Legal Ethics Case Digest Set 2

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

FACTS: Atty. Fe T. Tuanda the respondent was suspended for practicing her profession until further notice from the Supreme Court finding her guilty of violating Batas Pambansa 22. She was now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez) and she is not guilty of the offense charged. ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted. RULING: No, The Supreme Court ruled to deny the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude citing Section 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility. We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

DR. RAUL C. SANCHEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALUSTINO SOMOSO, respondent. FACTS: Dr. Raul C. Sanchez filed a complaint-affidavit before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP). He was a member of the medical staff of Sta. Lucia General Hospital, he stated that he was the attending physician of respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso during the latter’s confinement at the hospital from 31 March to 09 April 1998. The respondent paid the complainant by issuing checks but it was dishonored. Dr. Snachez then filed a complaint in the court. Despite the receipt of IBP-CBD order in his two given addresses, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. The respondent was finally declared in default. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Salustino Somoso was guilty of misconduct. RULING: Yes, the Court finds respondent Atty. Salustino Samoso giilty of misconduct, and he is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and he was warned that any further infarction by him shall be dealt with most severely. The Court resolved that the respondent’s action of issuing his personal checks in payment for his medical bills, knowing fully well that his account with the drawee bank has been already closed, constitutes a gross violation of the basic norm of integrity required of all memebers of the legal profession. When respondent paid, with a personal check from a bank account which he knew had already been closed, the person who attended to his medical needs and persisted in refusing to settle his due obligation despite demand, respondent exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. His conduct deserve nothing less than a severe disciplinary sanction.The law profession is a noble calling, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent and fit to exercise it.

LOURDES R. BUSIÑOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT, respondent.

FACTS: A sworn complaint for disbarment dated 31 October 1994 but received by us on 21 November 1994, complainant Lourdes R. Businos charged respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort, a practicing lawyer in Oas, Albay with having committed the crime of estafa under Article 315(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code by misappropriating the sum of Php 32,000.00. The initial case of estafa was filed and subsequently dropped upon payment of the respondent of the amount allegedly owed to the complainant. However, the administrative case was pursued by the complainant claiming gross misconduct on the part of the respondent as to the delayed payment of debt even with repeated request in addition to the asking of Php 2000 as bond in a case handled by him, which was not even required. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco Ricafort be disbarred or suspended in his practice of law. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled to DISBAR Atty. Francisco Ricafort in relation to his palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 and Rules 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11. Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read: Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS. Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01. — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02. —A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03. — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on

all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is specially so, as here, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.

C.E. PIATT, Chief of Police of Manila, Complainant, Vs. Perfecto Abordo, respondent

FACTS: On February 19, 1932,Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar entered into a transaction between two individuals to purchase a quantity of opium for Php 600. He found out that the opium was fake and he filed charges to the two individuals with the crime of estafa and convicted. Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above, adding that "he is sincerely sorry for it and vows not to repeat". His defense is that "there being no evidence in the record establishing the relationship of attorney and client between the respondent and the malefactors", and "the act complained of not having been committed in the exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law", the acts he committed could not affect his status as attorney-at-law and could not, therefore, constitute a ground for disciplinary action. ISSUE: Wherher or not the acts committed by Atty. Abordo constitute a ground for disciplinary action. RULING: Yes, the Court issued an Order that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year to begin on September 1, 1933. The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respect as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him. It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, attempted to engage in an opium deal in direct contravention of the criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan from succeeding was the treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators. The intention to flaunt the law was present even if consummation of the overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of professional ethics which govern the conduct of attorneys, the act was as reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successful culmination. "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws" said the United States Supreme Court in the well known case of Ex Parte Wall ( [1882], 107 U.S., 265), and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support.

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants, vs. ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent. FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia on August 20, 1991by Doctors Fernandez, Dr. Ongtengco, Dr. Bartolome and St. Luke’s Medical Center. The respondent is charged with dishonestyband grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages from medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his client (Atty. Damaso B. Aves) against the a forenamed doctors and St. Luke’s. Atty. Grecia had a previous disbarment case filed on November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for his immoral complicity or “unholy alliance” with a Judge in Quezon city. After three years since the first disbarment case he was reinstated in the profession. Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not effectively reform him. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a Member of the Bar. RULING: The Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR. On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that: Canon 1. . . . Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent. FACTS: In averified complaint filed by Angel Bautista, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order the complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution the Court granted respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts: Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients the Furtunado’s to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143 covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent interest thereof as attorneys’s fees from the Furtunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract RULING: Yes, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Furtunados contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith advance the expenses in litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Furtunados, however does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreedto carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

