identically charged Judge Martonino R. Marcos (Formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tarlac City) and Clerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya (of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gerona, Tarlac) with immoral conduct and illegal solicitation from litigants. Zacarias alleged that, on two occasions, Judge Marcos and Visaya tried to extort money from him in exchange for a favorable decision in a criminal case against Zacarias and for his provisional release. He further alleged that upon some inquiries, he was informed that the respondent Judge does not approve bailbonds without bribe money and that the respondents are engaged in an illicit love affair which is common knowledge to municipal and court personnel and as well as to the people of Gerona. Issue:

Presiding judge Armando de Asa was charged with sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness by Floride Dawa, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto and Noraliz Jorgensen. Dawa and Barreto were employed as stenographic reporters while Jorgensen was a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of Caloocan City and detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court. They charged de Asa for allegedly forcing himself on them and kissing them on the lips. Issue: Whether de Asa violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics Ruling. Yes. Canon 2 provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. He should behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is therefore paramount that a judge's personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. In the present case, the Court found totally unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employees. Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. The Court concludes with moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal from office. IN RE JUDGE MARCOS Facts:

60 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Whether respondents violated the Code of Judicial Conduct Ruling: Yes. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate “should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities” and “should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.” Since appearance and reality fuse in the performance of judicial functions, the judge -- like Caesar’s wife -must not only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion. the actions of respondent judge were not free from all appearances of impropriety. His conduct lacked the meticulous care expected of one ever mindful of the image of the judiciary that one portrays. It is the kind of behavior for which he must be administratively dealt with, as it erodes public confidence in the judicial system. As to respondent clerk, we find that she was equally remiss in the performance of her duties. By her own admission, she required complainant to post the cash bond, even though she had not been instructed to do so by respondent judge. She thereby arrogated judicial power unto herself. The determination of whether to require a cash bond, like the approval of bail or the release of the accused, is purely a judicial function. It was certainly not among the mandated duties of respondent clerk. It has been stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed by the trust and confidence reposed in a public office. The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work therein, from the judge to the lowliest clerk. LACHICA V. FLORDELIZA Facts: Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, charged the respondent, Judge Rolando A. Flordeliza of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jose Abad Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse of judicial position and intimidation, for allegedly compelling her to sign a death certificate even though she was not the attending physician. According to Lachica, during a party, Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk at that time, threatened to file an administrative case against her if she will refuse to sign the death certificate.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Issue: Whether respondent-judge is guilty as charged of abuse of judicial position and intimidation amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct Ruling: Yes. A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.” From all the foregoing, as well as the evidence on record, this Court is convinced that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge has been established by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. His undue interest in having complainant sign the Death Certificate is highly questionable, to say the least. Further, his inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a witness is reprehensible in a judge and should be subjected to disciplinary action. Respondent was FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN V. JAVELLANA Facts: Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana, acting presiding judge of the RTC of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave misconduct in the performance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. The complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of Andersons Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San Carlos City RTC. Complainant averred that there was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment in the criminal case, the decision, that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered only on the tenth month after the case was submitted for decision. Respondent judge was also cited for impropriety by complainant because he was often seen with Attorney Vic Agravante, counsel for the accused, whose vehicle respondent judge would even use at times.

and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence. The respondent was ADMONISHED to constantly be circumspect in his conduct and dealings with lawyers who have pending cases before him. SAMSON V. CABALLERO Facts: This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero. Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case. According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003. At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted. Issue: Whether respondent violated the Code of Judicial Ethics Ruling:

Issue: Whether Judge Javellana violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics Ruling: Yes. The Investigating Justice has seen impropriety on the part of respondent judge in his close association with a counsel for a litigant. The Court shares the view and disquisition of the Honorable Justice. Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time

61 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Yes. Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer. In this particular case, respondent’s dishonest act was against the lawyer’s oath to “do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.” It cannot be denied that respondent’s dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. The first step towards the successful implementation of the Court’s relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge. Respondent was DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. CANON 3 DIMO REALTY V. DIMACULANGAN Facts: Leonardo P. Dimaculangan, respondent, filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for specific performance against Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. (Dimo Realty) and spouses Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon, petitioners. The complaint alleges that sometime in 1967 to 1968, petitioners engaged the services of respondent as geodetic surveyor to subdivide (into subdivision lots) 2 parcels of land situated in Barrio Namuco, Rosario, Batangas. As payment for respondent’s services, petitioner agreed to give him 1 subdivision lot at Villa Luz Subdivision and pay him P9,200.00 in cash. After the completion of respondent’s work, petitioners paid him P9,200.00 in installments and delivered to him possession of the lot. However, despite respondent’s demands, petitioners failed to deliver the title of the lot, prompting him to file with the RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages. The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint for improper venue. Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for inhibition alleging partiality on the part of the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago. CA denied the motion for inhibition. Issue: Whether the CA erred in denying the motion for inhibition Ruling: No. Suffice it to state that whether judges should inhibit themselves from a case rests on their own "sound discretion." Otherwise stated, inhibition partakes of voluntariness on the part of the judges themselves. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. In a catena of cases, we held that "bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office require them to administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the rich." Here, petitioners merely alleged the arbitrary issuance of a temporary restraining order

