Kant - Kuno Fischer

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Cornell University Library

B2798 .F52 1888 Critique of Kant. Tr. from

ttie

German by

3 1924 029 023 137 olin

:

A

CRITIQUE OF KANT

KUNO

FISCHER,

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY

W.

S.

HOUGH.

AUTHORISED ENGLISH EDITION.

LONDON SWAN SONNENSCHEIN, LOWREY & PATERNOSTER SQUARE. iS88.

CO.,

Printed by Hazell, Watson,

&

Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.

FROM THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE "COR

the New Edition of the fifth volume Modem Philosophy, which comprises

*•

forerunners,

I

of

my

The

publish separately.

my

his

first

four

I

herewith

chapters are entirely

the fifth gives in revised form the substance of the

;

chapter of the original volume on Fichte.

first I

and

have written, as an " Introduction to Post-

Kantian Philosophy," a Critique of Kant, which

new

History of

Fichte

formerly thought

it

right, as well as suited to the plan of

work, to add a short critique of the Kantian' philosophy

to the history of the development of post- Kantian philosophy,

—which former, — and

to reserve

of the whole,

when

in all its branches

with

all

an

grows out of a

criticism of the

exhaustive critique

till

the close

the reader will have become acquainted

the standpoints

which attempt a solution of the

Kantian problems, and which have thus exercised an influence

which wish

and

upon the Kantian epoch. is in

I still

hold this view,

keeping with the historic method.

my work I

And

to serve the

But

I

also

needs of the immediate present,

have thought that a comprehensive and thorough

criticism of Kant's doctrines,

correct conception of his

which should be guided by a

whole system, might prove espe-

Author's Preface.

iv

cially

a propos at this time, and contribute something towards

many

correcting the

abroad

On

a

Kant which are spread

in the literature of the day.

number of

work, which third

errors about

I

was

critical

questions relating to Kant's chief

obliged to investigate at the close of the

volume of my History of Modern Philosophy,

have met with some opposition critics.

For that reason,

upon me again

to

if for

at the

no

my

views

hands of competent

other,

I felt

it

incumbent

take up those questions, and to carry

out the criticism there begun in the comprehensive manner at

which

I

have aimed in the present work.

KUNO Heidelberg,

1883.

FISCHER.

.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

pROFESSOR *

History of

FISCHER'S monumental work on The Modem Philosophy * has been until a recent

date wholly inaccessible to fore thought that his

main

results of the

EngUsh

Critique

readers.

of Kant,

if

two volumes on Kant

I

have there-

which gives the in the

" History,"

together with the Author's criticism of the Kantian doctrines,

would be acceptable

in English dress, not

only as a valuable

and suggestive Essay on Kant, but as affording an Introduction to

the

point

Fischer's exposition of

The

*

of view

and method of Professor

Modern Philosophy.

distinguishing feature of the Critique of

K. Fischer

Bassermann.

Kant

is

Geschichte der modernen Philosophie, 6 Bde, Miinchen.

:

An

English version of the

School has appeared within this year.

its

Fr.

volume on Descartes and His earnestly to be hoped that a vifork

first

It is

which would render such important service to philosophical culture in England and America, as the translation of Professor Fischer's entire "History," may be carried forward to completion.

Meanwhile, the present fragment, translated

nearly two years ago, before this larger undertaking was

not be valueless.

Certainly

it is

not a few to a study of the larger

t K. Fischer 1883.

As

:

made known, may it may stimulate

the hope of the translator that

work

Kritik der kantischen Philosophies Wctachtn, Fr. Bassermann,

Prof. Fischer tells us in his Preface, this work, besides being

lished separately, also appears as part of the

fifth

pubvolume of the " History."

h

Translator's Preface.

vi

" Exposition of

comprehension of Kant's whole philosophy.

Kant," or "Criticism of Kant," too often means exposition or criticism

of

the

of Pure Reason.

Critique

Prbfessor

Fischer everywhere emphasizes the importance of basing criticism

all

of Kant

upon the whole of

" In criticising the Kantian philosophy," he "

we should always remember

that

his philosophy. tells

us

(p. 146),

by no means issued

it

from the Critique of Pure Reason as a finished system, but

on the contrary,

that,

results

it

continued to develop, and reached

which were not involved

not accord with

its

in

which do

fundamental principles, and cannot be

adjusted to them by any attempt at

Again, he says

etc.

that work,

(p.

artificial

symmetries,"

"If we now compare the

156),

foundation of the Kantian criticism with

its

completion, or

the Critique of Pure Reason with the Critique of Judgment, it

clearly appears

how

the

work has progressed and been

transformed under the hands of the philosopher.

Neither

the doctrine of phenomena, nor that of things-in-themselves,

has remained the same,"

We

etc.

are familiar with

the

great transition which Kant's philosophic thinking under-

went when he turned his back upon the old metaphysics, has not always been made sufficiently prominent that

but

it

his

mental attitude underwent important changes, and made

important advances, even after entering upon the Critical period.

and

(Critical)

not,

It is

the merit of

illustrated so forcibly

Kuno and

philosophy of Kant

;

Fischer to have emphasized

development in the

fully this

and

it

is

this, if

which especially commends his Critique

of philosophical students, and entitles

it

to

we mistake

to the attention

be considered

"

Translator's Preface.

some

as in

vii

sense a contribution to

real

the

criticism

of

Kant. It is also believed that the Critique will

be found a valu-

able General Introduction to the study of Kant. Fischer's lucid and vigorous style

nowhere are these

is

than in the

better displayed

qualities

Professor

well-known, and perhaps

concise yet comprehensive statement of this epitome.

It is

thought that the clear exposition of "Transcendental Idealism," and the masterly discussion of the " Thing-in-itself

—

that

bugbear

of

Kantian

the

Philosophy

—

will

prove

especially helpful.

The

translation has

aimed

to

be exact, and has sought

something of the manner of the

to retain

notoriously troublesome

word

original.

The

Vorstellung has been uniformly

rendered "idea," this rendering being, perhaps, on the whole, the most

The more

satisfactory.

"presentation,"

is

coming

nearly equivalent word,

into general use in psychological

discussions, but besides being often unwieldy, is

too restricted to meet the

in the present work.

its

application

more general use of Vorstellung

The verb

vorzustellen has generally

been rendered " to conceive " or " mentally represent."

noun

verbal

Vorstellen, as in

has been uniformly rendered "thought." tions, this

word

is

time,

thought, or,

all

reason.

The

with

as

designating

Critical point of view, as being

theoretical,

reader will

i.e.,

thought conditioned by space and

and hence, from the

co-extensive

In such connec-

used by Professor Fischer as compre-

hending perception and understanding, all finite

The

" Gesetse unseres Vorstellens,"

or

scientific,

or

knowing

please carefully distinguish idea

Translator's Preface.

viii

{Vorstellung) from Idea {Idee), which also frequently occurs. It

thought that no especial apology

is

retention of the

word Aufkldrung.

Professor Fischer has

made use of

is

needed

for the

In quoting from Kant, Hartenstein'sy?^s^ edition

(Leipzig, Leop. Voss. 1838). I

am

indebted to Dr.

W.

T. Harris for

mission to republish this Critique from lative

Philosophy,

where

it

first

th-e

appeared.

exception of a few unimportant omissions, and

of verbal changes,

Paris, Aug.

it

i\st, 1887.

kind per-

^& Journal of Specu-

appears here unaltered.

With a

the

number

CONTENTS. CHAPTER

I.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE. I.

The Doctrine of Phenomena. 1.

2.

II.

2.

2.

.

.

.

10

The Relative Validity of Geometrical Axioms. Second Objection The Uncritical View of the World. First Objection

:

:

The Doctrine of Things-in-themselves 1.

PAGE 2

The Origin of Phenomena. The Ideality of Phenomena.

Objections to the Transcendental Esthetic 1.

III.

Transcendental Idealism

.

.

.

.20

The Sensuousness of Pure Reason. The Thing-in-itself.

CHAPTER

II.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM. I.

1

II.

Kantian Realism and Idealism

The

^1:

Thing-in-itself as

Will

Intelligible Causality.

The Moral Order

of 4he World.

35 .

36

X

Contenls. PAGE

III.

The Doctrine of God and Immortality 1.

Kantian Theism.

2.

The Kantian Doctrine

.

.

.

-4°

of Immortality.

CHAPTER

III.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF DEVELOPMENT. I.

II.

Kant's Fundamental Problems

The World Viewed 1.

2. 3.

4.

III.

63

as an Historical Development

2. 3.

67

The Natural Development. The Intellectual Development. The Social Development and the Development The Moral and Religious Development.

of Culture.

The Teleological View of the World 1.

.

.

.

.75

The World-development as Phenomenon. The World-development as Teleological Phenomenon. The World-development as TManifestation of Thing-in-itself.

CHAPTER

IV.

EXAMINATION OF KANT'S FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES. I.

Examination of the Doctrine of Knowledge

-

.

3.

4.

Review of

2.

II.

.

The Contradiction in the Critique of Pure Reason. The Origin of the Contradiction. The Second Refutation of Idealism. Kant vs. Jacobi.

1.

.95

Objections.

Examination of the Doctrines of Freedom and Develop-

ment

121

1.

Schopenhauer's Critique of the Kantian Philosophy.

2.

The Correspondence between

the Doctrines of

Knowledge

and Freedom. ^

3.

4.

The The

Contradiction in the Doctrine of Freedom. Contradiction between the Doctrines of

Development.

Knowledge and

.

Contents.

III.

xi

Examination of the Doctrine of Phenomena and ThingsIN-THEMSELVES I33 1

2.

The Knawableness of Human Reason, The Knowableness of Natural Ends in Man and

of Blind

Intelligence. 3. 4.

The Knowableness The Knowableness

of Life and of Beauty. of Things-in-themselves.

CHAPTER

V.

THE PROBLEMS AND LINES OF DEVELOPMENT OF POSTKANTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I.

The Fundamental Problems of Post-Kantian Philosophy 1.

2.

II.

The Lines of Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy 1.

2.

i6o

The Metaphysical Problem. The Problem of Knowledge.

The The

169

Re-establishment of the Doctrine of Knowledge.

Threefold

Antithesis

:

Fries,

Herbart, and Schopen-

hauer. III.

The Course of Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy

179

1.

Metaphysical Idealism.

2.

The

Threefold Advance: Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and

Hegel. 3.

The Order

of Post-Kantian Systems.

CHAPTER

I.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE.

TN

undertaking a criticism of

be necessary,

will

first

of

all,

principles, in order to correct

the

Kantian philosophy,

to review briefly

any

critical

only what

we have

fundamental

false or distorted

view which

For we can

might destroy the conception of the system. criticise

its

justlv

And from a

rightly understood.

knowledge of the system there follows the establishment

of those

new problems contained

in

it,

which determine the

course of the development of post-Kantian philosophy. shall

it

proceed,

therefore,

Kantian doctrines to their

from the criticism,

characterization

We

of the

and then deduce the pro-

blems which have led to their transformation and development.

The Kantian philosophy

as a

whole unites

in itself three

fundamental features, which must be rightly conceived, and rightly combined, if this philosophy

we

are to appreciate the

which swayed the

last

century

full peculiarity

:

of

they are Doctrine

of Knowledge, Doctrine of Freedom, and Doctrine of Development. Its

new

doctrine of knowledge conditions

its

new

doctrine of

Critique of Kant.

2

freedom, and both of these condition

ment.

its

These themes are arranged

new

doctrine of develop-

in the order in

which they

follow one another in the course of the Critical investigation.

The

first

problem, and that which determines

mental questions of the Kantian inquiry, origin of

human knowledge.

There

is

is

the funda-

all

concerned with the

no simpler expression

with which to designate Kant's fundamental problem, and at the

same time the

criterion

which guided him

also furnishes us the best

fairly

It

means of keeping our bearings

reference to the nature and

problem was never

in its solution.

method of

That

his system.

in

this

recognised, not to say solved, before

Kant, we have shown in our characterization of the epoch of

and the pre-Kantian standpoints

Critical philosophy

in detail to

sufficiently

be able to refer the reader to that earlier dis-

cussion.i

I.

The Doctrine of Phenomena. Transcendental Idealism. I

If light

is

to

.

The Origin of Phenomena.

be thrown upon the origin of human knowledge,

those conditions must be investigated which precede

it,

which,

consequently, must be contained in the faculties of our intel-

'

Vide Fischer

:

Geschichte der neuern Philosophic, vol.

iii.,

pp. 3-38.

;

Doctrine of Knowledge. lectual nature, but

3

which are not yet knowledge

philosophers before Kant, some with

itself.

The

intention, others with

full

complete self-deception, presupposed these conditions, and thus treated the explanation of

human knowledge

dogmatically.

They

consequently failed of the solution, and in the very matter of

Hence the problem had

importance attained nothing.

and so taken that the

restated,

ledge were sought by a that path which

ledge

new

Kant

factors or conditions of

investigation of

This obvious proposition

is

its

be

know-

human reason along

Know-

called critical or transcendental.

unexplained as long as

is

to

remains obscure

origin

not only in reference to

valid

knowledge, but also in reference to every object of knowledge for to

know an

origination.

object

Hence

means

as

much

to understand

as

its

there can be no talk about a knowledge of

objects as long as their origin remains

unknown.

The

inquiry

concerning the origin of human knowledge necessarily coincides, therefore, with that concerning the origin of our objects of knowledge,

are,

or of things knowable to us.

and must

thought

;

be, phenomena,

nor does

it

here

All our objects of

knowledge

which we represent to ourselves

come immediately

whether the nature of things reveals quately, or inadequately, or not at

itself in

all.

the origin of our objects of knowledge

The is

into

in

question

phenomena ade-

inquiry concerning

accordingly identical

of Kant.

Critique

4 with

concerning

that

phenomenal world,

human in a

origin

the

we

reason as such, or which

common

world of

The

way.

sense.

or of the to the

phenomena which appear

,those

i.e.,

of phenomena,

conceive and experience

all

content of these

phenomena

is

our

That we have and conceive such a common

world of sense

may be

regarded as an established and uncon-

troverted fact

and

common

;

this

we were not compelled or according to the origin of

world would be impossible

to conceive things in a

same

laws.

human knowledge

is

The

if

common manner,

inquiry concerning the

thus seen, as soon as

it is

taken

up seriously and thoroughly, to involve the inquiry concerning the origin

common

of the sense-world, or of that idea of the world

to us

all.

The problem of knowledge cannot be

and the conditions involved

in its process investigated, without

stating the question in the

we can

recast,

manner

rightly contemplate

the

Just developed.

stellar

world only

Just

as

after

we

have won that point of view from which the situation and

motion of our own earth become apparent, so we can rightly r

apprehend and estimate the world of sense only when we have attained of our

of

an insight

knowing reason.

view

in

astronomy.

philosophy

into

The

the

Critical

corresponds

standpoint

and

activity

or Transcendental point to

the

Copemican

in

Doctrine of Knowledge. If

we

ourselves create an object,

own

ble to us as our

activity,

completely knowable. tained in the

something

If,

itself is

consequently

on the other hand, there

is

that con-

object which has and retains the character of

something which we cannot produce, or which

given,

come

origination is as intelligi-

its

and the object

cannot be reduced to our creative will

S

at this point

then our knowledge

activity,

upon an impenetrable

The

barrier.

objects of our knowledge are, therefore, just as far completely

knowable as they are our

products,

i.e.,

just

as far as

we

are

capable of creating them and of making the process of this creation clear to our consciousness

ableness of things extend.

;

only so far does the

know-

Accordingly, the inquiry concerning

the origin of our knowledge and

its

objects, the sum-total of

which constitutes our common world of sense,

is

more exactly

to be taken, so that under the term "origin" shall be under-

stood creation by the factors or capacities of our reason.

world of sense

is

the product of our reason,

pletely intelligible object of our reason

far as

it

is this

product.

;

it

is

it

is

If our

also the

com-

this object only so

" For one thoroughly comprehends

only what one can himself completely produce according to notions."

^

'Kant: KfiHk der Fischer

:

Urtheilskraft,

§68.

{Werke,

Geschichte der neuern Philosofhie, vol.

iv.,

vol. vi., p. 258.) p. 483.

Cf.

— ;

6

Critique of Kant.

2.

Now

The

Kant has shown

mena which

of Phenomena.

Ideality

that there

is

an

elevient in all

our pheno-

has and retains the character of something given

These, however, as such,

namely, our impressions or sensations.

phenomena, but only the material out of

are not yet objects or

which objects and phenomena

arise in

accordance with the laws

of our thought, or through the form-giving power of our perception

Thus the sense-world

and understanding.

originates from

the material of our impressions, which are so formed and bined, fulfilled

in

accordance with

necessary and

the

we

laws of our thought, that

The

natural order of things.

all

involuntarily

conceive the same

laws of thought are the funda-

— space,

mental forms of perception and understanding

The

and the categories.

com-

time,

involuntary or unconscious fulfilment

of these laws takes place through the imagination, while the

knowledge of them

is

a matter of

Since the laws of thought they must precede the

critical inquiry.

make phenomena and

latter,

and

are,

therefore,

experience,

not given

empirically and a posteriori, but a priori, or transcendentally

they are the forms, the sensations on the contrary, the stuff or matter, of it is

phenomena.

given to

it,

This matter

not produced by

it

;

is

received by our reason

therefore

it

is

;

not a priori.

Doctrine of Knowledge.

j

Yet we may not say that our impressions are

but a posteriori.

given a posteriori or empirically.

This inexact and incorrect

expression utterly confounds the Kantian doctrine.

What we

draw from experience, or what

—

a posteriori or is

is

given by experience

Kant expressly teaches

empirical.

borrowed merely from experience

or empirically." stitute the

Now,

^

matter of

to the conditions

tained in

it,

all

it

phenomena and

and elements of experience, hence are con-

but not produced by

given to us through experience.

Kant

explicitly says

:

object through sensation

it

;

they do not result from

That

since

we

is

Sensations are the material

is

is

related to

Kritik der

If so, then

reitien

Id. Transc.

^sth., %

empirical object is

self-evident,

Kant taught

Kant must have

Vernunft.

I (p.

:

an

it,

that the

given a priori, the matter a posteriori

is

59, et seq.).

contradictorily

given by experience

Introd. III., Note.

P- 39-) ''

An

not produced by

relation

this

taught that the matter for experience :

^

empirical."

are so often compelled to hear

or empirically.

Kant

it,

very necessary to enforce the correct conception of

form of our knowledge

'

empirical which

is

" Perception which

Although

presupposes sensation. it is still

only a posteriori

experience, they belong

of experience, and are, therefore, given for it.

" That which

:

appears that since impressions con-

experience, but experience from them. is

known

is

this is

(IVerke, vol.

1

ii.,

8

Critique

Then he has not explained presupposed

it

in experience

mena

;

;

of Kant.

experience, but, like his predecessors,

then the ground of sensations must be sought

;

then the thing-in-itself

then the Kantian philosophy

is

lies

hidden

in

pheno-

turned completely upside

down. Since our sense-world

ihroughoni phenomenal. sists in sensations, their

consists only

in

Since the matter of

phenomena, all

phenomena con-

form in perceptions and notions, the

elements of the same are through and through subjective their material

is

it

;

both

and formal constituents are contained in our

knowing reason, and have the character of ideas (the word taken in the broadest sense). ideas

;

ideal.

Hence

all

they consist in being conceived,

This doctrine of the

their origination

ideality of all

from our sense

states

our

phenomena

is

are

and are throughout

phenomena, and of

and forms of reason,

is

called Transcendental Idealism. All

space.

phenomena

are in time

;

objective

If they contained anything

phenomena

are also in

which was independent of

our ideas, and which was nevertheless in space and time, the latter

could not be the fundamental forms of our ideas, hence

not pure perceptions.

Since, now, space

and time are pure

perceptions and nothing real in themselves, everything in space

and time must be through and through

ideal.

The being

—

Doctrine of Knowledge. of

all

objects

in

From

conceived.

space

phenomena

:

and time consists

the

in

their

being

of space and time

the Kantian doctrine

there follows, therefore,

g

doctrine of

the ideality of

all

the Transcendental Esthetic founds that Transcen-

dental idealism which characterizes Kant's entire

doctrine of

knowledge.

Because space and time are the forms of perception of our reason, the pure magnitudes of space and time, and hence

since there are no other magnitudes

—pure magnitudes

in general,

are the products of the perceptive or constructive activity of our

reason, and as such they are completely knowable.

The

doctrine

of magnitudes or pure mathematics has, therefore, before

all

other theoretical sciences, the character of a perfectly evident

and purely

Kant

rational

declare,

" that

in

much

exact

science

to

precisely as

mathematics."

A

knowledge.

It

each

was of

this

the

fact

which led sciences

natural

can be found as there

is

^

refutation of the Transcendental Esthetic

would

affect the

whole doctrine of Transcendental idealism, and thereby the entire basis

and the

'

(

Kant

Werke,

and character of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge,

Critical

:

philosophy in general.

But a

false interpreta-

Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft.

vol. viii., p.

444)

Preface.

Critique of Kant.

10 tion

no

is

We

refutation.

have now to concern ourselves with

views which mistake the sense of the Kantian" doctrine and thus attack

it

with arguments which necessarily prove ineffec-

tual..

Objections to the Transcendental ^Esthetic.

II.

,

To

the Kantian doctrine of space and time, as the two funda-

mental forms of perception of our reason, two objections present themselves, one calling in question the underived or a priori (transcendental) character of these two ideas, the other their anthropological character. validity of mathematical,

The

first

denies the unconditional

and especially geometrical, axioms,

and makes the idea of space dependent upon empirical conditions

;

the

second

denies the anthropological

origin and

character of these fundamental perceptions, in order to be free to maintain their cosmological suffice,

in order to

and universal

meet these objectipns,

validity.

It will

to set the sense of

Kant's doctrine in a clear light.

I

.

First Objection

:

The Relative Validity of Geometrical Axioms.

Kant by no means teaches the unconditional metrical axioms, but one entirely dependent

validity of geo-

upon our idea of

1

Doctrine of Knowledge.

Why we

space.

space

have

why our reason

;

and not some other perception of

this,

in general

Kant

otherwise, these questions

is

constituted as

leaves,

and uninvestigated, but yet unsolved declares

them

doctrine,

we may regard

1

to be incapable of solution.

the perception of space

the constitution of it

he

indeed,

;

and not

not untouched

true,

it is

it is,

explicitly

According to his

human

involves, as a primitive fact, but

not characterize this fact as empirical, since experience

product of reason, not

its

and

reason,

may

is

the

condition.

If there were beings possessing perception of space of only

two dimensions, fact,

and

in

this perception

would be

consequence they would

destitute of the ideas of solids, as

those ideas. is

If

it

for

them a

necessarily be

just as

we must

primitive

necessarily possess

be true of plane surfaces, that a straight line

the shortest distance between two points in the surface, that

between these two points there

is

only one such

line, that

two

straight lines cannot inclose space, etc., these propositions are

not nullified by the fact that they do not hold good respecting the connection of two points upon the surface of a sphere, e.

g.,

the extremities of a diameter.

of space

is

i.e.,

definite perception

the luminous ground of knowledge from which certain

insights follow, ever,

That a

as,

which under

apodictically, yalid

this presupposition are

—

this

was the

fact

now and

for

which arrested

Critique

12

of Kant.

the attention of Kant, and which he was only able to explain by

regarding the original ground of

all

our ideas of space

— space

itself— as an underived form of our thought, or as a fundamental

perception of our reason.

The validity of our mathematical insights is, therefore, according to the explicit teaching of our philosopher,

ditioned, but,

on the contrary, absolutely dependent upon our

perception of space and time. is

apodictic in a

If

But under this presupposition

way which no other

character of knowledge ditions.

by no means uncon-

we should

sort of

knowledge

is.

changes with the change of

its

it

The con-

substitute for our discursive understanding

an intuitive one, and for our sensuous perception an intellectual perception, knowledge would no longer follow the

way of

perience, but see and penetrate everything at a glance.'

should substitute for our external perception of space,

If i.e.,

ex-

we the

perception of space of three dimensions, some other, the character

and compass of our mathematical ideas would change accordingly, but not the apodictical certitude of judgments based upon the

corresponding construction and perceptive insight.

This point

contains the fact which at once characterizes and explains the

nature of mathematics.

'

Hence those

objections which found

Cf. infra, pp. 20-26.

3

Doctrine of Knowledge.

1

upon another perception of space some other and

axioms are so

its

can be proved that 2 x 2

it

geometry

calculated to refute Kant's doctrine

much more may and should appeal

that they If

little

sort of

is

not in

to

it.

equal to 4,

all cases

that in our perception of a plane surface a straight line does not in all

instances

describe the

points, etc., then for the

To him

time

is

distance between two

Kant's doctrine refuted.

pure mathematics seemed the only science in which

knowing and same.

first

shortest

creating, thought

and

object,

were one and the

Because pure magnitudes are constructions, or the pro-

ducts of perception, he regarded space and time as the perceptions of reason, or as the perceptive activity of reason

itself.

Because our notions of magnitude presuppose the perceptive or sensible

knowledge of magnitude, he regarded space and time

as the fundamental forms of sense, not of understanding.

Even

if

these objections, which seek to base themselves upon

the empirical origin of geometry, were stronger than they are, they would

still

ideality of all

If time

time.

in time

if

phenomena, since they is

refer only to space, not to

a pure idea, or a form of perception,

can contain nothing independent of

phenomena But

prove ineffectual against the doctrine of the

phenomena

all ideas.

Now,

all

are in time, the objective as well as the subjective.

objective

phenomena

are ideas, then space, since

it

con-

Crtttque of Kant.

14 tains all objective

phenomena, can be nothing

but

real in itself,

The

only the fundamental form of our external perception.

transcendental ideality of time establishes the ideality of all

phenomena, even that of objective phenomena, hence also that of space.

Second Objection

2.

The

:

The Uncritical View of the World.

objections which our

common

consciousness opposes to

the systems of great thinkers are in their eyes generally the most insignificant of offer to the

all,

yet because of the constant obstruction they

comprehension and diffusion of their views, they

always prove themselves the most potent

;

for, like

our feelings

and sensations, they are not to be silenced with reasons, and as Schiller says in Wallenstein, " like the

back to their hours."

first

Such an

women who

always

come

word when one has preached reason

inflexible

always found the most

fault,

and

uncritical

among

for

way of thinking has

the doctrines of Kant,

all

with the Transcendental /Esthetic, since

are,

it

maintains that space

and time are mere perceptions of human reason, and nothing apart from the latter.

must

first

Accordingly, as

it

seems, space and time

appear in the world with our reason, hence with the

existence of man, and can therefore neither exist before him,

nor endure after him.

Now, we

are obliged to conceive the

Doctrine of Knowledge.

human

15

race as having originated and as perishable, and yet

cannot possibly conceive the universe, which contains in

we

itself

the conditions of the origin as well as the destruction of the earth and

inhabitants, without space

its

and time.

It

seems

highly absurd, therefore, to seek to confine these two funda-

mental conditions of

and

limits of

human

introducing his

new

all

natural existence to the organization

reason.

Kant

himself,

indeed,

before

doctrine of the ideality of space and time,

taught the mechanical origin and development of the cosmos,

and the natural history of the heavens, and of the earth and. organic

life.

But with

development the to stand in the

it

view of the world as an historical

idealistic doctrine of

space and time appears Surely

Kant could not

this contradiction, since

he has nowhere

most open opposition.

have been sensible of

made

this

the subject of especial discussion and explanation.

Meanwhile the natural consciousness, which, with

its

ideas of

space and time, finds the Kantian perfectly unintelligible, disabused of

time

is

its

objections.

is

of the Critical philosophy fact,

there

is

not

But Kant's doctrine of space and

the foundation of his doctrine of knowledge, and the

to his doctrine of freedom.

In

its

way

Nothing, therefore, would remain

if this

doctrine be rejected.

no contradiction between Kant's view of the

world as a natural development in time and his Critique of Pure

6

:

of Kant.

Critique

1

In the

Reason.

that of the

first

place, both have different subjects of inquiry

the explanation of the world, that of the second

first is

The problem

the explanation of knowledge. of the world

is

How

:

did the world in which

according to natural and mechanical laws Critique

is

How

:

of the explanation

we

live originate

The problem

?

did this our explanation of the world originate

according to the laws of our reason and thought question

is

regarding the

phenomena of

intelligible

i.e.,

world would not

The

case, if the elements of

if

they were not

entire fact of our idea of the

exist, if natural objects

tained anything inconceivable.

There the

nature, here regarding

they would not appear to us,

and knowable.

?

These phenomena would not be

the knowableness of the same.

phenomena,

And

were inconceivable or con-

this

would necessarily be the

which they consisted were not deter-

mined by the character and conditions of our thought. matter

we

of the

Their

determined by the manifold of our impressions, which

is

receive by

means of

sense,

and consequently regard

these impressions are the matter of phenomena.

as given

Their form

;

is

determined by the laws of our thought, which we regard as pure forms of reason, and the content of which Kant called pure reason

;

these laws constitute the form of

phenomena.

mena, therefore, are through and through objects of experience,

ideas.

Pheno-

Phenomena,

and the progressive Science of Experience,

Doctrine of Knowledge. are

all

17

created from the matter of our sensations in accordance

with the rational laws of our thought, the latter having partly the character of constitutive, partly that of regulative, principles.

These laws determine the world of phenomena, because they constitute

it.

They

mena, world-conditions or world -principles. entirely mistaken

realm of pheno-

are, therefore, within the

But their meaning

when only an anthropological

or psychological

validity is ascribed to them.

They cannot be

psychology, because they

make psychology

Kant's

first

Critique of Pure Reason

is

is

by

established

itself possible.

no anthropological inves-

tigation.

And

here those objections which our unscientific view of the

world oppose to the Critical philosopher and his doctrine of space and time refute themselves.

Space and time are the laws

of perception imposed by our reason, and as such they determine the entire world of sense, because they possible.

Their cosmical or universal

natural sense so rightly far is,

first

demands and holds

make

it

in general

— which

validity fast

—

is

the

therefore so

from being disproved by the Critique of Pure Reason that the rather, thereby

however, this validity still

first

is

really established.

limited in such a

it

At the same time,

way

that there

may

be something independent of space and time, while the

common

consciousness, uncritical and thoughtless as

it is,

regards 2

8

of Kant.

