Labor Stds. (Wah Yuen - Shie Jie Corp. digests)

Wah Yuen Restaurant v. Jayona | GR 159448 | Dec. 16, 2005 | J. Carpio-Morales F: Primo Jayona (respondent) was hired in December 1998 as Assistant Manager of Wah Yuen Restaurant (petitioner). By respondent’s claim, his initial monthly salary was P9,000.00, which was increased to P9,450.00 effective January 15, 2000. By letter-memorandum dated January 5, 2000. Betty Chua, the President of petitioner, directed respondent to explain within 72 hours why he should not be dismissed from the service for grave dishonesty and loss of confidence for billing a customer in an amount considerably less than the cost of the actual stuff ordered. And Betty warned respondent that a repetition of the same act would cause his automatic dismissal from the service. A handwritten note with an unidentified initial at the lower portion of the letter-memorandum indicates that respondent refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. Subsequently, petitioner through counsel, by letter of April 5, 2000 which was served upon respondent on even date, terminated his services effective that same date, upon the ground that he was “found for the second time on April 3, 2000 (the first was on January 3, 2000) to have charged/billed a customer an amount, which was considerably less than the actual order, [which] is certainly prejudicial to the interests of [his] employer, a practice which can bring about the collapse of the business in the long run; that is if the practice is not checked immediately.” Respondent thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, recovery of overtime pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground that as an assistant manager, he works for as long as he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer, but once the trust and confidence are lost, he has no more reason to stay as such.

Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, the dismissal of an employee must be for a just or authorized cause and after due process. Procedural due process requires the employer to give the employee two notices. The first is to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and the second is to inform him of the decision to terminate him. Failure to comply with these mandatory procedural requirements taints the dismissal with illegality and any judgment rendered by the employer without compliance therewith can be considered void and inexistent. For petitioner to consider the letter-memorandum of January 5, 2000 as the first notice, and the letter of April 5, 2000 as the second notice of termination of employment is erroneous. For albeit the two letters dealt with infractions of the same nature, they were separate and distinct. The April 5, 2000 termination letter itself clearly stated that respondent was being terminated for committing a second infraction. As such he should have been given the chance to give his side thereon. But he was not. In any event, not only did petitioner fail to observe the due process requirements. It also failed to establish by substantial evidence that the alleged second infraction was committed. Loss of confidence then, which is the usual ground for the removal of a managerial employee, not having been established, like any other lawful cause, the petition must fail. Although the loss of confidence on petitioner’s part is unfounded, reinstating respondent to his former position would not be advisable given the souring of their relationship. This Court now, therefore, directs petitioner to just afford respondent his right to separation pay, backwages, and other benefits under the law.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by Resolution of December 14, 2001, affirmed the dismissal. On respondent’s Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the NLRC Resolution. The CA gave the petition due course.

Since the records do not provide a basis for the determination of the amount of separation pay plus backwages and other benefits to which respondent is entitled, a remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter is thus in order.

Hence, the present petition for review. Petitioner harps on the “unwarranted stress on respondent’s rather selfserving claim that he was granted a salary increase barely two (2) weeks after he committed his first infraction.”

The decision is AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION. The records of this case are REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter, through the National Labor Relations Commission, only for the determination of the amount of separation pay plus backwages and other benefits to which respondent is entitled.

I: WON the respondent was illegally dismissed

Austria v. NLRC, 310 SCRA 293

H: In the case at bar, petitioner, which has the onus of proving that the dismissal of respondent on account of loss of confidence arose from particular facts, failed to discharge the same.

F: PHILIPPINE STEEL COATING CORPORATION (PHILSTEEL), private respondent, is engaged in the manufacture of prefabricated steel, galvanized iron and other metal products. On 19 December 1985 it hired petitioner Nazario C. Austria as its Credit and Collection Manager. On 11 August 1987 petitioner and private respondent PHILSTEEL entered into a "Confidentiality Agreement" whereby he agreed not to disclose to anyone outside the company any technical, operational and other such information acquired in the course of his employment, unless otherwise duly authorized by private respondent, on pain of immediate dismissal.

On respondent’s claim that his salary was increased effective January 15, 2000, petitioner argues that other than respondent’s self-serving claim, no evidence was presented to show that indeed the salary increase took effect on January 15, 2000. This Court notes that in its Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, petitioner stated that respondent was hired in December 1998 at a monthly salary ofP9,540.00 “more or less.” If respondent was hired at such amount, contrary to respondent’s claim that his initial salary was P9,000.00 but that it was increased toP9,450 on January 15, 2000 or twelve days after he was alleged to have committed an infraction on January 3, 2000, it would have been easy for petitioner to present documentary proof of its claim. But none was produced. Under Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, as well as Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V and Section 2, Rule I, Book VI, of the Implementing

A smooth and satisfactory employee-employer relationship ensued between the two (2) parties until 17 August 1989 when petitioner was unceremoniously terminated by private respondent company on the ground that he allegedly disclosed confidential information to prospective competitors and had undertaken activities far beyond his official duties and responsibilities. On 30 August 1989 Austria filed a case for illegal dismissal against PHILSTEEL. He alleged that on 5 August 1989 the President of PHILSTEEL, Abeto Uy, demanded his resignation

purportedly due to loss of confidence but refused to shed light on the reasons therefor. Austria further alleged that on 17 August 1989, without any prior written notice, he was summoned to a meeting with the Vice-President for Finance, Primo Valerio, and Vice-President for Legal and Personnel, Gregorio Vega. Therein he was questioned about a certain 13 July 1989 telefax message sent by one Felix Lukban to PHILSTEEL's Australian supplier of equipment and machinery, Bliss Fox Manufacturing Corporation (BLISS FOX). The telefax showed that, on behalf of an unnamed client, Lukban was asking for the purchase price of a complete line of machinery and equipment for a steel galvanizing plant. Austria denied any knowledge of the telex. Petitioner was also asked about his close relationship with Lukban, which the former admitted, Lukban being the godfather of his child. Immediately after the meeting Austria was given his notice of termination and required to surrender the keys to his company car and to his room which were in his possession. When he returned to his room it was already padlocked; when he passed by his car it was barricaded. Austria submitted in support of his complaint the affidavit of Felix Lukban executed on 13 December 1989 disclaiming any participation of petitioner in the sending of the telefax message. In addition, Lukban testified to the same effect and denied hearing any answer from BLISS FOX on his telefax. PHILSTEEL, on the other hand, contended that any information as to the sources of its supply was highly confidential as the steel industry was very competitive, and the information was disclosed by Austria to Lukban. The basis for this contention was the incident of 5 August 1989 when a representative of BLISS FOX named Charles Villa informed Abeto Uy, in the presence of Primo Valerio and Gregorio Vega, of the fax message sent by Lukban to BLISS FOX. Charles Villa was said to have stated that Lukban represented himself to be acting for PHILSTEEL so he verified the representation from Uy who however denied it. Forthwith, Villa dialed a certain number from the telefax message.[9] After a brief exchange with the person on the other end of the phone, during which time Villa scribbled a name at the back of the telex, he informed Uy that he just talked with Lukban who informed him that his contact with PHILSTEEL was Rudy Austria whose name he had just written. After Villa left, Austria was immediately investigated on the matter. Petitioner admitted having a close relationship with Lukban. Austria also volunteered to disclose secret meetings at Manila Garden Hotel with Lukban and the latter's son-in-law regarding plans to put up a rival galvanizing business either here in the Philippines or in Singapore, as well as meetings at company premises with a group of Australians on the same subject. A second investigation held on 17 August 1989 yielded the same result. Testimonies of Vega and Valerio, as well as the latter's 29 November 1989 affidavit, the confidentiality agreement and the termination letter were presented to buttress private respondents' evidence. The Labor Arbiter found the evidence of private respondents credible on the ground that no other inference other than Austria's guilt could be drawn from these established circumstances: the Australian representative of BLISS FOX did not know Austria nor the latter's nickname (Rudy) when he called Lukban and inquired who Lukban's contact person was at PHILSTEEL; Lukban was not only known to Austria, he was close to him; and, Austria signified his intention to join the rival company which Lukban planned to form. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that petitioner failed to establish any motive on the part of private respondents and of Valerio and Vega in terminating his employment or in testifying against him since his services were still highly satisfactory as of July 1989. Thus, the Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal to be legal but ordered private respondents to pay petitioner P24,000.00 separation pay considering that the company suffered no loss and that there was no proof of a rival company later established by petitioner.

On appeal the NLRC agreed with the thesis of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner failed to prove any other motive by private respondents for his termination considering his excellent job performance. The Commission however modified the Labor Arbiter's decision by directing PHILSTEEL to pay petitioner an indemnity of P1,000.00 for non-observance of due process in failing to provide petitioner with a prior written notice of the investigation and for not giving him time to answer charges and to seek assistance of counsel. Basic is the rule that judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor officials' findings rest, more so when both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC share the same findings. This, notwithstanding, we cannot affirm the decision of the NLRC especially when its findings of fact on which the conclusion was based are not supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence, we mean the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. The NLRC grounded its findings on the following postulates: (a) the witnesses of PHILSTEEL are credible for petitioner failed to show any ground for them to falsely testify, especially in the light of his excellent job performance; and, (b) respondents' witnesses are more credible than petitioner's - Lukban who, insofar as the source of the information is concerned, impressed the NLRC as evasive. The NLRC however entertained a patent misapprehension of the burden of proof rule in labor termination cases. Unlike in other cases where the complainant has the burden of proof to discharge, in labor cases concerning illegal dismissals, the burden of proving that the employee was dismissed with just cause rests upon the employer. Such is the mandate of Art. 278 of the Labor Code. In brief, the evidence of PHILSTEEL rests upon the following bases: (a) the allegation of Charles Villa, representative of BLISS FOX, that Lukban named petitioner Austria as his contact in PHILSTEEL; (b) the close relationship of Lukban and Austria; and, (c) the admissions of Austria during the investigation relative to both the close relationship with Lukban and their plans to set up a rival business. I: WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion for its misappreciation of the evidence and giving it undue weight H: Like a house of cards, the evidence of private respondents collapses when we take into account the fact that its foundation is made of hearsay evidence or mere speculations. It must be noted that the testimonies of Valerio and Vega relied mainly on the veracity of the assertions of Villa. They did not say that they actually heard or observed Lukban admit to Villa that the former's client was PHILSTEEL and that his contact with PHILSTEEL was Austria. What they seemingly saw was Villa scribbling a name on the telefax purportedly dictated by Lukban. In short, what they appear to have observed was what Villa wanted them to observe, no matter whether it was the truth or not. Thus, their testimony was clearly hearsay and must not be given weight. Moreover, the veracity of Villa's assertions, even as to his being a representative of BLISS FOX, is suspect. The reliance both by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on the hearsay testimonies in assessing the evidence of private respondents reflects a dangerous propensity for baseless conclusions amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Such propensity is further shown when public respondent gave imprimatur to PHILSTEEL's conclusion that Austria was the one who divulged the so-called confidential information due mainly to his close affinity with Lukban. Of significance here is the fact that nowhere in all the allegations of PHILSTEEL was there proof of any concrete action by Austria of divulging confidential information and of setting up a rival business. Everything was according to what Villa said or what Lukban supposedly said. Thus, PHILSTEEL's resort to Austria's "admissions." The admission of close relationship is certainly true as it was affirmed by both Austria and Lukban. The "admission" however, of their setting up a rival business strikes this Court as somewhat forced like squeezing a stone for water. The reality of

such admission is negated by subsequent events. At no time did such an envisioned "rival" company come to being. Indeed, after his dismissal, petitioner had to languish for several months in uncertainty while looking for employment, instead of just joining the alleged company. Until he died on 15 March 1997, petitioner never went into partnership with Lukban nor joined any other company. Accusation cannot take the place of proof. A suspicion or belief no matter how sincerely felt cannot be a substitute for factual findings carefully established through an orderly procedure. Such orderly procedure was denied petitioner by PHILSTEEL, as correctly found by the NLRC, thus In the instant case, there was at least a partial denial of the complainant's right to due process because there was no showing: (1) that he was given the required first written notice; (2) that he was given sufficient time to answer the charges against him; and, (3) that he had the chance to obtain the assistance of counsel. As there is a finding of illegal dismissal, an award of back wages, instead of indemnity, computed from the time of dismissal up to the time of his death, with legal interest plus attorney's fees, might properly assuage the hurt and damages caused by such illegal dismissal. The petition is GRANTED. General Bank & Trust Co. v. CA, 135 SCRA 569 F: This case starts with the employment of plantiff-appellee with the Cebu Branch of the First National City Bank of New York for 18 years, where he rose to the position of Chief Clerk, Accounting Department (Exhibit 0); that on January 11, 1965, plaintiffappellee joined the defendant bank in its Cebu branch as accountant with an annual compensation of P6,000.00 (Exhibit A); that on April 26, 1965, the Cebu Branch of defendant bank began operating and doing business with the public; that on January 1, 1966, plaintiff received an increase of P50.00 bringing his monthly salary to P550.00 (Exhibit D); that on April 11, 1967 defendant bank appointed the plaintiff to the position of Acting Manager of its Cebu Branch, with the corresponding increase of sale to P700.00 a month (Exhibit E); that effective September 1, 1967, defendant bank granted plantiff a monthly housing allowance of P200.00 in addition to his monthly salary (Exhibit F); that on October 3, 1967 defendant bank appointed plaintiff as the regular Manager of its Cebu Branch (Exhibit G) effective May 1, 1968; that defendant bank increased plaintiff's salary to P1800.00 a month (Exhibit H); that on May 16, 1969 while the plaintiff was on vacation leave, he happened to visit the bank and learned that three tellers of defendant bank's branch in Cebu City, namely, Miss Crystal Enriquez, Miss Yolanda Chu, and Miss Sonia Chiu, had been transferred to the head office in Manila by defendant Jose D. Santos; that the plantiff went to Manila on May 18, 1969 to make personal representation with the head office for the retention of the said tellers in Cebu; that on May 26, 1969 the plaintiff reported back for duty with defendant bank's branch in Cebu and reinstated immediately the three tellers to their respective positions in the Cebu branch of defendant bank; that on May 28, 1969 defendant Jose D. Santos submitted a report to defendant Salvador D. Tenorio alleging that there was excess personnel in the Cebu Branch; that on the same date defendant Jose D. Santos submitted a supplementary report to defendant Salvador D. Tenorio charging the plaintiff of over appraising the real estate offered by Domingo Chua as collateral for his credit accommodation (Exhibit 34); that defendant Salvador D. Tenorio immediately dispatched a letter to the plaintiff dated May 30, 1969 requiring him to explain within twenty-four hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for alleged repeated violation of defendant bank's policies and directives regarding credit accommodations and for over-appraisal of the real estate collateral for Domingo Chua's account, among others (Exhibit 8); that on June 6, 1969, the plaintiff received the said letter of defendant Salvador D. Tenorio but found it impossible to render the required explanation in 24 hours; that on June 19, 1969 defendant Jose D. Santos went to Cebu City and served

plaintiff with the letter of defendant Salvador D. Tenorio, dated June 18, 1969, suspending the plaintiff; and that on July 22, 1969 plantiff was served with the order of his termination signed by defendant Clarencio S. Yujuico, dated July 18, 1969. The Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a decision, finding the dismissal of plantiff as without just cause or otherwise illegal arbitrary, oppressive and malicious, and ordering defendants to pay to the plaintiff, jointly and severally. The Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the lower court. I: WON the dismissal of Manuel E. Batucan was justified on the ground that he repeatedly failed to uphold the interests of the bank thus leading to his employer's loss of confidence on him. H: After a careful review of the case, we find no error in the finding of the Court of Appeals that Mr. Batucan was indeed illegally dismissed. The petitioners' claim that "undisputed documentary evidence show that prior to his dismissal, specifically from March 1968 to January 1969, respondent Batucan had been repeatedly cited, warned and finally threatened with dismissal by his superior, petitioner Tenorio, for his practice of granting credit accommodations without authority during his tenure." They support such claim with six memoranda addressed to Mr. Batucan, to wit: Exh. "22" dated April 17, 1968 by Tenorio; Exh. "23" dated March 12, 1968 by Tenorio; Exh. "24" dated March 14, 1968 by Tenorio; Exh. "29" dated December 9, 1968 by Tenorio; Exh. "30" dated December 27, 1968 by Tenorio; Exh. "34" dated January 28, 1969 by Tenorio. Petitioners' argument is devoid of merit. We agree with the respondent that these communications are "nothing more than routinary acts and/or privileged acts of top management officials which could not in any way affect or erode petitioners' confidence in respondent Batucan." After the first three aforecited exhibits were dispatched to Cebu on March 12, 1968, March 14, 1968, and April 17, 1968, petitioner San Luis cleared Mr. Batucan from an exceptions reported by the Central Bank examiners in connection with their examination conducted in March, 1968. In his report to the President of the bank in about the first week of March 1968, San Luis commended Mr. Batucan for the good image enjoyed by the bank in the locality because clients, customers, and depositors spoke well and highly of Mr. Batucan for his dedication, sincere and upright dealing with people. Because of such commendation, the president of the bank, the late Senator Quintin Paredes gave Mr. Batucan an increase of P100.00 in his monthly salary effective May 1, 1968. Mr. Batucan was also asked to speak at the manager's meeting on October 19, 1968 on his "Techniques in Effective solicitation of Deposits or New Accounts." Batucan was also given a free hand in the prosecution of a defalcating head teller relying on his good judgment to protect the interests of the bank. With the foregoing circumstances, we cannot reconcile the management's alleged loss of confidence in Mr. Batucan with the latter's commendations for efficient performance, his having been given an increase in salary and his being asked to speak to other colleagues on effective banking techniques shortly after the supposed loss of confidence. We agree with the Court of Appeals in its finding that preponderance of the evidence, however, shows that the alleged unauthorized extension of temporary over-draft or credit accommodations referred to credit accommodations which were granted by and already existing during the term of the previous management. Not only did the Court of Appeals establish that there were no improper credit accommodations granted during Mr. Batucan's term as manager but his competence at being able to regularize

these accounts and his contributions to the improvement of the bank were clearly ascertained. There is no question that managerial employees should enjoy the confidence of top management. This is especially true in banks where officials handle big sums of money and engage in confidential or fiduciary transactions. However, loss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. We now come to the issue of damages. Petitioners question the propriety of awarding moral and exemplary damages to the respondent. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code: Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or commission. Mr. Batucan left a stable job with a reputable bank to join the petitioner bank. He had been an employee of the First National City Bank of New York for eighteen (18) years. Undoubtedly, before he accepted petitioner Tenorio's invitation, he must have thought the matter over several times. And from the time he joined the petitioner bank, the records show that Mr. Batucan has indeed worked his way up from accountant to permanent branch manager of the bank. During his term as manager, he was able to increase the income and resources of the bank. He raised the image of petitioner bank in the business and banking community and placed its operations on a good and competitive basis. His peremptory dismissal from the bank was certainly a shock to him and damaged his moral feelings and personal pride after all the loyalty and hard work he had dedicated to the bank. The only reason for his dismissal found in the records is his failure to follow top-management orders with regards to the transfer of the three tellers. Petitioners alleged it to be insubordination. Nevertheless, insubordination must be proven to justify dismissal (St. Luke's Hospital v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 116 SCRA 240). And we do not think that his earnest efforts in making representations to retain the three tellers warrant his dimissal. A manager or supervisor must stand up for his subordinates unless the latter are guilty of wrongdoing or some conduct prejudicial to the employer. Only after as representations was Mr. Batucan questioned on the several "unauthorized credit accommodations." His failure to explain within 24 hours which, in the light of the circumstances, was too short, caused his suspension and later, his dismissal retroactive to the date of suspension. There was no valid reason for his dismissal, much less for all the charges and accusations made against him. The dismissal followed by the efforts to justify it was tainted by bad faith or malice on the part of the petitioners who wanted Mr. Batucan removed from his post. The employer's right to dismiss his employee, however, differs from, and should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised. The manner in which the company exercised its right to dismiss in the case at bar was abusive; hence, it is liable for moral damages, as previously discussed. A review of the records, however, indicates that the moral and exemplary damages awarded may be somewhat excessive. Hence, in the exercise of our discretion and after considering all factors, we have decided to reduce to P20,000.00 the award for moral and exemplary damages and to P5,000.00 the award for attorney's fees.

The award of P1,000.00 a month from the time Mr. Batucan's employment was terminated up to the date this case becomes final and executory is likewise excessive. At the same time, pursuant to Republic Act 1052 as amended by Republic Act 1787, which provides that in case of employment without a definite period, an employer may terminate an employee's services without just cause by serving to the employee a written notice at least one month in advance or by granting him pay equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever is longer. Considering the facts and equities of this case, however, we have decided to limit compensatory damages to only P12,000.00, as explained above.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Lastly, petitioners raise the issue that "individual petitioners, having acted in their official capacities as bank officers, did not incur any personal liability in favor of Batucan. We quote with favor the finding of the respondent Court: The evidence shows that the individual defendants acted jointly in causing the illegal and unjustifiable dimissal of the plaintiff-appellee. Hence, the trial court is correct in holding the individual defendants jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff-appellee. " Clearly, the petitioners acted beyond their authority and against what the law provides. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Sy v. Metrobank, 506 SCRA 580 F: Petitioner Dennis D. Sy, herein substituted by his heirs Soledad Y. Sy, Ronald Allan Y. Sy, and Melinda S. Pompenada, was the branch manager in Bajada, Davao City, of respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Under the bank’s Retirement Plan, an employee must retire upon reaching the age of 55 years or after rendering 30 years of service, whichever comes first. Sy would have rendered 30 years of service by August 18, 1999. However, on February 5, 1999, he was reappointed as branch manager for a term of one year starting August 18, 1999 until August 18, 2000. His monthly compensation was accordingly increased from P50,400 to P54,500, effective August 16, 1999. Meanwhile, on November 10 and 15, 1999, the bank released the results of the audit conducted in its Bajada branch. On November 15, 1999, Sy tendered an irrevocable letter of retirement. In his letter, he requested the timely release of his retirement pay and other benefits. His request was denied. The bank alleged that Sy allowed spouses Gorgonio and Elizabeth Ong to conduct "kiting" activities in their account with the bank. Thus, the bank placed Sy under preventive suspension and gave him 48 hours to submit a written explanation. In response, Sy wrote a letter explaining that he only made a wrong credit judgment. Not satisfied with his answer, the bank notified Sy of other alleged violations of company policies. In reply, Sy explained in writing that the accommodation granted to spouses Samuel Aquino and Charito Sy-Aquino was only P650,000, not P9.11M as claimed by the bank. He added that the spouses even offered a parcel of land as collateral and were willing to sell a vehicle in settlement of their obligation with the bank. Unconvinced, the bank dismissed Sy on December 15, 1999. Sy filed against the bank a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and money claims, docketed as RAB-11-0100024-0. However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) deemed Sy compulsorily retired. Thus, the NLRC awarded him retirement benefits, unpaid salary, monetary value of unused leave credits, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus, and refund of provident fund.

continue in its employ a person in whom it has lost trust and confidence and whose continued employment would patently be inimical to the bank’s interest.24 While the scale of justice is tilted in favor of workers, the law does not authorize blind submission to the claim of labor regardless of merit.

The parties sought reconsideration, which were both denied for lack of merit. Respondent bank elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the ruling of the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. On motion for reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals modified its ruling and ordered the bank to reimburse Sy’s contribution to the provident fund.

While the Court commiserates with petitioner who has spent with the bank the best three decades of his employable life, we find no room to accord him compassionate justice. Records showed that he violated the bank policies prior to his compulsory retirement. Thus, there can be no earned retirement benefits to speak of. No such provision is provided for by the Labor Code. In fact, even the Civil Service Law imposes forfeiture of retirement benefits in valid dismissal cases.

I: (1) Was petitioner illegally terminated? (2) If his dismissal was valid, would he still be entitled to retirement benefits? H: Sy was validly dismissed on the ground of fraud and willful breach of trust under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Records show that as bank manager, he authorized "kiting" or drawing of checks against uncollected funds in wanton violation of the bank’s policies. 19 It was sufficient basis for the bank to lose trust in him. Unlike a rank-and-file worker, where breach of trust as a ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged anomaly and where mere uncorroborated accusation by the employer will not suffice, the sheer existence of a basis for believing that the employer’s trust has been breached is enough for the dismissal of amanagerial employee. Petitioner’s conduct betrays his culpability. Shortly after the audit conducted in the Bajada branch, he tendered an "irrevocable letter of retirement." In the said letter, he requested that his retirement be made effective December 1, 1999. Said request arouses suspicion considering that he had previously agreed to the extension of his employment as branch manager until August 18, 2000. Petitioner’s evident failure to offer any reasonable explanation for such sudden shift in his plans is prejudicial to his cause. As for the requirement of due process, records show that it has been fully satisfied in the instant case. The bank had complied with the two-notice requirement, i.e.: (a) a written notice of the cause for his dismissal to afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires; and (b) a written notice of the decision to terminate him, stating clearly the reason therefor. Petitioner, however, theorizes that having been compulsorily retired, he could no longer be dismissed by the bank. His premise is absurd. Indeed, he would have qualified for compulsory retirement under the bank’s Retirement Plan. However, he opted to accept the bank’s offer of extending his employment for another year with a corresponding salary increase. Thus, in effect, he had never retired. Unfortunately for him, while serving such extended term, the bank discovered his unauthorized grant of accommodation to accounts engaged in "kiting" activity. Such act is a clear breach of the trust reposed in him by the bank. He cannot now elude dismissal for a just cause by claiming he was already retired compulsorily. Is petitioner nevertheless entitled to retirement benefits? Under the Labor Code, only unjustly dismissed employees are entitled to retirement benefits and other privileges including reinstatement and backwages. Since petitioner’s dismissal was for a just cause, he is not entitled to any retirement benefit. To hold otherwise would be to reward acts of willful breach of trust by the employee. It would also open the floodgate to potential anomalous banking transactions by bank employees whose employments have been extended. Since a bank’s operation is essentially imbued with public interest, it owes great fidelity to the public it deals with. In turn, it cannot be compelled to

Notably, the Court has also disallowed claims for retirement benefits in valid dismissal cases because the retirement plan itself precluded employees dismissed for cause from availing it. Although no such prohibition in the retirement plan was alleged or proved in this case, we nevertheless deny petitioner’s claims because his offenses, vis-à-vis his long years of service with the bank, reflect a regrettable lack of loyalty which he should have strengthened instead of betrayed. The petition is hereby DENIED. Jardine Davies v. NLRC, 311 SCRA 289 F: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in general trading, including the exclusive distribution in the country of the world-renowned “Union 76” lubricating oil manufactured by Unoco Philippines, Inc. Private respondent was a former sales representative of petitioner. A review of the records of this case reveals that petitioner engaged the services of a private investigation agency to conduct surveillance and investigation pertinent to reports that some of petitioner’s products, particularly the “Union 76” lubricating oil, were being illegally manufactured, blended, packed and distributed. Consequently, a private investigator of the said investigation agency, confirmed that there were really fake “Union 76” lubricating oil in the market and reported further that the same were indeed being illegally manufactured, blended, packed and distributed by private respondent Virgilio Reyes. Petitioner then secured a search warrant which led to the seizure of some of the alleged fake items found in the apartment complex reportedly occupied by said private respondent. Thereafter, a criminal complaint for violation of Article 189 on unfair competition of the Revised Penal Code [2] was filed against private respondent and others. Subsequently, private respondent was likewise charged administratively for having committed serious misconduct inimical to the interest of petitioner company. Accordingly, he was advised to go on an indefinite leave. This eventually led to his termination from employment on February 23, 1983. Meanwhile, all the materials seized by virtue of the search warrant issued were released by order of the same court in view of a petition filed by private respondent’s younger brother, Donato Reyes. Apparently, the younger Reyes convinced the court that he was the legal tenant of the apartment complex searched and that all the materials seized are legally owned by him. He further proved that he was legally engaged in the business of general merchandising, operating under the trade name of Lubrix Conglomerate, a single proprietorship duly licensed by the government in dealing with oil and lubricant products. Furthermore, he presented the receipts covering the purchases of the seized Unoco products purposely for packing the same in small containers to be resold to the public. Relying on the foregoing facts, private respondent sued petitioner for illegal dismissal. But the Labor Arbiter, Manuel R. Caday, dismissed his complaint.

In a Decision dated September 24, 1985, the labor arbiter stated that the apartment complex allegedly occupied by private respondent was indeed the situs of the illegal manufacture, blending and packaging of “Union 76” oil and lubricating products. Convinced that private respondent was personally involved in the aforementioned illegal activity, the labor arbiter ruled that the private respondent committed an act of serious misconduct, fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in him by petitioner, a just cause for terminating employment. Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. In its Decision dated March 17, 1986, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s judgment on the ground that there is no cogent reason for petitioner to lose its trust and confidence on private respondent. I: WON public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor arbiter’s judgment which found a just and valid cause for dismissal of private respondent by petitioner. H: Petitioner’s attack on the alleged misappreciation of facts and distorted evaluation of evidence by public respondent stands, in our view, on hollow ground. Resort to judicial review of the decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission by way of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor agency in reaching its conclusion. Neither is it for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses nor substitute findings of fact for those of an administrative body which has gained expertise in its specialized field. Arguably, there may even be an error in judgment. This, however, is not within the ambit of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. It is beyond dispute that loss of trust and confidence constitutes a valid ground for dismissing an employee. It is settled that loss of confidence as a just cause for terminating employment must be premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation obtains where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as care and protection, handling or custody of the employer’s property as in this case. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be “work-related” such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer. Likewise, it must be noted that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of confidence. It is sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position. This Court, however, has repeatedly stressed that the right of an employer to dismiss employees on account of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily and without showing just cause, so as not to render the employee’s constitutional right to security of tenure nugatory. Thus, although the dropping of a criminal charge for an employee’s alleged misconduct does not bar his dismissal, and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to justify the same, still the basis thereof must be clearly and convincingly established. Besides, for loss of confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, such loss of confidence must arise from particular proven facts. In other words, this ground must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest; otherwise the dismissal will be rendered illegal. In the case at bar, private respondent was suspended and eventually dismissed for allegedly committing fraudulent acts and unfairly competing with petitioner. To justify its administrative action, petitioner somehow grave credence to the

surveillance report implicating private respondent in the illegal manufacture, blending, packing and distribution of petitioner’s products. Petitioner likewise relied on the result of the search on the apartment reportedly leased by private respondent from which alleged counterfeit “Union 76” oil products were seized. Unfortunately, these could not be deemed sufficient basis for petitioner to lose its trust and confidence on private respondent so as to justify the latter’s dismissal. For evidently, the surveillance report is unreliable. As found by the NLRC, the conclusions therein were mere deductions not supported by any substantial corroborating evidence. Public respondent also observed that the petitioner failed to show concrete evidence to controvert the proof presented by private respondent that the packing of genuine “Union 76” oil in small containers was in support of the marketing policy of petitioner. Furthermore, as the Solicitor General points out, petitioner’s agents surprisingly did not submit to laboratory test the alleged fake merchandise seized during the search, to determine its genuineness. This deficiency could be attributed to the misstep of the private detectives who were specifically instructed to investigate precisely the reported counterfeiting of petitioner’s products. Another virtual confirmation that petitioner lacks factual basis for its distrust of private respondent was the subsequent judicial order releasing the articles seized during the search. As it appears on record, the court believed the explanation of Donato Reyes, brother of private respondent, that he was the lessee of the aforesaid apartment. In sum, we hold that public respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that petitioner failed to duly prove that the dismissal of private respondent was justified on account of loss of trust and confidence. Hence, private respondent’s dismissal was found illegal. With the finding that private respondent was illegally dismissed, an award of backwages is proper. It must be emphasized, though, that jurisprudence distinguishes between employees illegally dismissed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715 on March 21, 1989, and those whose illegal dismissals were effected after such date. Thus, employees illegally dismissed prior to March 21, 1989, are entitled to backwages up to three (3) years without deduction or qualification, while those illegally dismissed after are granted full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. Considering that private respondent was terminated from the service on February 23, 1983, he is entitled to backwages up to three years only, computed on the basis of his last monthly salary or pay. In addition to backwages, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to either reinstatement, if feasible, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable. Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative c. Macaraeg | GR 145800 | Jan. 22, 2003 F: Petitioner is an electric cooperative duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. Respondent Geronima Macaraeg and Maribeth de Vera are employees of petitioner at its office in Area V, Bayambang, Pangasinan. Respondent de Vera was employed as teller whose primary duty was to accept payments from petitioner’s consumers in Bayambang and remit her collections to the cashier, herein co-respondent Geronima Macaraeg. Respondent Macaraeg’s duty was to deposit the daily collections of the office to petitioner’s account at the Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan in Bayambang. From January 1998 to January 1999, respondent de Vera accommodated and encashed the crossed checks of her sister, Evelyn Joy Estrada. Evelyn issued two hundred eleven (211)

crossed checks amounting to P6, 945,128.95 payable to petitioner cooperative despite the absence of any transaction or any outstanding obligation with petitioner. In turn, respondent de Vera, with the knowledge and consent of respondent Macaraeg, paid the full value of these checks from the cash collections of petitioner. At the end of the day, respondents credited the checks as part of their collection and deposited the same together with their cash collection to the account of petitioner at the Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan. Sometime in January 1999, petitioner, through its Finance Department, noticed that several checks payable to petitioner from the collections in the Area V office were returned due to insufficiency of funds. On January 19, 1999, Josefina Mandapat, Sandra Frias and Marites Radac, petitioner’s Finance Manager, Chief Accountant and Legal Assistant, respectively, confronted respondents with their discovery. Respondent de Vera admitted that the checks were issued by her sister and that she encashed them from the money collected from petitioner’s customers. On January 21, 1999, Mrs. Josefina Mandapat submitted a memorandum to petitioner’s General Manager, Salvador M. de Guzman, detailing their findings about the bounced checks. On February 2, 1999, she submitted an addendum to her memorandum. On February 4, 1999, petitioner, through de Guzman, issued a memorandum to respondents placing them under preventive suspension and requiring them to explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours why they misappropriated cooperative funds. In the same communication, a hearing was set on February 13, 1999 at 9:30 a.m. at the Board Room of petitioner before Atty. Teodoro Fernandez. In their respective Answers/Explanations, respondents denied having misappropriated the funds of petitioner cooperative. They alleged that: (1) the checks that bounced were redeposited with the Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan; (2) the amount representing the face value of the checks had been used by petitioner as of December 15, 1998; (3) there was never any shortage in the cooperative money or funds in their possession; and (4) they never violated any policy of the cooperative and on the contrary, they have been very religious in remitting the funds and money of petitioner. At the scheduled hearing on February 13, 1999, respondents, with assistance of counsel, appeared before Atty. Teodoro Fernandez. Respondent de Vera testified and admitted that she encashed the checks of Evelyn Joy Estrada because the latter is her older sister and that she has a soft spot for her; that Mrs. Estrada owns a sash factory and that she merely wanted to help her sister meet her business obligations; that sometime in November 1998, Mrs. Marites Radoc, Chief Accountant of petitioner, called her attention to one check which bounced thrice; that this check was eventually replaced by her sister with cash; that despite the bouncing of some other checks, all checks were eventually funded and paid to petitioner, hence, petitioner incurred no losses in its collections; that she has worked for petitioner for nineteen (19) years and this is the first time she has been charged administratively by petitioner. Respondent Macaraeg admitted that she knew of the accommodations given by respondent de Vera to her sister; that she allowed her subordinate to do it because respondent de Vera is her kumare, and that she knew that Mrs. Estrada’s checks were sufficiently funded. She worked for petitioner for twentytwo (22) years and has never had an administrative charge. Mrs. Josefina Mandapat, Finance Manager of petitioner, testified as petitioner’s witness. She stated that she prepared a report on the findings of their accountant regarding the encashment of Evelyn Joy Estrada’s checks, and that the encashment of said checks is prohibited under an office memorandum. On March 10, 1999, Atty. Fernandez submitted his findings to the General Manager of petitioner. On March 19, 1999, on the basis of said findings and recommendation, the General Manager issued to respondents separate notices of termination, effective April 9, 1999, for “serious misconduct, and breach of trust and confidence reposed on them by management.”

Respondents, with the help of the President and representative of the Union, Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative (CENPELCO) Employees’ Association-Tupas Local Chapter No. R01-0012, questioned their dismissal before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). They claimed that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which requires that the case should first be brought before a grievance committee. Eventually, the parties agreed to submit the case to a voluntary arbitrator for arbitration. On August 12, 1999, the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review. On August 17, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition and affirming the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. Hence, the present course of action. I: WON the CA gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioner illegally terminated the services of herein private respondents. H: The petition is impressed with merit. At the outset, we hold that the first issue raised in the petition pertaining to the alleged violation of the CBA grievance procedure is moot and academic. The parties’ active participation in the voluntary arbitration proceedings, and their failure to insist that the case be remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear intention on their part to have the issue of respondents’ illegal dismissal directly resolved by the voluntary arbitrator. We therefore find it unnecessary to rule on the matter in light of their preference to bring the illegal dismissal dispute to voluntary arbitration without passing through the grievance machinery. This leads us to the next issue of whether respondents were validly dismissed. To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) it must be for a just or authorized cause, and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. We hold that there exists a valid reason to dismiss both employees. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to dismiss employees for willful breach of trust or loss of confidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of their misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that they are responsible for the misconduct and their participation therein rendered them unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of their position. To be sure, the acts of the respondents were clearly inimical to the financial interest of the petitioner. During the investigation, they admitted accommodating Evelyn Joy Estrada by encashing her checks from its funds. They did so without petitioner’s knowledge, much less its permission. These inimical acts lasted for more than a year, and probably would have continued had it not been discovered in time. All along, they were aware that these acts were prohibited by the Coop Checks Policy. Clearly, there was willful breach of trust on the respondents’ part, as they took advantage of their highly sensitive positions to violate their duties. Moreover, the acts of the respondents caused damage to the petitioner. During those times the checks were illegally encashed, petitioner was not able to fully utilize the collections, primarily in servicing its debts. In her memorandum dated January 21, 1999, Finance Manager Josefina Mandapat reported how petitioner is prejudiced. It is not material that they did not “misappropriate any amount of money, nor incur any shortage relative to the funds in their possession.” The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employees concerned hold positions of trust. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offence for which an employee is penalized. In the case at bar, the respondents held positions of utmost trust and confidence. As

teller and cashier, respectively, they are expected to possess a high degree of fidelity. They are entrusted with a considerable amount of cash. Respondent de Vera accepted payments from petitioner’s consumers while respondent Macaraeg received remittances for deposit at petitioner’s bank. They did not live up to their duties and obligations. Nor is there any doubt that petitioner observed procedural due process in dismissing the respondents. In separate memoranda dated February 4, 1999 and signed by the General Manager ( de Guzman), the respondents were both appraised of the particular acts or omissions constituting the charges against them. They gave their own “answer/explanation” to the charges. They participated in the investigation conducted at petitioner’s board room. We are aware that the respondents Macaraeg and de Vera have been employed with the petitioner for 22 and 19 years of continuous service, respectively, and this is the first time that either of them has been administratively charged. Nonetheless, it is our considered view that their dismissal is justified considering the breach of trust they have committed. Well to emphasize, the longer an employee stays in the service of the company, the greater is his responsibility for knowledge and compliance with the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in the company. Considering that they have mishandled the funds of the cooperative and the danger they have posed to its members, their reinstatement is neither sound in reason nor just in principle. It is irreconcilable with trust and confidence that has been irretrievably lost. The petition is GRANTED. Mcleod v. NLRC, 512 SCRA 222 F: John F. McLeod filed a complaint for retirement benefits, vacation and sick leave benefits, non-payment of unused airline tickets, holiday pay, underpayment of salary and 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees plus interest against Filipinas Synthetic Corporation (Filsyn), Far Eastern Textile Mills, Inc., Sta. Rosa Textiles, Inc., Patricio Lim and Eric Hu. He alleges that at the time of his retirement complainant was receiving P60, 000.00 monthly with vacation and sick leave benefits; 13th month pay, holiday pay and two round trip business class tickets on a Manila-London-Manila itinerary every three years which is convertible to cash if unused. Respondents accordingly failed to pay vacation and leave credits and requested complainant to wait as it was short of funds but the same remain unpaid at present. Respondents likewise failed to pay complainant’s holiday pay up to the present. There were more benefits which were not honored. The Labor Arbiter, held all respondents jointly and severally liable for the money claims of Mcleod. However, the NLRC reversed and made Peggy Mills as the sole entity liable for the retirement pay of Mcleod. This was affirmed by the CA. I: WON an employer-employee relationship exists between the private respondents and the petitioner for purposes of determining employer liability to the petitioner. H: No employer-employee relationship, McLeod was a managerial employee of PMI from 20 June 1980 to 31 December 1992. McLeod could have presented evidence to support his allegation of employer-employee relationship between him and any of Filsyn, SRTI, and FETMI, but he did not. Appointment letters or employment contracts, payrolls, organization charts, SSS registration, personnel list, as well as testimony of coemployees, may serve as evidence of employee status. It is a basic rule in evidence that parties must prove their affirmative allegations. While technical rules are not strictly followed in the NLRC, this does not mean that the rules on proving allegations are entirely ignored. Bare allegations are not enough. They must be supported by substantial evidence at the very least. McLeod’s reliance on Annex M can hardly carry the day for him. Annex M, which is McLeod’s letter addressed to "Philip Lim, VP Administration," merely contains McLeod’s proposals for the

grant of some benefits to supervisory and confidential employees. Contrary to McLeod’s allegation, Patricio did not sign the letter. Hence, the letter does not embody any agreement between McLeod and the management that would entitle McLeod to his money claims. Neither can McLeod’s assertions find support in Annex U. Annex U is the Agreement which McLeod and Universal Textile Mills, Inc. executed in 1959. The Agreement merely contains the renewal of the service agreement which the parties signed in 1956. John Hancock Life Insurance Corp. v. Davis | GR 169549 | Sept. 3, 2008 F: Respondent Joanna Cantre Davis was agency administration officer of petitioner John Hancock Life Insurance Corporation. On October 18, 2000, Patricia Yuseco, petitioner's corporate affairs manager, discovered that her wallet was missing. She immediately reported the loss of her credit cards to AIG and BPI Express. To her surprise, she was informed that "Patricia Yuseco" had just made substantial purchases using her credit cards in various stores in the City of Manila. She was also told that a proposed transaction in Abenson's-Robinsons Place was disapproved because "she" gave the wrong information upon verification. Because loss of personal property among its employees had become rampant in its office, petitioner sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI, in the course of its investigation, obtained a security video from Abenson's showing the person who used Yuseco's credit cards. Yuseco and other witnesses positively identified the person in the video as respondent. Consequently, the NBI and Yuseco filed a complaint for qualified theft against respondent in the office of the Manila city prosecutor. But because the affidavits presented by the NBI (identifying respondent as the culprit) were not properly verified, the city prosecutor dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence. Meanwhile, petitioner placed respondent under preventive suspension and instructed her to cooperate with its ongoing investigation. Instead of doing so, however, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that petitioner terminated her employment without cause. The labor arbiter, in a decision dated May 21, 2002, found that respondent committed serious misconduct (she was the principal suspect for qualified theft committed inside petitioner's office during work hours). There was a valid cause for her dismissal. Thus, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent appealed the labor arbiter's decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the assailed decision on July 31, 2003. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated October 30, 2003. Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) claiming that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. She claimed there was no valid cause for her termination because the city prosecutor of Manila "did not find probable cause for qualified theft against her." The dismissal of the complaint proved that the charges against her were based on suspicion. The CA, in its July 4, 2005 decision found that the labor arbiter and NLRC merely adopted the findings of the NBI regarding respondent's culpability. Because the affidavits of the witnesses were not verified, they did not constitute substantial evidence. The labor arbiter and NLRC should have assessed evidence independently as "unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations and conclusions of employers (did) not provide legal justification for dismissing an employee." Thus, the CA granted the petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

I: WON petitioner substantially proved the presence of valid cause for respondent's termination. H: We grant the petition. Misconduct involves "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." In this case, petitioner dismissed respondent based on the NBI's finding that the latter stole and used Yuseco's credit cards. But since the theft was not committed against petitioner itself but against one of its employees, respondent's misconduct was not work-related and therefore, she could not be dismissed for serious misconduct. Nonetheless, Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those which are susceptible of comparison to another in general or in specific detail. For an employee to be validly dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article 282, the cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the employee. A cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act or omission attesting to an employee's moral depravity. Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct. Did petitioner substantially prove the existence of valid cause for respondent's separation? Yes. The labor arbiter and the NLRC relied not only on the affidavits of the NBI's witnesses but also on that of respondent. They likewise considered petitioner's own investigative findings. Clearly, they did not merely adopt the findings of the NBI but independently assessed evidence presented by the parties. Their conclusion (that there was valid cause for respondent's separation from employment) was therefore supported by substantial evidence. All things considered, petitioner validly dismissed respondent for cause analogous to serious misconduct. Petition is hereby GRANTED. Security and Credit Investigation v. NLRC, 350 SCRA 357 F: Private respondents Mercado, Somosot and Oliver were employed as security guards by petitioner and assigned to the CHR which was petitioner’s client. Sometime in February 1990, about eighteen (18) of petitioner’s security guards detailed at the CHR, including Mercado, Somosot and Oliver, filed a complaint for money claims against petitioner. However, upon petitioner’s request that the security guards withdraw the complaint, each of the complainants, except for Mercado, Somosot and Oliver, signed a Release and Quitclaim in favor of petitioner. Mercado averred that he was being pressured by petitioner to sign a Release and Quitclaim, so he went on leave from work on March 22, 1990. When he called petitioner’s office on the afternoon of the same day to inquire about his work assignment, petitioner’s officer-in-charge, Rogelio Vecido, informed him that he was not assigned anywhere because he was suspended from work. Somosot likewise claimed that on March 22, 1990, Mr. Igmedio Tomenio, petitioner’s shift-in-charge at the CHR, tried to pressure him to sign a Release and Quitclaim but he refused. That afternoon, Somosot learned that he had been suspended from work. When he attempted to report for work the next day, he was informed verbally that his employment was already terminated. The next day, March 23, 1990, Mercado and Somosot filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay, service incentive leave benefits and night differential against petitioner. The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-03-01791-90.

Like Mercado and Somosot, respondent Oliver asseverated that on March 27, 1990 he went to petitioner’s office to reiterate his money claims and was forced by Mr. Reynaldo Dino, petitioner’s operations manager, to sign a Release and Quitclaim. Because of his refusal to sign the same, he was not given any new assignment by petitioner. He was thus surprised to receive on March 29, 1990 a telegram from petitioner requiring him to explain his absence from work without leave from March 27, 1990. Subsequently, Oliver filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment of backwages against petitioner, which case was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-03-01886-90. Upon motion of petitioner, the two cases were consolidated. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied that it dismissed Mercado, Somosot and Oliver and alleged that the latter abandoned their employment. Meanwhile, on February 18, 1991, petitioner filed a third-party complaint against the CHR, claiming that its failure to effect the increase in the minimum wage of respondent security guards from July 1, 1989 to March 31, 1990, was due to the failure of the CHR to promptly pay the increases in the wage rates of said guards pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6727 (R.A. 6727). The CHR approved payment of increased wage rates only from April 16, 1990. Petitioner claimed that under R.A. 6727, the CHR was mandated to pay increased wages to the security guards commencing from July 1, 1989. The CHR denied that it was obliged to pay the increase in the wage rates of the respondent guards. It averred that R.A. 6727 is not applicable to it, because it had already been paying the respondent security guards more than P100.00 a day even before the effectivity of said law. Its decision to increase the salaries of respondent guards effective August 16, 1990 was due only to humanitarian reasons. In his Decision dated November 18, 1991 the Labor Arbiter found that there was neither dismissal by petitioner of the respondent security guards nor abandonment of employment by the latter, and that the controversy resulted from miscommunication and misapprehension of facts by the parties. The Labor Arbiter, however, ruled that there was underpayment of respondent guards’ salaries, holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, overtime pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave benefits. All parties filed their respective appeals with the National Labor Relations Commission. In their partial appeal, respondents Mercado and Somosot argued that the Labor Arbiter erred in not finding that they were illegally dismissed and in not awarding backwages in their favor. Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that the Labor Arbiter erred in not finding that respondent security guards abandoned their employment, and that it is the CHR which should be held liable for the monetary award given to respondent security guards. The CHR for its part contended that the Labor Arbiter erred in not finding that R.A. 6727 does not apply to it, and in failing to appreciate the CHR’s Letter dated April 16, 1990 which stated that it was increasing the wage rates of the security guards beginning April 16, 1990. I: WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents did not abandon their posts H: The Court finds that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the finding that petitioner did not dismiss respondent security guards, and that the latter did not abandon their employment. Both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter found no clear proof that petitioner had in fact dismissed respondent security guards. Mercado based his claim of illegal dismissal only on the statement of officer-in-charge Mr. Vecido that he had not been

assigned to any post. Similarly, Somosot relied merely on the verbal information relayed to him that he had been terminated. Oliver’s belief that he had been illegally dismissed was founded on the telegram from petitioner requiring him to explain his absence without leave which he received on March 29, 1990. None of them exerted efforts to confirm from petitioner’s office whether they had in fact been dismissed. Furthermore, petitioner denied the allegation that it terminated respondent security guards’ employment without just cause and even alleged that respondent guards abandoned their employment. Thus, absent any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioner had dismissed Mercado, Somosot and Oliver, their claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained. There being no finding that respondent security guards were illegally dismissed, there is no basis for an award of backwages in their favor. It is axiomatic that before backwages may be granted, there must be unjust or illegal dismissal from work. Neither did the NLRC find evidence to support petitioner’s allegation that Mercado, Somosot and Oliver abandoned their employment. The records reveal that their failure to report for duty was not caused by a willful and deliberate intent to abandon their employment. Rather, such failure resulted from their belief, though mistaken, that they had been suspended or terminated from work. The rule is that for abandonment to exist, two elements must concur: first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. The filing by Mercado, Somosot and Oliver of their complaints for illegal dismissal negates the existence of any intention on their part to abandon their employment. On the other hand, there is merit in petitioner’s argument that there was an error in the computation of the amounts constituting underpayment of overtime pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave benefits to respondent security guards by the Labor Arbiter, which in turn was affirmed by the NLRC. However, in computing the underpayment for overtime, 13th month and service incentive leave benefits, the Labor Arbiter erroneously included the period from September 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989 in spite of his finding that there was no underpayment in wages during said period. The Court also finds merit in petitioner’s argument that the NLRC should not have reversed the Labor Arbiter’s finding that the CHR is liable for the payment of P28,500.00 representing the differentials of respondent security guards’ wage, overtime, 13th month and service incentive leave benefits for the period July 1, 1989 to April 15, 1990. The record shows that petitioner informed the CHR regarding the increase in the wages of the security guards effective July 1, 1989, pursuant to R.A. 6727 which mandated a Twenty Five Peso (P25.00) increase in the daily wage rate in a Letter dated August 7, 1989. In its reply letter dated April 16, 1990, the CHR stated that it had approved the increase in the wages effective April 16, 1990. The CHR, however, maintains that it is not liable to pay increased wages to the security guards and claims that there is a proviso in Section 4 of R.A. 6727 which exempts employees already receiving more than P100.00 daily from receiving the P25.00 increase required under said law. The CHR argues that since the security guards were receiving P103.56 daily for the year 1989, it was not required to pay them the P25.00 per day increase under R.A. 6727. The CHR further asserts that its approved increase in the security guards’ wages from April 16, 1990 was due only to humanitarian reasons and was not an admission of any obligation to increase the same under R.A. 6727. It must be noted that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that there were discrepancies in the minimum wage prescribed under R.A. 6727 and what were actually received by respondent security guards from July 1, 1989. The rule is that the factual

findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC are accorded to great weight and respect when supported by substantial evidence, and devoid of any unfairness and arbitrariness. It is clear that the CHR is the party liable for payment of the wage increase due to respondent security guards. While petitioner, as the contractor, is held solidarily liable for the payment of wages, including wage increases, as prescribed under the Labor Code, the obligation ultimately belongs to the CHR as principal. The Labor Arbiter was therefore correct in requiring the CHR to reimburse petitioner the amount of P28, 500.00 representing the unpaid wage increases of respondent security guards for the period July 1, 1989 to April 15, 1990. The assailed decision of the affirmed with the MODIFICATION CALS Poultry Supply v. Roco, 385 SCRA 479 F: CALS Poultry Supply Corporation is engaged in the business of selling dressed chicken and other related products and managed by Danilo Yap. On March 15, 1984, CALS hired Alfredo Roco as its driver. On the same date, CALS hired Edna Roco, Alfredo’s sister, as a helper in the dressing room of CALS. On May 16, 1995, it hired Candelaria Roco, another sister, as helper, also at its chicken dressing plant on a probationary basis. On March 5, 1996, Alfredo Roco and Candelaria Roco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against CALS and Danilo Yap alleging that Alfredo and Candelaria were illegally dismissed on January 20, 1996 and November 5, 1996, respectively. Both also claimed that they were underpaid of their wages. Edna Roco, likewise, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging that on June 26, 1996, she was reassigned to the task of washing dirty sacks and for this reason, in addition to her being transferred from night shift to day time duties, which she considered as management act of harassment, she did not report for work. According to Alfredo Roco, he was dismissed on January 20, 1996 when he refused to accept P30,000.00 being offered to him by CALS’ lawyer, Atty. Myra Cristela A. Yngcong, in exchange for his executing a letter of voluntary resignation. On the part of Candelaria Roco, she averred that she was terminated without cause from her job as helper after serving more than six (6) months as probationary employee.red The Labor Arbiter on April 16, 1998, issued a decision dismissing the complaints for illegal dismissal for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter found that Alfredo Roco applied for and was granted a leave of absence for the period from January 4 to 18, 1996. He did not report back for work after the expiration of his leave of absence, prompting CALS, through its Chief Maintenance Officer to send him a letter on March 12, 1996 inquiring if he still had intentions of resuming his work. Alfredo Roco did not respond to the letter despite receipt thereof, thus, Alfredo was not dismissed; it was he who unilaterally severed his relation with his employer. In the case of Candelaria Roco, the Labor Arbiter upheld CALS’ decision not to continue with her probationary employment having been found her unsuited for the work for which her services were engaged. She was hired on May 16, 1995 and her services were terminated on November 15, 1995. Edna Roco, according to the Labor Arbiter, began absenting herself on June 25, 1996. She was sent a memo on July 1, 1996 requiring her to report for work immediately, but she did not respond. In their position papers, the complainants claimed that they were not given their overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, 13th month pay, allowances. They were also not given their separation pay after their dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, however, denied their claims, stating that they had not substantiated the same; on the other hand, CALS presented evidence showing that complainants received the correct salaries and related benefits. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in a decision

promulgated on January 17, 2000, affirmed the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. On appeal by Alfredo, Candelaria and Edna Roco to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court set aside the NLRC’s decision and ordered reinstatement of Alfredo and Candelaria Roco to their former positions without loss of seniority of rights and benefits, with full payment of backwages. However, in the case of Edna Roco, the Court of Appeals found that her appeal cannot be favorably considered as she actually abandoned her work without justification. In considering that Alfredo Roco was illegally dismissed, the Court of Appeals relied on his allegation that on January 20, 1996 when he reported for work, following his leave of absence from January 10 to 18, 1996, he learned from Elvie Acantelado, a secretary of Danilo Yap that he was already separated from his employment. I: WON there was illegal dismissal by CALS H: From the facts established, we are of the view that Alfredo Roco has not established convincingly that he was dismissed. No notice of termination was given to him by CALS. There is no proof at all, except his self-serving assertion, that he was prevented from working after the end of his leave of absence on January 18, 1996. In fact, CALS notified him in a letter dated March 12, 1996 to resume his work. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that Alfredo, as well as Candelaria Roco, was not dismissed. Their findings of fact are entitled to great weight. With respect to Candelaria Roco, there is no dispute that she was employed on probationary basis. She was hired on May 16, 1995 and her services were terminated on November 15, 1995 due to poor work performance. She did not measure up to the work standards on the dressing of chicken. The Labor Arbiter sustained CALS in terminating her employment. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. The Court of Appeals did not disagree with the NLRC’s finding that Candelaria was dismissed because she did not qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the company to her at the time of her employment. CALS argues that the Court of Appeals’ computation of the 6month probationary period is erroneous as the termination of Candelaria’s services on November 15, 1995 was exactly on the last day of the 6-month period. We agree with CALS’ contention as upheld by both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that Candelaria’s services was terminated within and not beyond the 6-month probationary period. As there is no mention of the basis of the above order, we may assume it was the temporary payroll authority submitted by the petitioner showing that the private respondent was employed on probation on February 16, 1978. Even supposing that it is not self-serving, we find nevertheless that it is self-defeating. The six-month period of probation started from the said date of appointment and so ended on August 17, 1978, but it is not shown that the private respondent’s employment also ended then; on the contrary, he continued working as usual. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, ‘an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.'’ Hence, Pilones was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he ceased to be a probationer. WHEREFORE, our Resolution of April 1, 2002 denying the petition is hereby SET ASIDE and another one entered REVERSING the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it ruled in favor of herein respondents and the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission REINSTATED.

Jardine Davies v. NLRC, 225 SCRA 757 Nature: The instant Petition for Certiorari seeks the reversal of the resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission, dated 22 July 1992, which declared private respondent Salvador Salutin as not having abandoned his work by his alleged failure to report for work during the pendency of the petitioner's appeal before the respondent Commission. F: Respondent Salvador Salutin ["Salutin"] was employed by petitioner Jardine Davies, Inc. ["JDI"] on 15 July 1985, as a demonstrator/agronomist to provide services relating to, and to give advice on, the promotion and use of JDI's pesticides and other products. The controversy that spawned two [2] special civil actions for certiorari [this instance included] with this Court, began when respondent Salutin filed a complaint against petitioner JDI for illegal dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement and backwages or, in the alternative, separation pay plus wage differential, service incentive leave pay, thirteenth [13th] month pay, holiday pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The complaint was decided by the Labor Arbiter in favor of respondent Salutin. JDI appealed the case to the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC], and it posted a supersedeas bond to answer for the monetary awards. It also reinstated Salutin, "on payroll only", beginning 26 August 1991, in compliance with the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Article 223, paragraph 3, of the Labor Code. In a Decision dated 17 October 1991, NLRC dismissed JDI's appeal for lack of merit but modified the decision by eliminating the awards given for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages. A motion for reconsideration was filed which was denied in NLRC's resolution of 13 January 1992. On 14 February 1992, JDI filed its first petition for certiorari with this Court, docketed as G. R. No. 103720, assailing the 17 October 1991 decision and the resolution of 13 January 1992 of respondent Commission. In Our Resolution dated 26 February 1992, the petition was dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's Circular No. 28-91 on forum-shopping. Its subsequent motion for reconsideration was itself denied on 20 May 1992. The Resolution of 26 February 1992 became final and executory on 19 June 1992, and an entry of judgment was accordingly made on 20 August 1992. At the time when the above narrated events were still unfolding, some material facts occured beginning with JDI's appeal to the NLRC on the 08 August 1991 decision of the Labor Arbiter. Shortly after the reinstatement of Salutin "on payroll only", JDI sent a letter dated 21 September 1991, to Salutin directing him to report for work to their Bacolod Branch Manager. Salutin, as directed, reported on the 24th of September 1991 at around 9:20 a.m. He did not stay long, however, since after fifteen minutes or so, he left and was reported not to have thereafter returned for work. JDI forthwith stopped further payment of salary to Salutin. On 17 October 1991, JDI filed a "Manisfestation and Motion" with the respondent Commission stating that Salutin be considered as having abandoned his work considering his continuous absence of more than three (3) weeks since he was required to report for work and that any award for reinstatement to his former position, without loss of seniority and other rights, in the Arbiter's decision subject of this appeal be considered and held as waived or lost. Salutin opposed the motion, claiming that he was forced to leave in haste because he was then suffering from a serious ailment. He submitted a medical certificate to support his claim. On 13 January 1992, respondent Commission denied JDI's "Manifestation & Motion" stating, among other things as to the issue of whether the complaint-appellee Salvador Salutin is guilty of work abandonment, this is a new and factual matter which has to be determined and resolved in appropriate proceedings before the Arbitration Branch, more especially in the present case, where the charge of abandonment is seriously controverted.

I: Is Salutin, who was then on payroll reinstatement since 26 August 1991, not guilty of abandonment when his failure to report for work was because he was also working for another entity from 01 September 1991 to 31 December 1991? Correlatively, did respondent Commission not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not take into consideration such other employment? H: The answer is in the negative. The records show that at the time JDI filed its Manifestation and Motion dated 17 October 1991, the sole basis of its prayer for a declaration that Salutin abandoned his work was his alleged unauthorized absences from the date he was notified to report for work. A shift to a new focus took place when, on 30 January 1992, JDI, at its request, received a letter-certification issued by the Officer-in-Charge of King's Enterprises of Iloilo City that Salutin was employed by Monsato Philippines, Inc., from 01 September to 31 December 1991, as Aggressive Crop Technician, for which he was paid P5,146.00 per month. Thus, this was the reason given by JDI in its ex parte motion dated 16 June 1992, to set for hearing the Manifestation and Motion of 17 October 1991. NLRC denied the said ex parte motion in the now assailed resolution of 22 July 1992. When JDI filed its first petition for certiorari [in G. R. No. 103720] with this Court on 14 February 1992, assailing the 17 October 1991 decision of NLRC, it also raised, as an added argument on the alleged abandonment of work by Salutin, the fact that he was gainfully employed elsewhere. Considering that this matter was thus already taken up by the petitioner in its first petition for certiorari, which this Court dismissed with finality, the petitioner should really now be barred from invoking anew that issue in this present [second] petition. Be that as it may, the same fate of dismissal is still inevitable. Although this Court is not a trier of facts, it may still wade through the records of a case if only to prevent any possible misgiving in its ultimate disposition. The petitioner's evidence to establish Salutin's supposed abandonment of work is the certification of employment issued by King's Enterprises at the request of herein petitioner to the effect that Salutin had indeed been employed by Monsato Philippines, Inc., during the period from 01 September to 31 December 1991. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment there must be a deliberate unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. This refusal must be clearly shown. Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. Abandonment of position is a matter of intention expressed in clearly certain and unequivocal acts. In this instance, however, certain uncontroverted facts show just exactly the opposite. Hence, Salutin did report, as directed, on 24 September 1991, but that he could not stay long because he was ailing at that time; he, although perhaps belatedly made, did seek medical consultation on 7 November 1991, at the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Regional Hospital, for "peptic ulcer"; and on 11 December 1991, he did, in fact, manifest his desire to assume his work with the petitioner.

a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Respondent claimed she was terminated by petitioners because she failed to dissuade her daughter from continuing her employment at the Sylvia Santos Company, a business competitor of petitioners. In their defense, petitioners argued that respondent abandoned her work on March 14, 1992 and that they reported this to the Department of Labor and Employment on May 15, 1992. On May 7, 1993, labor arbiter Melquiades Sol D. del Rosario found petitioners guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. On August 10, 1995, the NLRC issued a resolution affirming in toto the decision of the labor arbiter. Hence, this petition. I: WON the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals were arrived at arbitrarily H: The petition is without merit. As petitioners are well aware of, factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they are in agreement with those of the labor arbiter, are deemed binding and conclusive on this Court. As long as their decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in their evaluation of the evidence all that is left for us to do is stamp our affirmation and declare its finality. Having perused the records, we find no such arbitrariness here. We would like to reiterate some salient points laid down in our prior pronouncements concerning abandonment of employment. Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to perform his employment responsibilities. Mere absence or failure to work, even after notice to return, is not tantamount to abandonment. The records are bereft of proof that petitioners even furnished respondent such notice. Furthermore, it is a settled doctrine that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with abandonment of employment. An employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned his work. The filing of such complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment. Clearly, petitioners’ claim that respondent’s complaint was "an afterthought," having been filed a long time after the date of the supposed abandonment, was utterly without merit. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, citing the case of Pare v. NLRC, respondent had four years within which to institute her action for illegal dismissal. Compared to the six months it took the aggrieved employee in that case to file his complaint for illegal dismissal, respondent’s 84 days was not unreasonably long at all. The petition is hereby DENIED. Shie Jie Corp. v. NFL, GR 153148, July 15, 2005

GSP Manufacturing Corp. v. Cabanban | GR 150454 | July 14, 2006

F: Respondents, in their complaint, alleged that they were employed as fish processors by petitioners. On July 20, 1998, Sammy Yang and Michael Yang, petitioners, confronted them about their union activities. Immediately, they were ordered to go home. The next day, petitioners suspended them for one week effective July 22 to 28, 1998 (except respondent Wilfredo Toribio). Upon their return, they were served with a notice of petitioners’ memorandum terminating their services for abandonment of work.

F: Respondent Paulina Cabanban worked with petitioner GSP Manufacturing Corporation (GSP) as a sewer from February 7, 1985 until her alleged termination on March 1, 1992. On June 16, 1992, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), National Capital Region Arbitration Branch,

Petitioners, in their answer, denied respondents’ allegations. They claimed that on July 20, 1998, about 2:45 o’clock in the afternoon, 13 rank-and-file employees staged a walk-out and abandoned their work. Among them were respondents Wilfredo Toribio, Nida Toribio, Yolanda Lorenzo, Sorraya Amping, Vivian

This Court's Resolution of 26 February 1992, denying the petition in G. R. No. 103720, became final and executory on 19 June 1992. Respondent Salutin's interim employment, stressed by the petitioner, did not stain the picture at all. The petition is hereby dismissed.

Mendoza, Merylene Delos Reyes, Arnold Francisco, and Manuel Francisco. As a consequence, petitioners’ business operations were interrupted and paralyzed, prompting them to issue a memorandum suspending respondents for one week or from July 22 to 28, 1998. However, on July 24, 1998, petitioners, in another memorandum, directed them to report for work on July 27, 1998. Instead, respondents Ernesto Etrata, Sorraya Amping, Yasher Taning, Yolanda Lorenzo, Merylene Delos Reyes, and Wilfredo Toribio submitted their resignation letters and quitclaims. Subsequently or on July 28, 1998, petitioners sent respondents Arnold Francisco, Nida Toribio, Vivian Mendoza, and Manuel Francisco a notice terminating their services for abandonment of work. On August 20, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding respondents guilty of unfair labor practice (for dismissing petitioners illegally); and ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners P843, 960.62. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated its Decision dated April 27, 2000 reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and dismissing respondents’ complaint. Respondents then filed a motion for reconsideration but were denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated June 29, 2000. Hence, they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. On November 29, 2001, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the NLRC’s Decision and reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. On December 21, 2001, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but were denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated April 9, 2002. I: WON the CA erred in holding that petitioners failed to prove by substantial evidence that respondents voluntarily resigned and/or abandoned their work. H: Voluntary resignation is defined as the act of an employee, who finds himself in a situation in which he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. Acceptance of a resignation tendered by an employee is necessary to make the resignation effective. No such acceptance, however, was shown in the instant case. Moreover, the fact that respondents immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners and repudiated their alleged resignation completely negated petitioners’ claim that they voluntarily resigned. In Molave Tours Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held: “By vigorously pursuing the litigation of his action against petitioner, private respondent clearly manifested that he has no intention of relinquishing his employment, which act is wholly incompatible to petitioner’s assertion that he voluntarily resigned.” Neither do we find any indication that respondents have shown by some overt acts their intention to sever their employment in petitioner company. In this case, respondents did not report back for work on July 27, 1998 because they were suspended by petitioners for one week effective July 22 to 28, 1998. Verily, their absence cannot be considered abandonment of work, a just cause for termination of employment. In fine, considering that respondents did not abandon their work, their dismissal from the service is illegal. The petition is DENIED.