FACTS: In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage in the said examination.[1]Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, reported the matter to the Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled and that a formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken.Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in mercantile law and resolved to hold another examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However, because numerous petitions, protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of such examination. On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15) percentage points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects (Resolution datedOctober 7, 2003). An Investigating Committee was formed and directed to determine and identify the source of the leakage, the parties responsible therefor and those who benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations. It was found out from the investigation that the source of leakage came from the computer of Atty. Balgos who was the author of the questions and it was Atty. De Guzman had an access and admitted that he had copied the said questionnaire and given it to other persons in the fraternity where he belongs. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Danilo De Guzman be disbarred from the legal profession. Whether or nor not Atty. Balgos committed his negligence and lack of due care in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile law.

RULING: Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit to continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving it in another bar scandal, causing the cancellation of the mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of this institution. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and likewise be required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public scandal he brought upon it as a result of his negligence and lack of due care in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile law. As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on account of the leakage of Attorney Balgos test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar questions in that examination, Atty. Balgos is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan

Guiapal by the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a view to their criminal prosecution as probable co-conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test questions in mercantile law. With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations and prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at present under study by the Courts Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of proposals for bar reforms, the Investigating Committee believes it would be well-advised to refrain from including in this report what may turn out to be duplicative, if not contrary, recommendations on the matter.

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent. FACTS: (READ AGAIN) Respondent, Atty Saguico awas a former Personnel manager and Counsel of Taggat Industries Inc. Thereafter in 1992, he was appointed as Asst. Provincial prosecutor of Tuguegarao Cagayan. Employees of Taggat filed criminal charges against the complainant who took over the management and control of Taggat, withheld the payment of their wages and salaries without a valid cause. The complainant charges respondent with the engaging in private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor and for violation of Rule 15.03 of Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated Rule 15.03 of Code of Professional Responsibility. Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat posits conflict of interests with his work as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

RULING: The Court finds that there is no conflict of interest on the part of the respondent when he handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal charges filed by the Taggat Employees. The issue of the matter of the criminal complaint was pertaining to the withholding of the wages and salaries of the Taggat employees which occurred from April 1, 1996 to July 15, 1997. Evidently, the respondent was no longer connected with the Taggat Inc during such period since he is working as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor since 1992. Should there be apparent conflct of interest, it must be supported by sufficient evidence that Taggat, respondent’s former client, used any confidential information from his preceding employment with Complainant in resolving the filed criminal complaint. As the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat together with the case he handled as government prosecutor was labor-related case which fact is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests.

In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent, Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.

FACTS: This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against the respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him. The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife for some nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a second marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A) stating that the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the same time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each member’s right against the party marrying. The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the document and declared that they were again single and as such could contract another marriage. Relying on this document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage. The respondent upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and let them sign the deed of cancellation (EXHIBIT C) a month later but after the second marriage of Baniquit. ISSUE: whether or not Atty. Roque Santiago committed malpractice in his acts regarding the dispensation of such advice and preparation of document. Whether or not the document regarding separation (EXHIBIT A) valid. RULING: Yes, for the first issue, the advice given by the respondent and his preparation and acknowledgement by of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. No, for the second issue, marriage separation should be sanctioned in the proper court and before the separation. Apart from this, the document subverts the vital foundation of the family, marriage, and is contrary to law, moral and public policy.

ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA, complainants, vs. ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR., respondent. FACTS: By a verified complaint received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on May 5, 1998, Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice. The complainants are lessee of the property of the respondent. There had been an agreement between the parties that the complainant will obtain the Deed of Sale of the property after helping them to settle the respondents obligation of the property because it was mortgage in a loan incurred by the respondents mother(Mrs. Mesina). The complainants were able to comply with the agreement. Some years later or on May 2, 1990, respondent approached complainants and told them that he would borrow the owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants favor. In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died in the early part of 1991. Despite respondents repeated promises to effect the transfer of title in complainants name, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to the public. The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed on August 24, 1992 a Complaint[9] against respondent and his two siblings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Ecija in Cabanatuan City, for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property. ISSUE: Wheteher or not Atty. Mesina can de disbarred from the legal profession by falsification of documents. RULING: Yes, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED. This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes,28 and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law;29 That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.30 Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.31 Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty. That the signature of Felicisima M. Melencio in the 1985 document32 and that in the 1979 document33 are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979 or the 1985 document or even both

