Labrel - Vi (Digest Pool)

DIGEST POOL : Class VI

LABOR RELATIONS

LABOR RELATIONS ATTY. MEL SAN LUIS

Part 6

1. BANGALISAN vs. CA, Gr. No. 124678, July 31, 1997 2. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS vs. OVEJERA, Gr. No. L-59743, May 31, 1982 3. UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC AND NESTLE Gr. No. 91025, December 19, 1990 4. ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA vs. NLRC Gr. No. 91980, June 27, 1991 5. SAN MIGUEL vs. NLRC, Gr. No. 99266, March 2, 1999 6. PHIL. STEAM NAVIGATIONAL CO. vs. PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS GUILD Gr. No. L-20667, October 29, 1965 7. PEPSI-COLA LABOR UNION vs. NLRC Gr. No. L-58341, June 29, 1982 8. TIU AND HAYUHAY vs. NLRC Gr. No. 123276, August 18, 1997 9. NUWHRAIN DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER vs. CA Gr. No. 163942, November 11, 2008 10. GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL vs. GLOWHRAIN Gr. No. 153664, July 18, 2003 11. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE vs. TORRES Gr. No. 100158, June 29, 1992

12. TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS UNION-FFW vs. SEC. OF LABOR Gr. No. 122743, December 12, 1997

EMPLOYEES

13. UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNIONFFW vs. CA, Gr. No. 169632, March 28, 2006 14. LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION Gr. No. L-25003, October 23, 1981 15. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS Gr. No. 31195, June 5, 1973 16. GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE vs. NLRC Gr. No. 103560, July 6, 1995 17. PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS ASSOCIATION vs. CIR, Gr. No. L-10095, October 31, 1957 18. CROMWELL COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES LABORERS UNION vs. CIR Gr. No. L-19778, September 30, 1964

AND

19. CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARSMAN Gr. No. L-17038 July 31, 1964 20. ABARIA vs. NLRC, Gr. No. 154113, December 7, 2011

meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI BANGALISAN vs. CA Gr. No. 124678, July 31, 1997 Facts: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit. The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, thus the Secretary charged petitioners with “grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.” They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension. Petitioners failed to give their answer to the complaint filed against them despite due notice. Thus, the DECS secretary found them guilty of the offenses and ordered their dismissal from service. The secretary, acting on petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, modified its ruling. Instead of dismissal, petitioners would be suspended from service for nine months without pay. Petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The latter reduced the suspension period from nine months to six months with automatic reinstatement in the service but without payment of back wages. Petitioners appealed the case to CA but dismissed the same for lack of merit. Petitioners’ main argument is that they were merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. “It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient but non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.” It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at common law. Indeed, it is frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit such strikes, either by statute or by judicial decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common law rule. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in the private sector.

Issue: Whether or not Government employees can engage in a strike.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS vs. OVEJERA Gr. No. L-59743, May 31, 1982

Held: No. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of

Facts: Petitioner NSFW (bargaining agent of the rank and file) and respondent company (CAC) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) wherein parties agreed to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus and amelioration (improvement) bonus. On Nov. 30, 1981, petitioner and respondent entered into a compromise agreement two days after the strike to compel th payment of the 13 month pay, agreeing to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th month pay if it clearly held that the employer is liable to pay the same separate and distinct from the bonuses already given. Meanwhile, G.R. No. 51254, Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Marcopper Mining Corporation which sought to annul the decision of the Labor Deputy Minister granting the 13th meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI month pay to its employees in addition to mid-year and Christmas bonuses under a CBA was dismissed on June 11, 1981 and became final and executory on December 18, 1981. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the MOLE a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW commenced a strike. One day after the commencement of the strike, or on January 29, 1982, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with MOLE. CAC filed a petition the Regional Arbitration Branch, MOLE to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice (ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote. Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal. CAC filed for a restraining order for the enforcement of the of LA’s decision. No restraining order was issued. Issue: Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is illegal. Held: The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the deputy of labor minister, ruled that the failure of the NFSW to abide with the mandatory cooling-off period and the 7 day strike ban made the strike illegal and the NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC. Language of the law. — The foregoing provisions hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory. When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) coolingoff period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period.

UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC AND NESTLE Gr. No. 91025, December 19, 1990 Facts: On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro Employees, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-andfile employees of Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed a Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of CBA deadlock and unfair labor practice. Private respondent assailed the legal personality of the proponents of the said notice of strike to represent the Nestle employees, before the NCMB. This notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to attend the conciliation meetings and to which private respondent failed to attend contending that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated in accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws. Thereafter, Company terminated from employment all UFE Union officers, and all the members of the negotiating panel for instigating and knowingly participating in a strike staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro on September 11, 1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the purpose. The union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA upheld the validity of the dismissal; NLRC en banc affirmed. Subsequently, company concluded separate CBAs with the general membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro units; Assailing the validity of these agreements, the union filed a case of ULP against the company with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by the NCMB but yielded negative result. Petitioner filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties. On October 28, 1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon “certified” to the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and Nestle, Philippines.. which reads as follows: “The NLRC is further directed to call all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock within twenty (20) days from submission of the case for resolution.” Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution granting wage increase and other benefits to Nestle’s employees, ruling on non-economic issues, as well as absolving the private respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge. Petitioner finds said resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agree therewith. It filed a motion for reconsideration, denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent nlrc seriously erred in holding that the cba to be signed by the parties shall cover solely the bargaining unit consisting of all regular rank-and-file employees of the respondent company. Held: No.The Court is convinced that the public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving only the sole issue certified to by the Secretary and formulating a CBA which covers the bargaining units consisting of all regular rank-and-file meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI employees of the respondent company at Makati, Alabang and Cabuyao only. In its assailed resolution, public respondent stated: "A perusal of the records and proceedings of this case reveals that after the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of his Order dated 28 October 1988 certifying the dispute to Us, the Union filed an Urgent Manifestation seeking the modification of the certification order to include the Cebu Davao and Cagayan de Oro divisions, the employees/workers therein being all bonafide members of the Union which is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file workers of the company nationwide. Their non-inclusion in the certification order, the union argues, would give premium to the alleged unlawful act of the Company in entering into separate 'Collective Bargaining Agreements' directly with the workers thereat. "In the same vein, the union manifested its intention to file a complaint for ULP against the company and its officers responsible for such act, which it eventually did. "Considering that the Union had reserved the right to prosecute the Company and its officers responsible for the alleged unlawful execution of the CBA directly with the union members in Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao units, as it has in fact filed a case which is now pending with our Arbitration Branch, the issue as to whether such acts constitute ULP is best heard and decided separately from the certified case, not only because of the evidentiary need to resolve the issue, but also because of the delay that may ensue in the resolution of the present conflict. "Furthermore, the consolidation of the issue with the instant case poses complicated questions regarding venue and joinder of parties. We feel that each of the issues propounded by the parties shall be better dealt with separately according to its own merits. "Thus, We rule to resolve the sole issue in dispute certified to this Commission, i.e., the deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiations in Cabuyao/Alabang and Makati units." (Rollo, pp. 174176) We agree. Public respondent's resolution is proper and in full compliance with the order of the Secretary of Labor. The concomitant delay that will result in resolving petitioner's motion for the modification of the certification order to determine whether to include Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro Divisions or not will defeat the very purpose of the Secretary of Labor's assumption of jurisdiction and his subsequent certification order for compulsory arbitration. The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power measure. It cannot be denied that the private respondent is engaged in an undertaking affected with public interest being one of the largest manufacturers of food products. The compelling consideration of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction is the fact that a prolonged strike or lockout is inimical to the national economy and thus, the need to implement some measures to suppress any act which will hinder the company's essential productions is indispensable for the promotion of the common good. Under this situation, the Secretary's certification

order for compulsory arbitration which was intended for the immediate formulation of an already delayed CBA was proper.

ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA vs. NLRC Gr. No. 91980, June 27, 1991 Facts: IBM representing 4500 employees of SMC working at various plants, offices and warehouses in NCR presented to the company a demand for correction of the significant distortion in the workers’ wages pursuant to the Wage Rationalization Act. Demand unheeded by company hence the union members refused to render overtime services until the distortion has been corrected by SMC. It appears that the employees working hours/schedule has been freely observed by the employees for the past 5 years and due to the abandonment of the longstanding schedule of work and reversion to the eight-hour shift substantial losses were incurred by SMC. SMC filed a complaint with arbitration branch of NLRC then before the NLRC for the latter to declare the strike illegal. Union’s contention: workers’ refusal to work beyond 8 hours was a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct distortion. SMC: The coordinated reduction by the Union’s members of the work time in order to compel SMC to yield to the demand was an illegal and unprotected activity.

Issue: Whether or not the strike was legal Held: No. It is illegal. The strike invoking the issue of wage distortion is illegal. The legality of these activities depends on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained. These joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of the Act. Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, “Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout.” Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and the Union, relevant provisions of which are quoted by the former without the latter’s demurring to the accuracy of the meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI quotation, also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving disputes or controversies, generally, said agreement clearly stating that settlement of “all disputes, disagreements or controversies of any kind” should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure and ultimately by arbitration.

SAN MIGUEL vs. NLRC Gr. No. 99266, March 2, 1999 Facts: San Miguel Corporation (SMC), which allegedly needed to streamline its operations due to financial losses shut down some of its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant. Consequently, the private respondent union (SMCEU) filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees, praying for the redeployment of the said employees to the other divisions of the company. During the grievance proceedings, however, most of the employees were redeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a result, only 17 employees remained when the parties proceeded to the third level of the grievance procedure. The private respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a notice of strike. Petitioner, on the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike, but the NCMB failed to act on the motion. Petitioner SMC filed a complaint with the respondent NLRC praying for the dismissal of the notice of strike, and an order compelling the respondent union to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the notice of strike, and the recovery of the expenses of litigation. Respondent NLRC came out with a minute resolution dismissing the complaint. Aggrieved by the resolution, petitioner found its way to this Court via the present petition. In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by the private respondent union are non-strikeable. Their grounds appear more illusory than real. The Court held that the violation of the CBA is chargeable against the private respondent union. The Supreme Court granted the instant petition. SMCEUPTGWO was directed to complete the third level of the Grievance Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if necessary. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of a no strike clause. Held: Yes. Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as “the situation between the labor and the management of the company where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate.” The situation is non-existent in the present case since there is a Board assigned on the third level (Step 3) of the grievance

machinery to resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of asking the conciliation decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private respondent (union) violated the mandatory provisions of the CBA. Petitioner (employer) having evinced its willingness to negotiate the fate of the remaining employees affected , there is no ground to sustain the notice of strike of the union. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation and private respondent San Miguel Corporation Employees Union - PTGWO are hereby directed to complete the third level (Step 3) of the Grievance Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if necessary.

PHIL. STEAM NAVIGATIONAL CO. vs. PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS GUILD Gr. No. L-20667, October 29, 1965 Facts: PHILSTEAM is engaged in inter-island shipping, PMOG is a labor-union affiliated with Federation of Free Workers (FFW) representing and which represented some of PHILSTEAM’s officers. The Cebu Seamen’s Association (CSA) is another labor union that represents some of PHILSTEAM’s officers. PMOG sent PHILSTEAM a set of demands with a request for collective bargaining but PHILSTEAM required PMOG to first prove its representation of a majority of PHILSTEAM’s employees before its demands will be considered. PHILSTEAM started interrogating and investigating its captains, deck officers, and engineers, to find out directly from them if they had joined PMOG or authorized PMOG to represent them. PMOG filed a notice of intention to strike stating PHILSTEAM’s alleged refusal to bargain and unspecified ULP. The CSA also transmitted its own set of demands to PHILSTEAM where the latter considered its demands. PHILSTEAM and CSA signed a CBA. On that same day, PMOG declared a strike against PHILSTEAM Issue: Whether or not PHILSTEAM committed ULP. Held: The acts found by respondent court constituting the foregoing unfair labor practice are: (1) the interrogation and investigation by PHILSTEAM's supervisory officials of its captains, meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI deck officers and engineers, to determine whether they had authorized PMOG to act as their bargaining agent; (2) the subjection of PMOG to vilification; and (3) the participation of PHILSTEAM's pier superintendent in soliciting membership for a competing union. PHILSTEAM admits that it initiated and carried out an investigation of its officers as to their membership in PMOG and whether they had given PMOG authority to represent them in collective bargaining. The reason for this, PHILSTEAM was merely to ascertain for itself the existence of a duty to bargain collectively with PMOG, a step allegedly justified by PMOG's refusal to furnish proof of majority representation. The asserted reason for the investigation cannot be sustained. The record discloses that such investigation was started by PHILSTEAM even before it received PMOG's reply stating a refusal to submit proof of majority representation. Specifically, the investigation was put under way on June 29, 1954 the same day PHILSTEAM sent its request that PMOG submit proof of majority representation whereas, PHILSTEAM knew of PMOG's refusal to furnish said proof only on July 6, 1954, when it received PMOG's reply letter. PMOG's refusal to submit evidence showing it represented a majority had nothing to do with PHILSTEAM's decision to carry out the investigation. An employer is not denied the privilege of interrogating its employees as to their union affiliation, provided the same is for a legitimate purpose and assurance is given by the employer that no reprisals would be taken against unionists. Nonetheless, any employer who engages in interrogation does so with notice that he risks a finding of unfair labor practice if the circumstances are such that his interrogation restrains or interferes with employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization. The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the company of its employees to a series of questionings regarding their membership in the union or their union activities, in such a way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on their part, constitutes unfair labor practice. The respondent court has found that PHILSTEAM's interrogation of its employees had in fact interfered with, restrained and coerced the employees in the exercise of their rights to selforganization.

PEPSI-COLA LABOR UNION vs. NLRC Gr. No. L-58341, June 29, 1982 Facts: On December 11, 1979, a certification election was held at the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company's (PEPSI) plant in Naga City. Out of 131 votes which were cast, the UNION got 128 so it regarded itself as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit. The losing labor group contested the election at various levels but it was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, on April 1, 1980, the UNION filed a notice of strike with MOLE's Regional Office in Legaspi City on the ground that PEPSI refused to bargain. PEPSI countered that it was willing to bargain but there was yet no final decision on the appeal of the other labor union as to who is the EBR. Med-Arbiter Antonio B. Caayao issued a resolution stating that the Notice of Strike under consideration, being premature, is illegal and should, therefore, be dismissed. The Union disregard the resolution and staged a strike. On May 15, 1980, PEPSI filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal strike. Labor Arbiter Fulleros, declared that the strike staged by the respondents herein was beyond doubt illegal and therefore all officers and member of the union whose names appear on the complaint be considered to have lost their employment status effective May 7, 1890. Issue: Whether or not Strike is illegal so as to declare that all the officers and members of the union whose names and positions appear on Annex "A" of the complaint except Romulo Cal, Nilo Bariso and Mauro Nieto be considered to have lost their employment status effective May 7, 1980. " Held: No. It is now settled "that a strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike." (Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees, Assn. vs. Tandayag, G.R. No. L-29217, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 56, 72. And it has also been held that the members of a union cannot be held responsible for an illegal strike on the sole basis of such membership or even on account of their affirmative vote authorizing the same. They become liable only if they actually participated therein. (ESSO Philippines, Inc. vs. Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO (MME), G.R. No. L-36545, January 26, 1977, 75 SCRA 73.) In the case at bar, although the strike was indeed illegal, We cannot discount the presence of good faith on the part of the rank and file members of the UNION considering that in the certification election the UNION obtained 128 out of the 131 votes cast so that they could justifiably consider it as their sole bargaining representative. Moreover, there is no proof that the members of the UNION all participated in the illegal strike. The ones who deserve what Justice Barredo calls "capital punishment" in the Esso Philippines case, supra, are the officers of the UNION who staged the strike in defiance of the ruling of Med-Arbiter Caayao

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DIGEST POOL : Class VI WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate all of those persons whose names and positions appear in Annex "A" which is mentioned in the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter dated November 20, 1980, under the same terms and conditions of employment existing prior to May 7, 1980, except for the officers of the UNION. No costs.

TIU AND HAYUHAY vs. NLRC Gr. No. 123276, August 18, 1997 Facts: RBS (company) had a CBA with GMAEU (union) which took effect on July 2, 1989. RBS observed that a huge amount of overtime expenses incurred which moved the president to form guidelines on the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime work. On June 11, 1991, RBS furnished GMAEU a copy of the said guidelines and requested the latter to comment thereon. The union did not file any comment. RBS then implemented the said guidelines. GMAEU then send a letter to the president. The union argued that, the union was not consulted in the formulation of the said guidelines which violates their CBA, the guidelines would render nugatory the CBA provision of the same subject and the diminution of benefits being enjoyed by all employees with respect to the mid-year bonuses (from 2-1/2 months to 1-1/2 months constitutes a withdrawal of an existing company policy). RBS management and GMAEU officials met on 3 July 1991 and on 10 July 1991 to thresh out the issues raised by GMAEU in its 26 June 1991 letter. Both talks, however, were short lived as the union refused to hold further talks with RBS. On 12 July 1991, GMAEU filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) based on unfair labor practices allegedly committed by RBS on grounds of violation of existing CBA, employees coercion, union interference and discrimination. The NCMB set a conciliation meeting on 19 July 1991, but as early as 16 July 1991 the Union held a strike vote among its members and submitted the results thereof to the NCMB on 18 July 1991 which showed that majority of the union members voted to go on strike. During the conciliation meeting held on 19 July 1991, RBS, through counsel, informed GMAEU’s officers that RBS did not violate any provision in the collective bargaining agreement since the issuance of the guidelines was a management prerogative duly recognized in their agreement. As regards GMAEU’s charges of coercion, union interference and discrimination, RBS argued that these alleged unfair labor practices were neither raised by the union in its 26 June 1991 letter nor during their 3 July and 10 July 1991 talks. RBS’ counsel requested GMAEU’s officers to name the persons or officers of RBS involved in the alleged unfair labor practices and to state the specific act or acts complained of so that RBS management could adequately refute said allegations or impose appropriate disciplinary actions against its erring officers. GMAEU’s

officers, however, ignored both RBS’ and the labor conciliator’s requests for a bill of particulars. In a second conciliation meeting held on 25 July 1991, RBS reiterated its request to GMAEU’s officers to furnish RBS the details of the alleged unfair practices committed by RBS’ officers. Again, the Union denied RBS’ request and refused to hold any further talks with RBS management. On the same day, RBS filed a motion to dismiss GMAEU’s notice of strike and forewarned the Union about the consequences of an illegal strike. On 2 August 1991, the union struck. On the same day, RBS filed a complaint for illegal strike and unfair labor practice against GMAEU and its fourteen (14) officers with the NLRC. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Labor immediately assumed jurisdiction over the case, issued a return-to-work order, and certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In the certified case, the labor arbiter found no factual and legal ground to hold RBS guilty of unfair labor practices against the Union. On appeal (docketed as NLRC-NCR CC No 00076-01), the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision in a resolution dated 31 July 1992. Meanwhile, the labor arbiter continued to hear the illegal strike case filed by RBS against GMAEU. On 18 February 1994, the labor arbiter rendered judgment declaring the strike illegal and the union officers who knowingly participated in the illegal strike to have validly lost their employment status. 10 of them did not appeal. Tiu and Hayuhay appealed. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the labor arbiter’s decision that petitioners staged an illegal strike. Held: The notice of strike filed by the union before the NCMB on 12 July 1991 contained general allegations that RBS management committed unfair labor practices by its gross violation of the economic provisions in their collective bargaining agreement and by alleged acts of coercion, union interference and discrimination which amounted to union busting. It is the union, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support these allegations. It is not disputed that prior to 12 July 1991, the union treated RBS’ issuance of the “guidelines on the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime services” as “gross” violations of the existing collective bargaining agreement. In its talks with the union, RBS painstakingly explained that the said allegation was unfounded because the issuance of said guidelines was RBS’ management prerogative. Up to that point, the union never raised the issue of unfair labor practices allegedly committed by RBS’ official under Article 248 of the Labor Code. But in its notice of strike filed two days later, the union raised issues of coercion, discrimination, and union interference for the first time. Significantly, the union had two (2) conciliatory meetings arranged by the NCMB at which it could have substantiated these additional allegations. However, the fact that it had submitted the results of the strike vote even ahead of the conciliatory meetings, and continuously refused to substantiate its allegations in its notice of strike thereafter, lends credence to the NLRC’s observation that meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI these charges were indiscriminately hurled against RBS to give a semblance of validity to its notice of strike. The bottom line is that the union should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery established in their agreement with RBS. In disregarding said procedure the union leaders who knowingly participated in the illegal strike “have acted unreasonably, and, as such, the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their behavior.”

Union members. The NLRC ordered the Hotel to grant the 61 dismissed Union members financial assistance in the amount of ½ month's pay for every year of service or their retirement benefits under their retirement plan whichever was higher. Upon appeal the CA promulgated its January 19, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which dismissed the Union's petition and affirmed the rulings of the NLRC. Issue: Whether or not the union, may be adjudged guilty of staging an illegal strike despite respondents' admission that they prevented said officers and members from reporting for work for alleged violation of the hotel's grooming standards.

NUWHRAIN DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER vs. CA Gr. No. 163942, November 11, 2008 Facts: Petitioner (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) is the certified bargaining agent of dusit hotel nikko located in Makati city. On October 24, 2000 they submitted their CBA proposal to the hotel. The negotiations started but they failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions (DEADLOCK). December 20, 2001 they filed a notice to strike to the National conciliation and mediation board (NCMB) on the ground of the bargaining deadlock. Conciliation hearings were conducted but was unsuccessful, On January 14, 2002 they decided to wage a strike. On January 17 and 18 some members of the union started to have cropped or clean shaven hair, Eventually the hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards. The union later on staged a picket outside the premises of the hotel which eventually led to severe lack of manpower to the hotel and temporarily ceasing their operations in 3 restaurants. On January 20, 2002 the hotel issued notice to the union preventively suspending them and charging them with the following offense ((1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket; (3) unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike) The next day the union filed a second notice to strike on the ground of ULP and violation of article 28(a). On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixty-one (61) members; and suspended eighty-one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days, four (4) employees for 10 days, and three (3) employees for five days. On January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice of Strike this time on the ground of unfair labor practice and unionbusting. The case was later on compulsory arbitrated to the NLRC which eventually decided that the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision. The NLRC also held that the January 18, 2002 concerted action was an illegal strike in which illegal acts were committed by the Union; and that the strike violated the "No Strike, No Lockout" provision of the CBA, which thereby caused the dismissal of 29 Union officers and 61

Held: First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action. The Hotel does not need to advertise its labor problems with its clients. It can be gleaned from the records before us that the Union officers and members deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their heads or cropped their hair. Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on grooming was designed and calculated to place the Hotel management on its heels and to force it to agree to the Union's proposals. Thus, we hold that the Union's concerted violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotel's operations is an unprotected act and should be considered as an illegal strike. Second, the Union's concerted action which disrupted the Hotel's operations clearly violated the CBA's "No Strike, No Lockout" provision, The facts are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The concerted action is an economic strike upon which the afore-quoted "no strike/work stoppage and lockout" prohibition is squarely applicable and legally binding. Third, the Union officers and members' concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards but also violated the Union's duty and responsibility to bargain in good faith. By shaving their heads and cropping their hair, the Union officers and members violated then Section 6, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code.20 This rule prohibits the commission of any act which will disrupt or impede the early settlement of the labor disputes that are under conciliation. Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban before it conducted the strike on January 18, 2002. The NLRC correctly held that the Union failed to observe the mandatory periods before conducting or holding a strike. Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal since, as shown by the pictures21 presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and members formed human barricades and obstructed the driveway of the Hotel.

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DIGEST POOL : Class VI GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL vs. GLOWHRAIN Gr. No. 153664, July 18, 2003 Facts: Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries – Silahis International Hotel Chapter and the petitioner Grand Boulevard Hotel executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering the period from July 10, 1985 up to July 9, 1988. The petitioner thereafter dismissed some of its employees and suspended others who were members of the respondent union. On May 26, 1987, the respondent union filed a notice of STRIKE with the Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), based on the following grounds of illegal suspension, violation of CBA, and harassment. The Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment issued a status quo ante bellum order certifying the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code; and further directing the employees to return to work within forty-eight hours from receipt of the order, and for the petitioner to accept all returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute. The respondent union complied with the order of the SOLE. The respondent union filed another notice of strike against the petitioner on account of alleged violations of the CBA and the illegal dismissal of nine employees. The SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, directing the nine employees to return to work and enjoining both parties from engaging in any strike or lockout that would exacerbate the situation. The parties were also directed to sign a CBA within fifteen days from notice of the said order. The petitioner placed the respondent union’s Director for Grievances Apolonio Bondoc, Jr. under preventive suspension. The respondent union filed a manifestation and motion praying that the petitioner be held in contempt for violating the May 23, 1990 Order of the SOLE. Michael Wilson, the petitioner’s general manager, wrote the SOLE informing him of the petitioner’s decision to retrench seventeen less senior employees on a staggered basis, spread over a period of sixty days, to lessen the daily financial losses being incurred by the petitioner. The next day, the respondent union, through its president, informed the DOLE-NCR that the union will conduct a strike vote referendum on October 23 and 24, 1990. The petitioner wrote the SOLE of its decision to implement its retrenchment program to stem its huge losses. On November 5, 1990, the petitioner disseminated a circular to all the employees, informing them that the personnel plantilla would be decreased by two hundred employees to be implemented on a staggered and “last in, first out” basis. It terminated the employment of sixty employees and two officers of the respondent union effective December 6, 1990. Moreover, the said employees, including the two union officers, were immediately barred from working. On November 7, 1990, the respondent union protested the actions of the petitioner invoking Section 15, Article VI of the CBA. The respondent union filed an urgent motion for a reconsideration by

the SOLE of the Certification Order dated October 31, 1990. On November 14, 1990, the petitioner terminated the employment of eighty-six more employees effective December 14, 1990. The remaining employees were also informed that it will close in six months. On November 14, 1990, the petitioner terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, effective December 14, 1990. By way of riposte, the respondent union filed on November 16, 1990 another notice of strike because of what it perceived as the petitioner’s continuing unfair labor practices (ULP). On the same day, at about 12:00 noon, the officers of the respondent union and some members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel, obstructing the free ingress and egress thereto. At 3:00 p.m., the police operatives of the Western Police District arrived and dispersed the picket line. On November 28, 1990, the SOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for consolidation with the previously certified case. The SOLE issued a return-to-work order, excluding those who were retrenched, and enjoined all parties from committing any act that would aggravate the already tense situation. The SOLE further stated that the validity and propriety of the retrenchment program of the petitioner should be ventilated before and resolved by the NLRC. The SOLE denied the respondent union’s motion to reconsider. The petitioner filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Office of the NLRC for illegal strike against the union, its members and officers. The petitioner alleged inter alia that the union members and officers staged a strike on November 16, 1990 which lasted until November 29, 1990 without complying with the requirements provided under Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter, although sympathetic with the respondent union, held that for the latter’s failure to comply with the requirements laid down in Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, the strike that was staged on November 16, 1990 up to November 29, 1990 was illegal. The respondent union and the individual respondents therein interposed an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. The respondent union pointed out in its appeal that it had complied with the requirements laid down in Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code because its November 16, 1990 notice of strike was a mere reiteration of its September 27, 1990 notice of strike, which, in turn, complied with all the requirements of the aforementioned articles. The NLRC ratiocinated that the compliance by therein respondents of the requirements laid down in Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code respecting the September 27, 1990 notice of strike filed by the union cannot be carried over to the November 16, 1990 notice of strike. Resultantly, for failure of the union to comply with the aforementioned requirements for its November 16, 1990 notice of strike, the strike staged on November 16 up to November 29, 1990 was illegal. Dissatisfied, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 153664. Edna Dacanay, another officer of the union, filed a similar petition before this Court. Issue:

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DIGEST POOL : Class VI Whether or not the strike staged by the respondent union on November 16 up to 29, 1990 is legal. Whether or not the dismissals of the private respondent’s officers of the respondent union as a consequence of the strike on November 16 to 29, 1990 are valid. Held: The requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE thirty days before the intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of ULP; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.[37] The requisite sevenday period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members. The notice of strike and the cooling-off period were intended to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.[38] A strike simultaneously with or immediately after a notice of strike will render the requisite periods nugatory. Moreover, a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or certification order, becomes a prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. In this case, the respondent union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on November 16, 1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel, in violation of the law. Police operatives of the Western Police District had to disperse the picketers and take into custody Union President Rogelio Soluta and the other officers of respondent union, Henry Babay and Dennis Cosico. The respondents cannot argue that since the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those contained in their notice of strike on September 27, 1990 which complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike staged by them on November 16, 1990 was lawful. The matters contained in the notice of strike of September 27, 1990 had already been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on October 31, 1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining the respondent union from intending or staging a strike. Despite the SOLE order, the respondent union nevertheless staged a strike on November 16, 1990 simultaneously with its notice of strike, thus violating Article 264(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred the officers of the respondent union from working and had terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, and sent out circulars of its decision to retrench its employees effective December 16, 1990, the same were not valid justifications for the respondents to do away with the statutory procedural requirements for a lawful strike. It behooved the respondents to avail themselves of the remedies under the CBA or file an illegal dismissal case in the office of the Labor Arbiter against the petitioner or by agreement of the parties, submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that the matter may be subjected to voluntary arbitrary proceedings instead

of resorting to an immediate strike. There was no immediate and imperative need for the respondents to stage a strike on the very day that the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 was filed because the retrenchment envisaged by the petitioner had yet to take effect on December 14, 1990. The grievances of the respondent union could still very well be ordered and acted upon by the SOLE before December 14, 1990.

ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE vs. TORRES Gr. No. 100158, June 29, 1992 Facts: St. Scholastica College and Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika (NAFTEU) initiated for a first ever collective bargaining agreement but the negotiations fail and the union file for a motion to strike. The union declared a strike and it paralyzed the whole operation of the college which affected the students. The respondent issued a back to work order but instead of returning to work the union then filed for a motion for reconsideration. The college sent each member of the union a letter to enjoin them to return to work but the union continued to defy the return to work order. Conciliation meetings were held but this proved futile as the college remained steadfast in its position that any return to work order should be unconditional. The college sent termination letters to the individual strikers and filed a complaint for illegal strike against the union. The respondent issued an order directing the reinstatement of striking union members and holding union officers responsible for the violation of the return to work order and were correspondingly terminated. Both parties moved for the partial consideration of the return to work order. Issue: Whether or not the striking union members terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply with the return to work order of the secretary of labor reinstated. Held: The labor code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, all striking employees should immediately return to work. This means that a return to work order is immediately effective and executor, notwithstanding the filing of a motion of reconsideration, it must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. After all, the assumption and certification order issued in the exercise of the secretary’s compulsive power of arbitration and until set aside, must therefore be complied immediately.

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DIGEST POOL : Class VI The college correspondingly had every right to terminate the services of thos who chose to disregard the return to work order issued by the secretary of labor in order to protect the interest of the students who form part of the youth of the land.

TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW vs. SEC. OF LABOR Gr. No. 122743, December 12, 1997 Facts: Two petitions comprise this case. The first is the Union’s petition questioning the exclusion of union officers, among others, in the order of the Sec. of Labor directing the company to accept back all striking workers, and the second is filed by Company seeking to set aside the writ of execution issued to implement the order. The Union and the Company reached a deadlock in their negotiations for a new CBA. Hence the Union struck. Sec. Brillantes, the Sec. of Labor, intervened and assumed jurisdiction. He ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers failed to return. Pending resolution of the issue involving the legality of the strike, Sec. Brillantes directed the Company to accept back all striking workers, except the Union Officers, shop stewards, and all those with pending criminal charges, whose termination shall be among the issues to be heard by Atty. Genilo. Issue: Whether or not the exclusion of the Sec. of Labor in the order of the Sec. of Labor directing the company to accept back all striking workers is correct Arguments: In these twin petitions, the UNION argues that the exclusion of union officers, shop stewards and those with pending criminal charges from the directive to the COMPANY to accept back the striking workers is tantamount to illegal dismissal since the workers are in effect being terminated without due process of law. The COMPANY on the other hand maintains that the dismissal of those who failed to comply with the assumption and return-to-work orders is valid and in accordance with jurisprudence Held: No. It may be true that the workers struck after the Secretary of Labor and Employment had assumed jurisdiction over the case and that they may have failed to immediately return to work even after the issuance of a return-to-work order, making their continued strike illegal. For, a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. But, the liability of each of the union officers and the workers, if any, has yet to be determined. Thus, did all or some of the UNION leaders knowingly participate in the illegal strike? Did

any or all of the members of the UNION who then had pending criminal charges knowingly participate in the commission, if any, of illegal acts during the strike? The records do not bear the answers to these questions, but not expectedly so, for Atty. Genilo of the DOLE has yet to hear and receive evidence on the matter, and to submit a report and recommendation thereon. Thus to exclude union officers, shop stewards and those with pending criminal charges in the directive to the COMPANY to accept back the striking workers without first determining whether they knowingly committed illegal acts would be tantamount to dismissal without due process of law. The Court therefore holds that the Honorable Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion in excluding union officers, shop stewards and those with pending criminal charges in the order to the COMPANY to accept back the striking workers pending resolution of the issue involving the legality of the strike.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW vs. CA Gr. No. 169632, March 28, 2006 Facts: This is a case between the University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW (UNION) and The University of San Agustin (UNIV). Sometime on 2000, the parties agreed on a 5-year CBA, the economic provisions of which are effective for 3 years only. After the lapse of 3 years, the parties negotiated on the economic provisions but did not agree on the terms during the remaining 2 years of the CBA and beyond. Since the parties did not agree on the computation of tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) which shall be the basis for the increase of salaries, they underwent a preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB. Still unresolved, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock and thereafter filed a Notice of Strike at the NCMB, which was expectedly opposed by the Univ through a Motion to Strike-out Notice of Strike and Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration, since the CBA contained a "no-strike, no-lockout" provision, and a grievance machinery for settling disputes, including a voluntary arbitration mechanism should the grievance machinery fail to settle the dispute. The NCMB, however, failed to resolved the Univ's Motion Thereafter, both parties made a joint request for the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On September 18, 2003, he SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and with such assumption of jurisdiction, any strike or lockout was strictly enjoined. The day after the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and on the same day that the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order (AJO) was supposedly served to both parties, the Union staged a strike. Union meikimouse

DIGEST POOL : Class VI members refused to receive a copy of the AJO assailing that only the Union President is authorized to receive the same. The Union filed a Petition Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment Status of the striking employees, which Petition was filed at the NLRC. Such Petition was later on consolidated with the case pending before the SOLE, at the request of the Univ. The SOLE rendered a Decision resolving the various economic issues over which the parties had a deadlock in the collective bargaining, and likewise dismissed the Petition to Declare Illegal Strike. The University elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals after its Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the SOLE. The Court of Appeals partially granted the Petition. It declared the strike as illegal, but affirmed the SOLE's decision regarding the economic issues. Both the Univ and the Union filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. Basing on the CA's decision, on April 7, 2005, the Univ served the striking employees with their notices for termination and concurrently, the Union filed with the NCMB a second notice of strike, this time on ground of alleged union busting. On April 22, 2005, the parties again took initial steps to negotiate the new CBA but said attempts proved futile. Hence, on April 25, 2005, the Union went on strike. In reaction, the University notified the Union that it was pulling out of the negotiations because of the strike. On August 23, 2005, the CA, acting on the parties' respective motions for reconsideration, promulgated the herein challenged Partially Amended Decision. Finding merit in the respondent University's motion for partial reconsideration, the CA ruled that the SOLE abused its discretion in resolving the economic issues on the ground that said issues were proper subject of the grievance machinery as embodied in the parties' CBA. Consequently, the CA directed the parties to refer the economic issues of the CBA to voluntary arbitration. The CA, however, stood firm in its finding that the strike conducted by the petitioner Union was illegal and its officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. Issues: 1. Whether or not the strike was illegal and the Union Officers deemed to have lost their employment status on their failure to return to work immediately upon the service of AJO issued by the SOLE. 2. Whether or not the economic provisions of the CBA should be referred to Voluntary Arbitration. Held: On the first issue, the SC ruled that ART. 263 of the Labor Code provides: ."..Such assumption or certification (of the SOLE) shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout." The phrase

LABOR RELATIONS "immediately return to work" indicates an almost instantaneous or automatic compliance for a striker to return to work once an AJO has been duly served. Therefore, the act of the striking employees is violative of the foregoing provision. On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees, is one that arises from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, and these matters should be referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator, as provided in Art. 261 and 262 of the Labor Code. The peculiar facts of the instant case show that the University was deprived of a remedy that would have enjoined the Union strike and was left without any recourse except to invoke the jurisdiction of the SOLE.

LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION Gr. No. L-25003, October 23, 1981 Facts: Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought an action in the CFI-Manila against Permanent Concrete Workers Union, et al. for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and for damages it incurred when its employees were prevented from getting their daily supply of newsprint from its bodega. Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of a part of the premises of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon Roces, a first lessee from the aforesaid company. The premises of the plaintiff is separated from the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. by a concrete and barbed wire fence with its own entrance and road leading to the national road. This entrance is separate and distinct from the entrance road of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega for its newsprint in the sublet property which it uses for its printing and publishing business. The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its printing plant is taken from this bodega. On September 10, 1964, the employees of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. declared a strike against their company. October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal justification, Permanent Concrete Workers Union and its members picketed, stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega. The union members intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the employees who were in the truck. On October 6, 1964, union members stopped and prohibited the general manager, personnel manager, bodega-in-charge and other employees of the plaintiff from getting newsprint in their bodega. Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to intimidate and threaten its employees with bodily harm and not to blockade, picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from getting newsprint in their bodega. Defendants refused and continued to refuse to give in to the demands of the plaintiff. meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI As a consequence, plaintiff rented another bodega during the time members of the defendant union prevented its employees from entering its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary bodega. The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their employer prevented herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading and unloading of its products inside the premises of Permanent Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket. Issue: May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party? Held: Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and could not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship, is not an absolute right. The courts are not without power to localize the sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be recognized at the instance of an "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is create an impression that a labor dispute exists between him and the picketing union. Notes: Picketing is a form of protest in which people (called picketers) congregate outside a place of work or location where an event is taking place. Often, this is done in an attempt to dissuade others from going in ("crossing the picket line"), but it can also be done to draw public attention to a cause. Picketers normally endeavor to be non-violent. It can have a number of aims, but is generally to put pressure on the party targeted to meet particular demands and/or cease operations. This pressure is achieved by harming the business through loss of customers and negative publicity, or by discouraging or preventing workers and/or customers from entering the site and thereby preventing the business from operating normally. Picketing is a common tactic used by trade unions during strikes, who will try to prevent dissident members of the union, members of other unions and non-unionised workers from working. Those who cross the picket line and work despite the strike are known pejoratively as scabs.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS Gr. No. 31195, June 5, 1973 Facts: Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration. A meeting was called by the Company at the Company's canteen. The Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly, the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE' and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration, respondent Company charged petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' In their answer, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and

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DIGEST POOL : Class VI that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) - found herein petitioners PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and dismissing the employment of Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice. Issue: Whether or not petitioner PBMEO is guilty of bargaining in bad faith by violating the provisions of the CBA particularly Article XXIV: ‘NO LOCKOUT-NO STRIKE.’ Held: No. The demonstration held by the petitioners was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, hence, it was not a violation of the said provision of the CBA. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. Said mass demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency. They only exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional. The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees

LABOR RELATIONS to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three." Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". The dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities. Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police. It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights should be sustained. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."

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LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE vs. NLRC Gr. No. 103560, July 6, 1995 Facts: Petitioner's employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at said port. On the same morning, the strikers filed individual notices of strike ("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa PagWelga") with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest. Counsel for private respondents filed a manifestation that petitioner required prior screening conducted by the MLU-FFW before the remaining strikers could be accepted back to work. Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor Union (MLUFFW) filed a "Motion to Drop Most of the Party Respondents From the Above Entitled Case." The 278 employees on whose behalf the motion was filed, claimed that they were duped or tricked into signing the individual notices of strike. After discovering this deception and verifying that the strike was staged by a minority of the union officers and members and without the approval of, or consultation with, majority of the union members, they immediately withdrew their notice of strike and returned to work. The petitioner INPORT, not having interposed any objection, the Labor Arbiter granted their prayer to be excluded as respondents in the complaint for illegal strike. Moreover, petitioner's complaint was directed against the 31 respondents who did not return to work and continued with the strike. For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, the strike staged by petitioner's workers was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW). As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have possibly been "duped or tricked" into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner.

NLRC affirmed with modification the Arbiter's decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers was more of a "protest action" than a strike. Private respondents, including the six union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement. Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, NLRC modified its previous resolution. The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from service, there was no basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months' salary as separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of "equitable relief." The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given. Issue Whether or not the strike was illegal. Held: Yes! A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute. The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT. Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting requirements. As we stated in the case of National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, the language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory. Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia: (i)t SHALL be unlawful for any labor organization . . . to declare a strike . . . without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. In explaining the above provision, we said: In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs

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LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI the MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement' during the cooling-off period. . . . xxx xxx xxx The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike-vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of the law. The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 265 (now Article 264) of the Labor Code, make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein. A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to 20 have lost their employment status. An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike. In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union officers, back to work. Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused to submit to the "screening" required by the company.

who belong to the Philmaroa be furnished them. But the Philmaroa refused to do so for fear of reprisal. The Companies also averred that some of them had given salaries over and above that demanded in the standardization, some have given sick and vacation leave and hospitalization, etc. The companies were given six days of grace within which to act upon or answer the demands made by the Philmaroa. Concilliation efforts failed to effect a settlement and the 6 day period expired thus, Philmaroa declared a strike. The President of the Philippines certified the case to the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR allowed the strikers to go back to their respective positions, but without backpay. They denied standardization, vacation leave and closed shop agreement, but granting sick leave, free hospitalization with pay. Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be entitled to reinstatement with backwages. Held: SC upheld reinstatement but rejected the claim for back wages. The strike was by all means a voluntary act on the part of the strikers. The strike was used as an economic weapon to compel the grant of the conditions of employment; but it was not caused by any illegal or unfair labor practice on the part of the respondent companies/ employers at all. There is no reason for granting backpay as they had voluntarily absented themselves from work and there had been no unfair labor practice on the part of the respondent companies. The grant of backpay is governed by the principle “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor.”

PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS ASSOCIATION vs. CIR Gr. No. L-10095, October 31, 1957

Facts: In this case, PHILMAROA (petitioners) presented a list of demands to the Association de Navieros, the Philippine Shipowners’ Association and the Luzon Stevedoring Company,the most important of which are: (1) the standardization and increase of salaries; (2) sick and vacation leave; (3) hospitalization and sick leave; and (4) a closed shop agreement. As none of the companies were willing to consider its demands the Philmaroa gave notice of its intention to strike to the different shipping companies and to the Chief, Conciliation Service Division, Department of Labor. The Chief of the Conciliation Service called the parties for conference. At this conference the Association de Navieros and the Philippine Shipowners’ Association gave the information that they had no authority or power to bargain collectively and suggested that the members of the said association be notified, so the union sent notices to the different member companies(respondents). The respondent companies answered, questioning the authority of the Philmaroa to act as representative of the radio operators and demanding that the list of the members employed

CROMWELL COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS UNION vs. CIR, Gr. No. L-19778, September 30, 1964 Facts: On July 10, 1956, Cromwell Commercial Co. and the Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union (PTUC) signed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The changes in the working conditions in the company and the latter's failure to carry out its part of the agreement became a source of complaint among the employees. The company did nothing. The grievance machinery set up in the agreement could not function on account of the company's refusal to name its representatives in the committee. Then, the company dismissed Gaddi and Andrada, leaders of the shipping department-employees. The union dispatched another letter to the company, protesting the dismissal of Gaddi and Andrada. On March 8, the company took back the keys from the warehouseman and ordered the salesmen to put their trucks in the garage. meikimouse

DIGEST POOL : Class VI Finally, on March 11, 1954 the union struck and picketed the premises of the company. The company in turn gave the strikers until 8 a.m. of March 14, 1957 within which to return to work otherwise they would be considered dismissed for cause. It warned them that the strike was illegal for being against the no strike clause of the CBA. In a conference called by the Department of Labor, the strikers offered to return to work provided the company observed the provisions of the bargaining contract. But the company insisted that the strikers could be taken back only under the terms of its March 1 order. On September 19, 1957 this case was filed in the CIR, charging the company, with ULP. After trial, the court rendered judgment as follows: a) to reinstate Gaddi and the 5 salesmen with half backpay . b) To reinstate all the strikers listed in Annex "A" of the complaint, without backwages. The court in banc affirmed the decision. Hence this appeal. Issues: (1) awarding only half back wages to Gaddi and the five salesmen, (2) awarding no back wages to the rest of the strikers and (3) denying reinstatement to Andrada and Dario and to those who might have found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. Held: At the outset, two types of employees involved in this case must be distinguished, namely, those who were discriminatorily dismissed for union activities and those who voluntarily went on strike. # 1. To the first class belong Gaddi and Andrada, both of whom, as earlier shown, had been dismissed for union activities, and the five salesmen who were virtually locked out by the company when they were ordered to put their trucks in the garage. #2 To the second class belong those who declared a strike on March 11, 1957, following the failure of the companyunion conference to settle their dispute. The denial of backpay may be justified, although on a different ground. For this purpose, We shall advert again to the distinction earlier made between discriminatorily dismissed employees and those who struck, albeit in protest against the company's ULP. Discriminatorily dismissed employees received backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is from the day of their discharge. On this score, the award of backpay to Gaddi, Andrada and the salesmen may be justified. The salesmen, as already stated, were practically locked out when they were ordered to put their trucks in the garage; they did not voluntarily strike. Hence, the award of backwages. In contrast, the rest of the employees struck as a voluntary act of protest against what they considered ULP of the company. The stoppage of their work was not the direct consequence of the company's ULP. Hence their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. "When employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against ULP, it has been our policy not to award them backpay during the strike. However, when the strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the ULP and the employer

LABOR RELATIONS either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitute ULP, We are of the opinion that the considerations impelling our refusal to award backpay are no longer controlling. Accordingly, We hold that where, as in this case, an employer refuses to reinstate strikers except upon their acceptance of the new conditions that discriminate against them because of their union membership or activities, the strikers who refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's discriminatory acts." While it is true that the strikers in this case offered to return to work on March 14, 1957, We find that their offer was conditional. Their offer was predicated on the company's observance of the provisions of the CBA - the very bone of contention between the parties by reason of which the union walked out. To be effective so as to entitle the strikers to backpay, the offer must have been unconditional. The strikers must have offered to return to work under the same conditions under which they just before their strike so that the company's refusal would have placed on the blame for their economic loss. But that is not the case here. Indeed the offer of the company to accept the striker under the conditions obtaining before the strike, without prejudice to taking up the grievances of the strike can be considered in its favor in denying back wages to the strikers. Nor may it be said that the strikers could not have offered to return to work because the company dismissed them upon their failure to return to work on March 14, 1957. For the notice given by the company was merely a "tactical" threat designed to break the strike and not really to discharge the striking employees # 3. The case of Andrada and Dario who were found guilty of acts of violence consisting of hurling stones which smashed glass windows of the building of the company and the headlights of a car and the utterance of obscenities such as "Putang ina". But the union contends that the acts committed by Andrada and Dario were not so serious as to call for the forfeiture of their right to reinstatement. It is not for Us to judge the effect of misconduct by employees. That is primarily for the CIR to determine. In the absence of proof of abuse of discretion on the part of the CIR this Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. The same thing may be said of the denial of reinstatement to those who might have found substantial employment elsewhere. We agree with the union that the mere fact that strikers or dismissed employees have found such employment elsewhere is not necessarily a bar to their 1 reinstatement. According to the Court, it is for the Board in each case to weigh the particular facts and to determine, in the exercise of wise administrative discretion, whether the Act would best be effectuated by directing reinstatement despite the fact that the given employees had found equivalent employment. Obviously it was after considering the facts in this case that the CIR predicated the reinstatement of the employees concerned on the fact that they had not found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. Thus, it made clear in the dispositive portion of its decision that it was ordering the taking of affirmative acts "which the Court finds will effectuate the policy of meikimouse

LABOR RELATIONS

DIGEST POOL : Class VI the Act". The union has not shown that in so doing the CIR abused its discretion. DECISION: The decision and resolution of the CIR appealed from are hereby affirmed! Separate Opinions REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting: I can not agree to the ruling laid down in the opinion in so far as it denies backpay to the reinstated laborers. There is no dispute that the employer was the first to infringe the CBA by refusing to implement its provisions, particularly by its March 1 order, and by insisting on it as a condition for taking back the strikers. I cannot see how the objectives and policies of the Industrial Peace Act can be said to be promoted by placing the economic loss on the strikers, denying them backpay; the discouraging of ULP is certainly one of unfair labor policies, and the denial of backpay to the victims of ULP is a direct encouragement for the employer to continue its reprobable misconduct. While the laborers technically violated the no-strike clause, the facts as found reveal that the employer goaded the laborers into striking, by repeatedly violating the CBA and by preventing the organization of the grievance committee through the Company's refusal to name its representatives therein.

CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARSMAN Gr. No. L-17038 July 31, 1964

that when they were already working the Company would discuss with them their demands. Upon being informed to the Union's acceptance of the proposal the strikers returned to work. The Company admitted back sixteen picketing strikers on August 9, 1954 and later on, it also reemployed non-union employees and a majority of the strikers. However, complainants herein were refused admittance and were informed by Company officials that they would not be reinstated unless they ceased to be active Union members and that in any case the Company already had enough men for its business operations. As a result the strike and the picketing were resumed, because of which employees who had been admitted to work since July 21, 1954 had to stay inside the Company premises, where the Company furnished them food and quarters up to October 1954. Because of the Company's consistent refusal to reinstate the 69 complainants even after repeated requests, the Confederation of Labor Associations of the Philippines (CLAP), to which the Union had affiliated after seceding from the FFW initiated the present charge for unfair labor practice. Initially the strike staged by the Union was meant to compel the Company to grant it certain economic benefits set forth in its proposal for collective bargaining. The strike was an economic one, But the strike changed its character from the time the Company refused to reinstate complainants because of their union activities after it had offered to admit all the strikers and in fact did readmit the others. It was then converted into an unfair labor practice strike. The Court (Judge Jose S. Bautista), after hearing, found the Company guilty of the charge and ordered it to reinstate 60 of the aforementioned 69 complainants to their former positions or to similar ones with the same rate of pay, without back wages. Motions for reconsideration were denied hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the strike was illegal

Facts: Marsman & Company (Company) had employees of around 320 persons, about 140 of whom where members of MARCELA and about 20 of the National Labor Union. On December 23, 1953 the Industrial Court named Marsman & Company Employees and Laborers Association (MARCELA) as the employees' bargaining agent in regard to rates of pay, terms and conditions of employment. At that time MARCELA was affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers, or FFW, a national labor organization. On March 17, 1954 MARCELA-FFW submitted to the Company a set of proposals for collective bargaining, which the Company answered on March 24, 1954. Despite negotiations held between the Company and the Union, they failed to reach In agreement; so on April 8, 1954 the Union, failed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor. Mediation by the Conciliation Service of that Department proved fruitless. On June 4, 1954 the Union declared a strike and at the same time placed a "round-the-clock" picket line around the Company's premises in Intramuros, Manila. On July 30, 1954, in a conference called by Eleuterio Adevoso, then Secretary of Labor, the Union officials and members then present were prevailed upon by Adevoso to accept the proposals of Antonio de las Alas, Company vice-president, that they stop the strike and go back to work, and

Held: The Company claims that the complainants applied for readmission only on June 7, 1955, more than a year after the offer, when the CLAP, in their behalf, wrote the Company asking for their reinstatement. Prior to said letter, however, complainants had, by various means, sought readmission. After Delas Alas' invitation to return to work was accepted by the Union officers and members, they informed all the other strikers accordingly. Thereupon the strikers terminated the strike and presented themselves for work at the Company's premises. The Company alleges that it was economic reasons, i.e., its policy of retrenchment, not labor discrimination, which prevented it from rehiring complainants. This is disproved, however, by the fact that it not only readmitted the other strikers, but also hired new employees and even increased the salaries of its personnel by almost 50%. The Union began the strike because it believed in good faith that settlement of their demands was at an impasse and that further negotiations would only come to naught. It stopped the strike upon the belief they could go back to work. Then it renewed the strike (or it started a new strike) as a protest against the

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DIGEST POOL : Class VI discrimination practiced by the Company. Both are valid grounds for going on a strike.

ABARIA vs. NLRC Gr. No. 154113, December 7, 2011 Facts: The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). Under the 1987 and 1991 CBAs, the signatories were Pongasi, Sr. for MCCHI, and Atty. Alforque and Lumapguid for NFL-MCCHI. In the CBA effective from January 1994 until December 31, 1995, the signatories were Buot as Board of Trustees Chairman, Rev. Iyoy as MCCH Administrator and Atty. Yu as Legal Counsel of NFL, while Nava, President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMAMCCH-NFL) signed the Proof of Posting. Nava wrote Rev. Iyoy expressing the union’s desire to renew the CBA and attaching the proposal. Nava subsequently requested that some of the employees be allowed to avail of one-day union leave with pay. However, MCCHI returned the CBA proposal to secure first the endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining representative of MCCHI employees. Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA submitted by Nava was never referred to NFL and that NFL has not authorized any other legal counsel or any person for collective bargaining negotiations. By January 1996, the collection of union fees (check-off) was temporarily suspended by MCCHI in view of the existing conflict between the federation and its local affiliate. Thereafter, MCCHI attempted to take over the room being used as union office but was prevented to do so by Nava and her group who protested these actions and insisted that management directly negotiate with them for a new CBA. MCCHI referred the matter to Atty. Alforque, NFL’s Regional Director, and advised Nava that their group is not recognized by NFL. In his letter addressed to Nava some of the employees’ union membership was suspended for serious violation of the Constitution and By-Laws. Upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members. The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards, posters and streamers. Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted activities being carried out by union members which are not sanctioned by NFL. MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to submit a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having engaged in illegal concerted activities amounting to strike, and placed them under immediate preventive suspension. Responding to this directive, Nava and her group denied there was a temporary stoppage of work, explaining that employees wore their armbands only as a sign of protest and reiterating their demand for

LABOR RELATIONS MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain collectively. Rev. Iyoy, having been informed that Nava and her group have also been suspended by NFL, directed said officers to appear before his office for investigation in connection with the illegal strike wherein they reportedly uttered slanderous and scurrilous words against the officers of the hospital, threatening other workers and forcing them to join the strike. Said union officers, however, invoked the grievance procedure provided in the CBA to settle the dispute between management and the union. The DOLE Regional Office issued certifications stating that there is nothing in their records which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor organization, and that said union submitted only a copy of its Charter Certificate. MCCHI then sent individual notices to all union members asking them to submit a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having supported the illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as per DOLE records. In their collective response, it was explained that the picketing employees wore armbands to protest MCCHI’s refusal to bargain; it was also contended that MCCHI cannot question the legal personality of the union which had actively assisted in CBA negotiations and implementation. NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but the same was deemed not filed for want of legal personality on the part of the filer. The NCMB likewise denied their motion for reconsideration. Despite such rebuff, Nava and her group still conducted a strike vote during which an overwhelming majority of union members approved the strike. Meanwhile, the scheduled investigations did not push through because the striking union members insisted on attending the same only as a group. MCCHI again sent notices informing them that their refusal to submit to investigation is deemed a waiver of their right to explain their side and management shall proceed to impose proper disciplinary action under the circumstances. Thereafter, MCCHI sent termination letters to union leaders and other members who participated in the strike and picketing activities. It also issued a cease-and-desist order to the rest of the striking employees stressing that the wildcat concerted activities spearheaded by the Nava group is illegal without a valid Notice of Strike and warning them that non-compliance will compel management to impose disciplinary actions against them. For their continued picketing activities despite the said warning, more than 100 striking employees were dismissed. Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. The means of ingress to and egress from the hospital were blocked so that vehicles carrying patients and employees were barred from entering the premises. Placards were placed at the hospital’s entrance gate stating: “Please proceed to another hospital” and “we are on protest.” Employees and patients reported acts of intimidation and harassment perpetrated by union leaders and members. With the intensified atmosphere of violence and animosity within the hospital premises as a result of continued protest activities by union members, MCCHI suffered heavy losses due to low patient admission rates. The hospital’s suppliers also refused to make further deliveries on credit. meikimouse

DIGEST POOL : Class VI With the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a petition for injunction in the NLRC (Cebu City). A TRO was issued. MCCHI presented 12 witnesses (hospital employees and patients), including a security guard who was stabbed by an identified sympathizer while in the company of Nava’s group. MCCHI’s petition was granted and a permanent injunction was issued enjoining the Nava group from committing illegal acts. The City Government of Cebu ordered the demolition of the structures and obstructions put up by the picketing employees of MCCHI along the sidewalk. Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees. Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino rendered his decision dismissing the complaints for unfair labor practice filed by Nava and 90 other complainants. ELA Belarmino found no basis for the charge of unfair labor practice and declared the strike and picketing activities illegal having been conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a legitimate labor organization. The termination of union leaders was upheld as valid. The NLRC dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal is affirmed. Complainants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition on procedural ground. Hence, a petition is filed before the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether or not the strike and picketing activities conducted by union officers and members were illegal Whether or not union officers and members who participated in an illegal strike can be held liable thereof Held: Yes, the strike is illegal. As borne by the records, NAMA-MCCH-NFL was not a duly registered or an independently registered union at the time it filed the notice of strike and when it conducted the strike vot. It could not then legally represent the union members. Consequently, the mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike vote report were ineffective for having been filed and conducted by NAMAMCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as a legitimate labor organization, in violation of Art. 263 (c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Furthermore, the strike was illegal due to the commission of the following prohibited activities: (1) violence, coercion, intimidation and harassment against non-participating employees; and (2) blocking of free ingress to and egress from the hospital, including preventing patients and their vehicles from entering the hospital and other employees from reporting to work, the putting up of placards with a statement advising incoming patients to proceed to another hospital because MCCHI employees are on strike/protest. As shown by photographs submitted by MCCHI, as well as the findings of the NCMB and Cebu City Government, the hospital premises and sidewalk within its vicinity were full of placards, streamers and makeshift structures that obstructed its use by the

LABOR RELATIONS public who were likewise barraged by the noise coming from strikers using megaphones. On the other hand, the affidavits executed by several hospital employees and patients narrated in detail the incidents of harassment, intimidation, violence and coercion, some of these witnesses have positively identified the perpetrators. The prolonged work stoppage and picketing activities of the striking employees severely disrupted hospital operations that MCCHI suffered heavy financial losses. The findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter and NLRC, as sustained by the appellate court, clearly established that the striking union members created so much noise, disturbance and obstruction that the local government authorities eventually ordered their removal for being a public nuisance. This was followed by an injunction from the NCMB enjoining the union leaders from further blocking the free ingress to and egress from the hospital, and from committing threats, coercion and intimidation against non-striking employees and patients/vehicles desiring to enter for the purpose of seeking medical treatment/confinement. By then, the illegal strike had lasted for almost five months. Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for the consequences of an illegal strike to the participating workers: x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. The above provision makes a distinction between workers and union officers who participate in an illegal strike: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike. Considering their persistence in holding picketing activities despite the declaration by the NCMB that their union was not duly registered as a legitimate labor organization and the letter from NFL’s legal counsel informing that their acts constitute disloyalty to the national federation, and their filing of the notice of strike and conducting a strike vote notwithstanding that their union has no legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI for collective bargaining purposes, there is no question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers knowingly participated in the illegal strike. With respect to the dismissed union members, although MCCHI submitted photographs taken at the picket line, it did not individually name those striking employees and specify the illegal act committed by each of them. As to the affidavits executed by nonstriking employees, they identified mostly union officers as the persons who blocked the hospital entrance, harassed hospital employees and patients whose vehicles were prevented from entering the premises. Only some of these witnesses actually named a few union members who committed similar acts of harassment and coercion.

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