Land Titles Digest Part 2

LAND TITLES DIGEST PART 2 INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS TO PD 957 ATTY G: INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS -starts with attachment (begins at the inception of the case) -levy of execution is only upon finality of case (to satisfy the judgment debt) -sec 71 of pd 1529 (surrender of duplicate certificate in involuntary dealings) rod shall inform the court of his refusal to surrender certificate of title, the court may require the owner to surrender certificate, but even if duplicate certificate is not surrendered, the involuntary dealing that was registered remains to be binding and valid; purpose is for memorandum to be annotated at the back of title -sec 107 of pd 1529 (surrender of withheld duplicate certificate of title) purpose is to issue a new title in favor of the prevailing party; provides remedy in cases of refusal of registered owner for the purpose of issuance of new title in favor of the prevailing party -sec 75 of pd 1529 (note: case of padilla) -sec 78 of pd 1529 (judgment for plaintiff and judgment adjudicating ownership) by annotation only, that the plaintiff is now declared owner (there is no issuance yet) -sec 79 there is need to issue title in favour of plaintiff thus the need for writ of execution issued by court -sec 80 (execution of deed by virtue of judgment) SAJONAS VS CA FACTS: Spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential land to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis. Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property. Upon full payment of purchase price, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Sajonas couple. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after. Domingo Pilares filed a civil case for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. Upon failure of Uychocde to comply with a compromise agreement, a writ of execution was issued in favour of Pilares. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title issued to the spouses Sajonas. The Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution but Pilares refused to cancel. The trial court ruled in favor of the Sajonas couple stating that: actual notice of an adverse claim is equivalent to registration and the subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any legal effect in any respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim annotated on the title of the Uychocdes. Upon appeal, the appellate court reversed the lower court's decision, and upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title. ISSUE: Who among the parties in suit has a better right over the property in question. HELD: Petitioners derive their claim from the right of ownership arising from a perfected contract of absolute sale between them and the registered owners of the property, such right being attested to by the notice of adverse claim; Respondent on the other hand, claims the right to levy on the property, and have it sold on execution to satisfy his judgment credit, arising from Civil Case against Uychocdes from whom petitioners derived their title. Annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof. The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.

Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title. Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many cases coming before us, the same, however, does not fit in the case at bar. While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale. The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title still in force when private respondent caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said title, considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it was annotated? This is a decisive factor in the resolution of this instant case. If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are charged with knowledge of pre-existing interest over the subject property, and thus, petitioners are entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the certificate of title. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides: The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration." At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads: After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest. If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony. To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim. In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon the execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof.

Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners. To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a long time to complete payments on their property, convinced that their interest was amply protected by the inscribed adverse claim. At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of registered land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and all prior claims, liens an encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly mentioned in the ACT as having been reserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would be futile and nugatory. ATTY G: 30-day period not provided for by Act 496, noticed that this is prone to abuse. The idea was to make the adverse claim only as a preliminary step before filing a case in court. What are you going to prove for cancellation? That the 30-day period has already lapsed. Basis of adverse claim a) must have claim or interest apart from registered owner, b) accrued after original registration, c) no provision under PD 1529 to register such claim or interest It boils down to who registered first. Court gave credence to adverse claim of Sajonas, making it superior than the levy filed by Pilares. RODRIGUEZ VS CA FACTS: Respondent spouses Calingo were the registered owners of a house and lot. The property was mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines, which mortgage was later absorbed by the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF) or Pag-ibig. Respondents Calingo and respondent respondents Barrameda entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage where the former sold to the latter the property in question and the latter assumed to pay the outstanding loan balance to the Development Bank of the Philippines. Respondents Barrameda filed with the Register of Deeds of Parañaque an affidavit of adverse claim on the property. The adverse claim was inscribed at the back of the certificate of title. Spouses Barrameda also wrote HDMF informing the office that they have purchased the subject property from the Calingo spouses and that they filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Parañaque. They also moved into the property. A notice of levy with attachment on real property by virtue of a writ of execution was annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the property in question. The writ of execution was issued by Judge Salvador Abad Santos in connection with civil case involving a claim by herein petitioners, Spouses Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez, against respondents Calingo. Respondents Barrameda completed payment to Calingo and the latter guaranteed that the property was clear and free from any liens and encumbrances, except the real estate mortgage assumed by respondents Barrameda. Respondents Barrameda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a petition for quieting of title with prayer for preliminary injunction. The petition prayed, among others, that the execution sale of the property be enjoined, the notice of levy and attachment inscribed on the certificate of title be cancelled, and that respondents Barrameda be declared the lawful and sole owners of the property in question. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, stating that the annotation of respondents Barrameda’s adverse claim at the back of the certificate of title was insufficient to establish their claim over the property. It said that respondents Barrameda, as buyers of the property, should have registered the title in

their names. Furthermore, respondents Barrameda’s adverse claim had lost its efficacy after the lapse of thirty days in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial court and held that respondents Barrameda’s adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title was still effective at the time the property was levied on execution. ISSUE: Whether respondents Barrameda’s adverse claim on the property should prevail over the levy on execution issued by another court in satisfaction of a judgment against respondents Calingo. HELD: We hold that it cannot. It is admitted in this case that the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was not registered, but instead, respondents Barrameda filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. The question now is whether the adverse claim is sufficient to bind third parties such as herein petitioners. In the case at bar, the reason given for the non-registration of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was that the owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title was in the possession of HMDF. It was not shown, however, that either respondents Barrameda or respondents Calingo exerted any effort to retrieve the owner’s duplicate copy from the HMDF for the purpose of registering the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. In fact, the parties did not even seek to obtain the consent of, much less inform, the HMDF of the sale of the property. This, despite the provision in the contract of mortgage prohibiting the mortgagor (respondents Calingo) from selling or disposing the property without the written consent of the mortgagee. Again, we stress that the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the law on registration of real property. Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is clear: Sec. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. xxx The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by respondents Calingo and Barrameda is a registrable instrument. In order to bind third parties, it must be registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. It was not shown in this case that there was justifiable reason why the deed could not be registered. Hence, the remedy of adverse claim cannot substitute for registration. The petition is granted. ATTY G: it must be shown that effort must have been exerted to retrieve the owner’s duplicate copy to whomsoever is in possession of such. Note: when adverse claim is available as a remedy ( PADILLA JR VS PHIL . PRODUCER’S COOPERATIVE FACTS: Petitioner and his wife are the registered owners of real properties. Respondent is a marketing cooperative which had a money claim against petitioner. Respondent filed a civil case against petitioner for collection of a sum of money in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. But herein petitioner failed to file an answer, thus was declared in default and the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The court issued

a writ of execution and the properties were levied. The lots were auctioned and the respondent was the only bidder. A certificate of sale was issued to respondent and such was registered in the Register of Deeds. Petitioner failed to exercise his right of redemption (12-month period), thus a writ of possession was issued to cause the delivery of the physical possession of the properties in favor of respondent. Respondent filed a motion to direct the Register of Deeds to issue new titles over the properties in its name, alleging that the Register of Deeds (RD) of Bago City would not issue new titles (in respondent’s name) unless the owner’s copies were first surrendered to him. Respondent countered that such surrender was impossible because this was an involuntary sale and the owner’s copies were with petitioner. The trial court granted the motion and the appellate court affirmed it. ISSUE: (1) whether or not respondent’s right to have new titles issued in its name is now barred by prescription (2) whether or not the motion in question is the proper remedy for cancelling petitioner’s certificates of title and new ones issued in its name. HELD: On the first issue, we rule that the respondent’s right to petition the court for the issuance of new certificates of title has not yet prescribed. It is settled that execution is enforced by the fact of levy and sale. The right acquired by the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate and does not become absolute until after the expiration of the redemption period without the right of redemption having been exercised. The fact of levy and sale constitutes execution, and not the action for the issuance of a new title. Here, because the levy and sale of the properties took place in June and July of 1990, respectively, or less than a year after the decision became final and executory, the respondent clearly exercised its rights in timely fashion. On the other hand, the issue of whether to acquire new titles by mere motion or through a separate petition is an entirely different matter. Petitioner is correct in assailing as improper respondent’s filing of a mere motion for the cancellation of the old TCTs and the issuance of new ones as a result of petitioner’s refusal to surrender his owner’s duplicate TCTs. Indeed, this called for a separate cadastral action initiated via petition. The proper course of action was to file a petition in court, rather than merely move, for the issuance of new titles. Section 75 of PD 1529 provides: Sec. 75. Application for new certificate upon expiration of redemption period.—Upon the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for redemption after the registered land has been sold on execution, or taken or sold for the enforcement of a lien of any description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser at such sale or anyone claiming under him may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate to him. Before the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such proceedings. It is clear that PD 1529 provides the solution to respondent’s quandary. The reasons behind the law make a lot of sense; it provides due process to a registered landowner (in this case the petitioner) and prevents the fraudulent or mistaken conveyance of land, the value of which may exceed the judgment obligation. In any event, respondent can still file the proper petition with the cadastral court for the issuance of new titles in its name. Wherefore, the petition is granted. ATTY G: Steps leading to issuance of title pursuant to levy on execution: 1. Levy on execution (issued by court; annotated) 2. Certificate of sale (result of auction sale; right of highest bidder is still inchoate because there is right of redemption available to judgment debtor to redeem property within 12 months; take note that at this stage, ROD is already mandated to notify the registered owner to surrender the duplicate’s copy for the purpose of registration; even if ROD fails to comply with required notification, the validity of the

involuntary transaction presented for registration is valid because entry in the primary entry book is sufficient to comply with the requirement) 3. Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale (after lapse of redemption period; highest bidder is considered to have absolute title over property) 4. File petition in court for issuance of new certificate of title (pursuant to Sec 75 of pd 1529) VIEWMASTER CONSTRUCTION VS MAULIT, ET AL A notice of lis pendens may be registered when an action or a proceeding directly affects the title to the land or the buildings thereon; or the possession, the use or the occupation thereof. Hence, the registration of such notice should tbe allowed if the litigation involves the enforcement of an agreement for the codevelopment of a parcel of land. FACTS: The subject property is known as the Las Piñas property registered in the name of Peltan Development Inc. (now State Properties Corporation). The Chiong/Roxas family decided to give control and ownership over the said corporations to only one member of the family, through the process of bidding among the family members, the bidder who acquires 51% or more of the said companies shall be deemed the winner. Defendant Allen Roxas, one of the stockholders of State Investment Trust, Inc. applied for a loan with First Metro Investment, Inc. (First Metro for brevity) to participate in the bidding. First Metro granted Alien Roxas' loan application without collateral provided, however, that he procure a guarantor/surety/solidary co-debtor to secure the payment of the said loan. Petitioner Viewmaster agreed to act as guarantor for the aforementioned loan in consideration for its participation in a Joint Venture Project to co-develop the real estate assets of State Investment Trust, Inc. After a series of negotiations, petitioner Viewmaster and defendant Allen Roxas agreed that should the latter prevail and win in the bidding, he shall sell to petitioner fifty percent (50%) of the total eventual acquisitions of shares of and stock in the State Investment Trust, Inc., at a purchase price equivalent to the successful bid price per share plus an additional ten percent (10%) per share. Roxas won the bid but he failed to take the necessary action to implement the Joint Venture Project with petitioner Viewmaster to co-develop the subject properties. Petitioner Viewmaster filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Las Piñas for the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on Transfer Certificate of Title No. (S-17992) 12473-A, registered in the name of Peltan Development, Inc. (now State Properties Corporation). The respondent Register of Deeds of Las Piñas denied the request for annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. The Respondent Land Registration Authority issued the assailed Resolution holding that petitioner's "Notice of Lis Pendens" was not registrable. The CA upheld the ruling of the LRA. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner failed to adequately describe the subject property in its complaint and in the notice of lis pendens. Whether or not the Las Piñas property is directly involved in Civil Case HELD: Description of Property As earlier noted, a copy of the TCT was attached to and made an integral part of both documents. Consequently, the notice of lis pendens submitted for registration, taken as a whole, leaves no doubt as to the identity of the property, the technical description of which appears on the attached TCT. We stress that the main purpose of the requirement that the notice should contain a technical description of the property is to ensure that the same can be distinguished and readily identified. In this case, we agree with petitioner that there was substantial compliance with this requirement. Property Directly Involved

A notice of lis pendens, which literally means "pending suit," may involve actions that deal not only with the title or possession of a property, but even with the use or occupation thereof. Thus, Section 76 of PD 1529 reads: Sec. 76. Notice of lis pendens. — No action to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered. According to Section 24, Rule 14 13 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz.: a) An action to recover possession of real estate; b) An action to quiet title thereto; c) An action to remove clouds thereon; d) An action for partition; and e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. This Court further declared that the rule of lis pendens applied to suits brought "to establish an equitable estate, interest, or right in specific real property or to enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against it . . . ." Thus, this Court observed that the said notice pertained to the following: . . . all suits or actions which directly affect real property and not only those which involve the question of title, but also those which are brought to establish an equitable estate, interest, or right, in specific real property or to enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against it, there being in some cases a lis pendens, although at the commencement of the suit there is no present vested interest, claim, or lien in or on the property which it seeks to charge. It has also been held to apply in the core of a proceeding to declare an absolute deed of mortgage, or to redeem from a foreclosure sale, or to establish a trust, or to suits for the settlement and adjustment of partnership interests. To repeat, the co-development is not merely auxiliary or incidental to the purchase of the shares; it is a distinct consideration for Viewmaster's guaranty. Hence, by virtue of the alleged agreement with Allen Roxas, petitioner has a direct — not merely incidental — interest in the Las Piñas property. The Court must stress that the purpose of lis pendens is (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the registration thereof 18 and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation. 19 One who deals with property subject of a notice of lis pendens cannot acquire better rights than those of his predecessors-ininterest. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. Purchasers pendente lite of the property subject of the litigation after the notice of lis pendens is inscribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds are bound by the judgment against their predecessors. Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying only on the Certificate of Title would be deemed a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the supposed rights of petitioner cannot be enforced, because the former is not bound by the property owner's undertakings not annotated in the TCT. Verily, there is no requirement that the right to or the interest in the property subject of a lis pendens be proven by the applicant. The Rule merely requires that an affirmative relief be claimed. 24 A notation of lis

pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. applicant's rights, which will be determined during the trial.

25

It merely protects the

ATTY G: What is established here is enforcement of joint-venture agreement which is well within the definition of notice of lis pendens. ATLANTIC ERECTORS VS HERBAL COVE REALTY The pendency of a simple collection suit arising from the alleged nonpayment of construction services, materials, unrealized income and damages does not justify the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the title to a property where construction has been done. FACTS: respondent] and [petitioner] entered into a Construction Contract whereby the former agreed to construct four (4) units of [townhouses]. The contract period is 180 days. Petitioner] claimed that the said period was not followed due to reasons attributable to [respondent], namely: suspension orders, additional works, force majeure, and unjustifiable acts of omission or delay on the part of said [respondent]. [Respondent], however, denied such claim and instead pointed to [petitioner] as having exceeded the 180 day contract period aggravated by defective workmanship and utilization of materials which are not in compliance with specifications. petitioner] filed a complaint for sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 97-2707) with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioner filed a notice of lis pendens for annotation of the pendency of Civil Case No. 97-707 on titles TCTs nos. T-30228, 30229, 30230, 30231 and 30232. When the lots covered by said titles were subsequently subdivided into 50 lots, the notices of lis pendens were carried over to the titles of the subdivided lots. respondent] filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens. It argued that the notices of lis pendens are without basis because [petitioner's] action is a purely personal action to collect a sum of money and recover damages. RTC judge granted motion to cancel notice of lis pendens. Subsequently, the judge reversed said order and reinstated the notices of lis pendens. The CA set aside the order and granted the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. ISSUE: Whether or not money claims representing cost of materials for and labor on the houses constructed on a property [are] a proper lien for annotation of lis pendens on the property title Whether or not the trial court, after having declared itself without jurisdiction to try the case, may still decide on the substantial issue of the case. HELD: Proper Basis for a Notice of Lis Pendens As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are as follows: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action for partition; and (c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon or the use or the occupation thereof.10 Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or possession of real property. This annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it. Apparently, petitioner proceeds on the premise that its money claim involves the enforcement of a lien. However, a careful examination of petitioner's Complaint, as well as the reliefs it seeks, reveals that no such lien or interest over the property was ever alleged. The Complaint merely asked for the payment of construction services and materials plus damages, without mentioning -- much less asserting -- a lien or an encumbrance over the property. Verily, it was a purely personal action and a simple collection case. It did

not contain any material averment of any enforceable right, interest or lien in connection with the subject property. As it is, petitioner's money claim cannot be characterized as an action that involves the enforcement of a lien or an encumbrance, one that would thus warrant the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. Indeed, the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Even assuming that petitioner had sufficiently alleged such lien or encumbrance in its Complaint, the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens would still be unjustified, because a complaint for collection and damages is not the proper mode for the enforcement of a contractor's lien. Narciso Peña, a leading authority on the subject of land titles and registration, gives an explicit exposition on the inapplicability of the doctrine of lis pendens to certain actions and proceedings that specifically include money claims. He explains in this wise: "By express provision of law, the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to attachments, levies of execution, or to proceedings for the probate of wills, or for administration of the estate of deceased persons in the Court of First Instance. Also, it is held generally that the doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be incidentally affected. It is essential that the property be directly affected, as where the relief sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession to specific property, or requiring its transfer or sale" 17 (Emphasis supplied) Peña adds that even if a party initially avails itself of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing of a case in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action. We quote him as follows: "It may be possible also that the case when commenced may justify a resort to lis pendens, but during the progress thereof, it develops to be purely a personal action for damages or otherwise. In such event, the notice of lis pendens has become functus officio."18 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, when a complaint or an action is determined by the courts to be in personam, the rationale for or purpose of the notice of lis pendens ceases to exist. To be sure, this Court has expressly and categorically declared that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on titles to properties is not proper in cases wherein the proceedings instituted are actions in personam. Jurisdiction of the Trial Court On the basis of the foregoing rule, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case only on August 31, 1998, when petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal.20 Thus, any order issued by the RTC prior to that date should be considered valid, because the court still had jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, it still had the authority or jurisdiction to issue the July 30, 1998 Order canceling the Notice of Lis Pendens. On the other hand, the November 4, 1998 Order that set aside the July 30, 1998 Order and reinstated that Notice should be considered without force and effect, because it was issued by the trial court after it had already lost jurisdiction. Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which governs appeals from regional trial courts, expressly provides that RTCs lose jurisdiction over a case when an appeal is filed. In any case, even if we were to adopt petitioner's theory that both the July 30, 1998 and the November 4, 1998 Orders were void for having been issued without jurisdiction, the annotation is still improper for lack of factual and legal bases.

PINEDA VS ARCALAS FACTS: The subject property consists of three parcels of land registered in the name of spouses Lateo. A certain Victoria Tolentino bought the said property from the Spouses Lateo. Sometime later, a civil case for Sum of Money, was instituted by Arcalas against Victoria Tolentino. This case stemmed from an indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note and four post-dated checks later dishonored, which Victoria Tolentino owed Arcalas.

The Quezon City RTC rendered judgment in favor of Arcalas. Meanwhile, Pineda bought the subject property from Victoria L. Tolentino. Pineda alleged that upon payment of the purchase price, she took possession of the subject property but failed to register the subject property under her name. To execute the judgment, the Quezon City RTC levied upon the subject property and the Notice of Levy on Alias Writ of Execution was annotated at the back of the TCT. Asserting ownership of the subject property, Pineda filed with the Deputy Sheriff of the Quezon City RTC an Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim but the RTC set aside the said affidavit. After the finality of the Order of the Quezon City RTC quashing Pineda’s third-party claim, Pineda filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna another Affidavit of Third Party Claim and caused the inscription of a notice of adverse claim at the back of TCT. Arcalas purchased the subject property at an auction evidenced by a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, and filed an action for the cancellation of the entry of Pineda’s adverse claim before the Laguna RTC which was granted by the said trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. ISSUE: WHETHER THE LEVY ON ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE MAY EXEMPT THE PORTION BOUGHT BY PINEDA FROM VICTORIA TOLENTINO WHETHER THE POSSESSION OF [PINEDA] OF THE 5 HECTARES PORTION OF LOT 3762 IS ALREADY EQUIVALENT TO A TITLE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF REGISTRATION. HELD: This petition must be dismissed. Pineda avers that she is not a party to civil case and that the levy on the alias writ of execution issued cannot affect her purchase of subject property. Such position runs contrary to law and jurisprudence. Sections 51 and 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provide that: Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.—An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies. (Emphasis provided.) Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration.—Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering. It is clear from these provisions that before a purchaser of land causes the registration of the transfer of the subject property in her favor, third persons, such as Arcalas, cannot be bound thereby. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a person’s interest in real property is the registration of the deed. As the deed of sale was unrecorded, it operates merely as a contract between the parties, namely Victoria Tolentino as seller and Pineda as buyer, which may be enforceable against Victoria Tolentino through a separate and independent action. On the other hand, Arcalas’s lien was registered and annotated at the back of the title of the subject property and accordingly amounted to a constructive notice thereof to all persons. The doctrine is well settled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. A registered lien is entitled to preferential consideration. The Court held that a registered writ of attachment was a superior lien over that on an unregistered deed of sale because an attachment is a proceeding in rem.

TOLEDO BANAGA VS CA FACTS: Banaga filed an action for redemption, but the trial court declared that she had lost her right to redeem. So, the property was foreclosed and sold at public auction. Banaga caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens. She, then, appealed and the CA reversed the trial court judgment and granted Banaga a certain period to redeem. The lower court ordered the cancellation of private respondents’ certificates of title and issue new ones in the name of Banaga. Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and caused the annotation of a 2nd notice of lis pendens. Petitioner Banaga sold the subject property to petitioner Tan with the deed of absolute sale mentioning private respondent's certificate of title which was not yet cancelled. Notwithstanding the notice of lis pendens, petitioner Tan subdivided the property in question under a subdivision plan, which she made not in her name but in the name of private respondent. Tan asked the Register of Deeds to issue new titles in her name, which was granted but still carried the two notices of lis pendens. The CA rendered decision declaring private respondent as owner of the property and ordered the RD to reinstate the titles in private respondent’s name. The RD refused stating that the certificate of titles of Tan must first be surrendered. Private respondent sought to cite the RD in contempt, but the trial court denied such ruling that his remedy is by consulta to the Commissioner on Land Registration. On appeal, the CA ruled in favour of private respondents. ISSUE: Whether not Tan is a buyer in good faith Whether or not the refusal of the RD on the reason that the certificates of title of Tan must first be surrendered is justified HELD: The Court is not convinced of the arguments proffered by petitioners. Such issue had already been clearly and categorically ruled upon by the CA and affirmed by this Court, wherein private respondent was adjudged the rightful and absolute owner thereof. The decision in that case bars a further repeated consideration of the very same issue that has already been settled with finality. Under the principle of res judicata, the Court and the parties, are bound by such final decision, otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. They argue that the winning party must wait execution until the losing party has complied with the formality of surrender of the duplicate title. Such preposterous contention borders on the absurd and has no place in our legal system. The surrender of the duplicate is implied from the executory decision since petitioners themselves were parties thereto. Besides, as part of the execution process, it is a ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name of a certain person, especially when the decision had attained finality, as in this case. At the time of the sale, the person from whom petitioner Tan bought the property is neither the registered owner nor was the former authorized by the latter to sell the same. She knew she was not dealing with the registered owner or a representative of the latter. One who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of his vendor is enough proof of his bad faith 27 and cannot claim that he acquired title in good faith as against the owner or of an interest therein. Being a buyer in bad faith, petitioner Tan cannot acquire a better rights than her predecessor in interest, 31 for she merely stepped into the shoes of the latter. ATTY G:

In almost all cases involving issuance of title in favour of someone else, there is that requirement of surrender of owner’s duplicate copy of title, but this rule admits of certain exceptions. In Padilla, it was levy on execution (property was made to answer for an obligation or judgment debt, the property or title itself was not subject matter of case but was made only to answer for a judgment debt). In Toledo-Banaga, title itself is subject matter of litigation (this case one of the exception where it is not necessary for the surrender of owner’s duplicate copy of title). Instances where surrender of owner’s duplicate copy of title not necessary (Toledo-Banaga case): 1. Final and executory decision 2. Subject matter of litigation is the property itself 3. One of the parties to the case is the registered owner

DBP VS BAUTISTA FACTS: Lourdes Gaspar Bautista applied to the Government for the sale favor of a parcel of land. After proper investigation, Sales Patent covering said property was issued in her favor by the Director of Lands, and was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, as a result of which Original Certificate of Title was issued in her favor. Said parcel of land was offered as security when Bautista applied for a loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor in interest of the plaintiff-appellee Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). On the basis of the documents mentioned and the appraisal of the property by its appraiser, the RFC approved a loan of P4,000.00 in favor of Bautista and a mortgage contract was executed. Bautista failed to pay the amortization on the loan so that the RFC took steps to foreclose the mortgage extra-judicially. In the auction sale, RFC acquired the property being the highest bidder and upon failure on the part of Bautista to redeem, consolidated ownership thereon. On or about this time, however, an action (Civil Case No. 870) was filed by Rufino Ramos and Juan Ramos in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the RFC (as successor in interest of Bautista) claiming ownership of the land in question. A decision was titled declaring the certificates of title issued to Bautista, Republic and RFC as null and void. Thus, the Development Bank of the Philippines now appellant, filed a complaint against one of its debtors, Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, now appellee, for the recovery of a sum of money representing the unpaid mortgage indebtedness. ISSUE: What is the right, if any, of a creditor which previously satisfied its claim by foreclosing extrajudicially on a mortgage executed by the debtor, whose title was thereafter nullified in a judicial proceeding where she was not brought in as a party? HELD: As the action there was one to annual the title, it was an action strictly in personam, if that was the case as it was, the judgment there could not in any way bind Lourdes who had not acquired in said decision in any way for what only happened is that as to the mortgage, the Bank foreclosed, and then sold unto Conrada and when the title had been annulled, the Bank reimbursed Conrada; stated otherwise, the annulment of Lourdes' title was a proceeding ex parte as far as she was concerned and could not bind her at all; and her mortgage was foreclosed and the Bank realized on it, when the Bank afterwards acquiesced in the annulment of the title and took it upon itself to reimburse Conrada, the Bank was acting on its own peril because it could not have by that, bound Lourdes at all. After appellant bank had acquired her title by such extrajudicial foreclosure sale and thus, through its own act, seen to it that her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive the same on the allegation that the title in question was subsequently annulled, considering that she was not made a party on the occasion of such nullification. In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines were likewise made defendants by appellant bank because of its belief that if no right existed as against appellee Bautista, recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund. Such a belief finds no support in the applicable, law, which allows recovery only upon a showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest therein by the operation of

the Land Registration Act.8 This certainly is not the case here, plaintiff-appellant being solely responsible for the light in which it now finds itself. Accordingly, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines are likewise exempt from any liability.

TORRES VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The parcel of land and the building erected thereon known as "M. Torres Building" is owned by Mariano Torres. Torres was and still is in possession of the realties, holding safely to his owner's duplicate certificate of title, and, at least until 1971, paying the real estate taxes due thereon, and collecting rentals from his tenants occupying the building. Francisco Fernandez, Torres' brother-in-law, misrepresenting to be the attorney-in-fact of Torres and falsely alleging that the duplicate copy of TCT was lost, succeeded in obtaining a court order for the issuance of another copy of the certificate. Once in possession thereof, Fernandez forged a simulated deed of sale of the realties in his favor. Fernandez mortgaged the realties to the Cues. Torres, upon learning of the fraud committed by Fernandez the annotation on the latter's TCT a notice of adverse claim. Torres filed a civil case against Fernandez to annul the TCT. In the meantime, Fernandez failed to pay his various loans which prompted the Cues to institute an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. After the foreclosure was enjoined, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, approved by the court whereby it was stipulated that Fernandez acknowledged and promised to pay his debt. Before Fernandez could pay his obligation under the settlement agreement, a decision was rendered in Civil Case whereby it held that the TCT issued in the name of Fernandez is void. But meanwhile, prior to the Court of Appeals' decision mentioned above, Fernandez failed to comply with his obligation under the amicable settlement and whereupon the Cues applied for and were granted a writ of execution. The properties were sold to Mota being the highest bidder. She then proceeded to collect the rentals from the tenants on the building situated in said parcel of land. ISSUE: Whose right will prevail over the subject parcel of land? Torres, the original and true owner, or Mota, seeking to be considered as innocent mortgagee? HELD: There is nothing on the records which shows that Torres performed any act or omission which could have jeopardized his peaceful dominion over his realties. Even if we grant Mota the status of an innocent mortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title, cannot be applied where the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same interest in a realty. The doctrine would apply rather when the forger thru insidious means obtains the owner's duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his name, and subsequently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent holder for value, for in such a case the new certificate is binding upon the owner. But if the owner holds a valid and existing certificate of title, his would be indefeasible as against the whole world, and not that of the innocent holder's. "Prior tempore potior jure" In view of the foregoing, to hold, for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage, that Mota was an innocent mortgagee would be futile because, as above shown, no certificate of title covering the subject realties in derogation of Torres' certificate of title may validly be issued.

LAHORA VS DAYANG HIRANG FACTS: On 26 November 1965 herein appellants petitioned the Court of First Instance of Davao for registration of nine (9) parcels of land, one-half of which having been acquired by appellant Toribia Moralizon allegedly by inheritance, and the other half by purchase and by continuous, open, public and adverse possession in the concept of owner. One of the lands is identified as Lot 2228. The petition was opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang, Jr., who alleged that lands belonging to him and his wife were included in the application for

registration, mentioning specifically Lot No. 2228. Counsel for the private oppositor filed a motion praying that the petition be dismissed insofar as it includes Lot No. 2228, for the reason that said lot was already registered and titled in the name of oppositor's wife. The court granted the oppositor's motion and directed the dismissal of the petition as regards Lot No. 2228, on the ground that it having been previously registered and titled, said parcel of land can no longer be the subject of adjudication in another proceeding. ISSUE: Whether or not Lot 2228 may be included in the application for registration filed by the Lahoras HELD: It may be recalled that the action filed by petitioners-appellants in the lower court was for original registration of certain parcels of land, including Lot No. 2228. It is not here denied by appellants that said Lot No. 2228 was the subject of a public land grant in favor of the oppositor's wife. Appellants, however, contend that the patent issued to oppositor's wife was procured by fraud. Thus, according to appellants, since they were the actual occupants of the property, the government could not have awarded it to oppositor's wife. The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act1, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. 2 In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding. In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of oppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier. Clearly, appellants' petition for registration of the same parcel of land can no longer prosper. Even assuming arguendo, that there indeed exists a proper case for cancellation of the patent for intrinsic fraud, the action for review of the decree should have been filed before the one year period had elapsed. 6 Thereafter, the proper party to bring the action would only be the person prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act. TAGUINOD VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated PD 27 for the emancipation of tenant-farmers from private agricultural lands they till that are primarily devoted to rice and corn. DAR launched Operation Land Transfer (OLT) to implement the law. When OLT was launched, Salud Alvarez Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots. The TCTs over the two lots were issued based on homestead patents. The first TCT was transferred to Vic Aguila (who was then 14 yrs old), and the second TCT was transferred to Josephine Taguinod. Both lots were placed under coverage of OLT. Salud Aguila, on behalf of Vic Aguila, filed a notice for retention. When Vic Aguila became of age, he filed a notice for exemption. Taguinod also filed a notice for exemption. Meanwhile, the two subject lots were surveyed and a subdivision plan of the lots parceled to the farmerbeneficiaries was prepared and approved. The DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) recommended to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) the approval of the applications of Salud A. Aguila/Vic A. Aguila and Josephine A. Taguinod for retention of rights. The PARO granted the application for retention rights. Respondents-farmer-beneficiaries opposed the decision. The RD affirmed the PARO’s decision but stated that the transfer made by Salud Aguila to petitioners is null and void, but that Salud Aguila should be granted the retention rights. Private respondents opposed this decision. Taguinod also filed a motion contending that Aguila was not the real owner of the land as such was by Taguinod from her biological mother and that the same was only mortgaged to Aguila which property she had already redeemed. The DAR Secretary affirmed the decision of the RD and denied Taguinod’s motion. Upon motion for reconsideration, the DAR Secretary ruled that Salud Aguila was disqualified in retention rights because she owned several other properties. Petitioners appealed to the Office of the President. The OP ruled that the said lots, having stemmed from homestead patents, are exempt from the coverage of PD 27. On appeal, the CA ruled in favour of private respondents. The CA however agreed with the OP that the rights of the homesteader and his/her heirs to own and cultivate personally their land acquired under the "homestead

laws" are superior over those of tenants invoking the "agrarian reform laws”. However, it found that petitioners Taguinod and Aguila failed to discharge the burden of adducing evidence to prove the identities of the original homestead patentees and that they are the direct compulsory heirs of the original patentees. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lands are exempted from coverage of PD 27 HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. Settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that the rights of a holder of a homestead patent are superior over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform Law. We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus, "The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life’s other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as x x x human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people’s happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right." It is therefore incumbent upon petitioners to identify substantial evidence on record to support the OP’s finding that their lots are excluded from the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. In fact, as aptly put by private respondents, petitioners never averred before the DAR and OP that Salud Aguila was the original homestead patentee or a direct compulsory heir of the homestead patentee. Without any substantial evidence that would show that petitioner Aguila or Salud Aguila was entitled to the exemption pursuant to the homestead laws, the lot is indubitably under the coverage of the OLT.More importantly, the records are bereft of any showing that petitioner Taguinod had indeed repurchased or redeemed subject property from landowner Salud Aguila. Thus, absent any evidence to the contrary, the lot is still owned by the owner of record, Salud Aguila. LIGON VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: IDP (Islamic Directorate of the Phils) sold to INK (Iglesia Ni Kristo) 2 parcels of land. . The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-five (45) days from the execution of the contract. IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply with its obligation. IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of INK. INK, then, filed a motion praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. The trial court rendered decision ordering Ligon to surrender the duplicate copies to INK. This was subsequently amended and Ligon was ordered to surrender such copies to the Register of Deeds. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to order the surrender of the owner’s duplicate copies Whether or not INK is entitled to the owner’s duplicate copies HELD: Jurisdiction of RTC

Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states that the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The principal action filed by INK before the trial court was for specific performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such action was well within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court. When INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case. Right of INC over the owner’s duplicate copies The order of the trial court directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. 9 It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition and compel INK to file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the trial court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be avoided. OLIVA VS REPUBLIC FACTS: Petitioner Doris Chiongbian-Oliva is the registered owner of a parcel of land. This title originated from a free patent granted CA No. 141. The free patent contained the condition that a 40-meter legal easement from the bank of any river or stream shall be preserved as permanent timberland. Petitioner filed a petition for reduction of legal easement alleging that the property is residential thus the applicable easement should be 3meters. The DENR countered that the property is inalienable. It also claimed that the applicant agreed on the forty-meter legal easement when the free patent was applied for. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. It upheld the DENR’s claim that the property was inalienable. ISSUE: Is the property public or private land? Is the applicable legal easement forty or three meters? HELD: The property is a private land Only alienable or disposable lands may be disposed of through any of the forms of concession enumerated in the law.14 A free patent is one of such concessions 15 and once it is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property. Verily, by the issuance of a free patent, the property in this case had become private land. It is inconsistent for an alienable land of the public domain to be covered by a free patent and at the same time retain its character as public land.

The applicable legal easement is 3 meters Since the property in this case was originally alienable land of the public domain, the application for free patent contained the condition that a forty-meter legal easement from the banks on each side of any river or stream found on the land shall be demarcated and preserved as permanent timberland. However, after the property was administratively titled, it underwent several surveys for purposes of subdivision, consolidation, or consolidation-subdivision. Thus, presently only three meters is required to be demarcated and preserved as permanent timberland.

CAMBRIDGE REALTY VS ERIDANUS DEVT ISSUE: Whether there is overlapping of boundaries HELD: There is one serious flaw that the trial court committed: its failure to require the court-appointed surveyors - considering that there are quite a number of irregularities in the certificates of title of the parties. The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering. The very reason why commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis of the titles in conflict with each other. Given their background, expertise and experience, these commissioners are in a better position to determine which of the titles is valid. ATTY G: BLLM is the valid survey recognized by MLS (manual of land surveys). PLS (Public Land Survey), used by Nerit, is not recognized as valid reference point in manual of land surveys. One of the surveyors said that there is only technical overlapping. SC not prepared to determine overlapping for want of authority in deciding since SC is not a trier of facts. FELICIANO VS ZALDIVAR FACTS: Remegia Y. Feliciano filed against the spouses Aurelio and Luz Zaldivar a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title and reconveyance of the property. The said title is registered in the name of Aurelio Zaldivar. In her complaint, Remegia alleged that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land. Aurelio, allegedly through fraud, was able to obtain TCT covering a portion of Remegia’s lot. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Remegia. It declared that TCT in the name of Aurelio was null and void for having been obtained through misrepresentation, fraud or evident bad faith by claiming in his affidavit that Remegia’s title had been lost, when in fact it still existed. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of the spouses Zaldivar. ISSUE: Whether the certificate of title in the name of Zaldivar is null and void HELD: The Court finds the petition meritorious. It should be recalled that respondent Aurelio Zaldivar filed with the then CFI of Misamis Oriental a petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy, alleging that the owner’s duplicate copy was lost. CFI granted the petition and consequently, a new owner’s duplicate copy was issued. However, the trial court ruled that the CFI did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It has been held that “when the owner’s duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original certificate. In such a case, the

decision authorizing the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate of title may be attacked any time.” The new owner’s duplicate issued by the CFI upon the petition filed by respondent Aurelio is thus void. Consequently, the court a quo correctly nullified TCT in Aurelio’s name, emanating as it did from the new owner’s duplicate, which Aurelio procured through fraud. Respondent Aurelio cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of title because "the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud."15 As such, a title issued based on void documents may be annulled. ROLANDO LIM FACTS: Lim filed in the RTC his petition for judicial reconstitution of two TCTs of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, and for the issuance of owner’s duplicate copies of said TCTs. He alleged that the original copies of the TCTs and the originals of the owner’s duplicate copies of the TCTs were lost or destroyed in a fire. In view of the report of the LRA that the subject titles are also applied for reconstitution of titles under Administrative Reconstitution Proceedings, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition, it appearing that there is forum-shopping in the instant case, considering further the strict requirements of the law on the reconstitution of titles. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of petitioner applying for judicial reconstitution over titles which may be administratively reconstituted is proper and whether this would constitute forum shopping HELD: Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.10 The petition has merit. Lim was not guilty of forum shopping, because the factual bases of his application for the administrative reconstitution of the TCTs and of his petition for their judicial reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought were not identical. When he applied for the administrative reconstitution in the LRA on July 1988,11 he still had his co-owner’s duplicate copies of the TCTs in his possession, but by the time the LRA resolved his application on November 1998, allowing the relief prayed for,12 his co-owner’s duplicate copies of the TCTs had meanwhile been destroyed by fire. The RTC should have also noted soon enough that his resort to judicial reconstitution was not because his earlier resort to administrative reconstitution had been denied (in fact, the LRA had resolved in his favor), 17 but because the intervening loss to fire of the only permissible basis for administrative reconstitution of the TCTs mandated his resort to the RTC. The petition for judicial reconstitution and the application for administrative reconstitution addressed different situations and did not have identical bases. ATTY G: Application of RA 6732. Only basis is owners’ duplicate copy of title. Lim originally filed reconstitution because his copy of title was there, but subsequently his office got burned so he lost his duplicate copy. Since he cannot pursue his reconstitution (since duplicate copy needs to be surrendered), he opted to file a judicial reconstitution. When report of LRA was submitted to court, but lower court dismissed on ground of forum-shopping upon receipt of information that administrative reconstitution was filed. SC said there was no forum-shopping since it was a different petition was filed. When he lost his duplicate copy, he can no longer pursue the administrative reconstitution, but only judicial reconstitution. CANERO VS UP FACTS:

Cañero filed a petition for reconstitution of title of a lot. They alleged that the lot had been registered in their name, but the original copy of the TCT had been lost when the Quezon City Hall was razed by a fire. Sometime later, petitioner received information that respondent UP had claimed title and secured a tax declaration in its name for the said lot. Petitioner filed an action 16 to quiet the title. Respondent UP filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that it had been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the said lot from the year 1914. The trial court rendered judgment in favour of Canero. But this reversed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lot is owned by UP HELD: We rule that the lot subject of the case at bar belongs to respondent UP. In numerous earlier jurisprudence, we have held that this subject lot is part of the mass of land owned by respondent UP. It is judicial notice that the legitimacy of UP's title has been settled in several other cases decided by this Court. We rule that the appellate court is correct in holding that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint to quiet title. Petitioner’s reconstituted title is his basis for filing the action to quiet title against respondent UP. The reconstituted title and the proceedings from which it hailed from are, however, void. R.A. No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing but not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is an absolute absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. When a judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction and its nullity is shown by virtue of its own recitals, it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. We further note that even if the subject lot had not already been registered in the name of respondent UP, still the reconstitution proceedings are void for lack of notice to adjoining property owners. Judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration proceeding. Thus, notice of the proceedings must be given in the manner set forth by the letter of the law. 34 A cursory perusal of the petition for reconstitution35 filed by petitioner, clearly reveals that the adjoining property owners were never mentioned and, hence, not notified. As early as the case of Manila Railroad Company vs. Moya,37 we had already ruled that if no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if, otherwise, the said order should have been final and executory. The rule is rightly so because one who seeks the reconstitution of his title to property is duty-bound to know who are the occupants, possessors thereof, or persons having an interest in the property involved, specially where the property is so vast and situated in a suitable residential and commercial location, where buildings and improvements have been or are being constructed openly and publicly. We strongly admonish courts and unscrupulous lawyers to stop entertaining spurious cases seeking further to assail respondent UP’s title. These cases open the dissolute avenues of graft to unscrupulous land-grabbers who prey like vultures upon the campus of respondent UP. By such actions, they wittingly or unwittingly aid the hucksters who want to earn a quick buck by misleading the gullible to buy the Philippine counterpart of the proverbial London Bridge. It is well past time for courts and lawyers to cease wasting their time and resources on these worthless causes and take judicial notice of the fact that respondent UP’s title had already been validated countless times by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such doctrine is to be viewed as a deliberate intent to sabotage the rule of law and will no longer be countenanced.

HEIRS OF VENTURANZA VS REPUBLIC FACTS: The title in question – TCT No. 2574 of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur – was issued sometime in 1959 in the name of Gregorio Venturanza. The government’s negotiation committee assigned a deputy

clerk of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) to verify the true copies of TCT No. 2574 in the name of Gregorio Venturanza. Upon verification, it was discovered that the title covers only a parcel of land with an area of 451 square meters and not 23,944,635 square meters. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a complaint for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2574 and the Reversion of the Land Described Therein to the Republic of the Philippines. The trial court came out with its decision ordering the annulment and cancellation of the Venturanzas’ TCT. The trial court principally anchored its judgment on the ground that the reconstituted title issued in the name of Florencio Mora could have been fraudulently secured, hence, does not legally exist. On appeal, the Venturanzas argued that Mora’s reconstituted title from where their TCT No. 2574 was derived is already indefeasible on the ground that upon the lapse of one (1) year, the decision granting reconstitution of Mora’s title becomes final. The CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not the TCT of the Venturanzas is valid HELD: We DENY. Petitioners are wrong. Clearly, the provisions relied upon refer to original decrees of registration and not to orders of reconstitution. As it is, petitioners cannot even seek refuge in the Land Registration Act because the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been brought within the operation of said law. As a necessary consequence, no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora’s TCT over the land which has never been originally registered. Petitioners also claim that they are protected by law considering that they were buyers in good faith. Again, this assertion is without basis considering that Mora’s reconstituted TCT, from where petitioners’ TCT was derived, is void. The only way by which Mora could have acquired ownership over the subject parcels of land and validly transfer that ownership to the petitioners was for Mora to apply for their registration in his own name. What makes petitioners’ cause doubly undeserving of merit is the finding of the two courts below that the land subject matter of this case is part timberland. A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be cancelled in whosever hand said title may be found. Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. PASCUA VS REPUBLIC FACTS: Petitioner claimed that she is the owner in fee simple of a lot having inherited it from her parents. Due to the ravages of World War II, however, the owner’s duplicate certificate of the Torrens title covering the lot, its original copy on file with the Laguna Register of Deeds (RD), and other pertinent papers were lost and/or destroyed, and diligent efforts to find them were futile. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title (OCT). After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. The RTC denied the petition for reconstitution for insufficiency of evidence. Its main reason being that petitioner claim ownership over Lot 3209, but the tax declaration indicated Assessor’s Lot No. 19-pt, and that the petitioners failed to prove that Lot 3209 and Assessor’s Lot No. 19 is the same. The CA affirmed the trial court’s order. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner presented sufficient evidence for judicial reconstitution HELD: The petition lacks merit. Sec. 2 of RA 26 provides: SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available in the following order: (a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original has been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Petitioner asserts that under Sec. 2(f) of RA 26, other documents may be considered by the court as sufficient bases for the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title. As held in Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court,7 when RA 26, Section 2(f) speaks of "any other document," the reference is to similar documents previously enumerated in the section or documents ejusdem generis as the documents earlier referred to. The Deed of Absolute Sale between Limuaco and petitioner’s parents states that the land was not registered under Act No. 496. Petitioner nevertheless insists that Lot No. 3209 is the subject of a decree of registration according to the records of the LRA. We are not convinced. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System, Act No. 496. Petitioner’s evidence itself, the Deed of Sale between Limuaco and her parents, stated that the lot was not registered under Act No. 496. Assuming that Lot Nos. 19-pt and 3209 are the same, we are still constrained to deny the reconstitution of title mainly because there is no proof that a certificate of title was originally issued to both lots. We are not persuaded that petitioner’s pieces of evidence warrant the reconstitution of title since she failed to prove the existence of the title in the first place. The purpose of reconstitution of title is to have the original title reproduced in the same form it was when it was lost or destroyed. 11 In this case, there is no title to be re-issued. The appellate and trial courts were correct in denying Pascua’s petition. We emphasize that courts must be cautious in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles. It is the duty of the trial court to scrutinize and verify carefully all supporting documents, deeds, and certifications. Each and every fact, circumstance, or incident which corroborates or relates to the existence and loss of the title should be examined. BARSTOWE PHILS VS REPUBLIC FACTS: This case involves the conflicting titles to the same parcels of land (subject lots) of petitioner Barstowe Philippines Corporation (BPC) and the respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic). Due to the fire that gutted the Office of the Quezon City Register of Deeds on 11 June 1988 and destroyed many certificates of title kept therein, Antonio sought the administrative reconstitution of the original copies and owner’s duplicate copies of 2 TCTs. The Republic applied for administrative reconstitution of the same with the LRA. It was then that the Republic came to know that another party had applied for reconstitution which also covered the same lots. The RTC rendered judgment declaring both BPC and Republic as buyers in good faith. But it upheld BPC’s rights over the republic since it was registered earlier. The Ca ruled for the Republic. ISSUE: Who between BPC and the Republic has a better title over the subject lots? HELD: Ultimately, this Court is called upon to determine which party now has superior title to the subject lots: the Republic, BPC, the intervenors Abesamis, Nicolas-Agbulos, and spouses Santiago, or Servando’s heirs? BPC, the intervenors Abesamis, Nicolas-Agbulos, spouses Santiago, and Servando’s heirs derived their title to the subject lots from Servando’s TCTs No. 200629 and 200630. This Court then is compelled to look into the validity, authenticity, and existence of these two TCTs.

However, there is an absolute dearth of information and proof as to how Servando acquired ownership and came into possession of the subject lots. Relying on the findings of the LRA, it was established that TCTs No. 200629 and 200630 were forged and spurious, their reconstitution was also attended with grave irregularities. BPC was unable to attack the authenticity and validity of the titles of the Republic to the subject lots, and could only interpose the defense that it was a buyer in good faith. It points out that it purchased the subject lots from Servando and registered the same , way before the titles of Servando were declared null by the RTC. Under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, an original owner of registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without prejudice to the rights of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of title. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. A deed of sale executed by an impostor without the authority of the owner of the land sold is a nullity, and registration will not validate what otherwise is an invalid document. However, where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger and, while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. Now the question is whether BPC qualifies as an innocent purchaser for value which acquired valid titles to the subject lots, despite the fact that the titles of its predecessor-in-interest were found to be forged and spurious. This Court finds in the negative. BPC cannot really claim that it was a purchaser in good faith which relied upon the face of Servando’s titles. It should be recalled that the Quezon City Register of Deeds caught fire on 11 June 1988. Presumably, the original copies of TCTs were burnt in the said fire. Servando’s heirs sought the administrative reconstitution of the TCTs. If BPC bought the subject lots after TCTs were destroyed when the Quezon City Register of Deeds burned down, but before the said certificates were reconstituted, then on the face of what titles did BPC rely on before deciding to proceed with the purchase of the subject lots? There was no showing that there were surviving owner’s duplicate copies of TCTs. Without the original copies and owner’s duplicate copies of TCTs, BPC had to rely on the reconstituted certificates. Under section 7 of Republic Act No. 26,57 "Reconstituted titles shall have the same validity and legal effect as the originals thereof" unless the reconstitution was made extrajudicially.58 In this case, TCTs were reconstituted administratively, hence, extrajudicially. In contrast to the judicial reconstitution of a lost certificate of title which is in rem, the administrative reconstitution is essentially ex-parte and without notice.59 The reconstituted certificates of title do not share the same indefeasible character of the original certificates of title for the following reason – x x x The nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate Of Title of registered land is similar to that of a second Owner's Duplicate Transfer Certificate Of Title. Both are issued, after the proper proceedings, on the representation of the registered owner that the original of the said TCT or the original of the Owner's Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and could not be located or found despite diligent efforts exerted for that purpose. Both, therefore, are subsequent copies of the originals thereof. A cursory examination of these subsequent copies would show that they are not the originals. Anyone dealing with such copies are put on notice of such fact and thus warned to be extra-careful. x x x.60 The fact that the TCTs were reconstituted should have alerted BPC and its officers to conduct an inquiry or investigation as might be necessary to acquaint themselves with the defects in the titles of Servando. This Court cannot declare BPC an innocent purchaser for value, and it acquired no better titles to the subject lots than its predecessors-in-interest, Servando and Antonio.

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions, viz: "Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals." xxxx Significantly, the other private respondents – Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and Madaya – bought such "expanded" lots in good faith, relying on the clean certificates of St. Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to the innocent purchasers for value. YUJUICO VS REPUBLIC FACTS: Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land. Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon, a private party, opposed but said opposition was stricken for having been filed after the expiration of the period given by the court. Order was issued granting the application, and both parties did not appeal said decision. The land was then sold to Jesus S. Yujuico, who subdivided the land into two lots with one of them issued in the name of petitioner Augusto Y. Carpio. Sometime in 1977, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085, stating that land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay became the properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands or the acquisition of reclaimed lands. The PEA also acquired ownership of other parcels of land along the Manila Bay coast, some of which were subsequently sold to the Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC), which in turn leased portions to Uniwide Holdings, Inc. The PEA undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and Carpio discovered that a verification survey they commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped their property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC. On 1996, Yujuico and Carpio filed a case with the RTC but subsequently entered into compromise agreement, where the PEA property with an area of 1.4007 hectares would be conveyed to Jesus Yujuico and petitioner Carpio in exchange for their property with a combined area of 1.7343 hectares. Subsequently, on 1998, the new general manager decided to defer its implementation following the view that the compromise agreement did not reflect a condition of the previous PEA Board, requiring the approval of the Office of the President. The petition was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it was filed out of time. It was also dismissed by the CA and the SC. On 2001, Republic of the Philippines filed a case with the RTC, alleged that when the land registered to Castro was surveyed by Engr. H. Obreto on August 3, 1972 and subsequently approved by the LRC on April 23, 1973, the land was still a portion of Manila Bay as evidenced by Namria Hydrographic Map. Significantly, respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Fermina Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were likewise void. RTC rendered judgment stating that after 28 years without being contested, the case had already become final and executory. The trial court also found that the OSG had participated in the LRC case, and could

have questioned the validity of the decision but did not. Said case was thus found barred by prior judgment. CA reversed the decision. It observed that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant. Further, res judicata does not apply to lands of public domain, nor does possession of the land automatically divest the land of its public character. ISSUES: (1) Is a reversion suit proper in this case? (2) Is the present petition estopped by laches? (3) Did the CA erroneously apply the principle of res judicata? HELD: (1) Is a reversion suit proper in this case? An action for reversion seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. It is provided under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141 recognized the power of the state to recover lands of public domain. Upon effectivity of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129, the Intermediate Appellate Court are given the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs. When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on July 1, 1997, it incorporated Rule 47 on annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions of the RTCs. The two grounds for annulment under Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Thus, effective July 1, 1997, any action for reversion of public land instituted by the Government was already covered by Rule 47. It is clear therefore that the reversion suit was erroneously instituted in the Parañaque RTC and should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The proper court is the CA which is the body mandated by BP Blg. 129 and prescribed by Rule 47 to handle annulment of judgments of RTCs. (2) Is the present petition estopped by laches? Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned or declined to assert it. The lapse of almost three decades in filing the instant case, the inexplicable lack of action of the Republic and the injury this would cause constrain us to rule for petitioners. While it may be true that estoppel does not operate against the state or its agents, deviations have been allowed. In Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, we said: “Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals.” Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that “it is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value.” Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed before the action for reversion was filed, then said action is now barred by laches.

While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by laches or estoppel. Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for value over and above the interests of the government. SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.—The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrances for value. There is no allegation that Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire the land fraudulently. He thus had the protection of the Torrens System that every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the x x x encumbrances which may be subsisting.[26] The same legal shield redounds to his successorsin-interest, the Yujuicos and Carpio, more particularly the latter since Carpio bought the lot from Jesus Y. Yujuico for value and in good faith. (3) Did the CA erroneously apply the principle of res judicata? We find that the instant action for reversion is already barred by res judicata. In Romero v. Tan,[33] we ruled that “a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata.” We also made clear that a judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits, wherein the parties have validly entered into stipulations and the evidence was duly considered by the trial court that approved the agreement. In the instant case, the May 18, 1998 Resolution approving the compromise agreement confirmed the favorable decision directing the registration of the lot to Castro’s name. For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. The threshold question pertains to the second requisite, whether or not the then Pasig-Rizal CFI had jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.[39] Consequently, the proper CFI (now the RTC) under Section 14 of PD 1529[40] (Property Registration Decree) has jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to land. Conformably, the Pasig-Rizal CFI, Branch XXII has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the land registration case filed by Fermina Castro, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, since jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the initiatory pleading¾the application.[41] Settled is the rule that “the authority to decide a case and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. When there is jurisdiction, the decision of all questions arising in the case is but an exercise of jurisdiction.” In Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, the land registration court initially has jurisdiction over the land applied for at the time of the filing of the application. After trial, the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, can determine whether the title to the land applied for is registrable and can be confirmed. In the event that the subject matter of the application turns out to be inalienable public land, then it has no jurisdiction to order the registration of the land and perforce must dismiss the application. Based on our ruling in Antipolo, the threshold question is whether the land covered by the titles of petitioners is under water and forms part of Manila Bay at the time of the land registration application in 1974. If the land was within Manila Bay, then res judicata does not apply. Otherwise, the decision of the land registration court is a bar to the instant reversion suit.

After a scrutiny of the case records and pleadings of the parties, we rule that the land of Fermina Castro is registrable and not part of Manila Bay at the time of the filing of the land registration application (based upon ocular inspections conducted at that time by the land inspector and geodetic engineer). Furthermore, the fact that PEA signed the May 15, 1998 Compromise Agreement is already a clear admission that it recognized petitioners as true and legal owners of the land subject of this controversy. IN SUM, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Parañaque RTC. Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein. CALALANG VS RD OF QUEZON CITY ATTY G: This is two consolidated cases. This is a case of double sale. First sale made from Dorothea dela Cruz in favour of the group of Clemente. Sale made in 1954. Other sale is made in favour of Lucia dela Cruz subsequently sold to Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC). first case, which of the two sale is valid. SC said it has something to do with finality, conclusiveness of judgment, that it binds the parties to the case. In the first place, what happened was that there was sale in favour of Lucia dela Cruz made in 1935 but owner’s duplicate was not presented because it was still in possession of original owners, the group of Dorothea. SC, in the question of which of the two sales are valid, said it was already decided before that the sale in favour of Lucia dela Cruz to INC was already determined and decided as the one to be valid. Opening the case 10 years later would result in no end to litigation. Decision remains valid and binding to parites. Second issue is about consulta. What happened was that deed of sale in favour of INC was presented to Office of RD. RD at that time really felt that it was the group of Clemente who actually owns property and not Lucia dela Cruz so he denied the registration, and he elevated by way of consulta the registration. It was denied by the administrator. Decision in the consulta of administrator said that arguments advanced by RD was misplaced. 1) once administrator issues ruling en consulta, this is binding in RD. RD cannot file motion for reconsideration or appeal. When RD filed motion for reconsideration, Virginia Calalang intervened in the consulta because she thought that she has the support of the RD. Since this was denied by administrator, this was elevated to SC. SC said that it is not a remedy, otherwise it is an indirect attack on the title in the name of INC. The remedy of Calalang from the denial of commissioner is to appeal to CA.

ST. MARY OF THE WOODS SCHOOL VS OFFICE OF THE RD ATTY G: This is also about consulta. This was a case involving notice of lis pendens, annotated already, registered in Makati RD. St Mary Woods prevailing party in case involving ownership of parcel of land. When case was decided in RTC, they caused cancellation of notice of lis pendens. There are instances where order of court states that notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of so and so, the RD is mandated to immediately cancel notice. An interlocutory order, but not a decision on merits. The group of Hilario appeal to CA and requested the reannotation of notice of lis pendens which was cancelled. St Mary opposed, one of the grounds said that they should elevate matter to consulta. SC held that it is not one of the instance that consulta may be filed. Consulta availed if: 1) RD is in doubt about how to decide a certain transaction, or 2) RD denies registration of certain transaction, registrant has 5 days from receipt of denial to elevate matter to consulta. These situations are not present in this case. The claim that

Hilario should have filed en consulta is baseless. The case is timely appealed to CA. The reannotation of notice of lis pendens is just proper. THE CONDOMINIUM ACT (RA 4726) Enacted: June 18, 1966 The one that gives life to condominium corporation is the master deed, “enabling deed”. This will identify all the condominium units that will be issued over this parcel of land. This is basic document that gives legal life to condominium project. For every unit that may be issued, there is description. A condominium owner holds specific interest over the particular unit that he owns. For the common areas, he has an undivided interest over this because the unit-holder becomes automatically a member of the condominium corporation and automatically becomes co-owner of the common area. Other that master, supposed to register declaration of restriction: provides for administration of project and powers of the management body. After securing such, RD issue CCT (condominium certificate of title). Under the condominium law, a foreigner is allowed to own a condominium unit provided that it does not exceed the maximum allowed by law for a domestic corporation (60 filipino-owned, 40 foreigner-owned). BPI VS ALS MANAGEMENT CORP ATTY G: This is a very funny case. BPI filed a case for collection. Under pd 957, the seller of a condominium project, once the buyer has already paid in full, he can ask only for registration fees. ALS refused to pay fees. BPI filed a case for refund for the registration fees worth P26,000. ALS filed a counterclaim alleging that BPI violated a contract of sale because they indicated in their brochure so many amenities, but BPI failed to comply with all the representations made in brochure and we relied on this brochure when we bought the property. Under pd 957, if the seller fails to comply, buyer may suspend payment. ALS claimed that they cannot rent out units because of the many deficiencies in the unit constructed. RTC upheld claim of ALS that there were lot of deficiency and awarded damages to ALS for more than half a million. CA upheld RTC decision. BPI claimed RTC do not have jurisdiction because matter of condominium is under HLURB. SC agreed, but just the same BPI is not stopped form claiming lack of jurisdiction for failing to raise the issue in the RTC. SC said that where parties already acceded jurisdiction to court, they cannot claim contrary stance once decision is adverse to them. Second issue is regarding validity of claim of ALS that BPI failed to comply with their part of bargain. SC said that representations made in flyers and brochures, under pd 957, are part of the warranties of the seller. For failure to comply with what is advertised, it is considered violation of law. SC upheld award held in RTC and CA, for BPI to pay ALS more than half-a-million in damages. (funny.) DE VERA VS COURT OF APPEALS ATTY G: Principle is found in sec 25 of pd 957. Seller duty bound to deliver title to buyer even if mortgage. A condominium developer may not mortgage their property. Mortgage approve by HLURB. De Vera bought a unit from QP San Diego, paid downpayment with the assurance that the loan from Pag-ibig will be released, their remaining balance will be paid already. In the meantime, they (realty corporation) provided for bridge financing (temporary financing in the meantime that principal loan is not yet released). There was a misunderstanding between De Vera and QP San Diego as well as other funders (3 banks who provided bridge financing). There was problem with remittance of payments made by De Vera in favour of QP De Vera was considered in default of payment, until eventually it was cleared that it was the failure of the

owner of the projects to remit the payment. SC said it is the responsibility of the seller to deliver the title to De Vera, even though it was mortgage, because it was already paid in full. Even if property is mortgage, and it had clearance from HLURB, seller duty bound to deliver certificate of title to buyer once full payment has been made. GOLD LOOP PROPERTIES INC VS CA In the case at bar, we subscribe to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when it held that: "x x x Private respondents were indeed justified in suspending payment of their monthly amortizations. The failure of petitioners to give them a copy of the Contract to Sell sued upon, despite repeated demands therefor, and notwithstanding the private respondents’ payment of P878,366.35 for the subject condominium unit was a valid ground for private respondents to suspend their payments. x x x xxx "And contrary to petitioner’s stance, records disclose that they were the ones who did fraudulent acts against private respondents by entering into a Contract to Sell with the latter and accepting their downpayment of P878,366.35, withholding a copy thereof for no valid reason at all, and then threatening them with rescission and forfeiture, when private respondents only suspended payment of the balance of the purchase price while waiting for their copy of the Contract to Sell."23 The private respondents are entitled to a copy of the contract to sell, otherwise they would not be informed of their rights and obligations under the contract. When the Sadhwanis parted with P878,366.35 or more than one third of the purchase price for the condominium unit, the contract to sell, or what it represents is concrete proof of the purchase and sale of the condominium unit. G.0.A.L Inc vs Court of Appeals GOAL contends that the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the fact that the construction of the fifth floor was with the written approval of public respondent HLURB as required by Sec. 22 of P.D. 957 which provides Sec. 22. Alteration of Plans. - No owner or developer shall change or alter the roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision development as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the written conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter, by majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision (underscoring supplied). The above provision is clear. We do not have to tussle with legal hermeneutics in the interpretation of Sec. 22 of P.D. 957. The written approval of the National Housing Authority alone is not sufficient. It must be coupled with the written conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association or the majority of the lot buyers. Failing in this, the construction of the fifth floor is violative of the decree invoked. The Court of Appeals simply applied the law, and correctly so. Realty Exchange Venture Corp vs Sendino HLURB possesses adjudicatory powers which include the power to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices and cases of specific performance. In the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must determine must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts and award damages whenever appropriate. Dela Cruz vs Court of Appeals It should be stressed however, that, only when there is a showing that the property subject of the controversy is a subdivision lot or condominium that the exercise of adjudicative authority of the HLURB comes into play. xxx The mere relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For the action to fall within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344. On this matter, we have consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, the National Housing Authority (NHA) before and now the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.