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP. ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP principal candidates violated Section 14 of the IBP Bylaws and made a traversy of the idea of a strict non-political Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-laws RULING: Yes, The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, vs. PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS: The petitioners recovered the machineriesfrom the complainant, thus result to petition to theCA yet, it was dismissed. The sheriff then sold it tothe highest bidder.The respondents then filed a petition to the CA inwhich the sold machineries are under a conjugalproperty, thus, the ½ share of the property belongs tothe petitioner’s wife.The petitioners then filed a petition, hence, this case.Respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M.Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostitutedthe judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of thejudgment, to the extended prejudice of thepetitioners. The respondents, with the assistance ofcounsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years todoggedly resist execution of the judgment thrumanifold tactics in and from one court to another (5times in the Supreme Court).We condemn the attitude of the respondents and theircounsel who far from viewing courts as sanctuariesfor those who seek justice, have tried to use them tosubvert the very ends of justice.Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn publicservant and his exalted position as an officer of thecourt, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become aninstigator of controversy and a predator of conflictinstead of a mediator for concord and a conciliatorfor compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in theconduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of theprimacy of truth and moral justice.

Issue:WON Atty. Luison violated Canon 1.03 (Alawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’scause.)

Held:A counsel's assertiveness in espousing withcandour and honesty his client's cause must beencouraged and is to be commended; what we do notand cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistencedespite the patent futility of his client's position, as inthe case at bar.It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,

SAMAR MINING CO., INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPEYO V. TAN and RUFINO ABUYEN, respondents-appellees. FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dismissing this case, with costs against the petitioner, and lifting the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued. Acting upon a claim for compensation, under Act No. 3428, filed by Rufino Abuyen, on June 18, 1956, for a disease allegedly contracted in the course of his employment, as foreman of the Samar Mining Co., Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the petitioner — and docketed as WC Case No. R-VI-217, decision was rendered, on October 14, 1958, by Pompeyo V. Tan — an officer of Regional Office No. VI of the Department of Labor — sentencing petitioner herein: 1. To provide continued medical treatment and hospitalization to the claimant in accordance with Section 13 of the Act until his tuberculosis is cured or arrested; 2. To pay to the claimant a lump sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE (P2,523.00) PESOS and a weekly compensation of P17.40 from date hereof until he is cured or his pulmonary tuberculosis is arrested as certified by a competent physician but the total compensation should not exceed P4,000.00; payment to be made, thru the Regional Office No. VI of the Department of Labor;

3. To pay to the workmen's compensation fund the amount of P26.00 as administrative costs pursuant to Section of 55 of Act 3428, as amended. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of Court of First Instance be affirmed. RULING: the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with treble costs, jointly and severally, against the petitioner and its counsel, Attorney Benedicto G. Arcinas and let certified copy of this decision be attached to the personal record of the latter, as a Member of the Bar. One other point must be stressed. The illness on which Abuyen's claim is based took place in 1956. Yet, — through the present case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of First Instance of Manila — petitioner has succeeded in prolonging the litigation, for the compensation involved therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more, petitioner's contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected by this Court as early as August, 1961. Then again, the compensability of Abuyen's disability had never been questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case, like the previous one, has been merely to delay, a policy "Often resorted to" —in the language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) — "as a means of draining the resources of the poorer party" — in this case atuberculosis patient — "and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion."9 Thus, the conduct of petitioner's counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same.

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent. FACTS: What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. RULING: No, the petition for certiorari was dismissed. The present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

ANGEL ALBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA, respondent. FACTS: This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. In a letter dated June 20, 1962 addressed to this Court, complainant alleged that during the Japanese occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney's fees. It was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that they as well as their coplaintiffs in the case promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-¹/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or damages. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Perpetua Coloma disbarred fro the legal profession. RULING:

No, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma, member of the Philippine Bar, is hereby dismissed. The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case "it is complainant and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who, after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for them said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, . . . ."12 He was of the opinion then that even if for purposes of said case the findings in judicial cases could not be considered binding "it is safe to conclude, from a review of the evidence in said court proceedings taken together with the evidence before us in this case, that respondent may be exonerated herein."13 With such a conclusion of the Solicitor General, this Court, to repeat, is in full agreement. Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent. FACTS: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows: Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential. Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in theTribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof. ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Estanislao Bayot committed malpractice in the legal profession. RULING: Yes, Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded. It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA, Duran & Lim for respondent. Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government. FACTS: The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, to advertise his skills as lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Atty. Luis Tagorda constitutes malpractice and warrants disciplinary action. RULING Yes, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorneyat-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929, The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to

disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics