Labor Code II Cases
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G.R. No. 85985 August 13, 1993 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. I NC. (PAL), (PAL), petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ISABEL P. ORTIGUERRA !" PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLO E MPLO#EES #EES ASSOCIATION ASSOCIATION (PALEA), respondents. Solon Garcia for petitioner. Adolpho M. Guerzon for for respondent PALEA. PALEA.
MELO, J.: In the instant petition for certiorari, certiorari, the Court is presented the issue of whether or not the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the employees. On March March 15, 1!5, 1!5, the "hilip "hilippin pine e #irli #irlines, nes, Inc. $"#%& $"#%& compl complete etely ly revis revised ed its 1'' 1'' Code Code of Discipli Discipline. ne. (he Code was circulat circulated ed among the employees employees and was immediately immediately implemente implemented, d, and some employees were forthwith sub)ected to the disciplinary measures embodied therein. (hus, on #ugust *+, 1!5, the "hilippine #irlines mployees mployees #ssociation $"#%#& $"#%#& -led a complaint complaint before the ational %abor /elations /elations Commission $%/C& $%/C& for unfair labor practice $Case o. C/00 *+510! *+510!5& 5& with with the follow following ing remar remar2s3 2s3 4%" 4%" with with arbitr arbitrary ary implem implementa entatio tion n of "#%6s Code Code of Discipline without notice and prior discussion with nion by Management4 $ Rollo, Rollo, p. 71&. In its position paper, "#%# contended that "#%, by its unilateral implementation of the Code, was guilty of unfair labor practice, speci-cally "aragraphs and 8 of #rticle *7 and #rticle *59 of the %abor Code. "#%# alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated in limited numbers: that being penal in nature the Code must conform with the re;uirements of suered to the re;uirements for negotiating a C=# which was inapplicable as indeed the current C=# had been negotiated. In its reply to "#%6s position paper, "#%# maintained that #rticle *7 $& of the %abor Code was violated when "#% unilaterally implemented the Code, and cited provisions of #rticles I? and I of Chapter II of the Code as defective for, respectively, running counter to the construction of penal laws and ma2ing punishable any o>ense within "#%6s contemplation. (hese provisions are the following3 @ec. *. Non-exclusivity . A (his Code does not contain the entirety of the rules and regulations of the company. very employee is bound to comply with all applicable rules, rules, regul regulati ations ons,, polici policies, es, proce procedur dures es and standa standard rds, s, includ including ing standa standard rds s of ;uality, productivity and behaviour, as issued and promulgated by the company through its duly authoriBed oense. @ec. . u!ulative Record. Record. A #n employee6s record of o>enses shall be cumulative. (he penalty for an o>ense shall be determined on the basis of his past record of o>enses of any nature or the absence thereof. (he more habitual an o>ender has been, the greater shall be the penalty for the latest o>ense. (hus, an employee may be dism dismis isse sed d if the the numbe numberr of his his past past o>ens o>enses es warr warran ants ts such such pena penalt lty y in the the )udgment of management even if each o>ense considered separately may not warrant dismissal. abitual o>enders or recidivists have no place in "#%. On the other hand, due regard shall be given to the length of time between commission of indivi individua duall o>enses o>enses to determ determine ine whethe whetherr the employ employee6 ee6s s conduc conductt may indica indicate te 1
occasional lapses $which may nevertheless re;uire sterner disciplinary action& or a pattern of incorrigibility. %abor #rbiter Isabel ". Ortiguerra handling the case called the parties to a conference but they failed to appear at the scheduled date. Interpreting such failure as a waiver of the parties6 right to present evidence, the labor arbiter considered the case submitted for decision. On ovember , 1!', a decision was rendered -nding no bad faith on the part of "#% "#% in adopting the Code and ruling that no unfair labor practice had been committed. owever, the arbiter held that "#% was 4not totally fault free4 considering that while the issuance of rules and regulations governing the conduct of employees is a 4legitimate management prerogative4 such rules and regulations must meet the test of 4reasonableness, propriety and fairness.4 @he found @ection 1 of the Code afore;uoted as 4an all embracing and all encompassing provision that ma2es punishable any o>en o>ense se one one can can thin thin2 2 of in the the comp compan any4 y4:: whil while e @ecti ection on , li2 li2ewis ewise e ;uot ;uoted ed abov above, e, is 4ob)ectionable for it violates the rule against double )eopardy thereby ushering in two or more punishment for the same misdemeanor.4 misdemeanor.4 $pp. 9!09, Rollo.& Rollo.& (he labor arbiter also found that "#% 4failed to prove that the new Code was amply circulated.4 oti oting ng that that "#%6s #%6s asse assert rtio ion n that that it had had furn furnis ishe hed d all all its its empl employ oyee ees s copi copies es of the the Code Code is unsupported by documentary evidence, she stated that such 4failure4 on the part of "#% resulted in the imposition of penalties on employees who thought all the while that the 1'' Code was still being followed. (hus, the arbiter concluded that 4$t&he phrase ignorance of the law eEcuses no one from compliance . . . -nds application only after it has been conclusively shown that the law was circulated to all the parties concerned and e>orts to disseminate information regarding the new law have been eEerted. $p. 9, Rollo.& Rollo.& @he thereupon disposed3 F/GO/, premises considered, respondent "#% is hereby ordered as follows3 1. Gurnish all employees with the new Code of Discipline: *. /econsider the cases of employees meted with penalties under the ew Code of Discipline and remand the same for further hearing: and 9. Discuss with "#%# the ob)ectionable provisions speci-cally tac2led in the body of the decision. #ll other claims of the complainant union $is& Hare hereby, dismissed for lac2 of merit. @O O/D/D. $p. 7+, Rollo.& Rollo.& "#% appealed to the %/C. On #ugust 1, 1!!, the %/C through Commissioner ncarnacion, with with "resi "residin ding g Commis Commissio sioner ner =onto0 =onto0"e "ere reB B and Commis Commissio sioner ner Maglay Maglaya a concur concurrin ring, g, found found no evidence of unfair labor practice committed by "#% and aect them. (he complainant union in this case has the right to feel isolated in the adoption of the ew Code of Discipline. (he Code of Discipline involves security of tenure and loss of employment A a property rightJ It is time that management realiBes that to attain e>ectiveness in its conduct rules, there should be candidness and openness by Management and participation by the union, representing its members. In fact, our Constituti Constitution on has recogniB recogniBed ed the principle principle of 4shared 4shared responsib responsibility ility44 between between empl employ oyer ers s and and wor2 wor2er ers s and and has has li2e li2ewi wise se reco recogn gniB iBed ed the righ rightt of wor2 wor2er ers s to participate in 4policy and decision0ma2ing process a>ecting their rights . . .4 (he 2
occasional lapses $which may nevertheless re;uire sterner disciplinary action& or a pattern of incorrigibility. %abor #rbiter Isabel ". Ortiguerra handling the case called the parties to a conference but they failed to appear at the scheduled date. Interpreting such failure as a waiver of the parties6 right to present evidence, the labor arbiter considered the case submitted for decision. On ovember , 1!', a decision was rendered -nding no bad faith on the part of "#% "#% in adopting the Code and ruling that no unfair labor practice had been committed. owever, the arbiter held that "#% was 4not totally fault free4 considering that while the issuance of rules and regulations governing the conduct of employees is a 4legitimate management prerogative4 such rules and regulations must meet the test of 4reasonableness, propriety and fairness.4 @he found @ection 1 of the Code afore;uoted as 4an all embracing and all encompassing provision that ma2es punishable any o>en o>ense se one one can can thin thin2 2 of in the the comp compan any4 y4:: whil while e @ecti ection on , li2 li2ewis ewise e ;uot ;uoted ed abov above, e, is 4ob)ectionable for it violates the rule against double )eopardy thereby ushering in two or more punishment for the same misdemeanor.4 misdemeanor.4 $pp. 9!09, Rollo.& Rollo.& (he labor arbiter also found that "#% 4failed to prove that the new Code was amply circulated.4 oti oting ng that that "#%6s #%6s asse assert rtio ion n that that it had had furn furnis ishe hed d all all its its empl employ oyee ees s copi copies es of the the Code Code is unsupported by documentary evidence, she stated that such 4failure4 on the part of "#% resulted in the imposition of penalties on employees who thought all the while that the 1'' Code was still being followed. (hus, the arbiter concluded that 4$t&he phrase ignorance of the law eEcuses no one from compliance . . . -nds application only after it has been conclusively shown that the law was circulated to all the parties concerned and e>orts to disseminate information regarding the new law have been eEerted. $p. 9, Rollo.& Rollo.& @he thereupon disposed3 F/GO/, premises considered, respondent "#% is hereby ordered as follows3 1. Gurnish all employees with the new Code of Discipline: *. /econsider the cases of employees meted with penalties under the ew Code of Discipline and remand the same for further hearing: and 9. Discuss with "#%# the ob)ectionable provisions speci-cally tac2led in the body of the decision. #ll other claims of the complainant union $is& Hare hereby, dismissed for lac2 of merit. @O O/D/D. $p. 7+, Rollo.& Rollo.& "#% appealed to the %/C. On #ugust 1, 1!!, the %/C through Commissioner ncarnacion, with with "resi "residin ding g Commis Commissio sioner ner =onto0 =onto0"e "ere reB B and Commis Commissio sioner ner Maglay Maglaya a concur concurrin ring, g, found found no evidence of unfair labor practice committed by "#% and aect them. (he complainant union in this case has the right to feel isolated in the adoption of the ew Code of Discipline. (he Code of Discipline involves security of tenure and loss of employment A a property rightJ It is time that management realiBes that to attain e>ectiveness in its conduct rules, there should be candidness and openness by Management and participation by the union, representing its members. In fact, our Constituti Constitution on has recogniB recogniBed ed the principle principle of 4shared 4shared responsib responsibility ility44 between between empl employ oyer ers s and and wor2 wor2er ers s and and has has li2e li2ewi wise se reco recogn gniB iBed ed the righ rightt of wor2 wor2er ers s to participate in 4policy and decision0ma2ing process a>ecting their rights . . .4 (he 2
