Land Titles Case Digests

Vda de Barroga vs. Albano, 157 SCRA 131 FACTS: CFI FACTS: CFI of Ilocos Norte adjudicated a parcel of land in favor of Delfina Aquino. One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. For unrecorded reasons, the decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of 14 years or so (October 14, 1955). It was only after 24 years (November 17, 1979) that OCT was issued in Delfina Aquino's name. 1970 - after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title issued in Delfina Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual — appellants Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino — appellees Angel Albano, et al. Barroga et.al.: et.al.: had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 9821  since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled and that a new title be made out in their names. Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4-square-meter portion of an adjoining Lot 9822, 9822 , belonging to Cesar Castro. Castro filed complaint in intervention for the recovery thereof. CFI:  CFI:  DISMISSED Barroga's and Padaca's complaint, and declaring intervenor Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion overlapped by Delfina Aquino's title. The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for recovery of Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the property, and in which proceeding the former's predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been declared in default. The  judgment of the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" and therefore "conclusive upon the title to t he thing.”  On August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of possession as regards Lot No. 9821. Writ of possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued. Again Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel Albano, et al. They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued.

Their argument: as possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession. ISSUE: Whether or not they can be ejected. HELD: Yes. The writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero v. Loot , It also declared that the segregation of the 4-square meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of Lot 9822, had no effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ of possession, which was the appropriate process for the enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Conformably with the established axioms set out in the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and vi ndication of the title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. The appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should no longer be allowed to continue doing so.

Veranga vs. Republic, July 21, 2006 Facts: In 1931, the Director of Lands, acting for and in behalf o f the Government, instituted a Cadastral Case for Gumaca, Quezon. More than six decades later, spouses Tan Sing Pan and Magdalena S. Veranga filed their Answer in the Cadastral Case over which jurisdiction was assumed by the 7th MCTC of Atimonan-Plaridel, Quezon, acting as a special land registration court. They asserted ownership over a lot covered by the Cadastre. Petitioners averred that they acquired the lot in question pursuant to a deed of sale executed in their favor by the children of the late Juan Laude who, in turn, inherited the property from his own deceased father, Leon

Laude, the original claimant thereof. Petitioners alleged that t hey have been in possession of the lot for about 18 years from the time they purchased it from their predecessors-in-interest, have paid the realty taxes due thereon, and that their possession thereof was public, peaceful, in the concept of an o wner, continuous and against the world. Tacking their possession to that of their predecessors-in-interest, petitioners claimed that they have been in possession of the subject lot for almost 60 years now. (Note: lot involved was originally surveyed as Lot No. 1027 but what was adjudicated to petitioners is a portion designated as Lot No. 1027-A now equal to Lot No. 18009 of the Atimonan Cadastre.) Come 1996, the 7th MCTC of Atimonan-Plaridel issued an Order admitting petitioners’ Answer. After hearing, it rendered its decision confirming petitioners’ title over the lot being claimed and directing the issuance of a decree of registration in their favor. The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, went on appeal to the CA on the sole  jurisdictional issue of whether the trial court erred in proceeding with the hearing of the case despite petitioners’ failure to prove the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Office Gazette. CA granted the Republic’s appeal and accordingly reversed and set aside the appealed decision. To petitioners, the jurisdictional requirement of publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing has been complied with way back in 1931 when the Director of Lands, acting for and in behalf of the Government, instituted the Cadastral Case because the present case is merely a continuation thereof. Petitioners insist that the Cadastral Case has l ong been the subject of court proceedings even before the outbreak of the Second World War and, consequently, all lots covered therein have already been included in the required publication. They also contend that the Republic cannot raise, and is already estopped from raising, this jurisdictional issue at this point in time when thousands of lots have already been adjudicated by the cadastral court without the need of publication. Petitioners hasten to add that, since it was the Director of Lands who initiated the cadastral proceedings, it was incumbent upon him to show proof of publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing. Issue: W/N new publication is required

Ruling: Yes. Without which, the trial court has no jurisdiction. The publication requirement is rendered even more imperative by the fact that the lot involved was originally surveyed as Lot No. 1027 but what was adjudicated to petitioners is a portion designated as Lot No. 1027-A now equal to Lot No. 18009 of the Atimonan Cadastre. It is incumbent upon the petiti oners to establish by positive proof that the publication requirement has been complied with, what with the fact that they are the ones who stood to be benefited by the adjudication of the subject lot. Regrettably, they failed to present proof of publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing. Their argument that the instant case is a mere continuation of the proceedings in Cadastral Case No. 67 whereat the Director of Lands must have caused the publication of the notice of initial hearing in the Official Gazette cannot hold water. In view of want of publication, it is only necessary to pronounce the order void, and a new trial is not called for. Doctrine: Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette is one of the essential requisites for a court to acquire jurisdiction in land registration and cadastral cases, and additional t erritory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new publication. Before a cadastral survey can be amended so as to include land in which no publication has been made, new publication is necessary, - a step essential to the protection of persons interested in the property which is intended to be included.

Director of Land vs. Benitez, 16 SCRA 557 In a previous cadastral proceedings, respondents were declared owners of lot 2457 in Tacloban Leyte 14.5k sq/m. After 26yrs, the respondents under the same cadastral court and under Republic Act 931 claims that through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect a portion o f said Lot No. 2157 containing an area of 1,805 sq. m. has not been included in the original survey. the court a quo issued an order admitting the petition, ordered that copies of the original as well as of the amended petition be furnished the Solicitor General, the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, the City Fiscal of Tacloban City, and the Register of Deeds of the province, setting

the case for hearing on October 18, 1958. The court then declared the petitioners the owners of the said misplaced lot. The spouses then moved for a write of execution and possession, but the 62 people who were already occupying the said additional lot opposed saying that they were granted the land by Dir of Lands. Subsequently, the Dir of lands made a motion to set aside the same judgment on the ground, among others, that said decision was a nullity for the reason that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to act on the petition of Emilio Benitez and his wife for the reopening of the cadastral proceedings for lack of the requisite publication and notice as required by law. This was denied, and hence this petition. Issue: is the re-opening of the cadstral proceedings legal?

Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 Doctrine: A land subjected to ca dastral adjudication under the Land Registration Act cannot be subject to registration by voluntary  proceedings, except where the applicant can still petition for  judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Facts: These case involves two petitions for review.

a) due to lack of publication b) there were already legal existing claimants at that time. Held: There is no question that respondents Emilio Benitez and his wife may file a petition for reopening of the Cadastral pursuant to Republic Act No. 931 with a view of claiming such portion of land which they may have failed to include in their original petition for survey and registration as authorized by the Cadastral Act provided that the petition be filed within the period prescribed by said Republic Act No. 931. HOWEVER a) An order of a court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make it include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new publication is made as a preliminary to such step. Publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration and cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new publication b) Republic Act No. 931 makes insofar as the right of a claimant to have an additional portion of l and registered in his name is concerned in t he sense that it can only be entertained if it does not refer "to such parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or authorized provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." Here it appears that the additional portion of land claimed by respondents is actually occupied by persons who claim to be entitled to it by virtue of lease applications or permits granted to them by the Bureau of Lands

G.R. No. L-35778

Respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court of Bataan an application for registration under Act No. 496 of one parcel of land situated in Mariveles, Bataan. The Republic opposed the application claiming that the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain, thus not subject to private appropriation. Commission of Land Registration (LRC) issued a certificate that such land is inside Lot 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles.

G.R. No. L-35779

Respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration before the same court for two parcels of land described as portions of Lot 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre. The Chief Surveyor of LRC filed a report in the lower court that such parcels of land do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands, and further examination will be conducted in order to determine whether or not a patent or title has been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles.

The Republic opposed the registration claiming that the land applied for are portions of the public domain thus not subject to private appropriation.

is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final  judgment.

*********************** In both cases, the lower court ruled in favor of applicants Martinez and Tanalega, hence this petition. Republic argued that Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of the Cadastral Court in 1937, thus the lower court is without jurisdiction over t he subject matter for voluntary registration under Act 496. The Republic also claimed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.

Issue:

W/N lower court has jurisdiction over application of registration of land which was already subjected to cadastral registration.

Held:

Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, the same must necessarily fail. In the instant cases, evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. Mere cultivation of portions of land does not constitute possession under claim of ownership.

In addition, the survey plans submitted by private respondents were not approved by the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission (LRC). The LRC has no authority to approve original survey plans. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical descriptions are duly approved the by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value.

* Respondents should have filed a petition to reopen the cadastral case under RA 931.

Merced vs. CA, 55 SCRA 240 FACTS:

NO, the lower court does not have jurisdiction. In cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the land object of the petition is required by Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return date or within such time as may be allowed by court. In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.

Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding

Ezequiel Santos was claiming ownership of Lot 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court in favor of his father. He sought recovery of ownership and possession of the land from De la Merced and of the landlord’s share in the harvests for 6 years.

De la Merced, on the other hand, asserted her ownership over the pro perty as evidenced by an OCT issued to her predecessor Juan de la Merced and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.

1957 - RTC – ruled in favor of Santos as evidenced by the OCT issued in the name of Santos’ father.  

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That in 1926, TCT was issued in the name of Ezequiel Santos That in 1926, the cadastral court declared l ot 395 public land, and as a consequence, De la Merced was able to obtain an OCT after filing a homestead application That the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to declare lot 395 as public land and ordered the cancellation of the OCT in the name of De la Merced Directed De la Merced to vacate the property

CA – affirmed RTC’s ruling 

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That upon the finality of the decree of the cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by prescription. As the land was no longer part of the public domain when the homestead patent was obtained by De la Merced, it cannot prevail over the cadastral court’s decree of registration of Lot 395 in favor of Santos

ISSUE:

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1926 – the same cadastral court declared the same lot public land and as a result, de la Merced applied for a homestead patent d) 1931 – De La Merced obtained a homestead patent e) De La Merced was the overseer of the Santos’ lands – therefore, he was a trustee at the time he applied for a homestead f) 1952 – complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed 2) With regards to public lands, the act of registration is the operative act to convey and affect such registration. It shall be made in the office of the RD. THEREFORE, the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the RD had been accomplished. 3) Decree of registration and certificate of title are two different things. It is the decree of registration, to be issued by the LRC o which shall be the basis of the certificate of title that quiets the title to the land. HOWEVER, this only applies to VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION o under the Land Registration Act 4) WHEN IS A TITLE TO THE LAND IN A CADASTRAL PROCEEDING VESTED? The court cited Govt. vs. Abural = After trial, 3 actions are taken: i. Adjudication of ownership in favor of one of the claimants – constitutes the decision, judgment, the decree of the court ii. The declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title iii. The Land Registration Office’s duty to issue the certificates - a ministerial act Registration of title under the cadastral system is final, o conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage o f the 30day period allowed for an appeal 5) The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision of adjudication by the court. 6) THEREFORE, the decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Santos of the certificate of title over Lot 395 had already become final. From that moment, the land had become registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession. o

What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court adjudicating the lot in favor of Santos and t he subsequent order directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Santos? Did these orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been issued? - YES Could the property still be lost by adverse possession? - NO

RULING: 1) These important facts must be considered first: a) 1923 – final decision was rendered in the cadastral case = Santos’ title was confirmed as against the whole world, including the Government b) 1925 – the cadastral court issued a decree and directed the Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title, although no such certificate was actually issued

Heirs vs. CA, 623 SCRA 637 Doctrine: A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties, the  purpose of the survey plan being simply to identify and delineate the extent of the land    it is not a proof of ownership of the land covered by the plan. –

Facts: Petitioners sought to enjoin National Power Corporation (Napocor) from selling the Caliraya Hydroeletric Power Plant, as they claimed ownership over the portions of the land where the power plant stood, specifically Lot 1873 and Lot 72.

Napocor denied petitioners’ allegations and claimed that it acquired Lot 1873 through purchase from the petitioners’ half sister, Olivia Ferrer (evidenced by two deeds of absolute sale, both duly notarized and registered under Act. No. 3344). As for Lot 72, Napocor claimed that its right to occupy it stemmed from the Right of Way Agreement.

Petitioners opposed Napocor’s claims, arguing that the sale was void. They alleged that Olivia, as a co-heir, inherited only a portion of lot 1873, thus the sale of an area in excess of her legitime made the sale void. They also presented a Certification issued by the Bureau of Lands (BL) that the questioned lot was claimed and surveyed by Crispulo Ferrer.

RTC dismissed the petition for injunction. Trial court ruled that petitioners failed to present convincing proof other than the BL Certificate, which by itself is not a proof of ownership. Napocor, on its part, was able to present two deeds of sale. In addition Napocor has been in possession of the lot and has constructed structures since 1936, making it ridiculous for petitioners not to protest during Napocor’s long occupation.

Issue: W/N the certification from the BL showing that their predecessor,Crispulo Ferrer was a survey claimant, is sufficient to establish ownership over lot 1873. Held: NO. The certification did not adequately establish their right to Lot 1873. The certification only proved that Ferrer was a survey claimant. The purpose of a survey plan is simply to identify and delineate the extent of the land. A survey plan, even if approved by the BL, is not a proof of ownership of the land. The petitioners were not even able to present the actual survey plan approved by the BL, they only relied on a copy of the certificate which states that Lot 1873 is in the name of C. Ferrer (as a survey claimant). Nothing in the certificate indicated whether C. Ferrer was actually in possession of the said lot or for how long he had been in possesion thereof.

The court also ruled that petitioners’ reliance on Art. 1137 of the Civil Code (Acquisition of ownership through prescription) is misplaced. Petitioners alleged that Lot 1873 is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. However, acquisition of ownership over alienable public land is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act). Claimants in order to acquire ownership over an alienable and disposable land of the public domain (in compliance to CA No. 141) must be able to prove an open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of said land. And in the case of the petitioners, they failed to do so.

The court added that any objection against the sale of lot 1873 between Napocor and Olivia Ferrer has already been barred by laches. Petitioners made no move to assert their claim for 61 years.

*The Second motion for Reconsideration was denied since the case did not involve higher interest of justice. CA found no reason to reverse the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.

Director of Lands vs. CA 106 SCRA 426 Facts:

Petitioner asserts that there is no substantial evidence to show that respondent nor her predecessors have been in possession for more than 30 years. 

Respondent Manuela Pastor filed an application for confirmation of imperfect title over 13 lots. Seven of the lots – inherited from her parents. The other six lots – inherited from her aunt. Respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot s under claim of ownership for more than 30 years. Director of Lands filed opposition – applicant and her predecessors neither had title in fee simple nor imperfect title over the lots Respondent submitted a certification from the Land Registration Commission stating that Lot 9330 from which Lot 9330-A and Lot 9330-C were derived, was declared public land in a cadastral survey. The CFI as land registration court approved the application. Director appealed but the CA affirmed t he decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N the lower court erred in granting the application over Lots 9330-A and 9330-C despite evidence presented by applicant herself that the lots were declared public land in a previous cadastral proceeding

Widows vs. CA, 201 SCRA 165 Doctrine: A certificate of title cannot be altered or cancelled except in a different proceeding in accordance with law. No correction of certificate of title shall be made except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered.

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Held and Ratio: NO, the lower court did not err. Petitioner asserts res judicata over Lots 9330-A and 9330-C because of the previous cadastral proceeding declaring them as public land, and is therefore a bar to respondent’ s application. 

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The defense of res judicata was raised for the first time on appeal which cannot be cured. Even if res judicata was properly raised, petitioner still fails. There is NO PRIOR FINAL J UDGMENT – a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a  judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable. Respondent has amply shown that no final decree was ever issued in connection with the cadastral case.

Testimony of respondent which was corroborated by other testimonies and evidence has established beyond doubt her claim.

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August 27, 1974, WIDORA filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of land LRC-15352 WIDORA alleged that the parcel of land is covered by TITULO DE PROPRIEDAD 4136 issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro Y Esteban. In 1978, WIDORA filed an amended application for registration and alleged that the parcel of land is situated in Malitlit Uoogong Quezon City with an area of 156 hectares described in Plan 15352 and that WIDORA acquired said parcel from Don Marian San Pedro Y Esteban in 1954 In 1978, MOLINA filed an opposition claiming ownership over 1214 hectares of Lot 8 LRC-SWO 15352 and praying for the registration over said parcels In the same year, ORTIGAS filed a motion to dismiss alleging that trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for having been already registered in the Torrens System and in the name of ORTIGAS in TCT 77652 and 77653 1979, Trial Court issued an order directing WIDORA to prove its contention that the two TCTs of ORTIGAS are not the proper derivatives of the OCT which they purportedly issued.

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Same year, ORTIGAS filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that a Torrens title becomes indefeasible after a year and the same becomes conclusive against the whole world. Even the LRC itself has advised the court that the 156 hectares is covered by valid and subsisting titles in the name of ORTIGAS Motion was denied by trial court but set a date for hearing in order for WIDORA to prove that the TCTs of ORTIGAS are not proper derivatives of the OCT issued Trial court ruled, that TCTs presented by ORTIGAS show on its face that they were not derived from the OCTs of WIDORA and that if there was any error in the correct number of OCT on said titles, no step or measure to rectify the same was taken. Decree 1425- from which the TCTs of ORTIGAS were derived shows only 17hectares and is 4 km away from the 156 hectares subject of the application for registration of WIDORA. 1988, ORTIGAS filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear an application for registration of a registered land. CA ruled in favor of ORTIGAS contending that although the TCTs issued do not reflect the OCTs presented by WIDORA they are actual derivatives of the same and the lots covered by the TCTs are also covered by the OCTs presented by WIDORA. OCT 351 – secondary evidence presented by ORTIGAS clearly reflects Decree 1425. There has been a MISTAKE in the entries therefore the motion for reconsideration shall be granted in favor of ORTIGAS

Proof of the execution of the original handwriting It has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it is in the possession of an adverse party ORTIGAS has not shown compliance on the abovementioned and thus CA should not have accepted the secondary evidence in the first place On the unilateral action of CA Upon presentation of the secondary evidence, CA o substituted the findings of the trial court and ruled in favor of ORTIGAS SC is in the opinion that there should have been a trial o on the merits for this case involves a 156-hectare land, a vast track of land There was not even a request for evidentiary hearing o of this case. CA went out of its way to rule in favor of ORTIGAS On correcting the alleged errors in the TCTs CA committed a procedural lapse in correcting the o questioned TCTs. A certificate of title cannot be altered, amended or o cancelled except in a DIRECT PROCEEDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. No correction of certificate of title shall be made except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered. What ORTIGAS should have done, if t here was really o a mistake in the TCTs, is to file a PETITION FOR THE CORRECTION OF THE QUESTIONED TCTS 

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IS THE CA’S FINDING THAT ORTIGAS IS THE REGISTERED OWNER

CORRECT? Gabriel vs. CA, 159 SCRA 461 SC RULED: 

ON THE SHOWING OF A SECONDARY EVIDENCE WHICH  ALLEGEDLY IS THE COPY OF DECREE 1425  The evidence submitted by ORTIGAS adduced by o respondent CA is merely secondary and should not have been admitted in the first place. Before a secondary evidence may be admitted there must o be:

FACTS A survey was made for Santiago Quimson of a parcel of land located in Orani, Bataan. This parcel of land was registered and Original Certificate of Title No. 46 was issued in favor of Quimson. Subsequently, a cadastral survey was made which resulted in the increase of the area of the land and the designation of the land as Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre, which was subdivided into Lot No. 363-A and Lot No . 363-B. Lot No. 363-B

was subsequently acquired by Eligio Naval and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 787 was issued in his name. A parcel of land located in Hermoso, Bataan was surveyed for Potenciano Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu- 9742 was prepared and approved by the Director of Lands, but was subsequently amended because it was found that certain portions of t he land transferred to Naval were included. The undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so Plan Psu- 9742 was amended with a reduction of 293,432 square meters. The Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 issued in the name of Potenciano Gabriel contained the reduced area. Another cadastral survey was made of the Municipality of Hermosa, Bataan and the land of Potenciano Gabriel became Lot No. 557 with a further reduction by 339,847 square meters. No new certificate of title was issued showing the reduced area so that Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 subsisted with an area of 2,436,280 square meters under Plan Psu-9742. Accordingly, the partition of t he estate of Potenciano Gabriel by his heirs was based on plan Psu-9742 with an area of 2,436,280 square meters, instead of Lot No. 557 with a smaller area of 2,096,433 square meters. Later, the heirs of Gabriel filed a complaint against the administratrix and administrator of the estate of Eligio Naval, a son-in-law of Don Potenciano. They claim that said land was usurped by the late Eligio Naval who was also an adjoining owner; that said land was only loaned to the latter for dike and water control purposes of the latter's fishpond and that after the death of Don Potenciano, private respondents continued to possess, occupy and use said prop erty and notwithstanding repeated demands refused to vacate and to return the possession thereof, to the petitioners. It is prayed that private respondents herein be ordered to vacate the premises described in the complaint and to pay damages. The records show that the portion of 1,196 square meters sought to be recovered by petitioners is included in Lot No. 363-B of the Orani Cadastre and in amended plan Psu-9742. After the cadastral survey of Orani, said portion always remained in the possession of the late Eligio Naval included in TCT No. 787 in his name. The lower court ruled in favor of repondents, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Prior to the current petition, the property in litigation was transferred by absolute sale to the spouses Morencio Lucio and Conchita Gandan and Petrita Pascual prayed t hat said spouses be substituted in this action in her capacity as co-administratrix. Petitioners

prayed instead that said parties be joined as additional respondents, and the court authorized the inclusion of new parties.

ISSUE Whether or not courts have the authority to order the necessary correction of an erroneous technical description and make it conform to the correct area.

HELD NO. Petitioners contend that in ordering that OCT No. 1264 be made to conform with the land covered by Cadastral Lot No. 557, the trial court and later the Court of Appeals deprived them of their property as registered owners. Such act, petitioners insist, would amount t o a reopening of a decree of title after the lapse of the one-year statutory period, or the granting of an entirely new decree to a land already registered under act 496, now P.D. 1529.This contention is untenable. The lower court did not order the reopening of the decree of registration. What the lower court did was merely to correct the error in the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. so as to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557 of the Hermoso Cadastre and Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre which lots embody the correct technical description thereof. It has long been settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered o wner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. In a later case, such power of the court was further clarified and amplified to the effect that the above proposition does not exclude from the jurisdiction of the court the power to determine the priority of overlapping or over- lying registered titles. There is nothing in this proposition which militates against allowing the court in a cadastral case to determine which one of several conflicting registered titles shall prevail.

The fact that the portion of land in question is not a part of the property of the late Potenciano Gabriel, is established not only by the Hermoso and Orani Cadastre but by the behavior of Potenciano Gabriel himself, who is the original owner. He did not take the necessary action to recover said lot during his lifetime but after the discovery of its occupation in March, 1933, by the late Eligio Naval, he allowed instead the continued use and occupation of the same. In fact, there is no dispute that Eligio Naval and his successors-in-interest have always been in possession o f said property since that date. Finally as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners for failing to prosecute their claims for twenty (20) years have lost by laches their right to recover their property.

Abes vs. Rodil, 17 SCRA 832

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This is a suit for reconveyance and damages.

FACTS:

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In the cadastral proceeding for the Penarandacadastre (consisting of 5 lots in Nueva Ecija) defendant spouses and Alejandro Abes, the predecessor in interest of petitioner (AlejoAbes) are claiming ownership of the lots. In October 11, 1958 the cadastral court adjudicated the lots to the Rodil Spouses and pursuant thereto a Torrens Title was issued in their favor Feb 26, 1959, the heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a petition for review of the decree claiming they are the rightful owners of the land and that respondent spouses were awarded the l ot by means of fraud The cadastral court in July 1961, ruled that the petitioners failed to overcome the evidence of the adjudicates (Rodil spouses) The petitioners did not appeal to the ruling Instead on September 1961, plaintiffs sued the respondent spouses demanding for reconveyance averring that they acquired the properties though fraud, misrepresentation and the use of falsified deeds of sale. (essentially the same grounds they invokes in the former petition for review) Defendants claimed res judicata and moved to dismiss the case The court dismissed it and hence, this appeal.

ISSUES: W/N Res Judicata has set in

HELD: YES. The action for reconveyance will not prosper

RATIO: 1. To set up res judicata the following requisites must be present Final judgment o Court must have jurisdiction o Judgment must be on the merits o Identity of i. parties, ii. Subject matter iii. Cause of o action In this case, all were present. “Here, in the cadastral case, both t he judgment and the order denying plaintiffs' petition for review, are final; the jurisdiction of the cadastral court both on the subject matter and parties is beyond debate. For, defendants and Alejandro Abes, plaintiffs' predecessor, were claimants of the same lots in said cadastral case; and the present  plaintiffs were the petitioners for review in the same case. The original  judgment in the cadastral case is on the merits. There, defendant spouses proved their ownership over the p roperties. By reason thereof, the two were issued their Torrens title. In the petition for review of the cadastral decree', the heirs of Alejandro Abes and the same defendants already battled over the question of ownership. Defendants were the prevailing party. It thus results that there was identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action. Res judicata perfectly fits into this case. The present action was  properly dismissed.” 2.

The original proceeding was one in rem and the subsequent one was an action for reconveyance (in personam) however you should not be misled to thinking that this impairs the identity of cause of action. The main thing to take into account is that the point of the litigation is OWNERSHIP. The test to determine the existence of res judicata is this: Would the same evidence support and establish both the  present and the former cause of action? If the answer is yes then res judicata sets in.

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Plaintiffs aver that their petition for review did not put in issue "the question of ownership or title". They claim that said petition was but a mere preliminary step to reopening and that this should not be confused with the second step which is the new trial. This argument is flawed. Obviously the plaintiffs have misconceived the reach of the court order denying their petition. The lower court allowed them due course and permitted them to submit their evidence however they were unable to overcome the evidence of the respondents. The court discovered that they only began paying taxes on the land one month before the filing of their petition for review