62 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

without however showing bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. In fact, the Court of Appeals held that "such error of the respondent judge does not necessarily warrant his inhibition in the case." PIMENTEL V. SALANGA Facts: Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition is the right of respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit in judgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing attorney, appears as counsel. Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against respondent judge upon averments of "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence." Petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470 aforesaid. He there prayed that the records of those cases be transferred to another sala. Respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stood his ground with the statement that the administrative complaint against him is no cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court Issue: Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one of the parties is his adversary in an administrative case said counsel lodged against him? NO. Held: Rule 126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the grounds for disqualification of a judge upon being challenged and under which he should disqualify himself. The rule, however, has never been interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself, in the absence of any challenge by either party, due to his close blood relationship with counsel for one of said parties. Considering the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical grounds, is a matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the official who is empowered to act upon the request for such inhibition. The exercise of sound discretion — mentioned in the rule — has reference exclusively to a situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case.7 For, the permissive authority given a judge in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, is only in the matter of disqualification, not otherwise. Better stated yet, when a judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been — he has to continue with the case. A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those specified in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice. Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience. In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondent judge is not legally under obligation to disqualify himself, we may not, on certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned MONTEMAYOR V. BERMEJO (The RULING portion is kind of lengthy because I think the refutation of the Court for every misconduct alleged is important. ) Facts: Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge failed to decide the case within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court). Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the instant Administrative Complaint charging Judge Bermejo with gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three Motions for Execution and two Motions to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment. Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. According to him, it was only after the respondent Judge received the defendant’s supersedeas bond that the former issued the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court. The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable for delay in the rendition of judgment. In essence, he argues that since the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution was issued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment on October 10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-day period. Issue: Is the respondent judge guilty of delaying rendition of judgment and violating the Code of Judicial Ethics? YES. Held: The reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of judgment should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers of the parties, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, as provided by the Rules, not

63 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

from the issuance of the order by the judge deeming the case submitted for resolution. The reckoning point is fixed by law, not by the judge. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by the law. The records do not reveal when the parties received Judge Bermejo’s Order requiring them to submit their respective affidavits and position papers. Assuming, however, that the court received the defendant’s Position Paper on August 14, 2002, as respondent Judge claims, judgment should have been rendered on September 13, 2002. Instead, the decision was dated October 10, 2002, or nearly a month after the lapse of the mandatory period for rendition of judgment and almost two months from the receipt of the defendant’s Position Paper. Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay and, thus, administratively liable. Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to administer justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of the same Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable, constitutes gross inefficiency and is a ground for the imposition of administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge. The respondent Judge, however, can only offer feeble excuses for his inaction on the plaintiffs’ Motions for Execution. He claims that the first Motion for Execution prayed that hearing be set on a date that was not a motion day. Judge Bermejo forgets that while the Rules of Court requires all motions to be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next working day, the same Rules provides an exception for motions requiring immediate action. Perhaps, as a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer case is immediately executory, the plaintiffs believed that their motion came under the exception. However, if the respondent Judge did not share this view, he could have simply set the motion for hearing on the next motion day. Instead, he untenably ignored the motion. Judge Bermejo also rationalizes his failure to act on the motion on the ground that there was no proof yet that the defendant’s counsel had received notice of the Judgment. The plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Execution almost two months later on December 12, 2002. The fact that the registry receipts of the service of judgment had not yet returned at this point would have been cause for apprehension for any responsible judge. Yet Judge Bermejo has not conveyed any semblance of anxiety. He did not inquire from, nor inform, the Clerk of Court about the absence of the receipts two months after copies of the Judgment were sent to the parties. Instead, he found the lack of registry receipts a convenient reason for tarrying on the motion. These circumstances may lead a sophisticated mind to conclude one of two things. One, the registry receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge Bermejo is denying it to cover up such loss. This conclusion is buttressed by the odd fact that, despite the seriousness of Dr. Montemayor’s allegations, the respondent Judge has not offered in these administrative proceedings any evidence of the existence of the registry receipts. An obvious disregard of keeping records is evidence of incompetence and lack of professionalism.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. Two, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in which case, he is not only guilty of dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but, worse, bias in favor of the defendant. Other circumstances support the theory of bias. Judge Bermejo provides a flimsy justification for his inaction on Dr. Montemayor’s Second Motion for Execution. According to the respondent Judge, the court was undertaking its semestral inventory when the motion was filed. Even if the Court were to admit the adequacy of this obvious pretext, Judge Bermejo, at the very least, should have set the motion for hearing on the next motion day after the inventory. But again, he disregarded the second motion. Next, under Section 19, Rule 70, supra, in case the defendant does not file any supersedeas bond or did not make any monthly deposit, the plaintiff would be entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the inferior court’s judgment. In such a case the execution is mandatory. However, by countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays in obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Bermejo has put in question his partiality. It bears reminding him that a judge must at all times not only be impartial but maintain the appearance of impartiality. Thus, under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice. ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. of delay in the rendition of judgment in violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for which he is fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge is also declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of said Code and is fined the amount of P10,000.00. OKTUBRE V. VELASCO FACTS: Oktubre is the administrator of Paler Building, owned by Peggy D’Arcy. D’Arcy is the aunt-in-law of Judge Velasco. Shortly after Velasco’s appointment to the MTC of Maasin, he asked D’Arcy if he could reside at the Paler Building. He was initially allowed by D’Arcy however when he sought an extension to stay thereat he was denied by D’Arcy. Nevertheless, Judge Velasco was able to stay in the building albeit in another room. Judge Velasco then sent letters to the tenants of the building declaring that he was the lawful owner of the building and all rentals should be deposited by them at his office in the MTC. He also sent a strongly worded letter using the MTC’s letterhead to D’Arcy asserting possession over the building. Judge Velasco caused the removal of the building’s service jeep from its garage. D’Arcy then instructed Oktubre to replace the vehicle in the building and to take