latter latter provi provisio sion n was interp interpre reted ted by the Consti Constitut tution ional al Commis Commissio sioners ners to mean mean participation in 4management46 $/ecord $/ecord of the Constitutional Commission, ?ol. II&. In a sense, participation by the union in the adoption of the code if conduct could have accelerated and enhanced their feelings of belonging and would have resulted in cooper cooperati ation on rather rather than than resis resistan tance ce to the Code. Code. In fact, fact, labor labor0man 0manage agemen mentt cooperation is now 4the thing.4 $pp. 907, %/C Decision >. p. 17, Original /ecord.& /ecord.& /espondent Commission thereupon disposed3 F/GO/, premises considered, we modify the appealed decision in the sense that the ew Code of Discipline should be reviewed and discussed with complainant union, particularly the disputed provisions H. $(&hereafter, respondent is directed to furnish each employee with a copy of the appealed Code of Discipline. (he pending cases adverted to in the appealed decision if still in the arbitral level, should be reconsidered by the respondent "hilippine #ir %ines. Other dispositions of the %abor #rbiter are sustained. @O O/D/D. $p. 5, %/C Decision.& "#% then -led the instant petition for certiorari charging public respondents with grave abuse of discretion in3 $a& directing "#% 4to share its management prerogative of formulating a Code of Discipline4: $b& engaging in ;uasi0)udicial legislation in ordering "#% to share said prerogative with the union: $c& deciding beyond the issue of unfair labor practice, and $d& re;uiring "#% to reconsider pending cases still in the arbitral level $p. , "etition: p. !, Rollo.& Rollo.& #s stated above, the "rincipal issue submitted for resolution in the instant petition is whether management may be compelled to share with the union or its employees its prerogative of formulating a code of discipline. "#% asserts that when it revised its Code on March 15, 1!5, there was no law which mandated the sharing of responsibility responsibility therefor between employer and employee. Indeed, it was only on March *, 1!, with the approval of /epublic #ct o. '15, amending #rticle *11 of the %abor Code, that the law eEplicitly considered it a @tate policy 4$t&o ensure the participation of wor2ers in decision and policy0ma2ing processes a>ecting the rights, duties and welf welfar are. e.44 owe oweve ver, r, even even in the the abse absenc nce e of said said clea clearr prov provis isio ion n of law, law, the the eEer eEerci cise se of management prerogatives was never considered boundless. (hus, in ruz vs. Medina $1 @C/# 5'5 H1!& it was held that management6s prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion. In San Mi"uel #re$ery Sales %orce &nion 'P(G)*+ vs. *ple $1+ @C/# *5 H1!&, we upheld the company6s right to implement a new system of distributing its products, but gave the following caveat3 @o long as a company6s management prerogatives are eEercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer6s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circ circumv umvent entin ing g the the righ rights ts of the the empl employ oyee ees s under under spec specia iall laws laws or unde underr vali valid d agreements, this Court will uphold them. $at p. *!.& #ll this points to the conclusion that the eEercise eEercise of managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. unlimited. It is circumscribed by limitations found in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or the general principles of fair play and )ustice $ &niversity of Sto. (o!as vs. NLR , 1+ @C/# 5! H1+&. Moreover, as enunciated in A,,ott in A,,ott La,oratories 'Phil.+ vs. NLR $157 19 H1!&, it must be duly established that the prerogative prerogative being invo2ed is clearly a managerial one. # close scrutiny of the ob)ectionable provisions of the Code reveals that they are not purely business0oriented nor do they concern the management aspect of the business of the company as in the the San Mi"uel Mi"uel case case.. (he (he prov provis isio ions ns of the the Code Code clea clearl rly y have have repe reperc rcus usio ions ns on the the employee6s right to security of tenure. (he implementation of the provisions may result in the deprivation of an employee6s means of livelihood which, as correctly pointed out by the %/C, is a property right $allanta $ allanta vs arnation Philippines nc ., 175 @C/# *'! H1!'&. In view of these aspects of the case which border on infringement of constitutional rights, we must uphold the constitutional re;uirements for the protection of labor and the promotion of social )ustice, for these factors, according to Kustice Isagani CruB, tilt 4the scales of )ustice when there is doubt, in 3
favor of the wor2er4 $E!ployees Association of the Philippine A!erican Life nsurance o!pany vs. NLR, 1 @C/# '*! H11 '95&. ?erily, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which a>ect the rights of the employees. In treating the latter, management should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes action. "#% asserts that all its employees have been furnished copies of the Code. "ublic respondents found to the contrary, which -nding, to say the least is entitled to great respect. "#% posits the view that by signing the 1!011 collective bargaining agreement, on Kune *, 1+, "#%# in e>ect, recogniBed "#%6s 4eEclusive right to ma2e and enforce company rules and regulations to carry out the functions of management $ithout having to discuss the same with "#%# and much less, obtain the latter6sconfor!ity thereto4 $pp. 1101*, "etitioner6s Memorandum: pp 1!+01!1, Rollo.& "etitioner6s view is based on the following provision of the agreement3 (he #ssociation recogniBes the right of the Company to determine matters of management it policy and Company operations and to direct its manpower. Management of the Company includes the right to organiBe, plan, direct and control operations, to hire, assign employees to wor2, transfer employees from one department, to another, to promote, demote, discipline, suspend or discharge employees for )ust cause: to lay0o> employees for valid and legal causes, to introduce new or improved methods or facilities or to change eEisting methods or facilities and the right to ma2e and enforce Company rules and regulations to carry out the functions of management. (he eEercise by management of its prerogative shall be done in a )ust reasonable, humane andor lawful manner. @uch provision in the collective bargaining agreement may not be interpreted as cession of employees6 rights to participate in the deliberation of matters which may a>ect their rights and the formulation of policies relative thereto. #nd one such mater is the formulation of a code of discipline. Indeed, industrial peace cannot be achieved if the employees are denied their )ust participation in the discussion of matters a>ecting their rights. (hus, even before #rticle *11 of the labor Code $".D. 77*& was amended by /epublic #ct o. '15, it was already declared a policy of the @tate, 4$d& (o promote the enlightenment of wor2ers concerning their rights and obligations . . . as employees.4 (his was, of course, ampli-ed by /epublic #ct o '15 when it decreed the 4participation of wor2ers in decision and policy ma2ing processes a>ecting their rights, duties and welfare.4 "#%6s position that it cannot be saddled with the 4obligation4 of sharing management prerogatives as during the formulation of the Code, /epublic #ct o. '15 had not yet been enacted $"etitioner6s Memorandum, p. 77: Rollo, p. *1*&, cannot thus be sustained. Fhile such 4obligation4 was not yet founded in law when the Code was formulated, the attainment of a harmonious labor0management relationship and the then already eEisting state policy of enlightening wor2ers concerning their rights as employees demand no less than the observance of transparency in managerial moves a>ecting employees6 rights. "etitioner6s assertion that it needed the implementation of a new Code of Discipline considering the nature of its business cannot be overemphasiBed. In fact, its being a local monopoly in the business demands the most stringent of measures to attain safe travel for its patrons. onetheless, whatever disciplinary measures are adopted cannot be properly implemented in the absence of full cooperation of the employees. @uch cooperation cannot be attained if the employees are restive on account, of their being left out in the determination of cardinal and fundamental matters a>ecting their employment. F/GO/, the petition is DI@MI@@D and the ;uestioned decision #GGI/MD. o special pronouncement is made as to costs. @O O/D/D.
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G.R. No. 11$1%& O'to* 1+, 199$ SAN MIGUEL OO-S, INC. CEBU BMEG EE- PLANT, petitioner, vs.
HON. BIEN/ENI-O E. LAGUESMA, U!"*s'*t*0 o -OLE !" ILA2 AT BULO- NG MANGGAGA2A (IBM), respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, 4R., J.: p (his is a petition for certiorari under /ule '5 to review and set aside two /esolutions of Mediator0#rbiter #chilles ?. Manit, dated Kanuary 5, 17 and #pril ', 17, and the a C&NE 8=77 thereafter it shall continue inde-nitely unless sooner terminated upon thirty $9+& days notice served upon by one party to the other, eEcept as provided for in #rticles 1', 1 T 1! hereof. @ometime in #ugust of 1!!, "#% re;uested 1' additional security guards. @@I provided what was re;uested: however, "#% insisted that what @@I did was merely to pic2 out 1' guards from the !' already assigned by it and directed them to render overtime duty. On 1' Gebruary 1+, "#% terminated the security service agreement with @@I without giving the latter the 9+0day prior notice re;uired in paragraph *+ thereof. Instead, "#% paid each of the security guards actually assigned at the time of the termination of the agreement an amount e;uivalent to their one0month salary to compensate for the lac2 of notice. In ovember 1+, @@I, allegedly 4in its capacity as (rustee for @iEteen or on @ecurity 8uards,4 -led with the %/C #rbitration =ranch, ational Capital /egion, a complaint & against "#% for the recovery of "5,'++.++ representing termination pay bene-t due the alleged 1' additional security guards, which "#% failed and refused to pay despite demands. It further as2ed for an award of not less than "15,+++.++ for each of the 1' guards as damages for the delay in the performance of "#%6s obligation, and also for attorney6s fees in an amount e;uivalent to 1+R of whatever might be recovered. "ertinent portions of the complaint read as follows3 9. =y virtue of said contract and upon its e>ectivity, respondent re;uired eighty0siE $!'& security guards whom complaint @@I supplied: on or sometime in #ugust 1!, respondent as2ed siEteen $1'& security guards to render twelve $1*& hours each. 7. In Gebruary 1+ and for reasons of its own, respondent caused to terminate not only the contract but also the services of the security guards: in e>ecting such termination, said respondent caused to pay the e;uivalent of one $1& month6s notice unto all the security guards, eEcept the 1' who, as aforementioned were rendering 1* hours each from date of assignment up to and until their termination. 5. #s computed, the termination pay bene-ts due the 1' security guards amount to "5,'++.++, more or less, which, despite demands, respondent fails, neglects or refuses to pay, as it continue refusing, failing or neglecting to so do up to the present time.
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'. /espondent has not only incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation but also contravened the tenor thereof: hence, complainants are, by law, entitled to be indemni-ed with damages for no less than "15,+++.++ each for all complainants though the correct amount is left solely to the sound discretion of the onorable %abor #rbiter. . Complainants are now compelled to litigate their plainly valid, )ust or demandable claim on account of which services of counsel have been re;uired and thereby obligated themselves to pay, for and as attorney6s fees, the sum e;uivalent to ten percent $1+R& of whatever sums or sum may be recovered in the case. (he complaint was doc2eted as %/C0C/ Case o. ++0110+'++!0+ and assigned to %abor #rbiter Cornelio %. %insangan. "#% -led a motion to dismiss the complaint 3 on the grounds that the %abor #rbiter had no )urisdiction over the sub)ect matter or nature of the complaint and that @@I had no cause of action against "#%. In ampli-cation thereof, "#% argued that the case involved the interpretation of the security service agreement, which is purely civil in character and falls outside of the %abor #rbiter6s )urisdiction. It is clear from #rticle *1 of the %abor Code that for claims to be within the )urisdiction of %abor #rbiters, they must arise from an employer0employee relationship. "#% claimed that @@I did not allege the eEistence of an employer0employee relationship between "#% and @@I or its guards, and that in fact, paragraph 1+ of the agreement provides that there is no employer0employee relationship between the CO(/#C(O/ andor his guards on the one hand and "#% on the other. In its Opposition, @@I pointed out that "#% forgot or overloo2ed the fact that 4insofar as labor standards, bene-ts, etc. have to be resolved or ad)udicated, liability therefor is shifted to, or assumed by, respondent Hherein petitioners which, in law, has been constituted as an indirect e!ployer .4 "#% -led a supplemental motion to dismiss 5 wherein it cites the following reasons for the dismissal of the complaint3 $1& the clear stipulations in the agreement $paragraphs 7 and 1+& that there eEists no employer0employee relationship between "#% on the one hand and @@I and the guards on the other: $*& there were no 1' additional guards, as the 1' guards who were re;uired to render 1*0hour shifts were pic2ed out from the original !' guards already assigned and were already given a one0month salary in lieu of the 9+0day notice of termination of the agreement: $9& @@I had no legal personality to -le the case as alleged trustee of the 1' security guards: and $7& the real parties in interest A the 1' security guards A never showed any interest in the case either by attending any hearing or conference, or by following up the status of the case. #ttached to the supplemental motion to dismiss were, among other things, EeroE copies of con-rmation letters of @@I to "#% to show that no additional guards were in fact provided. $ %abor #rbiter %insangan did not resolved the motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion to dismiss. On 1* #ugust 11, he handed down a decision % ordering "#% to pay3 $1& the sum of "5,'++.++ representing the e;uivalent of one0month6s separation pay due the 1' individual security guards, plus 1+R interest from the date of -ling of the case until the whole obligation shall have been fully settled: $*& the sum of "5,+++.++ by way of eEemplary damages due each of the 1' security guards: and $9& another sum e;uivalent to 1+R of the total award for and as attorney6s fees. It was in that decision that %abor #rbiter %insangan mentioned for the -rst time that the resolution of the motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss 4was deferred until Hthe case is decided on the merits4 considering 4the ground not to be indubitable.4 In holding that he had )urisdiction over the case, he stated3
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#s heretofore and invariably held in similar cases, the issue of whether or not %abor #rbiters have )urisdiction over money claims a>ecting security guards assigned by security agencies $li2e complainant herein& to their client0 companies such as "#% is, more or less, settled, especially since, as the law views such as peculiar relationship, such money claims insofar as they have to be paid, are the ultimate responsibility of the client0-rms. In e>ect, the security guards have been constituted as indirect employees of the client )ust as the client becomes the indirect employer of the guards. #rt. 1+ and 1+ of the %abor Code eEpressly provide that. . . . (o )ustify the awards, %abor #rbiter %insangan opined3 vidence adduced clearly show that sometime in December 1!, aforementioned security service contract was eEecuted, based on which the re;uired number of security guards were assigned to, or posted at, the various premises of respondent A "#%. @aid number of security guards may, as the contract provides, be increased or reduced at respondent6s re;uest, such that the original number of eighty0siE $!'& guards, an additional siEteen $1'& were needed and, accordingly supplied who, pursuant to "#%6s instructions, were re;uired to render twelve $1*& hours each, per day. In Gebruary 1+, and for reasons of its own, "#% caused to terminate, as it did, the contract of security service. ne;uivocably, it caused to pay the separation pay bene-ts of the !'0security guards for the e;uivalent amount of one $1& month6s pay. #s to the additional 1', it failed and refused to grant similar e;uivalent, without any valid reasons therefor. #s earlier stated, respondent opted to rely solely on the ground set forth in its Motion to Dismiss as well as @upplement thereto. It failed to -le, despite directive made thereon, its position paper. either did it submit, nor adduce, evidence $documentary or otherwise& to rebut or contravert complainant6s claims especially since the money e;uivalent of the one month separation pay due the 1' guards has been duly ;uanti-ed as amounting to @eventy Give (housand @iE undred $"5,'++.