latest jurisprudence in conflicts of law

LATEST JURISPRUDENCE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Submitted by:

Angela B. Lumabas Conflicts of Law 3-5 pm 2nd Semester S.Y. 2015-2016

Submitted to: Atty. Cecilio Duka

1. Forum Non Conveniens Raytheon International Inc., vs. Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., February 26, 2008 FACTS: Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract. On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution became final and executory on 09 November 1998. In its Answer, petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. , the RTC denied petitioner’s omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non conveniens was

inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground of Forum Non Conveniens. RULING: Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court. That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved. Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.

Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are binding on this Court. 2. Center of Gravity Doctrine Orion Savings Bank v. Shigekane Suzuki, November 12, 2014 FACTS: In 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki , a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang , a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186] and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118] were for sale for P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to P2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as reservation fee. On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another check, BPI Check No. 83350, this time for P2,700,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2003 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit. Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to

deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds. To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated September 8, 2003, with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason. On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of P1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago dated February 2, 2003, in favour of Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003 In its decision dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City ruled infavor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki. The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s. The RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of the properties but he did not find any existing encumbrance in the titles. The CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses; RULING: Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property- Center of Gravity Doctrine Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court. To consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition. It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.

Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted. On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum. Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

3. Theory of Comity Marcos v Republic, March 12, 2014 FACTS:

On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379. The said Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name "Arelma, Inc.," which maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for the purpose of hiding illgotten wealth. Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. acknowledges that "the subject matter of the case (i.e. the power/authority to determine whether an asset may be forfeited under R.A. 1379) is within the (Sandiganbayan’s) jurisdiction."However, he objects to the graft court’s purported lack of territorial jurisdiction on the theory that forfeiture is an action in rem. He argues that the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds before the judgment may be enforced. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the Arelma proceeds, which are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States. RULING: The Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the

intent of the forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the reach of the courts and their recovery by the State. Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that: Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all new. As early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court held: "In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law.” The Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the foreign court agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in light of its assertion of sovereign immunity:

(The Republic's) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it has asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to amass a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the recent determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the money that was deposited in the Arelma brokerage account. Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment against the estate of Marcos to be executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the Philippines could irreparably undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets. The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition because it has a significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over property that may have been stolen from its public treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of the Republic. The high courts of the United States, the Philippines and Switzerland have clearly explained in decisions related to this case that wresting control over these matters from the Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity and reciprocal diplomatic selfinterests. These statements made by the foreign court; based on principles of comity and reciprocity, are highlighted if only to assuage petitioner's concerns on the effective enforcement of the Decision and this Resolution. 4. Theory of Vested Rights

Lamangan et al. v. Hon. Santiago Javier Ranada, April 12, 2005 On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court, District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international law. These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable. Respondents submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in this case. It urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered, ordering the enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in another country. The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of vested rights. The US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996. On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages. They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the US District Court of Hawaii can be enforced by the Makati RTC.

RULING: Yes, by virtue of plaintiffs’ vested rights granted by the judgment of the US District Court of Hawaii and by virtue of the generally accepted principles of International law. There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. 5. Conditions for recognition of foreign judgment and Nature and Proof of Foreign Judgment A. Minoru Fujiki vs. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, June 26, 2013 Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can seek recognition and enforcement of the judgment of divorce rendered by the Japanese Court and whether he has standing to enforce such/ RULING:

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. B. St. Aviation Services co. vs Grand International Airways, October 23, 2006 FACTS: St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd., petitioner, is a foreign corporation based in Singapore. It is engaged in the manufacture, repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. Grand International Airways, Inc., respondent, is a domestic corporation engaged in airline operations. Sometime in January 1996, petitioner and respondent executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification of Airbus A 300 B4-103 Aircraft Registration No. RP-C8882"