64 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

measures to ensure that the removal would not be repeated. Oktubre successfully replaced the vehicle and removed one of its wheels and put it inside the computer room of the building. Thereafter, Judge Velasco caused the destruction and replacement of the padlock to Oktubre’s room and the access gate to the third floor of the building. Oktubre then filed a complaint against the judge in the Punong Baranggay. Conciliation proceedings failed. After the hearing, Oktubre was asked by a police officer to come with him to the station at the chief’s request. Upon arrival, he was confronted with an arrest warrant signed under authority by Judge Velasco in connection with the alleged robbery of the jeepney’s wheel and he was put behind bars pursuant thereto. After obtaining his release he was again filed suit for malicious mischief and falsification of documents again by Judge Velasco. All the complaints were supported by the sole affidavit of Judge Velasco which he prosecuted using his Office. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Velasco is guilty of grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. RULING: Respondent Judge is Liable for Grave Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority. Note Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 3.12 of the same code. For inappropriately using his Office’s letterhead and for acting on his own criminal complaints against complainant and D’Arcy, respondent Judge violated these rules. Thus, he is liable for grave misconduct [and grave abuse of authority. On Respondent Judge’s failure to Recuse Himself from His Criminal Complaints. Note the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is intended to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice. True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and enforce the law. However, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of partiality is proscribed. Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation in this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is related to a party or to counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judge from doing so in cases where he is a party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his own case

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137. Respondent Judge’s subsequent inhibition from the three cases does not detract from his culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of the cases in the first place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due process. This became fait accompli when respondent Judge refused to abide by such rule. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Grave Abuse of Authority for violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled corporations. However, he shall receive any accrued leaves due him as of this date. SANDOVAL V. CA Facts: It appears that an impostor succeeded in selling property lawfully titled in another’s name by misrepresenting himself as the latter. The lower court ruled in favor of the original owner and nullified the deed of sale in favor of the buyer who claims to be a purchaser in good faith. CA affirmed. […] Hence, this petition for review where Juan C. Sandoval prays for the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision. Two issues are presented for resolution. First, petitioner contends that he was denied due process when the ponente of the decision in the Court of Appeals, Justice Luis Victor, did not inhibit himself from the case inasmuch as he was, for a time, the presiding judge in the court a quo trying the case. Second, petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value who should not be held accountable for the fraud committed against private respondent Tan, Jr. Issue: Whether or not the Justice who penned the assailed decision in the Court of Appeals should have inhibited himself from taking part in the case. Held: In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.” A judge’s conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and should deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office.” From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for Justice Victor to inhibit himself from deciding the case. To be sure, as trial court judge, he presided partly over

65 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

the case below, heard part of plaintiff’s evidence and ruled on motions. The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the Honorable Lucas Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was promoted. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to Justice Victor as ponente. The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the disqualification of a judge from deciding a case where his “ruling in a lower court is the subject of review” or “in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review.” Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the case. Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it is our considered view that his active participation in the case below constitutes a “just or valid reason,” under Section 1 of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case. THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ V. JUSTICE DICDICAN Facts: This is an administrative complaint against Justice Dicdican filed by Ma. Asparen, a party to a case involving St. Mary Mazzarello School. In that case, the school imposed disciplinary sanctions on Ms. Asparen but the same was lifted by Hon. Elumba, judge of the Trial Court. The respondent justice of the CA issued a TRO. So complainant here sought the inhibition of respondent from the case on the ground that the latter had previously represented various religious organizations during his practice in law and the petitioner in this case is run by a religious organization. Respondent denied that such circumstance affected his impartiality in the case but he nevertheless inhibited himself. Despite such inhibition, it was still alleged that Justice still appeared as one of the signatories of a resolution dated Nov. 21, 2006 of the CA admitting the memorandum of the petitioner school and which deemed the petition as submitted for resolution. Complainant alleged that respondent justice’s actions showed his manifest bias and prejudice against his client in the case. Respondent Justice however, was able to show that no document was forwarded to him when he inhibited from the case. It was also shown that another Justice took over the same. It was also shown that his inclusion as a signatory was a mere mistake by the stenographer as shown by the letter of apology. Held:

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Complaint was devoid of merit. In administrative proceedings, burden of proof is upon complainant. If complainant fails to do so, respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense. In the present case, the complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of impropriety and partiality against respondent justice. He failed to present any other evidence to prove his charges. A party’s remedy if prejudiced by the orders of a magistrate lies with the proper reviewing court, not with the office of the court administrator by means of an administrative complaint. When some other judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular. CANON 4 J. KING & SONS COMPANY V. JUDGE HONTANOSAS Facts: Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case pending before the RTC presided over by respondent. Respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment. An urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent and on the same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent approved defendants’ counter-bond despite knowledge that the bonding company’s Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net retention of the bonding company had a deficiency. At a meeting in his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to pay P250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed by complainant. Respondent’s favorite hang-out is the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses said facilities "gratis et amore." Held: We agree with the Investigating Justice’s finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-day notice rule. Respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the motion to lift attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in considering the same submitted for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on the same day without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter. It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by him in good faith, or in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption. However, it has also been held that when the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action. The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that respondent’s inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this case, we believe that respondent’s actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we

66 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

find respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice rule and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the opportunity to be heard on the matter As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to exercise due care in examining the supporting papers. The respondent should know the basic requirements before approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as counter-bond. It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to frequent the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free. Respondent thereby received benefits from a litigant appearing in his court. Respondent’s defense that his wife offered to pay but the management of the karaoke bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at said bar are quite clear that respondent’s wife would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever given by respondent or his wife. Respondent should have insisted on paying, especially considering that complainant has a total of three cases pending before his court. By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by said litigant, respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct. Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for judicial office reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the damage that can be done to the legal order by judicial corruption. CENTRUM AGRI-BUSINESS REALTY CORP V. JUDGE BETHEL KATALBASMOSCARDON Facts: Petitioner Centrum filed a complaint with the MTCC for ejectment of several stores leasing its building (JVLS Building). Centrum bought this property from JVLS Co. Inc., but the tenants refused to pay rent to Centrum (These tenants on the other hand sued JVLS to enforce their right of first option). MTCC ruled for Centrum, ordered the tenants to pay rent covering 53 months + interests. The tenants appealed this decision to RTC where respondent is the presiding judge. In that appeal, Centrum moved for the execution of the MTCC decision, but respondent refused. The tenants moved for 30 days within which to file their supplemental memorandum, which the judge granted, but limited the period to 10 days. Centrum urged for the early resolution of the case, but the judge said that Centrum’s motion was already moot and academic, but she wanted to give the tenants a chance to file their memorandum (meaning a ruling was already made). The judge on July 13 released the decision in favour of Centrum, but with different rental rates (higher, in favour of Centrum). This decision was dated June 15. In the present administrative case against respondent judge, Centrum charged her with 1. Corrupt acts and practices, gross dishonesty, serious misconduct; 2. Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order; 3. Gross ignorance of the law. Centrum states that not only were the amounts in the decision substantially increased, it also disclosed that it had received a duplicate copy of the decision even before it was promulgated, signed by the respondent. Judge claimed she was innocent and had no idea how Centrum got a copy. Centrum also alleges that the judge unjustly denied its motion for execution.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Held:

Held:

Respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct and is dismissed from office. Although there is no proof of how Centrum obtained a copy of the decision even before its promulgation, the fact is that a copy was obtained by it and this is highly irregular. Since the judge is ultimately responsible for the safekeeping of her papers, the burden of accounting is on her. (judge claims that her stenographer was at fault) This was not merely a simple case of breach of confidentiality, but evidence suggests a scheme to extort money from Centrum. There was a negotiation between the Judge and Centrum, as admitted by the latter’s counsel. Why Centrum filed this case against the judge appears to be that the decision, although it was completed as of June 15, was not promulgated until after nearly a month, leading Centrum to fear that respondent judge would welsh on her undertaking to increase the awards in its favour. On rendering an unjust interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law, the court finds the judge’s errors in this case to be grossly inexcusable. The judge violated certain provisions in the rules of court applicable to ejectment proceedings.

Both judges are fined (11,000 for petitioner, 16,000 for respondent) and given a stern warning for having violated Sec 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect. Misbehavior by judges and employees necessarily diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding is a disgraceful occurrence reflecting adversely on the image of the Judiciary. By fighting, respondent judges failed to observe the proper decorum expected of members of the Judiciary. More detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a mere allowance coming from the local government.

RIZALINA CAPCO-UMALI V. PAULITA ACOSTA-VILLARANTE Facts: Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (petitioner) charged Judge Paulita AcostaVillarante (respondent) with violation of Canon 4. The petitioner and other judges made a courtesy call to the Mayor of Mandaluyong and they talked about local allowance of judges. The Mayor noticed the disparity in the amounts received (respondent was receiving more, compared to petitioner and other judges). So the Mayor ordered that the allowance received by respondent be reverted to the previous rates. During the first ever monthly meetingof RTC judges, what happened in the courtesy call was reported. Angered, respondent yelled accusations of paninira at the Executive judge (she was there during the courtesy call and was presiding over the meeting). Petitioner, also present at the meeting, felt that she had to rescue the executive judge and explained what happened. This time, respondent yelled at petitioner, called her sinungaling and told petitioner to stop talking because “nakakahiwa boses mo.” Petitioner yelled back, “matanda ka na, malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan, madadamay pa kami,” to which the respondent answered that she was ready to die any moment because she did no wrong. Basically, they had a screaming match until they were pacified. Judge Villarante then wrote a Memorandum addressed to Executive Judge of the Mandaluyong RTC, copies of which were furnished to the Justices of the SC, JBC, other judges of Mandaluyong, its Congressman, and prosecutor. The memo suggested that the holding of monthly meeting of judges be suspended, considering what transpired. Petitioner filed a complaint for libel based on the memorandum. In causing the circulation of the memorandum, respondent claimed that it was her obligation to bring to the attention of concerned officials the personal demeanor of petitioner that would put the judiciary in public scrutiny and disrespect.

67 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

The behaviour of both parties was very unbecoming. Judge CapcoUmali failed to live up to the standard of propriety required of judges. While she might have been provoked by Judge Acosta-Villarante’s referral to her as a liar, she should have maintained her composure instead of shouting back at a fellow judge. She should have exercised self-restraint instead of reacting in such a very inappropriate manner. Judge Acosta-Villarante should also be required to answer for her failure to observe the basic norm of propriety demanded from a judge. She provoked petitioner by calling her sinungaling. She should have been more cautious in choosing her words. She also repeated the uncalled for conduct when she wrote the memorandum and caused its circulation. If indeed the memorandum was produced strictly to allow the parties to cool off and avoid a repetition of the incident, there was no need to mention the alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali during the meeting. The memorandum was thus written as a medium for retaliation against Judge Capco-Umali. BINALAY V. LELINA, JR. Facts: Complainant Atty. Binalay filed this administrative case against Judge Lelina, Jr. for violating Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct (both are with regard to prohibition on judges in the private practice of law). Respondent judge is preventively suspended for being charged with rape, abduction with rape and slight illegal detention. While still under suspension, the judge filed a manifestation for the court to grant him the permission to practice law during the remainder of his preventive suspension, or if such cannot be granted, to consider him resigned from the judiciary. It turned out, however, that even before he filed this manifestation, he had already engaged in the private practice of law representing 2 persons in a criminal case, and one in a civil case, all of which are still pending. All pleadings in those cases were signed by him, as a partner of the Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing & Associates Law Offices. In the meantime, the office of court administrator directed respondent to desist from engaging in the practice of law pending the court’s resolution of his manifestation. In his comment, the judge argues that the prohibition to engage in practice of law applies only to judges who are in the active service and should not cover those under suspension. He also said he was forced to practice law due to his impoverished life and because of the continuing sufferings of his wife and children.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Held: Judge is suspended and sternly warned. By being merely suspended, judge remains to bound by the prohibition to practice law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos ditinguire debemos. Law does not make a distinction between a suspended judge and an active judge. The fact that he tried to secure an authorization to engage in the practice of law only shows that he is aware of the prohibition. Moreover, he should not permit the law firm to still carry his name. By allowing the firm to do so, he held himself in public as a lawyer, in violation of the rules and norms of judicial ethics. CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN V. PRESIDING JUDGE PORNILLOS (Judge dismissed for borrowing money from lawyers with pending cases before her) Facts: Complainants charged Judge Pornillos for, among others, the violation of the Canons of Judicial Conduct for borrowing money from her staff and lawyers in amounts ranging from P500-P5k. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made an investigation and found that such attaches no administrative liability (since they were already paid or waived by the creditors and were obtained 19 years ago).

Describing her as a GRO, undignified, a whore, disgusting, repulsive, pakialamera, offensive, etc. (in a letter he wrote to the Executive Judge after he found out she ad him blotted with the police because of the text threat) Publishing such remarks in a newspaper Issue: W/N Judge Canda is guilty of gross misconduct Held: Yes. Sec. 2, Canon 4: As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen…in particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. Sec. 6, Canon 4: Judges are entitled to freedom of expression, but in exercising such right, they shall always conduct themselves in a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office. The acts committed by Judge Canda are unbecoming of a judge, and these subjected the judiciary to embarrassment. He was fined and was given a stern warning. IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF LOUIS BIRAOGO Facts:

Issue: W/N Judge Pornillos should be held administratively liable. Held: Yes. Judge Pornillos was dismissed from the service for gross misconduct (aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions and violation of SC rules). Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil service, borrowing money by superior officers from subordinates is a violation punishable by reprimand, suspension, and dismissal from service. At the very least, she should be admonished for dealing with her subordinates in an improper manner. More severely prohibited is borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in case pending before the court (a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of ROC). Under Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (the old one), a judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.

The Supreme Court, en banc, continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice Ruben Reyes in 3 consolidated cases (Limkaichong case). Since there was no further objection, the En Banc approved it. Being printed on Gilbert paper, Justice Reyes immediately circulated the ponencia during the same session. However, they decided to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy because 9 justices wanted to concur only in the result (if the majority concurred only in result, the ponencia would have no doctrinal value). They decided to hold oral arguments. Biraogo, a petitioner in one of the 3 cases, held a press conference and circulated to the media an undated letter signed by him together with a photocopy of the unpromulgated ponencia. He insinuated that the Court unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia. Since the unauthorized release of the copy infringed on the confidential deliberations of the SC and constituted contempt of court, the SC directed an investigation. The Investigating Committee found that the leak came from Justice Reyes himself. Hence, he must be liable for grave misconduct. Issue:

LIHAYLIHAY V. JUDGE ALEJANDRO CANDA

W/N Justice Reyes is liable for gross misconduct

Facts:

Held:

Petitioner filed a complaint against Judge Canda for the ff. acts: Threatening her through text message that she would be in trouble (because he thought she was supporting an applicant for sheriff which he opposed) Filing admin. complaints and criminal cases to harass her

YES. He is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely. The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that confidential information* acquired by justices and judges in their official capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purposes not related to their judicial duties.

68 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS *Information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases.

YES! Adopt findings of the CA. Caguioa Dismissed from service + forfeiture of retirement benefits except leave credits.

CANONS 5 & 6

RATIO: Gross Ignorance of the Law Judge Caguioa issued the Writs of Preliminary Injunction that did not satisfy the legal requisites for its issuance, and which was enforced outside of his territorial jurisdiction. In the former, the applicants of the Writ showed no clear and unmistakable right that was material and substantial as would warrant the issuance of such Writ, and the of its urgency and necessity. In short, he issued the Writs without basis. The requisites for the issuance of the Writ are basic and elementary, and should have been known by Caguoia. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Where the law is basic, lack of conversance with it, and for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, a judge should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.

REPUBLIC V. CAGUIOA Consolidation of 3 cases against respondent FACTS Case 1: Judge Caguioa issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Republic for the implementation of a law5 which required the payment of duties and taxes to importers in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, who formerly had an exemption to such taxes but was subsequently required by virtue of such law. He also granted various ex-parte motions for interventions of different but similarly situated corporations, and approved an injunction bond of P1M for all the petitioners. These orders were immediately implemented despite the MRs filed by the OSG. The Republic filed administrative cases against Caguioa for manifest partiality, gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. This was acted upon by the OCA and subsequently by the CA, stating that Caguioa gravely abused his discretion for ordering the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Injunction. Case 2: (Almost similar circumstances, different people involved) Judge Caguioa issued a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO, to enjoin a person from acting as an officer in a Gov’t agency. The agency filed administrative cases against Caguioa for manifest partiality, gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Case 3: Caguioa ordered a Writ of Execution, after his order of dismissal of a case based on prescription. Private Petitioner filed a case for Grave Misconduct against Caguioa. The CA saw this as invalid, because the Writ should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision. The Order of dismissal did not adjudicate any rights of the parties and resolved no other matter except the dismissal of the case. The findings of the Investigative Justice of the CA: Case 1: Guilty of gross ignorance of the law + conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Evidence on the Manifest Partiality was insufficient. Case 2: Same as Case 1. Case 3: Guilty of simple misconduct. Penalty: 1-year suspension + Stern Warning. ISSUE/S: W/N Caguioa is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Simple Misconduct. HELD:

5

RA 9334

69 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Not Grave Misconduct Even though Caguioa issued the Writs without basis, in this circumstance, it only amounts to simple misconduct. For grave misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt, or with evident bad faith. Such conduct was not evident in the case. DEE C. CHUAN & SONS INC. V. PERALTA FACTS: Sept 13, 2002: Final order of an unlawful detainer case in favor of Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. An appeal was filed with Peralta, an RTC Judge. March 18, 2003: DCCSI filed a "motion to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ of execution" for failure of the appellants to post the required bond and to pay the rentals due in accordance with the decision of the MeTC. March 21, 2003: Acting on the Motion, Peralta required appellants to file their comment. August 11, 2003, October 20, 2003 and December 3, 2003: DCCSI filed a motion to resolve. However, despite the lapse of more than one year, respondent failed and refused to resolve the pending motions. Complaint thus filed. When asked by the OCA about the case, Peralta said that it "ha (d) been resolved by (his) Court and the same (was) already for mailing" and attached a copy of his order dated May 5, 2004. In his order, he dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellants to file their memorandum and directed the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of DCCSI. The OCA, in its report, found Peralta indeed failed to resolve several motions for more than a year and showed indifference in his comment and recommended that he be held liable for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties and fined in the amount of P11, 000.