++& "esos. (hus established, it is clear that there was absolutely no legal)usti-able reason why said 1' guards applied and who rendered 1* hours each per day had to be discriminated against. Gollowing "#%6s failure or refusal to pay, demands were made by complainant, as2ing at the same time why that was so. Conceivably, respondent has smarted itself on its mista2en belief that there was, as between the guards and itself, no employer0employee relationship and, hence, there is no legal basis for it to pay. If that was so, why did it pay separation pay unto the !' regular employed guards. "#% being widely 2nown as a progressively0minded employer, it should be the -rst to show good eEample for emulation. In this instant case, it did not: in fact, its actuations were not consistent with good faith. It should, therefore, be held liable for eEemplary damages and having re;uired complainant to litigate a plainly valid, )ust or demandable claim, an award for attorney6s fees must perforce be assessed. On 9 @eptember 11, "#% -led its #ppeal 8 wherein it indicated that it received a copy of the decision on *' #ugust 11. #ttached thereto was a machine copy of the otice of KudgmentGinal Order, with the date of its receipt, i.e., D? Au"ust 8==8, 9 having been stamped on the upper right hand corner by "#%6s %egal Department. @@I countered this #ppeal with a motion foe eEecution of )udgment 1+ on the ground that since "#%, received a copy of the decision on the *9rd, not on the *'th, of #ugust 15
11 it had until * @eptember 11 to appeal: hence, the appeal interposed on 9 @eptember was late by one day. (he decision had then become -nal and eEecutory. In its opposition 11 to this motion, "#% insisted that it received a copy of the decision on *' #ugust 11: thus, it had until 5 @eptember 11 to -le its appeal. On 9+ @eptember 11, %abor #rbiter %insangan issued a writ of eEecution.
1&
On 1 October 11, "#% -led a motion to ;uash 13 the writ of eEecution. It tried to eEplain therein why it thought all along that it received a copy of the decision on *' #ugust 11, thus3 7. pon investigation the undersigned counsel learned that on *9 #ugust 11 $Griday& a server0messenger went to "#% %egal Department to serve said decision. (he receiving cler2s at that time were all out of the oect of rendering the )udgment -nal and eEecutory, it is e;ually settled that the %/C may disregard the procedural lapse where there is an accepta,le reason to eEcuse tardiness in the ta2ing of the appeal. &5#mong the acceptable reasons recogniBed by this Court are $a& counsel6s reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the %abor #rbiter that 4the aggrieved party may appeal . . . within ten $1+& $orin" days4: &$ $b& fundamental consideration of substantial )ustice: &% $c& prevention of miscarriage of )ustice or of un)ust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier -nal decision: &8 and $d& special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits &9 or the amount and the issue involved. 3+ # one0day delay in the perfection of the appeal was eEcused in Paci/c Asia *verseas Shippin" orp.vs. NLR 31 nsular life Assurance o. vs. NLR, 3& and ity %air orp. vs. NLR. 33 In the instant case, the %abor #rbiter6s lac2 of )urisdiction A so palpably clear on the face of the complaint A and the perpetuation of un)ust enrichment if the appeal is disallowed are enough combination of reasons that warrant a relaEation of the rules on perfection of appeals in labor cases. F/GO/, the instant petitioner is hereby 8/#(D. (he ;uestioned decision of the %abor #rbiter dated 1* #ugust 11 and the resolutions of the @econd Division of the ational %abor /elations Commission promulgated on * October 17 and 91 May 15 are hereby @( #@ID, and %/C0C/ Case o. ++0110+'++!0+ is DI@MI@@D.
20
G.R. No. 1&8++3
4u60 &$, &+++
RUBBER2ORL- 7PHILS., INC., !" 4ULIE #AO ONG, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AUINO MAGSALIN, PE-RO MA:IBO, RICAR-O BOR4A, ALICIA M. SAN PE-RO AN- ELOMENA B. TOLIN, respondents. DCI@IO
PAR-O, J.: Fhat is before the Court for resolution is a petition to annul the resolution of the ational %abor /elations Commission $%/C&, 1 aect on @eptember *', 17. =efore the e>ectivity date, however, /ubberworld was forced to prematurely shutdown its operations. On ovember 11, 17, private respondents -led with the ational %abor /elations Commission a complaint *against petitioner for illegal dismissal and non0payment of separation pay. On ovember **, 17, /ubberworld -led with the @ecurities and Echange Commission $@C& a petition for declaration of suspension of payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan.9 On December *!, 17, @C issued the following order3 4#ccordingly, with the creation of the Management Committee, all actions for claims against /ubberworld "hilippines, Inc. pending before any court, tribunal, o are hereby deemed @@"DD. 4Conse;uently, all pending incidents for preliminary in)unctions, writ or attachments, foreclosures and the li2e are hereby rendered moot and academic. 4@O O/D/D.47
21
On Kanuary *7, 15, petitioners submitted to the labor arbiter a motion to suspend the proceedings invo2ing the @C order dated December *!, 17. (he labor arbiter did not act on the motion and ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. On December 1+, 15, the labor arbiter rendered a decision, which provides3 4In the light of the foregoing, respondents are hereby declared guilty of I%%8#% @(DOF and that respondents are ordered to pay complainants their separation pay e;uivalent to one $1& month pay for every year of service. Considering the malicious act of closing the business precipitately without due regard to the rights of complainants, moral damages and eEemplary damage in the sum of " 5+,+++.++ and " 9+,+++.++ respectively is hereby awarded for each of the complainants. Ginally 1+ R of all sums owing to complainants is hereby ad)udged as attorney6s fees. @O O/D/D.45 On Gebruary 5, 1', petitioners appealed to the ational %abor /elations Commission $%/C& alleging abuse of discretion and serious errors in the -ndings of facts of the labor arbiter. On #ugust 9+, 1', %/C issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads3 4"/MI@@ CO@ID/D, the decision appealed from is hereby, #GGI/MD with MODIGIC#(IO in that the award of moral and eEemplary damages is hereby, D%(D. @O O/D/D.4' On ovember *+, 1', %/C denied petitioners6 motion for reconsideration. ence, this petition. (he issue is whether or not the Department of %abor and mployment, the %abor #rbiter and the ational %abor /elations Commission may legally act on the claims of respondents despite the order of the @ecurities and Echange Commission suspending all actions against a company under rehabilitation by a management committee created by the @ecurities and Echange Commission. "residential Decree o. +*0# is clear that 4all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.4 (he law did not ma2e any eEception in favor of labor claims. ! 4(he )usti-cation for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims is to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to e>ectively eEercise itshis powers free from any )udicial or eEtra )udicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the 6rescue6 of the debtor company. (o allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, e>ort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.4 (hus, the labor case would defeat the purpose of an automatic stay.8F$phi8 (o rule otherwise would open the Soodgates to numerous claims and would defeat the rescue e>orts of the management committee. =esides, even if an award is given to private respondents, the ruling could not be enforced as long as petitioner is under management committee. 1+
22
(his -nds ratiocination in that the power to hear and decide labor disputes is deemed suspended when the @ecurities and Echange Commission puts the corporation under rehabilitation. (hus, when %/C proceeded to decide the case despite the @C suspension order, the %/C acted without or in eEcess of its )urisdiction to hear and decide cases. #s a conse;uence, any resolution, decision or order that it rendered or issued without )urisdiction is a nullity.
2HEREORE , the petition is hereby 8/#(D. (he decision of the labor arbiter dated December 1+, 15 and the %/C resolution dated #ugust 9+, 1', are @( #@ID. o costs.
G.R. No. 11%$1
4!u*0 19, &+++
ALEMAR;S SIBAL < SONS, INC., petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NLMATIPUNAN (*=*s!t>!g t? g*ou= o CHARITO ALIMORONG), respondents. PAR-O, J.: (he petition before the Court is for certiorari1 to set aside the resolutions of the ational %abor /elations Commission* dismissing the appeal of petitioner and upholding the order of the %abor #rbiter to proceed with the eEecution of the decision rendered in favor of private respondent. On Kanuary 9+, 1!7, private respondent %M atipunan, representing the group of Charito #limurong, -led with the Department of %abor and mployment a notice of stri2e, 9 raising charges of unfair labor practice $%"& and illegal dismissal against petitioner. (hereafter, the charges were elevated to respondent ational %abor /elations Commission $%/C& for compulsory arbitration. 7 On #pril *, 1!5, %abor #rbiter milio ?. "eUalosa rendered a decision 5 ordering petitioner to pay private respondent separation pay e;uivalent to one0half $1*& month pay for every year of service. On December *9, 1!5, the /esearch and Information nit of the %/C submitted its computation of the separation pay due to private respondent, which amounted to a total of "*+,9'5.99. On Kanuary 7, 1!!, private respondent -led with the %abor #rbiter a motion for eEecution of the decision of the %abor #rbiter. "etitioner did not -le any opposition thereto. #t the hearing held on #pril 1, 1!!, petitioner and private respondent agreed to the computation of the separation pay. (he terms of settlement are as follows3 #s agreed upon by the parties, a downpayment of "*+,9'.59 will be paid in May 1!! which is e;uivalent to 1+R of the total money )udgment. In Kune 1!!, "71,79.+' will be paid by respondent and the rest covering the initial forty four $77& will be paid Kuly 1!!. (he balance of the "*+,9'5.*+ will be spread over a -fteen $15& months period. $@gd& Counsel for Complainant for /espondent '
$@gd&
Counsel
23
(hus, %abor #rbiter Kose de ?era directed petitioner to pay the agreed amount of "*+,9'.59 representing 1+R of the total amount of the separation pay due the complainants on May 1', 1!!. On Kune Kune 1+, 1!!, 1!!, the /ehabil ehabilita itatio tion n /eceive eceiverr of petiti petitione onerr submit submitted ted a Manif Manifest estati ation on with with Motion, alleging that petitioner was not yet in a position to comply with the directive of %abor #rbiter de ?era for the reason that it was still under /ehabilitation /eceivership by virtue of the order of the @ecurities and Echange Commission $@C& dated #ugust 1, 1!7. (hus, it sought deferment of such payment until the @C will issue an order formally approving approving the rehabilitation of petitioner and allowing complainants to -le their claims with the /ehabilitation /ehabilitation /eceiver. /eceiver. Due to the failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to pay the -rst batch of complainants their separation pay, the %abor #rbiter granted the motion for eEecution of private respondent in an order dated Kuly 1!, 1!!. On #ugust 5, 1!!, petitioner -led a motion for reconsideration of the order granting the motion for eEecution, contesting the amount computed by the /esearch Information nit of the ational %abor /elations Commission. On @eptember , 1!!, %abor #rbiter Kose De ?era denied the motion, stating as follows3 . . .res .respo pond ndent ent fail failed ed to mani manife fest st any any ob)e ob)ect ctio ion n or to subm submit it its its comm comment ent on the the computation made by the /esearch and Information nit, this =ranch. In fact, on March 1, 1!!, it submitted a proposal as to how the complainants6 claim for separation pay would be satis-ed. Gurther, when the complainants agreed to accept payment of their separation pay on scheduled basis, the -rst payment of "*+,9'.59 scheduled in May 1!!, which was agreed upon by the parties, said respondent failed to comply and instead, it -led a Manifestation with Motion praying for the deferment of eEecution until the @ecurities and Echan Echange ge Commis Commissio sion n issues issues an Order Order formal formally ly appro approvin ving g the rehab rehabili ilitat tation ion of the respondent. =esides, the respondent Motion for /econsideration is -led out of time considering that as per baili>s return, respondent received the ;uestioned Order on Kuly *', 1!! while its Motion was -led only on #ugust 5, 1!!, or more than ten $1+& days from receipt of the Order.! On @ept @eptem embe berr *', *', 1!! 1!!,, petit etitio ione nerr -led -led with with the the %abo %aborr #rbi #rbite terr a Moti Motion on to @usp @uspen end d Eecution, citi citing ng as reaso eason n ther theref efor or the the orde orderr issu issued ed by the the @ecu @ecuri riti ties es and and Ech Echan ange ge Commission which states3 #ll actions actions for claims claims again against st the corpo corporat ration ion befor before e any court, court, tribun tribunal al or body body are are 1+ suspended accordingly. On October *, 1!!, petitioner appealed the %abor #rbiter6s order 11 for the issuance of a writ of eEecution to the %/C. In a decision dated October 19, 19, the %/C dismissed the appeal. On Gebruary *, 17, the %/C li2ewise denied the petitioner6s motion for reconsideration. ence, this petition. 1* "etitioner contends that public respondent should have denied the order of the %abor #rbiter for the immediate payment of separation pay in favor of private respondent. "etitioner insists that a stay of eEecution of monetary award is )usti-ed in this case because of the order of the @ecurities and Echange Commission suspending all claims against petitioner pending before any court, tribunal or body. (he @olicitor 8eneral, in his Manifestation, 19 recommends that the petition be given due course with withou outt pre) pre)ud udic ice e to the subse subse;u ;uen entt rece receip iptt of sepa separa rati tion on pay pay by priv privat ate e resp respon onde dent nt in accordance with the preference and concurrence of credits under the Civil Code, the Insolvency %aw and #rticle11+ of the %abor Code. /espondent ational %abor /elations Commission, on the other hand, contends that petitioner is bound by its agreement with private respondent as to the computation of separation pay to be paid. (he %/C emphasiBes that the order of eEecution made by the %abor #rbiter had reached -nality and stresses that petitioner6s succeeding motions had been -led out of time. 17 24
Fe note that at the time this petition had been -led on May 7, 17, petitioner had been placed under rehabilitation receivership. Kurisprudence has established that a stay of eEecution may be warra warranted nted by the fact fact that that a petit petition ioner er corpo corporat ration ion has been been placed placed under under rehab rehabili ilitat tation ion 15 receivership. owever, it is undisputed that on March 5, 1, the @ecurities and Echange Commission issued an order approving the proposed rehabilitation plan of petitioner and placing it under li;uidation pursuant to "residential Decree +*0# . @ub)ect to the control of the @C, the li;ui li;uida dator tor,, %edes %edesma, ma, @aludo @aludo T #ssoci #ssociate ates, s, 1' was ordered ered to 4wi 4wind up the the a>a a>airs irs of the corporation, continue to manage the corporation for purposes of li;uidation in order to protect the interest of its creditors and avoid dissipation, loss, wastage, or destruction of the remaining assets and other properties of the corporation and to ensure orderly payment of claims against such corporation in accordance accordance with applicable laws.4 1 (hus, petitioner pointed out that the @C6s order suspending all claims against it pending before any other court, tribunal or body was pursuant to the rehabilitation receivership proceedings. @uch order was necessary to enable the rehabilitation receiver to e>ectively eEercise its powers free from any )udicial or eEtra0)udicial interference that might unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company. 1! @ince receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioner6s rehabilitation receiver and li;uidator, %edesma @aludo T #ssociates, has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate li;uidation, the cited order of the @ecurities and Echange Commission has been rendered functus rendered functus ocio. ocio. (hus, there is no legal impediment for the eEecution of the decision of the %abor #rbiter for the payment of separation pay. pay. Considering that petitioner6s monetary obligation to private respondent is long overdue and that petit petition ioner er has signisigni-ed ed its willi willingn ngness ess to compl comply y with with such such oblig obligati ation on by enteri entering ng into into an agreement with private respondent as to the amount and manner of payment, petitioner can not delay satisfaction of private respondent6s claim. owever, due to events subse;uent to the -ling of this petition, private respondent must present its claim with the rehabilitation receiver and li;uidator of petitioner, sub)ect to the rules on preference of credits. F/GO/, the Court hereby DI@MI@@@ the petition and direct private respondent to -le its claim with the rehabilitation receiverli;uidator of petitioner in @C = o. !1 entitled 4In the Matter of the %i;uidation of #lemar6s @ibal T @ons4 pending before the @ecurities and Echange Commission.8F$phi8.nHt Commission.8F$phi8.nHt
G.R. No. 11$3% O'to* 3, 199$ NATI/I-A- PON-OC, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (>t? ->@>s>o!, Cg0! " O*o C>t0) !" EMILIO PON-OC, respondents.
-A/I-E, 4R., J.: p p (he novel issue that confronts confronts us in this case is whether the Gifth Gifth Division of the ational %abor /elations Commission $%/C& can validly defeat a -nal )udgment of the %abor #rbiter in favor of the complainant in a labor case by3 $a& entertaining a petition for in)unction in)unction and damages, and an appeal from from the %abor #rbiter6s #rbiter6s denial of a claim for set0 o> based on an alleged indebtedness of the laborer and order of eEecution of the -nal )udgment: )udgment: and, $b& thereafter, thereafter, by receiving receiving evidence and ad)udging ad)udging recovery recovery on such indebtedness and authoriBing it to o>set the %abor #rbiter6s -nal award. (he petitioner petitioner ta2es ta2es the negative view. view. In its Manifestation Manifestation and Motion in %ieu of 1 Comment, the Oerential for of underpayment "95,'.++: /egular pay for
$9& "remium services AAAA $7& 19th AAAA
holiday holiday services pay
month
for
pay
and +*.++:
rest day 9,!7+.++: 9,'++.++
or the total amount of GO/(L0GO/ H sic sic (O@#D #D O D/D I8( "@O@ $"77,11!.++&. Other claims are denied for lac2 of merit. @O O/D/D $/ecords, pp. 9*909*7&. On his last day to perfect an appeal, private private respondent respondent -led a Manifestation Manifestation befo beforre the the %abo %aborr #rbi #rbite terr pray prayin ing g that that his his liab liabil ilit itie ies s be set0o set0o> > agai agains nstt petitioner6s alleged indebtedness to him $/ecords, pp. 9*509*&. (he %abor 26
#rbiter denied, however, the compensation, and, instead, issued a writ of eEecution as prayed for by petitioner $/ecords, p. 9*!&. =efore the eEecution order could be implemented, however, private respondent was able to obtain a restraining order from the %/C, where he -led a "etition for 4In)unction and Damages,4 doc2eted as %/C Case o. ICM0++++'5. On Gebruary *!, 17, public respondent %/C allowed compensation between petitioner6s monetary award and her alleged indebtedness to private respondent. It disposed3 F/GO/, the appealed order is hereby vacated and set aside. # new one is entered declaring the setting0o> of complainant6s indebtedness which allegedly amounted to "71,+51.95 against the complainant6s monetary award in the amount of "77,11!.++. (he additional amount of "5,+++.++ which complainant allegedly got from respondent on 1+ Kuly 19 could not be credited in view of appellant6s failure to submit evidence to prove that complainant was really paid "5,+++.++. #ccordingly, respondent ulalio "ondoc is hereby directed to pay complainant atividad "ondoc the amount of "9,+''.'5. (he (emporary restraining order issued herein is hereby made permanent. @O O/D/D $#nneE 4D4 of "etition&.
3
er motion for reconsideration of the )udgment having been denied by the %/C, the petitioner instituted this special civil action for certiorari under /ule '5 of the /ules of Court wherein she prays this Court annul the challenged decision of the %/C, Gifth Division $Cagayan de Oro City&, in %/C Case o. IC o. M0++++'5, and direct the enforcement of the writ of eEecution in %/C Case o. @/#=0+0+501+1+*0*, on the ground that the %/C, Gifth Division, acted without or in eEcess of )urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to determine the alleged indebtedness of the petitioner and set0o> the same against the liabilities of the private respondent. (he petitioner asserts that the decision of the %abor #rbiter in %/C Case o. @/#=0+0+50 1+1+*0* was already -nal and eEecutory when the private respondent tried to defeat the )udgment by asserting an alleged indebtedness of #ndres "ondoc as a set0o>, a claim not pleaded before the %abor #rbiter at any time before )udgment, hence deemed waived. Moreover the indebtedness 4did not evolve out Hsic employer0employee relationship, hence, purely civil in aspect.4 (he Oectual any decision in favor of such party. EEE EEE EEE (he fore"oin" ancillary po$er may be eEercised by the %abor #rbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but eEcluding labor disputes involving stri2e or loc2out. $emphasis supplied&. ence, a petition or motion for preliminary in)unction should have been -led in the appeal interposed by the private respondent, i.e., in %/C Case o. @/#=0+0+50 1+1+*0*. (his matter, however, became academic when the %/C consolidated the two cases as shown by the captions in its challenged decision of *! Gebruary 17 and resolution of ' May 17. @econdly, the appeal of the private respondent in %/C Case o. @/#=0+0+501+1+*0* was not from the decision therein, but from the order of the %abor #rbiter denying the set0o> insisted upon by the private respondent and directing the eEecution of the )udgment. (herefore, the private respondent admitted the -nal and eEecutory character of the )udgment. (he %abor #rbiter, in denying the set0o>, reasoned 4Hit could have been considered if it was presented before the decision of this case.4 Fhile this is correct, there are stronger reasons why the set0o> should, indeed, be denied. #s correctly contended by the O against the -nal )udgment of the %abor #rbiter. Ginally, even assuming ar"uendo that the claim for the alleged indebtedness fell within the eEclusive original )urisdiction of the %abor #rbiter, it was deemed waived for not having been pleaded as an aset the -nal award of the %abor #rbiter in %/C Case o. @/#=0+0+501+1+*0*. F/GO/, the instant petition is 8/#(D and the challenged decision of *! Gebruary 17 and resolution of ' May 17 of the ational %abor /elations Commission in %/C Case o. IC o. M0++++'5 and %/C Case o. @/#=0+0+501+1+*0* are #%%D and @( #@ID. (he )udgment of the %abor #rbiter in %/C Case o. @/#=0+0+501+1+*0* should forthwith be enforced without any further delay, the award therein bearing interest at the rate of twelve per centu! $1*R& per annu! from the -nality of such )udgment until it shall have been fully paid. Costs against the private respondent.
