LEGAL ETHICS - 20 Cases (Digested)

LEGAL ETHICS CASES (Case Digest) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #1 :

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. *** The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the requirement of law as having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of contracts and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Again, in the case of Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava, the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases and litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings and other similar work which involves the determination by a legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #2: PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally. ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #3: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendantappellant. G.R. No. L-19450 Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant. Paredes, J.: On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule. Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused. Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party. WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits. Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant hqXv. *** The Supreme Court held that the isolate appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists of frequents or customary actions, a succession of facts of the same kind or frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The mere appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. It is also worth noted that, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #4: JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUIG.R. NO. L-18727AUGUST 31, 1964 FACTS:Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoñaBenigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence bylegislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation.-Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, inthe order prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became theadministrator.-Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them andembodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter tothe defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and the demand nothaving been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui lateron intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui,another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation. -As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications tothe position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equalcircumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among thelegitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on

the other hand, is a member of the Bar and althoughdisbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospiciode Barili. - C o u r t a quo - decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donationand considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given astrict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by theintervenor. ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator.

(YES)

RATIO: Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not merepossession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after dueadmission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone,conferredby a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle itsholderto exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of personswho are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, andupon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as aconsequence.In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of theSupreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Barexaminations,taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificatebeing his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws initself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with therequirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all theprescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there areinstances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had notgone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Barexaminationsand to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessaryqualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such personsdo not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelorof Laws from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing testadvisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator shouldbea doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be theonewho pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for thegovernment of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids andincapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it thattherules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of theAct; and shall administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to bepresumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would beadistinct asset.Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office of administrator.As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatementtothe office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant wasrestored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previousdisbarment were wiped out.For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandsonof Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in thedeed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successivelytothe descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, heargues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenorbelongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #5: IN THE MATTER OF PREOCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VINCENTE RAUL ALMACEN G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970 FACTS:Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and

dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyer’s Certificate of Title. RULING: ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #6: IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN January 21, 1974 FACTS:Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition for relief and he alleged that the decision of the City Court was based on an admission made in open court by petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha on the basis of which the words "Confession of judgment" were written on the "expediente" of the case and underneath were affixed the signature of said petitioner and that of Atty. Felizardo de Guzman; that the alleged payments of Lagrimas Lapatha were made after the rendition of the decision to forestall immediate execution of the judgment; that when petitioner filed with the City Court a motion for reconsideration of the decision alleging fraud, the true circumstances attending the hearing of November 2, 1967, were brought out to the satisfaction of petitioner's counsel, for which reason the City Court denied the motion for reconsideration; that during the hearing on petitioner's motion for reconsideration Atty. de Guzman agreed not to press for the execution of the judgment on the assurance of petitioner that she would vacate the premises by January 15, 1968, however, petitioner did not comply with her promise and instead filed the Petition for Relief. ISSUE: Whether the petition for relief against the respondent who committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court of Manila be approved. RULING: We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the evidence is wanting" to sustain a finding that respondent committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court of Manila. In Go vs. Candoy, 19 this Court said: "It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated." WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint is dismissed and respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, is exonerated of the charge. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #7: In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao vs. Severino G. Martinez Facts: Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar. Two years later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the information in his application for such Bar Examination. Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school training, and neither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College in 1941. Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the US army, and took the General Classification Test which, according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma, although he failed to submit certification for such claim from any proper school officials. The claim was doubtlful, however, the second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain his AA degree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously certified, and asserts that he obtained his AA from Arellano University in 1949. This claim was still unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated from the University in April 1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948 (second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not have been permitted to take the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that “Previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (AA) as required by the Department of Private Education” Issue: Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred. Ruling:Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did by falsifying information. Admission under false pretenses thus give grounds for revoking his admission in the Bar, as passing the Bar Exam is not the only requirement to become an attorney at law.