Under this stipulation, petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and modification works on respondent's aircraft. The parties agreed on the mode and manner of payment by respondent of the contract price, including interest in case of default. They also agreed that the "construction, validity and performance thereof" shall be governed by the laws of Singapore. They further agreed to submit any suit arising from their agreement to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts. Petitioner undertook the contracted works and thereafter promptly delivered the aircrafts to respondent. During the period from March 1996 to October 1997, petitioner billed respondent in the total amount of US$303,731.67 or S$452,560.18. But despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent failed to pay, in violation of the terms agreed upon. On December 12, 1997, petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore an action for the sum of S$452,560.18, including interest and costs, against respondent, docketed as Suit No. 2101. Upon petitioner's motion, the court issued a Writ of Summons to be served extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent. The court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect service of the summons upon respondent. However, despite receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the claim. On February 17, 1998, on motion of petitioner, the Singapore High Court rendered a judgment by default against respondent. On August 4, 1998, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 117, Pasay City, a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1389. ISSUES: (1) whether the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the service of summons upon its office in the Philippines; and (2) whether the judgment by default in Suit No. 2101 by the Singapore High Court is enforceable in the Philippines.

RULING: Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our legal system are contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. – The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. 6. Local Law and Personal Law Norma Del Socorro vs. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, December 10, 2014 FACTS: Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never

gave support to the son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent under Article 195 of the Civil Code. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is obliged to give support to his son under Philippine Laws RULING: While petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. The Civil Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree). True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 7. Nationality and Citizenship, RA 9225, RA9139, Commonwealth Act 473

A. Casan Macode Maquiling vs COMELEC, April 16, 2013 FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division of the COMELEC disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen due to the fact that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises: By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again. The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen after the use of his American Passport RULING: The Supreme Court agrees with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship. B. Teodora Sobejana-Condon vs. COMELEC, August 10, 2012 FACTS: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,

Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010. Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship The trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be

sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the trial court’s decision. ISSUES: 1. Whether or non-compliance of the provisions of RA 9225 rendered petitioner ineligible to run and hold public office. 2. Whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement. RULING: Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus: “Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic”. To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her

submission on the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225. At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court’s duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. C. Dennis L. Go vs. Republic of the Philippines, July 2, 2014 FACTS: On October 13, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act (C.A.)No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, with the RTC. On September 11, 2003, the RTC set the initial hearing of his petition on August 17, 2004. During the hearings, petitioner testified to prove his compliance with all the requirements for naturalization and presented his witnesses, Dr. Joseph Anlacan, Dr. Edward C. Tordesillas, Silvino J. Ong, Teresita M. Go ,and Juan C. Go Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he conducted on petitioner, he had no psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test.

After petitioner presented his evidence and formally offered the same, the Republic, through the OSG, posed no objection as to the relevancy and competence of his documentary evidence. The OSG further manifested that it had no evidence to present and requested that the case be submitted for decision based on petitioner’s evidence.7 The OSG, however, later moved for the reopening of trial for the admission of its documentary evidence. It informed the RTC that it had received a report, dated November 23,2006, issued by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), tending to prove petitioner’s non-compliance with the requirements of the law on naturalization. On April 3, 2007, petitioner manifested to the RTC that he had a clearance issued by the NBI as proof of his lack of criminal record, and that he was not the same Dennis Go who was the subject of the NBI Investigation Report being offered in evidence by the OSG. After the conduct of a clarificatory hearing, the RTC issued its October 24, 2008 Order10 admitting the evidence adduced by both parties, but denying the motion of the OSG to re-open trial. On November 18, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization ruling that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth by law. Among these were petitioner’s lack of a derogatory record, his support for an organized government, his being in perfect health, his mingling with Filipinos since birth and his ability to speak their language, and his being a law abiding citizen. The RTC likewise found that petitioner presented convincing evidence that he was not disqualified for naturalization

Not in conformity, the OSG moved for reconsideration and the reopening of trial for the second time. This time, it sought to be admitted, as evidence, a background investigation report issued by the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) stating the following reasons to oppose the petition, among others: that petitioner’s parents remained as Chinese citizens up to the present; that petitioner’s aunt arrogantly refused to allow them to engage in an interview while at their residence; and that the retail business of petitioner’s family must be subjected to an investigation for unexplained wealth and tax deficiencies.On May 18, 2009, after an exchange of pleadings by the parties, the RTC denied the OSG’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. In its assailed decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed, without prejudice, the petition for naturalization. According to the CA, while there was sufficient evidence from which petitioner’s ability to write English or any of the principal Philippine languages, may be inferred, he failed to adduce evidence to prove that his witnesses were credible. He was not able to prove that the persons he presented in court had good standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word could be taken at face value, as a good warranty of his worthiness. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner has substantially complied with the requirements for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473. And RA 9139. RULING: Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil and political rights

subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community. The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens. Among those listed are citizens by naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the issuance of the proper naturalization certificate and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and issue a certificate of naturalization. In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation. Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and formal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations

The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioner’s witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence proving that the persons he presented were credible. In the words of the CA, "he did not prove that his witnesses had good standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word may be taken at face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of petitioner." While there is no showing that petitioner’s witnesses were of doubtful moral inclinations, there was likewise no indication that they were persons whose qualifications were at par with the requirements of the law on naturalization. Simply put, no evidence was ever proffered to prove the witnesses’ good standing in the community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a consequence, their statements about the petitioner do not possess the measure of "credibility" demanded of in naturalization cases. This lack of "credibility" on the part of the witnesses, unfortunately, weakens or renders futile petitioner’s claim of worthiness. An applicant for Philippine citizenship would carefully testify as to his qualifications, placing emphasis on his good traits and character. This is expected of a person who longs to gain benefits and advantages that Philippine citizenship bestows. Therefore, a serious assessment of an applicant’s witnesses, both as to the credibility of their person and their very testimony, is an essential facet of naturalization proceedings that may not be brushed aside. Further, petitioner’s witnesses only averred general statements without specifying acts or events that would exhibit petitioner’s traits worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship. For instance, a statement in their affidavits as to petitioner’s adherence to the principles underlying the

Philippine Constitution is not evidence, per se, of petitioner’s agreement and zeal to Philippine ideals. These appear to be empty declarations if not coming from credible witnesses. It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding that the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses only proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos. While almost all of the witnesses testified that they knew petitioner since birth and that they had interacted with petitioner’s family in times of celebration, this did not satisfy the other requirements set by law, that is, a genuine desire to learn and embrace the Filipino ideals and traditions. Besides, both the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt on petitioner’s alleged social interaction with Filipinos. The background checks done on petitioner yielded negative results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members of his household. In fact, petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents. To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner failed to prove that he has all the qualifications entitling him to the grant of Philippine citizenship. Filipino citizenship is predicated upon oneness with the Filipino people. It is indispensable that an applicant for naturalization shows his identification with the Philippines as a country deserving of his wholehearted allegiance. Until there is a positive and unequivocal showing that this is so in the case of petitioner, the Court must selfishly decline to confer Philippine citizenship on one who remains an alien in principles and sentiment. E. Edison So vs. Republic of the Philippines, January 29, 2007 FACTS:

On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. The RTC granted the petition after due hearing and substantial compliance by petitioner. The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period required by law, and they had affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his petition with evidence. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the decision to the CA. Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2) character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his fitness to become a Filipino citizen; they merely made general statements without giving specific details about his character and moral conduct. The witnesses did not even reside in the same place as petitioner. Respondent likewise argued that petitioner himself failed to prove that he is qualified to become a Filipino citizen because he did not give any explanation or specific answers to the questions propounded by his lawyer. He merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave general statements in answer to his counsel’s questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to prove that he had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. In its Decision dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for naturalization without prejudice. According to the CA, petitioner’s two (2) witnesses were not credible because they failed to mention specific details of petitioner’s life or character

to show how well they knew him; they merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their applicability to petitioner’s case. The appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002, petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling short of the requirement. The CA stated, however, that it was not its intention to forever close the door to any future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and that it believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country. Respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which took effect on August 8, 2001 and where the applicant’s age requirement was lowered to eighteen (18) years old), refers only to administrative naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization; it does not apply to judicial naturalization before the court, as in the present case. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act RULING: The petition is denied for lack of merit. Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as

amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. Petitioner’s contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should possess are those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines. These however, do not justify petitioner’s contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for naturalization by judicial act. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing

from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available. Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473. 8. Status and Capacity Republic of the Philippines vs. Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, August 12, 2013 FACTS: On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted. However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC. The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a

Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in affirming the RTC’s decision RULING: Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. 9. Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (RA 9189) Loida Nicolas-Lewis et al. Vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement

prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus. ISSUE: Whether or not those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. RULING: With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.