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS ISSUE/S: W/N Peralta is liable for inefficiency and undue delay in rendering a decision or order. HELD: YES! FINED + Sternly Warned. RATIO: Delivery of Decisions with Reasonable Promptness The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted for decision. Peralta ignored this mandate. Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. For more than a year, Peralta failed to resolve several motions ― the motion to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ of execution as well as the three motions to resolve, and didn’t offer any reason or justification on why it took him more than a year to resolve the motions. He thus violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. A judge’s failure to resolve motions and incidents within the prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency for it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. BACULI V. BELEN FACTS: Baculi, a Provincial Prosecutor, filed an Information against a person-accused for frustrated homicide. Belen, a RTC Judge, directed Baculi to submit evidence that the notice of preliminary investigation was duly served and received by such person. After a series of pleadings filed by Baculi, Belen directed the former why he should not be cited for tempt of court for making unfounded statements in his pleadings. No such reason was given, thus Belen found Baculi guilty of direct contempt for making scurrilous (vulgar) and contumacious (rebellious) statements in one of the latter's Motions, and subsequently for indirect contempt. Baculi moved that such order be set aside, but was denied by Belen, stating that such Decisions are final and executory. Therefore, Baculi filed a complaint against Belen, denying the claims against him, and added that Belen was induced by revenge because it was Baculi who indicted him in a previous libel case against him, and that Belen had a 'power complex'.

Gross Ignorance of the Law Indirect contempt is any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The scurrilous and contumacious statements constitute direct contempt because it is equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. But such is not the reason for indirect contempt. And even if such statements were considered as indirect contempt, Belen did not follow the proper procedure under the Rules of Court. This strengthens the OCA's findings that Belen is grossly ignorant of basic procedure. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic procedural rules must be at the palm of his hands. When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not know the same, and failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge like Belen. MARIANO V. JUDGE NACIONAL Facts: This is an administrative complaint for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty and violation of judicial conduct stemming from an action for ejectment. In the ejectment proceeding, Judge Nacional issued a pre-trial order dated Sep. 3, 2004 requiring the parties to file their respective position papers on Sep. 30, 2004 (w/c the parties complied with). Nacional subsequently issued an order dated Dec. 28, 2004 requiring parties to submit their respective “memoranda in the form of a court decision” which the parties complied with. The case was eventually decided by Nacional on Feb. 14, 2005. Complaint alleges that the issuance of the Dec. 28, 2004 order violated the prohibition on memoranda by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and that Nacional violated the Rules when he decided the case only on Feb. 14, 2005 (136 days from the date required by law). Judge Nacional admits that he exceeded the maximum period allowed under the Revised Rules and offered the following excuses: (1) quality of decision had priority over compliance w/ reglementary pd; (2) heavy caseload; and (3) documents were voluminous. Issue: W/N Nacional violated basic procedure and code of judicial conduct?

ISSUE: W/N Belen is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for citing Baculi in indirect contempt. HELD: YES! Suspended for 6 months + Stern warning. RATIO:

70 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

Held: Yes, he is fined P40K for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, P20K for violation of Canons 3 & 6 (Code of Judicial Conduct) and P10K for violations of CPR The urgency of restoring social order is the paramount consideration in settling unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases. The necessity of promptly resolving unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases is made more imperative by express provisions of the periods of rendition of judgment (30 days after receipt of the affidavits and position