Thus, the name Telesforo A. Diao is deleted from the roll of attorneys and he is required to return his law diploma within thirty days. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #8: Atty. Ismael G. Khan Jr. vs. Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo Facts: Simbillo advertised himself as an “Annulment of Marriage Specialist.” These advertisements appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and further research showed that similar advertisements were published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and 6, 2000 and in the Philippine Star in August 5, 2000. In September 1, 2000, Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of legal services, filed by Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of Public Information Office, Atty. Ismael G, Khan. Simbillo’s advertisement undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage, and violated rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court. Simbillo professed repentance and beg for the Court’s indulgence, this rings hollow as he again advertised his services in an issue of Buy and Sell Free Ads Newspaper in August 14, 2001, and again in October 5, 2001. Issue: WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of theRules of Court Rulings: Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilty, and Rule 138, section 27 of the Rules of Court, and therefore, suspended from the practice of Law for One year. Repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Held: Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely Ratio: The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the primary consideration Reasoning: -Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business - Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement orclaim regarding his qualifications or legal services. - Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.— A member of the bar may bedisbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grosslyimmoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before theadmission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. - The following elements distinguish legal profession from business: 1. A duty of public service 2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising andencroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. - Respondent advertised himself as an “Annulment Specialist,” and by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage —encouraging people whomight have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained form dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. - Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legalprofession.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #9: [A. C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005] ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent. Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case. Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor because he was too busy.” Eventually, he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services. Complainant filed this complaint but later on withdrew . Held: SUSPENDED: (1) month, with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely. Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a

manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case. Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel. “There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in this case.” --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #10: Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap, Inc. 399 SCRA 601 (2003) DOCTRINE: "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. FACTS:Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving a onestorey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila,Quezon City. Pursuant to the lease, Sulyap, Inc. paid, among others, advance rentals,association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone expenses. Upon the expiration of their lease contract, Sulyap demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues and deposit but Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money against Borja. Subsequently, the parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a “Compromise Agreement” stating that Borja is bound to pay the amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any amount due is not paid within the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month until fully paid plus 25% attorney’s fees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued as a matter of right. Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise. Sulyapfiled a writ of execution against Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja motioned to quash the writ by stating that his failure to pay the amounts within the agreed period was due to Sulyap’s fault; therefore, the penalty clause should not be imposed. Borja filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of execution and modification of the decision. This time, he contended that there was fraud in the execution of the compromise agreement. He claimed that 3 sets of compromise agreement were submitted for his approval. Among them, he allegedly chose and signed the compromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to the payment of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in case of default in payment. He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the said agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the court in order to make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein. Sulyap presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in the compromise agreement. He added that the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed by the petitioner inside the courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed that the penalty clause of 2% interest per month until full payment of the amount due, plus 25% thereof as attorney’s fees, in case of default in payment, was actually chosen by the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to the testimony of Atty. Cruz and even noted that it was more than one year from receipt of the judgment on compromise on October 25, 1995, when he questioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the approved compromise agreement despite several opportunities to raise said objection. ISSUE: Whether Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement. HELD: YES. While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground ofvitiated consent or forgery, we find that the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of fraud in the instant case. No evidence was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his former counsel fraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature to the compromise agreement submitted to the court. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the compromise agreement approved by the court. When he received the judgment reproducing the full text of the compromise agreement, to February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent inclusion of the penalty clause in their agreement. We note that petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must have read and understood the contents of

