Legal Ethics 2 Full Text, 2 Case Digest

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 516

June 27, 1967

TRANQUILINO O. CALO, JR., petitioner, vs. ESTEBAN DEGAMO, respondent. Teodoro O. Calo, Jr. for complainant. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Pedro A,. Ramirez for investigators. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Disbarment proceedings against the respondent Esteban Degamo 1 upon a verified letter-complaint of the petitioner, Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., filed with this Court on 2 March 1962, and charging the former with "having committed false statement under oath or perjury" in connection with his appointment as Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan. On 12 March 1962, this Court required the respondent to file "an answer (not a motion to dismiss.) After interposing an unsuccessful motion for a bill of particulars, he filed his answer on 29 May 1962 and this Court accordingly referred the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the Solicitor General referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan. The fiscal conducted an investigation. The petitioner adduced evidence, but not the respondent, because on the date set for hearing, on 25 July 1964, following several postponements, the respondent failed to attend, despite due notice, for which reason the investigating fiscal considered the respondent as having waived his right to present evidence. Thereafter, the fiscal forwarded the record of the investigation to the Solicitor General. On the basis thereof, the Solicitor General filed his report and a complaint with this Court, recommending the disbarment of the respondent, for gross misconduct. No evidence having been submitted by the respondent, the following facts are either unrebutted or admitted: On 17 January 1959, respondent Esteban Degamo, as an applicant to the position of Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan, subscribed and swore to a filled-out "Information Sheet" before Mayor Jose Malimit of the same municipality. The sheet called for answers about name, personal circumstances, educational attainment, civil service eligibility and so forth. One item required to be filled out reads: Criminal or police record, if any, including those which did not reach the Court. (State the details of case and the final outcome.)" — to which respondent answered, "None." Having accomplished the form, the respondent was appointed by the mayor to the position applied for. However, on the day the respondent swore to the information sheet, there was pending against him, and two (2) other co-accused, a criminal case in the Court of First Instance of Bohol (No. 2646) for illegal possession of explosive powder.2

Prior to the commencement of this administrative case, the respondent was also charged in an information, dated 23 September 1960, for perjury, in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2194, on the same facts upon which he is now proceeded against as a member of the Philippine bar. In his defense, the respondent claims that his answer "None" to the aforequoted questionnaire was made in good faith, it being his honest interpretation of the particular question (heretofore quoted) that it referred to a final judgment or conviction and that Criminal Case No. 2646 was not a criminal or police record.1äwphï1.ñët The defense is plainly untenable. The questionnaire was simple, couched in ordinary terms and devoid of legalism hence, it needed no interpretation. It only called for simple information. That it asked for records "whichdid not reach the Court" entirely disproves respondent's technical twist to the question as referring to final judgments or convictions. Petitioner's letter-complaint was filed on 2 March 1962 while the act of the respondent complained of was committed on 17 January 1959. Without explaining how and upon what authority, respondent invokes the defense of prescription. This defense does not lie; the rule is that — The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding, . . . (5 Am. Jur. 434). Nor is the pendency of Criminal Case No. 2194 (for perjury) a prejudicial question, since the ground for disbarment in the present proceeding is not for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude but for gross misconduct. A violation of a criminal law is not a bar to disbarment (6 Moran 242, 1963 Ed., citing the case of In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577), and an acquittal is no obstacle to cancellation of the lawyer's license. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399). Respondent Degamo stresses that there is no cause of action against him because the information sheet is not required by law but only by the Civil Service Commission. This argument is beside the point. The issue is whether or not he acted honestly when he denied under oath the existence against him of any criminal or police record, including those that did not reach the court. In this, he did not tell the truth. He deliberately concealed it in order to secure an appointment in his own favor. He, therefore, failed to maintain that high degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, 27 April 1963; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, 28 Dec. 1956; Bolivar vs. Simbol, Adm. Case No. 377, 29 April 1966 **), and he has violated his oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood". It needs no reiteration that the ethical standards applicable to a member of the bar, who thereby automatically becomes a court officer, must necessarily be one higher than that of the market place. The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent's insistence upon patent technical excuses disentitle him to leniency from his Court. For the foregoing reasons, respondent Esteban Degamo is hereby disbarred, and his name ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