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS period, or expiration of the period for the filing the same – ROC/Rules of Summary Procedure). Corollarily, Sec 5 of Canon 6 of Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. The justifications advanced by Nacional cannot be accepted because doing so will undermine the wisdom behind procedural rules & diminish respect for the law. The judge (by himself) cannot choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. If a judge needs more time to decide a case, he should formally request the SC for an extension of the deadline. Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Lack of malice or good faith will not exonerate Nacional because the rules violated were basic procedural law. All he had to do was apply them, but he chose not to. It is settled that one who accepts the position of judge owes the public and the court the ability o be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain the professional competence at all times. Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. (Note: length of service does not mitigate administrative penalty) CANEDA V. MENCHAVEZ Facts: Complainant Atty. Caneda is counsel for defendant Virginia Guzman, in Civil Case Roberto Borromeo v. Heirs of Juan Borromeo, for judicial partition pending with Judge Mechanvez’s sala. During the Dec. 14, 2005 hearing of said partition case, the motion to segregate the inheritance shares of one of the plaintiffs, Roberto Borromeo was due to be taken up. During the hearing, the defendants agreed to a partition subject to plaintiff’s withdrawal of a motion for reconsideration it filed before the SC to clear one of the areas (subject to partition) of squatters. Because the plaintiff could not withdraw the MR before the SC, Atty. Caneda suggested mediation. Judge Menchavez blurted out “never mind mediation, walay hinundan na.” When Judge Menchavez checked on the progress of the case, Atty. Caneda remarked it was being delayed because no proper summons had been served on the defendants who were residing outside the country. Menchavez reacted angrily and banged his gavel & shouted “I said no publication period.” Afterwards, Menchavez slammed the table with his hand and went inside his chambers. Afterwards, Judge Menchavez came back with a holstered handgun and smashed it on the table, as he angrily shouted at Atty. Caneda “Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa! Gahig ulo!” Atty. Caneda filed a complaint against Judge Menchavez alleging that the Judge’s act of challenging him inside the courtroom in the presence of many people was improper Issue:

Yes, Judge Menchavez overstepped the norms of propriety demanded of a member of the bench by losing his cool and uttering intemperate language during the hearing. In the courtroom, a lawyer makes submissions before a judge whose role is to hear and consider the submissions, and subsequently rule on the matter. It is not a situation where two equals, such as the opposing counsels, argue against each other. Menchavez should have coolly ruled and allowed counsel to respond to his ruling instead of proceeding in a manner that invited further arguments. Atty. Caneda also erred when he continued to argue despite Judge Menchavez’s ruling. However, Menchavez should have directed the complainant to wind up his arguments under pain of direct contempt if he persisted in his arguments. Direct contempt is not enforced by the judge’s act of bringing out of his weapon and asking counsel the direct question “what do you want?” This confrontational manner has no place in our present justice system. There are agents of the law, officers of the court & the police who can be called upon to implement contempt orders & restore order as needed. Judge Menchavez’s overreacting by bringing out a gun for everyone present in the court to see, even for purposes of maintaining order and decorum in court, is inexcusable in the absence of overt acts of physical aggression by a party before the court. While the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires a magistrate to maintain order and decorum in the court, the Code itself sets its limits (as provided for by Sec. 6 of Canon 6) wherein the judge himself must observe decorum by acting with dignity and courtesy to all those present in the courtroom. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient, and courteous both in conduct and in language. SUAREZ V. DILAG Facts: Suarez filed administrative complaints of (a) graft and corruption against Judge Dilag and Court Stenographer Pascua and (b) grave misconduct and ignorance of the law against Judge Dilag allegedly for collecting P30K from litigants in consideration of favorable judgments in cases for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Suarez further pointed out the existence of conflicting decisions rendered by Judge Dilar (Pancho Case, Tomboc Case, del Rosario Case which were all previously dismissed but subsequently reopened the case and granted the petition). After referral to an investigation officer, the Investigating Justice found Judge Dilag liable for (1) gross misconduct for singing conflicting decisions; (2) gross ignorance of the law and procedure in handling Moreno and Perez cases; and (3) gross negligence and inefficiency for failing to administer supervision over his staff when a fake registry return receipt was effected in Cayabyab Case and entries of judgment were effected in Moreno Case & Dinoso v. Corpuz. Pascua was found guilty of graft and corruption. Issue:

W/N Judge Menchavez should be held liable Held:

71 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena

W/N Judge Dilag should be held liable? Held:

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS Yes, Judge Dilag is dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office. A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence to uphold and maintain public confidence in the legal system. Thus, while he is expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence, he is presumed to have more than a cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure (Eg. taking cognizance of a second petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity when Dilag had already dismissed with prejudice the first petition involving the same parties, issues, and causes of action with that of the first petition). Not every error is indicative of ignorance, for if committed in good faith, no administrative sanction is imposed. Good faith, however, inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment. It does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal procedures evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. In the case at bench, Dilag failed to follow basic legal procedures which are not excusable but renders him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure (During questioning, Dilag said that re-filing is allowed in a dismissal with or without prejudice. Also, he deiced a case even before the submission of the City Prosecutor relative to the investigation to determine collusion between the parties as required under Sec. 9 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) Dilag was charged with gross ignorance of the law. However, to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. The acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. For to hold a judge administratively accountable for ever erroneous order or decision he renders would be intolerable. In the case at bar, there was no allegation whatsoever that Dilag was motivated by bad faith, malice or corruption when he issued the premature warrant of arrest. Be that as it may, the Court holds him administratively liable for his unfamiliarity with the rules on the conduct of prelim investigations. Judges should be conversant with basic legal norms and precepts as well as with the statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to follow developments in the law and to apply them. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in the law. Thus, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be faithful to the law and be the embodiment of professional competence.

72 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena