K- 710 Professional Ethics by Mr. Lokendra Singh

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW

LEGAL  ETHICS     ACCOUNTABILITY  FOR     LAWYERS  AND     BENCH-­‐BAR     RELATIONS    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW

     

Legal  Ethics  &  Significance       The  word  ethics  is  derived  from  the  Greek  word  ethos  (character),  and  from   the  Latin     word  mores  (customs).  Together  they  combine  to  define  how  individuals   choose  to     interact  with  one  another.  In  philosophy,  ethics  defines  what  is  good  for  the   individual     and  for  society  and  establishes  the  nature  of  duties  that  people  owe   themselves  and     one  another.  The  following  items  are  characteristics  of  ethics:     •Ethics  involves  learning  what  is  right  and  wrong,  and  then  doing  the  right   thing.     •  Most  ethical  decisions  have  extended  consequences.     •  Most  ethical  decisions  have  multiple  alternatives.     •  Most  ethical  decisions  have  mixed  outcomes.     •  Most  ethical  decisions  have  uncertain  consequences.     •  Most  ethical  decisions  have  personal  implications.     Legal  profession  is  noble  profession.  The  nobility  of  the  legal  profession  is      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW maintained  by  the  adherence  and  observance  of  a  set  of  professional  norms  by   those     who  adopt  this  profession.  It  is  knows  as  legal  ethics  or  the  ethics  of  the  legal     profession.  The  fundamental  of  the  legal  ethics  is  to  maintain  the  owner  and   dignity  of     the  law  profession,  to  secure  a  spirit  of  friendly  cooperation  between  Bench   and  Bar     in  the  promotion  of  highest  standard  of  justice,  to  establish  honorable  and   fairdealings  of  the  counsel  with  his  client,  opponent  and  witness,  to  establish  a   spirit  of  brotherhood  with  bar.  

ETHICS  OF  LEGAL  PROFESSION     Meaning,  Nature  and  Need       Professional  ethics  are  a  set  of  norms  or  codes  of  conduct,  set  by  people  in  a   specific     profession.  A  code  of  ethics  is  developed  for  each  profession.  Suppose  you   write     articles  in  a  newspaper.  Professional  ethics  require  that  you  verify  facts  before   you       People  are  surprised  when  they  hear  that  lawyers  are  expected  to  follow   professional      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW ethics  and  that  they  are  accountable  for  dishonest,  irresponsible  and   unprofessional     behavior.  Further,  most  people  do  not  know  that  lawyers  in  India  can  lose  the   license     to  practice  if  they  are  found  guilty  of  unethical  practices  that  tarnish  the   dignity  of     their  profession.  A  lawyer  must  adhere  to  the  professional  norms,  for  fair   dealing  with     his  client  and  to  maintain  the  dignity  of  the  profession       The  Bar  Council  of  India  is  a  statutory  body  that  regulates  and  represents  the   Indian     bar.  It  was  created  by  Parliament  under  the  Advocates  Act,  1961.  It   prescribes     standards  of  professional  conduct  and  etiquette  and  exercises  disciplinary   jurisdiction.     It  sets  standards  for  legal  education  and  grants  recognition  to  Universities   whose     degree  in  will  serve  as  a  qualification  for  students  to  enroll  themselves  as   advocates     upon  graduation.  

   

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW

    PROFESSIONAL  ETHICS      

Section  49(1)(c)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  empowers  the  Bar  Council   of  India  to     make  rules  so  as  to  prescribe  the  standards  of  professional  conduct  and   etiquette  to  be     observed  by  the  advocates.  It  has  been  made  clear  that  such  rules  shall  have   only     when  they  are  approved  by  the  Chief  Justice  of  India.  It  has  been  made  clear   that  any     rules  made  in  relation  to  the  standards  of  professional  conduct  and  etiquette   to  be     observed  by  the  advocates  and  in  force  before  the  commencement  of  the   Advocates     (Amendment)  Act,  1973,  shall  continue  in  force,  until  altered  or  repealed  or   amended     in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  act.        

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Chapter  II  of  part  VI  of  the  rules  framed  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India  deals  with   the     standards  of  professional  conduct  and  etiquette.  It  contains  several  rules   which  lay     down  the  standards  of  professional  conduct  and  etiquette.  These  rules  specify   the     duties  of  an  advocate  to  the  Court,  client,  opponent  and  colleagues,  etc.       The  rules  mentioned  in  chapter  II  of  part  VI  of  the  rules  of  Bar  Council  of  India   may     be  discussed  as  follow-­‐    

       

Duty  towards  court        

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW The  Bar  Council  of  India  has  made  certain  rules  so  as  to  prescribe  duties  of  an     advocate  to  the  court.  Such  duties  may  be  explained  as  follow       1)  During  the  presentation  the  case  and  while  acting  otherwise  as  an  advocate     before  the  court  it  is  required  to  conduct  himself  with  dignity  and  self     respect.  It  is  his  duty  to  submit  his  grievances  to  the  proper  authority.  The     rule  empowers  the  advocate  to  make  complaint  against  judicial  officer  but     it  should  be  submitted  to  proper  authority.     2)  An  advocate  is  required  to  maintain  towards  the  court  respectful  attitude     bearing  in  mind  that  the  dignity  of  judicial  office  is  essential  for  survival     of  free  community.       3)  Rule  has  made  it  clear  that  no  advocate  shall  influence  the  decision  of  the     court  by  any  illegal  means.  It  prohibits  the  private  communication  with  the     judge  relating  to  pending  case.  If  any  advocate  attempt  to  influence  the     decision  of  court  by  illegal  means  then  it  may  amount  to  misconduct.       4)  The  rule  requires  the  advocate  to  use  his  best  effort  to  restrain  and  prevent      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW his  client  from  resorting  to  sharp  or  unfair  practice  opposite  from  council     or  parties  which  the  advocate  himself  ought  not  to  do.       5)  An  advocate  shall  appear  in  court  at  all  times  only  in  the  prescribe  dress     and  his  appearance  shall  always  be  presentable.       6)  An  advocate  shall  not  enter  appearance  act,  plead,  or  practice  in  any  way     before  a  court,  tribunal,  or  authority  mentioned  in  section  30  of  the     Advocates  Act,  1961  if  the  sole  or  any  member  thereof  is  related  to  the     advocate  as  father,  nephew,  grandfather,  son,  grandson,  uncle,  brother,     first  cousin,  husband,  mother,  wife,  daughter,  sister,  niece,  sister-­‐in-­‐law,     mother-­‐in-­‐law,  and  father-­‐in-­‐law.       7)  The  rule  requires  the  advocate  not  to  wear  bands  or  gowns  in  public  place   other  than  in  court  except  on  such  ceremonial  occasions  and  at  such  places  as   the  Bar  Council  of  India  and  the  court  may  prescribe.     8)  The  rule  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  appear  in  or  before  any  court     or  tribunal  or  any  other  authority  for  or  against  an  organization,  institution,     society,  or  corporation  if  he  is  a  member  of  executive  committee  of  such     organization,  institution,  society,  or  corporation.      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW   9)  An  advocate  shall  not  act  or  plead  in  any  matter  in  which  he  himself  has     some  pecuniary  interest.      

Duty  towards  Client       Rule  11  to  33  deal  with  the  duties  of  an  advocate  to  his  client.  These  rules  may   be     explained  as  follow     10)  Rule  11  provides  that  an  advocate  is  bound  to  accept  any  brief  in  the  court     or  tribunal  or  before  any  authority  which  he  proposes  to  practice  at  fee   consistent  with  his  standing  at  bar  and  also  nature  of  case.     11)  Rule  12  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  withdraw  from  engagement     once  accepted  without  sufficient  cause  and  unless  reasonable  and     sufficient  notice  given  to  the  client.       12)  Rule  13  provides  that  an  advocate  should  not  accept  the  brief  or  appear  in     a  case  in  which  he  has  reason  to  believe  that  he  will  be  a  witness.      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW   13)  Rule  14  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  at  the  commencement  of  his     engagement  and  during  the  continuance  thereof  make  all  such  full  and     frank  disclosure  to  his  client  relating  to  his  connection  with  the  parties  and     any  interest  in  or  about  the  controversy  as  are  likely  to  affect  his  client’s     judgment  in  either  engaging  him  or  continuing  the  engagement.       14)  Rule  15  provides  that  it  is  the  duty  of  an  advocate  to  uphold  the  interest  of     his  client  fearlessly  by  all  fair  and  honorable  means  without  regard  to  any     unpleasant  consequences  to  himself  or  to  any  other.       15)  Rule  16  provides  that  an  advocate  appearing  for  the  prosecution  of     criminal  trial  shall  so  conduct  the  prosecution  that  it  does  not  lead  to     conviction  of  an  innocent.       16)  Rule  17  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  commit  directly  or  indirectly   any  breach  of  the  obligation  imposed  by  section  126  of  Indian  Evidence  Act.     17)  Rule  18  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  at  any  time  be  a  party  to  the     fomenting  litigation.      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 18)  Rule  19  makes  it  clear  that  an  advocate  shall  not  act  on  the  instruction  of     any  person  other  than  his  client  or  his  authorized  agent.     19)  Rule  20  provides  that  the  fee  of  an  advocate  depending  upon  the  success     of  the  sue  he  is  considered  as  oppose  to  public  policy.  Contract  for     contingent  fee  is  also  hit  by  section  23  of  the  Indian  Contract  Act.     20)  Rule  21  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  buy  or  traffic  in  or  stipulate  for   or  agree  to  receive  any  share  or  interest  in  any  actionable  claim.       21)  Rule  22  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  directly  or  indirectly  bid  foe  or     purchase  either  in  his  own  name  or  any  other  name  for  his  own  benefit  or     benefit  of  any  other  person,  any  property  sold  in  execution  of  decree  or     other  proceeding  in  which  he  was  professionally  engaged.       22)  Rule  23  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  adjust  fee  payable  to  him  by     his  client  against  his  own  personal  property  or  liability  to  the  client  which     liability  does  not  arise  in  course  of  his  employment  as  an  advocate.       23)  Rule  24  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  do  anything  whereby  he     abuses  or  take  advantage  of  the  confidence  repose  in  him  by  his  client.    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW   24)  Rule  25  provides  that  an  advocate  should  keep  an  account  of  clients     money  entrusted  to  him  and  accounts  should  show  amount  received  from     the  client  or  on  his  behalf  the  expenses  incurred  for  him  and  the  debits     made  on  account  of  fees  with  the  respective  dates  and  all  other  necessary   particulars.       25)  Rule  26  provides  that  where  money  are  received  from  or  on  account  of     client,  the  entries  in  the  account  should  contain  a  reference  as  to  whether     the  amount  have  been  received  for  fees  or  expenses  and  during  the  course     of  the  proceeding  no  advocate  shall  accept  with  the  consent  in  writing  of     the  client  concerned  be  at  liberty  to  divert  any  portion  of  the  expenses     towards  fee.       26)  Rule  27  provides  that  where  any  amount  is  received  or  given  to  him  on     behalf  of  his  client,  the  fact  of  such  receipt  must  be  intimated  to  the  client     as  early  as  possible.  If  the  client  demands  the  payment  of  such  money  and     in  spite  of  such  demand  the  advocate  does  not  pay  him,  he  will  be  guilty  of     professional  misconduct.      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW   27)  Rule  28  provides  that  after  termination  of  the  proceeding  the  advocate     shall  be  at  liberty  to  appropriate  towards  the  settle  fee  due  to  him  any  sum     remaining  unexpanded  out  of  the  amount  paid  or  send  to  him  for  expenses     or  any  amount  that  has  come  into  his  hands  in  that  proceeding.       28)  Rule  29  provides  that  if  the  fee  has  been  left  unsettled  the  advocate  can   deduct  out  of  any  money  of  the  client  remaining  in  his  hand  at  the  termination   of  the  proceeding  for  which  he  had  been  engaged.       29)  Rule  30  provides  that  the  copy  of  clients  account  shall  be  furnish  to  him     on  demand  provided  the  necessary  charges  are  paid.       30)  Rule  31  requires  an  advocate  not  to  enter  into  arrangements  whereby     funds  in  his  hands  are  converted  into  loans.  It  makes  it  clear  that  an     advocate  shall  not  enter  into  arrangements  whereby  funds  in  his  hands  are     converted  into  loans.       31)  Rule  32  prohibits  an  advocate  to  lend  money  to  his  client  for  the  purpose     of  any  action  for  legal  proceeding  in  which  he  is  engaged  by  such  client.  It      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  lend  money  to  his  client  foe  the     purpose  of  any  action  or  legal  proceeding  in  which  he  is  engaged  by  such     client.     32)  Rule  33  provides  that  an  advocate  who  has  at  any  time  advice  in     connection  with  the  institution  of  the  suit  appeal  or  matter  as  drawn  .  

 

Duty  towards  opponent       Rule  34  and  35  framed  by  the  Bar  council  of  India  contain  provisions  as  to  the   duties     of  an  advocate  to  the  opponent.       Rule  34  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  in  any  way  communicate  or   negotiate     upon  the  subject  matter  of  controversy  with  any  party  represented  by  an   advocate     except  through  that  advocate.     Rule  35  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  do  his  best  to  carry  out  all  legitimate   promises    

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW made  to  the  opposite  party  even  though  not  reduced  to  writing  or  enforceable   under     the  rules  of  the  court.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  advocate  not  to  engage  in  discussion   or     argument  about  the  subject  of  the  dispute  with  the  opposite  party  without   notice  of  his     counsel.  Resolution  43  of  Hoffman  provides“I  will  never  enter  into  any   conversation  with  my  opponent’s  client  relative  to  his  claim  or  defence,  except   with  the  consent  and  in  the  presence  of  his  counsel.”    

Other  duties       1)  Rule  40  requires  every  advocate  on  the  rolls  of  the  State  Bar  Council  to  pay  a     certain  sum  to  the  state  bar  council.  Rule  41  provides  that  all  the  sums  so     collected  by  the  state  bar  council  shall  be  credited  in  a  separate  fund  to  be     known  as  “Bar  Council  of  India  Advocates  welfare  fund  for  the  State”  and     shall  be  deposited  in  the  bank  as  provided  there  under.  According  to  rule  41(2)     the  Bar  Council  of  India  Advocates  Welfare  fund  Committee  for  the  State     shall  remit  20%  of  the  total  amount  collected  and  credited  to  its  account,  to   the     bar  council  of  India  by  the  end  of  every  month  which  shall  be  credited  by  the      Bar  council  of  India  and  the  Bar  council  of  India  shall  deposit  the  said  amount      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW in  a  separate  fund  to  be  known  as  “Bar  Council  of  India  Advocates  Welfare     fund.”     According  to  rule  41(3)  the  rest  80%  of  the  total  sum  so  collected  by  the  Bar     Council  of  India  Advocate  Welfare  Fund  Committee  for  the  state  shall  be     utilized  for  the  welfare  of  the  advocates  in  respect  of  welfare  schemes     sponsored  by  the  respective  State  Bar  Council.     Rule  42  deals  with  the  consequences  of  non  payment  of  the  said  amount  by   the     advocate.  It  provides  that  if  an  advocate  fails  to  pay  the  aforesaid  sum  within     the  prescribed  time,  the  secretary  of  the  State  Bar  Council  shall  issue  to  him  a     notice  to  show  cause  within  a  month  why  his  right  to  practice  be  not     suspended.  In  case  the  advocate  pays  the  amount  together  with  late  fee  within     the  period  specified  in  notice,  the  proceeding  shall  be  dropped.  If  the  advocate     does  not  pay  the  amount  or  fails  to  show  sufficient  cause,  a  committee  of   three     members  constituted  by  the  state  bar  council  in  this  behalf  may  pass  an  order     suspending  the  right  of  the  advocate  to  practice.     Rule  43  provides  that  an  advocate  who  has  been  convicted  of  an  offence     mentioned  under  section  24-­‐A  of  the  Advocates  Act  or  has  been  declared     insolvent  or  has  taken  full  time  service  or  part  time  service  or  engages  in      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW business  or  any  avocation  inconsistent  with  his  practicing  as  an  advocate  or     has  incurred  any  disqualification  mentioned  in  the  Advocates  Act  or  the  rules     made  there  under,  shall  send  a  declaration  to  the  effect  to  the  respective  state     bar  council  in  which  the  advocate  is  enrolled,  within  90  days  from  the  date  of     such  disqualification.     Rule  44  provides,  an  appeal  shall  lie  to  the  bar  council  of  India  at  the  instance     of  an  aggrieved  advocate  within  a  period  of  30  days  from  the  date  of  the  order     passed  under  rule  42  and  43.     Rule  44-­‐A  provides  that  there  shall  be  a  Bar  council  of  India  Advocates     Welfare  Committee  consisting  of  five  members  elected  from  amongst  the     members  of  the  council.  The  term  of  the  members  of  the  committee  shall  be     co-­‐extensive  with  their  term  in  the  Bar  Council  of  India.  Rule  44-­‐b  makes  it     clear  that  the  Bar  Council  of  India  shall  utilise  the  funds  received  under  rule     41(2),  stated  above,  in  accordance  with  the  scheme  which  may  be  framed  from     time  to  time.     2)  Duty  in  imparting  training  –  rule  45  framed  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India     makes  it  clear  that  it  is  improper  for  an  advocate  to  demand  or  accept  fees  or     any  premium  from  any  person  as  a  consideration  for  imparting  training  in  law     under  the  rules  prescribed  by  the  State  Bar  Council  to  enable  such  person  to      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW qualify  for  enrolment  under  the  Advocates  Act,  1961       3)  Duty  to  render  legal  aid  –  rule  46  provides  that  every  advocate  shall  in     practice  of  the  profession  of  law  bear  in  mind  that  any  one  genuinely  in  need     of  a  lawyer  is  entitled  to  legal  assistance  even  though  he  cannot  pay  for  it  fully     or  adequately  and  that  within  the  limits  of  an  advocates  economic  condition,     free  legal  assistance  to  the  indigent  and  oppressed  is  one  of  the  highest     obligation,  as  an  advocate  owes  to  the  society.     4)  Restriction  on  other  employment  –  rules  47,  48,  49,  50,  51  and  52  deals  with     the  restrictions  on  other  employment.  Rule  47  provides  that  an  advocate  shall     not  personally  engage  in  any  business  but  he  may  be  a  sleeping  partner  in  a     firm  doing  business  provided  that  in  the  opinion  of  the  appropriate  state  bar     council  the  nature  of  the  business  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  dignity  of  the     profession.  Rule  48  makes  it  clear  that  an  advocate  may  be  director  or     chairman  of  the  board  of  directors  of  a  company  with  or  without  any  ordinary     sitting  fees,  provided  none  of  his  duties  are  of  executive  character.  An     advocate  shall  not  be  a  managing  director  or  a  secretary  of  any  company.  Rule     49  provides  that  an  advocate  shall  not  be  a  full  time  salaried  employee  of  any     person,  government,  firm,  corporation  or  concern,  so  long  as  he  continues  to      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW practice  and  shall  taking  up  any  such  employment  intimate  the  fact  to  the  bar     council  on  whose  roll  his  name  appears  and  shall  thereupon  cease  to  practice     as  an  advocate  so  long  as  he  continues  in  such  employment.  Rule  50  provides     that  an  advocate  who  has  inherited  or  succeeded  by  survivorship,  to  a  family     business  may  continue  it,  but  may  not  personally  participate  in  the   management  thereof.  

Legal Profession in India The history of the legal profession in India can be traced back to the establishment of the First British Court in Bombay in 1672 by Governor Aungier. The admission of attorneys was placed in the hands of the Governor-in-Council and not with the Court. Prior to the establishment of the Mayor’s Courts in 1726 in Madras and Calcutta, there were no legal practitioners.  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW The Mayor’s Courts, established in the three presidency towns, were Crown Courts with right of appeal first to the Governor-inCouncil and a right of second appeal to the Privy Council. In 1791, Judges felt the need of experience, and thus the role of an attorney to protect the rights of his client was upheld in each of the Mayor’s Courts. This was done in spite of opposition from Council members or the Governor. A second principle was also established during the period of the Mayor’s Courts. This was the right to dismiss an attorney guilty of misconduct. The first example of dismissal was recorded by the Mayor’s Court at Madras which dismissed attorney Jones. The Supreme Court of Judicature was established by a Royal Charter in 1774. The Supreme Court was established as there was dissatisfaction with the weaknesses of the Court of the Mayor. Similar Supreme Courts were established in Madras in 1801 and Bombay in 1823. The first barristers appeared in India after the opening of the Supreme Court in Calcutta in 1774. As barristers began to come into the Courts on work as advocates, the attorneys gave up pleading and worked as solicitors. The two grades of legal practice gradually became distinct and separate as they were in England. Madras gained its first barrister in 1778 with Mr. Benjamin Sullivan. Thus, the establishment of the Supreme Court brought recognition, wealth and prestige to the legal profession. The charters of the Court stipulated that the Chief Justice and three puisne Judges be English barristers of at least 5 years standing. The charters empowered the Court to approve, admit and enrol advocates and attorneys to plead and act on behalf of suitors. They also gave the Court the authority to remove lawyers from the roll of the Court on reasonable cause and to prohibit practitioners not  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW properly admitted and enrolled from practising in the Court. The Court maintained the right to admit, discipline and dismiss attorneys and barristers. Attorneys were not admitted without recommendation from a high official in England or a Judge in India. Permission to practice in Court could be refused even to a barrister. In contrast to the Courts in the presidency towns, the legal profession in the mofussil towns was established, guided and controlled by legislation. In the Diwani Courts, legal practice was neither recognized nor controlled, and practice was carried on by vakils and agents. Vakils had even been appearing in the Courts of the Nawabs and there were no laws concerning their qualification, relationship to the Court, mode of procedure of ethics or practice. There were two kinds of agents – a. untrained relatives or servants of the parties in Court and b. professional pleaders who had training in either Hindu or Muslim law. Bengal Regulation VII of 1793 was enacted as it was felt that in order to administer justice, Courts, must have pleading of causes administered by a distinct profession Only men of character and education, well versed in the Mohamedan or Hindu law and in the Regulations passed by the British Government, would be admitted to plead in the Courts. They should be subjected to rules and restrictions in order to discharge their work diligently and faithfully by upholding the client’s trust. Establishment of the High Courts In 1862, the High Courts started by the Crown were established at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. The High Court Bench was designed to combine Supreme Court and Sudder Court traditions. This was done to unite the legal learning and judicial experience of the English barristers with the intimate experience of civil servants in matters of Indian customs, usages and laws possessed by the civil servants. Each of the High Courts was given the power to make  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW rules for the qualifications of proper persons, advocates, vakils and attorneys at Bar. The admission of vakils to practice before the High Courts ended the monopoly that the barristers had enjoyed in the Supreme Courts. It greatly extended the practice and prestige of the Indian laws by giving them opportunities and privileges equal to those enjoyed for many years by the English lawyers. The learning of the best British traditions of Indian vakils began in a guru-shishya tradition: “Men like Sir V. Bashyam Ayyangar, Sir T. Muthuswamy Ayyar and Sir S. Subramania Ayyar were quick to learn and absorb the traditions of the English Bar from their English friends and colleagues in the Madras Bar and they in turn as the originators of a long line of disciples in the Bar passed on those traditions to the disciples who continued to do the good work.” Additional High Courts were established in Allahabad (1886), Patna (1916), and Lahore (1919). There were six grades of legal practice in India after the founding of the High Courts – a) Advocates, b) Attorneys (Solicitors), c) Vakils of High Courts, d) Pleaders, e) Mukhtars, f) Revenue Agents. The Legal Practitioners Act of 1879 in fact brought all the six grades of the profession into one system under the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The Legal Practitioners Act and the Letters Patent of the High Courts formed the chief legislative governance of legal practitioners in the subordinate Courts in the country until the Advocates Act, 1961 was enacted. In order to be a vakil, the candidate had to study at a college or university, master the use of English and pass a vakil’s examination. By 1940, a vakil was required to be a graduate with an LL.B. from a university in India in addition to three other certified requirements. The certificate should be proof that a. he had passed in the examination b. read in the chamber of a qualified lawyer and was of a good character. In fact, Sir Sunder Lal, Jogendra Nath  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Chaudhary, Ram Prasad and Moti Lal Nehru were all vakils who were raised to the rank of an Advocate. Original and appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Courts of the three presidency towns had an original side. The original side included major civil and criminal matters which had been earlier heard by predecessor Supreme Courts. On the original side in the High Courts, the solicitor and barrister remained distinct i.e. attorney and advocate. On the appellate side every lawyer practiced as his own attorney. However, in Madras the vakils started practice since 1866. In 1874, the barristers challenged their right to do original side work. However, in 1916, this right was firmly established in favour of the vakils. Similarly, vakils in Bombay and Calcutta could be promoted as advocates and become qualified to work on the original side. By attending the appellate side and original side Courts each for one year, a vakil of 10 years service in the Court was permitted to sit for the advocates’examination. Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926. The Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 was passed to unify the various grades of legal practice and to provide self-government to the Bars attached to various Courts. The Act required that each High Court must constitute a Bar Council made up of the Advocate General, four men nominated by the High Court of whom two should be Judges and ten elected from among the advocates of the Bar. The duties of the Bar Council were to decide all matters concerning legal education, qualification for enrolment, discipline and control of the profession. It was favourable to the advocates as it gave them authority previously held by the judiciary to regulate the membership and discipline of their profession.  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW The Advocates Act, 1961 was a step to further this very initiative. As a result of the Advocates Act, admission, practice, ethics, privileges, regulations, discipline and improvement of the profession as well as law reform are now significantly in the hands of the profession itself. PROFESSIONAL  ETHICS  &  BAR-­‐BENCH  RELATIONS   TOPIC  –  Admission,  Enrolment  &  Rights  of  Advocates   Section  24  of  Advocates  Act,  1961  lays  down  the  categories  of  persons  who  are  eligible     being  admitted  as  advocates  on  the  State  roll.  The  persons  applying  for  such  admission     has  to  fulfil  certain  conditions  briefed  below:   a)    Citizen  of  India  –  Sec  24(1)(a)  of  the  Act  provides  that  the  person  concerned  should     be  a  citizen  of  India.  Even  the  nationals  of  other  country  are  permitted  to  practice     law  in  our  country  and  may  be  admitted  as  an  advocate  on  a  State  roll;  if  citizens  of     India,  duly  qualified,  are  permitted  to  practice  law  in  that  other  country.  The  person     desiring  to  practice  law  in  India  as  such  has  to  fulfil  the  other  conditions  as  well  as     have  been  laid  down  in  Advocates  Act,  1961.   b)    Age  -­‐  Sec  24(1)(b)  of  the  Act  provides  that  the  person  concerned  should  have     completed  the  age  of  21  years.   c)    Degree  of  Law  -­‐  Sec  24(1)(c)  of  the  Act  provides  that  the  person  should  have     obtained  the  degree  in  law  -­‐(i)  before  the  12th  day  of  March,  1967,  from  any  University  in   the  territory  of  India;  or   (ii)  before  the  15th  August,  1947,  from  any  University  in  any  area  which  was  comprised     before  that  date  within  India  as  defined  by  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935;  or    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW (iii)  after  the  12th  day  of  March,  1967,  save  as  provided  in  sub-­‐clause  (iiia),  after     undergoing  a  three  year  course  of  study  in  law  from  any  University  in  India  which  is     recognised  for  the  purposes  of  this  Act  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India;  or     (iiia)  after  undergoing  a  course  of  study  in  law,  the  duration  of  which  is  not  less  than     two  academic  years  commencing  from  the  academic  year  1967-­‐68  or  any  earlier     academic  year  from  any  University  in  India  which  is  recognised  for  the  purposes  of  this     Act  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India;  or   (iv)  in  any  other  case,  from  any  University  outside  the  territory  of  India,  if  the  degree  is     recognised  for  the  purposes  of  this  Act  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India  or;  he  is  barrister     and  is  called  to  the  Bar  on  or  before  the  31st  day  of  December,  1976  or  has  passed  the     article  clerks  examination  or  any  other  examination  specified  by  the  High  Court  at     Bombay  or  Calcutta  for  enrolment  as  an  attorney  of  that  High  Court;  or  has  obtained     such  other  foreign  qualification  in  law  as  is  recognised  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India  for     the  purpose  of  admission  as  an  advocate  under  this  Act;   d)    Fulfilment  of  Other  Conditions  -­‐  Sec  24(1)(e)  of  the  Act  provides  that  the  person     concerned  should  fulfil  such  other  conditions  as  may  be  specified  in  the  rules  made     by  the  State  Bar  Council;   e)    Payment  of  Stamp  Duty  -­‐  Sec  24(1)(f)  of  the  Act  states  that  the  person  concerned     has  to  pay  in  respect  of  the  enrolment,  stamp  duty,  if  any,  chargeable  under  the     Indian  Stamp  Act,  1899  (2  of  1899),  and  an  enrolment  fee  of  Rs.  600/-­‐  (Rupees  Six      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Hundred  Only)  payable  to  the  State  Bar  Council  and  Rs.  150/-­‐    (Rupees  One     Hundred  Fifty  Only)  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India,  by  way  of  a  bank  draft  drawn  in     favour  of  that  Council:   Provided  that  where  such  person  is  a  member  of  the  Schedule  Castes  or  the     Schedule  Tribes  and  produces  a  certificate  to  that  effect  from  such  authority  as  may     be  prescribed,  the  enrolment  fee  payable  by  him  to  the  State  Bar  Council  shall  be     Rs.100/-­‐  (Rupees  One  Hundred  Only)  and  Rs.  25/-­‐  (Rupees  Twenty  Five  Only)  to     the  Bar  Council  of  India.   The  Bar  Council  may  prescribe  the  qualifications  for  the  purpose  of  admission  as  an     advocate  on  a  State  roll  in  addition  to  qualifications  provided  under  Section  24(1)(c)  but  it     would  not  mean  that  such  qualification  would  go  counter  to  the  section  as  mentioned       above.  The  Advocates  Act,  1961  expressly  authorises  the  Bar  Council  of  India  to  add  such     other  conditions  by  making  appropriate  rules.   The  provisions  of  Section  24(1)(f)    of  the  Act  fixes  enrolment  fee  which  is  not     unconstitutional.  The  Bar  Council  of  India  is  entitled  to  charge  enrolment  fee  within  the     limits  determined  by  the  Parliament.  There  is  no  constitutional  vice  in  fixing  the  enrolment     fee  to  the  extent  it  has  been  fixed  by  Parliament  under  the  Act.  The  Bar  Council,  in  the     instant  case,  was  not  permitted  to  recover  such  renewal  fee  from  Advocates.  It  could     recover  renewal  fee  only  when  authorised  by  an  Act  of  Parliament.   According  to  Sec  25  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  the  application  for  admission  as  an      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW advocate  shall  be  made  to  the  State  Bar  Council  within  whose  jurisdiction  the  applicant     wishes  to  practice.     Reference  of  application  to  Enrolment  Committee:  Sec  26(1)  of  the  said  Act  contains     the  provision  that  a  State  Bar  Council  shall  refer  every  application  for  admission  as  an     advocate  to  its  enrolment  committee,  and  subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub-­‐sections  (2)  and     (3)  and  to  any  direction  that  may  be  given  in  writing  by  the  State  Bar  Council  in  this  behalf,     such  committee  shall  dispose  of  the  application  in  the  prescribed  manner:   Provided  that  the  Bar  Council  of  India  may,  if  satisfied,  either  on  a  reference  made  to  it  in     this  behalf  or  otherwise,  that  any  person  has  got  his  name  entered  on  the  roll  of  advocates     by  misrepresentation  as  to  an  essential  fact  or  by  fraud  or  undue  influence,  remove  the     name  of  such  person  from  the  roll  of  advocates  after  giving  him  an  opportunity  of  being     heard.   Refusal  of  Application:  Sec  26(2)  Where  the  enrolment  committee  of  a  State  Bar  Council     proposes  to  refuse  any  such  application,  it  shall  refer  the  application  for  opinion  to  the  Bar     Council  of  India  and  every  such  reference  shall  be  accompanied  by  a  statement  of  the     grounds  in  support  of  the  refusal  of  the  application.   Disposal  of  Application  in  conformity  with  Opinion  of  Bar  Council  of  India:  Sec  26(3)   The  enrolment  committee  of  a  State  Bar  Council  shall  dispose  of  any  application  referred     to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  under  subsection  (2)  in  conformity  with  the  opinion  of  the  Bar     Council  of  India.   Communication  of  Refusal:  Sec  26(4)  Where  the  enrolment  committee  of  a  State  Bar      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Council  has  refused  any  application  for  admission  as  an  advocate  on  its  roll,  the  State  Bar     Council  shall,  as  soon  as  may  be,  send  intimation  to  all  other  State  Bar  Councils  about     such  refusal  stating  the  name,  address  and  qualifications  of  the  person  whose  application   was  refused  and  the  grounds  for  the  refusal.   Disqualifications  for  Enrolment:    (Sec  24A)    of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961    lays  down     certain  conditions,  the  existence  of  which  may  disqualify  a  person  from  being  enrolled  as     an  advocate  as  below  –   (a)  The  person  concerned  should  not  be  convicted  of  an  offence  involving  moral     turpitude;   (b)    The    person  concerned  should  not  be    convicted  of  an  offence  under  the     provisions  of  the  Untouchability  (Offences)  Act,  1955  (22  of  1955);   (c)  The  person  concerned  should  not  be  dismissed  or  removed  from  employment  or     office  under  the  State  on  any  charge  involving  moral  turpitude.   Provided  that  the  disqualification  for  enrolment  as  aforesaid  shall  cease  to  have  effect  after     a  period  of  2  years  has  elapsed  since  his  release  or  dismissal  or,  as  the  case  may  be,     removal.   The  legislature,  even  at  that  stage  does  not  appear  to  have  thought  of  introducing  a     statutory  amendment  to  impose  any  ceiling  limit  based  on  the  introduction  of  an  upper  age     to  operate  as  a  disqualifying  factor  against  a  person  from  getting  enrolled  into  the  State     rolls.   In  the  case  of  Sampath  Kumar  J  Versus  Bar  Council  of  India  (1995)  before  Madras      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW High  Court,   Facts:  The  rule  which  was  the  effect  of  putting  an  axe  on  the  right  of  a  person,  who     otherwise  eligible  to  be  enrolled  as  an  advocate  has  the  consequence  of  substance,     prescribing  disqualification.  The  prescription  of  an  upper  age  with  ceiling  limit  of  45  years     per  se  operates,  as  a  permanent  disqualification  for  a  person  otherwise  entitled  to  get     enrolled  as  an  advocate.   Held  that:  It  may  not  be  permissible  for  the  Bar  Council  of  India  to  superimpose  a  further     qualification  by  putting  an  upper  age  limit  so  as  to  disqualify  or  render  ineligible  a  person,     though  otherwise  qualified  from  being  enrolled  merely  on  grounds  of  having  reached  a     particular  maximum  age  limit  prescribed  under  rules.   As  per  (Sec  26A)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  a  State  Bar  Council  may  remove  from  the     State  roll  the  name  of  any  advocate  who  is  dead  or  from  whom  a  request  has  been     received  to  that  effect.   Enrolment  of  an  Advocate:  As  per  the  (Section  22)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  the     State  Bar  Council  issues  a  certificate  of  enrolment.  It  is  to  be  issued  in  the  prescribed  form     to  every  person  whose  name  is  entered  in  the  State  roll  of  advocates.   If  there  is  any  change  in  the  place  of  permanent  address  of  the  advocate  the  same  is  to  be     intimated  to  the  State  Bar  Council  within  90  days  of  such  change.  The  enrolment  as  an     advocate  cannot  be  denied  to  a  law  graduate,  merely  because  he/she  had  undertaken     some  other  course  of  instruction  during  the  time  when  he/she  was  studying  in  law  classes     for  a  law  degree.    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW It  has  been  held  by  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  of  India  in  case  reported  in  1973,  that  Uttar     Pradesh  State  Legislature  is  competent  to  legislate  and  impose  stamp  duty  on  the     certificate  of  enrolment  under  (Sec  22)  to  be  issued  by  the  State  Bar  Council  of  Uttar     Pradesh.   Classes  of  Advocates:  As  per  the  Sec  16(1)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  there  are  two     classes  of  advocates,  namely  Senior  Advocates  and  Other  Advocates.  Sec  16(2)  states     that,  if  the  Supreme  Court  or  a  High  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  particular  advocate     possesses  ability,  standing  at  the  Bar  or  special  knowledge  or  experience  in  law,  and  if  the     advocate  concerned  consents  so,  he/she  may  be  designated  as  Senior  Advocate.   Certain  restrictions  for  Senior  Advocates:  According  to  Sec  16(3)  of  the  Advocates  Act,     1961  the  Bar  Council  of  India  may  prescribe  certain  restrictions  in  the  matter  of  practice  of     senior  advocates.  They  are  as  below  –   Ø    An  advocate  who  has  been  designated  as  senior  advocate  cannot  file  a     vakalatnama  or  act  in  any  Court  or  Tribunal  or  before  any  person  or  authority  as  laid     down  in  Section  30  of  the  said  Act.   Ø    The  senior  advocate  cannot  directly  appear  before  the  Court  or  Tribunal  or  before     any  person  or  authority  mentioned  in  Section  30  of  the  said  Act.  He  can  appear  only     through  an  advocate  in  Part-­‐II  of  the  State  roll.   Ø    The  senior  advocate  can  neither  accept  instructions  to  draft  pleading  or  affidavits,     advice,  on  evidence,  nor  he  can  do  any  drafting  work  of  an  analogous  kind  in  any     Court  or  Tribunal  or  before  any  person  or  authority  as  mentioned  in  Section  30,  nor      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW can  he  undertake  conveyance  work  of  any  kind.   Ø    A  senior  advocate  is  free  to  make  concessions  or  give  undertaking  in  the  course  of     argument  on  behalf  of  his  clients  provided  there  are  instructions  from  junior     advocate.   Ø    A  senior  advocate  is  not  free  to  directly  accept  from  any  client  any  brief  instructions     for  the  purpose  of  appearing  before  any  Court  or  Tribunal  or  before  any  person  or     other  authority  in  India.   Ø    The  advocate  who  has  acted  as  a  junior  advocate  in  a  given  case  cannot  after  his     becoming  a  senior  advocate  advises  on  grounds  of  appeal  in  a  Court  of  appeal  or  in     the  Supreme  Court  or  an  advocate  in  Part-­‐II  of  the  State  roll.   Ø    A  senior  advocate  may  in  recognition  of  the  services  rendered  by  an  advocate  in     Part-­‐II  of  the  State  roll  appearing  in  any  matter  pay  him  a  fee  which  he  considers     reasonable.   Maintaining  Roll  of  Advocates:  Section  17(1)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  states  that  the     Bar  Council  of  every  State  has  to  prepare  and  maintain  a  roll  of  advocates  where  in  the     names  and  addresses  of  the  following  persons  are  entered  –   (a)  all  persons  who  were  entered  as  advocates  on  the  roll  of  any  High  Court  under  the     Indian  Bar  Councils  Act,  1926  (38  of    1926),  immediately  before  the  appointed  day     including  persons,  being  citizens  of  India,  who  before  the  15th  day  of  August,  1947,  were     enrolled  as  advocates  under  the  said  Act  in  any  area  which  before  the  said  date  was     comprised  within  India  as  defined  in  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935,  and  who  at  any      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW time  express  an  intention  in  the  prescribed  manner  to  practise  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the     Bar  Council;   (b)  all  other  persons  who  are  admitted  to  be  advocates  on  the  roll  of  the  State  Bar  Council     under  this  Act  on  or  after  the  appointed  day.   According  to  Sec  17(2)  of  the  said  Act,  this  roll  of  advocates  is  divided  into  2  parts.  The     first  part  is  meant  for  the  names  of  senior  advocates  and  the  second  part  is  meant  for  the     names  of  other  advocates.   According  to  Sec  17(4)  of  the  said  Act  specifically  provides  that  no  person  shall  be     enrolled  as  advocate  on  the  roll  of  more  than  one  State  Bar  Councils.   The  rules  as  regards  to  preparation  and  maintenance  of  the  State  roll  are  mentioned  in     Chapter  I  of  Part  V  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India  Rules  as  below  –   1    (a)  The  Council  may,  from  time  to  time,  give  directions  as  to  the  manner  in  which     the  State  Council  shall  prepare  and  maintain  the  rolls  under  Section  17  of  the  Act.   (b)  The  copies  of  the  State  rolls  to  be  sent  under  Section  19  of  the  Act  shall  be  in     Forms  ‘B-­‐1’  &  ‘B-­‐2’  and  shall  contain  such  further  details  as  the  Council  may     specify.   2  Particulars  of  transfers  under  Sec  18  of  the  Act,  cancellations  directed  under  the     proviso  to  Sec  26(1)  of  the  Act,  punishments  imposed  by  an  order  under  Chapter  V,     particulars  as  to  result  of  appeals  and  relevant  decisions  of  the  Courts,  and  such  other     matters  which  the  Council  may  specifically  direct,  shall  be  noted  in  the  said  rolls.   3  Save  as  otherwise  directed  by  the  Council;  no  other  particulars  shall  be  entered  in      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the  said  rolls.   4  Every  page  of  the  roll  shall  bear  the  signature  or  a  facsimile  thereof,  of  the  Secretary     or  other  person  authorised  by  the  State  Council.   5  Authenticated  copies  of  any  additions  or  alterations  made  in  the  roll  shall  be  sent  to     the  Council  without  delay.   Transfer  of  Name  from  One  State  Roll  to  another  State  Roll:  According  to  Sec  18(1)  of     Advocates  Act,  1961,  where  the  name  of  any  person  whose  name  is  entered  as  an     advocate  on  the  roll  of  any  State  Bar  Council  may  make  an  application  in  the  prescribed     form  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  for  the  transfer  of  his  name  from  the  roll  of  that  State  Bar     Council  to  the  roll  of  any  other  State  Bar  Council  and,  on  receipt  of  any  such  application     the  Bar  Council  of  India  shall  direct  that  the  name  of  such  person  shall  without  the     payment  of  any  fee,  be  removed  from  the  roll  of  the  first  mentioned  State  Bar  Council  and     entered  in  the  roll  of  the  other  State  Bar  Council  and  the  State  Bar  Councils  concerned     shall  comply  with  such  direction.   Provided  that  where  any  such  application  for  transfer  is  made  by  a  person  against  whom     any  disciplinary  proceeding  is  pending  or  where  the  Bar  Council  of  India  is  of  the  view  that     the  application  for  transfer  has  not  been  made  bonafide,  and  that  the  transfer  should  not     be  made,  the  Bar  Council  of  India  may,  after  giving  the  person  making  the  application  an     opportunity  of  making  a  representation  in  this  behalf,  reject  the  application.   According  to  Sec  18(2)  of  Advocates  Act,  1961,  the  transfer  of  name  in  no  way  affects  the     seniority  of  the  advocate,  as  the  concerned  advocate  shall  retain  the  same  seniority  in  the      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW latter  roll  to  which  he  was  entitled  in  the  former  roll.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  advocate     applying  has  not  to  pay  the  fee  of  any  kind  for  transferring  of  his  name  from  one  State  roll     to  another  State  roll.   The  language  of  Sec  19  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  lays  down  that  every  State  Bar     Council  shall  send  to    the  Bar  Council  of  India  an  authenticated  copy  of  the  roll  of   advocates  prepared  by  it  for  the  first  time  under  this  Act  and    shall  also  thereafter     communicate  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  all  alterations  in  and  any  additions  to  such  roll,  as     soon  as  the  same  have  been  made.   The  provision  of  Sec  20(1)  of  the  said  Act  lays  down  that  every  advocate  who  was  entitled     as  of  right  to  practise  in  the  Supreme  Court  immediately  before  the  appointed  day  and     whose  name  is  not  entered  in  any  State  roll  may,  within  the  prescribed  time,  express  his     intention  in  the  prescribed  form  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  for  the  entry  of  his  name  in  the     roll  of  a  State  Bar  Council  and  on  receipt  thereof  the  Bar  Council  of  India  shall  direct  that     the  name  of  such  advocate  shall,  without  payment  of  any  fee,  be  entered  in  the  roll  of  that     State  Bar  Council,  and  the  State  Bar  Council  concerned  shall  comply  with  such  direction.   According  to  Sec  20(2)  of  the  said  Act,  any  entry  in  the  State  roll  made  in  compliance  with     the  direction  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India  is  to  be  made  in  order  of  seniority.  If  an  advocate     as  is  referred  to  in  Sec  20  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  omits  or  fails  to  express  his     intention  within  the  prescribed  time,  his/her  name  shall  be  entered  in  the  roll  of  the  State     Bar  Council  of  India.   Advocates  only  recognised  class  of  person  entitled  to  practice  law:  The  provisions  of      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Sec  29  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  lays  down  that  “subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act     and  any  rules  made  there  under,  there  shall,  as  from  the  appointed  day,  be  only  one  class     of  persons,  entitled  to  practice  the  profession  law,  namely  advocates.   Right  of  Advocates  to  Practise:  As  per  Sec  30,  an  advocate  whose  name  is  entered  in     the  State  roll  becomes  entitled  as  of  right  to  practise  throughout  the  territories  to  which  this     Act  extends  –   (i)    in  all  Courts  including  the  Supreme  Court;   (ii)  before  any  tribunal  or  person  legally  authorised  to  take  evidence;  and     (iii)  before  any  authority  or  person  before  whom  such  advocate  is  by  or  under  any     law  for  the  time  being  in  force  entitled  to  practise.   Appearance  of  Non-­‐Advocate:  Under  Sec  32  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  a  discretionary     power  is  given  to  the  Court  to  permit  appearance  to  any  non-­‐advocate  for  a  party.  Sec  32   restricts  the  power  of  the  Court  to  permit  any  non-­‐advocate  only  to  appear  on  behalf  of  the     party  in  any  particular  case.   In  the  instant  case,  the  petitioner  had  not  filed  the  petition  in  public  interest  and  did  not   disclose  the  circumstances  which  prevented  the  affected  persons  from  approaching  the     Court.  In  discharge  of  his  professional  obligations,  the  petitioner-­‐advocate  is  not  obliged  to     file  the  writ  petition  on  behalf  of  the  clients.  No  circumstances  were  mentioned  in  the     petition  which  allegedly  incapacitated  the  affected  person  from  filing  the  writ  petition.  Sec     30  of  the  Advocates  Act,  196  only  entitles  an  advocate  to  practise  the  profession  of  law     and  not  to  substitute  himself  in  his  own  name,  being  not  a  part  of  the  professional      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW obligation  of  the  Advocate;  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  dismissing  the  writ  petition     holding  that  the  petitioner-­‐advocate  had  no  locus  standi.   Right  to  advocacy  is  a  Statutory  Right:  It  appears  from  the  provisions  of  Secs  29  &  30   that  the  advocates  have  been  conferred  right  to  practise  not  only  in  all  Courts  including  the     Supreme  Court  but  also  before  any  Tribunal  or  person  legally  authorised  to  take  evidence     and  also  before  any  other  authority  or  person  before  whom  such  advocate  is  by  or  under     any  law  for  the  time  being  entitled  to  practice.  Therefore,  the  right  of  an  advocate  to     practise  profession  of  law  is  statutory  right  and  not  a  fundamental  right.   A  private  person  who  is  not  an  advocate  and  not  a  pleader  enrolled,  cannot  be  permitted     to  argue  and  plead  the  case  for  a  third  party/person  on  the  basis  of  attorney  unless     permitted  under  special  circumstances  by  the  Court.   Power  of  Court  to  permit  appearance  of  an  individual:  As  regards  the  entitlement  of  an     individual  to  appear  before  the  Court  in  a  given  case,  Sec  32  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961     lays  down  that  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  Court,  authority  or  person  to  permit  any  person     to  appear  before  it  or  him  in  a  particular  case.  The  provisions  confer  a  monopoly  right  of     pleading  and  practising  law  only  on  the  enrolled  advocates.  A  private  person  who  is  not  an     advocate  cannot  or  has  no  right  to  argue  for  a  party.  He/she  must  get  the  prior  permission     of  the  Court  for  which  motion  must  come  from  the  party  itself.  It  is  open  to  the  Court  to     grant  or  withhold  or  withdraw  permission  in  its  discretion.   Right  to  Practise  is  different  from  Right  of  Appearance:  Right  to  practise  is  different     from  the  right  of  appearance  in  a  particular  case.  The  right  to  practise  is  a  right  given  to  the      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW advocate  to  practise  the  profession  of  law  before  all  Courts,  Tribunals,  authorities  etc.  The     right  of  appearance  in  a  particular  case  depends  upon  the  permission  granted  by  the  Court     under  Sec  32  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  which  is  an  exception  to  the  right  of  practise  by     the  advocates.   Permission  once  granted  to  appear  may  be  withdrawn:     In  the  case  of  Harishankar  Rastogi  Versus  Giridhari  Sharma  (1978)   Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  held  that  a  private  person,  who  is  not  an  advocate,  has  no  right  to     barge  into  the  Court  and  claim  to  argue  for  a  party.  He  must  get  the  prior  permission  of  the     Court,  for  which  the  motion  must  come  from  the  party  himself.  It  is  open  to  the  Court  to     grant  or  withhold  the  permission  in  its  discretion.  In  fact,  the  court  may  even  after  grant  of     permission,  withdraw  it  halfway  through  if  the  representative  proves  himself  reprehensible.     The  antecedents,  the  relationship,  the  reason  for  requisitioning  the  services  of  the  private     person  and  a  variety  of  the  other  circumstances  must  be  gathered  before  the  grant  or     refusal  of  permission.   Advocates  alone  entitled  to  Practise:  As  per  Sec  33  of  Advocates  Act,  1961  it  is  clear  in     language  laying  down  that  “except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  Act  or  in  any  other  law  for     the  time  being  in  force,  no  person  shall  on  or  after  the  appointed  day,  be  entitled  to     practise  in  any  Court  or  before  any  authority  or  person  unless  he/she  is  enrolled  as  an     advocate  under  the  said  Act”.   A  recognised  representative  cannot  claim  to  appear  as  of  right.  Previous  permission  of     Court  is  necessary.  There  is  no  warrant  whatsoever  to  place  a  recognised  agent  holding  a      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW general  power  of  attorney  to  take  proceedings  in  Courts  in  the  same  position  as  an     advocate  to  whom  a  vakalatnama  has  been  given.   The  legal  capacity  of  an  advocate  to  practise  the  profession  of  law  in  Court  and  his     competency  to  act  in  Court  for  his  client  are  not  derived  from  any  contract  but  from  his     legally  recognised  status  as  an  advocate.  On  account  of  his  status,  his  duties  are  threefold     –  to  the  client,  to  the  Court,  and  to  the  public.   The  expression  “practise”  clearly  contemplates  practising  as  a  profession  for  gain.  That     neither  precludes  a  party  in  person  in  Court  to  argue  his  own  case  or  appoint  an  agent     who  is  acceptable  to  the  Court  to  present  his  cases  other  than  a  lawyer.  Prohibition  is  to     practise  as  a  profession  and  not  for  mere  appearance  in  an  isolated  case.   The  right  of  the  advocates  to  practise  in  all  Courts  including  Supreme  Court  as  of  right  is     always  subject  to  the  rule  making  power  of  the  High  Court  laying  down  conditions  subject     to  which  an  advocate  shall  be  permitted  to  practise  in  the  High  Courts  and  the  Courts     subordinate  thereto.  

 

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW

    An  Advocate  is  regarded  as  an  officer  of  the   Court   and  is  a  part  and  parcel  of  a  Court.  He   must  always  respect  and  co-­‐operate  with  the  proceedings  of  the  Court.   An  Advocate  must  always  respect  the  Court  and  follow  'Professional  Ethics'.   Abbort  Pary,  LJ  has  formulated  seven  essential  features  and  characteristics  for  advocacy.   These  characteristics  of  an  advocate  are  called  the  Seven  Lamps  of  Advocacy.   A  Judge  is  always  considered  Superior  to  an  advocate  because  he  represents  the  Justice.   Most   Courts   provide   a   Chamber   for   Advocates   in   the   Court   premises.   An   Allotment   Committee  will  generally  be  formed  for  the  purpose.   The   Right   to   Practice   is   a   Fundamental   Right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)   (g)   of   the   Constitution   of   India.   However,   Allotment   of   Chamber   is   neither   a   fundamental   right   nor   a   statutory  right  for  Advocates  but  is  a  customary  practice  followed  to  foster  the  Bar-­‐Bench   Relations.   An   Advocate   can   reject   taking   up   a   case   citing   it   is   not   in   the   domain   of   his   specialty.   However   a   Judge   cannot   reject   a   case   that   comes   to   him   citing   lack   of   knowledge   in   the   specialization  of  the  case.     Advocates  cannot  wear  bands  or  gowns  in  public  places  except  in  the  Court  premises  and  in   such  ceremonial  occasions  and  at  places  as  prescribed  by  the  Court  or  Bar  Council.     •

 

Advocates   in   India   have   to   follow   the   rules   and   regulations   prescribed   the   Bar   Council   of   India.     39  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW •

Advocate  has  to  pay  the  prescribed  fee  with  the  State  Bar  Council    

Being  an  Advocate  is  a  full  time  profession.  Hence,  many  countries  prohibit  Advocates  from   entering   /   running   businesses   or   managing   companies   or   being   into   a   full-­‐time   salaried   employment   Advocate's  Office   • • • •

An  Advocate's  Office  is  considered  a  public  office  in  the  sense  that  any  person  can   meet  him  and  seek  Legal  help  and  advice.     The  Office  should  be  adequately  staffed.     The   Office   should   have   a   Library   with   Books   and   latest   Journals   and   Computer   facility,  preferably  with  internet  access  facility.     Good   Chamber   is   necessary   so   that   he   may   have   reasonable   contact   with   the   Clients.    

In  some  cases,  Advocate  goes  unethical  and  does  certain  acts  that  cause  delay  for  the   Courts  to  clear  the  cases:   • • • • • • • • •

Filing  of  frivolous  petitions   Unnecessary  litigation   Harassing  the  opposite  parties   Squeezing  abnormal  fee  from  client   Shows  large  files  and  tells  the  client  that  they  are  still  pending   Says  he  couldn't  get  time  being  busy  with  a  large  case   Different  Courts  are  located  at  different  places   Negligence  and  indifference   Ill-­‐health  of  the  advocate  client/other  party/witness  etc  

 

In   India,   the   law   relating   to   the   Advocates   is   the   Advocates   Act,   1961   introduced   and   thought  up  by  Ashoke  Kumar  Sen,  the  then  Law  Minister  of  India,  which  is  a  Law  passed  by   the  Parliament  and  is  administered  and  enforced  by  the  Bar   Council   of   India.  Under  the  Act,   the  Bar  Council  of  India  is  the  supreme  regulatory  body  to  regulate  the  legal  profession  in   India   and   also   to   ensure   the   compliance   of   the   laws   and   maintenance   of   professional   standards  by  the  legal  profession  in  the  country.  For  this  purpose,  the  Bar  Council  of  India  is   authorized  to  pass  regulations  and  make  orders  in  individual  cases  and  also  generally.  

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Each   State   has   a   Bar  Council   of   its   own   whose   function   is   to   enroll   the   Advocates  willing   to   practice   predominately   within   the   territorial   confines   of   that   State   and   to   perform   the   functions  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India  within  the  territory  assigned  to  them.  Therefore  each   law   degree   holder   must   be   enrolled   with   a   (single)   State   Bar   Council   to   practice   in   India.   However,   enrollment   with   any   State   Bar   Council   does   not   restrict   the   Advocate   from   appearing  before  any  court  in  India,  even  though  it  is  beyond  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of   the  State  Bar  Council  which  he  is  enrolled  in.   The  advantage  with  having  the  State  Bar  Councils  is  that  the  work  load  of  the  Bar  Council  of   India  can  be  divided  into  these  various  State  Bar  Councils  and  also  that  matters  can  be  dealt   with  locally  and  in  an  expedited  manner.  However  for  all  practical  and  legal  purposes,  the   Bar  Council  of  India  retains  with  it  the  final  power  to  take  decisions  in  any  and  all  matters   related  to  the  legal  profession  on  the  whole  or  with  respect  to  any  Advocate  individually,  as   so  provided  under  the  Advocates  Act,  1961.   The  process  for  being  entitled  to  practice  in  India  is  twofold.  First,  the  applicant  must  be  a   holder   of   a   Law   Degree   from   a   recognized   institution   in   India   (or   from   one   of   the   four   recognized   Universities   in   the   United   Kingdom)   and   second,   must   pass   the   enrollment   qualifications   of   the   Bar   Council   of   the   state   where   he/she   seeks   to   be   enrolled.   For   this   purpose,   the   Bar  Council  of  India   has   an   internal   Committee   whose   function   is   to   supervise   and   examine   the   various   institutions   conferring   law   degrees   and   to   grant   recognition   to   these  institutions  once  they  meet  the  required  standards.  In  this  manner  the  Bar  Council  of   India  also  ensures  the  standard  of  education  required  for  practicing  in  India  are  met  with.   As   regards   the   qualification   for   enrollment   with   the   State   Bar   Council,   while   the   actual   formalities   may   vary   from   one   State   to   another,   yet   predominately   they   ensure   that   the   application  has  not  been  a  bankrupt/criminal  and  is  generally  fit  to  practice  before  Courts   of   India.   Enrollment  with  a  Bar   Council  also  means  that  the  Law   Degree  holder  is  recognized  as  an   Advocate  and  is  required  to  maintain  standards  of  Conduct  and  Professional  demeanor  at   all   times,   both   on   and   off   the   profession.   The  Bar  Council  of  India   also   prescribes   "Rules  of   Conduct"   to   be   observed   the   Advocates   in   the   Courts,   while   interacting   with   Clients   and   even  otherwise.   All  Advocates  in  India  are  at  the  same  level  and  are  recognized  as  such.  Any  distinction,  if   any,  is  made  only  on  the  basis  of  Seniority,  which  implies  the  length  of  practice  at  the  Bar.   As   recognition   of   Law   Practice   and   specialization   in   an   area   of   Law,   there   is   a   concept   of   conferral  of  Senior  Advocate  status.  An  Advocate  may  be  recognized  by  the  Judges  of  the    

41  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW High   Court   (in   case   of   an   Advocate   practicing   before   that   High   Court)   or   by   the   Supreme   Court  (in  case  of  the  Advocate  practicing  before  the  Supreme  Court).  While  the  conferral  of   Senior   Advocate   status   not   only   implies   distinction   and   fame   of   the   Advocate,   it   also   requires  the  Senior  Advocate  to  follow  higher  standards  of  conduct  and  some  distinct  rules.   Also,   a   Senior   Advocate   is   not   allowed   to   interact   directly   with   the  Clients.   He   can   only   take   briefs  from  other  Advocates  and  argue  on  the  basis  of  the  details  given  by  them.  From  the   year  2010  onwards  a  mandatory  rule  is  made  for  Lawyers  passing  out  from  the  year  2009-­‐ 10   to   sit   for   an   evaluation   test   named   AIBE   (All   India   Bar   Exam)   for   one   to   qualify   as   an   Advocate  and  Practice  in  the  Courts.   Further,  under  the  Constitutional  structure,  there  is  a  provision  for  elevation  of  Advocates   as  Judges  of  High   Courts  and  Supreme   Court.  The  only  requirement  is  the  Advocate  must   have   a   ten   years   standing   before   the   High   Court   (/s)   or   before   the   Supreme   Court   to   be   eligible   for   such.   (Article   217   and   124   of   the   Constitution   of   India   for   High   Courts   and   Supreme  Court  respectively)  

CHAPTER  III  (Advocates  Act,  1961)   ADMISSION  AND  ENROLMENT  OF  ADVOCATES   Section  16  Senior  and  other  

16-­‐1  There  shall  be  two  classes  of  advocates,  namely,  senior  advocates  and  other  advocates.   16-­‐2   An  advocate  may,  with  his  consent,  be  designated  as  senior  advocate  if  the  Supreme   Court  or  a  High  Court  is  of  opinion  that  by  virtue  of  his  ability  1[standing  at  the  Bar  or  special   knowledge  or  experience  in  law]  he  is  deserving  of  such  distinction.   16-­‐3  Senior  advocates,  shall  in  the  matter  of  their  practice,  be  subject  to  such  restrictions  as   the  Bar  Council  of  India  may,  in  the  interest  of  the  legal  profession,  prescribe.   16-­‐4   An   advocate   of   the   Supreme   Court   who   was   a   senior   advocate   of   that   Court   immediately   before   the   appointed   day   shall,   for   the   purposes   of   this   section,   be   deemed   to   be  a  senior  advocate:   2

[Provided   that   where   any   such   senior   advocate   makes   an   application   before   the   31st   December,   1965,   to   the   Bar     Council   maintaining   the   roll   in   which   his   name   has   been   entered  that  he  does  not  desire  to  continue  as  a  senior  advocate,  the  Bar  Council  may  grant   the  application  and  the  roll  shall  be  altered  accordingly].    

42  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 1.   2.  

Subs.  By  Act  No.  60  of  1993,  for  the  words  “experience  and  standing  at  the   Bar.”   Ins.  By  Act  No.  21  of  1964.   Section  17  State  Bar  Councils  to  maintain  roll  of  Advocates  

17-­‐1  Every  State  Bar  Council,  shall  prepare  and  maintain  a  roll  of  advocates  in  which  shall  be   entered  the  names  and  addresses  of-­‐   (a) All  persons  who  were  entered  as  advocates  on  the  roll  of  any  High  Court   under  the  Indian  Bar  Councils  Act,  1926  (38  of  1926)  immediately  before   the  appointed  day  1[including  persons,  being  citizens  of  India,  who  before   the  15th  day  of  August,  1947,  were  enrolled  as  advocates  under  the  said   Act   in   any   area   which   before   the   said   date   was   comprised   within   India   as   defined   in   the   Government   of   India   Act,   1935,   and   who   at   any   time]   express   an   intention   in   the   prescribed   manner   to   practice   within   the   jurisdiction  of  the  Bar  Council;       (b) All   other   persons   who   are   admitted   to   be   advocates   on   the   roll   of   the   State  Bar  Council  under  this  Act  on  or  after  the  appointed  day.   17-­‐2   Each   such   roll   of   advocates   shall   consist   of   two   parts,   the   first   part   containing   the   names  of  senior  advocates  and  the  second  part,  the  names  of  other  advocates.     17-­‐3   Entries   in   each   part   of   the   roll   of   advocates   prepared   and   maintained   by   a   State   Bar   Council  under  this  section  shall  be  in  the  order  of  seniority,  2[and,  subject  to  any  rule  that   may  be  made  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India  in  this  behalf,  such  seniority  shall  be  determined)   as  follows:  -­‐       (a) The   seniority   of   an   advocate   referred   to   in   clause   (a)   sub-­‐section   (1)   shall   be   determined   in   accordance   with   his   date   of   enrollment   under   the   Indian  Bar  Council  Act,  1926  (38  of  1926);       (b) The   seniority   of   any   person   who   was   a   senior   advocate   of   the   Supreme   Court   immediately   before,   the   appointed   day   shall,   for   the   purposes   of   the   first   part   of   the   State   roll,   be   determined   in   accordance   with   such   principles  as  the  Bar  Council  of  India  may  specify;        

43  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 3[(c)  

***]  

(c) The  seniority  of  any  other  person  who,  on  or  after  the  appointed  day,  is   enrolled   as   a   senior   advocate   or   is   admitted   as   an   advocate   shall   be   determined   by   the   date   of   such   enrolment   or   admission,   as   the   case   may   be.   (d)  4[(e)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  clause  (a),  the  seniority  of  an   attorney   enrolled   [whether   before   or   after   the   commencement   of   the   Advocates   (Amendment)   Act,   1980]   as   an   advocate   shall   be   determined   in  accordance  with  the  date  of  his  enrolment  as  an  attorney]    17-­‐4   No   person   shall   be   enrolled   as   an   advocate   on   the   roll   of   more   than   one   State   Bar   Council.   1.  

Subs.  By  Act  No.  60  of  1993,  for  the  words  “experience  and  standing  at  the   Bar.”  

2.  

Subs.   By   Act   21   of   1964,   for   the   words   “and,   such   seniority   shall   be   determined”.  

3.  

Omitted  by  Act  60  of  1973  

4.  

Ins.  By  Act  47  of  1980   Section  18  Transfer  of  name  from  one  State  roll  to  another  

18-­‐1  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  Section  17,  any  person  whose  name  is  entered   as   an   advocate   on   the   roll   of   any   State   Bar   Council   may   make   in   application   in   the   prescribed   from   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India   for   the   transfer   of   his   name   from   the   roll   of   that   State   Bar   Council   to   the   roll   of   any   other   State   Bar   Council   and,   on   receipt   of   any   such   application  the  Bar  Council  of  India  shall  direct  that  name  of  such  person  shall  without  the   payment  of  any  fee,  be  removed  from  the  roll  of  the  first  mentioned  State  Bar  Council  and   entered   in   the   roll   of   the   other   State   Bar   Council   and   the   State   Bar   Councils   concerned   shall   comply  with  such  direction:   1

[Provided  that  where  any  application  for  transfer  is  made  by  a  person  against  whom  any   disciplinary   proceeding   is   pending   or   where   for   any   other   reason   it   appears   to   the   Bar    

44  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Council   of   India   that   the   application   for   transfer   has   not   been.   Made   bona   fide   and   that   the   transfer  should  not  be  made,  the  Bar  Council  of  India  may,  after  giving  the  person  making   the   application   an   opportunity   of   making   representation   in   this   behalf,   reject   the   application.]   18-­‐2  For  the  removal  of  doubts  it  is  hereby  declared  that  where  on  an  application  made  by   an   advocate   under   sub-­‐section   (1),   his   name   is   transferred   from   the   roll   of   one   State   Bar   Council  to  that  of  another,  he  shall  retain  the  same  seniority  in  the  latter  roll  to  which  he   was  entitled  in  the  former  roll.   1.

Ins.  By  Act  21  of  1964  

  Section  19  State  Bar  Councils  to  send  copies  of  rolls  of  advocates  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  

Every  State  Bar  Council  shall  send  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  an  authenticated  copy  of  the   roll   of   advocates   prepared   by   it   for   the   first   time   under   this   Act   and   shall   thereafter   communicate  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  all  alterations  in,  the  addition  to,  any  such  roll,  as   soon  as  the  same  have  been  made.   Section  20  Special  provision  for  enrolment  of  certain  Supreme  Court  Advocates   20-­‐1   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   this   Chapter,   every   advocate   who   is   entitled   as   of  right  to  practice  in  the  Supreme,  Court  immediately  before  the  appointed  day  and  whose   name  is  not  entered  in  any  State  roll  may,  within  the  prescribed  time,  express  his  intention   in  the  prescribed  form  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  for  the  entry  of  his  name  in  the  roll  of  a   State  Bar  Council  and  on  receipt  thereof  the  Bar  Council  of  India  shall  direct  that  the  name   of  such  advocate  shall,  without  payment  of  any  fee,  be  entered  in  the  roll  of  that  State  Bar   Council,  and  the  State  bar  Council  concerned  shall  comply  with  such  direction.   20-­‐2   Any   entry   in   the   State   roll   made   in   compliance   with   the   direction   of   Bar   Council   of   India   under   sub-­‐section   (1)   shall   be   made   in   the   order   of   seniority   determined   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of  sub-­‐section  (3)  of  Section  17.  

20-­‐3   Where  an  advocate  referred  to  in  sub-­‐section  (1)  omits  or  fails  to  express  his  intention  within   the  prescribed  time,  his  name  shall  be  entered  in  the  roll  of  the  State  Bar  Council  of  Delhi.]    

45  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 1.

Subs.  By  Act  No.  60  of  1973   Section  21  Disputes  regarding  seniority  

21-­‐1   Where  the  date  of  seniority  of  two  or  more  persons  is  the  same,  the  one  senior  in  age  shall  be   reckoned  as  senior  to  the  other.   1

21-­‐2  Subject  as  aforesaid,  if  any  dispute  arises  with  respect  to  the  seniority  of  any  person,  it   shall  be  referred  to  the  State  Bar  Council  concerned  for  decision.]   1.

Subs.  By  Act  No.  60  of  1973   Section  22  Certificate  of  enrolment  

22-­‐1  There  shall  be  issued  a  certificate  of  enrolment  in  the  

prescribed   form   by   the   State   Bar   Council  of  every  person  whose  name  is  entered  in  the  roll  of  advocates  maintained  by  it  under  this   Act.  

22-­‐2  Every  person  whose  name  is  so  entered  in  the  State  roll  shall  notify  any  change  in  the   place  of  his  permanent  residence  to  the  State  Bar  Council  concerned  within  ninety  days  of   such  change.]   1.

Subs.  By  Act  No.  60  of  1973   Section  23  Right  of  pre-­‐audience  

23-­‐1  The  Attorney  General  of  India  shall  have  pre-­‐audience  over  all  other  advocates.     23-­‐2   Subject   to   the   provisions   of   sub-­‐section   (1),   the   Solicitor-­‐General   of   India   shall   have   pre-­‐audience  over  all  other  advocates.     23-­‐3  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub-­‐sections  (1)  and  (2),  the  Additional  Solicitor-­‐General  of   India  shall  have  pre-­‐audience  over  all  other  advocates.   123-­‐3A   Subject   to   the   provisions   of   sub-­‐sections   (1),   (2)   and   (3),   the   second   Additional   Solicitor-­‐General  of  India  shall  have  pre-­‐audience  over  all  other  advocates.]  

 

46  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 23-­‐4  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub-­‐section  (1),  1[(2),  (3)  and  (3A)]  the  Advocate  General  of   any  State  shall  have  pre-­‐audience  over  all  other  advocates,  and,  the  right  of  pre-­‐audience   among  Advocates-­‐General  inter  se  shall  be  determined  by  their  respective  seniority.   23-­‐5  Subject  as  aforesaid-­‐   (i) (ii)

Senior  advocates  shall  have  pre-­‐audience  over  other  advocates;  and   The   right   of   pre-­‐audience   over   senior   advocates   inter   se   and   other   advocates   inter  se  shall  be  determined  by  their  respective  seniority.   1. Ins.  By  Act  No.  47  of  1980   Section  24  Persons  who  may  be  adopted  as  advocates  on  a  State  roll  

24-­‐1  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  and  the  rules  made  there  under,  a  person  shall  be   qualified  to  be  admitted  as  an  advocate  on  a  State  roll,  if  he  fulfills  the  following  conditions,   namely:  -­‐   24-­‐1  (a)  He  is  a  citizen  of  India:   Provided  that  subject  to  the  other  provisions  contained  in  this  Act,  a  national  of  any  other   country  may  be  admitted  as  an  advocate  on  a  State  roll,  if  citizens  of  India,  duly  qualified,   are  permitted  to  practise  law  in  that  other  country;   24-­‐1  (b)  He  has  completed  the  age  of  twenty-­‐one  years;   24-­‐1  (c)  He  has  obtained  a  degree  in  law-­‐   (i)   Before   the   1[12th   day   of   March,   19671   from   any   University,   in   the   territory   of   India;  or   (ii)   Before   the   15th   of   August,   1947,   from   any   University   in   any   area   which   was   comprised  before  that  date  within  India  as  defined  by  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935;  or   2

[(iii)   After   the   12th   day   of   March,   1967,   save   as   provided   in   sub-­‐clause   (iii)   After   undergoing   a   three   years   course   of   study   in   law   from   any   University   in   India   which   is   recognised  for  the  purposes  of  this  Act  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India;  or  

 

47  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW (iiia)  After  undergoing  a  course  of  study  in  law,  the  duration  of  which  is  not  less  than   two  academic  years  commencing  from  the  academic  year  1967-­‐68  or  any  earlier  academic   year   from   any   University   in   India   which   is   recognised   for   the   purposes   of   this   Act   by   the   Bar   Council  of  India;  or]   2

[He  is  a  barrister  and  is  called  to  the  Bar  on  or  before  the  31st  day  of  December,  1976   3[or   has  passed  the  articled  clerks’  examination  or  any  other  examination  specified  by  the  High   Court   at   Bombay   or   Calcutta   for   enrolment   as   an   attorney   of   that   High   Court;]   or   has   obtained  such  other  foreign  qualification  in  law  as  is  recognised  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India   for  the  purpose  of  admission  as  an  advocate  under  this  Act]:   4

  (iv)   In   any   other   case,   from   any   University   outside   the   territory   of   India,   if   the   degree  is  recognised  ‘for  the  purpose  of  this  Act  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India]  or;   5

[(d)   *  *  *]  

(e)  He  fulfills  such  other  conditions  as  may  be  specified  in  the  rules  made  the  State   bar  Council  under  this  Chapter;   2

[(f)  He  has  paid,  in  respect  of  the  enrolment,  stamp  duty,  if  any,  chargeable  under   the  Indian  Stamp  Act  1899,  and  an  enrolment  fee  payable  to  the  State  Bar  Council  of   6[six   hundred  rupees  and  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India,  one  hundred  and  fifty  rupees  by  way  of  a   bank  draft  drawn  in  favour  of  that  Council]:   If   where   such   person   is   a   member   of   the   Scheduled   Castes   or   the   Scheduled   Tribes   and   produces  a  certificate  to  the  effect  from  such  authority  as  may  be  –scribed,  the  enrolment   fee  payable  by  him  to  the  State  Bar  Council  shall  be   6[one  hundred  rupees  and  to  the  Bar   Council  of  India,  twenty-­‐five  rupees].     7

[Explanation   –For   the   purposes   of   this     sub-­‐section,   a   person   shall   be   deemed   to   have   obtained  a  degree  in  law  from  a  University  in  India  on  the  date  on  which  the  results  of  the   examination   for   that   degree   are   published   by   the   University   on   its   notice-­‐board   or   otherwise  declaring  him  to  have  passed  that  examination].   24-­‐2   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   subsection   (1)   8[a   Vakil   or   a   pleader   who   is   a   law  graduate]  may  be  admitted  as  an  advocate  on  a  State  roll,  if  he      

48  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW (a)   Makes   an   application   for   such   enrolment   in   accordance   with   the   revisions   of   this   Act,  not  later  than  two  years  from  the  appointed,  day,  and   (b)  Fulfills  the  conditions  specified  in  clauses  (a),  (b)  and  (f)  of  subsection  (1)   9

[(3)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  subsection  (1)  a  person  who-­‐  

(a)   10[*  *  *]  has,  for  at  least  three  years,  been  a  vakil  or  a  pleader  or  a  mukhtar  or   was  entitled  at  any  time  to  be  enrolled  under  any  law  7[*  *  *]  as  an  advocate  of  a   High  Court  (including  a  High  Court  of  a  former  Part  B  State)  or  of  a  Court  of  Judicial   Commissioner  in  any  Union  territory;  or   11

[(aa)   Before   the   1st   day   of   December,   1961,   was   entitled   otherwise   than   as   an   advocate  to  practise  the  profession  of  law  (whether  by  way  of  pleading  or  acting  or   both)  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  any  law,  or  who  would  have  been  so  entitled  had   he  not  been  in  public  service  on  the  said  date;  or]    12[(b)      *  *  *]   (c)  Before  the  1st  day  of  April,  1937,  has  been  an  advocate  of  any  High  Court  in  any   area  which  was  comprised  within  Burma  as  defined  in  the  Government  of  India  Act,   1935-­‐,  or   (d)  Is  entitled  to  be  enrolled  as  an  advocate  under  any  rule  made  by  the  Bar           (e)  Council  of  India  in  this  behalf,  may  be  admitted  as  an  advocate  on  a  State  roll  if   he-­‐   (i)  Makes  an  application  for  such  enrolment  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this   Act;  and   (ii)  Fulfills  the  conditions  specified  in  clauses  (a),  (b),  (e)  and  (f)  of  sub-­‐section   13

 

[(4)   *  *  *]   1.  

Ins.  By  Act  No.  47  of  1980  

2.  

Subs.  By  Act  No.  60  of  1973.   49  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 3.  

Ins.  By  Act  No.  107  of  1976.  

4.  

Ins.  By  Act  No.  21  of  1964.  

5.  

Omitted  by  Act  No.  60  of  1973.  

6.  

Subs.  By  Act  No.  70  of  1993.  

7.  

Ins.  By  Act  No.  14  of  1962.  

8.  

Subs.  By  Act  No.  21  of  1964.  

9.  

Ins.  By  Act  No.  21  of  1964  

10.  

Certain  words  omitted  by  Act  No.  33  of  1968.  

11.  

Ins.  By  Act  No.  60  of  1973  

12.  

Omitted  by  Act  No.  60  of  1973  

13.  

Omitted  by  Act  No.  107  of  1976   Section  24A  Disqualification  for  enrolment  

24-­‐1A    No  person  shall  be  admitted  as  an  advocate  on  a  State  roll-­‐   (a)  If  he  is  convicted  of  an  offence  involving  moral  turpitude;   (b)  If  he  is  convicted  of  an  offence  under  the  provisions  of  the  Untouchables  (Offences)  Act,   1955;    

 2(c)  If  he  is  dismissed  or  removed  from  employment  or  office  under  the  State  on  any   charge  involving  moral  turpitude.   Explanation.   –In   this   clause,   the   expression   ‘State’   shall   have   the   meaning   assigned   to   it   under  article  12  of  the  Constitution:]   If   the   disqualification   for   enrolment   as   afore   said   shall   cease   to   have   effect   after   a   period   of   two  years  has  elapsed  since  his  3[release  or  dismissal  or,  as  the  case  may  be,  removal.]  

 

50  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 24-­‐2A   Nothing  contained  in  sub-­‐section  (1)  shall  apply  to  a  person  who  having  been  found  guilty  is   dealt  with  under  the  provision  of  the  Probation  of  Offenders  Act,  1958  (20  of  1958).   1.  

Certain  words  omitted  by  Act  No.  33  of  1968.  

2.  

Ins.  By  Act  No.  70  of  1993  

3.  

Subs.  By  Act  No.  70  of  1993  

Section  25  Authority  to  whom  applications  for  enrolment  may  be  made   An   application   for   admission   as   an   advocate   shall   be   made   in   the   prescribed   form   to   the   State  Bar  Council  within  whose  jurisdiction  the  applicant  proposes  to  practise.   Section  26  Disposal  of  an  application  for  admission  as  an  Advocate   26-­‐1   State   Bar   Council   shall   refer   every   application   for   admission   as   an   advocate   to   its   enrolment   committee,   and   subject   to   the   provisions   of   sub-­‐section   (2)   and   (3),   1[and   to   any   direction   that   may   be   given   in   writing   by   the   State   Bar   Council   in   this   behalf]   such   committee  shall  dispose  of  the  application  in  the  prescribed  manner:   2

[Provided   that   the   Bar   Council   of   India   may,   if   satisfied,   either   on   a   reference   made   to   it   in   this   behalf   or  otherwise,  that   any   person  has   got   his   name   entered   on   the   roll   of   advocates   by   misrepresentation   as   to   an   essential   fact   or   by   fraud   or   undue   influence,   remove   the   name   of   such   person   from   the   roll   of   advocates   after   giving   him   an   opportunity   of   being   heard.]   26-­‐2  Where  the  enrolment  committee  of  State  Bar  Council  proposes  to  refuse  any  such  application,   it   shall   refer   the   application   for   opinion   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India   and   every   such   reference   shall   be   accompanied  by  a  statement  of  the  grounds  in  support  of  the  refusal  of  the  application.  

26-­‐3   The  enrolment  committee  of  State  Bar  Council  shall  dispose  of  any  application  referred  to  the   Bar  Council  of  India  under  sub-­‐section  (2)  in  conformity  with  the  opinion  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India.   2

26-­‐4  Where  the  enrolment  committee  of  a  State  Bar  Council  has  refused  any  application  for   admission   as   an   advocate   on   its   roll,   the   State   Bar   Council   shall   as   soon   as   may   be,   send   intimation  to  all  other  State  Bar  Councils  about  such  refusal  stating  the  name,  address  and   qualifications  of  the  person  whose  application  was  refused  and  the  grounds  for  the  refusal.]    

51  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 1.  

Ins.  By  Act  21  No.  of  1964  

2.  

AddedbyActNo.21of  l964.   Section  26A  Power  to  remove  names  from  roll  

A  State  Bar  Council  may  remove  from  the  State  roll  the  name  of  any  advocate  who  is  dead   or  from  whom  a  request  has  been  received  to  that  effect.)       1. Subs.  by  Act  No.  60  of  1973.     Section  27  Application  once  refused  not  to  be  entertained  by  another  Bar  Council  except   in  certain  circumstances     Where   a   State   Bar   Council   has   refused   the   application   of   any   person   for   admission   as   an   advocate  on  its  roll,  no  other  State  Bar  Council  shall  entertain  an  application  for  admission   of   such   person   as   an   advocate   on   its   roll,   except   with   the   previous   consent   in   writing   of   the   State  Bar  Council  which  refused  the  application  and  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India.     Section  28  Power  to  make  rules   28-­‐1  A  State  Bar  Council  may  make  rules  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  this  Chapter.   28-­‐2   In  particular,  and  without  prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the  foregoing  power,  such  rules  may   provide  for-­‐   1

[(a)  The  time  within  which  and  form  in  which  an  advocate  shall  express  his  intention   2 for  the  entry  of  his  name  in  the  roll  of  a  State  bar  Council  under  Section  20;]   [(b)  *  *  *]   (c)  The  form  in  which  an  application  shall  be  made  to  the  Bar  Council  for  admission   as  an  advocate  on  its  roll  and  the  manner  in  which  such  application  shall  be  disposed  of  by   the  enrolment  committee  of  the  Bar  Council;   (d)  The  conditions  subject  to  which  a  person  may  be  admitted  as  an  advocate  on  any   such  roll:    (e)  The  instilments  in  which  the  enrolment  fee  may  be  paid.  

 

52  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 28-­‐3   No   rules   made   under   this   Chapter   shall   have   effect   unless   the   Bar   Council   of   India   has   approved  them.   1.  

Omitted  by  Act  No.  60  of  1973.  

2.  

Omitted  by  Act  No.  60  of  1973.  

     

CHAPTER  IV   RIGHTS  TO  PRACTISE  (Advocates  Act,  1961)    

Section  29  Advocates  to  be  the  only  recognised  class  of  persons  entitled  to  practice  law  

  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act  and  any  rules  made  there  under,  there  shall,  as  from  the   appointed   day,   be   only   one   class   of   persons   entitled   to   practise   the   profession   of   law,   namely,  advocates.     Section  30  Right  of  advocates  to  practise   30-­‐1  Subject  to  provisions  of  this  Act,  every  advocate  whose  name  is  entered  in  the   1[State   roll]   shall   be   entitled   as   of   right   to   practise   throughout   the   territories   to   which   this   Act   extends,  -­‐       (i)  In  all  Courts  including  the  Supreme  Court;   (ii)  Before  any  tribunal  or  person  legally  authorised  to  take  evidence;  and     (iii)   Before   any   other   authority   or   person   before   whom   such   advocate   is   by   or   under   any  law  for  the  time  being  in  force  entitled  to  practice.       1. Subs.  By  Act  60  No.  Of  1973  for  “common  roll”.       Section  [31.   *  *  *]    

53  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW  

1.        

Omitted  by  Act  No.  107  of  1976.   Section  32  Power  of  Court  to  permit  appearances  in  particular  cases  

Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   this   Chapter,   any   court,   authority,   or   person   may   permit  any  person,  not  enrolled  as  an  advocate  under  this  Act,  to  appear  before  it  or  him  in   any  particular  case.   Section  33  Advocates  alone  entitle  to  practise   Except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  Act  or  in  any  other  law  for  the  time  being  in  force,  no   person  shall,  on  of  after  the  appointed  day,  be  entitled  to  practise  in  any  court  or  before  any   authority  or  person  unless  he  is  enrolled  as  an  advocate  under  this  Act.   Section  34  Power  of  High  Courts  to  make  rules   34-­‐1   The  High  Court  may  make  rules  laying  down  the  conditions  subject  to  which  an  advocate  shall   be  permitted  to  practise  in  the  High  Court  and  the  courts  subordinate  thereto.   1

34-­‐1A  The  High  Court  shall  make  rules  for  fixing  and  regulating  by  taxation  or  otherwise  the   fees  payable  as  costs  by  any  party  in  respect  of  the  fees  of  his  adversary’s  advocate  upon  all   proceedings  in  the  High  Court  or  in  any  Court  subordinate  thereto.   2

34-­‐2   Without   prejudice   to   the   provisions   contained   in   sub-­‐section   (1),   the   High   Court   at   Calcutta   may   make   rules   providing   for   the   holding   of   the   Intermediate   and   the   Final   examinations  for  articled  clerks  to  be  passed  by  the  persons  referred  to  in  Section  58  AG  for   the   purpose   of   being   admitted   as   advocates   on   the   State   roll   and   any   other   matter   connected  therewith.]   3

[34-­‐3      *  *  *]   1.  Ins.  By  Act  No.  60  of  1973.   2.  Ins.  By  Act  No.  38  of  1977.   3.  Omitted  by  Act  No.  107  of  1976.    

 

54  

JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW                         Related  Cases  /  Recent  Cases  /  Case  Laws     R  Vs  Special  Commissioner  of  Income  Tax  and  another  (Respondents)  [2013]  UKSC  1,  UK  Supreme   Court,   January   2013:   Legal   advice   privilege   should   not   be   extended   to   communications   in   connection  with  advice  given  by  professional  people  other  than  lawyers,  even  where  that  advice  is   legal  advice  which  that  professional  person  is  qualified  to  give.       Central   Bureau   of   Investigation,   Hyderabad   Vs   K   Narayana   Rao:   A   lawyer   does   not   tell   his   client   that  he  shall  win  the  case  in  all  circumstances...  a  professional  may  be  held  liable  for  negligence  on   one  of  the  two  findings,  viz.,  either  he  was  not  possessed  of  the  requisite  skill  which  he  professed  to   have   possessed,   or,   he   did   not   exercise,   with   reasonable   competence   in   the   given   case,   the   skill   which  he  did  possess.     ..it  is  beyond  doubt  that  a  lawyer  owes  an  “unremitting  loyalty”  to  the  interests  of  the  client  and  it  is   the   lawyer’s   responsibility   to   act   in   a   manner   that   would   best   advance   the   interest   of   the   client.   Merely   because   his   opinion   may   not   be   acceptable,   he   cannot   be   mulcted   with   the   criminal   prosecution,   particularly,   in   the   absence   of   tangible   evidence   that   he   associated   with   other   conspirators.    

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Deepak  Aggarwal  Vs  Keshav  Kaushik  and  Others,  Civil  Appeal  Jurisdiction,  Civil  Appeal  No.  469  OF   2013,   Supreme   Court   of   India   Judgement   dated   January   21,   2013:   Vinay   Balachandra   Joshi   Vs   Registrar  General,  Supreme  Court  of  India  (1998)  7  SCC  461:  ..  It  would  be  a  matter  of  discretion  of   the   Principal   Judge   of   the   Court   to   decide   to   whom   and   to   what   extent   that   facility   should   be   extended  when  the  same  is  available...  It  would  be  for  him  to  decide  when,  to  whom,  to  what  extent   and  on  what  terms  and  conditions  he  should  allot  Chambers.       C  Ravichandran  Iyer  Vs  Justice  AM  Bhattacharjee  (1995)  5  SCC  457:  The  Supreme  Court  discussed   at  length  and  has  laid  down  several  principle  and  guidelines  in  regard  to  Bar-­‐Bench  relations.     UP  Sales  Tax  Service  Association  Vs  Taxation  Bar  Association  (1995)  5  SCC  716:   The   appearance   of   an   Advocate   before   a   tribunal   carrying   his   licensed   revolver   is   condemned   by   the  Supreme   Court.   The  act  is  considered  inconsistent  with  dignity  of  the  Court.  The  Supreme  Court  advised  Advocates   to  be  equipped  with  law  and  precedents  but  not  with  firearms.     Satyendra   Narain   Singh   and   others   Vs   Ram   Nath   Singh   and   others,   AIR   1984   SC   1755:  When  a  case   of   a   Advocate   Son   came   before   a   Judge   Father,   the   Advocate-­‐Son   withdrew   from   the   case.   The   Supreme  Court  felt  that  the  Advocate  son,  rather  than  the  judge  father,  withdraws  from  the  case.     P   G   Gupta   Vs   Ram   Murti   (1997)   7   SCC   147   In   the   matter   of   Madhav   Singh,   AIR   1923   Pat   185:   Advocates  and  pleaders  are  enrolled  not  only  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  assistance  to  the  Courts   in  the  administration  of  Justice  but  also  for  giving  Professional  Advice  to  their  Clients  for  which  they   are  paid  by  those  members  of  the  public  who  require  their  services.     In  the  matter  of  Babu  Diwakar  Prasad  Mithal,  AIR  1924  All  253:  Advocates  are  agents,  not  of  their   Client  who  pay  them,  but  are  acting  in  the  administration  of  Justice.  

INTRODUCTION    Rule  of  Law  is  the  basic  principle  of  governance  of  any  civilized  and  democratic  society.   The   principle   asserts   supremacy   of   law   bringing   under   its   purview   everyone,   individuals   and   institutions   at   par   without   any   subjective   discretion.   It   connotes   the   meaning   that,   “Whoever   the   person   may   be,   however   High   he   or   she   is,   no   one   is   above   the  law  notwithstanding  how  powerful  and  how  rich  he  or  she  may  be.”  There  can  be  no   Rule   of   Law   unless   the   bulwark   of   that   grand   concept   “the   Court   of   Justice”   are   kept   alive   at   institutions   breathing   freedom,   openness   and   justice.   No   society   can   exist   without   laws   and   laws   have   no   meaning,   if   they   cannot   be   enforced.   It   is   through   the   Courts   that   the   rule   of   law   reveals   its   meaningful   content.   The   Indian   Constitution   is    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW based   upon   the   concept   of   Rule   of   Law   and   for   achieving   this   cherished   goal,   the   framers   of   Indian   Constitution   has   assigned   the   special   task   to   the   judiciary.   The   judiciary  is  the  guardian  of  the  Rule  of  Law.  Hence  judiciary  is  not  the  third  pillar  but   the   central   pillar   of   the   democratic   state.   An   independent   or   impartial   Judiciary   is   the   sine  qua  non  of  a  healthy  society.  It  is  the  last  resort  for  the  common  people  of  a  country,   as   they   repose   their   ultimate   faith   in   it   to   get   justice.   Therefore,   it   is   essential   for   the   Judiciary   to   be   protected   from   all   sorts   of   evil   likely   to   affect   the   administration   of   justice.  For  better  protection  and  preservation  of  prestige  and  dignity  of  the  courts,  the   law   on   contempt   of   court   has   evolved.   So,   broadly   speaking,   this   law   helps   the   courts   in   discharging   justice   keeping   its   stand   supreme   in   the   eye   of   society.   Actually   this   law   aims  at  ensuring  the  administration  of  justice  by  courts  in  the  society.     The   essence   of   contempt   is   action   or   inaction   amounting   to   an   interference   with   or   obstruction   to   or   having   a   tendency   to   interfere   with   or   to   obstruct   the   due   Administration  of  Justice.  Lowering  the  dignity  of  the  court  or  shaking  confidence  of  the   public   in   it   is   undoubtedly   reprehensible.   But   if   general   remarks   impugning   the   independence  of  a  court  are  made,  such  remarks  can  tend  to  interfere  with  or  obstruct   the  administration  only  indirectly  and  remotely.  In  such  cases  there  can  be  no  warrant   for   the   exercise   of   the   extraordinary   powers   which   the   courts   possess   to   deal   with   contempt.   The   power   to   punish   for   contempt   any   one   who   interferes   with   the   Administration  of  Justice  is  an  inherent  power  vested  in  the  judiciary.     The   law   of   contempt   is   based   on   the   sound   public   confidence   in   the   administration   of   justice.  The  purpose  of  contempt  jurisdiction  is  to  uphold  the  majesty  and  dignity  of  law   courts   and   their   image   in   the   minds   of   the   public   at   large.   The   object   of   the   discipline   enforced  by  the  court  in  case  of  contempt  of  court  is  not  to  vindicate  the  dignity  of  the    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW court   or   of   the   judge   but   to   prevent   undue   interference   with   the   administration   of   justice.   DEFINING  CONTEMPT  OF  COURT   The  Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971  defines  “contempt  of  court”  for  the  first  time.  Before   it,   there   was   no   statutory   definition   of   the   concept,   “Contempt   of   Court”.   Even   the   definition   of   contempt   of   court   given   in   the   Contempt   of   Courts   Act,   1971,   is   not   a   definition,  but  only  the  classification  or  categories  of  Contempt  of  Courts,  Actually,  it  is   very   difficult   to   define   the   concept,   “Contempt   of   Court”.   What   would   offend   the   dignity   of   the   Court   and   lower   the   Court’s   prestige   is   a   matter   for   the   Court   to   determine   and   it   cannot   be   confined   with   the   four   walls   of   a   definition   (State   of   Bihar   vs.   Shree   Kuber   Nand  Kishore  Singh,  1986  PLR  933;  Ahmed  Ali  vs  Supdt.  Dist.  Jail  Tezpur,  1987  Cr  LJ  1845).     In   the   opinion   of   Oswald   contempt   of   Court   may   be   said   to   be   constituted   by   any   conduct  that  tends  to  bring  the  authority  and  administration  of  law  into  disrespect  or   disregard  or  to  interfere  with  or  prejudice  parties,  litigation  or  their  witnesses  during   the  litigation.     In   Halsbury’s   it   has   been   defined   as   “Any   act   done   or   writing   published   which   is   calculated   to   bring   a   Court   or   Judge   into   contempt   or   to   lower   his   authority   or   to   interfere  with  the  due  course  of  justice  or  the  lawful  process  of  the  Court  is  Contempt  of   Court”     According   to   Section   2(a)   of   the   Contempt   of   Courts   Act,   1971   “contempt   of   Court”   means   Civil   Contempt   or   Criminal   Contempt.   Section   2(b)   of   the   Act   provides   that   “civil   contempt”  means  willful  disobedience  to  any  judgment,  decree,  direction,  order,  writ  or   other   process   of   a   Court   or   willful   breach   of   an   undertaking   given   to   a   Court.   Section    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 2(c)   of   the   Act   provides   that   “Criminal   Contempt”   means   the   publication   (whether   by   words,   spoken   or   written   or   by   signs   or   by   visible   representations   or   otherwise)   of   any   matter  or  the  doing  of  any  other  act  whatsoever  which  :-­‐   (i)    

scandalizes  or  tends  to  scandalize  or  lowers  or  tends  to  lower,  the  authority  of,   any  Court,  or  

(ii)  

prejudices  or  interferes  or  tends  to  interfere  with  the  due  course  of  any  judicial   proceeding  or  

(iii)  

interferes   or   tends   to   interfere   with   or   obstructs   or   tends   to   obstruct,   the   administration  of  justice  in  any  manner  

  The  above  definition  contained  in  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971  is  not  exhaustive.  It   merely   indicates   that   the   contempt   may   be   civil   contempt   or   criminal   contempt.   Actually  the  Contempt  of  Court  cannot  be  defined  exhaustively.  It,  is,  thus  better  to  leave   it   to   the   court   to   deal   with   each   case   as   it   comes   and   a   right   of   appeal   in   all   cases   of   contempt  will  cure  whatever  defect  there  may  be  in  the  application  of  law.     NATURE  AND  EXTENT  OF  PUNISHMENT   Section   12   of   the   Contempt   of   Courts   Act,   1971   makes   provision   in   respect   of   punishment  for  contempt  of  court.  The  provisions  of  Section  12  are  as  follows:     (1)  Save  as  otherwise  expressly  provided  in  this  Act  or  in  any  other  law,  a  contempt  of   Court  may  be  punished  with  simple  imprisonment  for  a  term  which  may  extend  to  six   months,   or   with   fine   which   may   extend   to   two   thousand   rupees,   or   with   both:   Provided   that   the   accused   may   be   discharged   or   the   punishment   awarded   may   be   remitted   on   apology  being  made  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Court.       Explanation  -­‐      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW An   apology   shall   not   be   rejected   merely   on   the   ground   that   it   is   qualified   or   conditional   if  the  accused  makes  it  bona  fide.       (2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any  law  for  the  time  being  in  force,  no  Court   shall  impose  a  sentence  in  excess  of  that  specified  in  sub  section  for  any  contempt  either   in  respect  of  itself  or  of  a  Court  subordinate  to  it.       (3)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  this  section,  where  a  person  is  found  guilty   of  a  civil  contempt,  the  Court,  if  it  considers  that  a  fine  will  not  meet  the  ends  of  justice   and   that   a   sentence   of   imprisonment   is   necessary   shall,   instead   of   sentencing   him   to   simple  imprisonment,  direct  that  the  he  be  detained  in  a  civil  prison  for  such  period  not   exceeding  six  months  as  it  may  think  fit.       (4)   Where  the  person  found  guilty  of  contempt  of  Court  in  respect  of  any  undertaking   given   to   a   Court   is   a   company,   every   person   who,   at   the   time   the   contempt   was   committed,   was   in   charge   of,   and   was   responsible   to,   the   company   for   the   conduct   of   business   of   the   company,   as   well   as   the   company,   shall   be   deemed   to   be   guilty   of   the   contempt   and   the   punishment   may   be   enforced,   with   the   leave   of   the   Court,   by   the   detention  in  civil  prison  of  each  such  person  :  Provided  that  nothing  contained  in  this   sub  section  shall  render  any  such  person  liable  to  such  punishment  if  he  proves  that  the   contempt  was  committed  without  his  knowledge  or  that  he  exercised  all  due  diligence   to  prevent  its  commission.       (5)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub  section  (4)  where  the  contempt  of  Court   referred   to   therein   has   been   committed   by   a   company   and   it   is   provided   that   the   contempt   has   been   committed   with   the   consent   or   connivance   of,   or   is   attributable   to   any   neglect   on   the   part   of,   any   director,   manger,   secretary   or   other   officer   of   the    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW company,  such  director,  manager,  secretary  or  other  officer  shall  also  be  deemed  to  be   guilty   of   the   be   contempt   and   the   punishment   may   be   enforced,   with   the   leave   of   the   Court,   by   the   detention   in   civil   prison   of   such   director,   manager,   secretary   or   other   officer.       Explanation  -­‐  For  the  purpose  of  sub  sections  (4)  and  (5)  -­‐     (a)   'Company'   means   anybody   corporate   and   includes   a   firm   or   other   association   of   individuals,  and     (b)  'Director'  in  relation  to  a  firm,  means  a  partner  in  the  firm.       Ordinarily  the  punishment  prescribed  under  the  Act  is  simple  imprisonment  for  a  term   which  may  extend  to  six  months  or  with  fine  which  may  extend  to  two  thousand  rupees   or  with  both.  There  is  a  proviso  appended  to  Section  12  which  provides  that  the  accused   may  be  discharged  or  the  punishment  awarded  may  be  remitted  on  apology  being  made   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   Court   (Section  12(1)  of  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971).   The   apology  shall  not  be  rejected  merely  on  the  ground  that  it  is  qualified  or  conditional  if   the   accused   makes   it   bona   fide   (Explanation  to  Section  12(1)  of  the  Contempt  of  Courts   Act,  1971  ).   Previously   apology   if   conditional   was   not   accepted.   Now   the   law   has   been   amended   by   this   provision   which   says   that   an   apology   shall   not   be   rejected   merely   because   it   is   conditional.   This   was   necessary   because   often   it   was   felt   that   the   alleged   contemnor   was   convinced   that   he   had   not   committed   any   contempt   of   court,   and   yet   he   did   not   want   to   contest   the   finding   to   the   contrary   given   by   the   court.   In   such   circumstances,  if  the  contemnor  explained  his  point  of  view  and  then  submitted  that  if   the   court   was   of   the   opinion   that   contempt   was   committed,   he   apologized.   Similarly,   many  other  situations  could  arise  in  which  conditional  apology  was  offered.        

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Now  the  position  is  made  clear  that  apology  will  not  be  rejected  for  the  simple  reason  of   being  conditional.  Facts  have  to  be  examined  before  the  same  can  be  rejected.  Another   important   feature   of   the   section   is   that   in   civil   contempt’s,   sentence   of   imprisonment   is   to   be   inflicted   only   when   it   is   considered   that   sentence   of   fine   will   not   meet   ends   of   justice.  Corporations  have  also  been  declared  as  capable  of  being  punished.       Sometimes   personal   considerations   affect   the   award   of   punishment   under   contempt   matters.  In  Hoshiam   Shavaksha   Dolikuka   v.   Thrity   Hoshie   Dolkuka   (1982,  2  SCC  577   at   p.   582),   the   Court   felt   that   imposition   of   any   kind   of   punishment   on   the   father   for   whom  daughter  has  a  lot  of  affection  is  likely  to  upset  her  and  cause  her  mental  distress.   In   the   unfortunate   and   acrimonious   dispute   between   the   husband   and   the   wife,   the   main   concern   in   the   instant   case   has   been   the   welfare   of   the   child.   Only   taking   into   consideration   the   fact   that   the   welfare   of   the   child   is   likely   to   be   affected,   the   court   was   of  the  opinion  that  under  the  present  circumstances  and  in  the  situation  now  prevailing   one   should   let   off   the   father   with   a   reprimand   and   a   warning,   although   he   has   been   rightly  found  guilty  of  having  committed  contempt  of  court  by  the  Bombay  High  Court,   in   the   hope   that   the   appellant   in   future   will   not   do   any   such   act   as   may   constitute   contempt   of   court   and   will   try   to   serve   the   cause   of   welfare   of   the   minor   daughter   by   carrying  out  the  directions  given  by  the  court.       The  Supreme  Court  in  R.   K.   Garg   v.   State   of   H.P.  (1981,   3   SCC   166   at   p.   167),  held  that   the  contemner  had  suffered  enough  in  mind  and  reputation  and  no  greater  purpose  was   going   to   be   served   by   subjecting   the   contemner   to   a   long   bodily   suffering.   The   punishment   in   this   case   was   reduced   to   one   month   imprisonment   from   six   months   whereas  the  fine  was  enhanced  from  Rs.  200/-­‐  to  Rs.  1000/-­‐.        

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW In   Zahira   Habibullah   Sheikh   V.   State   of   Gujarat   (AIR   1998   SC   1895),   the   Supreme   Court  has  observed  that  the  Parliament  by  virtue  of  Entry  77  of  List  I  is  competent  to   enact   a   law   relating   to   the   powers   of   the   Supreme   Court   with   regard   to   contempt   of   itself  and  such  a  law  may  prescribe  the  nature  of  punishment  which  may  be  imposed  on   a   contemner   by   virtue   of   Article   129   read   with   Article   142   (2)   of   the   Constitution.   Since   now   law   has   been   enacted   by   Parliament,   the   nature   of   punishment   prescribed   under   the   Contempt   of   Courts   Act,   1971   may   act   as   a   guide   for   the   Supreme   Court   but   the   extent   of   punishment   as   prescribed   under   that   Act   can   apply   only   to   the   High   Court   because   the   1971   Act   ipso   facto   does   not   deal   with   the   contempt   jurisdiction   of   the   Supreme   Court   except   that   Section   15   prescribes   procedural   mode   for   taking   cognizance   of   the   criminal   contempt   by   the   Supreme   Court   also.   Section   15   is   not   a   substantive  provision  conferring  contempt  jurisdiction.     (i)  Meaning  of  Apology     According   to   the   Oxford   Pocket   Dictionary   of   Current   English   the   term   apology   means   a   regretful  acknowledgment  of  an  offense  or  failure.     As   stated   earlier   the   accused   or   contemner   may   be   discharged   or   the   punishment   awarded   may   be   remitted   on   apology   being   made   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   court.   But   in   serious  matters  the  apology  cannot  be  accepted.  Where  statements  were  an  intentional   assault  on  the  integrity  and  impartiality  of  a  learned  Judge  of  High  Court  and  on  the  fair   name   of   the   High   Court,   and   irreparable   damage   had   already   been   done;   no   apology   could  undo  it.  The  journalistic  restraint,  which  should  be  inherent  in  a  columnist  of  the   Illustrated  Weekly,  was  thrown  into  the  winds.  He  cannot  take  cover  under  an  apology,   tendered   later   when   proceedings   in   contempt   are   initiated   under   the   Contempt   of   Courts  Act.        

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW The  Apex  Court  in  State  v.  Radhagobinda  Das  (AIR  1954  Orissa  7 ),  held  that  if  the  law   finds  one  to  be  guilty  of  contempt  and  he  bows  down  to  the  judgment  of  the  court  that  is   not  any  adequate  expression  of  apology.       Apology   is   an   act   of   contrition   and   it   must   not   be   shorn   of   penitence.   Tendering   of   apology  cannot  be  a  panacea  in  every  case  of  contempt.  In  State   of   Orissa   v.   R.   N.   Patra   (1975  41  Cut  LT  329),   the   Court   held   that   no   apology   could   undo   gross   contempt   and   serious  cases  of  contempt.  In  Rupert  J.  Bamabas  v.  N  Bharani  (1990  LW  (Crl)  27  Mad),   it   was   held   that   the   court   can,   even   when   accepts   the   apology,   commit   an   offender   to   prison  or  otherwise  punish  him.  In  State   of   Punjab   v.   Raddha   Krishan   Khanna   (AIR   1961  Punj  113)   the   Apex   Court   held   that   an   unreserved   apology,   in   less   serious   cases,   has  the  asset  of  taking  the  stringent  of  contempt.       (ii)  Nature  of  Apology     Apology   is   an   act   of   contrition.   Unless   apology   is   offered   at   the   earliest   opportunity   and   in  good  grace,  apology  is  shorn  of  penitence.  Tendering  of  apology  cannot  be  a  panacea   in  every  case  of  contempt.  If  that  were  so,  cases  of  gross  contempt  would  go  unpunished   and   serious   mischief   would   remain   unchecked   in   spite   of   the   fact   that   provision   has   been  made  under  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act.  Thus  the  purpose  of  the  Statute  would  be   frustrated  (State  v.  R.N.  Patra,  (1976)  1  Cr.  L.J.  at  p.  445  Orissa)     Apology   cannot   be   a   weapon   of   defense   forged   always   to   purge   the   guilty.   It   is   intended   to   be   evidence   of   real   contribution,   the   manly   consciousness   of   a   wrong   done,   of   an   injury   inflicted   and   the   earnest   desire   to   make   such   reparation   as   lies   in   the   wrong   doer's  power.  Only  then  it  is  of  any  avail  in  a  court  of  Justice.  But  before  it  can  have  that   effect,  it   should   be   tendered   at   the   earliest  possible  stage,  not  the  latest.  Even  if  wisdom   dawns   only   at   a   later   stage,   the   apology   should   be   tendered   unreservedly   and    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW unconditionally,   before   the   Judge   has   indicated   the   trend   of   his   mind.   Unless   that   is   done,  not  only  is  the  tendered  apology  robbed  of  all  grace  but  it  ceases  to  be  an  apology.   It  ceases  to  be  the  full,  frank  and  manly  confession  of  a  wrong  done,  which  it  is  intended   to   be   (In   the   matter   of   Hiren   Bose,   1969   Cr.   L.J.   40   at   p.   43   Cal).   Apology   must   be   voluntary,   unconditional   and   indicative   of   remorse   and   contrition   and   it   should   be   tendered   at   the   earliest   opportunity   (Bhalchandra  Gangadhar  Ghate  v.  Pralhad  Sadhuji   Raghute,  1976  Mah.  711  at  p.  712)   (iii)  Apology,  when  cannot  be  accepted     It  is  not  necessary  that  every  apology  is  to  be  accepted  by  the  court.  A  court  can  refuse   to  accept  an  apology  which  it  does  not  believe  to  be  genuine,  it  can,  even  when  it  accepts   the  apology,  commit  an  offender  to  prison  or  otherwise  punish  him.       The   Court   in   Lal   Behari   v.   State   (A.I.R.   1953   All   153   at   p.   158 )   held   that   what   may   appear   to   a   sophisticated   mind   as   harsh,   rough,   rude   and   uncouth,   may   not   be   so   to   unsophisticated   and   even   to   angry   irritated,   and   brooding.   There   is   nothing   to   hold   that   the  opponent  was  actuated  by  desire  to  disrepute  not  sure  about  his  ability  to  express   what   he   feels   just   or   unjust.   Under   these   circumstances,   there   is   no   hesitation   in   accepting  his  apology.       The   Court   may   or   may   not   accept   an   apology   goes   to   sentence   and   cannot,   therefore,   be   accepted   without   a   finding   that   contempt   has   been   committed.   However,   apology,   though  not  a  weapon  of  defence  forged  always  to  purge  the  guilty,  should  be  tendered   out   the   earliest   possible   stage,   unreservedly   and   unconditionally   and   it   must   be   indicative  of  remorse  and  contrition  as  well  as  free,  full,  frank  and  manly  confession  of  a   wrong   done   (Re   Hirenn   Bose,   AIR   1969   Cal   1).   A   hauling,   hesitating   and   vacillating    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW apology   deserves   to   be   rejected   (State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  v.  Krishna  Madho,  AIR  1952  All   86).   (iv)  Punishment  Primarily  a  Matter  of  Discretion     To  award  punishment  for  contempt  is  a  matter  sole  discretion  of  the  court.  It  has  been   seen  in  some  cases  where  a  contemnor  has  been  sufficiently  punished  for  disobeying  a   court  order  he  may  not  be  punished  further  for  continuing  to  do  the  same  thing,  even   though  in  a  sense  he  is  continuing  to  be  contumacious.  In  doing  so  the  court  takes  the   view   that   the   contemner   has   been   punished   enough   for   the   original   contempt,   and   he   is   not  going  to  comply  with  the  original  order  however  long  he  stays  in  custody,  therefore,   there   is   no   justification   for   continuing   to   keep   him   in   prison   (Enfield  London  Borough   Council  v.  Mahoney,  (1983)  2  All  E.R.  901  at  p.  907)     (v)  Quantum  of  Punishment     Ignorance   of   law   is   no   excuse.   A   person   who   inflicts   an   injury   upon   another   in   contravention  of  law  is  not  allowed  to  say  that  he  did  so  with  an  innocent  mind;  he  is   taken  to  know  the  law,  and  he  must  act  within  the  law  (Balkrishna  Narayan  Saoji  v.  Col.   N.S.  Jatar,  Inspector  General  of  Prisons,  C.P.  &  Berar,  Nagpur,  A.I.R.  1945  Nag.  33  at  p.  47).     It   is   not   open   to   accept   the   easy   and   ready   solution   of   accepting   the   apology   and   imposing   a   fine   in   the   case   of   a   contumacious   disregard   of   all   decencies,   which   can   only   lead   to   a   serious   disturbance   of   the   system   of   administration   of   justice   unless   duly   repaired   at   once   by   inflicting   an   appropriate   punishment   on   the   contemner   which   must   be  to  send  him  to  jail  to  atone  for  his  misconduct  and  therefore  to  come  out  of  prison  a   chastened   and   a   better   citizen   (Ashram  M.  Jain  v.  A.T.  Gupta,  (1983)  2  Cr.  L.J.  1499  at  p.   1500)    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW In  Nawal  Kishore  Singh  v.  Rajendra  Prasad  Singh  (A.I.R.  1976  Pat.  56  at  p.  57),  it  was   held  that  the  order  of  detention  in  the  civil  prison  is  intended  to  be  passed  in  addition  to   the  attachment  of  the  property  of  the  guilty  person.       (vi)  Impact  of  conduct  of  contemnor  on  Quantum  of  Punishment     An   important   question   relating   to   quantum   of   punishment   arises   that   whether   the   conduct   of   contemner   affect   the   quantum   of   punishment   i.e.,   good   conduct   help   in   reducing   the   punishment   of   imprisonment   and   fine   and   vice   versa.   When   the   Court   reaches   the   conclusion   that   there   is   a   punishable   contempt,   the   conduct   of   the   respondents   and   the   subsequent   events,   may   have   effect   and   impact   upon   the   quantum   of  punishment.  Such  matters  may  not  have  a  direct  relevance  on  the  question  whether  a   particular  passage  which  had  been  the  subject-­‐matter  of  a  specific  charge  does  or  does   not  amount  to  criminal  contempt  (Guruvayur  Devaswom  Managing  Committee  v.  Pritish   Nandy,  1987  Cr.L.J.  192  Ker)   The  Apex  Court  in  Shyam  Sundar  v.  Satchidananda  Rakshit  (A.I.R.  1955  Cal.  351  at  p.   353),   held   that   the   punishment   should   be   primarily   for   upholding   the   dignity   of   the   court   and   maintaining   due   respect   for   the   administration   of   justice.   There   should   be   no   element   of   vindictiveness   in   it   and   it   should   not   be   allowed   to   be   used   for   feeding   a   private  grudge  or  as  an  offensive  weapon  to  satisfy  private  vendetta.     CONTEMPTS  NOT  PUNISHABLE  IN  CERTAIN  CASES     Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any   law   for   the   time   being   in   force,   no   Court  shall  impose  a  sentence  under  this  Act  for  a  contempt  of  Court  unless  it  is   satisfied  that  the  contempt  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  substantially  interferes,  or   tends   substantially   to   interfere   with   the   due   course   of   justice   (Section   13   of   the   Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971  has  been  amended  and  new  provision  have  been  discussed  in    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the  later  part  of  this  Chapter  under  the  heading  of  the  Contempt  of  Courts  (Amendment)   Act,  2006)     The  law  does  not  take  into  consideration  the  trivial  matters  even  though  such  matters  in   the  technical  sense  may  be  covered  under  law.  The  contempt  law  is  also  developed  on   this  cardinal  rule  of  law  that  minor  matters  must  be  ignored.     It   is   submitted   that   every   infraction   of   court's   order   is   not   contempt   of   court   (H.S.   Butalia  v.  Subhas  Saksena,  1974  Cr  LJ  828  Cal)   Thus,   this   section   in   unambiguous   and   in   clear   terms   declares   that   only   willful   and   deliberate   disobedience   of   court's   order   or   substantial   interference   in   courts   order   is   to   be   punished.   A   party   (or   person)   can   be   committed   for   contempt   only   owing   to   any   willful   or   deliberate   or   reckless   disobedience   of   the   order   of   the   court   (Jiwani   Kumari   v.   Satyabrata   Chakraborty,   AIR   1991   SC   326)   Technical   contempt’s   are   to   be   ignored   (Baradakanta   Mishra   v.   The   Registrar,  Orissa  High  Court,  AIR  1974  SC  710)  But  the  contempt  by  a  senior  lawyer  could   not   be   ignored.   The   vituperative   language   was   the   outcome   of   a   defeated   Advocate   which   appeared   to   be   a   very   serious   matter   to   the   High   Court.   The   matter   becomes   more   serious   when   it   has   happened   in   a   mofussil   place   where   there   are   one   or   two   courts   and   a   few   lawyers,   and   the   litigating   public   is   mostly   illiterate   or   poorly   educated,   therefore   under   such   circumstances   contempt   is   not   to   be   ignored   or   allowed   to  pass  by  (Rama   Dayal,   Markarha   v.   The   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh,   A.I.R.   1978   SC   921   at   p.  929)     CONCLUSION   “Judge  not  lest  ye  be  judged”  is  a  Biblical  maxim  that  should  apply  to  judges  as  much  as  it   applies  to  lay  people.  Just  as  judges  have  the  right  to  judge  litigants;  litigants  have  the   right  to  judge  judges.  They  have  a  public  interest  to  know  how  judges  have  conducted    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW themselves  in  court,  and  in  each  case.  In  an  open  justice  system,  no  judge  and  no  court   can  avoid  criticism,  fair  or  foul.  Lord  Atkin  once  said,  “Justice  is  not  a  cloistered  virtue;   she   must   be   allowed   to   suffer   the   scrutiny   and   respectful,   even   though   outspoken,   comments  of  ordinary  men.”  To  speak  one’s  mind  is  a  right  that  cannot  be  denied  to  any   citizen.  To  suppress  this  in  the  name  of  scandalizing  the  court  is  no  guarantee  that  the   respect   and   dignity   of   the   court   will   be   enhanced.   As   Lord   Denning   remarked   (in   Quintin   Hogg’s   Case),   “Let   me   say   at   once   that   we   will   never   use   this   [contempt]   jurisdiction  as  a  means  to  uphold  our  own  dignity.  That  must  rest  on  surer  foundations”.   The  contempt  power  in  a  democracy  is  only  to  enable  the  court  to  function  effectively,   and  not  to  protect  the  self-­‐esteem  of  an  individual  judge.  The  foundation  of  judiciary  is   based  on  the  trust  and  the  confidence  of  the  people  in  its  ability  to  deliver  fearless  and   impartial   justice.   When   the   foundation   itself   is   shaken   by   acts   which   tend   to   create   disaffection  and  disrespect  for  the  authority  of  the  court  by  disrupting  its  working,  the   edifice  of  the  judicial  system  gets  eroded.  Judiciary  by  punishing  the  guilty  infuses  faith   in  the  supremacy  of  law  and  omnipotence  of  justice.  Every  offender  is  to  be  punished  for   contumacious   acts   under   the   relevant   contempt   laws,   but   it   is   extremely   important   to   make  it  sure  by  the  judiciary  that  these  provisions  are  not  to  be  misused.       It   can   be   adequately   inferred   that   the   Contempt   of   Courts   Act,   1971   is   of   paramount   importance   in   the   context   of   sustaining   the   concept   of   justice.   It   aides   to   make   the   process   of   administering   justice   expeditious   as   well   as   upholds   the   dignity   and   faith   the   people  have  bestowed  in  the  judicial  system  of  the  country.  In  itself,  it  abstains  from  any   form   of   arbitrariness.   It   gives   every   organization   or   individual   charged   under   the   act   reasonable   grounds   to   defend   it   or   himself,   as   the   case   may   be.   The   restrictions,   it   imposes,  is  just  and  fair  in  them.  Moreover,  it  recognizes  the  equal  footing  of  all  people   in  the  country  by  bringing  the  judiciary  and  its  officials  within  its  ambit.    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW  

CONTEMPT An act of deliberate disobedience or disregard for the laws , regulations, or decorum of a public authority such as a court or legislative body.

CONTEMPT OF COURT It is a behaviour that opposes or defies the authority, justice and dignity of the court. Contempt charges may be brought against parties to proceedings; lawyer or other court officers; witness; or people who insert themselves in a case, such as protesters outside a court room. Courts have great leeway in making contempt charges , and thus confusion sometimes exist about the distinction between types of contempt . Generally , however, contempt proceedings are categorized as civil or criminal.

 

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SECTION 2 ON THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT 1971 a) “Contempt of Court” means civil contempt or criminal contempt.

b) “Civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgement , decree, direction , order , writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. c) “Criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken, or written ,or by signs , or by visible representation or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which.

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW i.

Scandalizes or tends to scandalise , or lowers or tends to lower the authority of , any court;

ii.

Prejudices , or interferes or tends to interfere with due course of any judicial proceeding.

iii.

Interferes or tends to interfere with , or obstructs or tends to obstruct , the administration of justice in any other manner.

CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CHARGES Criminal contempt charges become separate charges from the underlying case . Unlike civil contempt sanctions, criminal contempt charges may live or after resolution of the underlying case. One charged with criminal contempt generally gets the constitutional rights guaranteed to criminal defendants , including the right to counsel, right to put on a defence, and the right to a jury trial in certain cases. Charges of criminal contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW However incarceration of contempt may begin immediately, before the contempt charge is adjudicated and the sentence decided. Depending on the jurisdiction and the case, the same judge who decided to charge a person with contempt may end up residing over the contempt proceedings. Criminal contempt can bring punishment including jail time and / or a fine.

DR. DC. SAXENA V/S HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA

In a clash of competing interests in constitutional contours, this case calls to strike a balance between the freedom of speech and expression, a salutary right in a liberal  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW democratic society and paramount countervailing duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. The petitioner has initiated public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution to direct Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, the President of Indian National Congress and the former Prime Minister of the country to pay a sum of Rs.8.29 lakhs and odd said to be due to the union of Indian for use of Indian Air Force aircraft or helicopters from October 1, 1993 to November 30, 1993. When writ Petition No. 432/95 was posted for hearing on July 17,1995 before the learned Chief Justice of India and brother Justice S.C. Sen the solicitor General for India, Shri Dipankar P. Gupta was sent for and the Court directed him to have the averments verified to be correct and directed the petition to be listed after two weeks. On August 7,1995, the writ petition came before the Bench comprising the learned CJI, Justice S.C. Sen and Justice K.S. Paripoornan. It is not in dispute that the Solicitor General had placed the record before the Court and upon perusal thereof and after hearing the petitioner-in-person, the Bench summarily "dismissed"" the writ petition which had triggered the petitioner to file yet another writ petition, this time against the learned Chief Justice of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi. The Registry raised objections for its maintainability but, at eh insistence of the petitioner, it was posted, with office objections, for hearing, as unregistered Writ petition (c) NO. 17209/95 on January 13,1996 before a Bench of three learned Judges, viz. Justice J.S. Bharuchal. The petitioner, again  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW appearing in person, persisted to justify the averments made against the learned CJI, Justice A.M. Ahmadi in the writ petition. In spite of the Court having pointed out that the averments were scandalous, the proceeding of the Court did indicate that the petitioner reiterated that he "stood by the averments made therein" and sought for declaration [1] that Justice A.M. Ahmadi is unfit to hold the office as Chief Justice of India; [2] that he should be tripped of his citizenship; [3] to direct registration of an FIR against him under various provisions of Indian penal Code for committing forgery and fraud and under the prevention of Corruption Act; (4) to direct prosecution of him under the prevention of Corruption Act; (5) to direct him to defray from his personal pocket the expenses incurred by the petitioner in filing the two writ petitions, i.e., W.P. No. 432/95 and the second writ petition; (6) to direct justice A.M. Ahmadi to reimburse from his pocket to the public exchequer the entire loss caused to the State,. as a consequence of non-payment of the dues by Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao with interest at 18% per annum and (7) other consequential directions. After hearing the petitioner, the Bench dismissed the second writ petition with the order as under: "The several averments in the writ petition are scandalous and it is surprising that the petitioner, who is said to be a Professor in a University, has chosen to draft and file such a writ petition. His understanding of the meaning of Article 32 of the Constitution, is to say the least, preposterous. The allegations made are reckless and disclose irresponsibility  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW on the part of the petitioner. This writ petition is wholly misconceived and is an abuse of the process of the Court. The writ petition has no merit. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. In view of the attitude of the petitioner even at the hearing, when the persisted in this stand and, on our asking him, reiterated that he stood by the scandalous averment made therein, we consider it our duty to issue to the petitioner a notice to show cause why proceedings to punish him for contempt of this Court should not be initiated against him. The Registry to take the necessary steps for registering the matter as a contempt petition. The petitioner who is presentin-person is given notice of the contempt petition. He is required to file his reply within four wheels to show cause why proceedings for contempt should not be initiated against him. We request the learned Solicitor General to assist the Court in this contempt matter.List the matter after notice of the date fixed by Registry is given to Dr. D.C. Saxena and the Solicitor General." While dismissing the petition, this Court observed in the later part of the order the petitioner's conduct in his persistence to stand by the scandalous averments made against the learned Chief Justice of India. This Court was constrained to initiate contempt proceedings and enlisted 14 instances which would prima facie constitute contumacious conduct of the petitioner  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW to scandalise the Court. In the meanwhile, the petitioner wrote in a newspaper criticising Justice J.S. Verma. Resultantly, Justice J.S. Verma reclused himself from the Bench. Thus the matter was posted before this Bench. On April 12,1996, the petitioner filed his reply to the show cause notice styling the same as "preliminary submissions" and reiterated his averments, which, as pointed by this Court, would constitute scandalisation of the Court and yet he had given his justification for accusing the chief Justice of India. However, at the end, as a foot-note, he has written in his own hand-writing as under: "N.B. If some passages seem strindent or pungent, the defendantis willing to suitably modify them." On April 14,1996, this court passed the order as under; "Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court the Contemnor Dr. D.C.Saxena is present today in person. He has stated that he would modify the offending portions noted in the show cause notice in Item (ii),(iv) (vi), (vii), (viii), (x),(xii),(xiii) and wishes to withdraw unconditionally item (xiv), paras B and C. The learned Solicitor General has pointed out that even if the Contemnor withdraws or files statement in the modified form what the Court required to do is whether his statements made in the writ petition originally filed constitute contempt of the Court or not statements would not be of material relevance for consideration. Since the contemnor seeks time to submit the show contemnor seeks time to submit the show cause in the modified language which he wishes to place  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW before the court, at his request the matter is adjourned to may 2,1996 at 2.00p.m. The Registry is directed to supply complete set of papers to learned solicitor General." When the case came up for hearing on May 2, 1996, the petitioner filed amended portions to substitute the averments made, at proper places, in the second unnumbered writ petition. We have heard learned Solicitor General as amicus curiae and the petitioner-in-person. Before opening the case, the solicitor General, in view of the seriousness of the averments made by the petitioner in the petition filed against the chief Justice of India, and in view of his stand in both the preliminary submissions to the contempt notice and the revised averments made in the writ petition, suggested that it would be advantageous for the petitioner to have consultation and legal assistance of any counsel of his choice and to revise his stand, but the petitioner remained silent and got along with the case. The learned solicitor General stated that on July 17, 1995, the Court had sent for and called upon him to have the allegations made in the first writ petition, verified and to place the factual position before the Court. Pursuant thereto, on August 7,1995, he had placed the record before the Court which are confidential in nature. After their perusal and hearings the petitioner, the Court did not think it necessary to issue the directions as sought for. At this stage, we would point out that when Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, as president of Indian National Congress or as the former prime Minister,  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW was alleged to have used the defence aircrafts, this Court obviously was of the view that the relationship between the two wings of the Government or the political party, i.e., the Indian national Congress is of debtor and creditor and that, therefore, prerogative writ under Article 32 of the Constitution would not lie to enforce contractual dues adjustable as per their practice. The exercise of the power under Article 32 was, therefore, obviously thought to be uncalled for. Supreme Court being the highest Judicial forum, the need to record reasons is obviated since there is no further appeal against the order of this Court. Recording reasons is not, therefore, necessary nor is called for. The learned solicitor General, therefore, contended that when the Court dismissed the writ petition, the petitioner, being a professor of English in Chandigarh University, should have exercised restraint and felt duty- bound not to proceed further in the matter. Instead, he filed the second writ petition with allegations which are ex-facie contumacious. The petitioner reiterated the same in his preliminary submissions to the notice of the contempt. His modified statement filed on April 24,1996 itself is not relevant. What would be material and relevant for consideration is whether the allegations made against the learned Chief Justice of India in the Second Writ petition do constitute contempt of the Court. The modified stand, therefore, is not relevant to adjudge whether the petitioner has committed contempt of this Court. The Court,  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW therefore, has to consider the totality of the averments and their effect on the judicial process to adjudge the conduct of the petitioner to be contumacious. The petitioner contended that he did not seek any personal gain for himself. As a dutybound citizen, he was actuated to see that the public dues are recovered from any person how-so-high he may be. To the best of his understanding, the petitioner made the averments for public good and he has no intention to scandalise the Court. He had approached this Court earlier more than 12 times to vindicate public justice. As a human being, he is fallible but he has no intention to denigrate the Court to which he has highest respect. His modified language in the statement filed on April 24,1996 does indicate his intention. In the proceedings of the Court dated July, 17,1995, it was recorded that the Solicitor General had appeared for Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao who was impleaded in his personal capacity. It is the petitioner's contention that the solicitor General cannot appear for him. He was not assisting the Court as amicus. When the Chief justice called for the records from the Government through solicitor General, it is Court's duty to give him copies of those documents but the same were denied to him. It is his xiv) Page 9 prayer (a) Declare the respondent unfit to hold office as chief Justice of India;  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW (b) Strip the respondent of his citizenship; (c) Direct the registration of an F.I.R. against the respondent under the Indian penal Code for committing forgery and fraud; (d) Direct the respondent's prosecution under the prevention of corruption Act. The alleged contemnor filed written submissions in reply to the contempt notice. His first submission was that the Bench which had heard and dismissed the second writ petition had been constituted by the respondent, who had thereby become a judge in his own cause. The second writ petition was, accordingly, not listed before a court, competent to dispose it of, so that the order of its dismissal was non est, and it was still deemed to be pending. The contempt notice was, therefore, premature. The written submissions then dealt with the portions of the second writ petition which had been indicated in the contempt notice and reiterated the same, except only that it was submitted that the allegation about fabrication of the court proceedings of 7th August, 1995, was "somewhat unhappily would". It was submitted thereafter that the contempt of Courts Act was a legacy of British imperialism and, while appropriate to a "banana republic", was imcompatible with a democratic, people's polity; it was a law-less law because it fused the offices of the prosecutor and the judge and "belongs with the infamous Spanish inquisition". After his signature at the foot of the written  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW submissions, the alleged contemnor added in hand, "N.B. If some passages seem strident or pungent, the defendant is willing to suitably modify them." The contempt notice came up before this Bench on 15th April, 1996. The following order was then passed; "Pursuant to the notice issued by this court the Contemnor Dr. D.C.. Saxena is present today in person. He has stated that he would modify the offending portions noted in the show cause notice in Item (ii),(iv),(vi), (vii),(viii),(x),(xi),(xii),(xiii) and wishes to withdrew unconditionally item xiv, paras B and C. The learned Solicitor General has pointed out that even if the Contemnor withdraws or files statement in the modified form what the Court required to do is whether originally filed constitute contempt of the statements would not be of material reliance time to submit the show cause in the modified Court, at his request eh matter is adjourned to may 2,1996 at 2.00 P.M. The Registry is directed to supply complete set of papers to learned Solicitor General." extract the relevant portions supplied to him by show cause and his reply thereto and of preliminary submissions and his modified statement as a substitution to the averments made in the second writ petition and the effect thereof. In respect of  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the averments made in the offending portions of item 1,3, 5,9,13 and 14(a) and (d), the petitioner stood by them. He submitted his modified statement on April 24,1996 only for the rest of the statements. Let us first consider the unmodified averments before examining the original and the modified averments. The first averment made at page 4 in paragraph 9 is that "it was improper for justice Ahmadi to hear it". Item 3 at page 6 in paragraph 14 is: "To this Justice Ahmadi responded that he (the solicitor General) was there to assist the Court, contrary to the evidence of the court proceedings". Item 5 relating to the averments made in page 6 in paragraph 17 is; "the subsequent course of action by Justice Ahmadi, in dealing with the grouse of the petitioner and dismissing his petition is totally unjust, unfair, arbitrary and unlawful. It is in flagrant violation of the mandates of Article 14 of the constitution, which "runs like a golden thread" through it ad is the foundation of justice and fair play". Item 9 relating to the averments made at page 8 in paragraph 18(f) is: "what are the legal consequences of the violation of the sacred oath of office by justice Ahmadi?" Item 14(a) relating to the prayer portion is: "declare the respondent (justice A.M. Ahmadi) unfit to hold office as Chief Justice of India" and item 14(d) is: "Direct the respondent's (Justice A.M. Ahmadi's) prosecution under the prevention of Corruption Act." The petitioner in his affidavit filed in support of the second writ petition has stated in para 2 thereof thus: "I am actuated purely by national interests and no personal gains and have truthfully and  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW carefully stated the facts (emphasis supplied), in pursuance of my fundamental duties, which can be effectively performed only through the fundamental rights enjoyed as a citizen of India." In his preliminary submissions, he has stated that the writ petition under Article 32 shall be heard by a Division Court of not less than 5 Judges. Emphasis was added by the petitioner himself. Since the writ petition was not listed before a Court components to dispose of the same, it made the order of dismissal non est and it should be deemed to be pending and is "not yet decided and disposed of constitutionally". No contempt proceedings can, therefore, be initiated. The notice is , therefore, pre-mature. Constitution of the Bench by the chief Justice is in violation of the principles of natural justice as no one can be a judge of his own cause. Justice "should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference of the course of justice.", he quoted the above statement of Lord Heward, C.J. Regarding Item 1 referred to hereinbefore; he justified the imputation stating that no person can be a Judge in his own cause directly or indirectly. In spite of his objection, the respondent (CJI) chose to constitute the bench himself as a presiding judge. According to the petitioner the word " improper", therefore was used in that perspective, with regard to the averments made in Item 3, his reply was that the Court proceedings dated July 17,1995 recording that the solicitor General, Shri Dipankar Gupta appeared in his official capacity  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW to Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, a private party. He had stated that even assuming, though not conceding, that he (Solicitor General was acting as amicus curiae also was not recorded in the Court proceedings. Therefore, his comment that CJI had Fabricated false record is fair and an accurate report of the court proceedings protected under section 4 of the Act. With regard to Item 5, he states thus: " This is a reaffirmation of an unimpeachable legal proposition in the most widely-prevalent legal phraseology, to which no umbrage can be taken, for by this logic all petitions containing this phrase would be deemed contemptuous. Even the part of the quotation is from a leading decision of this Hon'ble Court in Maneka Gandhi's case." With regard to averments made in item 9, he justified it stating that "this again is an unresolved question of great legal significance and he cited as analogy of Mr. Fazlul Huq, then Chief Minister of Bengal and quoted a passage from a special Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in R.C. Pollard v. Satya Gopal Majumdar [A.I.R. 1943 Cal. 594 (605)]. He added special emphasis to the words "the clear violation of it brands a man as unfit for public office" and stated that it is a legal question of substantial importance relating to the violation of oath of office, contained in the Third Scheduled of the Constitution and it cannot be disposed of by a three judge Bench. It cannot be considered as personal imputation against the judge. With regard to imputation and prayer (a) in item 14, he says that the analogy he had taken from the  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Calcutta High Court decision. It was natural corollary to the legal proposition considered by a constitution Bench. with regard to prayer (d) in Item 14, he states that this is only a prayer for relief sought. The defence taken in relation to (xiv)(b) and (c) would equally be applicable and so he has reaffirmed them to be correct. The allegations, therefore, are neither "reckless" nor do they "disclose irresponsibility" (put within inverted comma by the petitioner himself) and is not "an abuse of the process of the Court." He reiterated that "several averments in the writ petition" being truthful, factual, and made without rancour or malice and for no personal, gain, should not be construed "scandalous" (inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). Let us now consider other imputations, in the language of petitioner himself with regard to the "truthfully and carefully" stated facts. At page 5 in para 10, the petitioner has stated that "Justice Ahmadi's utmost reluctance to perform his fundamental duties and constitutional obligations was apparent. when after failing to browbeat the petitioner, he stated that it would be taken up at the end of the cause list." in his preliminary submissions he has stated that "this is a fair and accurate submission of the Court proceedings on matter which had already been "heard and finally decided"."(inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). He sought protection to it, as a fair comment, under Section 4 of the Act.  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW He further justified it stating that even the use of the would "browbeat" by the petitioner is a "fair criticism of judicial act" (inverted comma was put by the petitioner himself) to imply that proper hearing was not being granted to the petitioner who had approached the highest Court of the land to 'Protect and safeguard public property". he justified them as a "statement of truthful facts", for public good should not be construed as disrespect to the Hon'ble Court. After offering justification in his modified statement, he reiterates thus: "The petitioner discerned reluctance on the part of the presiding judge to allow the relief claimed, which was in public interest, and actuated by the desire to "Preserve and protect public property," without any personal malice." It would, thus, indicate that the petitioner imputed motives to Justice A.M. Ahmadi, chief justice India, in the discharge of his constitutional duty and that by not admitting the writ petition or dismissing the petition, the CJI was reluctant to perform his constitutional duty. He knew that the word "browbeat" is a strident imputation to the Court and, therefore, in his modified reluctance". Even in the modified statement, he attributed motives to CJI in the performance of his constitutional duty while the Bench that dismissed the first writ petition consisted of three judges. By inference, he suggested the other brother Judges to be mere non-entity. With regard to item 4 at page 6 in para 15, he imputed to the CJI that "and without recording the reasons for dismissing the petition. So much for the vaunted adherence to the twin principles of transparency and  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW accountability." In his preliminary submissions, he has given justification for his attributed motives to CJI stating that the Solicitor General handed over some documents to the bench, without supplying the copy thereof to the bench, without supplying the copy thereof to the petitioner. When he had objected to it in his own language, he avers that "justice Ahmadi asked him to argue on the supposition that nothing had been given to the bench. In view of this, reference has been made to the "twin principles of transparency and accountability which", according to the petitioner, "is a fair and accurate report of court proceedings, which is also for the "public good"." (inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). In the modified statement he stated thus: "That justice Ahmadi ultimately dismissed the petition, observing that the Government of India was capable to realise the dues from Shri Rao (which it had no to done in two years) and without recording the reasons for dismissing the petition, for which lapse it has often berated High Courts, in pursuance of the twin principles of transparency and accountability". It would, thus be seen that as regards this imputation, the petitioner gives justification that there was omission to record reasons for dismissal of the writ petition; he imputed to CJI that the CJI facilitated Sri Narasimha Rao to avoid payment of public dues. The act of the Court was not transparent. According to the petitioner, it is a lapse on the part of the Court for which the Court conduct, by implication, was not transparent and the Court must be accountable.  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Item 6 at page 7 in paragraph 18(c) reads thus: "For causing fabrication of courts proceedings of 7th August, 1995, and not mentioning the fact of appearance of the solicitor General, would justice Ahmadi not be liable to prosecution under the relevant provisions of the Indian penal code in consonance with the time-honoured maxim, `Be you ever so high, the law is above you"?" (inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). In his preliminary submissions he stated that "Although somewhat unhappily worded, it is one of the substantial questions of law, which needed to be determined by a constitution Bench of the apex court". According to him, above maxim is one to which this court has repeatedly stated to have avowed allegiance. In his modified version, he stated thus: "For inaccurate recording of the court proceedings of 7 August, 1995, and not mentioning even the fact of appearance of the solicitor General for the respondent, what responsibility would ensue on the presiding judge, who dictated them?" It would, therefore, in the language of the petitioner, be "discernible" difference of the imputation as originally made in the writ petition and reiterated in his preliminary submissions and its impact was understood by the petitioner. Therefore, he made the amended version imputing responsibility to justice Ahmadi personally for the so called inaccurate recording of the Court proceedings and stated that the CJI should be prosecuted for the record said to be falsely recorded by CJI after fabrication and it is a fraud and CJI is liable for prosecution for fraud etc. Item 7 at page 6 in  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW paragraph 18(d) reads thus; "can justice Ahmadi be allowed to take shelter behind the cloak of the judicial immunity, in the facts and circumstances of the instance case, particularly when unlike the president of India, who cannot be impleaded in Civil or criminal proceedings "during his term of office," CJI enjoys no such constitutional protection?" In his preliminary submissions, he stated that this is yet another constitutional conundrum which needed to be resolved by a constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Court under Article 145(3) read with Supreme Court Rules. According to the petitioner "Crucial to it are "the facts and circumstances" (inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself) spelled out earlier". implicitly conferring immunity on the congress president, Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, from laws of the land do not apply. Is this not a negation of all that the constitution holds sacred?" In the modified version, he stated thus "when under the Constitution Judges of superior courts do not, unlade the president of India, enjoy total immunity during their term of office, can the presiding judge, be allowed to make such a claim for wrong doing?" (Emphasis supplied). He, thus, imputed to the chief justice of India, Justice Ahmadi motives that CJI allowed Sri Narasimha Rao, Congress president, to avoid payment of dues causing loss to the national exchequer treating him as a class by himself and the CJI neglected to perform the constitutional duty which he holds sacred which is a wrong-doing. therefore, chief Justice of India should not be allowed to take judicial immunity and  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW is liable to criminal prosecution even during his term of office as CJI. Item 8 of the imputation at page 7 in para 18(e) reads thus; "for willfully and advertently violating (emphasis supplied) the fundamental rights of not only the petitioner as an individual, but that of the people of India, who are ultimately sovereign, as stated in the preamble to the Constitution, has not justice Ahmadi forfeited any legal protection, even if it were available to him?" In his preliminary submissions, he has stated that "The first part of the sentence is based on the implicit constitutional provisions and in fact shows that the petitioner/defendant looks upon the apex court as the guardian of his fundamental rights and those of the voiceless millions. The second part raises a constitutional question, which needed determination by an appropriate bench." In the amended version, he reiterated that "for violating the fundamental rights of not only the petitioner, as an individual, but also that of the people of India, who are the ultimate sovereign, as stated in the preamble to the Constitution, has not justice Ahmadi sent wrong signals tot he entire judiciary of which he is the head". In this paragraph, it is clear that the petitioner knew the distinction between the imputation as originally attributed to the Chief justice of India as Head of the Institution, i.e., Judiciary and reiterated in his preliminary submissions that CJI "willfully" and "advertently" violated the petitioner's and people's fundamental right to redressal by wrongful dismissal  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW of the writ petition. He knew its indelible effect on the public confidence in the efficacy of judicial dispensation and propriety of the judicial process. When they read the imputation, he attributed to the Chief Justice that CJI willfully and advertently violated the fundamental rights of the petitioner and other people in dismissing the writ petition. Thereby, justice Ahmadi forfeited legal protection of law, if it were available to him and he stated in his modified version that the action of Chief Justice of India sent wrong signals to the entire judiciary of which he is the head. In other words, it would imply that CJI as judge and as head of the institution committed misconduct. Imputation 10 made at page 8 in paragraph 18(g) reads thus: "For deliberate and willful failure to perform his fundamental duties and stultifying their performance by the petitioner, should not justice Ahmadi be stripped of his citizenship, because duties alone can confer the corresponding legal and constitutional rights?. In his preliminary submissions, he has stated that this is also a constitutional question needed to be interpreted on the ambit and enforceability of fundamental duties in Article 51-A; it should not be considered by a Division bench. "Moreover, this is a logical corollary of the foregoing question of law. It is respectfully reiterated that a question of law is not a personal imputation or insinuation." In his modified version, he has stated thus: "For failure to perform his fundamental duties and impeding their performance by the petitioner, should not justice Ahmadi be regarded as accountable to the people of  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW India, because duties alone can confer the corresponding legal and constitutional rights?" In this behalf, it is clear that the petitioner is well conversant with the effect of "a personal imputation and the negation". He attributed that Justice Ahmadi, Chief Justice of India deliberately and willfully failed to perform his fundamental duties by dismissing the first writ petition and stultified the performance of the duty by the petition and stultified the performance of the duty by the petitioner. Thereby Justice Ahmadi "be stripped of his citizenship". He also knew that for exercise of legal or constitutional rights one owes corresponding duties. The person who fails to perform the duty is accountable to the people. CJI willfully, in other words, deliberately with supine indifference dismissed the writ petition. CJI does not get legal protection but also forfeits his citizenship. Imputation 11 at page 8 in paragraph 18(h) reads thus: "For allowing his son who is a practising in the Supreme Court, to stay with him in his official residence, and presumably in the supreme Court, to stay with him in his official residence, and presumably misusing official facilities and prestige of office of chief Justice of India, is not Justice Ahmadi liable to be prosecuted under the prevention of corruption act, in view of the ratio decidendi of Veeraswami's case?" In his preliminary submissions, he reiterated that this is a question law based on information he had received from "public documents"(inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself) from an Article which was said to have appeared in  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW "India Today", with Justice Ahmadi's photograph and yet another one said to have been published in "The Times of India", authored by a woman senior Advocate of this Court. He states that "It is widely talked in legal circles that apart from being favoured in appointment on local commissions (by the Delhi High Court) Justice Ahmadi's son (and daughter also) are very often assigned government briefs". In support of his imputation, he seeks justification from the observation made by this Court in C. Ravichandran Iyer V. Justice A.M. Bhattacjarkee & Ors. [(1995) 5 SCC 457] of transparency of the conduct of the Judge on and off the bench. He further added that "the criminal contempt application of one M.P. Shorewala against the petitioner/defendant was got filed and in gross violation of statutory provision (mentioned in the office report) was got listed next to the petitioner's civil writ petition on the same day. i.e., 30th January, 1996, for reasons which need no dilation'. The petitioner had not modified in his modified version, though he undertook to do so. He stood by the above imputation and reiteration with further justification in that behalf made in his preliminary submissions. we may observe here itself that personal imputation against the chief Justice of India, Justice Ahmadi of allowing his son to practise in the supreme court is false. His permitting his son to reside in his official residence said to be in abuse of his official position has no relevance to the first writ petition relating to the recovery of the alleged arrears said to be due from Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao. During the course of hearing,  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW when it was pointed out to the petitioner that as a fact the son of justice Ahmadi is not practising in the Supreme Court and that the above imputation has no rational connection to the first writ petition and of the necessity to allege them in the second one, no answer was given by the petition and of the necessity to allege them in the second one, no answer was given by the petitioner. He sought to justify it on the basis of the reports said to have been published in the newspapers. When we further inquired from him whether he made any independent inquiry in the matter or on the accuracy of the newspaper publications, he stated that he relied upon the above statements as an accurate statement of fact reported therein. We may mention that this imputation has no relevance to the first proceedings. As a fact, the son of Justice Ahmadi is not practising in the Supreme Court. The alleged facility of permitting his son to stay in his official residence bears no relevance to the proceedings. The imputations were obviously off the cup. Imputation 12 made at page 8 in paragraph 18(i) reads thus: " Is Justice Ahmadi not liable to pay from his pocket not only the legitimate costs incurred by the petitioners in C.W.P. No. 432 of 1995 and the present petition, but also the loss caused to the public exchequer by non-payment of dues with 18% interest by Shri P.V.N. Rao?" In his preliminary submissions he reiterated it giving further justification thus: "This is the law laid down by this Hon'ble Court in relation to public servants. Whether it is also applicable to holders of constitutional office or not is a  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW substantial question of law, which should have been answered by a constitution bench." In his modified version he has stated thus: "who would be liable to reimburse the legitimate costs incurred by the petitioner by filing C.W.P. No.432 of 1995, and the present petition and the huge loss caused to the public exchequer because of the persistent default in paying them by P.V. Narasimha Rao, with 18% interest?" it would, thus, be apparent that for dismissal of the writ petition filed by a party, by a judicial act, the presiding judge of the Court is liable to pay costs to the litigant and also the resultant loss to the public exchequer for non-payment of the dues by the defaulter with interest. He justified it stating that when a public servant causes loss to the State and the same is sought to be recovered from him, why not the constitutional functionary for judicial act is also liable to pay over the same. In other words, if the Court dismisses a petition filed by a litigant, the resultant costs must be born by the presiding officer of the Court. Equally, the loss caused to the State should also be recoverable from the presiding judge from his personal pocket . Regarding imputation 13, though he stated that he wished to make modification to it, in his amended version, he did not touch upon the same. Imputation 13 at page 8 reads thus: "since no person can be a judge in his own cause, the senior-most judge of the Hon'ble Court may be permitted to constitute a constitution bench, for  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW expeditious hearing of the petition excluding any judge who owes his elevation to the apex court to justice Ahmadi. Further during its pendency, Justice Ahmadi may be advised to proceed on leave, so that he may not directly or indirectly influence any of the judges hearing the matter." In his preliminary submissions, he reiterates that " The prayer is in strict conformity with the maxim cited earlier in the words of lord Heward, C.J." He justified it on the basis of Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was), the senior-most judge's presiding over P.S. Gupta's case, i.e., First judges case when justice Chandrachud was imputed with some allegations. He also justified his quoting the advice given to Justice V. Ramaswami to proceed on leave when enquiry was pending against him under the Judges [Inquiry] Act. It would be seen that in this imputation, he categorically asserts and relies that justice Ahmadi, Chief justice of India would bring about influence directly or indirectly upon his colleagues when the matter was to be heard. While he is in the office, he also should not function as Chief Justice pending his second writ petition. CJI also should not constitute any benches. That should be done by the senior-most puisne Judge. Any Judge appointed to this Court during his tenure as CJI should not hear ht e case as CJI directly or indirectly would influence them when the case relating to his was dealt with. In other words, his imputation is that Judges appointed to the Supreme Court during the tenure of Justice A.M. Ahmadi as CJI amenable to influence in deciding the cases at the behest of  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the CJI as they owe their appointments to him. In other words, as soon as a writ petition under Article 32 or petition under Article 136 was filed attributing motives or bias to the CJI [it would equally apply to any Judge he should desist to perform judicial and administrative work. He should proceed on leave till that case is decided. The senior-most puisne Judge should assume the work of the CJI. Imputations in Prayer (b) and (c) read as under: "(b) strip the respondent (Justice A.M. Ahmadi) of his citizenship"; and (c) Direct the registration of an FIR against he respondent (Justice A.M. Ahmadi) under the Indian Penal Code for committing forgery and fraud." In his preliminary submissions, he has stated with regard to stripping of citizenship of CJI that "this may have been the consequence of the constitution bench affirming the view taken by the Calcutta High Court cited earlier. Moreover, this is only a prayer for relief sought, which does not fall within the mischief of the Contempt of Courts Act." With regard to  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW prayer (c) he states thus: "the plea taken in relation to (xiv (b). Now, in the modified statement, he seeks to withdraw them and states "May kindly be treated as deleted". It would, thus, be clear that his asking for stripping of the citizenship of the Chief Justice of India is for dismissing his writ petition and prosecution is the consequence of a decision of this Court which had affirmed the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Fazalul Haq's, Chief Minister, Bengal's case. At this stage, it may be relevant to mention that the petitioner, either in his preliminary submissions or modified version filed on April 24, 1996, during the course of hearing, did not tender any unconditional apology for the imputations made against CJI. On the other hand, it is clear that being a professor of English. he knew the consequences of the language used, its purpose and effect and pressed for consideration. At the time of dismissing the second writ petition to a pointed reference of the allegations to be scandalous, it was recorded in the order and there was no demur from the petition to the contra, that the petitioner stood by them. In other words, he would bear the consequences that would flow therefrom. According to the petitioner, many an imputation bearing constitutional contour require interpretation by a bench of five Judges under Article 145(3). We need not refer the case to the constitution Bench merely because the petitioner has raised that contention in the petition; nor the same requires decision unless the Court finds  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW that the petition cannot be disposed of without the questions being decided by the constitution Bench. When imputations were made against the Chief Justice, the petitioner assumed, in our view, "wrongly" that CJI cannot constitute benches nor he should discharge the functions of Chief Justice until the matter is decided. On appointment by the president by a warrant and on his taking oath of office, the CJI becomes entitled to discharge the functions and duties of that office including constitution of benches and assignment of judicial work to judges as per procedure. This responsibility flows from the office and none including a litigant has right to demand for contra position. As regards his personal disposition to hear a case by a bench of which he is a member, it is his own personal volition. The Chief Justice's prerogative to constitute benches and assignment of judicial business would no hinge at the whim of a litigant. The decisions of different benches are the decisions of the Court. For the convenient transaction of business, the senior judge among the members composing the Bench gets the privilege to preside over the Bench but the decision is that of the Court. The members composing the Bench collectively speak for the Court and would bear collective responsibility for the decision unless separate opinions are expressed by individual members composing the Bench. Majority opinion is the law as envisage under Article 145(5) of the constitution. Their opinion or order thus is the opinion or order of the  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Court. The minority opinion also would form part of the judgment or order but remains the minority view. The Chief justice is first among the colleagues. The question, therefore, arises: whether the afore- enumerated imputations constitute contempt of this court? Though the petitioner contended that the provisions of the Act are ultra vires Article 19 [1] (a) of the constitution, it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to twelve upon that contention. This court has taken suo motu cognizance of contempt of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution of India which reiterates as a court of record, its power to punish for contempt of itself. As pointed out in the proceedings of this Court dated January 13, 1996, in spite of the fact that this Court brought to his attention the gravity of the imputations, the petitioner insisted and reiterated that he stood by the scandalous averments made therein. This Court being duty bound, was, therefore, constrained to issue notice of contempt. The question, therefore, is: whether the aforesaid imputations are scurrilous attack intended to scandalise the Court and do they not impede due administration of Justice? Words are the skin of the language. Language in which the words are couched is media to convey the thoughts of the author. Its effect would be discernible from the language couched proprio vigore. The petitioner, a professor of English language in clear and unequivocal language emphasised and reaffirmed that the averments were "truthfully and carefully" worded. The question is: to what extent the petitioner is entitled to the freedom of those expressions guaranteed under  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Article 19[1](a) of the Constitution? If they are found scandalous, whether he would get absolved by operation of Article 19[1] (a) ?. As this Court has taken suo motu action under article 129 of the Constitution and the word `contempt' has not been defined by making rules, it would be enought to been defined by making rules, it would be enought to fall back upon the definition of 'criminal contempt" defined under section 2(c) of the act which reads thus: "Criminal Contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or buy visible representations, or otherwise of any other act whatsoever which-(i) Scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court: or (ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner." (emphasis supplied)  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW It is doubtless that freedom of speech and of expression guaranteed by Article 19[1] (a) is one of the most precious liberties in our secular, socialist republic. Freedom of expression is a prized privilege to speak one's open mind although not always in perfect good taste of all institutions. Since it opens up channels of open discussion, the opportunity of speech and expression should be afforded for vigorous advocacy, no less than abstract discussion. This liberty may be regarded as an autonomous and fundamental good and its value gets support from the need to develop our evolving society from unequal pas t to a vigorous homogeneous egalitarian order in which each gets equality of status and of opportunity; social, economic and political justice with dignity of person so as to build an integrated and united Bharat. Transformation for that strong social restructure would be secured when channels for free discussion are wide opinion and secular mores are not frozen. All truths are relative and they can be judged only in the competition of market. Liberty is not to be equated with certainty. Freedom of expression equally generates and disseminates ideas and opinions, information of political and social importance in a free market place for peaceful social transformation under rule of law. The doctrine of discovery of truth does require free exchange of ideas and use of appropriate language. words are the skin of the language which manifests the intention of its maker or the speaker. The right to free speech is, therefore, an integral aspect of right to self-development and fulfillment of  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW person's duties some of which are proselytised in part IVA of the Constitution as Fundamental Duties. The end of the State is to secure to the citizens freedom to develop his faculties, freedom to think as he will, to speak as he thinks and read as indispensable tools to the discovery of truth and realisation of human knowledge and human rights. Public discussion is political liberty. The purpose of freedom of speech is to understand political issues so as to protect the citizens and to enable them to participate effectively in the working of the democracy in a representative form of Government. Freedom of expression would play crucial role in the formation of public opinion on social, political and economic questions. Therefore, political speeches are given greater degree of protection and special and higher status than other types of speeches and expressions. The importance of speaker's potential development on political and social questions is also relevant to encourage human development for effective functioning of democratic institutions. Equally, debate on public issues would be uninhibited, robust and wide open. It may well include vehement, sarcastic and sometimes unpleasant sharp criticism of Government and public officials. Absence of restraint in this area encourages a well informed and politically sophisticated electoral debate to conform the Government in tune with the constitutional mandates to return a political party to power. Prohibition of freedom of speech and expression on public issues prevents  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW and stifles the debate on social, political and economic questions which in long term endangers the stability of the community and maximises the source and breeds for more likely revolution. If maintenance of democracy is the foundation for free speech, society equally is entitled to regulate freedom of speech or expression by democratic action. The reason is obvious, viz., that society accepts free speech and expression and also puts limits on the right of the majority. Interest of the people involved in the acts of expressions should be looked at not only from the perspective of the speaker but also the place at which he speaks, the scenario, the audience, the reaction of the publication, the purpose of the speech and the place and the forum in which the citizen exercises his freedom of speech and expression. The state has legitimate interest, therefore, to regulate the freedom of speech and expression. The state has legitimate interest, therefore, to regulate the freedom of speech and expression which liberty represents the limits of the duty of restraint on speech or expression not to utter defamatory or libelous speech or expression. There is a co-relative duty not to interfere with the liberty of others. each is entitled to dignity of person and of reputation. No body has a right to denigrate other's right to person or reputation. Therefore, freedom of speech and expression is tolerated so long as it is not malicious or libelous so that all attempts to foster and ensue orderly and peaceful public discussion or public good should result from free speech in the market place. If such  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW speech or expression was untrue and so reckless as to its truth, the speaker or the author does not get protection of the constitutional right. Freedom of speech and expression, therefore, would be subject to Articles 19 [2],129 and 215 of the Constitution, in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence etc. Article 3 read with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants to everyone liberty and right to freedom of opinion and expression. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights, 1966 to which India is a signatory and had ratified, provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression, to receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds but clause [3] thereof imposes corresponding duty on the exercise of the right and responsibilities. It may therefore, be subject to certain restrictions but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary for the respect of life and reputations of others for the protection of national security or public order or of public health or moral. it would thus be seen that liberty of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19[1] (a) brings within its ambit, the corresponding duty and responsibility and puts limitations on the exercise of that liberty. A citizen is entitled to bring to the notice of the public at large the infirmities from which any institution including judiciary suffers from. Indeed , the right to offer healthy and  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW constructive criticism which is fair in spirit must be left unimpaired in the interest of the institution itself. Critics are instruments of reform but not those actuated by malice but those who are inspired by public weal. Bona fide criticism of any system or institution including judiciary is aimed at inducing the administration of the system or institution to look inward and improve its public image. Courts, the instrumentalities of the state are subject to the Constitution and the laws and are not above criticism. Healthy and constructive criticism are tools to augment its forensic tools for improving its functions. A harmonious blend and balanced existence of free speech and fearless justice counsel that law ought to be astute to criticism. Healthy and constructive criticism are tools to augment its forensic tools for improving its functions. A harmonious blend and balanced existence of free speech and fearless justice counsel that law ought to be astute to criticism. Constructive public criticism even if it slightly oversteps its limits thus has fruitful play in preserving democratic health of public institutions. Section 5 of the Act accords protection to such fair criticism and saves from contempt of court. The best way to sustain the dignity and respect for the office of judge is to deserve respect from the public at large by fearlessness and objectivity of the approach to the issues arising for decision, quality of the judgment, restraint, dignity and decorum a judge observes in judicial conduct off and on the bench and rectitude.  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW In P.N. Duda vs. P. Shiv Shankar [AIR 1988 SC 1208] this court had held that administration of justice and judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the society and their accountability must be judged by the conscience and oath to their office, i.e., to defend and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour. Thus the judges must do, in the light given to them to determine, what is right. Any criticism about judicial system or the judges which hampers the administration of justice or which erodes the faith in the objective approach of the judges and brings administration of justice to ridicule must be prevented. The contempt of court proceedings arise out of that attempt. Judgments can be criticised. Motives to the judges need not be attributed. It brings the administration of justice into disrepute. Faith in the administration of justice is one of the pillars on which democratic institution functions and sustains. In the free market place of ideas criticism about the judicial system or judges should be welcome so long as such criticism about the judicial system or judges should be welcome so long as such criticism does not impair or hamper the administration of justice. This is how the courts should exercise the powers vested in them and judges to punish a person for an alleged contempt by taking notice of the contempt suo motu or at the behest of the litigant or a lawyer. In that case the speech of the Law Minister in a Seminar organised by the Bar Council and the offending portions therein were held not contemptuous and punishable under the  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Act. In a democracy judges and courts alike are, therefore, subject to criticism and if reasonable argument or criticism in respectful language and tempered with moderation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or public good no court would treat criticism as a contempt of court. Advocacy touches and asserts the primary value of freedom of expression. It is a practical manifestation of the principle of freedom of speech which holds so dear in a democracy of ability to express freely. Freedom of expression produces the benefit of the truth to emerge. It aids the revelation of the mistakes or bias or at times even corruption it assists stability by tempered articulation of grievances and by promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity., equality and justice. It plays its part in helping to secure the protection of other fundamental human rights. Legal procedure illuminates how free speech of expression constitutes one of the most essential foundations of democratic society. Freedom of expression, therefore, is one of the basic conditions for the progress of advocacy and for the development of every man including legal fraternity practising the profession of law. Freedom of expression, therefore, is vital to the maintenance of free society. It is essential to the rule of law and liberty of the Citizens. The advocate or the party appearing in person, therefore, is given  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW liberty of expression. As stated hereinbefore, they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary. In E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar [1971) 1 SCR 697] a Bench of three judges had held that the law of contempt stems from the right of a held that the law of contempt stems from the right of a court to punish, by imprisonment or fine, persons guilty of words or acts which obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. This right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie curiae by the superior courts on their own behalf or on behalf or courts subordinate to them, even if committed outside the Courts. Scandalising the judges or courts tends to bring the authority and administration o flaw into disrespect and disregard and tantamounts to contempt. All acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity or its majesty or challenge its authority, constitute contempt committed in respect of single judge or single court or in certain circumstances committed in respect of the whole of the judiciary or judicial system. Therein the criticism by the chief Minister who described judiciary as an instrument of oppression an d the judges as guided and dominated by class  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW hatred, class interest and class prejudices etc. was held to be an attack upon judges calculated to give rise to a sense of disrespect an distrust of all judicial decisions. It was held that such criticism of authority of the law and law courts constituted contempt court and the Chief Minister was found guilty thereof. The contempt of court evolved in common law jurisprudence was codified in the form of the Act. Section 2 [c] defines " criminal contempt" which has been extracted earlier. In A.M. Bhattacjarkee's case [supra] relied on by the petitioner himself, a Bench of the two judges considered the said definition and held that scandalising the court would mean any act done or writing published which is calculated to bring the court or judges into contempt or to lower its authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or the legal process of the court. In para 30, it was stated that scandalising the court is a convenient way of describing a publication which, although it does not relate to any specific case either past or pending or any specific judge, is a scurrilous attack on the judiciary as a whole, which although it does not relate to any specific case either past or pending or any specific judge, is a calculated to undermine the authority of the courts and public confidence in the administration of justice. Contempt of court is to keep the blaze of glory around the judiciary and to deter people from attempting to render justice contemptible in the eyes of the public. A liable upon a court is a reflection upon the sovereign people themselves. The contemnor conveys to the people that the administration  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW of justice is weak or in corrupt hands. The fountain of justice is tainted. Secondly, the judgments that stream out of that foul fountain is impure and contaminated. In Halsbury's Laws of England [4th Edn.] Vol. 9 para 27 at page 21 on the topic "Scandalising the Court " it is stated that scurrilous abuse of a judge or court, or attacks on t he personal character of a judge, are punishable contempts. The punishment is inflicted, not for the purpose of protecting either the court as a whole or the individual judge of the court from a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the public, and especially those who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject subject to the jurisdiction of the court, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal is undermined or impaired. In consequence, the court has regarded with particular seriousness allegations of partiality or bias on the part of a judge or a court. On the other hand, criticism of a judge's conduct or of the conduct of a court, even if strongly worded, is not a contempt provided that the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good faith, and is not directed to the personal character of a judge or to the impartiality of a judge or court. Therefore, it is of necessity to regulate the judicial process free from fouling the fountain of justice to ward off the people from undermining the confidence of the public in the purity of fountain of justice and due administration. Justice thereby remains pure, untainted and unimpeded. The punishment for contempt, therefore, is not for the purpose of protecting or  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW vindicating either the dignity of the court as a whole or an individual judge of the court from attack on his personal reputation but it was intended to protect the public who are subject to the jurisdiction of the court and to prevent under interference with the administration of justice. If the authority of the court remains undermined or impeded the fountain of justice gets sullied creating distrust and disbelief in the mind of the litigant public or the right-thinking public at large for the benefit of the people. Independence of the judiciary for due course of administration of justice must be protected and remain unimpaired. Scandalising the court, therefore, is a convenient expression of scurrilous attack on the majesty of justice calculated to undermine its authority and public confidence in the administration of justice. The malicious or slanderous publication inculcates in the mind of the people a general disaffection and dissatisfaction on the judicial determination and indisposes in their mind to obey them. If the people's allegiance to the law is so fundamentally shaken it is the most vital and most dangerous obstruction of justice calling for urgent action. Action for contempt is not for the protection of the judge as private individual but because they are the channels by which justice is administered to the people without fear or favor. As per the Third Schedule to the Constitution oath or affirmation is taken by the judge that he will duly and faithfully perform the duties of the office to the best of his ability, knowledge and judgment without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and will so uphold the Constitution  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW and the laws In accordance therewith, judges must always remain impartial and should be known by all people to be impartial. Should they be imputed with improper motives, bias, corruption or partiality, people will lose faith in them. The judge requires a degree of detachment and objectivity which cannot be obtained, if judges constantly are required to look over their shoulders for fear of harassment and abuse and irresponsible demands for prosecution or resignation. The whole administration of justice would suffer due to its rippling effect. It is for this reason that scandalising the judges was considered by the parliament to be contempt of a court punishable with imprisonment or fine. Scandalising the court, therefore, would mean hostile criticism of judges as judges or judiciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in connection with office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slender. Yet defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or judges into contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an inroad on majesty of justice. Any caricature of a judge calculated to lower the dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or tend to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or majesty of justice. It would therefore, be scandalising the judge as a judge, in other words, imputing partiality, corruption, bias, improper motives to a judge is scandalisation of the court and would be contempt of the court. Even imputation of lack of impartiality or fairness to a  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW judge in the discharge of his official duties amounts to contempt. The gravamen of the offence is that of lowering his dignity or authority or an affront to majesty of justice. When the contemnor challenges the authority of the court, he interferes with the performance of duties of judge's office or judicial process or administration of justice or generation or production of tendency bringing the judge or judiciary into contempt. Section 2 (c) of the Act, therefore, defines criminal contempt the wider articulation that any publication, whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner, is a criminal contempt. Therefore, a tendency to scandalise the Court or tendency to lower the authority of the court or tendency to interfere with or tendency to obstruct the administration of justice in any manner or tendency to challenge the authority or majesty of justice, would be a criminal contempt. The offending act apart, any tendency if it may lead to or tends to lower the authority of the court is a criminal contempt. Any conduct of the contemnor which has the tendency or produces a tendency to bring the judge or court into contempt or tends to lower the authority of the court would also be contempt of the court.  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW It is true that in an indictable offence generally mens rea is an essential ingredient and requires to be proved for convicting the offender but for a criminal contempt as defined in Section 2 (c] any enumerated or any other act apart, to create disaffection disbelief in the efficacy of judicial dispensation or tendency to obstruct administration of justice or tendency to lower the authority or majesty of law by any act of the parties, constitutes criminal contempt. Thereby it excludes the proof of mens rea. What is relevant is that the offending or affront act produces interference with or tendency to interfere with the courses of justice. At this stage, we would dispose of one of the serious contentions repeatedly emphasised by the petitioner that he had no personal gain to seek in the lies except said to have been fired by public duty and has professed respect for the Court. Those are neither relevant nor a defence for the offence of contempt. What is material is the effect of the offending act and not the act per se. In E.M.S. Namboodiripad's case this court had held in paragraph 33 that a law punishes not only acts which had in fact interfered with the courts and administration of justice but also those which have that tendency, that is to say, are likely to produce a particular result. It was held that the likely effect of the words must be seen and they clearly have effect of lowering the prestige of the judges and courts in the eyes of people. Same view was reiterated in Sambu Nath Jha vs. Kedar Prasad Sinha [(1992(1) SCC 573 at 577]. As stated earlier, imputation of corrupt or improper motives in judicial conduct would  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW impair the efficacy of judicial dispensation and due protection of the liberties of the citizen or due administration of justice. This paramount public interest is protected by the definition in Section 2 [c] of the Act. It is, therefore, not necessary to establish actual intention on the part of the contemnor to interfere with the administration of justice. making reckless allegations or vilification of the conduct of the court or the judge would be contempt. The question, therefore, to be considered is: whether the imputations referred to hereinbefore have necessary tendency to impinge or tendency to impede the public confidence in the administration of justice or would create disbelief in the efficacy of judicial administration or lower the authority or interferes with majesty of Court? The court, therefore, is required to consider whether the imputations made by a contemnor are calculated to bring or have the effect of bringing the court into contempt or casting aspersions on the administration of justice tends to impede justice etc. The court has to consider the nature of the imputations, the occasion of making the imputations and whether the contemnor foresees the possibility of his act and whether he was reckless as to either the result or had foresight like any other fact in issue to be inferred from the facts and circumstances emerging in the case. The reason is obviously that the court does not sit to try the conduct of a judge to whom the imputations are made. It would not be open to the contemnor to bring forward evidence  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW or circumstances to justify or to show whether and how fairly imputations were justified because the judge is not before the Court. The defence justification to an imputation would not, therefore, be available to the contemnor. The imputation of improper motives or bias cannot be justified on the principle of fair contempt. In Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936 AC 322 at 335] Lord Atkin in his oft-quoted judgment held that justice is not a cloistered virtue and must be allowed to suffer the secutiny and respectfully, have been, though outspoken comments of ordinary man". But in the same judgment it was further pointed out that provided that members of the public should abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice. That was a case of criticism of the Court proceedings as is saved by Section 5 of the Act. Law is not in any doubt that in a free democracy everybody is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness or legality of a judgment or sentence or an order of a court but he should not overstep the bounds. Though he is entitled to express that criticism objectively and with detachment in a language dignified and respectful tone with moderation, the liberty of expression should not be a licence to violently make personal attack on a judge. Subject to that, an honest criticism of the  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW administration of justice is welcome since justice is not a cloistered virtue and is entitled to respectful scrutiny. Any citizen is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness of the judgment, order or sentence with dignified and moderate language pointing out the error or defect or illegality in the judgment, order or sentence. That is after the event as post-mortem. In Shri Baradakanta Mishra etc. v. The Registrar of Orissa High Court & Anr. etc. [1974) 1 SCC 374], the appellant, a District judge was suspended and a spate of litigation in that behalf had ensued. When an order of suspension was set aside by the Government, in exercise of his power under Article 235, the High Court further ordered suspension of him pending enquiry of the allegations made against judges in a memorandum and letters sent to the Governor in a vilificatory criticism of the judges in their function on the administration side. When contempt action was initiated, he challenged the jurisdiction of the court and the competency to initiate action for contempt on the specious plea that the acts done by the High Court were on the administration side and were not judicial actions. A three-Judge Bench had negatived the plea and convicted the appellant under section 12 of the Act. When the matter had come up before this court, a constitution Bench considered the gravamen of the imputations and had held that the allegations made against the court in the memo submitted to the Governor constituted scurrilous allegations against the  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW High Court. Again some of the allegations made in the memo of appeal and various communications to the Supreme Court were held to constitute contempt of the Court and the conviction was confirmed though sentence was reduced. This Court held that imputation of improper motives, bias and prejudice constitutes contempt under Section 2[c] of the Act. In Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, popularly known as U.P. Legislature's Warrant of Arrest of the Judges of the Allahabad High Court and Keshav Singh Reference, a Bench of seven judges of this Court observed that the power to punish for contempt alleged must always be exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. The best way to sustain the dignity and status of their [judges] office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, fearlessness and objectivity of their approach and buy the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct. It would equally apply to the legislature. Keeping the above perspective in view, the question emerges; whether the imputations itemised hereinbefore constitute contempt of the Court. At the cost for petition, we any reiterate that in a democracy though every one is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness or legality of a judgment or an order or sentence, judges do require degree of detachment and objectivity in judicial dispensation, they being duty bound with the oath of office taken by them in adjudicating the disputes brought before the court. The  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW objectivity or detachment cannot be obtained if the judges have constantly to look over their shoulders for fear of harassment and abuse and irresponsible demands for prosecution, resignation or to refrain from discharging their duties pending further action. Cognisant to this tendency;, the founding fathers of the Constitution engrafted Articles 121 and 211 of the constitution and prohibited the parliament and the legislatures to discuss on the floor of the House the conduct of any judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court in the discharge of his duties except upon a motion for presenting address to the president praying for the removal of a judge under Article 124[4] of the Constitution in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the judges [Inquiry] Act, 1968 and the Rules made thereunder. In A.M. Bhattacharjee's case on which great reliance was placed by the petitioner emphasising the rectitude on the part of a judge, this Court laid the rule for the advocates to adhere to a code of conduct in seeking redressal on the perceived aberration of the conduct of a judge otherwise than in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 124 [4] of the Constitution. The respect for and the dignity of the court thereby was protected from scurrilous attack on the judge or the court. if the forum of the judicial process is allowed to mount scurrilous attack on a judge, the question arises whether the forum of the judicial process of vilification of the judges or imputations to the judges in the pleadings presented to the court would give liberty of freedom of expression to an advocate or a light of  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the above discussion, we have little doubt to conclude that when an advocate or a party appearing before the court requires to conduct himself in a manner befitting to the dignity and decorum of the court, he cannot have a free licence to indulge in writing in the pleadings the scurrilous accusations or scandalisation against the judge or the court. If the reputation and dignity of the judge, who decides the case are allowed to be prescribed in the pleadings, the respect for the court would quickly disappear and independence of the of the judiciary would be a thing of the past. In Re: Roshan Lal Ahuja [(1993) Supp. 4 SCC 446] when the contemnor-petitioner's countless unsuccessful attempts against his order of removal from service became abortive and in spite of this Court granting at one stage compensation of a sum of Rs.30,000/- he had indulged in the pleadings with scurrilous accusations on judges who granted compensation and not reinstatement. It was held by a three- judge Bench that the contemnor had permitted himself the liberty of using language in the documents and pleadings which not only had the effect of scandalising and lowering the authority of the court in relation to judicial matters but also had the effect of substantial interference with an obstructing the administration of justice. The unfounded and unwarranted aspersions on the judges of this Court had the tendency to undermine the authority of the court and would create distrust in the public mind as to the capacity of the judges of this Court to met out  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW fearless justice. Accordingly, he was convicted and sentenced to under go imprisonment for a period of four months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default, to undergo sentence for a further period of 15 days. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. [1984) 3 SCC 405], the conduct of an advocate in using abusive language in pleadings and vilification of a judge was held to constitute contempt under Section 2 [c] (i) of the Act and his sentence under Section 12 of the Act was upheld. In Re: Shri S. Mulgaokar [(1978) 3 SCC 497] the conduct of a senior advocate in publishing a pamphlet imputing improper motives to the Magistrate who decided his case was held to constitute substantial interference with the due administration of justice. His conviction was accordingly upheld though sentence was reduced. In K.A. Mohammed Ali v. C.N. Prasannan [(1994) Supp. 3 SCC 509] while arguing the case, the counsel raised his voice unusually high to the annoyance of the Magistrate and used derogatory language against the Magistrate before whom he conducted the trial of an accused. His conviction and sentence for contempt was accordingly upheld. In Gillers "Regulation of Lawyers - Problems of Law and Ethics" [Third Edition - 1992] at page 747 it was pointed out that in spite of first Amendment protection of free speech, lawyers who committed contempt of the court were punished by American court even if they were advocating their clients interest at that time. The lawyer's behavior threatens the  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW dignity and authority of the Courts was held to constitute contempt of the court. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India & Anr. [(1988) 3 SCC 255], in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the advocate indulged in mud-slinging against advocates and this Court. It was held that those allegations were likely to lower the prestige of this Court. This Court accordingly held that he committed contempt in drawing up the petition and directed to initiate proceedings against him for overstepping the limits in particular of self-restraint. It would, thus, be seen that when the first writ petition was dismissed by this Court, as a responsible citizen, the petitioner would have kept quite. When the result animated by the petitioner was not achieved, he embittered to foul at the process of this Court and emboldened to file the second writ petition with imputation made against this Court, in particular targeting the Chief justice of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi. As stated hereinbefore and need not be reiterated once over that it is the duty of the Court to hear and decide any matter posted for admission. Therefore, there is nothing improper for the first Court presided over by the Chief Justice of India to hear and decide the matter. When it came up for admission, the Court appears to have been persuaded to ascertain the correctness of the allegations made in the writ petition. This Court obviously before issuing notice had sent for and directed the solicitor General to obtain the information from the Government as to  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the correctness of the allegations made before deciding whether the Court would exercise its prerogative power under Article 32 to issue directions as sought for. In furtherance thereof, the Solicitor General admittedly placed before the Court the record. On perusal thereof, the first Court the record. On perusal thereof, the first Court had declined to exercise the power as enumerated and obviously stated by the petitioner that the exercise of the power under Article 32 was not appropriate since the Government in the Defence Department could recover from the Prime Minister's Secretariat or from the Congress Party, as the case may be, all the arrears, if any, due and payable by the respective entities. It is not obligatory for this court to give reasons for dismissing the writ petition. Day in and day out in countless cases, while refusing to interfere with the orders this Court dismisses the petitions be it filed under Article 32 or 136 of the Constitution in limine. It is also seen that though the case was adjourned for two weeks, no doubt, it was not posted on that day but it was listed some time thereafter. In the proceedings of the Court recorded by the staff, it was recorded that the Solicitor General or in personal capacity obviously acted as amicus on behalf of the court. Being the Solicitor General for India, he was directed to have consultation with Government Departments and to obtain needed information. In appropriate cases this procedure is usually adopted by the Court. Recording of the proceedings by the court generally is not noted by the Court. Is it improper for the Chief justice to hear  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the case? Was the dismissal totally unjust and unfair for not recording the reasons? The petitioner obviously with halfbaked knowledge in law mixed up the language as "improper for Chief justice of India to hear it". "Dismissal of the "grouse" of the petitioner was totally unjust, unfair, arbitrary and unlawful flagrant violation of mandate of Article 14" "Violation of the sacred oath of office " and to "declare justice A.M. Ahmadi unfit to hold the office as Chief Justice of India". When these imputations were pointed out to the petitioner by three-Judge Bench presided over by brother Verma, J. while dismissing the second writ petition, to be scandalous and reckless, he had stated that he "stood by" those allegations. He reiterated the same with justification in his preliminary submissions. He has stated that the accusations made were truthful and "carefully" worded. In this backdrop scenario, the effect of these imputations is obviously reckless apart from scandalising this Court, in particular the Chief Justice of India and was intended to foul the process of the Court or lower or at any rate tends to lower the authority of the Court in the estimate of the public and tends to undermine the efficacy of he judicial process. It would, therefore, be clear that the accusations are gross contempt. At the height of it, he stated that since the first writ petition was not disposed of by a bench of not less than five judges, the writ petition was not dismissed in the eye of law and the order of dismissal is non est and it is "not decided and disposed of constitutionally". This assertion of the petitioner  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW flies in the face of the judicial finality of the order of this Court and the assertion tends to question the authority of the court. It creates tendency to obstruct the administration of justice and, therefore, it would be an outrageous criminal contempt. Omission to record reasons, according to the petitioner, is violative of the principles of natural justice. The Chief justice of India has committed impropriety in deciding the matter. As stated earlier, the decision is that of the Bench on behalf of the Court and the Chief justice, being the senior-most among the members constituting the bench, had spoken on behalf of the Bench. Therefore, the attribution of improper motives scandalises the efficacy of judicial adjudication and per se contumaciously lowers or at any rate tends to lower the dignity or authority of the Court. The prayer for prosecution of the Chief justice, though sought in Item 14 (a) and (d) to be withdrawn, which would be of no consequence, is, therefore, unbelievably outrageous contempt. These findings dispose of Items 1,3,5,9 and 14(a) which remain not even amended by the contemnor. As regards other imputations, it may be stated at this stage, as rightly pointed out by the learned solicitor general, that what we are required to consider is the effect of the imputations made by the contemnor in the second writ petition and not what he sought to amend some of he averments attributing  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW imputations to this Court and the effect thereof. By his own admission, they are "strindent" and "pungent". They are "truthful" and were "carefully" stated by him. Even the amended averments did not advance the contemnor's stand. On the other hand, they compound perpetration of contumacious conduct recklessly made by the contemnor in the second writ petition. It item 4, the contemnor attributed that "justice Ahmadi "ultimately" dismissed the petition observing that the Government of India was capable of realising the dues from Shri Rao (which it had not done in two years) and without recording reasons for dismissing the petition. So much for the vaunted adherence to the twin principles of the "transparency and accountability". It would be seen that insinuations that emerge from these words in writ petitions together with the phrase that CJI browbeated him ex facie scandalise the Court and tend to lower the authority of the Court. As seen, the insinuations tend to bring the court into contempt in the estimate of the general public and that the court lacked fairness, objectivity and dismissed the writ petition for known reasons. it also tends to interfere with the administration of justice and that the court should give reasons last the order be believed to be shrouded with suspicion. Therefore, it is ex facie contumacious. The contemnor seeks to justify his averments under Section 4 of the Act as fair and accurate report of the judicial proceedings and that, therefore, they are not contempt. Even in his modified statement, for his statement that the chief justice of  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW India browbeated him in dismissing the writ petition, he stated the "discerned reluctance" on the part of the presiding judge. In other words, his revised imputation compounds the commission of flagrant contempt by substituting the word "discerned reluctance" on the part of the presiding judge. In other words, his revised imputation compounds the commission of flagrant contempt by substituting the word "browbeat" with the words "discerned reluctance". In other words, he attributed motives to the Court for dismissal of the first writ petition. It would, thus, be clear that the contemnor animated to impute motives to the chief Justice of India in the discharge of his constitutional duty of deciding a case. When his grouse stated by the petitioner emphasis supplied] against sri P.V. Narasimha Rao was not redressed exercising the power under Article 32 a result which he wanted, the petitioner contumaciously attributed motives to the Court, in particular to the presiding officer of the Court, the Chief Justice of India and thereby he scandalised the court in the estimate of the general public. We fail to appreciate the stand of the petitioner that Section 4 bails him out and purges from contempt. It would be applicable only to publication of the report of a judicial proceedings fairly and with accuracy to outside the world. There is a distinction between expression in pleading and publication of he report of the judicial proceedings or an order without malice as fair and constrictive criticism to the readers. As stated earlier, fair criticism of the judicial proceedings outside the pleadings of the Court is a  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW democratic feature so as to enable the court to look inward into the correctness of the proceedings fn the legality of the orders of the orders of the Court by the Court itself for introspection. But a party has a duty and responsibility to plead as a part of the averments or the prayer in the relevant portion with language befitting with the dignity of the Court and the judicial process and not in self-abuse of the freedom of expression given under Article 19 [1] (a). abuse of the process of the court is a self-evidence. As such Article 19(2) creates an embargo on the freedom of the expression and excludes from its operation the power of contempt of Court under the Act. This Court being court of record, power of this Court under Article 129 is independent and is not subject to Article 19[1] (a), Ex abundanti cautela, Article 19[2] excludes the operation of Articles 19 [1] when speech or expression is trapped in contempt of court or tends to trench into it. When the contempt of court is committed by a litigant, the freedom of expression being contemptuous becomes punishable under Article 129 of eh Constitution de horse the power under Section 12 of the Act. Item 7 relates to the imputation that the Chief justice of India gets no judicial protection unlike the president of India for being prosecuted even while Chief justice A.M. Ahmadi holds office as Chief justice of India and is accordingly liable to prosecution. This bravado not only impinges upon the protection given by Article 124[4] of the Constitution and under relevant provisions of the protection of officials Act ex facie it is an outrageous tendency to lower the  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW authority of the Court and interference with judicial administration. The assertion of the petitioner that this is a constitutional conundrum required to be decided by a constitution Bench of this Court highlights contumacious conduct of the contemnor. In item 8 he attributes that this Court "willfully" and "advertently" [emphasis supplied] violated fundamental rights of the contemnor and of other people in not granting relief of direction to Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao to pay the alleged dues. The word "advertently" was carefully used by the petitioner and the word "willfully" was employed for refusal of the relief. They do emphasise the emphatic tone of he language and the motive of he contemnor and attribute motives to this court that the relief sought for in the first writ petition "advertently" was not granted and was "wilfully" declined and thereby the Chief Justice Ahmadi lost constitutional protection of not being prosecuted. This accusation is a culmination of the contumacious conduct of wanton scandalisation of the Court and reckless denigration. In his amended petition, her further aggravates the contempt stating that the dismissal of the petition by the first court sent wrong signals to the entire judiciary of which justice Ahmadi is the head as chief justice of India. The scurrilous attack, therefore, is not only on Justice Ahmadi as a judge but also as the Chief Justice of India and also as head of the institution of the whole  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW country. Thereby he designedly and deliberately allowed himself being brought within ex facie criminal contempt. Item 9 relates to the accusation "what are the legal consequences of the violation of oath of office by justice Ahmadi". He states in his preliminary submissions that it a constitutional question required to be decided by a constitution Bench. As stated earlier, every question raised need not necessarily be decided unless the case cannot be disposed of without deciding the question for granting or refusing to grant the relief. The oath of office taken by a judge of this Court is not that he should allow every case or dismiss every case but only to uphold the constitution and the laws and to administer justice in accordance therewith in tune with the oath of his office. The protection of Articles 124 [4], 121,211, the judicial officers protection act and the judges (protection) Act is to ensure independence to the judiciary. Threat to judicial process is a challenge to the authority of the court or majesty of justice. It would be ex-facie contumacious conduct. In item 10 again, the petitioner attributes that justice Ahmadi as Chief justice of India and as a judge of this court deliberately and willfully failed to perform his duties and stultified the performance of fundamental duties by the petitioner. This imputation is the consequence of the dismissal of he first writ petition. Thereby, he seeks stripping of citizenship of justice Ahmadi. It is an unbelievable outrageous  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW affront to the majesty of justice on the part of the contemnor and scandalisation of this Court. It tends to lower the dignity and authority of the Court and also sows seeds for persons with similar propensity to undermine the authority of the Court or the judiciary as a whole; he crossed all boundaries of recklessness and indulged in wild accusations. He sought justification in his preliminary submissions that it being a question of law, it does not amount to personal imputation or insinuation. In spite of this Court pointing it out to be scandalous, when the second writ petition was dismissed and his persistence that he stood by those allegations, it does not lie in his mouth to contend either in his preliminary submissions or his modified form that the dismissal of the first writ petition amounts to failure to perform fundamental duties by the CJI and, therefore, it would further compound the contempt. In imputation 11, the petitioner attributed to the chief Justice of India that he had allowed his so to practise in the supreme Court and to stay with him in his official residence etc. The petitioner sought justification to the said imputation from reports said to have been published in the "India Today" and "The Times of India" by a lady senior advocate of this Court. But he petitioner has not placed on record the said material. Therefore, we do not have the advantage to verify their contents or correctness or otherwise of the statements said to have been published therein. When we pointed out to the  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW petitioner whether he had made any independent enquiry, he had reiterated that he relied upon those statements. In other words, by implication, he admitted that he did not make any independent enquiry into the alleged misuse of official facility by the Chief Justice of India in permitting his son to practise in this Court or to reside in his official residence along with him. For the said imputation he said that Justice Ahmadi, the Chief justice of India is liable to be prosecuted under the prevention of Corruption Act and he seeks as a justification the ratio decidendi of Veeraswami's case. it is seen that Veeraswami's case has no application whatsoever. As stated earlier, Article 124 (4) of he constitution read with the Judges [Inquiry] Act prescribes the procedure to take action against a judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court for proved misbehavior or incapacity. As laid down in Bhattacharjee's case, Bar Association of the concerned Court was given liberty to place any material of the aberration of the conduct of a judge before the CJI for redressal as per the "in-house" procedure laid down therein. For proved misbehavior, the address by each house of parliament to the president for removal of a Judge pursuant to a finding of proved misbehavior or incapacity under the judges (Inquiry) Act by a resolution of not less than two-third of the members of the House and voting by two-third of the House present and an order of removal therein by the president of India is culmination. In Bhattacharjee's case, this Court also laid down that no other authority or person has power to conduct any  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW enquiry against the conduct of a judge. Articles 121 and 211 prohibit discussion, in the parliament or in the Legislature of a State, or the conduct of judge of the Supreme Court or High Court respectively. Therefore, when the constitution prohibits the discussion of the conduct of a Judge, by implication, no one has power to accuse a judge of his misbehavior or incapacity except and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Constitution and the Judges [Inquiry] act or as per the procedure laid down in Bhattacharjee's case. Irrelevancy of the accusations apart, the prayer for prosecution of the Chief Justice of India under the prevention of Corruption Act is an assault on majesty of justice, affront to authority of law, the gravest contumacious conduct and scurrilous scandalisation of the Court. Item 12 of the accusation relates to the payment of litigation cost incurred by the contemnor in both The writ petitions and the loss said to have been caused to the public exchequer by non-payment by Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, from personal pocket of Justice Ahmadi as a Chief Justice for dismissal of the Writ petition. He stated in his preliminary submission that when loss was caused by a public servant in his official capacity to the public exchequer due to his dereliction of duty and under the law it was recoverable from pay or pension of the public servant, on the same analogy Chief justice of India should be liable to make good the loss incurred by him and by the State due to non-payment by Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao. The  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW implication is that by judicial act, if a presiding Judge dismisses a petition, he is liable to bear personally not only the costs incurred by the litigant but also the resultant loss to the state with interest payable thereon. This imputation is a deliberate interference with the judicial process and tends to lower the authority of the Court spreading the virus to repeat by drum beats of similar reckless imputations against the judiciary at every forum down to the lower rank of the judiciary spreading rippling effect on independence of the judiciary, authority of the Court and wanton interference with judicial process. It must be held to he a depraved contumacious conduct. Item 13 relates to the interference with the judicial management of the Court and the duty of a Judge. When an accusation is made against the presiding judge, by implication, until the matter is decided, the presiding officer has to desist from discharging the judicial duties by his proceeding on leave and the senior-most puisne judge would assume the office of the Chief Justice. This is a deliberate interference in the judicial management tending to son disaffecting in the efficacy of dispensation of justice. The further accusation that the Chief Justice of India should not constitute a Bench of the Judges appointed during his tenure so that "he (CJI)" "may not directly or indirectly or indirectly influence any of the Judges hearing the matter". It would, thus, be in unequivocal loud expression that the contemnor  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW attributed motives to the CJI that the judges appointed during his tenure as Chief Justice are amenable to his influence in judicial adjudication and would decide the causes by pressure or influence directly or indirectly brought by the Chief Justice of India. Equally, it is a corollary that these judges are amenable to influence and thereby they do not decide the cases posted before them legally and objectively. The Court is subject to pressures and decides cases under influence. These accusations are flagrantly outrageous to scandalise the Court. Though the contemnor has sought leave to modify this statement, ultimately, in his amended statement, he did not touch upon this aspect of the matter. In other words, as stated earlier, he stood by his averments calculatedly made. His justification that justification that justice P.N.Bhagwati (as he then was) decided first S.P. Gupta's case when allegations against CJI Chandrachud were made has no application. In a judicial proceedings taken by this Court, the office of the chief Justice of India was directly involved in appointment of additional judges or extension of their tenure as additional Judges or their transfer. The Chief Justice of India reclused himself from the Bench; resultantly, the senior-most puisne judge came to preside over that Bench. Thus, the contemnor has committed the contempt of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution. The question then is: what punishment is to be awarded to the contemnor? As pointed out earlier, the repeated assertions of  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the petitioner that he has no personal gain in the litigation and was actuated by the public duty and laid the petitions, bear no relevance or a defence. It is already held that in a contempt proceedings, the motive, in other words, the mens rea is not relevant. What would be the effect of the act or conduct or imputation is the relevant question for decision? It is true that in an indictable offence under penal law generally mens rea is an essential ingredient and the burden lies on the prosecution to prove it affirmatively. In a contempt proceedings of summary nature, the proof of mens rea is absolutely unnecessary. What is material is the effect or the tendency of the act, conduct or the publication of the words, written, spoken or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise and whether it scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of the court or prejudices or tends to prejudice or interfere or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings or interferes or tends to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. The tendency due to the publication, whether by words written or spoken or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise, of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever is relevant and material. It is already noted that while dismissing the second writ petition, this Court has pointed out the scandalous nature of accusations which found place in the second writ petition and when the petitioner persisted for consideration of scandalous  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW accusations to lay proceedings against the Chief Justice of India for prosecution and other reliefs referred to hereinbefore, he reiterated that he would stand by those accusations. Resultantly this Court was constrained to be into merits and dismissed the petition and initiated suo motu contempt proceedings and got the notice issued to him pointing out specifically 14 items which constituted scandalous and reckless litigations pleaded with irresponsibility. He reiterated them in his preliminary submissions with further justifications. He admitted that many of them are strident and pungent. He modified some but, as has been pointed out, by compounding further contempt. In spite of the solicitor General pointing out the seriousness of the accusations and the need for the petitioner to have further consultation with a counsel of his choice the contemnor remained unmoved. On April 15, 1996, when the matter came up before this Bench for the first time after the service of notice of the contempt and his filing the preliminary submissions, the petitioner had orally stated that some legal counsels in the Bar suggested to him that he should modify the offending portions noted in the contempt notice. It would, thus, be seen that he appears to have had consultation with some advocates at the Bar and that he did not retract his steps. He did not tender any unconditional apology, though this Court is not bound to accept such an unconditional apology for consideration. Considered from the totality of the facts and circumstances, the gravest magnitude of the contumacious  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW conduct of the contemnor, we are left with no opinion but to convict and sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three moths with a fine or Rs. 2,000/- payable in a period of months and in case of defaulted, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month. The contempt petition is accordingly disposed of

 

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CONTENTs

Writ Jurisdiction 1. What is Writ? 2. Importance of Writ 3. Type of Writ 4. Writ context to Indian Constitution 2|Page

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Q. What is Writ? Ans. The Indian Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to issue writs for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of Indian Constitution under Article 32. Thus the power to issue writs is primarily a provision made to make available the Right to Constitutional Remedies to every citizen. The Right to Constitutional Remedies, as we know, is a guarantor of all other fundamental rights available to the people of India. In addition to the above, the Constitution also provides for the Parliament to confer on the Supreme Court power to issue writs, for purposes other than those mentioned above. Similarly High Courts in India are also empowered to issue writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Under the Indian legal system, jurisdiction to issue 'prerogative writs' is given to the Supreme Court, and to the High Courts of Judicature of all Indian states. Parts of the law relating to writs are set forth in the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court, the highest in the country, may issue writs under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of Fundamental Rights and under Articles 139 for enforcement of rights other than Fundamental Rights, while High Courts, the superior courts of the States, may issue writs under Articles 226. The Constitution broadly provides for five kinds of "prerogative" writs: habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition. 3 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Importance of Writ Article 226 of the constitution, confers the High Courts’ wide powers to issue orders and writs to any person or authority. Before a writ or an order is passed, the party approaching the court has to establish that he has a right and that right is illegally invaded or threatened. High court can issue writ and directions, to any Government, authority or person even beyond its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action partly arises within its territorial jurisdiction. Wherever questions of facts are involved normally High Court does not exercise its power under article 226. Similarly, when an alternative remedy is available to the Petitioner, the Courts do not entertain petitions under Article 226. Also, when there is an inordinate delay in approaching the court, the court may not give relief acting under this article. There are various types of Writs: – Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto and Certiorari. Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution can exercise similar powers. The basic idea in conferring powers under Article 226 upon High Court is to see that the rule of law is maintained in the society. The executive Authorities are to be corrected whenever they transgress the limits of their power and encroach upon the rights of the citizen. Violations of human rights, natural rights etc., are instances where the High Courts’ interfere using this powerful article of the constitution. 4 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Type of Writ There are five types of Writs - Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Certiorari and Quo warranto. 1. Habeas Corpus "Habeas Corpus" is a Latin term which literally means "you may have the body." The writ is issued to produce a person who has been detained, whether in prison or in private custody, before a court and to release him if such detention is found illegal. The incalculable value of habeas corpus is that it enables the immediate determination of the right of the appellant’s freedom”. The writ of Habeas Corpus is a process for securing liberty to the party for illegal and unjustifiable detention. It objects for providing a prompt and effective remedy against illegal restraints. The writ of Habeas Corpus can be filled by any person on behalf of person detained or by the detained person himself. It is a judicial order issued by Supreme Court or High Court through which a person confined may secure his release. The writ of Habeas Corpus can be filed by any person on behalf of the other person. In Icchu Devi v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that in a case of writ of Habeas corpus there are no strict observances of the rules of burden of proof. Even a post card by any pro bono publico is satisfactory to galvanize the court into examining the legality of detention. In A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, it was observed that “the writ of Habeas Corpus is a process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective means of immediate relief from unlawful or unjustifiable detention whether in prison or private custody. By it the High Court and the judges of that court at the instance of a subject aggrieved command the production of that subject and inquire into the cause of his imprisonment. If there is no legal justification for that detention, then the party is ordered to be released.” 5 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW It is an extraordinary remedy at law. Habeas corpus in Latin means “May you have the body” is a writ (legal action) which requires a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court. This ensures that a prisoner can be released from unlawful detention—that is, detention lacking sufficient cause or evidence. The remedy can be sought by the prisoner or by another person coming to the prisoner’s aid. This right originated in the English legal system, and is now available in many nations. These Writs are filed nearly everyday in nearly every jurisdiction. 6 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 2. Mandamus Mandamus is a Latin word, which means "We Command". Mandamus is an order from the Supreme Court or High Court to a lower court or tribunal or public authority to perform a public or statutory duty. This writ of command is Issued by the Supreme Court or High court when any government, court, corporation or any public authority has to do a public duty but fails to do so. Mandamus is a judicial remedy which is in the form of an order from a superior court to any Government agency, court or public authority to do or forbear from doing any specific act which that body is obliged to do under the law. The writ of mandamus is issued whenever the public authorities fail to perform the statutory duties confirmed on them. Such writ is issued to perform the duties as provided by the state under the statute or forbear or restrain from doing any specific act. The first case reported on the writ of mandamus was the Middle tone case in 1573 wherein a citizen’s franchise was restored. The writ of mandamus can be issued if the public authority vested with power abuses the power or acts mala fide to it. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, it is mentioned that, “As a general rule the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was required to do, so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply, and it must be shown by evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which the party seeking the mandamus desires to enforce and that that demand was met by a refusal.” A writ of mandamus is an order issued by a superior court to a lower court or other entity commanding the lower court, corporation or public authority to perform or not perform specific acts. Rules applying to a mandamus include: The requested act must be used as a judicial remedy. The act must conform to statutorily-authorized provisions. The write must be judicially  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW enforceable and protect a legal right. Three types of mandamus are utilized, depending upon the legal circumstances. § The alternative mandamus demands a defendant to appear before court, perform an act or show cause for not having done so. § The peremptory mandamus is used when a defendant fails to comply with an alternative mandamus and which is an absolute command for performance. 7|Page

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Third, the continuing mandamus requests an officer or authority to perform its activities expeditiously for an indefinite period of time in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. §

(Practical example is the case of the Kanchi Shankaracharya who got entangled in a criminal case. Looks like the police froze the accounts of the trust he runs and subsequently, the writ mandamus was filed and upheld by the Chennai High Court.) 8 | Page