G.R. No. 1&$$&5 S=t* 18, 199% ANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH -I/ISION, !" BEN4AMIN RELU#A, 4R., E-GAR-O GENA#AS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENO#A, RO-OLO GONGOB, -ARIO BINO#A, BEN4AMIN BASMA#OR, ABELAR-O SACURA, LORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, 4OSEPH CABIGIS, RO-RIGO CILLON, /IRGILIO UION, GUARINO E/ANGELISTA, ALE4AN-RO GATA, BENE-ICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA, -IONISIO PERMACIO, 4UANITO SALU-, A-OR RIMPO, ELIPE ORAE, 4ULIETO TE4A-A, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONORE UION, RU-# AL/ARE, CRESENCIO LORES, ALRE-O PERMACIO, CRESENCIO AL/IAR, HERNANI SURILLA, -IOS-A-O SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ACARIAS ORTI, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, 4ERR# /ARGAS, E-UAR-O BUENO, PASCUAL HU-A#A, ROGELIO NIETES, !" RE#NAL-O NIETES, respondents.
PUNO, J.: 29
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner anlaon Construction nterprises Co., Inc. see2s to annul the decision of respondent ational %abor /elations Commission, Gifth Division and remand the cases to the #rbitration =ranch for a retrial on the merits. "etitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with principal oerentials and thirteenth0month pay. ngineers stacio and Dulatre were named co0respondents. @ome of the cases were assigned to %abor #rbiter 8uardson #. @iao while the others were assigned to %abor #rbiter icodemus 8. "alangan. @ummonses and notices of preliminary conference were issued and served on the two engineers and petitioner through ngineer stacio. (he preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by ngineers stacio and Dulatre and private respondents. #t the conference of Kune 11, 1+ before #rbiter @iao, ngineer stacio admitted petitioner6s liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their wage di>erentials and thirteenth0month pay on Kune 1, 1+. #s a result of this agreement, ngineer stacio allegedly waived petitioner6s right to -le its position paper. 1 "rivate respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their complaints as their position paper. & On Kune 1, 1+, ngineer stacio appeared but re;uested for another wee2 to settle the claims. %abor #rbiter @iao denied this re;uest. On Kune *1, 1+, #rbiter @iao issued an order granting the complaint and directing petitioner to pay private respondents6 claims. #rbiter @iao held3 EEE EEE EEE Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these cases were -led, and what the complainants might thin2 as to how this branch operates andor conducts its proceedings as they are now restless, this #rbiter has no other alternative or recourse but to order the respondent to pay the claims of the complainants, sub)ect of course to the computation of the Giscal Eaminer II of this =ranch pursuant to the oral manifestation of respondent. (he @upreme Court ruled3 4Contracts though orally made are binding on the parties.4 $%ao @o2 v. @abaysabay, 19! @C/# 197&. @imilarly, this =ranch would present in passing that 4a court cannot decide a case without facts either admitted or agreed upon by the parties or proved by evidence.4 $Lu Chin "iao v. %im (uaco, 99 "hil. *: =enedicto v. Lulo, *' "hil. 1'+& F/GO/, premises considered, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the individual claims of the above0named complainants representing their wage di>erentials within ten $1+& days from receipt of this order. (he Giscal Eaminer II of this =ranch is li2ewise hereby ordered to compute the individual claims of the herein complainants. @O O/D/D. 3 On Kune *, 1+, #rbiter "alangan issued a similar order, thus3 Fhen the above0entitled cases were called for hearing on Kune 1, 1+ at 1+3++ a.m. respondent thru their representative manifested that they were willing to pay the claims of the complainants and promised to pay the same on Kune *!, 1+ at 1+39+ a.m. owever, when these cases were called purposely to materialiBe the promise of the respondent, the latter failed to appear without any valid reason. Considering therefore that the respondent has already admitted the claims of the complainants, we believe that the issues raised herein have become moot and academic. F/GO/ premises considered, the above0entitled cases are hereby ordered Closed and (erminated, however, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the complainants their di>erential pay and 19th0month pay within a period of ten $1+& days from receipt hereof based on the employment record on -le with the respondent.
30
@O O/D/D. "etitioner appealed to respondent ational %abor /elations Commission. It alleged that it was denied due process and that ngineers stacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner. "etitioner6s appeal was -led by one #tty. #rthur #bundiente. In a decision dated #pril *, 1*, respondent Commission a or duly authoriBed public o or a duly deputiBed o6"*!, !60 RE#NAL-O /. BENE-ICTO, SHIRLE# /. BENE-ICTOTAN, E-GAR /. BENE-ICTO !" LILIBETH /. BENE-ICTO-E LA /ICTORIA,Y, respondents. DCI@IO
CORONA, J.
47
(his is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the October 1!, *++1 decision* and March 1!, *++* resolution 9 of the Court of #ppeals $C#& in C#08./. @" o. 59719 which in turn aect siE months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present %/C which was attached to the Department of %abor and mployment for program and policy coordination only. 9 Initially, #rticle 9+* $now, #rticle **9& thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the %/C to the @ecretary of %abor, but ".D. o. 191 subse;uently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. o appellate review has since then been provided for.
