Labor cases

April 15, 2018 | Author: jheneliechell | Category: Employment, Psychiatry, Psychosis, Labour Law, Major Depressive Disorder
Share Embed Donate


Short Description

digest...

Description

G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988 NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO AN! ART"RO L. PERE#,petitioners, vs. T$E $ONORA%LE T$IR! !IVISION, NATIONAL LA%OR RELATIONS CO&&ISSION, &INISTR' O LA%OR AN! E&PLO'&ENT, &ANILA AN! E"GENIA C. CRE!O,respondents. ACTS) Eugenia C. Credo, an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), was administratively charged y Sisinio S. !loren, "anager of #inance and Special $ro%ect and Evaluation &epartment of NASECO, stemming from her non'compliance with !lorens memorandum. hen Credo was called y !loren to e*plain further the said instructions, she showed resentment and ehaved in a scandalous manner y shouting and uttering remar+s of disrespect in the presence of her co'employees. Credo was called to meet Arturo !. $ere, then Acting -eneral "anager of NASECO, to e*plain her side in connection with the administrative charges filed against her. On same date, Credo was placed on #orced !eave status for /0 days. NASECOs Committee on $ersonnel Affairs delierated and evaluated a numer of past acts of misconduct or infractions attriuted to her and recommended Credos termination, with forfeiture of enefits. Credo was made to e*plain her side in connection with the charges filed against her1 however, due to her failure to do so, she was handed a Notice of 2ermination. Credo filed a supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging asence of %ust or authoried cause for her dismissal and lac+ of opportunity to e heard. 2he laor ariter rendered a decision3 /) dismissing Credos complaint, and 4) directing NASECO to pay Credo separation pay e5uivalent to one half months pay for every year of service. 6oth parties appealed to N!7C which rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position. 8ence, the present recourse y oth parties. 9SS:E3 hether the termination of Credo was for a valid or authoried cause. 7uling3 2he Supreme Court held in the negative. NASECO did not comply with the guidelines for employers in the e*ercise of their power to dismiss employees for %ust causes in effecting Credos dismissal. Although she was apprised and given the chance to e*plain her side of the charges filed against her, this chance was given so perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory Credos right to security of tenure. 2hat Credo was not given ample opportunity to e heard and to defend herself is evident from the fact that the compliance with the in%unction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a chance to prepare for her defense was dispensed in only a day. 6esides, Credos mere non'compliance with !orens memorandum regarding the entry procedures in the companys Statement of 6illings Ad%ustment did not warrant the severe penalty of dismissal. 9n %ustifying Credos termination of employment, NASECO claims as additional lawful causes for dismissal Credos previous and repeated acts of insuordination, discourtesy and sarcasm towards her superior officers.

9f such acts of misconduct were indeed committed y Credo, they are deemed to have een condoned y NASECO. No disciplinary measure was ta+en or meted against her, nor was she even reprimanded. NASECOs condonation is gleaned from the fact that on ; Octoer /, Credo was given a salary ad%ustment for having performed in the %o at least satisfactorily and she was then rated ?ery Satisfactory as regards %o performance, particularly in terms of 5uality of wor+, 5uantity of wor+, dependaility, cooperation, resourcefulness and attendance. Considering that the acts or omissions for which Credos employment was sought to e legally terminated were insufficiently proved, as to %ustify dismissal, reinstatement is proper. #or asent the reason which gave rise to @the employees separation from employment, there is no intention on the part of the employer to dismiss the employee concerned.

G.R. No. 80609 A*+* 2, 1988 P$ILIPPINE LONG !ISTANCE TELEP$ONE CO&PAN', petitioner, vs. T$E NATIONAL LA%OR RELATIONS CO&&ISSION / &ARIL'N A%"CA', respondents. ACTS) "arilyn Aucay, a traffic operator of the $hilippine !ong &istance 2elephone Company, was accused y two complainants of having demanded and received from them the total amount of $>,=BB.BB in consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone installation. 9nvestigated and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service. She went to the "inistry of !aor and Employment claiming she had een illegally removed. After consideration of the evidence and arguments of the parties, the company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lac+ of merit. 8owever, the laor ariters declared that Aucay must e given one month pay for every year of service as financial assistance. 6oth the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the National !aor 7elations 6oard, which upheld the said decision in toto and dismissed the appeals. 2he private respondent too+ no further action, therey impliedly accepting the validity of her dismissal. 2he petitioner, however, is 5uestioning the award as having een made with grave ause of discretion. 9SS:E3 hether the award of financial assistance to an employee who had een dismissed for cause as found y the pulic respondent is legal. 7uling3 2he Supreme Court held that the grant of separation pay in the case at ar is un%ustified. Separation pay shall e allowed as a measure of social %ustice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. here the reason for the valid dismissal is, for e*ample, haitual into*ication or an offense involving moral turpitude, li+e theft or illicit se*ual relations with a fellow wor+er, the employer may not e re5uired to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the

ground of social %ustice. A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. G.R. No. L-062- Ar34 11, 1972 CALTE5 ILIPINO &ANAGERS AN! S"PERVISORS ASSOCIATIONpetitioner, vs. CO"RT O IN!"STRIAL RELATIONS, CALTE5 (P$ILIPPINES, INC., .E. &ENEEE / %.. E!AR!S, respondents. ACTS) Calte* #ilipino "anagers and Supervisors Association is a laor organiation of #ilipino managers supervisors of the respondent Company. After the Association was registered as a laor organiation, it sent a letter to the Company informing the latter of the formers registration and therey sent a set of proposals wherein one of the demands was the recognition of the Association as the duly authoried argaining agency for managers and supervisors in the Company. 2o this the Company countered stating that a distinction e*ists etween representatives of management and individuals employed as supervisors and that managerial employees are not 5ualified for memership in a laor organiation1 hence, it is digested that the Association institute a certification proceeding so as to remove any 5uestion with regard to position titles that should e included in the argaining unit. 2he Association felt disinclined to follow the suggestion of the Company and so the Company initiated a certification proceeding. 2he Association filed notice to stri+e. &uring the hearing of the certification proceedings, udge 2aigne cautioned the parties to maintain the status quo. On the asis of the stri+e notice filed and in view of acts committed y the Company which the Association considered as constituting unfair laor practice, the Association struc+ on April 44, /B, /
View more...

Comments

Copyright ©2017 KUPDF Inc.
SUPPORT KUPDF