It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation. 10. Domicile Mayor Jose Ugdoracion Jr. vs COMELEC, April 18, 2008 FACTS: Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007 elections. Both filed their respective Certificates of Candidacy (COC).On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that Ugdoracion's declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation because Ugdoracion is actually a "green card" holder or a permanent resident of the United States of America (USA). Specifically, Ugdoracion stated in his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines for forty-one years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country.It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on September 26, 2001. Accordingly, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Services (USINS) issued him Alien Number 047-894-254.

For his part, Ugdoracion argued that, in our jurisdiction, domicile is equivalent to residence, and he retained his domicile of origin (Albuquerque, Bohol) notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of permanent residency in the USA. Ugdoracion then pointed to the following documents as proof of his substantial compliance with the residency requirement: (1) a residence certificate dated May 5, 2006; (2) an application for a new voter's registration dated October 12, 2006; and (3) a photocopy of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status dated October 18, 2006. On May 8, 2007, the COMELEC First Division promulgated one of the herein questioned resolutions canceling Ugdoracion's COC and removing his name from the certified list of candidates for the position of Mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. Posthaste, on May 11, 2007, Ugdoracion filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution arguing in the main that his status as a "green card" holder was not of his own making but a mere offshoot of a petition filed by his sister. He admitted his intermittent travels to the USA, but only to visit his siblings, and short working stint thereat to cover his subsistence for the duration of his stay.In yet another setback, the COMELEC En Banc issued the other questioned resolution denying Ugdoracion's motion for reconsideration and affirming the First Division's finding of material misrepresentation in Ugdoracion's COC. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in canceling Ugdoracion's COC for material misrepresentation. RULING:

There is no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's cancellation of Ugdoracion's COC for material misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petition must fail. Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in unmistakable terms, requires that the facts stated in the COC must be true, and any false representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for cancellation thereof, thus: SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election. The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code pertains to material fact, and is not simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate's qualification for elective office such as one's citizenship and residence Ugdoracion's assertions miss the mark completely. The dust had long settled over the implications of a "green card" holder status on an elective official's qualification for public office. We ruled in Caasi v. Court of Appeals that a Filipino citizen's acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. In short, the "green card" status in the USA is a renunciation of one's status as a resident of the Philippines.

Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention. In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties' naturally conflicting perspectives on domicile, we are guided by three basic rules, namely: (1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time. The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with such purpose. In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion's acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status in the United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA. 11. Renvoi Doctrine Paula Llorente vs CA and Alicia Llorente, November 23, 2000 FACTS: Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through

naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Law shall apply. RULING: Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.

The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. 12. Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (RA 8552) and Inter Country Adoption Act of 1998 (RA 8043) Herbert Cang vs. CA, September 25, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children. Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children. Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then

directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of adoption. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by law.The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. RULING:

In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioner's "meager" financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the children was not exactly the "paramount consideration" that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption. The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998": (a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality. (b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in

accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child. (c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s). Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to instant case are the following provisions: States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests. A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts with both parents . . . States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.

Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-à-visthat of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible. Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was filed. Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them. 13. Annulment, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris vs. Brix Ferraris, July 17, 2006 FACTS: Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple’s relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brix’ fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to

withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brix’s “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarrelled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family. ISSUE: Whether or not Psychological Incapacity is attendant in the case at bar. HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarrelled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the expert was not able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder “can be part of his family upbringing” She stated that there was a history of Brix’s parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is of course inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case at bar.

The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.