Legal Ethics 2017 Case Digests

DE LA SALLE LIPA COLLEGE OF LAW

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

Ezekiel T. Mostiero JD 1

Atty. Mary Alice Abratigue

Professor, Legal and Judicial Ethics Marita Tolentino and Fely San Andres Vs. Sheriff IV Glenn A. Umali A.M. No. P-16-3615. January 24, 2017 Facts: Judge Corazon A. Domingo-Rañola (Judge Rañola), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 10, received separate letter-complaints from Marita Tolentino (Tolentino) and Fely San Andres (San Andres), respectively. The letter-complaints alleged that defendant Sheriff IV Glenn Umali received the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) from San Andres representing payment of the judgment debt awarded in Tolentino's favor in a criminal case then pending before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pulilan, Bulacan. It appears, however, that such amount was neither delivered to Tolentino or the clerk of court, nor was it deposited to the MTC's bank account. Thus, the letter-complaints requested a conference before Judge Rañola to resolve the issue. Subsequently, Judge Rañola held the requested conference, during which Umali agreed to pay the unremitted judgment debt on or before March 13, 2015. Thereafter, Judge Rañola reported the matter to Executive Judge Ma. Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega (Judge Arcega) of the RTC of Bulacan who then referred the Memorandum to the OCA for appropriate action. OCA: Respondent Sheriff Umali failed to comply with the rule that if the judgment obligee is not present to receive the payment, the judgment obligor shall give the payment to the sheriff. Thereafter, the sheriff shall turn over the amount paid to the clerk of court within the same day, or if the same is not possible, the sheriff shall deposit the said amount to the depository bank of the court. A misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present. Respondent Sheriff Umali may therefore be dismissed from the service. Ruling: The Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation. Under Section 46 (A)(3), Rule 10 on the Schedule of Penalties of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from service in the first instance. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and being barred from taking civil service examinations. Umali's bare assertion that his failure to turn over the judgment debt m accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court resulted from a "misunderstanding" is specious, at best. The fact that Umali did not offer any form of explanation as to the nature, cause and incidents of this so-called

misunderstanding shows that it was a mere afterthought and a lame excuse offered after his misdeed had been discovered. Moreover, while the Court is aware that it may consider circumstances to mitigate the imposable penalty prescribed under the RRACCS, no such circumstance has been invoked, nor does any appear from the records of the case. FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sheriff IV Glenn A. Umali GUILTY of grave misconduct, meriting the penalty of DISMISSAL from service, with FORFEITURE of retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, and PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or financial institution. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Executive Judge Illuminada P. Cabato, et al. A.M. No. RTJ-14-2401. January 25, 2017 Facts: Sheriff IV Oliver N. Landingin of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Baguio City, complained of bias and partiality against Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora. He submitted with the letter a video compact disc (VCD) showing two persons purportedly punching in the Daily Time Record (DTR) Bundy Cards of his other co-employees in the early hours of the morning. By doing so, Landingin alleges that it was made to appear that his co-employees arrived on time when in fact, they usually arrived late. Landingin, thus, concludes. that Judge Tabora acted with partiality by refusing to sign his DTR Bundy Card while affixing her signature on the DTR Bundy Cards of his other coemployees. The investigating team, as directed by the Office of the Court Administrator, found that instead of using the bundy clocks, the court personnel were manually entering their arrival times in their bundy clock cards and office logbooks. The team also observed that numerous court personnel were arriving after 8:00am and leaving the court premises before 5:00pm, and that instances of loafing were prevalent. The team inspected the logbooks of each and every branch/office of the Baguio courts to identify those making untruthful entries therein, thereby committing acts of dishonesty and falsification. OCA: The OCA classified the above court personnel into four (4) groups and with their corresponding penalty: 1) the personnel who have no entries in the attendance log books/sheets are administratively liable, and guilty of simple negligence 2) the personnel who have no time-outs in the attendance log books/sheets are also are administratively liable, and guilty of simple negligence 3) the personnel who made untruthful time-outs in the attendance log books/sheets are imposed with the fine of P10,000.00; 4) the Judges and the Clerks of Court who certified the DTRs of the above court personnel with penalty of suspension subject to respective respondents.

Ruling: The Court is disposed to modify the recommendations of the OCA. First and Second Group: Court Personnel who had no entries in the logbooks or did not enter their log-out. The first two (2) groups delineated by the OCA as those who had no entries in the attendance log books/sheets and those who left their offices without entering their time-outs are correctly administratively liable. They are, however, not liable for simple negligence but rather for Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. OCA Circular 7-2003 requires that: 4. Every Clerk of Court shall: 4.1. Maintain a registry book (logbook) in which all officials and employees of that court shall indicate their daily time of arrival in and departure from the office; In Contreras v. Monge, the Court classified the failure of court personnel to enter their timein and time-out in the office logbook as a light offense, to wit: Respondent was previously reprimanded in AM. No. P-05-2040. Her act of not logging in and out of the attendance logbook was, without doubt, her second violation of civil service rules. A light offense such as a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, if violated for the second time, is punishable by suspension for one to 30 days. Relevantly, Rule 10, Article 46 (F) (3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Case in the Civil Service provides: The following light offenses are punishable by reprimand for the first offense; suspension of one (1) to thirty (30) days for the second offense; and dismissal from the service for the third offense: 3. Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations; Thus, considering that the above court personnel will only be administratively liable for the first time with this case, the proper punishment for them would only be a Reprimand with a stern warning that the repetition of the same or any similar act or omission shall be dealt with more severely. Third Group: Court Personnel who made untruthful time-outs As such, the allegations of the court personnel on this matter are unmeritorious. In Flores-Tumbaga v. Tumbaga, is that: the presumption is that witnesses are not actuated by any improper motive absent any proof to the contrary and that their testimonies must accordingly be met with considerable, if not conclusive, favor under the rules of evidence because it is not expected that said witnesses would prevaricate and cause the damnation of one who

brought them no harm or injury. Thus, respondent's bare denial vis-a-vis the positive testimonies of the witnesses, the latter should prevail. Here, the OCA team reported that they conducted the roll call of the court personnel before 5:00pm and found that the above court personnel already logged their time-out as 5:00pm. There was no reason for the OCA team to falsify its report. As such, petitioners' contention herein is bereft of merit. Specifically as to Derasmo, Pasag, and Mariano, it bears noting that, after examining the Attendance - Log Sheet of RTC Branch 6 for May 5, 2011, they, along with Peralta, Ferrer, Sacpa, Fagel, and Gonzales logged time-outs of 5:00pm or after. It is, therefore, unbelievable that the OCA team would select the three court personnel at random and allege that they were no longer at the court when, in fact, they were. Respondents have not given any reason why the OCA team would do so. The same principle applies to Manipon, Eserio and Romero who argue that they were also present when the roll call was conducted by the OCA team. Again, it is illogical for the OCA team to make false allegations against them and yet say that the other court personnel of Branch 7, namely Fukai, Perez, Madayag and Pangan were present when the roll call was conducted. In People v. Villajlores, Well-entrenched is the rule that evidence should first be believable and logical before it can be accorded weight. To be given any credence, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself as a common experience and observation that mankind can deem probable under the circumstances. Thus, unless the OCA team was motivated by some reason to distinguish respondents from the other personnel, the allegations cannot be given any credit. With regard to the penalty, Office of the Court Administrator v. kasilag is relevant: Jurisprudence on this matter is clear. Falsification of a DTR by a court personnel is a grave offense. The nature of this infraction is precisely what the OCA states: the act of falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed in one act, as in this case. In the instant case, however, the Court agrees with the penalty recommended by the OCA in consonance with the ruling in Office of the Court Administrator v. Hernandez. In previous cases, the Court accorded some measure of compassion to erring employees. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Magbanua, the Court ratiocinated that the law is concerned for the working man, and respondent's unemployment would bring untold hardships and sorrows on his dependents. In addition, the Court regarded as mitigating circumstance, the fact that Magbanua had been an employee of the court since 1985.

The Court deems it proper to instead impose the fine of Five Thousand Pesos (PhP5,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely. Fourth Group: Judges and Clerks of Court that certified the DTRs of the erring court personnel As to the findings and penalties for the certifications made by the judges and clerks of court of the Baguio courts, it would be in line with jurisprudence to admonish rather than reprimand them. Verily, the abovementioned judges and clerks of court must be Admonished for their failure to properly supervise their subordinates, particularly in the logging of their attendance. Ruth B. Bawayan, Clerk of Court, Branch 4, RTC; Jerico G. Gay-Ya, Clerk of Court, Branch 61, RTC With regard to Bawayan, as discussed above, she is likewise guilty of failing to log her timein and time-out on the day of the inspection and was penalized with Reprimand. The more serious penalty shall, therefore, be imposed pursuant to Section 50, Rule 10 of the RRACCS, which states: Section 50. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. - If the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. Thus, her previous penalty of being Admonished for certifying as correct the DTRs of the erring court personnel will be absorbed by the penalty of Reprimand earlier imposed. The same principle will apply to Gay-ya who was earlier found above to have entered an untruthful time-out in the logbooks and fined the amount of PhP5,000.00. Such fine shall, therefore, absorb the penalty herein imposed. Utility Worker, Manolo V. Mariano III As to the case of Utility Worker Manolo V. Mariano III, while it may seem that his situation is similar to the OCA's second group of personnel who failed to log their time-in and time-out in the log books, the extent of the proven failure of Mariano to perform his duty differentiates his case from the others. The OCA recommends the imposition of the penalty of Suspension for ten (10) months on Mariano, following this Court ruling in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Cyril Jotic as Mariano committed a Grave Offense punishable at the first instance with dismissal from the service. This would be the first time that Mariano will be held administratively liable. As such, Mariano shall be imposed a Suspension from work of three (3) months and one (1) day with the warning that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely.

Mariano was earlier found liable for making an untruthful time-out on the date of the inspection and was Fined the amount of PhP5,000.00. Such penalty is absorbed by the imposition of the instant penalty of Suspension. Dominador B. Remiendo, Clerk Ill, Branch 7, RTC Finally, as to Clerk III Dominador B. Remiendo, he was the person identified in the videotape punching in the DTRs of his officemates. This is clearly an act of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document, both of which are grave offenses punishable in the first instance with dismissal from the service. The OCA recommends the imposition of such extreme penalty to make him a strong example to all the court personnel in the country. We disagree with this recommendation. As aptly stated by the Court in Velasco v. Obispo, dismissal should not be imposed if a less punitive penalty would suffice: The Court also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by the employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only for the law's concern for .the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners. Applying the rationale in the aforesaid judicial precedents and rules, the Court considers as mitigating circumstances the fact that this is the first infraction of Obispo and more importantly, the lack of bad faith on his part in committing the act complained of. Here, this would be the first time that Remiendo would be held administratively liable. Further, he admits his error and apologized for the same. Considering the above extenuating circumstances and following the ruling in Velasco, Remiendo is hereby Suspended for a period of six (6) months with a stern warning that a repetition of this offense shall be met with a harsher penalty. On a final note, court personnel are reminded of their sworn duty to always act with honesty, as eloquently put by this Court. In Gubatanga v. Boday: this Court will not tolerate dishonesty. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest employee, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service… It has been consistently stressed that even minor employees mirror the image of the courts they serve; thus, they are required to preserve the judiciary's good name and standing as a true temple of justice.

Silvestra Medina and Santos Medina Loraya Vs. Atty. Rufino Lizardo A.C. No. 10533. January 31, 2017 Facts: Complainant Silvestra, because of her advanced age, allegedly entrusted the owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) to respondent. However, since complainants are not the only owners of the properties covered by said TCTs, and other heirs were asking for the original duplicate copies, complainants went to the residence of Atty. Lizardo and requested the return of said TCTs. However, respondent claimed that Silvestra entrusted the TCTs to him because they sold their shares in in favor of a certain Renato Martinez (Martinez). He refused to return the subject TCTs because complainants did not secure the written consent of Martinez. Respondent notes that complainants only had a one-fourth share in the subject lots based on a compromise agreement. Complainants allegedly sold this one-fourth share to Martinez, but their co-owners resisted the transfer of the titles to said properties, forcing Silvestra and Alicia to file a Complaint for Partition. Upon the death of Alicia, her heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale wherein said heirs appear to have agreed to convey in favor of Martinez and his spouse all their shares. Complainants averred that they did not notice that the subject lots were sold together with another subject lots. Santos claims that they did not read the Extrajudicial Settlement since they trusted Atty. Lizardo to sell only one parcel of land covering 1,000 square meters to Martinez. Hence, complainant informed the Investigating Commissioner of their letter terminating the services of Atty. Lizardo as counsel for total loss of trust and confidence and prayed for the latter's disbarment. IBP: The Investigation Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. The Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and

approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thereby suspending Atty. Lizardo from the practice of law for two years. Ruling: This Court resolves to adopt with modification the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors. The main charge against Atty. Lizardo is his alleged violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. This Court has explained the test in determining whether conflicting interests are being represented in this wise: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. In the case at bar, it is undeniable that complainants Silvestra and Santos, on one hand, and Martinez, on the other, have conflicting interests with regard to the disputed property, particularly lot which complainants assert they never sold to Martinez. Atty. Lizardo now finds himself arguing against the ownership by Silvestra and Santos of their shares in the disputed property, which is the very legal position he was bound to defend as their counsel in the partition case. The Court observes that the complaint for partition in the RTC of Makati is the only case filed in court concerning the subject properties, and Atty. Lizardo is the counsel of record therein of Silvestra and Alicia. There is no mention of Martinez in said Complaint. These inactions make it hard for us to believe Atty. Lizardo's claim that Martinez engaged his services concurrently with Silvestra and Alicia in the filing of the partition case. There is no credible proof on record that Atty. Lizardo was from the beginning engaged to represent Silvestra, Alicia and Martinez as their common counsel. Respondent is required to deliver the property of his client when due or upon demand, and mandated to always be loyal to them and vigilant to protect their interests, in accordance with the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Atty. Lizardo's withholding of the TCTs entrusted to him by his clients to protect another purported client who surreptitiously acquired his services despite a conflict of interest is therefore a clear violation of several provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For this reason, we also uphold the grant of complainants' prayer for the return of the subject titles which they turned over to Atty. Lizardo for safekeeping. In any event, the return of said TCTs will not unduly prejudice Martinez who may cause his adverse claim to be duly annotated thereon. However, we refrain from passing upon the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Lizardo was guilty of deceit. The matter of fraud in the execution of said agreement which will have implications on its validity and legal effects must be first threshed out by the parties in the appropriate proceedings. We find insufficient basis to hold Atty. Lizardo liable for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 at this point in time, a lighter penalty is in order. Suspension from the practice of law for one year is sufficient in the case at bar. FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Rufino C. Lizardo GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17, and Rules 15.03 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision, ORDERS him, under pain of contempt, to return TCTs No. 3900 and 13866 to complainant Silvestra Medina within 15 days from notice of this Decision, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Eufemia A. Camino Vs. Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagui A.C. No. 11095. January 31, 2017 Facts: In a Supreme Court decision in 2011, respondent was disbarred after he was found guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct for converting the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent.

Complainant alleged that respondent violated their agreement for the latter to facilitate and secure a loan in order to finance the payment of necessary expenses to transfer the title of a certain property under her name. She claimed that respondent obtained a loan in her name and that of her husband, using their property as collateral, but Atty. Pasagui arrogated the proceeds thereof to himself. The court ruled that by his failure to make good of their agreement to use the proceeds of the loan for the transfer of the title in complainant's name, Atty. Pasagui not only betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client, but he is likewise guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct. For his acts, Atty. Pasagui degraded himself and besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession. Complainant now prays for the issuance of a Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the said judgment. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of writ of execution may be granted for enforcement of judgment; Ruling: Yes. The issuance of writ of execution may be granted for enforcement of judgment. Generally, once a judgment or order becomes final and executory, the judgment obligee may file a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in the court of origin as provided for under Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.: SEC. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. Corollarily, judgments declared to be immediately executory, as in the present case, are enforceable after their rendition. Similar to judgments or orders that become final and executory, the execution of the decision in the case at bar is already a matter of right. 4 The judgment obligee may, therefore, file a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in the court of origin as provided for under Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Guillermo P. Agloro vs Court Interpreter Leslie J. Burgos, et al. A.M. No. P-16-3550 January 31, 2017 Facts: Judge Agloro reported to respondent Judge Renato C. Francisco (EJ Francisco) of RTCMalolos that based on his own investigation, the LRC case regarding certain irregularities relative to the petition for reconstitution of four (4) transfer certificates of title, was raffled off to Branch 77 but for "unknown reason," the record of the case appeared in Branch 8. He also averred that he came to know that the registration of the entry of judgment for the order was refused by the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) because the LRC case was raffled off to Branch 77, and not to Branch 83; and that he was in a predicament because there was a pending motion for execution, yet the decision was not yet final and executory. On 2012, the new Executive Judge, Ma. Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) after she had conducted her own investigation on the personnel of the OCC and Branch 83 regarding the apparent anomalies surrounding the LRC case. She also forwarded the case folder of the LRC case from Branch 77 and the case folder from Branch 83, together with the affidavits of the court personnel. OCA: The OCA recommended the following: a) that the administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter against the respondents; b) the administrative complaint against respondent Court Interpreter Leslie Burgos, Branch 83, RTC, Malolos City, Bulacan, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence; c) in view of the death of respondent Clerk III Julieta Fajardo, same court, the administrative complaint against her be DISMISSED; d) respondent Clerk III Annaliza Santiago, same court, be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and be REPRIMANDED, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of such or any similar act shall be dealt with more severely by the Court; and e) respondent Court Stenographer Marissa M. Garcia, same court, be found GUILTY of grave misconduct, serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service. Accordingly, her retirement and other benefits may be forfeited except accrued leave credits, and be perpetually disqualified from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution; Ruling:

The Court agrees that there is a dearth of evidence to hold Burgos administratively liable. Indeed, no participation, whatsoever, relating to the subject scheme could be attributed to her. The records would also show that Burgos came to know of the misdeed only after Fajardo had reported the same to her. Thus, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the OCA that Burgos could not be made administratively liable as she could not have prevented the devious scheme by any amount of diligence. Respondent Clerk III Julieta Fajardo As regards Fajardo, jurisprudence is settled that the death of a respondent does not preclude a finding of administrative liability, subject to certain exceptions. In the case of Gonzales v. Escalona, the Court wrote: While his death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has been settled that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the respondent's case; jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case. The above rule, however, admits of exceptions. In Gonzales, citing the case of Limliman vs. Judge Ulat-Marrero, the Court held that the death of the respondent necessitated the dismissal of the administrative case upon a consideration of any of the following factors: first, if the respondent's right to due process was not observed; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, the kind of penalty imposed. In the case against Fajardo, none of the aforesaid exceptions exists. Thus, the case against Fajardo could not be dismissed merely on account of her death. Nevertheless, the Court is convinced that the case against Fajardo must be dismissed for want of evidence against her. Respondent Court Stenographer Marissa M. Garcia The Court likewise concurs with the recommendation of the OCA with respect to Garcia, but modifies its findings in the case of Santiago. The Court is convinced that Santiago is also administratively liable for grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Garcia performed numerous acts which led to no other conclusion than that she was instrumental and complicit in making sure that the petition would be granted. Garcia first approached the OCC and tried to persuade them to have the LRC case assigned to Branch 83. Her request was denied as there was a process of raffling off the cases. This, however, did not stop Garcia from pursuing her objective. When the LRC case mysteriously appeared in Branch 83, it was Garcia who practically prepared all the orders relating to the said case. More importantly, it was Garcia who prepared the draft of the order which granted the petition. Respondent Clerk III Annaliza Santiago The Court disagrees with the OCA that her acts were done in accordance with her usual daily routine. Contrary to the OCA findings, Santiago's acts, relating to the present anomaly, could not be considered as constituting simple neglect of duty because they were not committed due to carelessness and indifference, but as a result of a willful violation of the established rules. In fact, her participation was an essential part of the scheme, without which, no semblance of legitimacy could have attached to the proceedings before Branch 83 regarding the LRC case. The totality of the evidence shows that Garcia and Santiago connived to guarantee that the LRC petition would be acted on favorably.

Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty are grave offenses which merit the penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense. Such penalty shall carry with it the cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. FALLO: WHEREFORE, the complaints against respondents Leslie J. Burgos, Court Interpreter, and Julieta Fajardo, Clerk III, both of Branch 83, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondents Marissa M. Garcia, Court Stenographer, and Annaliza P. Santiago, Clerk III, both of Branch 83, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, are found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and are, thus, DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all their retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government office, including government-owned and controlled corporations. SO ORDERED.