DIR OF LEGAL AFFAIRS V BAYOT

FACTS:  Bayot was charged with malpractice by publishing “Marriagelicense promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation

on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.” In the Sunday Tribune  Bayot first denied the publication but later on admitted, and asked for mitigation saying: o I only did it once. I won’t repeat it again! o I never had any case by reason of the publication ISSUE: WoN Bayot can be charged with malpractice? HELD: YES. 1. The publication is tantamount to a solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. 2. In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent. Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3910

June 28, 2001

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents. RESOLUTION DE LEON, JR., J.: On August 14, 2000, a Decision was rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case, finding respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. guilty of gross misconduct. The dispositive portion of the Court's Decision reads: WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latter's TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. From the afore-quoted Decision respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. seeks this reconsideration. The finding of guilt for gross misconduct was based on the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon whom the case was referred for investigation. We again quote the said findings for emphasis: Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission's full faith and credence. Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts. FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the subject property to the respondent.

This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property. SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral "giving" of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that. THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and Exh. "A-2" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wife's signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned. FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the respondent and Exh. "A-3" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense. 1 We remain convinced that respondent was remiss in his duty to abide by his sworn oath as a member of the bar to "do no falsehood nor consent to its commission"2 and further violated the mandate of his profession to "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." 3 In the instant case, after a review of the records, we note that this is the first and only administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Villalon in his long career as a member of the bar. At one time, he was even the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Manila 1 Chapter, and as such he introduced various programs to uphold the confidence of the public in the integrity of the legal profession and to uplift the welfare of his brethren. Furthermore, it appears that as

of July 8, 1997, respondent Atty. Villalon already returned to the complainant himself the owner's duplicate of the subject TCT No. M-3023 and the complainant acknowledged receipt4 thereof, thus there is a need to delete the directive to deliver the said TCT from the Court's Decision. Hence, we agree to reduce the penalty imposed on respondent Atty. Villalon. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and MODIFIES the Decision dated August 14, 2000 in that respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS only with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. The directive in the Decision to deliver TCT No. M-3023 to complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. is DELETED, the delivery thereof having been accomplished as of July 8, 1997. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Integrated Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Resolution. March 18, 1954.]In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., Facts:

The Congress passed Republic Act 972, also known to be the controversial Bar Flunker’s Act of 1953 Which has the title “An Act To Fix The Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and Including1955”. Section 1 of said Republic Act provides that any bar candidate who obtained the following general average in their corresponding bar examination year, without obtaining a grade below 50% in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: from 1946 to 195170%; 1952- 71%; 1953- 72%; 1954- 73%; and 1955- 74%. Section 2 of said Republic Act provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventyfive per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take. 1,094 examinees will be benefited by the Republic Act. Petitions were filed, however, questioning the validity of Republic Act 972. Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 972 is CONSTITUTIONAL. Held: The Court held Republic Act 972 to be partly constitutional, declaring the portion in Section 1referring to the 1946 to 1952 examinations and all of Section 2 as unconstitutional, and declaring the remaining portions of the law as valid and shall continue in force. First of all, Republic Act 972 was passed to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation because of the aftermath of the Japanese occupation. The Court declared some parts unconstitutional because:1. Its declared purpose is to admit candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner, and this is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.2. It is a judgment revoking the resolution of the Court on the petitions of the 810 candidates without having examined their respective examination papers. In attempting to do it directly, Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.3. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and these are just considered minimum norms. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly class legislation.5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void. Because of lack of votes, the portion pertaining to the 1953-1955 is declared valid and shall continue in force.