Critique

1

space as the huge box, and time as the vast stream, in which everything that

Man,

is

must be contained.

as a natural individual, or as anthropology regards him,

belongs to the phenomena of nature, and

He

sense.

is

is

a part of the world of

the result of a definite stage in the world's history

—a stage which forms a

link in the chain of

which presupposes a succession of

cosmic changes, and

and development of man must be regarded and

origin

gated as natural, historical

facts,

Kant was so

that he rather proposed to himself that thesis

by

strated

conditions of our knowledge.

far

;

investi-

from denying

and he demon-

and more especially by

his criticism of reason,

doctrine of space and time, that

are not dependent general,

is

man

Natural, historical

upon him, but

conditioned by them.

called the pure perceptions of

distinguish the sense in

is,

this

as the knowing subject, not as

ledge.

As the subject of

When

all

is

it

is

;

it

knowledge— so

far is

as

denotes

we

are

the con-

of

all

sense,

in

which in the course of time the natural

general,

in

one of the objects of know-

dition

in

they

important to

taken

capable of investigating the latter— our reason objects

;

space and time are

reason,

word

there-

phenomena

he, like all

human

which

his

necessity follows from the

its

by no means the sole proprietor of space and time

fore,

man

That the

earlier stages.

or of the entire world

of

human

Doctrine of Knowledge.

19

race appears and develops itself in successive stages, each of

which

necessarily

stage.

For

originate

matter,

phenomena

before and

duration, all

all

and

which

after

are

But

in time, but time in

it,

with the

succeeding

is

its

time-

since they

time,

exception of

single

knowing subject

the

for time

and a

time; each has

in

which there

pass away,

persists.

preceding

a

implies

not

is

the fundamental form of

is

sensuous thought. If,

on the other hand, space and time be regarded, with

Schopenhauer, as the forms of perception of our at the

same time be declared

brain, then there arises for the

and

to be animal functions of the

time that absurdity which

first

—

space and time are

obviously describes a circulus vitiosus

viz.,

made dependent upon a

which,

condition,

organism and the stages of nature and animal is itself

intellect,

like life

the

animal

preceding

it,

only possible under the conditions of space and time.

If the latter are, as

individuatioms"

i.e.,

Schopenhauer teaches, the " principium

the ground of

then they cannot possibly be,

all

as,

multiplicity

and

diversity,

notwithstanding, Schopen-

hauer also teaches, the products or functions of individual organisms.

Nor was Schopenhauer

ever able successfully to

explain away or to solve this erroneous circle, grounded as in a fundamental feature of his doctrine.

it

is

Critique oj Kant.

20

III.

The Doctrine of Things-in-themselves. 1

.

The knowing it;

The Sensuousness of Pure Reason. subject

is

not in space and time, but these in

hence the entire world in space and time

is

pure pheno-

through and through phenomenal and

menon

or idea;

ideal.

This doctrine constitutes the Transcendental Idealism,

which

founds

knowledge. given,

but,

it

is

and

If,

characterizes

the

Kantian

of

now, in the knowing subject there was nothing

on the contrary, everything was

the world of

doctrine

phenomena would be

entirely

notions would be immediate perceptions,

its

ledge would consist in perceptive thought,

by

it,

product;

its

created its

faculty of in

i.e.,

an

know-

intuitive

understanding, or in an intellectual perception, to which every-

thing

it

creates

appears at once as object or thing.

knowing and creating would be completely would

be

identical,

no difference between sense and

perception and thought, objects and notions,

Then

then there

understanding,

phenomena

'and

ihings-in-themselves.

Such a faculty of knowledge inconceivable, but

it

is

not the

not in

itself

one we possess

create things, but develops itself repeatedly,

is

and

its

;

objects.

impossible or ours does not

Kant taught

and indeed always, with the utmost explicitness,

Doctrine oj Knowledge. that our understanding

is discursive,

not

2i

intuitive,

our perception

Accordingly he carefully distinguished

sensuous, not intellectual.

between sense and understanding, and explained human knowledge in such a way that

is

it

from the matter of impressions

and sensations, which have and retain the character of something given, that we produce phenomena, and the knowledge of

phenomena, or experience. Intuitive understanding

human understanding to the character of Critique,

human

reason, as

belongs sensuousness,

there

and therefore divine

creative,

not intuitive

and being sensible

ceiving,

of,

;

nor

Kant i.e.,

is it

but

pure subject, for

investigates

it

in his

the capacity of re-

impressions, or of being affected

which are

its

medium, nor with the

definite sensations

they convey, since these belong to the constitution of the

Yet our sensations as such presuppose a

body.

;

Sense must not be identified with the organs of

by a manifold. sense,

is

is

human

faculty

of

sense or receptivity, which enables us to be-affected by a variety of impressions, and without which the matter of knowledge

would

fail, i.e.,

knowledge would remain empty, hence

in general

not exist at

all.

This sensuousness Kant ascribes to pure reason,

since

not,

in the

it

is

first

place, a question of the sort of

affections or the quality of impressions, but only of the capacity itself

of receiving something given.

Our reason must form and

Critique of Kant.

22

material, according to the laws of

work up the given tion

its

percep-

and thought, into phenomena, experience, and empirical

knowledge.

Our knowing reason would be were not sensuous,

which

it

must

systematize.

knowledge, but Since

it

receives

it

it

can only combine and

not generative of the matter of not creative, but

iae.xe\y fo7'm-giving,

it,

it

receptive,

is

And

and productive

;

and

architectonic.

in this respect not original, but

the entire organization of

conditioned by

standing another

its

;

sensuousness.

Sense

its

knowing

one

is

faculty,

this is receptive of material, that

this is passive, that active

pressions, that creates notions. is

if

does not make the matter of knowledge, but only

dependent. is

and which

therefore

is

hence divine,

capable of being affected by impressions,

i.e.,

receive,

It

creative,

;

Hence our

faculty

under-

form-giving

this receives im-

perceptive faculty

not intellectual, but sensuous, our understanding not intuitive,

but discursive,

i.e.,

it

is

obliged to take up

its

by one, and proceed by connecting part with

perceptions one part,

comparing

perception with perception, and by uniting these to pass from perceptions to notions and judgments.

Consequently the objects

of our knowing reason are not entirely are constructed out of matter and form it,

the latter

is

given or added by

it.

;

its

own products

the former

is

;

they

given to

Our knowledge of things

—

Doctrine of Knowledge,

z^

a gradual experience

(objects), therefore, consists in

complete in an instant, but originates and develops

it

;

is

We

itself.

and hence also

are obliged to think objects in succession,

not

in co-

since nothing would persist in a mere succession, thus

existence ;

also nothing could

Space and time are therefore

be thought.

the fundamental conditions,

since nothing can be thought

or,

without them, the fundamental forms, of our thought; they are, since every perception

must be combined part by

part,

the

fundamental forms of perception, and since our perceptive faculty

not intellectual, but sensuous, the fundamental forms

is

of sense

:

in short, they are the

fundamental perceptions of our

reason.

With a

creative or divine reason,

knowing and

and thing, must be one and the same.

the divine by

its

sensuousness

necessary forms of selves

all

with

it,

thought and of

is

distinguished from

space and time are the

all

is

only reason knowable to us

it

our-

we know.

human

for us equivalent to

thus, since sense belongs to the pure reason

investigated in his Critique,

We

knowledge.

are the only sensuous-rational beings which

Hence sensuous reason

And

;

could be conditioned

It

Our reason

by neither space nor time.

creating, idea

reason.

which Kant

—although the

was called by him

human

capacity of receiving material,

is

reason.

Now

sense, as the

of a dependent and derived

Critique of Kant.

24

And

nature.

this

must be true of the entire organization and

knowing reason, since without sensuousness

constitution of our it

would be an entirely different one from what

Quite at the beginning of the

Let us hear Kant himself.

Transcendental Esthetic, he says

manner

ideas in the

By means of

sense.

and

it

ever,

"

sentation

— that

The

capacity of receiving

The

empirical.

is,

so far as is

is

we

from the

latter that notions

upon the

faculty of repre-

are affected by

That

in

in certain relations

phenomena

I

call the

that,

;

On

^

itself

iv.,

form of the same.

again be sensation,^

pp. 494

so,

Kant reads Empfindiing

is

Since that

set in definite

although the matter

:

Gesch.

d. n.

—498. (sensation) here, not

as given in the text of Prof. Fischer.

ning "It

to

however, which

the discursive and intuitive understanding, Cf. Fischer

vol

is

phenomena be disposed

whereby sensations can alone be ordered and

'

is sensation.

phenomena which corresponds

possible that the manifold of

form cannot

—

it

indeterminate object of an empirical perception

phenomenon.

it

it

related to an object through sensation

sensation I call the matter of

Philos.,

I call

sense, therefore, objects are given to us,

action of an object

Perception which

makes

The

which we are affected by objects

in

by the understanding, and

call

"

:

alone furnishes us perceptions ; objects are thought, how-

arise."

I

it is.i

not necessary,"

etc.,

Erscheinung (phenomenon),

Also in the following quotation, begin-

the edition of

Benno Erdmann has been

—

Doctrine of Knowledge. of

phenomena

all

indeed^ given only a posteriori, the form of

is

the same must, on the contrary, already

wholly apart from sensation."

sidered

Transcendental Esthetic,

we

Kant

says

limit perception in space

may be

It

lie

a priori as an entirety

mind, and, consequently, must be capable of being con-

in the

that

2$

"

:

^

It is

At the close of the not necessary, either,

and time to human

sensibility.

in this respect (although that cannot be determined), yet

not cease, even on account of this universality, to be

cause

man

that all finite thinking beings are necessarily like

it is

it

would

sense,

be-

a derived (intuitus derivatus), not an original {intuitus

originarius),

hence not

perception seems,

an

intellectual,

on the ground

just

Such a

perception.

brought

forward,

to

belong only to the Primitive Being, not, however, to a being

dependent as well in

existence as in

determines the relation of

latter

This

jects.

ever,

its

last

observation

in

its

its

perception, which

existence to

given ob-

how-

our Esthetic theory,

must be regarded merely as an explanation, not as any-

thing fundamental."^

followed, instead of reading in the affirmative (It

is

from which Prof. Fischer quotes (Vid. Preface. edition also

makes

necessary) with the edition

Hartenstein in his second

the correction), as the sense certainly requires this reading.

Tr. '

vol. 2

Kant ii.,

:

Kritik

d. r.

Vernunft. Transc. Elementarlehre, Part

pp. 59, 60.)

Ibid

:

§ 81. (vol.

iii ,

p. 86, et seq.)

I.,

§

I.

(

Werke,

Critique of Kant.

26

The

2.

Our knowing reason matter of

to the

all

is

accordingly not creative in reference

phenomena and knowledge, but merely

It receives this

receptive.

hence the

Thing-in-itself.

matter in virtue of

dependent and conditioned.

latter is

its

sensuousness

And

;

here arises

the necessary inquiry concerning the origin of our impressions

Since these are the material which our faculties

or sensations.

of knowledge mould and form, they cannot themselves proceed

from the

latter,

but are rather the necessary conditions by which

And, since

these faculties are aroused and

set

they constitute the matter of

phenomena, we cannot derive

all

falling into the erroneous circle

them from phenomena, without of

first

into activity.

deducing phenomena from impressions, and then im-

from

pressions

phenomena.

Indeed, they can

in

no way

originate from the world of sense, since the world of sense arises

from them.

sensations stitute

is

not

From

itself

but not that of knowledge. all

appears that the origin of our

It is

the subject of necessary inquiry,

It is

something which precedes and

experience, but which itself can never be

ceived, nor experienced. is

it

a phenomenon, and hence does not con-

a knowable object.

underlies

this

first

felt,

con-

This unknown and unknowable object

that transcendental Z' which the

Kantian doctrine must neces-

Doctrine of Knowledge. sarily

have met with in the course of

exactly, within the limits of

human

its

27

inquiry beyond, or,

more

reason.

There must be something which causes the impressions we receive,

something which underlies our

sensibility,

and there-

with the whole constitution of our knowing reason, something therefore which also underlies

sense-world.

But precisely on

all

phenomena and the

this

account

it

cannot

entire

itself

be

anything sensible, cannot be a phenomenon, cannot be an object of knowledge. calls Thing-in-itself,

This " supersensible substratum " Kant

designating thereby that transcendental

which the Critique of Pure Reason introduces, and which itself,

on the grounds pointed

calculation.

phenomena.

sees

out, obliged to introduce into its

It is called thing-in-itself in distinction

from

all

If our reason were not sensuous, but divine, not

receptive, but creative, then selves,

it

X

its

ideas would be things them-

then there would be no difference between phenomena

and things-in-themselves.

Since, however,

and time are the fundamental forms of

its

it is

sensuous, space

perception,

its

objects

of knowledge are phenomena, and these merely ideas, hence

not things-in-themselves. gation of reason,

we must

Consequently, in the Critical investidistinguish between

phenomena and

things-in-themselves with the utmost precision, regarding every

attempt to unite the two as the cayse of irremediable confusion.

Critique of Kant.

28

Now, because the

which

objects

thing-in-itself, or the relations

numerous and so

unlike,

in Kant's teaching in so it is

we

relate

which the

see

why

many and

themselves to the

latter sustains, are so

the thing-in-itself appears

For

different connections.

the supersensible substratum at once of our sensibility and

of the whole constitution of our

hidden ground of subjective,

world.

all

knowing reason

;

hence

it is

phenomena, the objective as well

the

as the

and therefore the substratum of the entire sense

In reference to sense, which

matter of knowledge,

it

merely receptive of the

appears as the matter-giving principle,

In reference to the constitu-

or as the cause of our sensations. tion of our

is

knowing reason

in general,

it

is

represented as the

hidden ground of our mode of perception and thought,

i.e.,

as

the cause of our perceiving and thinking, and mentally representing to ourselves objective and subjective phenomena.

phenomena

are in space and time,

Since

and hence consist throughout

in external relations, the thing-in-itself is called, in distinction

therefrom, "the inner, that which belongs to objects in themselves,"

—an

expression which needs careful attention, lest the

radically false impression be received that the thing-in-itself lies

hidden somewhere the thing-in-itself

in is

phenomena.

The meaning

is rather,

that

not external, not related to another, hence

not in space and time at

all.

Since

all

phenomena

are empirical

Doctrine of Knowledge. objects, the thing-in-itself

transcendental object."

29

called in distinction therefrom "the

is

Since

all

phenomena

and not

are ideas,

objects external to and independent of thought, the thing-in-

" the true

called

itself is

phenomena alone

correlate

And, since

of our ideas."

are objects of knowledge, the thing-in-itself

denotes the bounds of our knowledge, or " the limiting notion of

our understanding.''

In

these manifold meanings

all

self-transforming Proteus, but one and the

the philosopher

is

same

He

Let us take Kant's own words. "

:

The

see

thing,

no

which

obliged to exhibit from different points of

view according to the various relations which

space

we

transcendental notion of

it

sustains.

says in the doctrine of

phenomena

in space is

a reminder of the Critical philosophy that in general nothing

which

is

perceived in space

is

of things, which might be in

a thing-in-itself, nor space a form

itself in

some way

peculiar to them,

but that objects in themselves are for us, indeed, unknown, and

what we

call external objects are

of our sense, the form of which

which, however,

i.e.,

nor can be known in experience."

'

Kant

:

Kr.

^

d. r.

;

nothing other than pure ideas is

space, the true correlate of

the thing-in-itself,

and

for the latter

no

is

not thereby known,

quest, likewise,

is

made

" For the substantiation of this theory of the

Vemunft.

Tr.

Msth. §

3.

{Werke,

vol.

ii.,

p. 68, seq)

Critique of Kant.

JO

ideality of external as well as internal sense,

hence of

of sense as pure phenomena, the observation

may be

service,

that

objects

all

of especial

which belongs to

everything in our knowledge

perception contains nothing except mere relations

—namely, the

places in a perception (extension), change of place (motion),

and the laws according to which

mined (moving

this

What, however,

forces).

or what beyond the change of place themselves,

is

not thereby given.

known through mere noted

that, since

change of place

relations.

is

deter-

present in a place,

is

occasioned in the things

is

Now, a

thing-in-itself

Hence

it

is

is

not

to be carefully

nothing save pure ideas of relation are given

to us through external sense, this also can contain in

its

idea

only the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner nature,

that which belongs

to

in itself.

the object

With

internal

perception the conditions are the same."^

The

substratum of our external and internal perception

that of our external

tution of our

;

also

and internal phenomena, that of the consti-

knowing reason

and understanding

is

hence

as well as of our thought.

it

in general, is

and of our

sensibility

the ground of our spatial ideas

Kant says

:

" That something which

underlies objective phenomena, and which so affects our sense

'

Kant

:

Kr.

d. r.

Vernunft.

Tr. jEsth. § 8. (p. 83).

—

1

Doctrine of Knowledge. that

it

3

receives the ideas of space, matter, form, etc

regarded as

thing,

noumenon

as

better,

(or,

—

this

some-

transcendental

might also be

at the

same time the subject of thought

although, through the

mode

in

object),

affected,

we

receive

of space and

which our

no perception of

idea, will, etc., but only

This something, however,

determinations.

its

sensibility is thereby-

not "extended, not impenetrable, not composite, since predicates belong only to sense and are affected by such (otherwise

its

all

these

perceptions, so far as

unknown)

objects."

is

we

^

That we mentally represent objective and subjective phenomena, that we have ceive

and think

We

reason. as

"

and understanding, that we per-

—herein consists the organization of our knowing

discover that, but not why, our reason

and not otherwise.

it is,

The

sensibility

To

take Kant's

cluded,

amount

to the following :

namely, that of space (a

filling

if

own words

again

:

everything imaginary be ex-

How

is

impossible to answer.

never be

Kant

:

filled,

Kr.

And

external perception

—

of the same, form and motion)

But

in a thinking subject in general possible ?

'

constituted

notorious question concerning the community of thought

and extension would consequently,

.

is

this

gap

in

this question

it is

our knowledge can

but only in so far characterised, that external

d. r.

Vernunft.

Tr. Dialektik ; Krit. 2 Paralog, (p. 667).

—

Critique of Kant.

32

ascribed to a transcendental object which

phenomena be

is

the

— an object, however, which we by no

cause of this sort of ideas

means know, and of which we can never obtain a notion.

may

the problems that

all

treat these

arise in the field of experience,

In

we

as objects in themselves, without troub-

phenomena

ling ourselves about the original

ground of their

possibility (as

we go beyond

the limits of experi-

ence, the notion of a transcendental object

becomes necessary."^

phenomena).

however,

If,

The philosopher Eberhard, Leibnitzian

doctrine

of knowledge

Kant's

Reason was unnecessary and superfluous, the latter that

namely,

ing

— without

sensations

which we

Kant

was not able

it

will,"

he

says,

" we

invalidates this stricture

He replies

it.

of Criticism

;

only

:

"

it

who

in Halle,

held that after the Critique

made the

of Pure

criticism

upon

to explain the matter of sense

"Choose

things-in-themselves.

come upon by

Now that is

at

things-in-themselves."

once admitting and correct-

precisely the constant assertion

does not set the ground of the matter of

sensuous ideas anew in things, as objects of sense, but in something supersensible, something which

lies at the basis

and of which we can have no knowledge. '

of sense,

Criticism

says

:

Objects, as things-in-themselves, give the matter for empirical

'

Kant

lehre.

(

:

Kr.

Werke,

d. r.

vol.

Vernunft. ii.,

Beirachiung

p. 696, seq.)

iiber d.

Summe

d.

rdnen

Seelen-

Doctrine of Knowledge. perceptions (they contain

ground

the

representative faculty according to

its

33 determining

for

the

sensuousness), but they

are not that matter.' "'

In order to a just estimate and criticism of the Kantian philosophy,

vital

scope.

It

too

to the objects of

them, as shell,

if

in its origin

and development as well

commonly happens when

sidedly taken, as

The

importance that the doctrine of the thing-in-

be understood

itself

its

of

it is

that

is

it

falsely

as in

and one-

things-in-themselves are referred merely

knowledge or phenomena, and transferred

to

they were contained in them, like the kernel in the

only that they remain hidden from us as sentient beings.

Empiricists, who, like

Bacon and Locke, granted the

validity

of no other than sensible knowledge, declared things-in-them-

be unknowable, while the Rationalists, as Descartes

selves to

and Leibnitz, held sense to be confused understanding; and

distinct thinking,

clear

on the contrary, to be the true form of

knowledge, and therefore things-in-themselves to be the true

Then

objects of knowledge.

nomena

are the same objects

as they appear to us

'

Vide

Kant

:

Ueber eine

Vernunft durch eine iii.,

;

things-in-themselves and phe-

when

;

when

perceived, they are things

clearly

and

distinctly thought.

Entdeckung nach der

dltere entbehrlich

gemacht werden

alle

soil

(

1

neue Kritik der 790).

Werke, vol.

p. 352.

3.

Critique of Kant.

34

on the contrary, they are things as they are

same thing

is,

therefore, according to

— whether by sense or by or distinctly— phenomenon

in themselves.

the way in which

The it

is

apprehended

understanding, whether

obscurely

or

precisely this confusion

to

especially that of

The thing-in-itself is the

of phenomena,

because

it is

that of our sensibility,

tions, itself

its

metaphysics.

him, both the above notions are to be absolutely

distinguished.

is

In

Kant saw the fundamental error of the

Dogmatic philosophy, and According

thing-in-itself.

that of our

which

supersensible substratum

knowing reason,

because

it

has, but does not create, sensa-

and receives impressions, which can be caused neither by nor by one of

its

objects.

CHAPTER

II.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM. Kantian Realism and Idealism.

I.

T T is

not our purpose at this point to inquire whether the fun-

damental doctrines of Kant accord or discord with one another, whether, and in

how

far,

they are uncontroverted, or

We

indeed recognized as incontrovertible. to fix in

mind

themselves,

desire here simply

that the recognition of the reality of things-in-

and of

their distinction

essential part of those doctrines.

from phenomena,

This recognition

is

is

an

related to

the doctrine of the ideality of phenomena, as the thing-in-itself to the latter, at

and

it

thus forms in the doctrinal edifice of Kant

once the substructure and the

Transcendental idealism.

To deny

necessary

completion

of

or misapprehend the reality

of things-in-themselves and their distinction from phenomena

means

When

to

shake the foundations of the Critical philosophy.

the reality of things-in-themselves

is

indeed affirmed, but

yet they are not properly distinguished from arises that confusion of both

phenomena, there

which constitutes the character

Critique

36

of Kant.

and fundamental error of the Dogmatic philosophy. were merely things-in-themselves, and no phenomena,

all

know-

were merely phenomena

If there

ledge would be impossible.

If there

and no things-in-themselves, the sense-world we conceive would be a dream— z. dream

common to

us

all,

to be sure,

and harmonious

in itself, but yet

a purely subjective image without actual ground

or consistence.

The knowableness of

ideality,

i.e.,

in

its

the world consists in

its

being through and through capable of repre-

sentation in thought, and in

being so represented.

its

This

characteristic the Critical philosophy, as Transcendental idealism,

teaches and establishes. that which underlies all

and

all

faculties of

The

phenomena

thought

Critique as "thing-in-itself."

nomena may be

world consists in

reality of the

—and

—-since which

it

is

underlies

all

ideas

designated by the

In this sense the doctrine of phe-

called the Kantian Idealism, the doctrine of

things-in-themselves the Kantian Realism.

II.

The 1.

Thing-in-itself as Will. Intelligible Causality.

Kant regards things-in-themselves as the supersensible substratum of our knowing reason and sense-world, as the mattergiving principle, or as the cause of our sensations. to them, accordingly, a causality

which

is

to

He

ascribes

be taken in an

Doctrine of Freedom.

from that

sense

different

entirel;^

37

category of cause which

determines the succession of phenomena in time, and thereby

both renders our experience possible and creates also,

the

precisely

account,

that

This notion

latter.

may be

on

has

but which

it,

only within

validity

a rule of the understanding, which

is

applied only to phenomena, hence not to things-in-

Kant knew

themselves.

this,

and taught

We

it.

assume that such a thinker has entangled himself doctrines in so clumsy and apparent a

manner

as

must not

own

in his

composedly

to apply to things-in-themselves the very same notion which he

had shown

to be invalid for

Kant distinguishes two

them.

of causality, which are inherently and essentially unlike

conditioned or sensible," and " the unconditioned or ble."

The former

of which in time

is

is

valid only for

determined and constituted by

Now, things-in-themselves

time.

hence their causality

is

the

"the

intelligi-

phenomena, the succession

not valid for phenomena, and

latter is

:

sorts

is

it

alone

;

independent of

are timeless

unconditioned

and

and

the all

causal;

intelligible,

which, according to Kant's doctrine, consists in Freedom or in

pure

will

;

and

this constitutes the

2.

There

is

still

moral principle of the world.

The Moral Order of

the

World.

another world than the sensible and temporal

Critique

of Kant.

intelligible

world,

38 namely,

world,

an

which

—a world which

completely

is

must not be thought

independent of the former

of and sought after as a heavenly world of spirits existing

somewhere beyond our common experience, yet of necessity

—

in space

and time

Mysticism

—but

in

this

would be the way to Swedenborg's

one which we recognize as the moral world, that

which the laws of freedom

The

ment.

world

is

intelligible

world

the World as Idea

(

the thing-in-itself, and

is

But

independent of the just as the sensible

faculty of

world

;

the former

phenomena

;

while this

is

is

Kant

latter.

in other words,

Herewith

is

;

it

is

hence

dependent upon

will, or,

to our practical reason

independent of the former, while the

upon the

related to

it.

related to the intelligible, so our

knowledge must be related to the

same thing, our theoretical

is

the basis of the sense-world

latter,

fulfil-

the World as Will, the sensible

Vorstellung)

lies at

and

find their recognition

the latter as thing-in-itself to

it is

still

former

;

what

is

the latter

He

is

dependent

is

that relation determined

called the " Primacy of Practical Reason."

the

which

saw himself

obliged to hold the reality and causality of things-in-themselves,

and to

identify the latter, as intelligible causality, with

freedom

or pure will, and thus to teach the primacy of practical reason.

In other words, the true or real principle of the world ing to Kant, not knowing reason, but

will.

is,

accord-

Doctrine oj Freedom.

The

goal of our will

according to the law of freedom, the

This goal

purity of volition.

the endeavour finds

its

which constitutes the Since,

is,

39

is

to be striven for

and attained

expression in the purification of the

real

;

will,

foundation-theme of the moral world.

now, without the sense-world no sensuous motives or

appetites could be operative in us, hence no material of purification

given,

it

becomes

unobstructed as to

its

own

clear

that

the

laws, constitutes a necessary

and an integral part of the moral world

and swayed by the

sense-world,

entire

latter;

;

that

it

is

member

compassed

and that the laws of nature are

subordinate to the laws of freedom, although they are thereby in

no way suspended or annulled. sensible

life

As thus understood,

acquires a moral meaning, and becomes a moral

phenomenon, in which a definite disposition, definite state of purity or impurity, reveals

The constancy of this necessitated,

character.

our

i.e.,

the will in a

and manifests

itself.

makes our moral conduct seem

to be the consequence of our given empirical

But since

which appears

disposition

i.e.,

it is

the disposition, or tendency of the

in our empirical character

and forms

its

will,

principle,

the latter must be ?iphenomenon of will, or a willed phenomenon, i.e.,

a phenomenon of the intelligible character or of freedom.

Here we

see

how

Kant's doctrine of intelligible and empirical

character necessarily follows from his doctrine of freedom and

Critique of Kant.

40

and space there

ideality of time

Without the

purification.

possibility of a sense-world, but also

no

Without a sense-world and freedom there

is

no

possibility of freedom. is

no necessity

for the

no moral phenomena of a sensible and

purification of the will,

empirical sort, hence no empirical character as a manifestation of the intelligible, and no

community of freedom and necessity

the conduct and characters of men.

Because Kant

first

made

in

this

unity of freedom and necessity intelligible, Schopenhauer was led to call

And

it

" the greatest of

since the

way

all

the contributions of

human thought."

won

only through the

to this insight could be

doctrine of space and time, the scendental .Esthetic

same

and the doctrine of

writer extolled the Tranintelligible

and empirical

character as " the two diamonds in the crown of Kantian fame."

III.

The Doctrine of God and Immortality. I

The Idea and

.

Kantian Theism.

recognition of the moral order of the world

involves the question regarding the original ground of the same, as

also that

regarding the attainability of

namely, the purity of the

will,

or moral perfection,

attainable in a temporal, but only in an eternal

the immortality of the soul.

highest

end,

The moral author of the world

will.

God, and the purity of the

its

is

is

not to be

life, i.e.,

through

According to Kant, the Ideas of

Doctrine of Freedom.

41

Freedom, God, and Immortality go hand Critique

hand.

in

In the

of Pure Reason they are merely Ideas fideenj, but

in

the Critique of Practical Reason they have the value of realities and, indeed,

it

is

;

only through the reality of freedom and the

moral order of the world that the other two Ideas also are realized or

made morally

certain.

It is utterly

impossible, from

the point of view of the world of sense, to comprehend and

demonstrate the existence of freedom, God, and immortality. Indeed,

all

proofs directed to that end with the means furnished

by our theoretical reason must necessarily

fail.

Critical inquiry

reveals the fact that these objects are incapable of demonstra tion,

reality

while at the same time

leaves the question of their

it

Now, the doctrine of

untouched.

the ideality of time

and space, and of the sense-world, has already established the possibility of freedom.

But since time

can distinguish ourselves from then, something in us which

timeless something

under which the activity of the

is

freedom

fact of

it,

is

;

is

and must do

independent of

and as

it

we

purely our idea,

is

so. all

There time

;

is,

this

the only condition

our moral self-consciousness and the

moral law within us can take place, not only the

possibility, but the actuality of

freedom

is

to be affirmed.

The

-moral order of the world consists in the fulfilment of the laws of

freedom.