the judgment on compromise. In fact, on November 13, 1995, he filed, without the assistance of counsel, a motion praying that the amounts of P50,000.00 and 37,575.00 be withheld from his total obligation and instead be applied to the expenses for the repair of the leased premises which was allegedly vandalized by the private respondent Even assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of the said clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified.17 Indeed, petitioner’s failure to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was tantamount to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity thereof. Finally, we find no merit in petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement should be annulled because Atty. Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then an employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in the private practice of his profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited "private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. Such was never established in the instant case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #11: [A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003] LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent. FACTS: Atty. Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates that all disputes, except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong not included), between and among residents of the same city or municipality should be brought first under the system of barangay conciliation before recourse to the court can be allowed. Because of respondent’s transgressions, his client was haled to court as part-defendant. Respondent also refused to return petitioner’s money in spite of his meager service. Held: GUILTY of negligence and incompetence. SUSPENDED for (6) months. RETURN the money of complainant with interest. STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The breach of respondent’s sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards he was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently established. Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar. ***** CANON 17. – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent erred in not returning complainant’s money despite demands after his failure to file the case and his devious act of compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he has no financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of complainant’s papers. This conduct violated the following Canon: CANON 15. – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT. Rule 16.03. – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand. The failure of an attorney to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. In short, it is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #12: Adelino H. Ledesma vs Hon. Rafael C. Climaco(GR No. L-23815, June 28, 1974)

Facts: Petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. The SC found the petition without merit. As stated in the assailed order of the respondent judge, even before the petitioner accepted the appointment to the Comelec, he knew that the case was going to resume on that day, that the case has been delayed eight times at the instance of the petitioner, and that hiswork as an election registrar will not be in conflict with his serving as counsel de oficio for the said accused. The high court described the petitioner as unmindful of his work as counsel de oficio and reminded him that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions including that of being appointed counsel de oficio which makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. In the end, the Court challenged the petitioner to “exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only toerase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing” and added that “the admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in theranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.” --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #13:

CARLOS REYES vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN CELIA ARROYO-POSIDIO vs ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN VIOLETA TAHAW vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN MAR YUSON ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN

A.C. A.C. A.C. A.C.

No. No. No. No.

5835 6051 6441 6955

Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO-MORALES, VELASCO, JR.,* NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, Promulgated: August 10, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.: This refers to the undated Petition filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on July 28, 2009 by Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, praying that he be reinstated as member in good standing of the Philippine Bar and be allowed to resume the practice of law, claiming that he had already served the penalty of suspension imposed on him, and that he is now reformed. As background, four (4) administrative cases were filed against Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, in each of which he was found guilty and meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In the first case, A.C. No. 6441, (Violeta R. Tahaw v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on October 21, 2004,[1] Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6)months, effective immediately upon receipt of the Decision. He was further ordered to return the amount of P30,000 to complainant for legal services he did not render. The records disclose that respondent received the Decision on November 12, 2004 and the period of suspension would have ended on May 12, 2005. In A.C. No. 5835, (Carlos B. Reyes v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 15, 2005,[2] Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6) months; and ordered to pay complainant P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned. Per records, the Court’s decision was received by him on May 13, 2005, and his suspension would have ended on November 13, 2005. In A.C. No. 6955 (Mar Yuson v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on July 27, 2006,[3] respondent was found liable for his failure to pay a just debt in the amount of P100,000.00. Upon investigation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) imposed the penalty of Suspension for two (2) years. This was modified by the Court after finding that there was partial payment of the loan, and the penalty was reduced to six (6) months

suspension with warning, effective upon receipt of the Decision. In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the decision, asserting that there was full payment of the loan. The motion was denied in the Resolution dated March 6, 2007. In this connection, the OBC noted respondent’s shrewdness by moving out of his given address to evade receipt of the copy of the decision/resolutions of the Court. After diligent efforts at searching for respondent’s correct address proved unavailing, the Court in its Resolution dated July 17, 2007, considered the March 6, 2007 Resolution as having been served on respondent. In the decision in the fourth case, A.C. No. 6051, (Celia Arroyo-Pesidio v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 2, 2007,[4] respondent was found to have failed to render the legal services sought after he had received the amount of P100,000, and was once again, suspended for one (1) year, with stern warning. The Decision was received on April 18, 2007, so the suspension period should have lapsed on April 18, 2008. Upon the recommendation of the OBC, the four administrative cases were consolidated. [5] In a Report dated February 23, 2010, the OBC noted that respondent has been repeatedly suspended from the practice of law, for an aggregate period of 30 months or 2 ½ years. Accordingly, respondent should have served the orders of suspension successively pursuant to the Court’s resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857, entitled “Gabriel de la Paz v. Judge Santos B. Adiong,” where the Court clearly stated that “in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served successively by the erring respondent.”[6] It is, therefore, incumbent upon respondent to show to the Court that he has desisted from the practice of law for a period of at least 2 ½ years. The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios,[7] issued the guidelines on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance thereof. However, the Court will not hesitate to withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that respondent, as an officer of the Court, is still not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public. Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the Court Resolved to GRANT Respondent’s Petition for Reinstatement, effective upon his submission to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to the fact: 1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on him successively; 2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared as counsel in any court during the periods of suspension, as follows: (a) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to November 13, 2005; (b) One (1) year suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April 18, 2008; (c) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004 to May 12, 2005; and (d) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the Resolution dated March 6, 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated July 27, 2006. 3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the Court in the following cases, attaching proofs thereof: (a) In A.C. No. 5835 – the sum of P17,000 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned; and (b) In A.C. No. 6441 – the amount of P30,000. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is further directed to FURNISH copies of the Sworn Statement to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge(s), as mandated in Maniago. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the Respondent under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. SO ORDERED. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #14: Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE

AC-5365.

April 27, 2005

Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault. Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon

individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. “A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.” By taking the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent’s full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #15: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #16: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #17:

People vs de luna et al GR 10236-48

Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez. Pedro B. Ayuda. Alawadin I. Bandon. Roque J. Briones. Abraham C. Calaguas. Balbino P. Fajardo. Claro C. Gofredo. Estela R. Gordo. -took an oath as a lawyer even though they did not

Generoso H. Hubilla. Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr. Angelo T. Lopez. Eustacio de Luna. Jaime P. Marco. Santos L. Parina. Florencio P. Sugarol, and Maria Velez y Estrellas pass the bar exams. (sa notary public pa jud)

RULING: It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol, have not passed the examinations, it was resolved: A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action in connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64; B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10 days from notice thereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of the Court; C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered the oath to the said persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the pratice of law; D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Department of Justice; E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respective cases. (pp. 36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.) It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by appellees herein and that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no jurisdiction over the cases at the bar. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

#18:

Leslie Ui vs. Atty. Iris Bonifacio AC#3319 June 8, 2000

Facts: Leslie Ui and Carlos Ui were married on January 1971. On June 1988, Leslieconfronted the respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio for the illicit affair . Respondentadmitted the relationship and said that she will cut off the said relationship. OnDecember 1988 Carlos and Iris had a second child. On March 1989 complainantpleaded to respondent to stop their illicit relationship.On Atty Iris’ side, she asserts that she had no knowledge of Carlos’ previousmarriage. Carlos Ui was the one who represented himself as single during theircourtship. She submitted her Certificate of marriage dated Oct. 1985 to court. Uponthe court’s investigation it was found out that the marriage was in fact on Oct 1987. In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when shemet Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love withhim and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2)children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Iris Bonifacio is guilty of gross immoral conduct as aground for disbarment RULING: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of thisResolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supportedby the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint forGross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. IrisBonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfullyattaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning thata repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #19: Elmer Canoy, complainant v. Atty. Jose Max Ortiz, respondent 2005

