Kulayan v. Abdusakur Tan

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HELD: The Senate Committees’ power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows: “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”

            The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case, the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. On this score, the Senate Committee cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the Senate Committee be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.

JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu, et al. G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.) The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management

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Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President HELD: It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that

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a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

ARNOLD VICENCIO v. HON. HEYNALOO A. VILLAR, et al. G.R. No. 182069, 3 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.) The mandate of the Commission on Audit is to observe the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. The City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM), presided by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled “An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy Services for Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas of Concern.” Arnold Vicencio was elected City Vice-Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also became the Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at the same time, the head of the Sanggunian Secretariat. Vicencio, representing the City Government of Malabon City, entered into Contracts for Consultancy Services. After the signing of their respective contracts, the three consultants rendered consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, the three consultants were correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts therefor. However, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing the amount for being u s t l a w l a w r e v i e w, v o l l v i i , n o . 1 , n o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2