Without

this

moral order they would remain empty

;

Critique of Kant,

42

they would not be laws, and freedom

There

fancy.

follows,

itself

from the moral order of the world, to reality of the

moral

attainability of the

moral

which the sensible must be subordinate, the ground of the world (God), and the

in itself the perfection of

end of the world, which includes will,

would be a mere

and therefore immortality.

the

These are the so-called moral

arguments with which Kant sought to demonstrate, through freedom, the primacy of practical reason and the necessary fulfilment

of

its

postulates

—the

existence

of

God and

the

immortality of the soul.

These moral proofs have won

for

Kant many adherents, on

account of their religious importance and the ease with which they are comprehended

;

but,

owing to their apparent inconsis-

tency with the results of the antagonists as well,

honest criticism,

Kant sought

first

Critique, they

who have made them

now

of ridicule.

in the Critique

It

have found

the subject

now

of

has been asserted that

of Practical Reason, but with weak

arguments, to raise up again as a makeshift for weak souls what

he had already destroyed, and with conclusive argument, in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Among

the writers on the Critical

philosophy, Schopenhauer, in particular, this

view,

theism.

and the most pronounced

is

the representative of

opponent of Kantian

Doctrine of Freedom.

The

43

doctrine of freedom and the absolute supremacy of the

moral order of the world, or the doctrine of the primacy of practical

reason, rests with

Kant upon

proof for the existence of

Regarding the

Kant held inquiry.

God

firm ground.

stands or

falls

The moral

with this doctrine.

demonstrability of God's existence,

theoretical

different views at different stages of his philosophical

In his pre-Critical period he sought to restate these

proofs and give

them new cogency

;

in the

Critique of Pure

Reason he not only denied, but refuted them, or demonstrated their impossibility

;

and

in the Critique of Practical Reason,

as

well as in that of Teleological fudgment, he neither abandons nor

modifies this last position, but, in perfect agreement with

deduces

—using

the well-known and evident arguments

it,

— from

the necessity of the moral order of the world, the necessity of

the moral ground of the world, or the existence

of

God.

Accordingly, in what concerns the question of the demonstrability of the divine existence,

we

find

no contradiction

in the different

views of Kant, but a logically consistent advance. differently

he may have thought on

knowableness of

God

—there

this

point

was not a moment

the development of his philosophical

— namely,

the

in the course of

convictions

denied, or even only doubted, the reality of God. still

But, however

when he

And

there

is

a second and a third point which remained unquestionably

Critique

44

of Kant. 1

tendency,

and even

him,

certain _to

when he

at

the time of his most sceptical^

ridiculed Swedenborg's

world and of our intercourse with that morality

is

it

:

I

dreams of a

mean

spirit-

his conviction!

independent of every sort of scientific knowledge,! i

as well as of every doubt that

may shake

the spiritual world as well as spiritual

;

and that

intercourse

consists,

the latter

merely in a moral community, or in the moral order of the world.^

The Kantian Doctrine of Immortality.

2.

On

the other hand, the

way

which the summum lonum

in

conceived in the Critique of Practical Reason

—the

being produced with the aid of the Ideas of tality

—involves a

And

it

will

series of difficult

notion of

is

it

God and immor-

and doubtful conside^tjons.

be advisable, in order to gain a correct apprehension

of the matter, that

we

take up our criticism of this doctrine of

Kant's along with

its

characterization.

philosophy sees entirely

itself necessitated

new view

For, since the Critical

from the standpoint of

of the world to affirm immortality,

it

its

is all-

important that this affirmation be properly understood.

The summum bonum

is

recognised by Kant as the unification

of virtue and happiness, as that state of blessedness which

'Cf.

K. Fischer

:

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol.

iii.,

is

pp. 229, 230, 252-254, 264, 265.

Doctrine of Freedom.

45

merited by our worthiness, and appointed us by the justice of

God.

It is

because the purity of the

will

yet cannot be attained in this our present

of Practical Reason postulates a future

must be

attained,

and

that the Critique

life,

life, i.e.,

the continuance

and permanence of our personal existence, or the immortality of the soul.

We

will test this

conception of the matter exactly

according to the canons which the Critical philosophy prescribes for us.

In the

first

place,

it is

not at

all

clear

why

purity of disposi-

tion should be absolutely unattainable during our earthly exist-

In

ence.

Kant has himself contradicted

reality,

in his doctrine of religion.

conditions

this assertion

For he there exempts from these

not merely the ideal Saviour, but

the historical

person Jesus, expressly declaring that His example would not

be practical and

Him

effectual if this purity should

or ascribed to

Hence

Him

be either denied

as a supernatural, miraculous power.^

the proposition that the goal of our moral perfection can

be attained only in a future and eternal

This objection aside,

it

is

life

does not stand proof.

further not evident in what respect

Perma-

the permanence of our existence

is

to help the matter.

nence, like duration in general,

is

a time-determination, and as

'

Cf.

K. Fischer

;

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol. iv., pp. 309, 310, 321, 322.

46

Critique of Kant.

such

within time and the sense-world.

it falls

perfection

is

now, moral

If,

not attainable in the present sense-world, owing to

the temporal and sensible nature of our existence, then

will

it

remain unattainable in the future sense-world, since the conditions of

its

impossibility are in

no way removed. The eternal

must be distinguished from the temporal is

not to be regarded as eternal

gretted that

Kant

this distinction.

life.

:

even endless existence

And

it

is

much

to

in his doctrine of immortality did not

He demands

life

be

re-

make

" an existence and personality of

the same rational being enduring to infinity."

But future

immortality

if

life,

is

we must ask

:

recognised as continued existence or

Hoiv can our personality

still

continue

within time and the sense-world after our bodily existence has

ceased

By a second

}

earthly birth (transmigration of souls),

or by removal to another, perhaps less dense, planet, as Jupiter, for

example

possible else

?

^

—what

Kant himself

— or by wandering

in

earlier

life

held to be

through the starry heavens, or

how

Such questions present themselves, and yet they admit of

no answer, or only a

fanciful

one

;

so that the doctrine of the

immortality of the soul, considered as a lasting duration of our personal existence in time and in the sense-world,

'

Cf. Fischer

:

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol.

iii.,

is

p. 148.

degraded

—

Doctrine of Freedom.

from a postulate of

practical reason to

47

an object of imagination

and phantasy. According to the demands of practical reason, our worthiness is to

be the cause of our happiness, our purity that of our salvaIf

tion.

we have

and receive

it

attained the

first

we have merited the second,

from the hand of God.

Now, we

fail

from purity

sort of happiness that does not follow of itself still

to be added.

Self-denial

complete,

is

all

love and self-seeking are subdued, and thus

make

us unhappy have vanished.

to see what

motives of

all

The pangs

still

lacks anything,

it

of an evil conIf this

can only be the fulness of

outward goods, as compensation for the outward it

self-

the evils which

science have given place to the peace of a good one.

blessedness

is

evils suffered

seeming, perhaps, that after achieving the heaven of a good

conscience

we ought

Abraham's bosom

!

also,

It is

in his doctrine of morals

upon the most happiness,

summum

rigid

speaking in

figure,

to

revel

not clear with what right Kant,

in

who

maintained and emphatically insisted

and even painful separation of morality and

now demands,

in

order to the production of the

honum, the necessary unification of the two under the

constant presupposition of their fundamentally

different origin.

Morality follows from the pure

happiness from

will, striving for

the empirical will or self-love, which desires everything that pro-

Critique of Kant.

48 motes

its

well-being.

Is,

and eternal

then, striving for future

happiness less eudsemonistic, less covetous and striving for present happiness

?

selfish,

Kant's teaching says: Seek thou

;

before everything purity of disposition, and happiness

Thou

to thee of itself in virtue of divine justice.

this

hope were

and requisition servants,

!

sliall fall

shalt not desire

and demand happiness, but thou mayst indeed hope though

than

for

it. ,

As

not, too, a silent expectancy, covetousness,

(With such a hope we are much

who demand

like the polite

nothing, even assure you they will take

nothing, yet at the same time furtively open the hand. ^ All these

weak points

in the

Kantian doctrine of immortality,

as they present themselves to us in the postulates of practical

reason,

may be

xj/cvSoi lies

traced to one fundamental error.

in the fact that divine justice is

standard of temporal justice, and

made

The

apprehended

Trpwrov

after the

to consist in retribution.

Accordingly, the disproportion between virtue and happiness in

our present

be

first

life

demands an equalization which can and should

realised in a future state.

Kant established penal

justice,

the administration of which belongs to the power of the State,

on the notion of the necessity of notion he

and

now founds a reward-dispensing

infallible administration

God, and

retribution.

first

of which

exercised in the

life

is

On

the same

justice, the perfect

only possible through

beyond.

He

thus degrades

Doctrine of Freedom. eternal

to a future

life

makes

personality,

life,

49

immortality to a mere permanence of

purity tantamount to a goal

which

unattainable in the present, and the moral states of perfection with

in hand.

which the

Following this view,

it

states of

life

is

absolutely

to a series of

recompense go hand

must be demanded, as Emil

Arnoldt has already aptly remarked,' that the degree of happiness

be adapted and proportioned to the moral quality of our

hence that the impurity of the corresponding punishments. purified has

still

will

will,

be accompanied with the

And, as a

will

not completely

the character of impurity, divine justice would

be compelled to exercise

its office

of retribution in the other

world chiefly by inflicting greater or less penalties, which would

be appointed us according to the greater or impurity.

less

degree of

oilr

In this way we find ourselves in the midst of the

labyrinth of the Platonic doctrines of immortality and retributioUj

while following the threads of the Kantian. It is further

God

not evident why, in our present

as granting rewards, and, in the future

penalties, should in each case cease or

are led to infer, since

Kant

doctrine of immortality.

'

E. Arnoldt

:

life,

life,

the justice of as inflicting

be suspended, which we

scarcely mentions the latter in his

Why

Ueber Aant's Ideen

are the countless inequalities

vom

hSchsten Gut.

(Kbnigsberg, 1874),

PP' 7-I3-

4

go

of Kant.

Critique

between virtue and happiness permitted even

in this

world

—

if

they actually are, indeed, the inequalities which they seem to us to be ?

omnipresence and justice of

If they are not, as the

compel us

to believe, then

which divine

justice

is

to

even those conditions disappear under

assume

and character of an equalizing

Kant wanted

to

God

first

in a future life the office

retribution.

harmonize his new doctrine of freedom with

the old doctrine of immortality and of retribution in a future world, and he sought to do this by recognizing and defending

the latter as a necessary postulate of the former.

must necessarily have by the principles of the of

God remains

for us

failed,

This attempt

and, indeed, have been frustrated

Critical philosophy itself.

If the activity

an unsearchable mystery, as Kant taught

and must have taught, then he could not consistently have attempted to unveil the mode of activity of the divine justice, and

have sought to determine

according to a standard that

it

subject to the conditions of time.

And even

saying nothing of

the fact that he unjustifiably apprehended this as retribution,

hensible, he

and permitted still

was not

it

to appear as

mode

of activity

something compre-

justified in representing this divine

retribution as inoperative in the present temporal state, first

to be looked for in the future

Our aim

is

to

is

and as

life.

judge the Kantian doctrine of immortality

1;

Doctrine of Freedom.

5

according to the fundamental canons of the Critical philosophy,

and we

desire, therefore, to

not to reject

new

it

amend

doctrine of freedom

radically

and that the

scendental Idealism a

agreement with them,

For we certainly appreciate that the

altogether.

immortality also,

in

it

changes

latter

new stadium

the

enters

doctrine of

Tran-

through

Now, the

of affirmation.

apprehension as well as the determination of the problem pf immortality depends upon the question whether we, with that constitutes our being, are in time If time

and space are

conditions of

all

of them, then

it

change

;

then

all

the

and space, or these

all-comprehensive,

all

in us.

fundamental

existence, so that nothing can be independent

matter alone which persists, while

is

particular things

its

forms

must originate and pass away

then no single being, no individual, hence also no person, can perpetually endure

;

on the contrary, each one has a

duration in time which

is

so

bound up with

definite

his being that the

limits of this duration are the insurmountable limits of personal

existence.

Under

this presupposition,

according to which time

and space are things, or determinations of

things-in-themselves,

there remains nothing further for us than either, in agreement

with the above assumption, to deny every sort of individual (personal)

immortality, or, in

contradiction to

it,

to affirm

and

conceive of the latter in a wholly fanciful manner, merely to

—

Critique

52 satisfy certain

of Kant.

needs of the inner nature.

decay take place in time, aiid are only possible in time. ever

is

can neither originate nor pass away

Since, now, time as such

eternal.

the necessary form of thought,

phenomena, which depend they appear, or

being, however, since

nomena, it

is itself

hence

;

It is

it is

no

upon a being

no phenomenon all

;

it

time

is

This

not in time, but time in i.e.,

timeless, or eternal.

phenomena should

impossible that certain

originate,

ad

infinitum.

and It

phenomena should pass away,

of actually perishing, continue to exist in time

and the sense-world in

to

constitutes the condition of all phe-

independent of

yet, instead

only

things in time are ideas or

conceives and knows them.

just as impossible that certain

and

this alone is

:

thing-in-itself, but

for their existence

who it

all

is

then, instead of passing away, continue to exist is

What-

wholly independent of time, or has the character of time-

less being,

whom

and

All origination

in

some

secret manner.

which the immortality of the human

Yet

this is the

soul

is

way

commonly

conceived

— namely,

time

once aflSrmed and denied, and death thus regarded in

is

at

reality as

The

the perishableness of

human

existence in

a mere formality.

true notion of immortality coincides with that of eternity.

Such immortality the through

its

new

Critical

philosophy affirms and establishes

doctrines of time and space, of the ideality of our

Doctrine of Freedom.

53

sense-world, and of the reality of that supersensible substratum

which

the basis of our theoretical reason and

lies at

nomena, and which Kant called "

objects of sense are throughout

life

entire sense-world

is

Now,

phenomenal so

has the character of a pure phenomenon

;

phe-

and exhibited

thing-in-itself,"

as the principle of the moral order of the world. all

its

just as

also our sense-

and

just as the

the manifestation of the intelligible or moral

man

order of the world, so the empirical character of manifestation of his intelligible character transitory, this timeless

and

eternal.

;

The

that

is

is

the

temporal and

eternity of our intelli-

gible being must, like freedom, be affirmed, although immortality, as thus truly apprehended, cannot be represented to the mind,

or drawn in the imagination, since to conceive

means

it

pictorially,

it

altogether.

to

make

it

it,

or to fashion

temporal and therewith to deny

Since without sensuous ideas there are no know-

able objects, the immortality of the soul can never be theoretically

demonstrated.

But since

condition of time, which

our being

is

all

sensuous ideas stand under the

is itself

merely the form of our thought,

timeless or eternal, and the immortality of the soul

can never be refuted

;

all

proofs directed against the doctrine are

just as futile as the theoretical

arguments for

the reality of time, and what

is

of our being, are

first

falsely

really

it.

On

either side,'

tantamount to the mortality

assumed

:

and then the one,

in

Critique

54

of Kant.

order to establish the immortality of the soul, demonstrates

its

immateriality and indestructibility, while the other, in order to refute the

same proposition, proves the

opposite position with proofs which are equally invalid.

of immortality.

to

be driven out of the

their

by demonstrating the

impossibility, but they cannot be nullified

qpponents are not

and

materiality

may be confuted by showing

Invalid proofs

perishability.

soul's

Hence

by demonstrations

field

But one may, indeed, and without overstepping

the bounds of a proper use of reason, oppose to

which they cannot

refute,

and which "

theoretically demonstrable.

itself

makes no claim

The Doctrine

Critique of Pure Reason contains, in

its

them an hypothesis to

be

of Methods " in the

section

on the "Discipline

of Pure Reason in reference to Hypotheses," a most noteworthy

and

characteristic passage,

in

which Kant commends to

his

adherents the doctrine of immortality in just such an hypothetical form, in order that they antagonists.

may make

"If, then,"

he

says,

use of

it

in

opposing their

"as opposing

itself to

the

assumed

(in

as being

something immaterial and not subject to bodily trans-

any but a speculative connection) nature of the

soul,

formations, you should meet with the difficulty of the argument, that

experience,

nevertheless,

seems to show that both the

increased capacity and the derangement of our mental powers are merely different modifications of our organs,

you can weaken

—

Doctrine of Freedom.

1

5

the force of this proof by assuming that our bodies are nothing but

\ki& fundamental phenomenon, to

and herewith

faculty of sense,

present state

The

(life).

which as condition the entire

all

thought, refers

separation from the

itself in

body

the

would

then be the end of this sensible use of your faculty of knowledge,

and the beginning of the

The body would

intellectual.

consequently not be the cause of thought, but merely an impeding condition of

it,

and hence to be regarded, indeed, as a

furthering of sensible and animal

life,

but yet just in such mea-

sure as also a hindrance to pure, spiritual

pendence of the animal

life

new

query,

it

The

fortuity of generation, for

does, with

man

has

life,

its

humours and

—throws a great

caprices,

difficulty in the

and contingent circumstances.

little

example

as well as with the non-rational

the lasting existence of a creature whose trifling

state of

upon circumstance, and even upon sustenance, upon

the conduct of vice

upon the

which has been as yet either unsuggested or not

depending, as

upon

life

But you might go even farther and trace out some

sufficiently pursued.

creatures,

Thus the de-

upon the bodily constitution proves

nothing as to the dependence of the mental our organs.

life.

to

and often indeed

way of the notion of

life

This

began under such difficulty,

however,

do with the question of the permanence (here upon

earth) of the whole race, since the contingency in individual

$6 cases

But

of Kant.

Critique

is

nevertheless on that account subject to general rule.

to expect in reference to every individual

effect

such a far-reaching

from so insignificant conditions, seems certainly question-

But

able.

in

opposition to this query you

transcendental hypothesis, that intelligible

;

that

is strictly

a

offer

speaking only

not subject to time-mutations

is

it

all life

could

;

that

it

neither has a beginning in birth, nor will find an end in death that this life

is

nothing but a pure phenomenon —

of the pure, spiritual

life

;

i.e.,

;

a sensuous idea

that the entire sense- wo rid

is

merely

an image, which hovers before us on account of our present

and which,

faculty of knowledge,

reality in itself; that if

as they are,

we were

we should

like

a dream, has no objective

to perceive ourselves

see ourselves

natures, our only true intercourse with birth,

nor

will

nomenon). all this

in

a world of spiritual

which neither began

Now, although we do not know the

which we here it

offer as a

in earnest

least thing of

defence against our opponents,

—

it is all

by no means an Idea of

the reason, but merely a notion thought out as a

— we

at

cease with the death of the body (as mere phe-

nor even maintain

defence

and things

are, nevertheless,

with reason, since

have exhausted

all

proceeding in

strict

weapon of accordance

we only show the opponent, who thinks

to

the possibilities of the matter by erroneously

declaring that the want of

its

empirical conditions

is

a proof of

—

'

Doctrine of Freedom. the perfect impossibility of what

can just as

span, by the

little

is

57

believed by us, that he

mere laws of experience, the

we

entire field of possible things considered in themselves, as

outside of experience can achieve anything in a well-founded

way

Whoever

our reason.

for

resorts

such hypothetical

to

remedies for the assumptions of an over-confident disputant

must not be held responsible real opinions.

He

for them, as if they

were his own

abandons them as soon as he has silenced

the dogmatic presumption of his antagonist.

modest and moderate

certainly

it

is,

For,

when one merely

to or disagrees with the views of another,

however objects

always becomes,

it

soon as one would have his objections recognized as

just as

proofs of the opposite, a no less arrogant and presuming claim

than

he had made a

if

direct attack

upon the position of the

affirmative party." It will

not be

difficult to

ing immortality what

determine in this hj'pothesis regard-

to~be ascribed to the

is

theoretical

mode

of

conception and the method of Kant, and what to be regarded as his

own most inward

conviction.

based upon the new doctrine of the sense-world

'

Kant

:

—that

Kr.

pp. 583-585.)

d. r.

Conviction ideality of

plainly

it

is

time and the

our sense-life has the character of a mere

Vemunft.

Cf. Fischer

:

Methodenlehre, Part

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol.

I, sec. 3. iii.,

(

Werke, vol.

pp. 530, 531.

ii.

Critique of Kant.

S8

phenomenon, and that our intelligible being

hence timeless and

time,

eternal

free,

sense- world were nothing but a

dream

is

independent of

and immortal.

all

If the

that floated before us, or

a scene which we contemplated like a theatrical performance, then

it

self-evident that

is

of imagination

;

for the

we should

survive this passive state

end of the dream

not that of the

is

But the

dreamer, nor the end of the play that of the spectator.

matter

We

not so simple.

is

sense- world, but active in

it

theatre, but actors as well.

;

are not only perceptive of the

not merely spectators in the world's In other words, the world has no

place for spectators but the stage live

and

act,

where we appear

;

this is the

as performers,

time contemplate and recognize our

scene where

and

at the

own performance.

accordingly, actor and spectator are in so far one that,

looker-on ceases to be a performer,

With our existence

looker-on.

in the

we

same Here;

when the

he also ceases to be a world of sense, our con-

templation of things, and even the appearance of things, vanishes.

With our with

it

sense-life our sensuous

that

and time.

thought perishes, and together

knowledge the fundamental forms of which are space Corresponding to our timeless being there

state of timeless

is

the

knowing, or of that intellectual perception

which has immediate knowledge of the inner nature of things. It is this

organ of knowledge which Kant means when, in the

Doctrine of Freedom.

59

passage cited above, he sanctions the assertion that " our body is

nothing but the fundamental phenomenon, to which, as con-

dition,

the entire faculty of sense, and herewith

relates itself in the present state

the body

;

all

thinking,

" that " the separation

from

the end of the sensible use of our faculty of know-

is

ledge and the beginning of the intellectual " and that " If we ;

were to perceive ourselves and things as they see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures.''

knowing can belong,

as

Kant elsewhere

are, If,

we should

now, timeless

teaches,^ only to the

Primitive Being, then the end of our sensible existence

is

to be

regarded as a return to God, and our eternal or purely spiritual life

as a

appetites

in

life

on account of which Kant

of immortality

all

sensuous

Then

rejects,

in his practical doctrine

demanded the endless duration of our personal purity would not constitute the

goal, but the condition

hauer

With sensuous thought

must have disappeared, and thereby that need of

purification,

existence.

God.

and character of immortal

problem and

life.

Schopen-

along with the Kantian theism, the doctrine of im-

mortality which

is

expounded

in the Critique

of Practical Reason,

as coinciding with the doctrine of retribution.

He

affirms the

immortality of our being on the ground of the Transcendental

Cf. supra.

The

Thing-in-itself.

6o

Critique of Kant.

Esthetic.

He

says:

"Did one wish

demand, as has so often

to

happened, the permanence of individual consciousness, in order to couple with

would

and

reward or punishment in a future world,

it

it

be only a question of the compatibility of virtue

in fact

But these two

selfishness.

never embrace each other

will

"

they are diametrical opposites."

The adequate answer

;

to the

question of the permanence of the individual after death lies in

Kant's great doctrine of the ideality of time, which proves just here especially fruitful, since,

yet well elucidated insight,

it

itself

by a thoroughly theoretical,

makes compensation

dogmas,

for

which lead on the one hand as well as on the other to absurdities,

and thus

a stroke does away with the most prolific of

at

all

metaphysical questions. Beginning, end, permanence, are notions

which borrow their significance

from time, and conse-

solely

quently are valid only under the presupposition of the

But time has no absolute existence, nor

is it

the sort or

latter.

mode

of

being /^Tw of things, but merely the form of our knowledge of our

own

existence and of that of

count

it is

all

things

;

and precisely on that

very incomplete, and limited to

Since, now,

is

it

ac-

mere phenomena."*

absolutely impossible for our reason as at

present constituted to form for itself an idea of the state of

'

A. Schopenhauer

p. 564.

Cf. his

:

Die Weltals Wille und Vorstellung,

Parerga und Paralipomena,

vol.

ii.,

vol.

ii.,

fifth edition,

fourth edition, § 137.

Doctrine of Freedom. timeless being and knowing,

know anything

is

we must conclude

in the least of the

life after

dogma

not intended to defend the

that

death.

Kant chose,

that

as

desirable

that this hypo-

of immortality, but

only to combat the opponents of the dogma. very noteworthy

we cannot

It is

Kant expressly declares

to note, therefore, that thesis

6i

Yet

best

remains

it

the

illustrating

" hypotheses of pure reason " which he permitted and justified for polemical use, precisely this doctrine

— the doctrine, namely,

which exhibits our present existence as a mere phenomenon or sensuous idea of our eternal and intelligible

If

life.

we compare

the Kantian doctrine of immortality as expressed in this hypothesis of pure reason with the

the practical reason,

we

see that eternal

as timeless, supersensible,

there

a

it is

life in

and purely

hence

contrary, as temporal,

same doctrine

sensible,

as a postulate of

life is

there conceived

spiritual

;

here,

and needing

God

first

and space.

purification

;

regarded as completion, which we are to conceive as ;

on the other hand, as an endless process

here,

of moral purification, subject to divine retribution. to the

on the

conception, our eternal

What

is

life is

independent of time

called the state of the soul after death

for our present faculty of knowledge, mysterium

" the tiresome query

According

:

forever silenced, since

When it

is

?

Where ? and

now

How

magnum. ?

"

is

is,

And

herewith

senseless and absurd, seeking

:

62

;

Critique of Kant.

But, accord-

timeless and spaceless existence in time

and space.

ing to the second conception, the soul

to continue

is

its

existence

to experience a series of progressive states of

after death,

is

purification,

hence

is

at a definite period of

to live

on in time and the sense-world

time

must leave the body, seek a new

place of abode, take on a

it

new form of

life

;

and since

all this

can only take place in space and time, in the everj'-day world about

us,

might

it

not seem that, with ordinary sagacity,

ought to be able to detect the great

us

is

its

hidden way

?

The

we

knowledge that

Beyond must ever remain an unfathomable mystery to

now no

longer our possession, and we- stand helpless, like

Mephistopheles before the corpse of Faust " Und wenn ich Tag und Stunden mich zerplage, Wann ? Wie ? und Wo? das ist die leidige Frage."

"And though I fret and worry till I'm weary. When ? How ? and Where ? remains the fatal

query."

—Taylor's Translation.

CHAPTER

III.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF DEVELOPMENT. I.

npHE

Kant's Fundamental Problems.

fact that

first

problem

we conceive its

;

a

solution

Kantian doctrine of knowledge. completely phenomenal, fact

i.e.,

common

world of sense

is

the

theme of the

constituted the

If this world of sense

were not

conceivable and conceived, that

would necessarily have been recognized as inexplicable.

Objects of sense are appearances or phenomena. explain the virtually

latter,

three questions have to be answered, which

involve Kant's fundamental problems.

must be a

subject, to

The

question

is

Who (what)

:

Secondly, there must be an

essence,

does not create out of

itself

in general

phenomenon would be is

the knowing subject

.?

which constitutes the ground

of phenomena, and of the knowing subject latter

Firstly, there

which anything objective could

appear, and without which no sort of possible.

In order to

itself,

the things

it

provided the

conceives.

In

64

Critique

this case the

knowing subject would

ground of being of case,

it

of Kant.

all

phenomena.

must be asked

What

:

is

same time be the

at the

But since

this is not the

the substratum which

is

the

ground of the knowing subject as well as of the entire phenomenal world

Thirdly,

?

everything based upon

between it

substantial

this

ground and

there must subsist a relation

which

determines the nature of the forms and objects of knowledge

(phenomena) peculiar to

us,

prehension, explains them.

and which,

The

if it lie

question

is

:

within our com-

Why

the nature

of our knowledge, and the nature of things, are constituted as

they are,

and not otherwise

summarily designated by the

The

}

initial

three problems

words

:

Who

?

may be

What

.''

Why.?

The

first

through

its

through

its

question

is

solved by the Critique of Pure Reason

investigation of our faculties

of knowledge,

and

doctrine that the sense-world originates from the

material elements of our impressions and the formative elements

of our perceptions and notions.

The second

question Kant

answered by his differentiation of phenomena from things- inthemselves.

shows by

What

its

the latter are, the Critique of Practical Reason

doctrine of freedom and the moral order of the

world, and the cognate doctrines of third question

is

God and

immortality.

The

regarded by Kant as incapable of solution,

Doctrine of Development.

owing

to the constitution of the

human

If the relation of things-in-themselves intelligible relation, the first cause

65

faculties of

knowledge.

and phenomena were an

of things, and therefore their

primal origin, the timeless creation, would be known, and the riddle of the world solved.

But

this relation

remains unknow-

able, the inner nature of things unsearchable, the mystery of the

world three

:

Of

a mystery.

still

these unsolvable problems there are

the cosmological, the psychological, and the theological.

If the intelligible character of the world consists in freedom,

then

the Will which determines the peculiar constitution of

it is

our knowing sensuous reason, as well as the peculiar nature of

phenomena, and upon which they both depend. possible

Kant

How

this is

the question which holds the secret of the world.

is

rightly grasped

declared an answer to

and it

rightly stated this question, but

to be impossible.

he

Schopenhauer claims

the honour of having found the only true answer, and of having solved by his

own

doctrine the problem which

Kant merely

discovered.

The

psychological and theological problems are subordinate

to, rather

than co-ordinate with, the cosmological, since they

contain the same problem applied in the one case to humari reason, and in the other to

problem

is

human

character.

The

psychological

concerned with the nature of our knowing

faculties,

S

—

66

Critique

in the constitution of

which sense and understanding are

of Kant.

once distinguished and united, as tion in

:

"

How

is

is

external perception

indicated in Kant's ques-

— namely,

a thinking subject in general possible

thinking subject " soul," and

its

at

?

that of space If

"

we

call

the

outward manifestation " body,"

the psychological problem involves, in this

its

true conception,

the old inquiry concerning the relation of body and soul.

The

theological problem deals with the fact of our moral disposition,

with the relation of our intelligible to our empirical character, or with the way in which freedom and necessity consist together

and are united held that

it

moral conduct.

in our

All these questions

Kant

was impossible to answer with the means of our

theoretical or scientific

The fundamental

knowledge.

inquiry has to do with the relation between

things-in-themselves and phenomena, or, what

is

the same thing,

the relation between freedom and nature, between the intelligible

and the

sensible, the

moral and the material orders of the world,

or between the causality of will and mechanical causality.

The

unification of both lies in the principle of natural adaptation,

and the teleological view of the world based upon which by no means retical)

knowledge

—a view

it

lays claim to the validity of scientific (theo-

—yet

claims, nevertheless, the character of

necessary and indispensable principle of judgment.

a

But the idea

Doctrine of Development. of immanent ends in nature

is

6j

so intimately connected with the

idea of natural development that the two are inseparable.

which develops

itself

must develop

itself to

something,

i.e.,

That self-

development implies the necessary actualization of an inherent end

;

and whatever has such an inherent end, or implanted

tendency, which strives for realization, must, in the very nature of things, develop therefore, final

In the notion of natural development,

itself.

and mechanical

causality, will

and mechanism,

freedom and nature, thing-in-itself and phenomenon, unite them-

We

selves.

accordingly take Kant's doctrine of development as

the unification of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom.

II.

The World Viewed I.

If

as an Historical Development.

The Natural Development.

we compare the

pre-Critical inquiries of our philosopher

with the Critique of Pure Reason and with the views that grow out of

it,

we

find

one fundamental thought running through the ideas

of both periods development

;

it is

Kant's view of the world as an historical

—a view which was by no means contradicted nor pre-

judiced by the Critique, but, in

had been possible before world

is

it.

fact,

more firmly established than

Since the subject of this view of the

nothing other than the natural cosmic changes, or the

succession in time of the different states of the world (whicli are

Critique of Kant.

68

connected according to the law of causality, so that the later necessarily follow from the earlier), the development of things

coincides with their natural history, which different itself

from the customary

with

artificially

classifying

with grouping their

things,

what they are

become what they

and transformations they have undergone

how and under what

it

knowledge he found

His short geological

He

may be regarded

races are rightly designed

"

to

Ka7U

:

himself led the

scientific

account of

together with his

contributions to the

as

two

treatises

on the human

be contributions to the natural

It is true philosophy,"

the diverse forms of a thing through '

new

treatises,

natural history of the earth, while his

man.

hand, and

with his General Natural

History and Theory of the Heavens this

history of

at

be attempted as a new and bold problem,

own example, founding

Physical Geography,

what changes

in the course of time,

the solution of which must be ventured.

the world.

are,

Such a natural history of the world

in the scientific

he demanded that

his

in their

conditions the present states have grown

out of the previous ones.

way by

This contents

Natural history, on the other hand, explains how

things originated and have

Kant missed

something entirely

description of nature.

external attributes, and with describing

present state.

is

said Kant, " to trace

all its history."^

Physische Geographic, Introduction, §

4.

Part II, Sec.

I.,

§ 3.

Doctrine of Development.

The

2.

The

69

Intellectual Development.

Critique ofPure i?«aw« teaches

how phenomena,

the sense-

world, and experience originate from the conditions of our representative nature,

and how tive

it

how

experience grows and becomes increased,

systematises

Ideas of reason

ledge, the final

it

itself,

strives

as in accordance with the regula-

toward a

goal of which, were

nothing other than the completely ment of the world. Critique in the

how

it

tions

scientific

If

we

system of know-

attainable,

could be

intelligible system

of develop-

it

follow out the investigations of the

development and progress of

its results,

and see

makes phenomena or objects originate from our sensa-

and the form-giving capacities of our perception and

thought, and experience originate from the synthesis of pheno-

mena, and systematised experience, gressive development of

its

i.e.,

science in the pro-

various departments, or the history

of the sciences, originate from the co-ordination of experiences in accordance with the regulative Ideas,

and

results of the Critique

summed up than

we

see that the problem

cannot be more concisely and aptly

in the designation

we have chosen

doctrine of the origin and development of

In every development the stadium reached

:

it

is

the

human knowledge.

is

always in

its

cdm-

pletion the condition, the material, the beginning of a higher

70

of Kant.

Critique

This

form.

is

also trae of our states of

sions are the material

phenomena the

knowledge.

phenomena

out of which

Impres-

are formed,

material for experience, completed experiences

the material of actual experimental knowledge.

Thus the

states

of knowledge, the origin of which the Critique teaches, are the

0/ development of knowledge.

states

The Social Development and

3.

The

natural history of

man

is

the

Development of Culture.

the condition and the material

The

of the history of his freedom.

natural

and

intellectual

development serves the moral, which does not merely, so to

say,

continue the former on a higher plane, but subordinates

and

makes

its

development subservient to

its

own.

The

it

progressive

development of our natural and intellectual capacities shows itself,

in this service

history of culture

;

of freedom,'as

human

and the nature of

the view of Kant, such that

it

is

civilization

freedom

itself.

torical culture,

only

when

its

it

is

is,

or as the

according to

involuntarily impelled forward

from the natural ends and interests of the law of freedom, but

civilization,

man

to the fulfilment of

completed only by the Idea of

Moral freedom can only develop

itself as his-

and the history of culture can complete

highest goal

ledge and purpose.

is

Then

striven for with the clearest

itself

know-

the laws of freedom will not be

Doctrine of Development. blindly

but

fulfilled,

capacities of

human

with freedom.

fulfilled

nature receive

71 In order that the

development and attain

full

their natural ends, the antagonism of interests, the competition

of ability, the division of labour, discord and the struggle for existence,

must enter into

from the isolated

be

more complex and more

For

tYie.

life,

security of life.

hence

is

is

only pos-

Security belongs

union and public law

social

and order must be sought and attained

That form

intense, but without

full unfolding of capacities

to the natural ends of

our

and the endangering of existence

under the condition of the

possible.

and from barbaric

freedom, where the conflict of

civil

that reciprocal destructiveness

sible

there must be an advancement

sure, continues, and, with the increase of

wants, becomes

and freedom.

;

state of life to the social,

freedom to social and interests, to

life

in the

highest form

the constitutional government.

But even

the constitutional state remains insecure, as well as the existence

of

all

individuals

as long as states

and the development of

and peoples

still

all interests

of culture,

exist in a condition of barbaric

freedom, warring with each other to their mutual destruction.

Consequently the natural ends of

life,

has for security, demand not only a the most secure form of which

is

or the needs which

civil,

but an international law,

a federation of

and constitutionally governed peoples.

man

free, civilised,

:

Critique

72

4.

The Moral and Religious Development.

But freedom in a

of Kant.

is

only actualised and, as

moral state of the world, when

account of the security of

life,

not

the

"

striven for, not

factors of

mechanism of our

freedom

on

sake,

itself

but

inclinations,"

knowledge, and moral character.

conscious purpose,

ethical

Kant,

demanded

accordingly,

is

were, embodied

but for freedom's own

and with those means which are the these are,

it

it

that

a con-

the necessity of

federation of nations, with a view to establishing lasting peace,

should not be urged merely in the interests of security and civilisation,

but that

it

should be placed upon moral grounds,

and held up to view as the moral end of the world, and that in this spirit of world-citizenship the universal history of

should be written.

In order to show that

man

"the evolution

of a form of government based upon natural right " lay in the

plan of the world's history, and that

its

time had come, Kant

appealed to the enthusiasm and intense interest with which civilised

nations greeted the attempt of the French to found

a government of natural rights.

saw the

all

rise

And

in

his

own epoch he

of Individualism in thought and knowledge

age of enlightenment," the goal of which could be

— " the

nothing

other than an intellectually and morally enlightened period.

—

whose

Doctrine of Development.

73

culture should be permeated through

and through with

the Idea of freedom.

But the moral development by no means goes hand

in

hand

with the progress of our culture and our external civilization.

On

the contrary, the more complex

more

suffers internal

it

human

disruption, the

society becomes, the

more

it

inequality of individuals in the circumstances of it

develops the life,

the

more

arouses and fosters motives of self-seeking, and allows conten-

tion and hateful dispositions,"

to

enormous vices

these " offspring of lawless

evil passions,

grow without bounds.

as ingratitude

pleasure, ill-will

bosom of

and

It

is

because such

and hatred, jealousy and malicious

and calumny,

flourish

society, that the latter

and luxuriate

in the very

needs to be transformed and

purified in its very core, needs a complete regeneration,

which

not "the juridical," but only "the ethical state," hence not the

moral kingdom of

State, but only the Church, as the

Here the

earth,

is

capable of effecting.

which

all

those evils spring that

one another, are

to

order that good-will

be rooted

may

of such a kingdom of

out,

sinful natures, out of

intentionally bring

and men's hearts

reign in the world.

God upon

of that most important of is

men

all

earth

is

God on

The

upon

purified, in

establishment

necessary for the solution

problems

man's salvation, and

it

consequently recognized by Kant as a duty of mankind to

Critique

74 itself,

and in

this respect as

of Kant.

The

su,i generis.

fulfilment of this

duty constitutes the special theme of the religious development, the true problem and goal of which

first

found

its

historical

expression in the appearance of Christianity, and which needed the growth of the visible

in

order that

Church constant

should not become

it

forms, and the real essence be

there belongs that

veracity

fixed

lost

which

in

rectification, in

outward,

To

sight of.

sincere

Nothing con-

conviction based upon moral self-knowledge.

with religious belief more than hypocrisy, and hypocrisy

flicts

is

true faith

with

identical

is

lifeless

the offspring and

Kant regarded the

companion of compulsory

religious Aufklarung,

owing

faith.

to

its

Hence principle

of tolerance, as an essential feature of the Aufkldrung

and

epoch as a necessary stage of reform

its

itself,

in the history of

the Church.

The manner religion

may

and

in

which Kant apprehended the relation of

revelation, of the invisible

and the

visible

Church,

serve as an excellent illustration of his doctrine of develop-

ment

in general.

He,

religious education of

like Lessing,

mankind, the

regarded revelation as the visible

Church as the form

of manifestation and development of the invisible great

stress

upon the

formative stages, since

it

just is.

appreciation of

;

and he

laid

these historical,

quite as mistaken to consider

them

Dodnne

of Development.

worthless and superfluous as to hold religion, or its is

immutable forms.

them

And

freedom and the

to be the essence of

Church

just as the visible

related to the invisible, so our natural

related to

75

and

social history is

final

moral end of man, and our

sense-life to our intelligible being,

and the sensible world to the

moral.

The Teleological View of the World.

III.

I.

We

see

The World-development as Phenomenon.

how

the Kantian philosophy presents

itself,

entire view of the world, as Doctrine 0/ Development.

nature and freedom,

culture

and the

church, as historical developments

;

state,

It

religion

and, although

it

in its

regards

and the has not

developed these subjects, but only sketched their main features

and general

outline, yet

it

had already seized upon the problem

of such a view of the world before the Critique of Pure Reason,

and has established

The

it

by means of the

latter.

laws of world-development are partly laws of nature,

partly laws of freedom.

The

first

consist in the laws of

motion

of the material world, in the causality of objective and subjective

changes, in the necessary succession in time of the different states of

the world; the second consist in the moral end of

reason, from which follow those objective

and

subjective laws

^6

of Kant.

Critique

of freedom which are to be culture

and of the

fulfilled

in

the development of

and of the Church.

State, of religion

In the pre-Critical period, Kant's views of development were confined to natural history, and especially to the mechanical origin Nevertheless, he declared

and transformations of the cosmos.

even at this time, that the origin of organic bodies could not be

comprehended

after

mere mechanical

laws.

The

inquiry con-

cerning the knowahleness of natural changes, or of the causal

nexus of things, lay

remote from him when, in his General

still

Natural History and Theory of

He

mechanical cosmogony. given, and

known

to

left

us.

the

Heavens, he set forth his

took the world and

its

laws as

unconsidered the way in which they become

The thorough

investigation

of this question,

which concerns the causal nexus of things, necessitated him to

abandon

and to Reason.

rationalism,

set out

upon the

first

then also the old-school empiricism,

entirely

new path

This brought the solution

:

it

of the Critique of Pure

discovered how, in accord-

ance with the constitution of our reason, phenomena, and their necessary synthesis

—the

sense-world as constituted by natural

law (nature), originate out of the material of our impressions

and the laws of our thought (sense and understanding).

We

are

obliged by the nature and laws of our reason to conceive the material universe in a mechanical development, the realm of

Doctrine of Development.

animal

life in

an organic development, and mankind

And, since

development.

tain nothing that

ideas of our reason

dom,

i.e.,

through and through phenomenal.

is

;

both are necessary

those condition the sensible, these the

Hence,

also, the history of nature

And what

else could

evolution, of whatever sort they

and

free-

may

it

be, since all stages of

be, are successive, or con-

a time-succession, hence must take place in time, which, as

stitute

form

pure

phenomena

2.

The

of thought,

can

itself

contain

only ideas or

}

The World-development as

Teleological

notion of phenomenon, however,

much more

is

Phenomenon.

necessarily grasped

adequately in the doctrine of development than in

doctrine of knowledge. tific

;

the entire world-development, has the character of idea

or phenomenon.

a

moral

these orders of development con-

all

laws are laws of nature and of freedom

moral experience.

in a

might not be conceivable and conceived, the

entire world-development Its

"jy

As objects of our experience or

knowledge, phenomena

may

scien-

not be referred to ends ; as

forms of development, on the contrary, they cannot be conceived apart from ends.

something;

it

Whatever evolves

bears

its

itself

must evolve

own determination

within

itself into itself,

manifests the character of self-determination and freedom.

and If

78

Critique of Kant.

we compare phenomenon

menon

as

we

stage of development,

in the conception of

knowledge with pheno-

as object of

immanent

see that the difference lies

teleology,

former and comprehended in the

which

is

excluded in the

And, indeed, the idea

latter.

of inherent, final causes as operative in

phenomena must be

applied to the entire world-development

;

not merely to the

organic and moral development, but also to the mechanical. the organic development the notion of ends

is

a necessary prin-

ciple of our judgment, since living bodies are

which develop or organize

themselves,

Iij

ipso facto

those

and are consequently

conceivable without the Idea of inherent ends.

in-

In the moral

development the notion of ends acts as the necessary principle, not only of our judgment, but also of our conduct and the out-

ward manifestations of our character, since the

will acts

accordance with ends, and the moral character of both determined and judged by the moral law. world ends have

mechanical world

real,

in the organic,

they

are

to

and therefore only

nexus of

all

themselves to

phenomena.

is

validity;

in

the

whatever!

but one time and one

one sense-world, or If,

acts is

In the moral

have no validity

According to the doctrine of Kant, there space,

ideal,

its

in

one universal

now, some phenomena show

be determined by ends, and others must be

teleologically judged, there certainly can

be no phenomena that

—

Doctrine of Development, are wholly without end.

kind it

is

also organic,

79

For the moral development of man-

and without

would not be development

organic-sensuous character

its

at

all

material and mechanical as well.

and organic bodies are

;

Consequently the inorganic

bodies also, although they must be explained independently of the notion of ends, cannot yet be without end, else there would

be no universal nexus of phenomena, no unity of the senseworld,

no unity of time and of space, by which we understand,

not a closed unity in the sense of

totality,

but a world-unity, as

opposed to those numberless independent worlds assumed by

and also accepted by Kant

Leibnitz,

his

in

first

studies

afterwards, however, reckoned, together with the Monadology,

among

" the legends from the Utopia of Metaphysics."

view of the world advances from the

lifeless

and from the living to the moral

;

that

realm to the is,

organic world evolves from the inorganic, and

it

the to

fall

first

to the

ground

if it

And

how

the

this

view

should deny the validity of ends in

stadium of evolution, and then in the second be obliged

acknowledge their necessary application, and,

third, discover their reality.

in the

living,

how humanity and

the moral world evolve from the organic world.

would

sees

Our

Kantian doctrine.

But

The

this is not the

latter denies,

finally, in

the

view expressed

not the validity of

ends, but their theoretical or scientific knowableness in both the

Critique of Kant.

8o

inorganic and organic worlds.

It affirms their

knowableness in

the moral world, because here the activity of ends

apparent from the will the

will,

is

immediately

Matter renders ends unknowable

itself.

Ends

on the contrary, knowable.

but matter

is

spatial, and, like space,

are

immanent causes,

completely external

thing in space exists as externality, and consists

hence

relations;

This

causes,

is

contains

it

true of

no

sort

phenomena

in

in

ment.

outward

general

;

hence of

all

them

as

because they develop themselves.

i.e.,

unity of the world

also the unity of the world-develop-

is

Consequently the end that reveals

order of things and gives also

every-

simply because they produce, form, and

reproduce themselves,

The

;

of knowable immanent

bodies, even the organic, which oblige us to consider

controlled by ends,

;

them

itself in

their intelligible

the moral

meaning must

be recognized as the principle that underlies the natural

order of things, but presents

phenomena.

That end

is

itself as

freedom.

knowable

in

Accordingly,

no natural

we must

consider the entire world-development as the manifestation of freedom, and the sensible order of the world as the manifestation

of the moral.

We

thus rise to a point of view where the inner

nature of things, which ever remains hidden from our knowledge in

its

exact sense,

the world

is

becomes unveiled, and where the mystery of

solved.

1

Dactrine of Development.

3.

8

The World-development as Manifestation of

Thus

in the

Thing-in-itself.

Kantian doctrine of development the two other

fundamental disciplines of the Critical philosophy of knowledge and freedom,

notions of nature and freedom

or,

what

is

—are united.

— the doctrines

the same thing,

The

the

Critique of Pure

Reason culminates in the teleological point of view, and attains,

by working clusions doctrine,

this out, a systematic

we have drawn stand

Kant or

force

Kantian

directly in the line of the

and they are embodied

ascribe to

The con-

view of the world.

in expressions

upon him views

that

which

no way

in

he has not himself

For he held both to

expressed or sanctioned in his teaching.

the unity of the world and to evolution, both to the ideal validity

of design in the organic realm and to

its real

validity in the

moral realm, both to freedom as the moral end of the world and to the intelligible character of freedom intelligible character

of whatever sort

it

is

;

and he declared that

identical with thing-in-itself.

may

Adaptation,

be, consists in the correspondence of a

thing with an end or purpose.

This presupposes

activity

towards

an end, hence an end-active power and an end-positing faculty, will

and freedom.

Such a correspondence

and exists in

thing

itself

that

must be present.

it

actuality, or

it

In the one case

is

i.e.,

either given in the

appears to our reason it is factual

and 6

real,

;

82

Critique

in the other

it is

only a necessary idea, and therefore merely

Moral ends are of the

ideal.

Since, now, without

second.

of Kant.

first sort,

organic or natural of the

end or purpose,

i.e.,

without will or

freedom, adaptation in general can neither exist nor be conceived,

and

development must be considered as teleological, the

all

latter

must be recognized as the manifestation of freedom or of thingin-itself.

In other words, while the world-development consists

in the natural

and moral orders of things, the second

the highest stage of development of the

the sensible world

is

the moral, but also

is

its

phenomenon.

Critique

is

follows

:

Kant declared

primacy of practical reason, and confirmed

of fudgment.

" that supersensible is

He

in it

explained that that super-

and of

The

phenomena,

all

upon which we must base nature

identical with freedom.

as

phenome-

statement

literal

is

as

"There must, however, be a ground of the

unity of the

which underlies nature, with

which the

supersensible,

that

notion of freedom practically contains, and even this

ground

the manifestation of freedom.

sensible substratum of our knowing reason

non,"

its

In short, the entire world-

in fact the truth of the matter

his doctrine of the in the

but also

not merely the temporal presupposition of

development or world-order

That such

first,

not merely

is

if

the notion of

ground leads neither to a theoretical nor a practical know-

ledge of the same, and hence possesses no particular sphere, yet

Doctrine of Development.

makes possible the

it

transition

83

from the mode of thought

according to the principles of the one, to that according to the "

principles of the other.''^ tically contains

is,

What

moral end. moral end

''

itself,

What

the notion of freedom prac-

according to Kant, nothing other than

is

final

coincident or one with this can only be the

for this

only one with

is

When, con-

itself.

sequently, " the unity of the supersensible which underlies nature,

with what the notion of freedom practically contains," of,

is

spoken

that supersensible substratum can be nothing other than the

final

moral end

And when Kant

itself.

says " there

a ground of that unity," only the ground of the

can be understood by

it

;

but this

moral end

simply and solely will or

That " supersensible which underlies nature "

freedom.

fore, will or

freedom.

There

is,

as the spirit of Kant's doctrine,

as the

is

final

final

practical,

according to the

no other

is,

there-

letter as well

Now, of freedom

issue.

moral end we have no theoretical, but indeed a

knowledge.

substratum of

must be

all

But of freedom as the supersensible

phenomena we have

a practical knowledge,

i.e.,

neither a theoretical nor

we can form no

sort of

an idea of

the " ground of the unity of the supersensible which underlies

'

Id.

Kant :

:

JCritik der Urtheilskraft, Introduction

ll.{Werke,

Dialectik der teleologischen Urtheilskraft, § 78, p.

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol. iv., pp. 397

and 497.

vol. vii., p. 14.)

231.

Cf. Fischer

:

Critique

84

of Kant.

nature, with

what the notion of freedom practically contains."

Hence Kant

says, there

must be such a ground, the character of

which permits us to unite the principles of nature with those of freedom, although practical

we can

knowledge of

and freedom consists tion

;

mated

and in

The

ground.

this

in the

organic

all

acquire neither a theoretical nor a unification of nature

notion of natural freedom or adapta-

phenomena must be considered and

accordance with this principle as criterion.

necessity or the

mechanism of things we have a

esti-

Of natural theoretical

knowledge, of moral freedom a practical knowledge, of natural

freedom no knowledge is

unknowable

at all

;

that

is,

will or

natural ends or final causes

;

freedom in nature

must necessarily be

conceived, but they can never be known. All the

phenomena of nature

are exertions of force

freedom consists in the freedom of force

phenomenon, or the phenomenon

in

freedom displays

its

;

it is

:

natural

the freedom of

freedom.

Within the

natural world

this

bodies,

such bodies as bring forth, shape, and reproduce

themselves

we

in

i.e.,

;

these are the living

itself

in

self-developing

phenomena of

nature,

which

are accordingly obliged to conceive of after the principle

of objective, immanent teleology.

The

necessity of regarding

organic nature in this way was the subject which Kant worked out in his Critique of Teleological fudgment.

Doctrine of Development.

There is

is

85

also the free contemplation of things,

not our object or problem, but our

state

where freedom

—that

harmonious

condition of our powers of mind which does not seek to investigate and analyze phenomena, but leaves

them

in their freedom,

apprehending them with pure contemplative pleasure. perfectly free attitude of mind, dependent

no

interests, there

phenomenon

in

pure pleasure

;

upon or

complete freedom.

we pronounce

it

theme of

his Critique

confined

itself to

the

i.e.,

the object of our

beautiful or sublime.

principle of the subjective fitness of faculty of aesthetic judgment,

It is

this

restrained by

corresponds the free phenomenon,

its

To

phenomena

is

Upon

this

founded our

which furnished Kant with the

0/ the .Esthetic Judgment.

His investigation

the analysis of our aesthetic judgment, or of our

thought in the state of freedom.

mented by a discussion of the

This needed to be supple-

correlate of our aesthetic

plation, namely, the phenomenon in the state

contem-

of freedom, or by the

attempt to establish also the objectivity of aesthetic

fitness.

This

supplementary step was taken by Schiller, who, more than any other

down to Schopenhauer,

furthered and extended the Kantian

Esthetics without abandoning the principles of the Critical philosophy. as such,

it

If

freedom

is

the highest law of reason, and

if,

determine the character of our knowledge, the laws

of which (the laws of the understanding) condition the sense-

86

Critique

world, then also

necessarily conceive freedom in

we must

and phenomenon

;

of Kant.

in its

freedom

is

beauty.

phenomena

Schiller could

not have indicated his Kantian standpoint, and at the same time his

advance within

done

in a

word

in

more

it,

one of those

chief aesthetic ideas in

all

and more forcibly than he has

aptly

Komer, which

letters to

Even these few words

their freshness.

show what a profound understanding of the he possessed

thyself (which

is

'

Determine thyself out of

philosophy, 'Nature stands

This great Idea of

under the laws of the understanding.' determination

We

and

shall

philosophy

once the content of his whole philosophy),

at

this other, of the theoretical

nature,

Critical

" Certainly no greater word has yet been spoken

:

by mortal man than the Kantian

and

give his

is

self-

mirrored back to us from certain phenomena of

this

we

not

now

call

Beauty."

^

ask whether the Kantian doctrines of know-

ledge and development conflict with one another, but only note that,

in the

first,

things-in-themselves are absolutely unknow-

able and absolutely distinguished from phenomena, while in the

second the Phenomenon of Freedom shows

'

Schillers Briefwechsel

mit Korner, and

ed.,

edited

Letter of the 18th of February, 1793, pp. 18,

above are the following

five written in

Jena

:

itself.

19.

With End,

by Carl Goedeke, 1878.

The

letters referred to

that of January 25th,

of the 8th, l8th, 23rd, and 28th of February, 1793.

will

Vide pp. 5-51.

and those

Doctrine of Development. enters the

phenomenal world

character,

or thing-in-itself,

more

things advances, the

world-development

is

;

87

with Will, freedom, intelligible

and the distinctly

farther the evolution of

manifests

it

recognized by Kant as the manifesta-

and ever-increasing revelation of freedom.

tion

the mechanical world

hidden, forces light

that

we

phenomena of an end

;

present.

The

itself.

not at

is

all

That which

manifest or

is

in

completely

itself

already in the organic realm so far to the

are

not even able perfectly to experience the

life

without the idea of

and in the moral sphere

it

is

life's

inner adaptation to

completely manifest and

In the organic evolution of the world we take ends

into account

;

in the moral,

the thing

it is

itself.

Yet between the two doctrines, as they shaped themselves the

mind of Kant,

there

is,

in the

but a deep underlying harmony.

first

place,

in

no contradiction,

Against the charge

that,

while

the doctrine of knowledge holds things-in-themselves to be forever absolutely hidden, the doctrine of development regards

them

as increasingly intelligible and knowable,

Kant

is

shielded

from the outset by his distinction of the sorts of knowledge. such a stricture he would reply

:

Things-in-themselves are only

so far intelligible as they are practically knowable

knowable they never

are.

To

Every phenomenon

knowledge, a link in the nexus of things

;

;

theoretically

is,

as object of

each has

in our idea

88

Critique of Kant.

of the world

and place

fixed time

its

;

none

the thing-in-itself which underlies them thing-in-itself knowable,

appears that

" There

it

is

across

analyze and dissect

it,

resolve

it

in our

none

in

all;

knowledge and

it

into its

knowable

then from these construct our knowledge of

factors,

Among

it.

all

phenomena,

appear, because it

show

is

it

itself, either,

exhaust

itself

in

or the inherent end of in the world.

life

It

can reveal

artist in his

itself,

it

is

to

Now, even is

it is, i.e.,

does not

work, the will to live exertion,

its

contained in an object in such a it

will

be

hit

upon and

the most searching analysis of any pheno-

not able to discover the ground to discover

like character in

appear means, in the exact

that in the analysis of the object

menon

it

does

but not appear.

in the organism, force in

For something

sense of the word, that

found.

such

any one form or stage of development, nor

conduct, the genius of the

way

No more

in the evolution of things, since

becomes manifest, yet ever remains hidden,

God

and

This does not

the cause of appearance.

consist in any transition. It

not to be found.

is

say,

ground of

factors the thing-in-itself, the creative or originative

being of

this

never so

it

i.e.,

is

know a phenomenon we must

In order to

"

thinkable without

nowhere appears,

it

we could come !

is

its

innermost being.

why and

To be

io

sure,

what end one need

not necessarily trouble himself with this question, and, indeed,

;

Doctrine of Development. in experimental

knowledge and the so-called exact

is

authorized to pay no heed to

if

he choose, banish

But

question.

also,

the mystery of the world rests as a burden, distinction of things-in-them-

phenomena, as well as

selves from

he

profound thinkers among philosophers,

Thus the Kantian

can never do.

One may

whatever.

it

sciences,

completely from thought, as an idle

it

this the

whom

those upon

89

its

doctrine of the

unknow-

ableness of the former in the way of the scientific analysis of the

latter, retains its

The

deep and abiding meaning.

question concerning the thing-in-itself as the ground of

being of

all

of things.

phenomena

carries us

back to the original ground

This, according to Kant,

from no phenomenon, of whatever from the

final

reason, by

end of the world,

means of

tion of the will. final

itself,

and

In this sense

end of the world.

sort

i.e.,

intelligible to us

may

it

be, but solely

from the end which our

freedom from the world we conceive

its

(sense-world), posits for

becomes

"

Hence

but not that which makes

realizes

through the purifica-

man may be it is

recognized as the

only the faculty of desire

man dependent

(through sensuous

impulses) upon nature, not that in respect to which the worth

of his existence depends upon what he receives and enjoys. is

It

rather that worth which he alone can give to himself, and

which consists

in

what he does, how and according

to

what

of Kant.

Critique

90 principles

he

acts,

and not as a part of nature, but in the freedom That

of his appetitive faculties.

a good will

is,

that

is

whereby

alone his existence can have an absolute worth, and in relation

which the existence of the world can have a

to

Our philosopher judges

"The deed

like

everything,

is

our poet

"

:

final

" Enjoyment debases ;

With

fame."

nothing the

Goethe's Faust rises to the point of

confession

end.'"

its

this

highest

morality.

end of our existence were mere happiness, or that

If the

enjoyment of the world which consists in continual amusement, if

we came

farce,

into the world only in order, like the

make

to

pleasure,

it

a

"joke" of

in the

and to seek unmixed

ourselves,

would seem that modern Pessimism, inspired as

by the pleasure- seeking of our day, this object

man

of

life

has proved a

right in declaring that

is

failure,

and

that

goal that has been reached, inasmuch as the in reality far less than the

valent than amusement.

it is

the opposite

sum of pleasure

sum of pain, and ennui far more

Then

it is

the result of

buffoonery, would be truly a most sad "joke."

life,

is

pre-

as that of the

Nothing is more

genuine knowledge of man than this

foolish

and wanting

sort of

a debit-and-credit account of pleasure and pain, of joy

'

Kant

Fischer

:

:

in all

Kritik der Urtheilskraft, % 86.

Cesck

d. n. Philos. vol. iv.,

pp. 505

(

—

Werke, vol.

17.

vii.,

p. 326.)

Cf.

Doctrine of Development.

and sorrow, as

if

and the sum of

they could be added and subtracted like money,

life

figured out

same plane

to

;

The

by such a childish example.

pessimism and optimism of the ordinary cisely the

91

sort stand

upon pre-

both are eudamonistic, and hold happiness

be the only desirable good.

The

pessimists,

on the one

hand, find the world so ill-conditioned that we can never attain

and enjoy

this good, but only

we

satisfied craving, so that

and ever chase

are thus

after

condemned

it

with un-

to a continual

Tantalus-torment, to the most intense misery conceivable. optimists,

mind

on the other hand,

find

the world and the

The

human

so beneficently planned that, with the right knowledge and

a corresponding perfectly

happy

As people Kant, there

regulation of conduct,

are able to attain a

life.

are busying themselves a is

we

good deal nowadays with

naturally considerable dispute, this

way and

that,

as to whether his teachings are to be taken in the sense of a

pessimistic or an optimistic view of that such a question

shows

sufficiently

doctrine

is

But the simple

how

little

Kant

is

understood.

neither the one nor the other, since

of the object of

life

the happiness which

fact

debated, as answerable by yes or no,

is

well

life.

eudsemonistically at

we

all.

it

His

does not judge

Were

this object

necessarily craved, according to the

sensuous impulses of our nature, such a state of well-being, even

::

Critique of Kant.

92 if it

could be fully attained, would leave our moral nature empty

and

unsatisfied, since

human

or personal end of

only posited,

ence

we should thereby

willed,

i.e.,

the world

in

which cannot be given

life,

by ourselves.'

consists

in its very nature is

no

is

is

in

life,

lies in

it

man

of

life's

worth of human

'

who

no one moment, but

to free

Kant

:

A*?-,

:

solution.

for

;

yet

all

content-

but won

daily has to

win

" it

!

in the entire fulness of

;

He who

traverses

moral energy alone

that she merely intensifies. life

Kant judged

man from

it.

and

from the attacks of the monster Care, who robs

view of the world, as Goethe

magic

life

every gratifying enjoyment

she cannot stay

interests,

not to be found,

is

both the joys and sorrows of creating.

this path is free

wide

new problems

" Only he earns freedom as well as

Contentment

all its

only to be found in the way of this free

Indeed,

self-development.

exist-

moral self-development,

of complete contentment

ment worthy of man

human

of

which we are to enjoy with folded

idle bliss,

moment

hands, no

to us, but

an unceasing and endless progress.

Every solved problem presents

Here there

The end

man's

in

which comprehends culture as well as which

utterly fail of the truly

Of

the end and

at the close of his teleological

at the

end of Faust.

It

needed no

care and the world's spirits of torment

Urtheilsltraft, § 83.

(JVerke, vol.

vii., p.

311

et sej.)

;

Doctrine of Development. "

Im

Welterschreiten find' er Qual and " !

Er, unbefriedigt jeden Augenblick

The world.

goal of our moral self-development If "

man under moral

laws "

is

is

93 Gliick, '

freedom /raw/ the

recognised as the

final

end of the world, then these laws must be recognised as worldand the moral order of the world as the order of

laws,

all

things

then there must be also a moral author of the world, or an original ground oi all things,

which can be nothing other than the

world-creating will or God.

Thus Kant's

teleological view of

the world culminates in the moral theology which furnishes the basis for the only valid demonstration of the existence of God,

whose bility

reality

Kant never doubted, whose

he denied and disproved

theoretical demonstra-

in his doctrine of

knowledge,

whose existence he affirmed with complete certitude doctrine of freedom and faith.

ground of the world, there final

is

Without

in

his

will as the original

in the latter neither freedom,

nor

end, nor development.

'

" In marching onward, bliss and torment find, " Though, every moment, with unsated mind !

—Taylor's Faust, Part II.,

Ad

V., Scene 5.

Translation.

CHAPTER

IV.

EXAMINATION OF KANTS FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES. T) Y

and uniting Kant's fundamental doctrines, we have

fixing

won

the right conception of the system, as

the mind of

its

author.

It

it

contains themes enough, which

has only sketched in outline, or not developed at

enough, which he partly of solution.

of scholars

To

was present to

left

all

to

fill

its

principles.

On

hand, the attempt to extend the system beyond

the task

the other

its

original

and to advance where Kant remained stationary and

commanded philosophy its

is

out and complete the work of the

master without touching upon

limits,

problems

;

unsolved, partly declared incapable

discover and supply the deficiencies

who wish

Kant

to halt,

solution to a transformation

doctrines.

is

a problem which leads for

and development of the Kantian

But, in order to determine such a problem,

we must

ascertain whether the principles of Kant's teaching, in their

authentic form, are permanent principles, and whether they are

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

95

fundamentally consistent in themselves and harmonious

with

one another.

Examination of the Doctrine of Knowledge.

I.

I

We

.

The Contradiction our eyes,

fix

which constitutes

And

our

first

Idealism,

first

in the Critique

of

the- real

question

all,

upon the doctrine of knowledge,

theme of the

is

of Pure Reason.

Critique of Pure Reason.

Does Transcendental

:

the founding of which

won

for

or Critical

Kant the fame of

being the Copernicus of philosophy, stand uncontradicted in the Critique of Pure Reason itself

.''

The fundamental

recognition of

,this doctrine of Idealism is unquestionably not the

as a logically consistent adherence to

student will at once notice, involves the

it.

same thing

Here, as the special

we touch upon

the point which

much- controverted difference between the

first

and

second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, a point which

we have

already

made

tive discussion, to

the subject of a very careful and exhaus-

which we here take occasion

present problem, which

is

to refer.^

The

concerned with the criticism of the

Kantian doctrine, obliges us to return to this very important point.

Fischer: Gesch.

d. n. Philos., vol.

iii.,

pp. 558-576.

— 96

Critique of Kant.

be well

It will

Transcendental idealism teaches

as possible.

mena

to put the question itself as briefly

and precisely

all

:

our pheno-

or objects of experience are mere ideas, and nothing inde-

pendent of the

beyond question.

We

phenomena

objective

phenomena

in

That subjective phenomena are such,

latter.

are concerned, therefore, only with the

these are the things external to us, the

;

Kant must

hence bodies or matter.

space,

and has taught

necessarily have taught,

in the

manner

in the "

the

edition of the Critique, that matter

first

is

most unambiguous

Paralogisms of Pure Reason," as is

it

appears in

a mere idea.

In

the second edition, he added a " Refutation of Idealism," in

which he declares that matter point with which

we

contradiction, which

away from In the

is

not a mere idea.

are here concerned.

We

This

is

the

have before us a

no ingenious interpretation can explain

either the spirit or letter of the original passages.

first

—

edition of the Critique

in the sections

entitled

to cite these passages

" Paralogisms of Pure Reason "

and

" Observations on the Result of the Pure Doctrine of the Soul,"

we read

the following

:

"

We

have undeniably shown in the

Transcendental Esthetic that bodies are

mere phenomena of our

external sense, and not things-in-themselves.''

under the Transcendental idealism of

all

" I understand,

phenomena,

that principle

according to which we regard phenomena as a whole as mere

Examination of

Transcendental possibility,

idealist) recognizes matter,

merely as phenomenon, which

-our sensibility, matter is with

which are objective, not as

in themselves external, but

this

and indeed

he

(the

its

inner

nothing apart from

is

sort of ideas (percep-

they were related to objects

if

because they refer perceptions to space,

which everything external

in

him only a

97'

" Since

and not as things-in-themselves."

ideas,

tion)

Kantian Doctrines.

the

while space

is,

To

itself is in us.

Transcendental idealism we have already given our adherence

at the

beginning."

"Now,

external objects (bodies)- are merely

phenomena, hence nothing other than a

sort of

my

ideas, the

objects of which only have existence in virtue of these ideas

" It

apart from them, however, they are nothing."

shown

that

if I

clearly

is

should take away the thinking subject, the entire

material world would disappear,

since

it

nothing but the

is

appearance in the sensibility of the subject, and a sort of ideas."

through

its

persistence,

phenomenon which

Now, the second

:

is

only knowable

and persistence only knowable

at all times

only knowable substance, since

Kant

its

'

According to Kant's doctrine, substance

'

;

fills

it

space.

alone

Hence

among

matter

in the is

the

objects persists.

edition of the Critique of Pure Reason declares.

Kritik der reinen

Vernunft.

(

Werke, vol.

ii.,

pp. 667, 675, 676,

684.)

7

;

Critique of Kant.

98 in

its

disproof of idealism:

persistence

is

"Thus

the perception

of

this

only possible through a thing external to me, and

not through the mere idea of such a thing."

"^

Accordingly, as to what concerns things external to us, bodies or matter, Kant teaches in the

i.e.,

edition of the Critique,

first

that external objects (bodies) only have existence in virtue of our ideas,

but apart from them they are nothing ; in the second edition,

the other hand, that the perception of matter

a thing external

to

me,

aud

is

on

only possible through

not through the mere idea

of such a

thing.

There he teaches that things external to us are mere ideas here,

on the other hand, that they are not mere

;

There he

ideas.

teaches that things external to us have existence merely in virtue

of our ideas, but that they are nothing independent of the latter here, that they have existence, by ideas, but independently of

them.

no means

Hence our

in virtue of

our

ideas of things

external to us, and these things themselves are different from

one another, and external things must, consequently, be objects independent of our ideas,

i.e.,

things-in-themselves.

Since, now,

things external to us are in space, space also must be something

independent of our thought.

But

this

means

Transcendental idealism and to return under

Kant

:

Kr.

d. r.

Vernunft.

{Werke,

vol.

utterly to full sail

ii.,

abandon

to the old

p. 224.)

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

gg

dogmatism.

In his establishment of Transcendental idealism,

Kant appears

as the

Copernicus of philosophy

of "psychological idealism," rather as

The The

;

in his refutation

on the contrary, as Ptolemy, or

Tycho Brahe, who confounded both

inconsistency of the two editions

is

systems. perfectly obvious.

second, in which the text of the Critique should presumably

have received

its definitive

form, contains the establishment of

Transcendental idealism and at the same time a disproof of

which

idealism,

directly

contradicts

the

original

doctrine.

Accordingly, the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason or doctrine of

knowledge,

is

here at variance with

itself,

and indeed

in literal

statement. 2.

The new

The Origin of the Contradiction.

refutation of idealism in the second edition of the

Critique, as well as the notes

was called very

first

forth

and appendix to the Prolegomena,

by the misconceptions which arose with the

review of the Kantian masterpiece, the Transcendental

idealism of the

new

doctrine being confounded with the old

dogmatic idealism, and especially that of Berkeley.

Kant wished

to shield his

work from such misapprehensions,

and therefore undertook radically to distinguish the new idealism from the old by a logical and convincing proof. establishes

phenomena and

experience;

the

The former

latter,

on the

100

Critique of Kant.

contrary, bases itself

upon the

dogmatic idealism as the " empirical " or

Kant designates

this

"psychological''

He found

Upon

nothing but ideas in

developed in two principal forms.

which furnishes

empirical idealism had declared the

us,

of things external to

The former

impt)ssible. latter

this

the ground of our inner experience,

existence

us

to

be either doubtful or

position was taken by Descartes, the

Hence Kant

by Berkeley.

Hence

facts of inner experience.

called the doctrine of the

one

the "problematic'' that of the other the " dogmatic idealism."

Berkeley had a radically false idea of space, which, like colour,

he ascribed

taste, etc.,

to our sensations, and, consequently, re-

garded an idea of space independent of impressions as something impossible and wholly imaginary.

thought that which the

existence

ground for

is

idealism

Transcendental Esthetic''

Thus

took as the matter of

Hence he denied

the form of thought.

of external things.

this

He

Kant

rightly said

"

The

has already been destroyed in our

*

only remained to disprove Descartes.

it

:

To do

this,

it

was necessary to show that our inner experience was only possible under the presupposition of outer experience, in the idea of external things.

'

Kant

p. 223.

:

Kr.

Cf.

d.

r.

But since

all

ideas are in us, even

Vernunft, "Refutation of Idealism."

1st ed., pp. 67, 68.

Note.)

which consists

{Werke, vol.

ii.,

Examination of

the

those of things external to us,

it

Kantian Doctrines. had

to

loi

be shown that these ideas

were only possible under the presupposition of the things external to us, or that "the idea.of matter

is

existence of

only possible

through a thing external to me, and not through the mere such a son,

Precisely this course was taken, and for this rea-

thing.''

by the "Refutation of Idealism"

the Critique. to us, Kant

idea o(

in the

second edition of

In order to prove the existence of things external

made

inner experience dependent upon outer, and

outer experience dependent upon the existence of external things; that

he made the existence of external things independent of

is,

our thought, and the latter dependent upon the former

;

he thus •

made

things external to us,

themselves.

And

so

i.e.,

bodies and matter, things-in-

Kant subverted,

in this particular, his

own

doctrine of Transcendental idealism, while seeking to vindicate it,

and to secure

it

against confusion with empirical idealism.

In order fundamentally to differentiate the one from the other, he tore

them asunder

in the very point in

they agree in holding

mena

all

which they agree

;

for

our objects of knowledge to be pheno-

or ideas, and as such in us.

In order, now, to show that

he could demonstrate what Descartes had been unable

to prove,

he brought forward a proof which Descartes had already made use

of,

and, indeed, in the same way,

idea of bodies

is

—

that,

namely, that our

only possible under the condition of the

'

Critique of Kant.

102

existence of bodies independent of our ideas.

In like manner

Descartes had shown that matter or extended substance was a thing-in-itself, entirely

was the

independent of thought, and that space

and likewise independent of

attribute of this thing,

thought.

of idealism

Certainly this refutation

example of how

easily, in

is

a very noteworthy

the vindication of his cause, even so

powerful a thinker as Kant could surrender his

own

position, in

order to avoid the mere appearance of agreement with certain

Kant and Berkeley both

related standpoints which he opposed.

teach that space

phenomena

in us,

is

and that things external to us are our

or ideas, and nothing independent of the latter.

spite of this agreement, however, their doctrines are

According

tally different.

colour and taste

;

independent of

all

it is

fundamen-

to Berkeley, space is a sensation, like

a perception which

is

According to Berkeley, space

is

according to Kant, sensation.

a given material of thought, like to Kant,

In

all

it

is

our impressions

;

according

a necessary form or fundamental law of thought.

Thus Berkeley's idealism was overthrown by Kant's Transcendental Esthetic, and consequently the confusion of the two points of

view was utterly unjustifiable and

Ct

Fischer

:

Gesch. d. n.

I Alios.,

false.

vol.

i.

Kant

rightly appealed

(3rd ed.), pp. 324-26.

Examination of to this refutation,

and ought

But he would have nothing ism of Berkeley, and so are by no

means mere

to

in

Kantian Doctrines. have

common

thing-in-itself. it

103

the matter rest there.

with the dogmatic idealthat external things

and that matter

is

something inde-

Berkeley had declared matter to be a

Kant now demonstrates

nonentity, so

let

now he demonstrates

ideas,

pendent of our thought.

proves that

the

its reality,

Berkeley had said. Space

is external to us.

is

in us

as if ;

so

it

were a

Kant now

1^ I

3.

TTie

Second Refutation of Idealism.

But Kant had not

satisfied

Kant

versus Jacobi.

himself with having disproved ideal-

ism in the text of the second edition of the Critique ; he called note,

upon

also

to furnish the preface to this edition with a long

which should renew and confirm most emphatically the

former refutation, and drive from the but just appeared. the

felt

field

an opponent who had

This opponent was Jacobi,

Doctrine of Spinoza,

and

his Talks on

in his Letters on

David Hume.

The

former appeared two years after the Prolegomena (17S5), the latter in the

same year as the second edition of the

Pure Reason (1787), but some months

earlier.

Now

Critique

of

Jacobi had

maintained that we can never demonstrate the existence of external things, but only be certain of

it

through faith, since such

existence becomes apparent to us purely through

immediate

I04

Critique of Kant.

He

revelation.

but also to

opposed

this position not only to all

dogmatism,

philosophical idealism, since the latter

all

to hold external things to be

mere ideas

obliged

is

This criticism

in us.

also affects Transcendental idealism.

Of

course, Jacobi understands, under external things, things

independent of

Kant wants

all

our ideas,

prove the contrary

to

;

he wants to demonstrate the

existence of external things in the

maintains

he has inserted will

abandpn

same sense

Thus

indemonstrability.

its

which Jacobi

which

sees in advance that he

second time

his standpoint a

In

originates the Note

One

in his preface.^

Now

things-in-themselves.

i.e.,

;

he

will

show

that

external things are things-in-themselves.

Really, the attack of

Jacobi put Kant so beside himself, that he

let

He

a word.

be

says

(as in fact

physics, yet

it is

it

is

common human

"

:

idealism

with

fall

However innocent Idealism may be held

not) in respect to the essential

none the

less

to

aim of meta-

an abuse of philosophy and of

reason to be obliged to take the existence of

external things (from which

we

nevertheless receive the entire

material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) merely on faith,

and not to be front

'

him with

Kant

3«. 32

)

:

Kritik

able, if

any one

is

satisfactory proof."

d. r.

Vernunft.

inclined to doubt

He

it,

to con-

had, to be sure, already

Preface to 2nd ed.

(

Werke, vol.

ii.,

pp.

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines,

105

disproved idealism and cleared himself of the charge of

it,

but

"certain obscurities" were found in the expressions of the proof

And

which should now completely disappear.

refutation of idealism takes such a form that

time the

this

we can no longer

doubt that external things figure as things-in-themselves ; else

would be com-

also his disproof of Jacobi's philosophy of faith

pletely ineffectual.

We

know

according to the doctrine of Kant,

that,

all

the

material of our cognitions consists in our impressions or sensations,

which we do not make, but

receive,

which are given

and, indeed, through things-in-themselves.^

now

instructs

us that

is

it

The new "note"

external things " from

receive the entire material of knowledge, even

sense."

to us,

which we

for our inner

Accordingly, external things figure as things-in-them-

selves.

According to the doctrine of Kant, objects of knowledge,

thing that persists

;

is

matter,

the only substance, since

and as that which

fills

other than external appearance or idea.^ the

'

*

" note " most expressly,

Vide supra, Chap. Cf. supra,

Reason."

I.,

Chap. IV.,

and

Part III., Sec. I.

among

I.

:

"The

2,

in

space,

We

italics,

it

it

are

is

is

all

our

the only

nothing

now

told in

the diametrical

on " The Thing-in-Itself."

Contradiction in the Critique of Pure

io6

Critique

opposite

of Kant.

" This persisting object, however, cannot be a per-

:

ception in me, for

can be found

in

all

determining grounds of

my

being, which

me, are ideas, and demand as such a persisting

object distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and

my

hence

existence in time, in which they change, can be deter-

There

mined."

is,

accordingly, no doubt that in this passage,

may be

in order that all idealism

disproved, and the existence of

external things demonstrated, matter must be taken as some-

thing independent of our ideas, It is

as a thing-in-itself.

i.e.,

likewise pointed out to us anew, that inner experience

dependent upon outer, and that the existence of external things.

remark may

this the

still

persistent in existence is

may be

this

all

(i)

idea

;

To

be added, that the idea of something

not tantamount to a persisting

very variable and inconstant, as it

is

since

our ideas are,

all

related to

idea,

something per-

which must consequently be an external thing distinct

sistent,

be

dependent upon the

For, the " note " continues, "

even those of matter, and yet

from

latter is

is

our ideas,"

etc.

The Kantian

the sole persisting object it

is

;

and

doctrine holds matter to (2) a

accordingly the only persisting

mere appearance or idea,

and, as such,

completely identical with the idea of something persistent in existence.

" note "

If,

now,

declares,

this

" an

persisting something

external

thing,

must

distinct

be,

from

as

the

all

our

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

ideas," then matter is a thing-in-itsel£ shall

now be

obliged, in hartnony with

tinguish also space

107

And

if

the

" note,"

we

consistent,

and the idea of space, and

to

to

dis-

pronounce

space an object wholly independent of and distinct from our idea of space, itself.

i.e.,

And

a thing-in-itself, or the attribute of a thing-in-

thus space becomes, once more, with Kant what

it

was with Descartes.

When

thought

is

was done by Kant

distinguished from the object of thought, as

in his disproof of idealism

Transcendental idealism

is

and

in the "note,"

surrendered, and, at the

same

time,

the possibility of explaining the correspondence between idea and object,

i.e.,

of explaining knowledge, and, as well, the possibility

of understanding the Critique 0/ Pure Reason. insight that Sigismund

thought and

its

Beck declared such a

It

was with

distinction

between

object to imply a standpoint from which

it

impossible to understand or rightly estimate the Critique.

thought can only correspond with thought.

thought,

its

object,

when

its

this

was

For

object

is

This point of view, which regards the object of not as a thing independent of thought, but as

its

necessary product. Beck called " the only possible " one for

comprehending and Reason.

From

rightly

this point of

appreciating the Critique of Pure

view he wrote a Commentary on

Kant's Works, and, indeed, as he expressly says on the title-page

Critique of Kant.

Io8

of his book, " With Kant's Approval."

worthy

fact,

This

is

a very note-

and one which must not be overlooked, when the

question of the real teaching of Kant, and of passages that contradict

very well

explain

it,

knew of the

them away,

contradictions, but sought too lightly to

in permitting the

philosopher to assume at

times the language of dogmatism and the

common

ness for the sake of a pleasing intelligibility.

when Kant

talks

and setting of the sun

common

usage, without at

however,

that, in the

;

all

passages

his standpoint for that of the teaches that the existence

e.g.,

as Copernicus

thinks that

might of the

he simply speaks according to the

We find,

changing his standpoint.

we have examined, Kant exchanges

common

consciousness, since he

of external things can be demonstrated

the sense in which such existence

in

He

conscious-

about the object of thought as a thing indepen-

dent of thought, he speaks, rising

Beck

be investigated and decided upon.

to

is

idealism and presupposed by the

is

common

denied by dogmatic understanding.

Kant had proved the existence of external things

in a

manner

perfectly consistent with Transcendental idealism, and, indeed, in

such a way that the fact of the external world, as

the

common

appears to

consciousness, was completely explained.

pointed out, that is

it

is,

He

had

that the existence of things external to us

immediately apparent to every

human consciousness

—a

fact

Examination of

the

which would be impossible other than

phenomena

my ideas,

109

external things were

if

He

or ideas.

objects (bodies) are merely

than a sort of

Kantian Doctrines.

Now

"

says,

anything

all

external

phenomena, hence nothing other

the objects of which only have existence

through these ideas, while apart from them they are nothing. External things

just as really as I myself exist, and

on the immediate evidence of my self-conscious-

both, in truth, ness,

exist, therefore,

only with the difference that the idea of myself as the

thinking subject

is

referred merely to the inner sense, while the

ideas which designate extended beings are also referred to the

outer sense.

I

axajust as

little

obliged to deduce the actuality of

external objects as the actuality of ,the

sense (my thought)

;

for they are

objects of

my

inner

on both sides nothing but

ideas, the

immediate perception (consciousness) of which

sufficient

proof of their actuality." ^

This

is

a

and highly

lucid

significant declaration stands in the first edition of the Critique

of Pure Reason

;

in the

observations that take for

second edition

its

place

it

is

it is

and

left out,

in the

by no means compensated

by any equivalent statement, although, here

close of the criticism of rational psychology,

it

also, is

at

the

noted that

outer and inner objects "are distinguished from one another

'

Kant

:

Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1st

Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology."

ed.).

{Werke,

"Critique of the Fourth vol.

ii.,

p. 676.)

no

Critique of Kant.

only so far as the one appears external to the other, and that thing-in-itself,

which underlies the phenomenon of matter, as

may perhaps

not be so unlike in kind."

As

*

if

totally

uncon-

scious that he had already explained from the Critical point of

view the existence of the external world, and shown with trans-

we

parent clearness that, and why,

are not obliged logically to

Kant now gives

deduce the actuality of external objects,

in the

second edition of the Critique a refutation of idealism in which the existence of external things

is syllogistically

syllogism runs, in brief, as follows

dependent upon the outer

;

:

The

Our inner experience

:

outer experience

the existence of external things

proved.

is

is

dependent upon

therefore external things are

independent of our inner experience, and are not mere ideas.

4.

Review of

Objections.

Emil Arnoldt has shown himself, by a quiries,

'

such a thorough and scholarly

Kant: Kr.

d.

r.

Vernunft (2nd

the Psychological Paralogism." '^

By

faculty,

in

of both the

life

^

"Conclusion of the Solution of ii.,

pp. 326, 327.)

he has, among other things, shown, for

social relations to the

Rautenburg and Konigsberg are

Jahre

critic

beyond doubt, that Kant was never enrolled

and that his pedagogical and

connections hitherto unknown. ersten

ed.).

Werke, vol.

his recent biographical studies

the first time

House

(

series of instructive in-

to

in the theological

Count Kayserling's

be determined according to family

Vide E. Arnoldt

:

Kants Jugend und diefiinf

seiner Privatdxenlur (Konigsberg, 1882),

pp. 26,

and 54-57.

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

ill

and doctrines of Kant, that

his investigations are deserving of

the most careful attention.

In his commendatory review of

my

work, he has also brought forward the points in which he does not share

my

contradiction

the

knowledge.

The most important arnong them concerns

views.

stated to

exist

the Kantian doctrine of

in

Respecting the character and fundamental import

of Transcendental idealism we are agreed.

Arnoldt, too,

is

"not

disposed to explain away the philosophical difference between the two editions of the Critique of-Pure Reason."

He

grants

that the second edition might give rise to a false conception of

the Kantian doctrine, and indeed, as a matter of so

;

and that the

first

edition,

in

material world,

be preferred to the second.

is

to

has done

owing to the energetic and un-

ambiguous manner

which

fact,

it

teaches the ideality of the

On

the other

hand, he contends that the difference between the two editions

does not

affect the

knowledge, and

fundamental principles of Kant's doctrine of " Refutation of Idealism,"

that, in particular, the

which Kant developed in the second with Transcendental idealism.

edition,

The

rather,

is

not inconsistent

Kant here sought

to show, as a refutation of Descartes only, that our inner ex-

I

mention

this incidentally, in

to Kant's theological studies. p. 51.

Cf. Pref., p.

viii.

order to correct Vide Fischer

my own :

Gesch

exposition in reference d.

«.

Philos., vol.

iii.,

2

Critique

1 1

perience

is

of Kant.

dependent upon and mediated by the outer

suc-ceeded in proving

it,

and

this constituted the special service

rendered by his new " Refutation of Idealism."

I

'

must oppose

Arnoldt's pointed arguments for the following reasons

cendental idealism teaches the inner and outer experience.

when

outer experience

it is

:

(i )

Trans-

and direct immediacy of

full

This doctrine

is

contradicted

regarded as the means and condition

Outer experience cannot be such a condition,

of the inner. since

is

he had

;

itself also

inner experience

;

necessary sphere of inner experience, inner experience

is

a part or special

it is

(z)

To show

that

and our

dependent upon and mediated by the outer

was not the end of Kant's new " Refutation of Idealism," but

The

merely a stadium of the argument. the dependence of outer experience things, that

thought.

to

is,

Then

show

real

upon the

end was

existence

to

show

of external

that external things are independent of our

things external to us figure as things-in-them-

selves

;

then phenomena are confounded with things-in-them-

selves

;

then Transcendental idealism and Kant's whole doctrine

of knowledge are completely contradicted. question.

in

I

maintain,

therefore,

that

This

is

the Transcendental

idealism expounded in both editions of the Critique,

'

E. Arnoldt

:

18S2), pp. 31-42.

Kant nach Kuno

Fischers neuer

the point

compared

Darstdlun^ (Kbnigsberg,

Examination of the Kantian Doctrines. with the

new " Refutation of

preface of the second edition,

A

to non-A.

113

Idealism," and the Note to the related to these latter positions,

is

Consequently, in order to disprove

this,

be shown that Kant has not denied throughout the

first

as

it

must

edition

of the Critique that external things (bodies) are independent of our ideas, and that he has by no means affirmed and sought to

demonstrate the same in the passages

Arnoldt denies that there editions,

and seeks

shows with greater

a contradiction

to graduate their

explicitness

explicitness that souls, are

ism.

is

cited.

The second shows

difference.

bodies,

that

phenomena

;

it

spiritualism,

the

two

"

The

first

but with less

approximates spiritual-

with greater explicitness that souls,

but with less that bodies, are phenomena;

opposed to

in

which

cation of materialism, which

it

it

it

vindicates, as

sets aside, the relative justifi-

likewise rejects."

If

one only

Jknew in each case the degree of "the greater" and "the explicitness " first

!

For Kant declared with

edition of the Critique, that bodies were

and denied with

all

explicitness,

the

mere phenomena,

in both editions, that souls

were phenomena or knowable objects ,

all explicitness, in

less

at all.^

In an excellent paper, evincing exact technical knowledge and

'

Id.

:

p. 32.

—

1

Critique

14

a penetrating judgment, written

and especially

upon the

is

of

second edition

first

edition,

by

Kant, Johann Witte has also touched

we

not to be regarded as a

it

are at present occu-

opinion, that the " altered exposition of the

change

for the better,''

contradicts the fundamental doctrine of the

and would

limit the difference of the

indistinctness."

I

two to the

idealistic character

"the second weakens the

.fact that first

my

is

but denies that

upon my history of philosophy,

question with which

critical

He

pied.

my work on

of Kant.

must object to

of the

this expression

as

too indefinite, and to Witte's further explanation as incorrect. seeks in the passages cited to show, as appears both

What Kant

from the passages and the context,

not, as Witte supposes,

is

that external things are independent of subjective or individual

thought, but of thought as such. to the preface of the

Of

that, the

Note appended

—which Kant

second edition

intended to

confirm the " Refutation of Idealism " to be found in the text

does not leave the least doubt. tion "

itself,

tence

is

according to which " the perception of this persis-

only possible through a thing external to me, and not

through the mere

idea of

"the perception of in time."

reasons

Nor, indeed, does the " Refuta-

:

such a thing."

Now, Witte

this persistence" as that

This interpretation seems to because (i)

"my

me

interprets

"of my existence

impossible, for two

existence in time"

is

not persistent.

Examination of arid

Kantian Doctrines.

the

because, (2) according to

existence,

among

no

Kant's express teaching,

knowable objects, persists, except matter.

all

as Witte holds, always understands by

If Kant,

115

"thing" an

" object thought," or the idea of a thing, then he in reality says in the

above passage

:

" The perception of this persistence

only possible through a thing

I

{i.e.,

external to me, and not through to me."

It is evident that

no

And

origin.

I

I

a. thing)

mere idea of a thing external

sort of skilful exegesis

away the contradiction which its

through the idea of

is

can explain

have pointed out and traced to

ought certainly to be protected from the

supposition, which surely would not be entertained by so acute

and expert a

critic

as Witte,

that

any prepossession for the

doctrine of another philosopher, as Hegel, has exerted the least influence It is

upon

my estimate

of Kant.^

always a thankworthy and profitable experience to receive

the criticisms of thorough scholars, in order to be able either to correct one's

own

views, or, as I

may have succeeded

the present important question, to confirm them. disagreeable to be obliged to repel opponents

doing in

in

But

it is

most

who know nothing

whatever of the matter in question, or of the method in which

'

Joh. Witte

:

Kuno

Fischers

Behandlung der

sein Verhaltniss zur Kantphilologie. esp. pp. 143-148.

Geschichte der Philosophie

AHpr. Monatsschr.,

yo\.

xv.., 'p^.

it

und

129-151,

ii6 is

of Kant.

Critique

treated, yet

who, with ignorant and over-confident loquacity,

take part in the

and

discussion,

affect

write a polemical

to

such as one of our weekly papers has granted an un-

treatise,

known author It will

against me.^

by a striking

to point out,

suffice

what

illustration,

ignorance of the Critical philosophy, and what complete incapacity for a comprehension of

it,

our anonymous

with his empty bombastic phrases. Critique

critic exhibits

Every one versed

in the

of Pure Reason knows that Kant regarded the stand-

points of transcendental idealism and empiri_cal realism on the

one hand, and those of transcendental realism and empirical idealism on the other, as necessarily belonging together

he united the

that

first

two

in his

and claims to

doctrine,

have disproved the other two, which belong

to dogmatism.

Transcendental idealism teaches the origin of our

nomenal world ingly,

common

phe-

empirical realism teaches that there are, accord-

no other objects of knowledge but phenomena, or sensible

things.

and

;

and

;

Therefore the two standpoints necessarily go together,

their

names merely denote

of thinking.

It is

precisely the

different sides of the

same way

same with the other two.

Trans-

cendental realism teaches that things external to us are in-

'

Die Grenzboten,

No 40

C1882)

:

Kant und A'uno

Fischer, pp. 10-17.

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines,

dependent of our thought, or are things-in-theraselves idealism teaches that precisely on that account

117

;

empirical

we do not

conceive external things immediately, but only mediately,

by

logical inference,

and that therefore we can be

their existence than of our

own thought

;

or,

i.e.,

less certain of

what

is

thing, that the existence of our thinking being (soul)

the same

alone

is

certain, while the existence of external things is uncertain or

doubtful.

In other words, whoever

must also be an empirical

is

a transcendental

realist

These two standpoints are

idealist.

not at variance with one another, but identical, and their names

simply denote different sides of the same method of thought. If

it is

as the transcendental realist maintains respecting the exis-

tence of external things, idealist teaches

then

it

must be as the empirical

regarding our idea of things, and the certainty

The two

of their existence. tion, since they

do not

points of view need no reconcilia-

conflict

with one another,

but are

complementary sides of the same thing, and together constitute the character of that dogmatic rationalism which was founded

by Descartes, and overthrown by the Kant.^ its

The matter

stands thus.

Critical investigations of

And now

the Grenzboten lets

philosopher announce the following nonsense, with that

Fischer

:

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol.

iii.

(3rd ed.), pp. 450-456.

Il8

Critique

of Kant.

ridiculous emphasis which delights his whole prodigious

power

empty heads

:

to reconcile the contradiction

empirical idealism and transcendental realism,"

^

between

So Kant

etc.

two standpoints which, according to his view,

(i) reconciled

he (2) reconciled two points of

are completely harmonious;

which

view, both of

" Kant exerted

h.&

proved

to be

untenable

;

and, in order to

solve a contradiction which, according to his doctrine,

is

none,

nor ever was one, he (3) " exerted his prodigious power," and, moreover, the " whole " of

nonsense I

in

of

!

It is

impossible to utter more

fewer words.

come back

doctrine

it

to the result of

knowledge, and

my

examination of the Kantian

must

regard

.

it

as

sustained.

According to Kant's doctrine, things-in-themselves are to be distinguished from phenomena, hence also from things external to us, with the is

to be

most

utmost precision, and every confusion of the two carefully guarded against.

Notwithstanding, in

the text and in the preface of the second edition of the Critique

of Pure Reason, Kant has refuted idealism in such a way that things external to us are

recognised as independent of our

thought, hence as things-in-themselves, and consequently the latter are

confounded with phenomena.

'

It

Die Grenzboten" No. 40 (1882),

corresponds com-

p. i6.

,

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines

pletely to the Kantian doctrine, both in its spirit

ascribe reality

as

much

and

and causality to things-in-themselves.

contradicts this doctrine to attribute to

knowableness {empirical

reality)

and external

119

them

letter,

Yet

it

to

just

theoretical

They

causality.

are the causes of our sensible impressions, or of the empirical

material of our knowledge, but they are not external causes, since these are external things or

phenomena, which originate

from sensations, hence cannot create the ingly, a radically false

doctrine to regard

it

latter.

as holding things-in-themselves to be the

Such a conception

absolutely impossible with Transcendental

the later " Refutation of Idealism " so far possible, that

it

Kantians of the ordinary

condemn

of

the

it is

idealism, but

not impossible

is

with

— indeed,

soon became the customary one with It is this

sort.

his opposition to the Kantians,

Critique

accord-

and inverted conception of the Kantian

external causes of our affections of sense.

it is

It is,

and

later

view which Fichte, in Schopenhauer, in his

Kantian Philosophy, could not strongly enough

as anti-Kantian

and contradictory.

long as Kant did not expressly declare, that

Fichte said

:

" So

sensations are to he

explained in philosophy from an externally present, in itself transcendental tell

object,

so long I shall not believe what these expounders

us about Kant.

But

if

he makes

this declaration, I shall

sooner hold the Critique of Pure Reason to be the product of

I20

Critique of Kant.

Yet

remarkable chance than that of a mind." '

it is

just as false

and inverted a view of the Kantian doctrine to hold that denies

all reality

and causality whatever to things-in-themselves,

and

since they cannot be the external causes of our sensations, that

it

recognises them as nothing further than mere inoperative

notions.

and

have already shown in

I

letter of the

causality not the sensible intelligible

reality

both from the

and

is

not the empirical, and this

and

somehow not

activity 1

Is will

and freedom,

thing-in-itself,

and

according to Kant's explicit teaching,

is,

How

be the cause of our sensations, of our

and of the constitution of our reason

posjible.

Schopenhauer saw

which he sought day's

'

vol.

J. i.,

in general

Kant regarded an answer

the question.

to solve

in

\i

the

to

it

p. 486.

:

The will.

sensibility,

How ?

.''

That

as for ever im-

enigma of the world,

by his doctrine of the

will.

history of organic development established

G. Fichte

at the

The thing-in-itself is, according

thj£g-in-itself will

and

external, but the supersensible

to Kant's explicit teaching, the cause of our sensations.

can

spirit

and causality of things-in-

— namely, the causality olwill.

then, according to Kant,

same time

reality

only this reality

themselves,

detail,

Kantian system, that our philosopher taught,

and must have taught, the

is

it

Zweile EinltUmtg in die Wissenschaftslehre.

And

to-

by Darwin,

Vide

Werke,

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

implies, as appears from the intelligent

way

121

which

in

it

grasps

the relation of function and organ, this factor which Schopen-

hauer called the will If

to live}

Kant had not maintained the

independent of

all

ideas and

pronounced opponent of

all

being of things-in-themselves

phenomena, a man

like Herbart, that

idealism and monism, would never

have called himself a " Kantian," and have been convinced that "

Kant possessed the

notion of being."

true

He who

had

demonstrated the impossibility of the ontological proof for the existence of God, as Kant had done in the Critique of Pure Reason, was,

Herbart's

in

metaphysics."

II.

view,

" the

man

to

overthrow

the

old

^ ,

Examination of the Doctrines of Freedom and Development.

I.

Schopenhauer's Critique of the Kantian Philosophy.

In his Critique of the Kantian Philosophy (which the second edition

of the

chief

work),

is

based upon

Schopenhauer

has

accounted the same the highest product which the history of philosophy has brought

forth.

It is related to

Part III., 2, and Chap. III., Part

'

Cf. supra,

Chap.

2

Cf. infra.

Chap. V., Part

I.,

the old metaphysics

II., 2.

I.

Critique of Kant.

122

of the nature of things (God, the world, and the soul) as the true

view of the world to the

And even

false,

or as the

new chemistry to alchemy

the profound idealistic systems of old time, which, as

the religion of India and the Platonic philosophy, had attained the insight that our sense-world

is

only conceived and

phenome-

the Kantian doctrine as the incorrectly esta-

nal, are related to

blished truth to that which

correctly established, or as the

is

of a Pythagorean to that of

heliocentric view of the world

At the same time the Kantian philosophy wants

Copernicus.

both completeness and consistency.

accompanied by two chief the " distinction of

Its

two chief merits are

Its greatest

errors.

phenomenon from

merit consists in

thing-in-itself,"

by which

" the complete diversity of the Real and the Ideal," and the

merely conceived or phenomenal (hence not real) being of our sense-world,

become apparent.

Its

" knowledge of the undeniably moral as entirely different

something that

is

meaning of human conduct,

from and not dependent upon the laws of

phenomena, nor even explicable as

second merit consists in the

in

accordance with them, but

immediately connected with the thing-in-

itself." 1

The

'

first

of the two main errors of Kant, Schopenhauer finds

Schopenhauer

:

Die Welt

ed., 1879), pp. 494-500.

als Wille

und

Vorstelbtng, vol.

i.,

Appendix

(5th

Examination of in the fact that

he has not

and abstract or

the

Kantian Doctrines.

clearly distinguished

knowledge.

reflective

mediable confusion, now by

falsely

123

between sensible

This has led to

now by

confounding,

irre-

falsely

Thus Kant has denied

opposing the two sorts of knowledge.

sensible knowledge to the understanding, as

a visible sense-world without understanding

if

;

there could be

and has treated

reasonj^not as the faculty of abstract or jreflective knowledge by

means ofgudgments and conclusions, but and moral conduct, while,

in truth,

it

only determines the rules

according to which prudent conduct virtuous,

mous

as that of principles

regulated.

is

Moral or

and reasonable or prudent, are by no means synony-

terms.

The Machiavelian

policy

is

not virtuous, but

it is,

indeed, clever and reasonable, while self-sacrificing generosity quite as virtuous as

it is

From

unwise.

is

the sensible knowledge

of the understanding there arises the abstract, through the faculty of reflection or thought (reason).

Hence

sensible perceptions

are related to notions, as sensible objects to thought-objects, or

as

"phenomena"

to

things-in-themselves

appearances.

;

Kant's

"noumena," but

not as

appearances to

for abstract notions represent nothing but

treatment

phenomena and noumena

as

of the equivalent

difference

to

the

between appearances and things-in-themselves, and sequent designation of the

latter as

between difference his

con^

noumena, has proved a

1

Critique

24

mischievous and

fatal error,

of Kant.

growing out of that

fundamental

first

one.''

The second main

error,

which seriously

conflicts with the

fundamentally idealistic view of the Critique of Pure Reason, consists in

the false introduction of the thing-in-itself as the external

cause of our sensations. in-itself as related to

It is

not the recognition of a thing-

a given phenomenon that

but this method of deducing

it

and

;

it

is

this

is

which proved

troublesome to the second edition of the Critique in tation

of Idealism."

Critique

"

No one

erroneous,

its

" Refu-

imagines that he knows the

of Pure Reason, and has a clear notion of Kant's doctrine,

when he has read

it

ing editions

is

;

that

only in the second or in one of the follow absolutely impossible, for he has read only

a mutilated, corrupted, and in some measure spurious text." It is

^

equivalent to a contradiction of the fundamental idealism

of the Kantian doctrine to regard the thing-it-itself, according to the law of causality, as the external cause of our sensations.

And

it

is

equivalent to an utter misconstruction and denial of

the entire Kantian doctrine to reject the thing-in-itself altogether, or to

'

deny

Schopenhauer

:

Ibid.,

reality,

Die Welt

517. 563-566, 610-614. «

it

pp. 515-517-

als

i.e.,

the character of original being,

Willi

und

Vorstellung, vol.

i.,

pp. 513

and

Examination of as has recently

been done

Kantian Doctrines.

the

some of the

in

latest periodicals.

Schopenhauer unjustly attempted to ascribe Kantian system "

tattle

—which he was

—to Fichte, who,

wont

on the

125

this

view of the

to call " nonsensical tittle-

contrary,

had maintained,

like

Schopenhauer, that the logically consistent criticism of reason could never teach the external existence and causality of thingsin themselves,^

and had,

like

him, denied the unknowableness of

the same, and held that the thing-in-itself

is

known

is

in our self-consciousness,

that

it

to

so

be immediately known, and,

indeed, as will.

We

have here no interest in further pursuing Schopenhauer's

criticism of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, since that

necessarily lead to an examination of his

saw

itself

obliged,

following

its

own

distinction

doctrine,

would

which

between under-

standing and reason, between the sensible knowledge of the one

and the abtsract knowledge of the

other,

to reject entirely

Kant's doctrine of the categories of the understanding and the In the two chief points which constitute

postulates of reason.

the character of Kant's system, ideality of all

phenomena

thing-in-itself,

which

is

'

viz.,

(objects),

in the

doctrines of the

and of the

reality

of the

completely independent of and different

Cf. supra, pp. 119, 120.

—

126

Critique of Kant.

from phenomena, Schopenhauer sought to develop his in

agreed with Kant, and has

is

The World as Will and Idea

own system

accordance with these principles.

In his view respecting the

groundwork of the Kantian philosophy we must concur in his view that the confusion

of

phenomena and

themselves conflicts with this groundwork things-in-themselves are confounded with are recognized as things

causes of our sensations

;

—

;

;

also

things-in-

also in his view that

phenomena when they

external to us,

and as the external

also in his view that in the "Refutation

of Idealism," as developed in the second edition of the Critique, things external to us do figure as something independent of

thought, and accordingly as things-in-themselves. ever,

all

When, how-

Schopenhauer holds that not merely the external causality

of things-in-themselves, but their causality in general, cilable with the

Kantian doctrine

(since,

the notion of causality in general themselves),

is

free

from

latter,

inapplicable to things-in-

we cannot agree with him,

is

irrecon-

according to the

either that such a view

contains the contradiction he claims, or that the

the Critique

is

this contradiction, if

it

first

edition of

were one.

That

things-in-themselves are the supersensible substratum or hidden

ground of the constitution of our reason, hence also that of our sensations and world of sense,

Kant himself declared

constant assertion of his criticism."

It

to

be " the

never occurred to

him

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

127

to apply temporal or sensible causality to things-in-themselves their causality is

is

the timeless or intelligible, just as their reality

not temporal, but timeless,

reality.^

If

Schopenhauer

recognise the validity of no other than time-causality, that

and the discussion of

affair,

criticism of his system, with

He

;

it

will

is

his

belongs to the exposition and

which we are. not now concerned.

censures Kant for ascribing causality to things-in-themselves.

Why

does he

commend enough

been

difficult

futile

attempt withal,

his affirmation of their reality ?

in

has

Schopenhauer himself, and a wholly

for

to ascribe to the thing-in-itself (will) original

being, and at the same time to deny

shown

It

what points

I

it

causality.

After I have

agree with Schopenhauer concerning

the difference between the two editions of the Critique of Pure

Reason and the contradiction in the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, I must express the wish that, respecting this very question,

those points shall not be overlooked in which

The Correspondence between

2.

the

I differ

from him.

Doctrines of Knowledge

and

Freedom.

The Kantian

doctrine of knowledge, subject to the contradic-

tion pointed out, conflicts with the doctrine of freedom.

from

'

this contradiction,

Cf. supra,

Chap.

I.,

it

Free

establishes the possibility of freedom.

Part III., Sec. 2, and Chap.

II.,

Part

II.,

Sec

I.

Critique of Kant.

128 and, indeed, that,

alone

it

of space and time,

We

or will.

length that

For there

systems.

all

is,

Reason in will,

absolutely independent

phenomena and

and can

we here need only

three Critiques

intelligible

be, nothing other than

freedom

to refer to that earlier discussion.^

may be taken

The

documents

as the authentic

Critique of Pure Reason in

its

doctrine of

and empirical character, the Critique of Practical

its

doctrine of the reality of freedom and the primacy

and the Critique of Judgment

in its doctrine

adaptation and immanent natural ends, as well as final

no doubt

is

have already enlarged upon this point at such

for the assertion:

of

all

according to this doctrine, the thing-in-itself, absolutely

distinguished from

The

among

its

of natural doctrine of

moral ends and the original ground of the world.

Kant has shown with such

fulness

and clearness the connection

of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom, thing, the identity

After

or,

between thing-in-itself and

what will,

is

the same

we cannot

possibly think, with Schopenhauer, that the matter only hovered

dimly before him, like a presentiment

;

and that he recognised

the thing-in-itself as will, not with the conviction of a philosopher, but as

has

still

"A

good man, through obscurest

an instinct of the one true way."

•

^

Vide supra, Chap. Faust.

— Taylor's

11.,

tr.

^

"I

Part IX.

aspiration,

therefore venture

Exatntnatton of the Kanltan Doctrines. to

assume,"

Schopenhauer,

said

" although

it

129 not to be

is

proved, that Kant, as often as he spoke of the thing-in-itself,

always thought in the obscurest depths of his mind indistinctly of will." ^

But

" distinction

after

of

Schopenhauer himself has recognised the

phenomenon from

" knowledge of the undeniably moral meaning of as something that

duct,

thing-in-itself," as the

is

and the

thing-in-itself,"

human con-

immediately connected with the

two greatest services of our philosopher,

and has extolled his doctrines of time and space, and of gible and empirical character, as

intelli-

"the two diamonds

crown of Kantian fame," we are compelled

the

in

to regard the sen-

tence just cited, not only as an imperfect and less commendatory estimate of the services of Kant, but as an obvious contradiction

of his

own

statement.

Kant must have been conscious of what

he taught, when he apprehended things-in-themselves as

Ideas,

these as ends, these as determinations of will, and the will itself ^^ freedom, which, although revealed to us with immediate

absolute certainty only in our

own moral

being,

is

and

nevertheless

" that supersensible which

we

are

obliged to posit as underlying nature as phenomenon,"

i.e.,

necessarily identical with

it

is

necessarily identical with the thing-in-itself.^

Schopenhauer '

:

Die Welt ah Wille und Vorstellung,

Cf. supra,

Chap.

III.,

Part III., Sec.

vol.

i.,

p. 599.

3.

9

Critique of Kant.

130

3.

The Contradiction

Between the

is

harmony

have discovered and expounded

Kant's immortal service.

is

The doctrine

no contradiction, but the deepest

To

and most perfect harmony.

of freedom

demands a system of morals absolutely

from hedonism, elevated entirely above every eudaemonistic

free

view of

life,

and thus above

Kant

pessimism.

himself, in separating virtue from happiness,

summum bonum he

virtually

been

After

all

We

when

but

in his doctrine of

eudaemonistic aims in

utterly shut out in a system

purity of will, they should

soul.

;

united them, this high ethical ground was

abandoned.

doctrines of the

between optimism and

strife

all

developed such a system of ethics the

of Freedom.

Kantian doctrines of know-

logically consistent

ledge and freedom, there

this

in the Doctrine

life

had

based upon freedom and the

not have been introduced by the

summum bonum and

of the immortality of the

were obliged earlier in the discussion, in order to set

forth clearly Kant's doctrine of immortality,

the true conception of contradiction

in his

it

from the

false,

and to distinguish to

doctrine of freedom, and

point out this

may

avoid

all

Die Welt

als

repetition by referring to those remarks. ^

'

Vide supra. Chap.

Wille

und

II.,

Part

Vorstellung, vol.

i.,

III., Sec. 2.

pp. 620-622.

Cf.

Schopenhauer

:

Examination of

The Contradiction between

4.

Kantian Doctrines.

the

131

of Knowledge and

the Doctrines

Development.

That Kant had already furthered the evolutionist view of

made

things before the Critique of Pure Reason, and had

working problem

;

that he

had established

of the Critique, and had developed ol

both nature and

moral world tion.

'^

We

—

civilization, or the

all this

world-development

its

is

revelation

that,

offreedom.^

view by means

principles in his treatment

whole organic,

social,

and

it

according to his doctrine, the

be apprehended as phenomenon, and

to

phenomenon

ultimate ground

his

has been pointed out in a previous sec-

have also shown

fact, as teleological

its

this

it

is

We

;

that in

its

in

unity as well as in

nothing other than the progressive therefore regarded Kant's doctrine of

development as a unification of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom, and the world-development

phenomenon and

thing-in-itself,

itself as

and

a unification of

such a unification

as

neither confounds both nor negates itself by holding the un-

knowableness of the

thing-in-itself,

immanent end of a thing,

it is

on the ground

that, as the

not to be found in the phenomenon,

as the object of our experience, by even the minutest analysis.

Vide supra. Chap. III., Parts

I.

and

Vide supra. Chap. III., Part III.

II.

Critique of Kant.

132

There

is,

accordingly, a point of view from which the Kantian

doctrine of development does

not, in

the

first

place, conflict with

the doctrine of knowledge.

We and

must conceive the development of things as

We

as universal.

universe,

but

its

must extend

and the

will

application to the entire

knowableness must be limited to the moral

order of things, since will,

its

teleological,

all

ends become known merely from the

only from one's

own

Conse-

practical reason.

quently, the development of things, like ends in general, remains theoretically unknowable.

Since, now,

all

phenomena

are objects

of our experience or scientific (theoretical) knowledge,

development

is

of knowledge,

and

a phenomenon, and yet held not to be an object

we

are

here confronted with a contradiction

between the Kantian doctrines of knowledge and development,

which

affects the truth

of the

character of

phenomenon

denying

scientific

its

It consists in

latter.

to development,

knowableness.

and

ascribing the

at the

same time

The Kantian philosophy

teaches the unknowableness of thing-in- itself and the knowableness of as

phenomenon

soon as

it

:

this, its

foundation doctrine,

is

shattered

sees itself obliged to recognise either the

ableness of the former or the unknowableness of the

such a recognition

it is

brought by

its

know-

latter.

To

doctrine of development.

Without the knowledge of the end, or of the

thing-in-itself,

:

Examination of

Kantian Doctrines.

the

which underlies the development of things,

133

development

this

is

an incomprehensible, unknowable phenomenon, and therefore, in strictness, no

things

is

phenomenon

at all.

immanent end of

If the

not apparent to us, then certainly there appears to us

no development

in the nature

Hence

of things.

the Kantian

doctrine of development finds itself in the following dilemma either the intelligible, knowable,

i.e.,

phenomenal, character of

development must be denied, or the knowableness of the thingin-itself affirmed

;

and, indeed, not merely

moral knowableness, but also

III.

its

and

theoretical

practical

its

and

scientific.

Examination of the Doctrine op Phenomena and Things-in-themselves. I.

The

The Knowableness of

Human

scientific validity of the doctrine of

this affirmation.

Reason.

development demands

Hence the Kantian doctrine of knowledge does

not admit of permanent acceptance in the form Critique of Pure Reason, in accordance with

phenomena ledge

is

while

all

are objects of knowledge, and

confined to the realm of practical

all

theoretical

know-

or objects of sense,

restricted to the realm of

freedom or of Ideas, and any further knowledge impossible.

received in the

which only sensuous

phenomena

knowledge remains

it

But the Critique of Pure Reason

is

held to be

itself contradicts this

Critique of Kant.

134 inasmuch as

result,

it is

of knowledge which

criticism

neither practical (moral), nor has sensible

is

phenomena

things or

itself,

obliged to admit the existence of a sort

This knowledge

for its objects.

so far as in

investigation

its

The

establishes the conditions of experience. to have determined in

its

and

is

its

the

discovers and

it

Critique professes

Transcendental Esthetic and Analytic

human

the constitution or organization of

ledge

is

not a practical knowledge, for

its

This know-

reason.

subject

is

not freedom

;

objects are not phenomena, since according to the Critique

space and time are not phenomena, any more than productive imagination, pure understanding, or pure consciousness.

knowledge

is

not experience, for

conditions which precede All

knowledge which aims

all

its

is

objects are precisely those

experience and

theoretical

and

claim to the character of science

itself

it

would not

knowledge.

:

it is

it

possible.

It establishes

itself

and

Such

scientific.

;

and such as

it is

lays

the Doctrine of Knowledge

be, if its doctrine of

;

knowledge were not

the knowledge of experience by

showing how experience originates entirely if

it

presented in the Critique of Pure Reason

.neither empirical nor practical, but theoretical,

and that

make

in the first place only at insights,

not at conduct, must be termed

a knowledge

This

were experience

;

;

and

it

for that

would

fail

of

its

end

would be tantamount

to establishing experience by experience, hence not establishing

;

Examination of at all, but

it

And

done.

presupposing it

the

it,

Kantian Doctrines.

135

as the dogmatic philosophy had

ought not to be objected here that Kantj there-

has used the inductive method of experimental science, in

fore,

establishing his doctrine of knowledge, so that the Critique of

Pure Reason selves

itself rests

on experience.

Let us not deceive our-

by an ambiguous play with the word " experience."

strictness,

In

our philosopher recognises only the knowledge of

phenomena ; while, on the contrary, the Critique of Pure Reason virtually leads to a sort of

knowledge the objects of which are

not

phenomena, but the subjective conditions of phenomena.

The

fact of experience is

Whatever that, is,

is

established

one thing,

by experience

establishment another. empirically

is

on the contrary, by which experience

precisely

itself is

known

established

on that account, no object of empirical, but only of

Transcendental knowledge.

must have distinguished

These two

in the

knowledge has the character tical,

its

way that he

oj"

did.

theoretical as

but not that of empirical, knowledge.

the Critique of Pure Reason transcends by

bounds which

it

had

set as the

knowledge Kant

sorts of

its

Transcendental

opposed to prac-

We

thus see

own

how

insights the

insurmountable limits of

all

theoretical knowledge.

The

insight into those subjective conditions from which phe-

nomena

(objects of experience)

and the knowledge of phenomena

Critique of Kant.

136

originate, constituted Transcendental Idealism

thereby gained, that

we can have no other

;

and the insight

objects of knowledge

We

than sensuous phenomena, constituted Empirical Realism.

know

the necessary connection that subsists between these two

doctrines is

:

they are related as premise and conclusion.

therefore

more thoughtless

Nothing

in estimating the Critical philo-

sophy, than to leave the character of Transcendental idealism,

whether through ignorance or misconception, entirely out sight,

of

and then to declare the Kantian doctrine to be Empiricism.

The

Critique of Pure Reason involves the

from the nature of our reason

—which

problem of deducing

is

revealed to us only

through the most penetrating self-knowledge

—the

conditions of

experience (" faculties of knowledge," Kant termed them), and thus of developing the doctrine of knowledge into an actual doctrine

of the process of knowledge.

This problem remains un-

solved in the Kantian philosophy itself; but

we have shown

that

the Critique of Pure Reason contains the data for such a solution,

and that

shows us

its

investigations are ordered in such a

in outline the course of

way

that

it

development of human know-

ledge from perception to scientific thought, and to the system-

Now, the doctrine of knowledge

atization of the sciences."

'

vol.

Vide supra, Chap. iii.

III.,

(3rd ed.), p. 519

Part

et seq.

II.,

Sec.

2.'

Cf. Fischer

:

Gesck. d. n. Philos.,

Examination of itself is scientific

founds

itself

knowledge

the

Kantian Doctrines.

and the doctrine of development

;

upon the notion of

development as such

is

137

end,

without which no sort of

Hence

intelligible.

this notion

.

may

not be regarded merely as a moral principle for the knowledge "of the

moral order of things, and a maxim of reflection for

contemplating the organic world

which

is

valid for the entire

;

is

it

a principle of knowledge

knowable order of the world, the

natural as well as the moral.

2.

The Knowabkness of Natural Ends in

Man and

of Blind

Intelligence.

Let us examine the reason why Kant limited the knowableness of ends to the moral, and excluded

—why he saw himself obliged

to

it

from the natural world,

deny knowableness to the imma-

nent natural end, which he had introduced into his Critique of

Pure Reason as a necessary Idea in our contemplation of the organic world, and as the principle of teleological judgment.

He

held that ends are only so far knowable as they are consciously

possessed and willed

ends and act

in

;

that only will and intelligence can posit

accordance with them

;

that consequently nature

or the material world has no ends (no knowable ones) therefore also the ends, without which

we

;

and that

are unable to

prehend the organization and constitution of

com-

living bodies, are

.

Critique of Kant.

138

not forces operative in nature, not knowable objects, but mere

They

Ideas.

are,

however, necessary Ideas;

for,

although in

organized bodies the parts should be understood in the light of the whole, we, with our discursive understanding, can only put together and comprehend the whole from the parts, and as are consequently incapable of perceiving

whole as the creative ground of end.

The

whole, that

is,

which

we

perceive sensibly as object,

life,

and knowing such a

we must conceive

refuge, as

it

be,

its

it

needs

judgment

it

to

By

human

teleologically

faculty

it

out of

its

own

compensate, as well as the

in general,

in particular, the latter presents itself as

velopment of

and

weakness our reason takes

for its native incapacity.

establishes the reflective

its

cannot

we should not need a

were, in this faculty, developing

primitive powers, because

may

In

as

are obliged to think as Idea,

intuitive understanding,

of teleological judgment.

it

we. are to conceive, but

hence we are compelled to consider living bodies

Had we an

we

way

in

which Kant

and the teleological

a necessary yorw of de-

reason, which seeks to solve a problem, to

supply a needed knowledge, and, under the peculiar constitution of

its

intellectual faculties,

Ends

can attain

in nature, therefore,

Fischer

:

its

object in no other way.'

according to the Kantian teaching,

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol. iv. (3rd ed.), pp. 492-498.

Examinatton of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

139

are unknowable and in effect impossible, since they require to

be posited by

and intelligence

will

;

and such an unconscious

intelligence, such an end-active yet blind force, contradicts the

Thus hylozoism, which teaches

notion of matter. is

living

Kant

that matter

and energized by inherent causes, was regarded by

as the death of

all

Philosophy of Nature.

living organized matter exists,

Since, now,

and we cannot conceive of

it

except as adapted to ends, Kant was obliged to deduce the end-active underlying force from the moral ground of things,

from the divine

will,

and of the world a

and thus to give

theistic basis.

i.e.

his teleological view of life

But the immanent natural ends,

the Idea of which rules and guides our teleological judgment, are thereby transformed into divine purposes, and

life itself,

as

well as all natural development, remains unexplained and inexplicable.

The unknowableness

of natural ends

is

based by Kant upon

the impossibility of an unconscious intelligence or of a blind will.

But the

reality

of such a blind intelligence had already

been shown by Leibnitz imperceptible ideas

in his doctrine of the unconscious or

{^perceptions petites),

a doctrine which he

raised to fundamental importance in his theory of knowledge.

And,

in fact,

Kant

also

was obliged to recognize the knowable-

ness of natural ends and the unconscious activity of our intellec-

140

Critique

He

tual faculties.

had denied of

life

it

recognized

of Kant.

human

in

it

in the organic world.

We

nature, though he

further the moral ends

—as

Kant

—without

being

by means of the "mechanism of instincts"

terms the impulses of our natural ends of conscious of them and willing them. create that struggle for existence,

life

Our

natural

interests

and that increasing complexity

of industrial society, from which issue, unconsciously and without volition, the moral orders of

life.

Wherever Kant

blished the necessity of the latter, he laid the greatest stress

esta-'-

upon

the reality and activity of our purely natural, and, at the same time, intelligible ends of

world of sense

is

life.'

That we conceive a common

a fact that our reflective consciousness finds at

hand, but does not create, since

it is,

the rather, produced from

the material of our impressions by the systematizing representative

faculties

reflective

of reason,

and hence

and unconscious

arises

through the non-

activity of intellect.

Kant saw

in

the productive imagination this form-giving faculty, which acts

unconsciously in accordance with the laws of pure consciousness,

and constitutes the bond that unites sense and understanding. " Synthesis in general

is

merely the work of the imagination, a

though indispensable function of the

soul,

Mind

without which we should

Vide supra. Chap. III., Part II.,

Sec

Examination of

^ave

the

Kantian Doctrines.

no knowledge whatever, yet of which

But to bring

scious.

we

which the sense."

are seldom even con-

— that

this synthesis to notions

Which belongs to the understanding, and latter first

141

in

is

a function

the exercise of

procures for us knowledge in the real

^

When,

accordingly,

in

especially organic nature,

and necessity to the

our

contemplation of nature, and

Kant

ascribes only subjective validity

notion

of

end,

conflicts with his theistic

it

doctrine, according to which the final ticularly the origin of life, is

end of things, and par-

deduced from the original ground

of things, thus recognizing an end-active power, which

no means a mere

idea.

When Kant

inherent natural ends in general, of the natural ends of pletely

human

life,

it

denies the knowahleness of conflicts with his doctrine

which he regarded as a com-

knowable and end-conformable mechanism of

by means of which the natural

historical progress of

forced to a moral development, and

its

instincts,

mankind

an unconscious presupposed

'

Kant

:

possibility of activity

in the

When

an unconscious intelligence and

toward an end

— which

is

necessarily

conception of inherent natural ends

Kritik der reineit

Vernunft.

Fischer: Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol.

iii,

is

end unconsciously and

involuntarily promoted, though not of course attained.

Kant denies the

by

is

—

Transcend. Analyiik., § 10.

(3rd ed.), p. 370.

this

Cf.

Critique of Kant.

142 assertion

is

contradicted not only by his doctrine of morals in

the points just mentioned, but also by his doctrine of knowledge

—that

is,

by the Critique of Pure Reason

deduction

itself in its

of the pure notions of the understanding, and especially in

its

doctrine of the productive imagination, as being

"a blind but

pensable function of the soul, without which

we should have no

indis-

knowledge whatever."

TAe Knowableness of Life and of Beauty.

3.

When Kant

teaches that

all

phenomena

subjective conditions of our reason,

own

i.e.,

originate from the

from the material of our

impressions and the form-giving faculties or the laws of

our thought, this doctrine

phenomena.

According

is

contradicted by his view of organic

to these conditions, there

objects in the sense-world which are not parts as precede the whole

can be no

composed of such

hence Kant also holds that

;

all

phenomena, especially bodies, are only mechanically knowable. But, now, there are certain objects with reversed.

whole which

differentiates,

Such phenomena are its

this relation is

In this case, the whole does not result from the parts,

but the parts from the whole.

before

which

parts,

Every object of

articulates,

living bodies.

and derive the

latter

and

this sort is

develops

a

itself.

Could we perceive a whole from the former, then also

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

143

an organism would be mechanically knowable, and hence an object of scientific knowledge in the exact sense of the word.

But that we cannot do, because such a faculty of perception, such an

intuitive understanding, is

wanting in

We are

us.

therefore

obliged to derive the constitution and parts of an organism from

of

Idea

the

the

and

whole,

consequently

to

consider

it

ieleologically.

The

character, then, of living bodies consists in their being

wholes which

Now,

let

it

articulate,

organize,

be carefully noted that

and develop themselves.

it is

not this character of the

organism, but only the teleological idea of the same, which comes

What, accordingly, characterizes

to the account of our reason. living

phenomena, and makes them what they

are,

does not

permit of being determined from the subjective conditions of

our impressions and forms of thought, and general, but in the

phenomena

specific

themselves.^

Ieleologically .

other words, that

If

there are living things,

'

Cf. Fischer

:

Kant ex

why we must conceive

of

That, however, there are living things, or, in life

Critique of Pure Reason

appears to us

in

the sense-world,

the

and Transcendental idealism do not give

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol.

(3rd ed.), pp. 403-406.

not founded in the

conformity to law or type of the

plains to us in his Critique ofJudgment

them

is

iii.

(3rd ed.), pp. 514-518

;

vol. iv.

Critique of Kant.

144

On

us to understand. in

the contrary,

when we compare the way

which Kant explains phenomena with the way in which he

apprehends the character and

and inexplicable, that

We

at all.

per

se

life

fact of

life, it

remains unexplained

appears to us in the natural world

are therefore obliged to conclude either that life

does not belong in the phenomenal world, or that some-

thing appears in

from our

it,

which the criticism of reason cannot derive

faculties of

understanding,

phenomena,

Now, the

but which,

underlies

fact or

ground, since

knowledge, neither from sense, nor from

it

life

independently of our

and constitutes

phenomenon of

life is

and

ideas

phenomenon.

its

undeniable.

Its creative

subsists independently of our ideas

and pheno-

mena, belongs to things-in-themselves, which are to be thought as Ideas

and ends, and

intelligible, or

are, in truth, will, the principle

moral order of the world.

conceive this creative ground of i.e.,

as unconscious intelligence

life

as

We

are obliged to

immanent

and blind

will,

natural end,

and can now no

longer hold this conception to be a mere Idea,

superadd to the phenomenon of

life,

and

activity of inherent natural ends,

fact

and phenomenon of

life,

of the

which we

since, without the reality i.e.,

would not

without blind exist at

all,

will,

the

and every

addition from the side of our reason would be useless.

whole, which differentiates, articulates, and organizes

That

itself,

is

Examination of the definite end of itself

by

activity,

the

Kantain Doctrines.

or the will to

life,

live,

145

which must

and develop the necessary organs

assert

for the

fulfilment of its functions.

And what

is

true of living

That there

(Esthetic.

faculties of

terests of

is

a

phenomena must

state of

also be true of

harmony and freedom

mind, in which, independent of

all

desire

and

all in-

knowledge, we give ourselves to pure contemplation

and enjoyment, follows from the constitution of our nature.

for our

Esthetic pleasure

is

a pure subjective

which there could be no talk about

state, apart

one object impresses us

as beautiful, another as ugly, a third as sublime,

must be condi-

tioned by the peculiar sort of the phenomena, and can as

the character of

be derived from the subjective

life

which are the ground of the phenomena and conformity to law.

from

That, how-

aesthetic objects.

ever, in this state of free contemplation

intellectual

their

little

as

factors,

general

There must, accordingly, be something

independent of our faculties of reason, which underlies the

phenomena

themselves,

related to the given

makes them what they

phenomenon,

in us is related to the empirical.

thing becomes

known

to us

are,

and -which

is

as the intelligible character

We

must add, that

this

some-

from the phenomena themselves,

although we do not find the same in the analysis of the given object.

Critique of Kant.

146

4.

The Knoivableness of Things-in-themselves.

This something

is

the thing-in-itself, the absolute unknowable-

ness of which Kant,

it

is true,

asserted

but in the progress of

;

he by no means adhered

his investigations

to this assertion.

On

the contrary, in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique

of fudgment light was thrown upon the subject he had not foreseen that he

still

in the Critique

in

a way which

of Pure Reason.

denied in the second edition of the

possibility of those principles

We know latter

which he afterwards discovered to

be necessary, and made the basis of his criticism of the judgment.^

And

This very noteworthy

in criticising

remember

that

it

fact

aesthetic

must not be overlooked.

the Kantian philosophy

we should always

by no means issued from the Critique of

Pure Reason as a finished system, but it

the

unfolded and developed

itself,

that,

on the contrary,

and reached

results

which

were not involved in that work, which do not accord with its

fundamental principles, and could not be adjusted to them

by any attempt

at artificial symmetries,

was so fond of applying.

such as the philosopher

The phenomena

to

which we add

the idea of beauty, of sublimity, or of inner adaptation, are not

included

'

among

Cf. Fischer

the

:

phenomena whose

Cesch. d. n. Philos., vol.

iv.

origin the Critique of

(3rd ed.), p, 408 JSf.

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

147

Pure Reason investigates; the former are sui generis, and include

more than

these.

According to the Critique of Pure Reason, things-in-themselves are the substratum of the nature of our reason as well as of

They

phenomena.

are, therefore, to

be absolutely distinguished

from phenomena, never confounded with them, hence never with things external to us, but always to be thought of as the

unknowable original ground of things.

This

is

the doctrine

which runs through the entire Critique of Pure Reason, and

it

is

difficult to

believe that any one having read this work would

dispute

Kantian character.

Kant

its

It

could not have occurred to

to hold the thing-in-itself to be a

thought- thing,

mena, as

it

that he did.

i.e.,

is

mere

idea, or

a mere

a cause ascribed by us in thought to pheno-

maintained in numerous recent publications

Were

and nothing more,

the thing-in-itself a mere thought-thing

it

would, as such, be completely knowable,

and not unknowable and

inscrutable, as

the Critique 'of Pure

Reason nevertheless teaches with the utmost explicitness.

If

the character of actuality or reality did not belong to things-in-

themselves, as the original ground of thinking and phenomenal being, the doctrine of their unknowableness would be not only

meaningless, but absurd.

does not exist at

all,

but

is

How

can anything which

in reality

merely thought, be seriously regarded

Critique of Kant.

148

unknowable

as something

Whoever, then, thinks that accord-

?

ing to the Kantian teaching there

is

no such thing

of things-in-themselves, must also maintain that Kant

reality

But

has never spoken of their unknowableness. actually thinks that, then

of Kant

critics

whom

as the

who

if

any one

he belongs to the already numerous

write

books on

the Critique of Pure Reason

is

his philosophy, yet for

to this day a thing-in-

itself.

Every one who has followed the fundamental investigations in

this

will

work up

to

the close of the Transcendental Analytic,

have the impression, especially after the section

Ground of the Distinction of

mena and

Noumena,"

all

that

:

"

On

the

Objects whatsoever as Phenothings-in-themselves

are

and

remain unknowable, that they represent the insoluble mystery of the world, and that our knowledge must confine itself to sensible

objects and to sensible experience.

blishment of empiricism, which carries with of

all

it

This new estathe destruction

metaphysics, often receives the distinction of being the

chief service

and

real

result of the

Kantian

criticism.

Thus

the Neo-Kantians of the day have stopped short under this impression, and likewise

understand him.

many

of our natural scientists,

who

the Konigsberg philosopher less than they praise

They overlook

the fact that the establishment of empiricisnj

Examination of is

the

Kantian Doctrines.

not empiricism, and cannot be empiricism

trary,

it

consists

in the

;

that,

149

on the con-

investigation of the principles of

all

experience, and must therefore result in a Doctrine of Principles, or a " Metaphysics of Phenomena," to have established which,

Kant regarded as the problem and performance of of knowledge.

Prolegomena

he would

Otherwise

to every future

not

his doctrine

have written

Metaphysic which may claim a

his

Scientific

Character.

When, however, we have followed the course of the

Critique of

Pure Reason further, and reached the close of the Transcendental Dialectic,

to

the darkness which obscured the thing-in-itself begins

disappear,

although

now confirmed by are obliged

to

the unknowableness

objects of

necessary Ideas,

which have

are

of both thinking and

ground of

all

knowledge, they are

is

phenomenal

is

we

that while

nevertheless

ground

objects, as well as the original

We now

know,

to be thought under these original grounds

or unconditioned principles,

Among

;

for their subject the original

possible and actual existence.

furthermore, what

and God.

are taught that, and why,

conceive of things-in-themselves

not

they

We

proofs.

same

of the

viz.,

the soul, the world as totality,

the world-Ideas, Transcendental freedom

represented to us as the sole Idea, which, while

it

is

can never

yet be the conbe a phenomenon or object of knowledge, can

Critique of Kant.

ISO

ceivable original ground of all as natural laws.

knowledge

Finally,

phenomena, and of their order

these ideas serve as a criterion of

they present themselves as regulative principles of

;

true,

can

never be attained, but yet are to be continually striven

for,

knowledge,

as goals of experience, which,

i.e.,

in order that our

so

combine

in

sciences shall

is

knowledge may become systematized, and may the highest diversity with the highest

itself

that the

unity,

it

specific

results

of

the several

become more and more

unified,

experimental

and approxi-

mate a system of knowledge which forms a simple whole.

Were such a system

attainable,

all

the sciences would

ulti-

mately be members of one whole, and the order of the world

would become known to us as a genealogical system, in which all

phenomena

primitive

Hence

in their various species

ground.

But

also the Ideas,

descend from one single

this primitive

since

ground

they prescribe

of homogeneity, specification, and continuity

is

unknowable.

" the principles (affinity) " for

the

experimental sciences, should be recognised only as maxims of our knowledge,

and not as principles of things.^

withstanding, in the Doctrine

have so

'

far

Not-

of Ideas, things-in-themselves

emerged from the obscurity which enveloped them

Cf. Fischer

:

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol.

iii.

(3rd ed.), pp. 514-518.

1

Examination of

the

Kantian Doctrines.

that they present themselves, not,

is true,

it

1

as objects of

5

know-

ledge, but as principles regulative of knowledge.

The

Doctrine of Methods in the Critique takes a step farther.

It reveals to

us in

its

things-in-themselves, science, but

"

Canon"

the possibility of a knowledge of

not along the path of experience

and

on the ground of moral laws given by immediate

self-knowledge or moral certitude.

7/" there are

such laws, they

have an unconditional validity—a validity independent of experience, exalted above

all

knowledge, opinion, and doubt,

and possessing immediate axiomatic

certainty.

And

as certain

do they make to us the

as these laws themselves are, so certain reality

all

of the moral order of the world and of those Ideas which

represent

its

power,

final

end, and original ground

Ideas of Freedom, Immortality, and Deity.

viz.,

:

Thus the

the

Critique

of Pure Reason leaves us with the possibility of a knowledge of things-in-themselves in view, only

we

are forced to

take this

knowledge, not as theoretical, but as practical, to regard cerlainty, not as objective, but as subjective or personal,

designate

The

it,

and to

not as science, but as belief.

Critique

of Practical Reason

realizes the possibility,

the Doctrine of Methods had held in prospect. fact of the

its

moral law and discerns the

moral order of the world.

That the

which

It establishes

reality of

the

freedom and the

thing-in-itself underlies our

;

152

Critique

of Kant.

theoretical reason, the Critique of Pure Reason teaches

title

the knowledge of the thing-in-itself be

recognized, the important thing circle of

that this

of Practical Reason teaches.

thing-in-itself is the will, the Critique

Under whatever

;

is

that

it

enters into the illumined

our reason, not only as Idea, but as reality and power

we know what

it

is,

and we know that the history of human

civilization consists in the fulfilment

of the laws of freedom and

the moral ends of reason, to which our natural ends of

subordinate and subservient.

life

are

Kant's Philosophy of the State

and Philosophy of Religion, together with the historico-philosophical treatises which history of the

belong with them, reveal to us the

world as the necessary development and mani-

festation of freedom.

And

that not only the moral, but also the sensible or natural

order of the world, or, in other words, that the world-develop-

ment, not only as history of culture, but also as history of nature, is

the manifestation of will and of freedom, our philosopher

taught in his Critique of fudgment.

The

will is that thing-in-

which underlies the constitution of our

itself

ledge,

which

makes

this subserve the moral.

is

faculties of

know-

the cause of our intellectual development, and

The

will is that thing-in-itself

which underlies phenomena, and determines their empirical character in such a wa} that

we are obliged

to judge their forms

Examination of (in the state of teleologically.

the

Kantian Doctrines.

153

our free contemplation) msthetically and their thus appears that there

It

something

is

life

in the

empirical character of things which does not admit of being

explained from our theoretical reason, nor of being discerned in our experience or in the analysis of is

involuntarily present,

something

is

the

phenomenon,

or,

there would be

phenomena, and yet which

and necessary to our thought.

phenomenon of freedom and in

This

the freedom of

one word, natural freedom, without which

no development, no

life,

no beauty

;

without

which, therefore, our aesthetic as well as teleological judgment

would be without an

object.

That there must be a correspondence between the thing-initself

which underlies our

underlies

phenomena

faculties of

or the

knowledge and that which

Kant had already

sense-world,

intimated in (both editions of) his Critique of Pure Reason. the Critique of fudgment he

same time

in

what

this

certain very noteworthy will

have

left

now

asserts

it,

In

explaining at the

correspondence consists.

Herewith

sentences become intelligible, which

upon every penetrating

reader, after a thorough

study of the Critique of Pure Reason, the impression that the

philosopher says more than his doctrine of knowledge It

declares

may

it

to be possible that

om and

the

justifies.

same thing-in-itself

underlie both objective and subjective phenomena, or, what

Critique of Kant.

54

1

is

own words

:

" That something which so affects our sense that;

receives the ideas of space, matter, form, etc.

it

Let us take his

the same thing, both matter and thought.

regarded as noumenon might

(or, better,

same time the

also be at the

the way in which

—that something,

as transcendental object),

of thought, although,

subject

our external sense

is

thereby affected,

receive no perception of ideas, will, etc., but only of space its

determinations."

'

As long

as things-in-themselves

and

as soul

"

suggested this problem consists, as

is

we and

and body were regarded

radically different substances,

impossible to explain their union.

in

The well

it

was

difficulty

which has

known,

in the pre-

supposed dissimilarity of an object of the inner sense (soul) and the objects of outer sense, since that depends only upon time, these upon time and space, as the formal conditions of their perception.

If

we remind

ourselves, however, that both sorts

of objects do not thereby distinguish themselves from

one

another inwardly, but only in so far as one seems external to the other {hence that which underlies the phenomenon of matter as .thingin-itself

perhaps ought not

be

to

regarded as so dissimilar), the

difficulty vanishes," ^ etc.

'

Kant: Kritik

d.

r.

Zweiten Paratogismus.

Vernunft

:

Cf. Fischer

Transcd. Dialectik. Kritik der

(isted.) :

Gesc/i.

d.

n. Philos.,

S70'

Kant

;

Kritik

d. r.

Vernunft (2nd ed.), pp. 326, 327.

voL

iii.,

pp. 447'

;

Examination of If

we designate

Kantian Doctrines.

the

155

the thing-in-itself which underlies our

modes

of thought, or the constitution of our faculties of knowledge (theoretical reason), as the in-itself

unknown

quantity X, and the thing-

which underlies external phenomena, or the material

unknown

world, as the

quantity V, then the Critique of Pure

Reason has already pointed out to us in both

V=X.

possibility that

phenomena of matter

This are

And

to assert

the possibility that

Now, the

unknowable as Critique

it

yet, again,

it

do,

F=X,

if

it

since the

our

had no right

things-in-themselves

teaches.

of Practical Reason teaches, by establish-

ing the primacy of the practical reason, that this itself

editions the

nothing other than

indeed

modes of thought.

really are as

was forced to

it

necessary

its

is

the thing-in-

which underlies and determines our theoretical reason

teaches that

X^will

or freedom; and

proposition with a " perhaps "

or "

it

it

does not state this

might be," but with

complete certitude. If,

now,

F=X,

and Z'=will or freedom, then also F, the

supersensible substratum of the material world, must cease to

be a perfectly unknown and unknowable quantity; for F=vii\\ or freedom.

He

Our philosopher must advance

does so in the Introduction

the essential purpose of which

to is

to this equation.

the Critique of fudgment, to

show

that

the hidden

;

156

of Kant.

Critique

ground of nature or the material world

one with freedom

is

and freedom underlie also the sense-world,

that will

words, that the sense-world manifestation of freedom. self-developing bodies,

the

is

If

it

or, in

phenomenon of

were not

this there

no phenomenon of

other

will or

the

would be no

no objects of

life,

our aesthetic and teleological judgment, no theme of the faculty of judgment, thus also no problem as the subject of a critique of judgment.

duction

" There must, then,

:

of freedom practically

ground, although practical

the above-named Intro-

a ground of the unity of the super-

contains.

the supersensible

And

with

knowledge of the same, and hence has no particular

makes possible the

transition

from the

of thought according to the principles of the one to

we now compare

of fudgment,

progressed

Kant

^

the foundation of the Kantian criticism

completion, or the Critique of Pure Reason with the

its

Critique

'

the

the notion of this

that according to the principles of the other." If

which

does not afford us either a theoretical or a

it

sphere, nevertheless

mode

be

says in

which underlies nature, with

sensible

notion

Hence Kant

:

Cf. Fischer

it

clearly

appears

and been transformed under

Kritilt der Urtheilskraft, Introduction. :

how

the

the hands

Vide Werke, vol.

Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol. iv. (3rd ed.), pp. 397, 497.

of the sentence quoted,

cf.

work has

supra. Chap. III., Part III., Sec.

3.

of the

vii.,

p. 14.

For elucidation

Examtnatton of philosopher.

the

Kantian Doctrines.

157

Neither the doctrine of phenomena nor that of

things-in-themselves has remained the same.

Phenomena now

confront us with the character of individuality and freedom, things-in-themselves with that of unity of essence and knowableness

;

for

the

correspondence between the supersensible

substratum of our sensuous reason and that of the sensible or material world bases itself in the end

nature

they are will and freedom.

;

disappears, which

And

upon

their identity of

herewith the obscurity

had seemed to envelop things-in-themselves.

After the Critique of Practical Reason had established the reality of freedom and the moral order of the world, and subordinated

our sensuous and theoretical reason to the practical, and the sensible

and

material

world

entire order of the world

to

our theoretical reason, the

was recognised as the manifestation

of thing-in-itself, or as the

phenomenon of

will,

i.e.,

as

the

development and manifestation of freedom.

The

farther the

Kantian investigations advance, from the

doctrine of knowledge to the doctrine of Ideas, from this to

the doctrines of moral freedom and the moral order of the world, from these to the philosophic doctrine of history, and to the doctrine of the natural

—which coincides with the judgment

— the

more

freedom of phenomena (bodies)

criticism of aesthetic

and teleological

distinctly things-in-themselves

come

into

158

Critique

And

view.

the

more

th,e

of Kant.

Kantian doctrine reveals things-in-

themselves in phenomena, and the latter win the character of

phenomena of

will,

so

much

the

more unmistakably does the

character of the doctrine of development imprint the Kantian philosophy

does

prove

it

with so

;

itself to be, as

much

the

more

itself

upon

distinctness

the problem of Critical thought

demands, the philosophical establishment and unfolding of the history

of

the development

of universal knowledge.

path which the Kantian It is therefore

follows.

the

a very superficial and radically false

phenomena and things-in-themselves

for the

is

Doctrine of Ideas points out and

conception of the Kantian philosophy to understand of

This

its

doctrine

as dividing the world

weal of mankind into science, and poetry, in the former

of which empiricism and materialism are sanctioned as the only valid knowledge, while in the latter metaphysics

is

saddled

upon Pegasus, and the Doctrine of Ideas permitted or compelled to seek

way one

is

Materialism,

its

in

kingdom

danger,

in the land of dreams.

with the

In this

author of the History

of confounding Kant's

of

Critique of Pure Reason

with Schiller's Partition of the Earth.

Our examination of Kant's fundamental doctrines has reached the result, that his system received a development in the course

of the three

Critique^

which

the

first

groundwork neither

Examination of counted upon nor was

the

Kantain Doctrines.

sufficient for.

159

After the second Critique

had made knowing reason dependent upon the law of moral freedom,

and the third Critique had discovered

well as the

life

new problems

of

phenomena the

arose,

in

the beauty as

character of natural freedom,

which could no longer pass

for insoluble

on the ground of the unknowableness of things-in-themselves. These problems became the themes of post-Kantian philosophy.

CHAPTER

V.

THE PROBLEMS AND LINES OF DEVELOPMENT OF POST-

KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I.

The Fundamental Problems of Post-Kantian Philosophy. I

SERIES

A

.

The Metaphysical Problem.

of distinct and historically important systems has

sprung, in the course of a few decades, from the roots of

the Kantian philosophy.

and

fruitful

This

fact alone

have been the influences,

shows how manifold

how deep and

far-reaching

the stimulus, which the philosophic spirit received through the Critique of Pure Reason.

Perhaps no philosophical epoch since

the days of Socrates and the Attic philosophy has been so ripe for great

New

and rapid advances as the epoch illuminated by Kant.

problems spring from his criticism

—questions which

affect

the groundwork of philosophy, and which are seized from so

many and variously

different sides, that

opposed points of view.

their

investigation calls

And

forth

the complicated course

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.

i6i

of development which the post- Kantian philosophy takes, branch-

ing as it

does again and again, finds here

it

separating into a

number of

these dividing up into into lesser contrasts.

onward movement

all

like a state of

explanation.

way

in the general course

Yet there

and

post-Kantian philosophy, extending state of the

lines of

down

entire

theme of the

and

In order to find

development of

one

problems which resulted from the

latter consisted,

the doctrine of the origination of tion

rules in these

to the present,

character and final form of the Kantian work

The

and

outward appearance looks almost

confusion and decline.

must know the

and these again

ever- increasing, variety of views, systems, first

see

there arises a great, and with the

phenomena a necessary law of development. one's

We

conflicting lines of development,

sorts of antitheses,

Thus

which on the

schools,

its

faculties of sensuous

itself.

on the one hand,

phenomena from

(=human)

in

the constitu-

reason,

and on the

other in the doctrine of the original ground of phenomena, or the thing-in-itself,

world.

which underlies the knowing reason and

For since the knowing reason, according

fundamental doctrine, sionable nature,

Since

it

phenomena

is

itself

arise

its

to

sense-

Kant's

of a sensuous or .receptive and impres-

cannot possibly be the original ground.

from the impressions or sensations of

sensuous reason as their material, sensations cannot possibly II

1

Critique of Kant.

62

be explained from phenomena;

for our philosopher

was not

of the opinion that the earth rested upon the great elephant,

and the great elephant upon the

phenomena from

origination of

forms of) our reason

is

(the material

phenomena we have designated to

phenomena)

of knowledge, but the it,

The

as the

knowing reason and of

Kantian Realism, because

regards things external to us

{i.e.,

as things-in-themselves.'

Kant carried out the

in

and the thought-

have understood by Transcendental realism that

way of thinking which external

doctrine of the

Transcendental or Kantian Idealism.

doctrine of the original ground of our

Kant wishes

The

earth.

idealistic establishment of his doctrine realistic,

with

all

the questions involved

he declared to be impossible, owing to the unknowable-

The

ness of the thing-in-itself.

realistic

establishment would

have had to answer the question why our knowing reason has these and not

some other thought-forms, why

otherwise constituted. held

it

But an answer to

would be impossible

he- himself in so far

for

answered

intelligible in the " Reality

it,

it

thus and not

this question

any one to give. that he

is

made

Nevertheless,

the thing-in-itself

of Freedom " or of pure

subordinated the theoretical to the practical reason.

"

Vide supra. Chap. II., Part

I.

Kant

will,

and

Distin-

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy. guishing,

now, in the doctrine of knowledge, the question

concerning the

of

subjeclive origin

ing their real ground, the latter metaphysical problem, insoluble, but

He

so

let

163

phenomena from

may be

taken as constituting the

which Kant declared to be completely

which he by no means

much

that concern-

upon

light fall

left

completely unsolved.

that his successors were

it,

forced to seek for more, and to attempt the complete illumi-

nation of the thing-in-itself in distinction from

and

free

To

from

all

obviate

phenomena

confusion with them.

all

misconceptions,

distinguish, in connection with the

empirical realism

phenomena,

all

and

the

is

realism

;

that

concerns

Transcendental idealism

this things-in-themselves.

and

carefully

Kantian doctrine, between

metaphysical

establishes empirical realism,

reader will

itself established

by meta-

physical realism.

2.

The Kantian

The Problem of Knowledge.

doctrine of knowledge consisted, in the broadest

sense, in isolating, fixing,

and explaining the fundamental

of our rational knowledge. retical

and a practical

These

(moral)

facts

sort.

facts

were of both a theo-

The

theoretical

facts

separated themselves into those of science, or knowledge in the

narrower sense, and those of our necessary contemplation or

1

Critique of Kant.

64

The two

judgment of things as guided by the Idea of end.

sense, theoretical

ground-facts of scientific and, in the exact

knowledge, were those of mathematical and natural science. necessary ways of contemplating the adaptation of

The two

phenomena

were the

to ends,

view, while practical

aesthetic

and teleological points of

knowledge had the character,

position and moral worth, of our conduct for facts of reason, unlike as

These all

the dis-

object.

they are, agree in that they validity,

which presents

the form of synthetic judgments d priori.

The problem

lay claim to a necessary

itself in

its

i.e.,

of Kant was

:

How

and universal

are these facts possible

one of determining their conditions or

?

The

factors.

sought and found along the path of inductive inquiry. as these facts are, so certain are the conditions

And

follow.

must be

question

is

These were

As

certain

from which they

since they are facts of reason, their conditions

faculties

of

reason.

Just as

conditions precede that

conditioned, so these faculties must precede their pro-

which

is

ducts,

i.e.,

the facts of our knowledge and objects of knowledge,

hence also of our experience and objects of experience. are, therefore, before all experience, or, as

priori (transcendental) "

;

that

is,

Kant expresses

They it,

they are pure faculties of

reason, or such as belong to reason, not as resulting from

experiences, but as preceding

all

"a

experience.

its

We

see

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.

165

how the

and

Critical philosophy proceeds.

determines the facts of reason

;

this

constitutes the putting of the question.

and finds by

this inductive

faculties of reason

its starting-point,

analyses these facts,

It

method the necessary and

which produce these

and

facts

original

this is its method.

;

wherein pure reason consists, or the content of what

It discerns

faculties constitute

one of the standing,

is

It isolates

it

;

this

forms

faculties discovered,

Do away

its result.

as,

e.g.,

sensibility or under-

and you have done away with the

Hence

experience.

as, e.g.,

understanding, or a supersensible perception,

Hence such a

fact of

faculty

is

Critical

This

is

of

to the facts

an

intuitive

and you have

human knowledge and

impossible.

which Kant called the

possibility

Add

these facts are necessary.

discovered another that conflicts with them,

done away with the

with any

experience.

the method 0/ proof

or Transcendental.

By

his

process of induction, Kant claims to have discovered the constitution of

ledge,

our reason, and the laws of our thought and know-

with just as

much

logical consistency

and certainty as

Kepler did the harmony of the cosmos and the laws of planetary motion. tary

Suspend Kepler's laws, and the phenomena of plane-

motion became impossible.

Human

reason must combine in

itself as

many fundamental

faculties as there are conditions required for the fact of

human

1

Critique of Kant.

66

Thus the

knowledge.

by the

fact of

pure mathematics was established

space and time are the two fundamental forms

fact that

of our sensibility,

and hence pure perceptions

;

fact of

the

experimental knowledge or natural science was established by the fact that the understanding, a faculty essentially unlike the

forms and combines phenomena by means of

sensibility,

irreducible notions. synthetic,

its

pure

These notions are not representative, but

What

and of the nature of judgments.

they combine,

must be given, hence received, and of a sensuous nature. this

account, our reason

only capable of knowing sensible

and not supersensible, such as things-in-themselves.

objects,

There

is

On

is

accordingly in the arrangement of our faculties of

knowledge no

intellectual perception or intuitive understanding,

to

which alone things-in-themselves could be given, and could

be

intelligible.

There

is

no object without subject, no thought

without thinking, no appearance without a being to appears.

We

should have no

objective experience,

if

common

we were not

whom

world of sense,

it

no

able to arrange, connect,

and combine the given material of our impressions according to the same universal laws of thought.

common

to

all,

there

is

To produce phenomena

required " the pure consciousness," and

"the productive imagination," which operates unconsciously according to the laws of the former.

To

conceive the given

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.

phenomena, there are required " the

167

faculties of apprehension,

of reproductive imagination, and of recognition in the notion," as

Kant designates them.

different

fundamental

Thus we

faculties,

see before us a series of

which, according to the calcula-

tion of the Critique, are necessary in order to create the facts of

our knowledge, and the sum-total of which constitutes the pro-

But

ductive capital of the theoretical reason.

this

sum has only

the character of a collective unity.

There

is still

which consists

in

be added the

fact

of practical knowledge,

the moral estimate of our dispositions and

This estimate necessarily involves the idea of an

conduct.

command, or of an unconditionally

absolute law.

to

obligatory moral

But a law that prescribes the course of conduct

disposition,

and thus concerns our

truest

for our

and innermost being,

can only be given by ourselves, and consequently demands the faculty of

autonomy or freedom, which

unconditioned or pure

from the

fact of our

of the moral law.

will.

consists in a completely

The moral law becomes apparent

moral judgment, and freedom from the fact

The moral law commands

"

:

unconditionally will and act so and not otherwise."

recognize the autonomy of our pure

freedom, which expresses because

thou oughtest."

itself in

will,

shalt

In this we

or the reality of our

the declaration

Thus Kant

Thou

;

"

Thou

also brings us to the

canst,

know-

1

Critique of Kant.

68

ledge of our freedom by the analysis of a

fact,

i.e.,

by

induction,

while at the same time he expressly declares that this insight is

not of an empirical character.

According to the falls into

results of the Critique, the theoretical reason

of sense and understanding

the antithesis

poles of knowledge theoretical

and

—and the

entire

—the

two

reason into the antithesis of

practical reason, or into that of the faculties of

knowledge and the pure

will.

To

these faculties of reason there

correspond the two realms of reason

—the sensible and the moral

orders of the world, or nature and freedom. causality rules, here teleological.

phenomena which appeal

Now,

it is

There mechanical a fact that there are

to us involuntarily as adapted or as not

adapted to some end, and which we, therefore, judge as asthetic or

teleological,

according as the character of their adaptation

referred merely to our contemplation of them, or to their existence.

There thus adds

itself to

is

own

the theoretical and practical

fundamental faculties the reflective judgment, which takes place between the other two, and itself

falls into

its

the two sorts

of aesthetic and teleological judgment.

Thus there criticism,

by

results, its

by the inductive method of the Kantian

analysis

practical knowledge,

of the facts of our theoretical and

and of our

aesthetic

and teleological con-

templation of things, a series of different original faculties, the

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy. collective content of

which constitutes our pure reason.

These

The

question

faculties are related to those facts as their ground.

now arises we cannot is

By what

:

sum

or collective notion.

between phenomena its

own

but systematic

;

is

Just as the connection

the work of reason, so the connection

faculties

sum- total of these

must be of the nature of reason.

faculties, therefore, is

The

not merely collective,

and the system of our faculties of reason must have

a determinable

common

investigation of this

nature of reason

root,

common

itself,

as primitive powers

world,

For

are the faculties themselves established?

possibly satisfy ourselves with the idea that reason

only their

between

169

of

all

from which

origin,

it

is

derived.

The

and the deduction from the

the faculties which

Kant represented

and made the substratum of the phenomenal

is \ki& fundamental problem

which presented

close of the Critical philosophy, as proceeding

itself after

from

its

the

results,

and as determining the direction of the investigations that followed.

The Lines of Development of Post-Kantian

II.

,

Philosophy. I.

The

The Re-establishment of the Doctrine of Knowledge.

question, therefore, in the development of the doctrine of

knowledge, and in the solution of

its

problem,

is

one of a

re-

1

70

of Kant.

Critique

establishment of the faculties of knowledge.

by the inductive method

The

is

What Kant found

now to be developed by the

possibility of such a deduction

deductive.

depends upon the knowledge

of a principle underlying our faculties of knowledge,

and hence

Kant had discovered the

the constitution of reason in general.

laws of our thought and of the process of our knowledge by the observation and analysis of the facts of knowledge, just as

Kepler did the laws of planetary motion by the observation and computation of

its

phenomena.

these laws inductively,

After Kepler had discovered

Newton appeared and deduced them

from one fundamental force and one fundamental law. similarly as

Newton

is

related to Kepler in the establishment of

the laws of motion, the post-Kantian philosophy

Kant

in the establishment of the laws of thought.

parison

is

And

is

related to

But this com-

intended to have no further application than subserves

the apprehension of the problem, and

the deductive character of the

Kant himself had hinted

is

used simply to emphasize

latter.

at this deductive

development, not

only by the deductive or synthetic mode of exposition which he followed in his chief work, but also by the arrangement of the faculties of reason themselves.

These he not merely co-ordinated,

but sought persistently to systematize. tion was to

The productive imagina-

him the uniting bond between sense and understand-

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy. ing.

That these

faculties

had a

common

but this origin was unknowable.

\'j\

origin was possible,

The

practical

reason he

regarded as the superior faculty, the theoretical as subordinated to

it

and dependent upon

uniting

bond of

both.

the reflective judgment as the

it,

Thus he had

himself, in effect, already

given a system of the faculties of reason, but really such,

it

wanted, to be

a foundation-principle and unity.

This unity Kant declared to be unknowable, and hence a thing-in-itself.

Should

it

become known,

then the solution

of the problem of knowledge would be also the solution of the

metaphysical problem.

It

thus appears

why

the post-Kantian

philosophy takes the metaphysical direction (in that to establish the doctrine of

it

knowledge deductively), and

it

seeks

does

so by attaching itself immediately to the Kantian doctrine.

shapes

itself

in its

knowledge of the

progressive forms of development into a

thing-in-itself

in this progress the question

and their knowableness decisive

importance.

remark on ahle in

It

this point.

will

We

;

and

it

is

easy to foresee that

concerning things-in-themselves

be the theme of pre-eminent and

will

add

still

a second prefatory

If the thing-in-itself passes for

««^«ow-

the current academic sense of the Kantian doctrine,

especially as this is stated in the Critique of Pure Reason, then

the doctrine

of, its

knowableness becomes

at

once the doctrine

172 of

Critique

its

nothingness,

a stadium where

of Kant.

and the post-Kantian philosophy soon enters to dispense with things-

becomes necessary

it

in-themselves altogether.

There thus

arises with the

and

important

of post-Kantian philosophy the

advance

penetrating

question whether the denial or affirmation of the reality of

things-in-themselves must go hand in hand with the knowledge of them.

An

affirmative

answer virtually declares for

the

true realism involved in a right understanding of the Kantian

doctrine, in opposition to Transcendental idealism,

no

basis.

Thus

originates the conflict between Realism

post-Kantian

Idealism in the extends

z.

down

to our

own

metaphysics

sophy seizes upon

is

—a

then,

which the post- Kantian philo-

the establishment of a

has three characteristic features

:

it

is

System of Identity "

knowing reason

new

doctrine of

This movement

as doctrine of principles,

metaphysical ; as doctrine of unity,

the thinking

that

conflict

Fries, Herbart, Schopenhauer.

knowledge from a single principle of reason.

historical terms, "

and

day.

The Threefold Antithesis :

The immediate problem,

is

which has

;

itself,

it is

monistic, or, in current

and, since it

is

its

principle

idealistic.

Each

of these characteristic developments calls forth an opposing

development, which likewise appeals to the Kantian doctrine,

:

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy. and seeks to tion

justify itself

by laying claim

and criticism of Kant.

Thus there

directions taken by post-Kantian

each

thesis,

standpoint

being

is

Critical in the

the truth

1

work of Kant

The

first

arises in the principal

a

special

The

interpretation

question with each

and is

:

what the deficiencies and errors of the

?

philosophy

to the true interpreta-

philosophy a threefold anti-

criticism of the Kantian doctrine.

What

173

what the permanent, what the perishable

}

antithesis

is

the most far-reaching.

It

aflHrms the

necessity of a re-establishment of the doctrine of knowledge,

but rejects the metaphysical, monistic, and idealistic {a priori) line of

development, as not leading to a solution of the problem,

and demands the observation of our inner

life,

empirical

i.e.,

and psychological investigation, as the only means of determining the system of our faculties of reason.

The

true criticism

of reason could be nothing other than " subjective anthropo-

logy"; "theory of the inner life";

human mind."

Accordingly, not metaphysics,

phical anthropology " it is

"natural doctrine of the but '^philoso-

appears as the fundamental

discipline

along this line that the criticism of reason and the doctrine

of knowledge

is

to

be newly established.

this standpoint is Fries (1773-1843),

has had a lasting influence.

The

representative of

who founded

a school, and

His principal works are

:

System of

of Kant.

Critique

174

Philosophy as Exact Science

New

Presentiment (1805);

and

The

work.

latter is the chief

itself into

What

else

Knowledge,

(1804);

Belief,

and

Critique of the Reason (1807).

Post-Kantian philosophy separates

the metaphysical and the anthropological movements.

can the knowledge of human reason, hence the

criticism of reason, seek to be than subjective or philosophical

anthropology

So say Fries and

1

How

followers.

his

can

anthropology seek to be the fundamental philosophical discipline

when

like all

itself,

it

needs be established

The

1

experimental sciences whatsoever, must

So answer

second antithesis has

post-Kantian metaphysics.

its

It

their opponents.

origin

and application within

accepts the metaphysical esta-

blishment of the doctrine of knowledge, but utterly rejects the monistic and idealistic features of the movement. to

monism (System

which

which undertakes

to discern

truly is (=thing-in-itself) as

independent of

all

thought.

Kant had

ideas,

rightly grasped things-

phenomena ;

and

this

must be scrupulously retained, and the knowledge

them made a matter of earnest

idealistic

all

and as completely independent of them

their character

of

and recognize

something absolutely

in-themselves as the supersensible substratum of

and

opposes

of Identity) the plurality of principles, and

to idealism, a realism

that

It

pursuit.

Every monistic and

metaphysics rests upon the uncritical and radically false

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.

175

presupposition that one and the same subject has diiferent faculties or powers, is

many.

i.e.,

upon the contradictory notion

Kant himself was under

since he regarded

and united

in

human

itself

His criticism of reason was respects

mental

— not

critical

essentially

in

this

And

enough.

It needs,

error.

this constant presupposition,

reason as of such a nature that

many and

one

that

different

respect

—and

it

had

powersother

in

this constitutes its funda^

therefore, not only to

be completed,

but to be reconstructed and built anew from the foundation up for

worked with notions that are

it

hence neither qualified

thing with

its

Accordingly,

it

attributes

These

first

for

contradictory

and changes,

must be the

of contradictions, and

knowledge nor

for

knowledge.

establishing

full

;

testing

notions

and are

:

Ego.

causality, matter.

and fundamental problem of

philosophy to investigate and rectify our categories of knowledge.

new

This reconstruction and

rectification

metaphysics, which opposes

ism,

and,

itself to all

is

the theme of a

monism and

by the removal of the contradictions that

natural thinking and constitute

knowledge of true being,

in

its evil,

order,

ideal-

fill

our

prepares the way for a

from the point of view

of such knowledge, to explain the origin of

phenomena and

ideas.

The founder

of this standpoint

is

Herbart (1776-1841).

The

Critique of Kant.

176

A

Metaphysics (1808). the Introduction

in

to

Points of

synopsis of the whole system was given

The

Philosophy (1813).

containing the completed system,

is

principal work,

General Metaphysics

the

In concluding the preface to this work, Herbart says:

(1829).

" Kant maintained that

'

our notion of an object

what and however much you side of is

Main

foundation-stone was laid by the work

first

it

that to

will

we must

;

in order to predicate existence of

is

a Kantian,

if

contain

nevertheless go out-

This

it.'

which the present work everywhere points

account the author

may

;

fact,

now,

and on

this

only from the year 1828, and

not from the days of categories and the Critique ofJudgment, as the attentive reader will soon discover. say

more

for the

shown

The

;

in advance.

chaotic

and

it

state

But

its

origin

It aflSrms

first

be

and application within the

the metaphysical and monistic

thing-in-itself as one original being underlying all

phenomena, and hence

all

knowledge

;

conception of this original being.

identifies original

'

one arm himself with patience,

can only be gradually brought to order." ^

monistic metaphysics.

idealistic

not necessary to

of previous metaphysics must

third antithesis has

knowledge of

let

It is

but

it

rejects

every

In consequence,

it

being (thing-in-itself) with thinking, knowing

Joh. Fr. Herbart

:

Allgemeine Metafhysik, Preface, p. xxviii.

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy. reason, transforms it

into an abstraction,

with ideas and phenomena.

and to

it

177

and hence confounds

thus demands the realistic

It

individualistic apprehension of thing-in-itself, in opposition

the idealistic

being

is

and

The more

abstract.

thought, or the more

it

is

abstract

original

and designated

universalized

with such names as "Absolute Identity," " Absolute Reason,"

"the Absolute,"

etc.,

the

more exasperated the

representative

of this opposition to idealism becomes, although he

an offspring of the family of Identity-philosophers.

One cannot

possibly be the universal

derived, always derived,

more

universal

them from

it

ideals,

is.

that

;

is

and so much the more

Reason forms

its

is

himself

The

All-

original, this

derivative, the

notions by abstracting

which themselves are abstracted from sensible

perceptions, which latter are produced from the material of our

sense-impressions and the perception-forms (space, time, and causality) of our intellect.

But these are functions of the brain,

which as such presuppose the bodily organism and of development.

Nothing, therefore,

conception of the All-One which,

is

its

stages

more absurd than

that

turning the matter upside

down, seeks to have recognized as the Original, as the absolute

one of the

last links in

the chain of derived and dependent phenomena.

Since, now,

First, that

which

in reality constitutes

original being cannot be anything universal,

it

must be sought

Critique of Kant.

178

Since

in the essence of individuality.

it

does not admit of

being derived or of being known mediately, discerned

immediately,

only to be

our

innermost

Now, the essence of our self-consciousness

being. volition,

is

effort or

the will for this definite life-manifestation, this par-

ticular existence, this will,

in

ourselves,

in

i.e.,

is

it

character.

individuality, this

not as consisting,

so to

It

impelling the consciousness on to a certain stage of manifestation and organization, and hence

is

its

the unconscious

the essence or innermost being of our manifestation,

essence or being of

realm of things in so,

is

is

all

perfectly

appears and objectifies

is will.

gradations

their

evident.

itself in

is

the

Hence the All-One, the

phenomena.

all

original being, or thing-in-itself,

it

bodily

But the very same principle which constitutes

or Uind will.

That

the

but as

consciousness,

say, in

is

The world and are

its

the

phenomenon.

Why and hmo

the will

the phenomenal world, remains

inscrutable.

The founder

He

of this standpoint

is

Schopenhauer (1788-1860).

derives his doctrine immediately from the Kantian doctrine,

and claims to be the only philosopher who has thought out the latter with logical consistency,

cian,

he

opposed

is

Herbart; as

realist

to

and

Fries

and completed ;

it.

As metaphysi-

as Transcendental idealist, to

individualist, to the

idealists

of the

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.

He

System of Identity.

was fond of calling Fichte, Schelling,

and Hegel " the three great sophists,"

whom

he himself was the Philosopher

In his

work,

first

Sufficient

his

its

the

in

in the

comparison with pre-eminent sense.

Fourfold Root of the Principle of

Reason (18 13), he established his point of view; and in

his chief work,

out to

On

179

The World as Will and Idea (1819), he carried

Schopenhauer

logical results.

growing fame

—a

it

lived to see late in life

fame which has survived him, and

still

survives to-day.

III.

The Course of Development

of Post-Kantian

Philosophy. 1.

The

Metaphysical Idealism.

threefold antithesis which

we have

presupposes that the thesis to which firmly adhered to, but

it

delineated necessarily is

opposed

is

not only

wrought out into such comprehensive and

powerful forms that they represent the actual dominating course of development of post-Kantian philosophy.

However

different

may

be, they

the opponents of the thesis and their lines of work all

have one

common

metaphysical idealism,

object of attack i. e.,

that

;

they reject in a body

movement which makes

Critical

or Transcendental idealism into metaphysics, or, what

same

thing,

which seeks

for the original

is

the

ground of phenomena

1

80

within knowing reason. critical

the

of Kant.

Critique

idealism

is

knowledge

This

is

utterly false, says Fries, since

transcendental

our

of

of

transcendental

the

results

not Trans-

this erroneous

con-

and metaphysics, object

ception, which confounds psychology

mode

faculties

From

cendental fa priori), but empirical.

of knowledge and

anthropological, and

not metaphysical, but

of knowledge, by regarding knowledge

Transcendental

as

knowledge, there

"the unfounded assumption of the transcendental," "the

Kantian prejudice," which dominates the entire metaphysical idealism.

This development

is

since the object of metaphysics real

being per

is

independent of

se,

This development

utterly false, says also Herbart,

thinking and knowing.

all

utterly false, says also

is

the knowing reason

not the knowing reason, but

is

Schopenhauer, since

the subjective origin of phenomena, but

by no means their original ground. Nevertheless, metaphysical idealism or the idealistic System

of Identity was the

first

and most

direct

development that

resulted from the Kantian criticism.

Kant himself had not only

indicated this development, but fixed

its

course.

that significant suggestion, that sensibility

He

had given

and understanding,

these two essentially different theoretical faculties, perhaps have a

common, but

to us

unknown, root

;

he had made theoretical

reason dependent upon the practical, and mediated both by the

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.

judgment

reflective intelligible

;

had designated

he

^

the unification of

and empirical character as the theme of the funda-

mental cosmological problem, and the

same

external preception in the

criticism the inquiry

raised

is

Everywhere

it

is

in

the

Kantian

concerning the principle and

unity of our faculties of reason.

unknowable,

thought and

unification of

subject, as that of the funda-

mental psychological problem.

for

i8i

And

since this unity passes

identified with the thing-in-itself,

and

hence with the subject of a metaphysical problem which Kant

The attempt

declared to be insoluble.

from the nature of reason

is

to solve this

of necessity the next

problem step

in

advance.

2.

The Threefold Advance

The problem reason.

is,

Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling,

and Hegel.

to solve a series of antitheses contained in our

these opposing

The deeper and more comprehensive

faculties are, the

common

:

deeper and more comprehensive

root from

which they spring.

is

the unity or

Consequently meta-

physical idealism passes through a series of stadia of develop-

ment, and increases or deepens and broadens with every step grasp of the unity of reason. discover

is

And

since what

we have here

its

to

the origination of our faculties of reason from one

'

Cf. stipra,

Chap. V., Part

II.,

Sec.

I.

1

Critique of Kant.

82

primitive ground, the constant

theme of metaphysical idealism

(which was already formulated in the Critique of Pure Reason) is

the doctrine

of the development of reason.

Within the sphere of the knowing or theoretical faculties of reason there

standing

;

antithesis

the antithesis between sensibility and under-

lies

within the sphere of

all

the faculties of reason, the

between theoretical and practical reason, or between

knowledge and

will

within the sphere of the entire world as

;

rational, the antithesis

between nature and freedom, or between

the sensible and moral orders of the world.

The

question, which

first

with the unity or is

common

shown, as a solution,

from one and the same attempt was

comprehends

least,

is

concerned

root of our theoretical faculties.

how

It

sense and understanding spring

faculty, that of representation.

made by Reinhold (1758-1823)

This

in his Elementar-

philosophie (1789).

The second

question,

more penetrating and

far-reaching, has

to do with all the faculties of reason, the theoretical practical.

In answer,

self-consciousness or

it is

Ego

and the

shown how they spring from the pure (the essence of

which

is

the will) in

accordance with the necessary law of development of the mind, which, whatever

it is

and does,

it

must also perceive and know.

This highly important and decisive advance was

made by Fichte

—

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy. (1762-1814) in his

183

Wissenschaftskhre (i794-i799),i the funda-

mental theme of which

nothing other than

is

the doctrine

of

the

development of mind.

The

third

and most comprehensive question deals with the

unity of the entire rational world, with the sensible

The

common

and moral order of the world, or of nature and freedom.

antithesis

of nature and

spirit

absolute principle of unity, which absolute identity or reason."

is

now

is

world-development,

is

the

designated as " the

This movement

tives in Schelling (1775-1854)

development of reason

be solved by the

to

preference " System of Identity," and finds

its

in the world, or the rationality

doctrine in which they both

The

'

;

1807-18 16.

all

which

it is

is

therefore thought best to retain.

so might be found in the fact that

it

fall

the

agree,

within the

latter, in

best

known by

A farther

the

the

it

is

German

reason for doing

has no good English equivalent.

context perhaps makes sufficiently plain,

of

other developments of post-

Fichte's chief work, the Wissenschaftslehre,

title,

The

principal works of

the two foundation-works of the

These, as

by

chief representa-

the former, so far as they concern this theme, years 1797-1807

calls itself

and Hegel (1770-1831).

before their lines of thought diverge.

years

root of the

a Theory or Science of

As the Know-

ledge.

Reinhold's Elemenlarphilosophie, which sought to supply the principle of unity wanting in Kant's Critiqtte,

German

form.

It is

is

likewise perhaps best retained

a Philosophy of the First Principle.

Tr.

in

the

184

Critique

Kantian philosophy, farther than

The lies in

it

of Kant.

may be done by

hinting at their main features.

chief problem of this monistic and idealistic metaphysics

the solution of the antithesis of nature and

within the sphere of

reason

;

and human

life itself,

in opposition to the intelligible natures itself in life,

as

human

divine.

consists

Beauty and Art.

limited and

The

is in

as

finite,

The

conflict with it is,

and develops

unity of the divine and

human mind,

in the

religious feeling

and devout resignation.

Identity finds

its

representative

appears

unity of man's sensible and

in asthetic freedom,

and experienced

it is felt

or in

nature, then within the sphere

In the nature of man, sense

of the universe.

spirit,

This antithesis must be solved

the knowledge of their unity. first

characterize

not here intended to

is

in

The

human

consists in

aesthetic aspect of

Schiller

the

(1759-1805),

religious in Schleiermacher (1768- 1834.)

In the universe, or in the nature of things as thesis to

be solved

is

likewise two-fold

between the natural and

:

totality,

the more restricted one

intellectual worlds, the

deeper and

comprehensive one between the universe and God. tion of the

first

is

the anti-

The

all-

solu-

attained by the notion of natural-rational

development, which Schelling grasped on the side of Philosophy of Nature and

Theology.

The

^^ilsthetics,

Hegel on the

solution of the second

is

side

of Logic and

effected

by a

theisti-

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy. cally (as

opposed

of God, that in

is,

to pantheism) conceived doctrine

standpoint

Von Baader

ally; Schelling,

(i

is

the world

revelation.

This

765-1 841) sought to carry out mystic-

in his later doctrine

(which claims the cha-

racter of positive philosophy), " historically,"

of Religion;

of development

by a theosophy, the theme of which

God, or the freedom and necessity of divine

185

Krause (1781-1832)

and

as Philosophy

and

rationalistically

onto-

logically.

The fundamental problem was

the re-establishment of the

Kantian principles of knowledge and freedom, or of the natural

and moral orders of the world.

The

the method of establishing these principles or

anthropological

question dealt with

first

Was

:

it

metaphysical

Within the metaphysical development

7

there arose the question of the unity or plurality of principles,

of their reality or ideality.

Within the metaphysical System of

Identity there arose the question respecting the character of the

All-One, respecting will }

God

universal will or

reality or

With the

ideality

individual will

in the world, or the

3.

is

its

world in

Was

God

.''

God

:

it

reason or

or blind will

.?

}

The Order of Post-Kantian Systems.

logical order of post-Kantian systems the historical

also given; the

first is

verified

by

its

agreement with the

1

Critique of Kant.

86

The

second.

first

development of the Critical philosophy must the metaphysical and

necessarily have been

ment

must have developed

it

;

idealistic

move-

and Schelling

in Reinhold, Fichte,

the standpoints of the Elementarphilosophie and the Wissenschaftsthe Philosophy of Nature and

lehre,

before

could

Fries

The

critique."

The

1807.

reached

its

Fries' Neva

of

the

falls

within the

Reason appeared

monistic and idealistic metaphysics must have

culminating point in Schelling and Hegel before

new metaphysics.

his Logic in

" anthropological

his

standpoints

Critique

Herbart could appear and oppose his

them

to

history of these

years 1789- 1800. in

oppose

the System of Identity,

all

monism and

Hegel's Phenomenology

1812-1816.

Herbart's

followed in j8o8, his Introduction

to

same year appeared Schopenhauer's

Main

in 1807,

z.-^-^&'&x&A.

Points of Metaphysics

Philosophy first

idealism with

work.

va.

1813.

When

In the

the latter

published his chief work (1819), Hegel had already made

known

the works which form the foundation of his system, and had

begun

his influential activity as professor in Berlin.

one of

his

Toward no

opponents did Schopenhauer show more hostility

than toward Hegel, since (apart from other grounds of animosity) he saw in him the culmination of that perverted develop-

ment

(the philosophy of identity)

which he called " nonsense."

In the short period of a generation (1790-1820) post-Kantian

Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy. philosophy fixed and wrought out of development, and antitheses. is

its

leading principles, lines

In this development one fact

very noteworthy and significant.

in the first place entirely

187

upon the

The new philosophy authority of Kant, and

rests still

seeks at the time of the appearance of the Wissenscha/lslehre io

be nothing more than the well-understood Kantian doctrine.

With Schelling, however,

it

begins to affect superiority, and

it

soon becomes fashionable to talk of " old Kant," as of past greatness.

Then, on the other hand, as opposed to the three-

movement, there

fold idealistic

arises the threefold antithesis,

own way,

the representatives of which, each in his to Kant.

point back

Fries wants to be a Kantian without sharing the errors

which resulted in " the Kantian assumption " of the

who preceded

him.

Herbart wants to

fulfil

idealists

the demands of the

Kantian criticism by applying them to the Kantian doctrine itself,

and

calls

himself a Kantian from the year 1828.

Schopen-

hauer honours the founder of the Kantian philosophy as his teacher and master, as the greatest of

all

claims to be the one genuine Kantian, the problem of the master to

Thus the Kantian

doctrine

its

thinkers,

who

and himself

has thought out

end, and found the solution.

exercises

a

controlling

power

over the subsequent systems, which describe, so to say, their orbits about

it,

as the centre of motion, and gravitate from

1

88

Critique

of Kant.

aphelion back again to perihelion.

Certainly the present bears

witness that in our time the writings of no philosopher are so

zealously studied, as fountains

of living truth, as are the

works of Kant.

r

^^

.y' \

±,

Printed by Hazell, Watson,

&

Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.

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