Lagman Vs Pimentel III

 

LAGMAN vs PIMENTEL III GR No. 235935, 236061, 236145 February 6, 2018 Ponente: Jusce Noel Tijam

ISSUE:

Can the Peoners invoke the expanded jurisdicon of the SC (Sec. 1, Art. VIII of Constuon) in seeking review of the extension of Proclamaon no. 216. Posion of Peoners:

Peon Pe oners ers queso queson n the man manner ner that that the Con Congre gress ss approv approved ed the extens extension ion of maral maral law in Mindan Min danao ao and charact characteri erized zed the sam same e as done done with with undue undue haste. haste. Peon Peoners ers pre premis mised ed their their argument on the fact that the Joint Rules adopted by both Houses, in regard to the President's request for further extension. Peoners argue that given its crical role in the system of checks and balance, the Court should review not only the suciency of the factual basis of the re-extension but also its accuracy. They assert that the standard for scruny for the present peons is suciency of factual basis, not grave abuse of discreon. The former is, by constuonal design, a stricter scruny as opposed to the laer. Moreover, the Court is allowed to look into facts presented before it during the pendency of  the ligaon. This includes, for example, admissions made by the Solicitor General and the military during oral arguments, as they aempted to show compliance with the constuonal requirements . Peoners insist that clear and convincing evidence is necessary to establish sucient factual basis for the extension of maral law instead of the "proba "probable ble cause" standard standard set in Lagman.  In Lagman. In comparison to the inial exercise of the extraordinary powers of proclamaon of maral law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, their corpus, their extension must have had the benet bene t of sucient me to gather gather addional informa informaon on not only on the factual factual situaon situaon of an actual rebellion, but also the inial exercise of the Execuve during its inial implementaon. Posion of the Respondent:

The invocaon of this Court's expanded jurisdicon under Secon 1, Arcle A rcle VIII of the Constuon is misplaced. As held in Lagman,  the "appropriate proceeding" in Secon 18, Arcle VII does not refer to a peon for certorari  led   led under Secon 1 or 5 of Arcle VIII, as it is not the proper tool to review the suciency of the factual basis of the proclamaon or extension. Ruling of the Court:

The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the Court’s  jurisdicon under the third paragraph of Secon 18, Arcle VII  (is special and specic, dierent from those enumerated in Secons 1 and 5 of Arcle VIII. IItt was further stressed therein that the standard of review in a peon for cerorari cerorari is whether whether the resp responden ondentt has commied commied any grave abuse of 

 

discreon amounng to lack or excess of jurisdicon in the performance of his or her funcons, whereas under Secon 18, Arcle VII, the Court is tasked to review the suciency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers. Hence, the Court concluded that a peon for cerorari pursuant to Secon 1 or Secon 5 of Arcle VIII is not the proper tool to review the suciency of the factual basis of the proclamaon of maral law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a peon for cerorari will emasculate the Court’s constuonal task under Secon 18, Arcle VII, which was precisely meant to provide an addional safeguard against possible maral law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Finally, the Court held that a cerorari peon invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdicon is not the proper remedy to review the suciency of the factual basis of the Congress’ extension of the proclamaon of maral law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.