52
(hus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the %/C. 1+ (he present @ection **9, as last amended by @ection 1* of /.#. o. '15, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be -nal and eEecutory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. Fhen the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no )urisdiction to review the decisions of the %/C, and formerly of the @ecretary of %abor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless re)ected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutiniBe the acts of such agencies on ;uestions of law and )urisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute: that the purpose of )udicial review is to 2eep the administrative agency within its )urisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties: and that it is that part of the chec2s and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and un)ust ad)udications. 11 "ursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subse;uent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely -le a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subse;uent remedy, 1& and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under /ule '5, 13 for which said /ule has now -Eed the reglementary period of siEty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 1+0day period for -nality of the decision of the %/C may already have lapsed as contemplated in @ection **9 of the %abor Code, it has been held that this Court may still ta2e cogniBance of the petition for certiorari on )urisdictional and due process considerations if -led within the reglementary period under /ule '5. 1 (urning now to the matter of )udicial review of %/C decisions, =.". o. 1* originally provided as follows3 @ec. . Curisdiction. A (he Intermediate #ppellate Court shall eEercise3 $1& Original )urisdiction to issue writs of !anda!us, prohibition, certiorari, ha,eas corpus, and 0uo $arranto, and auEiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate )urisdiction: $*& Eclusive original )urisdiction over actions for annulment of )udgments of /egional (rial Courts: and $9& Eclusive appellate )urisdiction over all -nal )udgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of /egional (rial Courts and ;uasi0)udicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, eEcept those falling within the appellate )urisdiction of the @upreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this #ct, and of subparagraph $1& of the third paragraph and subparagraph $7& of the fourth paragraph of @ection 1 of the Kudiciary #ct of 17!. (he Intermediate #ppellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate )urisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. (hese provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the %abor Code of the "hilippines and by the Central =oard of #ssessment #ppeals. 15 @ubse;uently, and as it presently reads, this provision w as amended by /.#. o. +* e>ective March 1!, 15, to wit3 @ec. . Curisdiction. A (he Court of #ppeals shall eEercise3 $1& Original )urisdiction to issue writs of !anda!us, prohibition, certiorari, ha,eas corpus, and 0uo $arranto, and auEiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate )urisdiction: $*& Eclusive original )urisdiction over actions for annulment of )udgments of /egional (rial Courts: and $9& Eclusive appellate )urisdiction over all -nal )udgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of /egional (rial Courts and ;uasi0)udicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the @ecurities and Echange Commission, the @ocial @ecurity Commission, the mployees Compensation Commission and the Civil @ervice
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Commission, eEcept those falling within the appellate )urisdiction of the @upreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the %abor Code of the "hilippines under "residential Decree o. 77*, as amended, the provisions of this #ct, and of subparagraph $1& of the third paragraph and subparagraph $7& of the fourth paragraph of @ection 1 of the Kudiciary #ct of 17!. (he Court of #ppeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate )urisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. (rials or hearings in the Court of #ppeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three $9& months, unless eEtended by the Chief Kustice. It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, 1$ the following amendments of the original provisions of @ection of =.". o. 1* were e>ected by /.#. o. +*, viz.3 1. (he last paragraph which eEcluded its application to the La,or ode of the Philippines and the Central =oard of #ssessment #ppeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of #ppeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its )urisdiction. *. (he reference to the %abor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph $9& of the section, such that the original eEclusionary clause therein now provides 4eEcept those falling within the appellate )urisdiction of the @upreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the La,or ode of the Philippines under Presidential 3ecree No. ::D as a!ended , the provisions of this #ct, and of subparagraph $1& of the third paragraph and subparagraph $7& of the fourth paragraph of @ection 1 of the Kudiciary #ct of 17!.4 $mphasis supplied&. 9. Contrarily, however, speci-cally added to and included among the ;uasi0)udicial agencies over which the Court of #ppeals shall have eEclusive appellate )urisdiction are the @ecurities and Echange Commission, the @ocial @ecurity Commission, the mployees Compensation Commission and the Civil @ervice Commission. (his, then, brings us to a somewhat perpleEing impass[, both in point of purpose and terminology. #s earlier eEplained, our mode of )udicial review over decisions of the %/C has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under /ule '5 of the /ules of Court. (his is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of )urisdictional issues, that is, lac2 or eEcess of )urisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac2 of )urisdiction. It will, however, be noted that paragraph $9&, @ection of =.". o. 1* now grants eEclusive appellate )urisdiction to the Court of #ppeals over all -nal ad)udications of the /egional (rial Courts and the ;uasi0)udicial agencies generally or speci-cally referred to therein eEcept, among others, 4those falling within the appellate )urisdiction of the @upreme Court in accordance with . . . the %abor Code of the "hilippines under "residential Decree o. 77*, as amended, . . . .4 (his would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the %/C. 1% Let, under such eEcepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the %/C cannot be brought to the Court of #ppeals, but to this Court by necessary implication. (he same eEceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of #ppeals has no appellate )urisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate )urisdiction of the @upreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of =.". o. 1*, and those speci-ed cases in @ection 1 of the Kudiciary #ct of 17!. (hese cases can, of course, be properly eEcluded from the eEclusive appellate )urisdiction of the Court of #ppeals. owever, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly eEcluded are cases falling within the appellate )urisdiction of the @upreme Court in accordance $ith the La,or ode. (his is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural ga>e, since there are no cases in the %abor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate )urisdiction of the @upreme Court or of any other court for that matter. # review of the legislative records on the antecedents of /.#. o. +* persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said #ct or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In -ne, Congress did intend to provide for )udicial review of the ad)udications of the %/C in labor cases by the @upreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. (his conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations eEtant in the records of Congress, more particularly on @enate =ill o. 175 and the /eference Committee /eport on @. o. 175. o. 1+75*. 18 54
In sponsoring @enate =ill o. 175, @enator /aul @. /oco delivered his sponsorship speech which we reproduce the following eEcerpts3
19
from
(he Kudiciary /eorganiBation #ct, Mr. "resident, =atas "ambansa =lg. 1*, reorganiBed the Court of #ppeals and at the same time eEpanded its )urisdiction and powers. #mong others, its appellate )urisdiction was eEpanded to cover not only -nal )udgment of /egional (rial Courts, but also all -nal )udgment$s&, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of ;uasi0)udicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, eEcept those falling within the appellate )urisdiction of the @upreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of =" =lg. 1* and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 7 of @ection 1 of the Kudiciary #ct of 17!. Mr. "resident, the purpose of the law is to ease the $orload of the Supre!e ourt ,y the transfer of so!e of its ,urden of revie$ of factual issues to the ourt of Appeals. 5o$ever $hatever ,ene/ts that can ,e derived fro! the expansion of the appellate 4urisdiction of the ourt of Appeals $as cut short ,y the last para"raph of Section = of #atas Pa!,ansa #l". 8D= $hich excludes fro! its covera"e the Idecisions and interlocutory orders issued under the La,or ode of the Philippines and ,y the entral #oard of Assess!ent Appeals. #mong the highest number of cases that are brought up to the @upreme Court are la,or cases. ence, @enate =ill o. 175 see2s to eli!inate the exceptions enu!erated in Section = and, additionally, eEtends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of #ppeals in the decision$s& of the @ecurities and Echange Commission, the @ocial @ecurity Commission, and the mployees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the @upreme Court. $mphases and corrections ours& EEE EEE EEE @enate =ill o. 175 authored by our distinguished Colleague from %aguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the wor2load of the @upreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal. In closing, allow me to ;uote the observations of former Chief Kustice (eehan2ee in 1!' in the #nnual /eport of the @upreme Court3 . . . #mendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the @upreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the @upreme Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated tas2 as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people6s basic rights and additional tas2 eEpressly vested on it now 4to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac2 of )urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the 8overnment. Fe used to have 5++,+++ cases pending all over the land, Mr. "resident. It has been cut down to 9++,+++ cases some -ve years ago. I understand we are now bac2 to 7++,+++ cases. nless we distribute the wor2 of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending. In view of the foregoing, Mr. "resident, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Kustice and uman /ights re;uests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber. EEE EEE EEE @urprisingly, however, in a subse;uent session, the following Committee #mendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired3 &+ @enator /oco. On page *, line 5, after the line 4@upreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,4 add the phrase 4( %#=O/ COD OG ( "I%I""I@ D/ ".D. 77*, #@ #MDD.4 @o that it becomes clear, Mr. "resident, that issues arising from the %abor Code will still be appealable to the @upreme Court. (he "resident. Is there any ob)ectionQ $Silence& earing none, the amendment is approved.
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@enator /oco. On the same page, we move that lines *5 to 9+ be deleted. (his was also discussed with our Colleagues in the ouse of /epresentatives and as we understand it, as approved in the ouse, this was also deleted, Mr. "resident. (he "resident. Is there any ob)ectionQ $Silence& earing none, the amendment is approved. @enator /oco. (here are no further Committee amendments, Mr. "resident. @enator /omulo. Mr. "resident, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments. (he "resident. Is there any ob)ectionQ $Silence& earing none, the amendment is approved. $mphasis supplied&. EEE EEE EEE (hereafter, since there were no individual amendments, @enate =ill o. 175 was passed on second reading and being a certi-ed bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed. &1 (he Conference Committee /eport on @enate =ill o. 175 and ouse =ill o. 1+75*, having theretofore been approved by the ouse of /epresentatives, the same was li2ewise approved by the @enate on Gebruary *+, 15, && inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the @upreme Court earlier discussed. (he Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the %/C to the @upreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for )udicial review of decisions of the %/C. (he use of the word 4appeal4 in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plu!ae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of )udicial review addressed to the appellate courts. (he important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original )urisdiction of this Court and the Court of #ppeals: &3 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the @upreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as eEpressed in the sponsorship speech on @enate =ill o. 175. Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some ;uarters were of the opinion that recourse from the %/C to the Court of #ppeals as an initial step in the process of )udicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasiBed, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning3 On the other hand, Mr. "resident, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of #ppeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be reeEamined and reweighed after which the -ndings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly a
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