A.C. No. 5485 March 16,

Facts: This is a case wherein complainant Elmer Canoy accused his former counsel, Atty. Jose Max Ortiz of misconduct and malpractice. In 1998, Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, and was represented in said case by Atty. Ortiz. Canoy, explained Ortiz, was one of his indigent clients, in that it was the latter’s practice since commencing his practice of law to cater to indigent and law-income clients. In the labor case against CCBP filed with the National Labor Relations Commission, the labor arbiter ordered the parties to submit their respective petition papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Canoy made several follow-ups with the office of his attorney, said visits were unfruitful until it came to his knowledge on 2000, upon inquiring with the NLRC itself, that his complaint was already dismissed way back in 1998 for failure to prosecute because the parties did not submit their position papers. Atty. Canoy further claimed that Atty. Ortiz never informed him about the status of his case nor of the fact that he failed to submit the position paper. In his Comment, Atty. Ortiz admitted to not being able to submit the position paper because the period within which to file it lapsed already, with arbiter already dismissing the case, but reasoned out that his election as a Councilor of Bacolod City made him very preoccupied with his functions. His duties as a public servant and a lawyer are “beyond physical limitation”, said Atty. Ortiz, so he had to withdraw from his other cases. He also claimed of not being able to remember whether he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, but recalled of Canoy conveying that he already has a lawyer to handle the case. Hence, his office did not insist on refiling the case. Atty Ortiz also pointed out that the dismissal of Canoy’s complaint was without prejudice. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ortiz is guilty of misconduct and malpractice Ruling:Upon investigation of the case, the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesconcluded that clearly “Atty. Ortiz failed to exercise the degree of competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting his client” and recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded. The Supreme Court, however, finds the recommended penalty of the IBP too lenent and instead suspended Atty. Ortize from the practice of law for one month, in lieu of the admonition or reprimand. According to the Court, Atty Ortiz several canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Specifically, Atty. Ortiz was guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of the Code, which states, “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable,” on account of his failure to file the position paper on time, tantamount to neglecting a legal mater entrusted to him. That the case was dismissed without prejudice does not mitigate his liability. Further, Ortiz also violated Rule 22.02, which states,“A laywer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.” Therefore, even if Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services due to his elective position, he should have coordinated with the new council of Canoy and turned over to the latter all papers and property which the Client is entitled and should have cooperated with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, as per Rule 22.02.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #20: Laput vs. Remotigue , J. (En Banc)

6 SCRA 45(A.M. No. 219, 29 September 1962)

LABRADOR,

FACTS: Petitioner ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT charge respondents ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG with unprofessional and unethicalconduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer. In May 1952, Nieves RillasV d a . d e B a r r e r a r e t a i n e d p e t i t i o n e r A t t y . L a p u t t o h a n d l e h e r " T e s t a t e E s t a t e o f M a c a r i o Barrera" case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan. 1955, petitioner had prepared two pleadings: (1) closing of administration proceedings, and (2) rendering of final accounting and partition of said estate.Mrs. Barrera did not countersign both pleadings. Petitioner found out later that respondentAtty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written appearance as the new counsel for Mrs.Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955, petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as Mrs. Barrera’scounsel.Petitioner alleged that: (1) respondents’ appearances were unethical and improper; (2) theymade Mrs. Barrera sign documents revoking the petitioner’s “Power of Attorney" purportedly todisauthorize him from further collecting and receiving dividends of the estate from Mr. MacarioBarrera’s corporations, and make him appear as a dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted byhis client; and (3) Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to petitioner. Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that when he entered his appearance on 11 Jan. 1955Mrs. Barrera had already lost confidence in her lawyer, and had already filed a pleading discharging his services. The other respondent Atty. Remotigue answered that when he filedhis appearance on 7 Feb. 1955, the petitioner had already withdrawn as counsel. The SC referred the case to the SolGen for investigation, report and recommendation. Thelatter recommended the complete exoneration of respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of unprofessional andunethical conduct in soliciting cases. RULING: No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counselfor Mrs. Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a case from petitioner because Atty.Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow. Besides, the petitioner'svoluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing almost simultaneously of a motion for thepayment of his attorney's fees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug ascounsel for the widow. The S C a l s o h e l d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t A t t y . R e m o t i g u e w a s a l s o n o t g u i l t y o f u n p r o f e s s i o n a l cond uct in as much as he entered his appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955, only on 7 February 1955,after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and after petitionerhad voluntarily withdrawn his appearance.As to Atty. Patalinghug’s preparation of documents revoking the petitioner’s power of attorney,the SolGen found that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurtpetitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix.Case dismissed and closed for no sufficient evidence submitted to sustain the charges. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------