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 3. Certiorari Literally, Certiorari means to be certified. The writ of certiorari can be issued by the Supreme Court or any High Court for quashing the order already passed by an inferior court, tribunal or quasi judicial authority. It is a writ (order) of a higher court to a lower court to send all the documents in a case to it so the higher court can review the lower court’s decision. Appellate review of a case that is granted by the issuance of certiorari is sometimes called an appeal, although such review is at the discretion of the appellate court. A party, the petitioner, files a petition for certiorari with the appellate court after a judgment has been rendered against him in the inferior court. However, unlike a writ of prohibition, superior courts issue writs of certiorari to review decisions which inferior courts have already made. The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ to certiorari which too is issued against the action of an inferior court. The difference between the two was explained by Justice Venkatarama Ayyar of the Supreme Court in the following terms: “When an inferior court takes up for hearing a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, the person against whom the proceedings are taken can move the superior court for a writ of prohibition and on that an order will issue forbidding the inferior court from continuing the proceedings. On the other hand, if the court hears the cause or matter and gives a decision, the party aggrieved would have to move the superior court for a writ of certiorari and on that an order will be made quashing the decision on the ground of want of jurisdiction.” 9 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW There are several conditions necessary for the issue of writ of certiorari. 1. There should be court, tribunal or an officer having legal authority to determine the question with a duty to act judicially. 2. Such a court, tribunal or officer must have passed an order acting without jurisdiction or in excess of the judicial authority vested by law in such court, tribunal or officer. 3. The order could also be against the principles of natural justice or the order could contain an error of judgment in appreciating the facts of the case. 10 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 4. Prohibition The Writ of prohibition means to forbid or to stop and it is popularly known as 'Stay Order'. This writ is issued when a lower court or a body tries to transgress the limits or powers vested in it. The writ of prohibition is issued by any High Court or the Supreme Court to any inferior court, or quasi judicial body prohibiting the latter from continuing the proceedings in a particular case, where it has no jurisdiction to try. After the issue of this writ, proceedings in the lower court etc. come to a stop. The writ of Prohibition is issued by the court exercising the power and authorities from continuing the proceedings as basically such authority has no power or jurisdiction to decide the case. Prohibition is an extra ordinary prerogative writ of a preventive nature. The underlying principle is that ‘prevention is better than cure .’ In East India Commercial Co. Ltd v. Collector of Customs , a writ of prohibition is an order directed to an inferior Tribunal forbidding it from continuing with a proceeding therein on the ground that the proceeding is without or in excess of jurisdiction or contrary to the laws of the land, statutory or otherwise. A writ of prohibition is issued primarily to prevent an inferior court from exceeding its jurisdiction, or acting contrary to the rule of natural justice, for example, to restrain a Judge from hearing a case in which he is personally interested. The term “inferior courts” comprehends special tribunals, commissions, magistrates and officers who exercise judicial powers, affecting the property or rights of the citizen and act in a summary way or in a new course different from the common law. It is well established that the writ lies only against a body exercising public functions of a judicial or quasi- judicial character and cannot in the nature of things be utilised to restrain legislative powers. 11 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW These Writs are issued as “alternative” or “peremptory.” An alternative Writ directs the recipient to immediately act, or desist, and “Show Cause” why the directive should not be made permanent. A peremptory Writ directs the recipient to immediately act, or desist, and “return” the Writ, with certification of its compliance, within a certain time. The writ can be issued only when the proceedings are pending in a court if the proceeding has matured into decision, writ will not lie. Difference between Prohibition and Certiorari: 1. While the writ of prohibition is available during the pendency of proceedings, the writ of certiorari can be resorted to only after the order or decision has been announced. 2. Both the writs are issued against legal bodies. 12 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW 5. aThe Writ of Quo-Warranto The word Quo-Warranto literally means "by what warrants?" or "what is your authority"? It is a writ issued with a view to restrain a person from holding a public office to which he is not entitled. The writ requires the concerned person to explain to the Court by what authority he holds the office. If a person has usurped a public office, the Court may direct him not to carry out any activities in the office or may announce the office to be vacant. Thus High Court may issue a writ of quo-warranto if a person holds an office beyond his retirement age. Conditions for issue of Quo-Warranto 1. The office must be public and it must be created by a statue or by the constitution itself. 2. The office must be a substantive one and not merely the function or employment of a servant at the will and during the pleasure of another. 3. There must have been a contravention of the constitution or a statute or statutory instrument, in appointing such person to that office. 13 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Writ context to Indian Constitution The makers of the Constitution have adopted the English remedies in the Constitution under Articles 32 and 226. There has been specifically made provisions in the Constitution which empowers the Supreme Court and High Courts to issue writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto and Certiorari. The fundamental rights which are inalienable sacrosanct in nature and character which were conceived in national and public interest could be illusory if there is no constitutional machinery provided for its enforcement. Unless such constitutional remedies for its enforcement is not provided the rights guaranteed by part III of the Constitution cannot be ever implemented by the citizens. Article 32 contained in Part III is itself a fundamental right given to the person under the Constitution. Similarly Article 226 of the Constitution is conferred on the High Courts to exercise its prerogative writs which can be issued against any person or body of person including the government. The distinction between the two remedies is very negligible. The remedy under Article 32 is confined to enforcement of fundamental rights whereas Article 226 is available not only against the enforcement of fundamental rights but also for any other purpose. Thus the constitution provides the discretionary remedies on the High Court and the Supreme Court. In the absence of the provisions of such remedies no one can enforce its rights given. Thus wherever there is a right there must be a remedy for it. Thus it should satisfy the maxim, ‘ubi jus ibi remedium.’ One of the principle makers of the constitution, Dr. Ambedkar has given the prime importance to Article 32 among all other articles from the Indian Constitution. He has referred that, “It is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it .” In Devilal v. STO , it has been marked that, “There can be no doubt that the Fundamental Rights, guaranteed to the citizens are a significant feature of our Constitution and  

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the High Courts under Article 226 are bound to protect these Fundamental Rights.” 14 | P a g e

 

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Justice Subbarao in the case of Basheshwar Nath v. Commissioner, Income Tax stated that, “A large majority of people are socially poor educationally backward and politically yet not conscious of their rights, cannot be pitted against the state or the institution or they cannot be put on equal status with the state or large organisations. The people are requires to be protected from themselves. It is therefore the duty of the court to protect their rights and interests. Fundamental rights are therefore transcendental in nature and created and enacted in national and public interest and therefore they cannot be waived.” In  Daryao  v.  State  of  U.P.,  it  was  held  that  the  right  to  obtain  a  writ  must   equally  be  a  fundamental  right  when  a  petitioner  presents  the  case.  Thus,  it   cannot  merely  be  considered  as  an  individual’s  right  to  move  the  Supreme   Court  but  it  is  also  the  duty  and  responsibility  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  protect   the  fundamental  rights.   PROFESSIONAL  ETHICS  &  BAR-­‐BENCH  RELATIONS   TOPIC  –  Admission,  Enrolment  &  Rights  of  Advocates   Section  24  of  Advocates  Act,  1961  lays  down  the  categories  of  persons  who  are  eligible     being  admitted  as  advocates  on  the  State  roll.  The  persons  applying  for  such  admission     has  to  fulfil  certain  conditions  briefed  below:   a)    Citizen  of  India  –  Sec  24(1)(a)  of  the  Act  provides  that  the  person  concerned  should     be  a  citizen  of  India.  Even  the  nationals  of  other  country  are  permitted  to  practice     law  in  our  country  and  may  be  admitted  as  an  advocate  on  a  State  roll;  if  citizens  of     India,  duly  qualified,  are  permitted  to  practice  law  in  that  other  country.  The  person     desiring  to  practice  law  in  India  as  such  has  to  fulfil  the  other  conditions  as  well  as      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW have  been  laid  down  in  Advocates  Act,  1961.   b)    Age  -­‐  Sec  24(1)(b)  of  the  Act  provides  that  the  person  concerned  should  have     completed  the  age  of  21  years.   c)    Degree  of  Law  -­‐  Sec  24(1)(c)  of  the  Act  provides  that  the  person  should  have     obtained  the  degree  in  law  -­‐(i)  before  the  12th  day  of  March,  1967,  from  any  University  in   the  territory  of  India;  or   (ii)  before  the  15th  August,  1947,  from  any  University  in  any  area  which  was  comprised     before  that  date  within  India  as  defined  by  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935;  or   (iii)  after  the  12th  day  of  March,  1967,  save  as  provided  in  sub-­‐clause  (iiia),  after     undergoing  a  three  year  course  of  study  in  law  from  any  University  in  India  which  is     recognised  for  the  purposes  of  this  Act  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India;  or     (iiia)  after  undergoing  a  course  of  study  in  law,  the  duration  of  which  is  not  less  than     two  academic  years  commencing  from  the  academic  year  1967-­‐68  or  any  earlier     academic  year  from  any  University  in  India  which  is  recognised  for  the  purposes  of  this     Act  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India;  or   (iv)  in  any  other  case,  from  any  University  outside  the  territory  of  India,  if  the  degree  is     recognised  for  the  purposes  of  this  Act  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India  or;  he  is  barrister     and  is  called  to  the  Bar  on  or  before  the  31st  day  of  December,  1976  or  has  passed  the     article  clerks  examination  or  any  other  examination  specified  by  the  High  Court  at     Bombay  or  Calcutta  for  enrolment  as  an  attorney  of  that  High  Court;  or  has  obtained      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW such  other  foreign  qualification  in  law  as  is  recognised  by  the  Bar  Council  of  India  for     the  purpose  of  admission  as  an  advocate  under  this  Act;   d)    Fulfilment  of  Other  Conditions  -­‐  Sec  24(1)(e)  of  the  Act  provides  that  the  person     concerned  should  fulfil  such  other  conditions  as  may  be  specified  in  the  rules  made     by  the  State  Bar  Council;   e)    Payment  of  Stamp  Duty  -­‐  Sec  24(1)(f)  of  the  Act  states  that  the  person  concerned     has  to  pay  in  respect  of  the  enrolment,  stamp  duty,  if  any,  chargeable  under  the     Indian  Stamp  Act,  1899  (2  of  1899),  and  an  enrolment  fee  of  Rs.  600/-­‐  (Rupees  Six     Hundred  Only)  payable  to  the  State  Bar  Council  and  Rs.  150/-­‐    (Rupees  One     Hundred  Fifty  Only)  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India,  by  way  of  a  bank  draft  drawn  in     favour  of  that  Council:   Provided  that  where  such  person  is  a  member  of  the  Schedule  Castes  or  the     Schedule  Tribes  and  produces  a  certificate  to  that  effect  from  such  authority  as  may     be  prescribed,  the  enrolment  fee  payable  by  him  to  the  State  Bar  Council  shall  be     Rs.100/-­‐  (Rupees  One  Hundred  Only)  and  Rs.  25/-­‐  (Rupees  Twenty  Five  Only)  to     the  Bar  Council  of  India.   The  Bar  Council  may  prescribe  the  qualifications  for  the  purpose  of  admission  as  an     advocate  on  a  State  roll  in  addition  to  qualifications  provided  under  Section  24(1)(c)  but  it     would  not  mean  that  such  qualification  would  go  counter  to  the  section  as  mentioned       above.  The  Advocates  Act,  1961  expressly  authorises  the  Bar  Council  of  India  to  add  such      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW other  conditions  by  making  appropriate  rules.   The  provisions  of  Section  24(1)(f)    of  the  Act  fixes  enrolment  fee  which  is  not     unconstitutional.  The  Bar  Council  of  India  is  entitled  to  charge  enrolment  fee  within  the     limits  determined  by  the  Parliament.  There  is  no  constitutional  vice  in  fixing  the  enrolment     fee  to  the  extent  it  has  been  fixed  by  Parliament  under  the  Act.  The  Bar  Council,  in  the     instant  case,  was  not  permitted  to  recover  such  renewal  fee  from  Advocates.  It  could     recover  renewal  fee  only  when  authorised  by  an  Act  of  Parliament.   According  to  Sec  25  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  the  application  for  admission  as  an     advocate  shall  be  made  to  the  State  Bar  Council  within  whose  jurisdiction  the  applicant     wishes  to  practice.     Reference  of  application  to  Enrolment  Committee:  Sec  26(1)  of  the  said  Act  contains     the  provision  that  a  State  Bar  Council  shall  refer  every  application  for  admission  as  an     advocate  to  its  enrolment  committee,  and  subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub-­‐sections  (2)  and     (3)  and  to  any  direction  that  may  be  given  in  writing  by  the  State  Bar  Council  in  this  behalf,     such  committee  shall  dispose  of  the  application  in  the  prescribed  manner:   Provided  that  the  Bar  Council  of  India  may,  if  satisfied,  either  on  a  reference  made  to  it  in     this  behalf  or  otherwise,  that  any  person  has  got  his  name  entered  on  the  roll  of  advocates     by  misrepresentation  as  to  an  essential  fact  or  by  fraud  or  undue  influence,  remove  the     name  of  such  person  from  the  roll  of  advocates  after  giving  him  an  opportunity  of  being     heard.   Refusal  of  Application:  Sec  26(2)  Where  the  enrolment  committee  of  a  State  Bar  Council      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW proposes  to  refuse  any  such  application,  it  shall  refer  the  application  for  opinion  to  the  Bar     Council  of  India  and  every  such  reference  shall  be  accompanied  by  a  statement  of  the     grounds  in  support  of  the  refusal  of  the  application.   Disposal  of  Application  in  conformity  with  Opinion  of  Bar  Council  of  India:  Sec  26(3)   The  enrolment  committee  of  a  State  Bar  Council  shall  dispose  of  any  application  referred     to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  under  subsection  (2)  in  conformity  with  the  opinion  of  the  Bar     Council  of  India.   Communication  of  Refusal:  Sec  26(4)  Where  the  enrolment  committee  of  a  State  Bar     Council  has  refused  any  application  for  admission  as  an  advocate  on  its  roll,  the  State  Bar     Council  shall,  as  soon  as  may  be,  send  intimation  to  all  other  State  Bar  Councils  about     such  refusal  stating  the  name,  address  and  qualifications  of  the  person  whose  application   was  refused  and  the  grounds  for  the  refusal.   Disqualifications  for  Enrolment:    (Sec  24A)    of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961    lays  down     certain  conditions,  the  existence  of  which  may  disqualify  a  person  from  being  enrolled  as     an  advocate  as  below  –   (a)  The  person  concerned  should  not  be  convicted  of  an  offence  involving  moral     turpitude;   (b)    The    person  concerned  should  not  be    convicted  of  an  offence  under  the     provisions  of  the  Untouchability  (Offences)  Act,  1955  (22  of  1955);   (c)  The  person  concerned  should  not  be  dismissed  or  removed  from  employment  or     office  under  the  State  on  any  charge  involving  moral  turpitude.    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Provided  that  the  disqualification  for  enrolment  as  aforesaid  shall  cease  to  have  effect  after     a  period  of  2  years  has  elapsed  since  his  release  or  dismissal  or,  as  the  case  may  be,     removal.   The  legislature,  even  at  that  stage  does  not  appear  to  have  thought  of  introducing  a     statutory  amendment  to  impose  any  ceiling  limit  based  on  the  introduction  of  an  upper  age     to  operate  as  a  disqualifying  factor  against  a  person  from  getting  enrolled  into  the  State     rolls.   In  the  case  of  Sampath  Kumar  J  Versus  Bar  Council  of  India  (1995)  before  Madras     High  Court,   Facts:  The  rule  which  was  the  effect  of  putting  an  axe  on  the  right  of  a  person,  who     otherwise  eligible  to  be  enrolled  as  an  advocate  has  the  consequence  of  substance,     prescribing  disqualification.  The  prescription  of  an  upper  age  with  ceiling  limit  of  45  years     per  se  operates,  as  a  permanent  disqualification  for  a  person  otherwise  entitled  to  get     enrolled  as  an  advocate.   Held  that:  It  may  not  be  permissible  for  the  Bar  Council  of  India  to  superimpose  a  further     qualification  by  putting  an  upper  age  limit  so  as  to  disqualify  or  render  ineligible  a  person,     though  otherwise  qualified  from  being  enrolled  merely  on  grounds  of  having  reached  a     particular  maximum  age  limit  prescribed  under  rules.   As  per  (Sec  26A)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  a  State  Bar  Council  may  remove  from  the     State  roll  the  name  of  any  advocate  who  is  dead  or  from  whom  a  request  has  been     received  to  that  effect.    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Enrolment  of  an  Advocate:  As  per  the  (Section  22)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  the     State  Bar  Council  issues  a  certificate  of  enrolment.  It  is  to  be  issued  in  the  prescribed  form     to  every  person  whose  name  is  entered  in  the  State  roll  of  advocates.   If  there  is  any  change  in  the  place  of  permanent  address  of  the  advocate  the  same  is  to  be     intimated  to  the  State  Bar  Council  within  90  days  of  such  change.  The  enrolment  as  an     advocate  cannot  be  denied  to  a  law  graduate,  merely  because  he/she  had  undertaken     some  other  course  of  instruction  during  the  time  when  he/she  was  studying  in  law  classes     for  a  law  degree.   It  has  been  held  by  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  of  India  in  case  reported  in  1973,  that  Uttar     Pradesh  State  Legislature  is  competent  to  legislate  and  impose  stamp  duty  on  the     certificate  of  enrolment  under  (Sec  22)  to  be  issued  by  the  State  Bar  Council  of  Uttar     Pradesh.   Classes  of  Advocates:  As  per  the  Sec  16(1)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  there  are  two     classes  of  advocates,  namely  Senior  Advocates  and  Other  Advocates.  Sec  16(2)  states     that,  if  the  Supreme  Court  or  a  High  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  particular  advocate     possesses  ability,  standing  at  the  Bar  or  special  knowledge  or  experience  in  law,  and  if  the     advocate  concerned  consents  so,  he/she  may  be  designated  as  Senior  Advocate.   Certain  restrictions  for  Senior  Advocates:  According  to  Sec  16(3)  of  the  Advocates  Act,     1961  the  Bar  Council  of  India  may  prescribe  certain  restrictions  in  the  matter  of  practice  of     senior  advocates.  They  are  as  below  –   Ø    An  advocate  who  has  been  designated  as  senior  advocate  cannot  file  a      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW vakalatnama  or  act  in  any  Court  or  Tribunal  or  before  any  person  or  authority  as  laid     down  in  Section  30  of  the  said  Act.   Ø    The  senior  advocate  cannot  directly  appear  before  the  Court  or  Tribunal  or  before     any  person  or  authority  mentioned  in  Section  30  of  the  said  Act.  He  can  appear  only     through  an  advocate  in  Part-­‐II  of  the  State  roll.   Ø    The  senior  advocate  can  neither  accept  instructions  to  draft  pleading  or  affidavits,     advice,  on  evidence,  nor  he  can  do  any  drafting  work  of  an  analogous  kind  in  any     Court  or  Tribunal  or  before  any  person  or  authority  as  mentioned  in  Section  30,  nor     can  he  undertake  conveyance  work  of  any  kind.   Ø    A  senior  advocate  is  free  to  make  concessions  or  give  undertaking  in  the  course  of     argument  on  behalf  of  his  clients  provided  there  are  instructions  from  junior     advocate.   Ø    A  senior  advocate  is  not  free  to  directly  accept  from  any  client  any  brief  instructions     for  the  purpose  of  appearing  before  any  Court  or  Tribunal  or  before  any  person  or     other  authority  in  India.   Ø    The  advocate  who  has  acted  as  a  junior  advocate  in  a  given  case  cannot  after  his     becoming  a  senior  advocate  advises  on  grounds  of  appeal  in  a  Court  of  appeal  or  in     the  Supreme  Court  or  an  advocate  in  Part-­‐II  of  the  State  roll.   Ø    A  senior  advocate  may  in  recognition  of  the  services  rendered  by  an  advocate  in     Part-­‐II  of  the  State  roll  appearing  in  any  matter  pay  him  a  fee  which  he  considers     reasonable.    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW Maintaining  Roll  of  Advocates:  Section  17(1)  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  states  that  the     Bar  Council  of  every  State  has  to  prepare  and  maintain  a  roll  of  advocates  where  in  the     names  and  addresses  of  the  following  persons  are  entered  –   (a)  all  persons  who  were  entered  as  advocates  on  the  roll  of  any  High  Court  under  the     Indian  Bar  Councils  Act,  1926  (38  of    1926),  immediately  before  the  appointed  day     including  persons,  being  citizens  of  India,  who  before  the  15th  day  of  August,  1947,  were     enrolled  as  advocates  under  the  said  Act  in  any  area  which  before  the  said  date  was     comprised  within  India  as  defined  in  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935,  and  who  at  any     time  express  an  intention  in  the  prescribed  manner  to  practise  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the     Bar  Council;   (b)  all  other  persons  who  are  admitted  to  be  advocates  on  the  roll  of  the  State  Bar  Council     under  this  Act  on  or  after  the  appointed  day.   According  to  Sec  17(2)  of  the  said  Act,  this  roll  of  advocates  is  divided  into  2  parts.  The     first  part  is  meant  for  the  names  of  senior  advocates  and  the  second  part  is  meant  for  the     names  of  other  advocates.   According  to  Sec  17(4)  of  the  said  Act  specifically  provides  that  no  person  shall  be     enrolled  as  advocate  on  the  roll  of  more  than  one  State  Bar  Councils.   The  rules  as  regards  to  preparation  and  maintenance  of  the  State  roll  are  mentioned  in     Chapter  I  of  Part  V  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India  Rules  as  below  –   1    (a)  The  Council  may,  from  time  to  time,  give  directions  as  to  the  manner  in  which     the  State  Council  shall  prepare  and  maintain  the  rolls  under  Section  17  of  the  Act.    

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW (b)  The  copies  of  the  State  rolls  to  be  sent  under  Section  19  of  the  Act  shall  be  in     Forms  ‘B-­‐1’  &  ‘B-­‐2’  and  shall  contain  such  further  details  as  the  Council  may     specify.   2  Particulars  of  transfers  under  Sec  18  of  the  Act,  cancellations  directed  under  the     proviso  to  Sec  26(1)  of  the  Act,  punishments  imposed  by  an  order  under  Chapter  V,     particulars  as  to  result  of  appeals  and  relevant  decisions  of  the  Courts,  and  such  other     matters  which  the  Council  may  specifically  direct,  shall  be  noted  in  the  said  rolls.   3  Save  as  otherwise  directed  by  the  Council;  no  other  particulars  shall  be  entered  in     the  said  rolls.   4  Every  page  of  the  roll  shall  bear  the  signature  or  a  facsimile  thereof,  of  the  Secretary     or  other  person  authorised  by  the  State  Council.   5  Authenticated  copies  of  any  additions  or  alterations  made  in  the  roll  shall  be  sent  to     the  Council  without  delay.   Transfer  of  Name  from  One  State  Roll  to  another  State  Roll:  According  to  Sec  18(1)  of     Advocates  Act,  1961,  where  the  name  of  any  person  whose  name  is  entered  as  an     advocate  on  the  roll  of  any  State  Bar  Council  may  make  an  application  in  the  prescribed     form  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  for  the  transfer  of  his  name  from  the  roll  of  that  State  Bar     Council  to  the  roll  of  any  other  State  Bar  Council  and,  on  receipt  of  any  such  application     the  Bar  Council  of  India  shall  direct  that  the  name  of  such  person  shall  without  the     payment  of  any  fee,  be  removed  from  the  roll  of  the  first  mentioned  State  Bar  Council  and     entered  in  the  roll  of  the  other  State  Bar  Council  and  the  State  Bar  Councils  concerned      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW shall  comply  with  such  direction.   Provided  that  where  any  such  application  for  transfer  is  made  by  a  person  against  whom     any  disciplinary  proceeding  is  pending  or  where  the  Bar  Council  of  India  is  of  the  view  that     the  application  for  transfer  has  not  been  made  bonafide,  and  that  the  transfer  should  not     be  made,  the  Bar  Council  of  India  may,  after  giving  the  person  making  the  application  an     opportunity  of  making  a  representation  in  this  behalf,  reject  the  application.   According  to  Sec  18(2)  of  Advocates  Act,  1961,  the  transfer  of  name  in  no  way  affects  the     seniority  of  the  advocate,  as  the  concerned  advocate  shall  retain  the  same  seniority  in  the     latter  roll  to  which  he  was  entitled  in  the  former  roll.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  advocate     applying  has  not  to  pay  the  fee  of  any  kind  for  transferring  of  his  name  from  one  State  roll     to  another  State  roll.   The  language  of  Sec  19  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  lays  down  that  every  State  Bar     Council  shall  send  to    the  Bar  Council  of  India  an  authenticated  copy  of  the  roll  of   advocates  prepared  by  it  for  the  first  time  under  this  Act  and    shall  also  thereafter     communicate  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  all  alterations  in  and  any  additions  to  such  roll,  as     soon  as  the  same  have  been  made.   The  provision  of  Sec  20(1)  of  the  said  Act  lays  down  that  every  advocate  who  was  entitled     as  of  right  to  practise  in  the  Supreme  Court  immediately  before  the  appointed  day  and     whose  name  is  not  entered  in  any  State  roll  may,  within  the  prescribed  time,  express  his     intention  in  the  prescribed  form  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India  for  the  entry  of  his  name  in  the     roll  of  a  State  Bar  Council  and  on  receipt  thereof  the  Bar  Council  of  India  shall  direct  that      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW the  name  of  such  advocate  shall,  without  payment  of  any  fee,  be  entered  in  the  roll  of  that     State  Bar  Council,  and  the  State  Bar  Council  concerned  shall  comply  with  such  direction.   According  to  Sec  20(2)  of  the  said  Act,  any  entry  in  the  State  roll  made  in  compliance  with     the  direction  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India  is  to  be  made  in  order  of  seniority.  If  an  advocate     as  is  referred  to  in  Sec  20  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  omits  or  fails  to  express  his     intention  within  the  prescribed  time,  his/her  name  shall  be  entered  in  the  roll  of  the  State     Bar  Council  of  India.   Advocates  only  recognised  class  of  person  entitled  to  practice  law:  The  provisions  of     Sec  29  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  lays  down  that  “subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act     and  any  rules  made  there  under,  there  shall,  as  from  the  appointed  day,  be  only  one  class     of  persons,  entitled  to  practice  the  profession  law,  namely  advocates.   Right  of  Advocates  to  Practise:  As  per  Sec  30,  an  advocate  whose  name  is  entered  in     the  State  roll  becomes  entitled  as  of  right  to  practise  throughout  the  territories  to  which  this     Act  extends  –   (i)    in  all  Courts  including  the  Supreme  Court;   (ii)  before  any  tribunal  or  person  legally  authorised  to  take  evidence;  and     (iii)  before  any  authority  or  person  before  whom  such  advocate  is  by  or  under  any     law  for  the  time  being  in  force  entitled  to  practise.   Appearance  of  Non-­‐Advocate:  Under  Sec  32  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  a  discretionary     power  is  given  to  the  Court  to  permit  appearance  to  any  non-­‐advocate  for  a  party.  Sec  32   restricts  the  power  of  the  Court  to  permit  any  non-­‐advocate  only  to  appear  on  behalf  of  the      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW party  in  any  particular  case.   In  the  instant  case,  the  petitioner  had  not  filed  the  petition  in  public  interest  and  did  not   disclose  the  circumstances  which  prevented  the  affected  persons  from  approaching  the     Court.  In  discharge  of  his  professional  obligations,  the  petitioner-­‐advocate  is  not  obliged  to     file  the  writ  petition  on  behalf  of  the  clients.  No  circumstances  were  mentioned  in  the     petition  which  allegedly  incapacitated  the  affected  person  from  filing  the  writ  petition.  Sec     30  of  the  Advocates  Act,  196  only  entitles  an  advocate  to  practise  the  profession  of  law     and  not  to  substitute  himself  in  his  own  name,  being  not  a  part  of  the  professional     obligation  of  the  Advocate;  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  dismissing  the  writ  petition     holding  that  the  petitioner-­‐advocate  had  no  locus  standi.   Right  to  advocacy  is  a  Statutory  Right:  It  appears  from  the  provisions  of  Secs  29  &  30   that  the  advocates  have  been  conferred  right  to  practise  not  only  in  all  Courts  including  the     Supreme  Court  but  also  before  any  Tribunal  or  person  legally  authorised  to  take  evidence     and  also  before  any  other  authority  or  person  before  whom  such  advocate  is  by  or  under     any  law  for  the  time  being  entitled  to  practice.  Therefore,  the  right  of  an  advocate  to     practise  profession  of  law  is  statutory  right  and  not  a  fundamental  right.   A  private  person  who  is  not  an  advocate  and  not  a  pleader  enrolled,  cannot  be  permitted     to  argue  and  plead  the  case  for  a  third  party/person  on  the  basis  of  attorney  unless     permitted  under  special  circumstances  by  the  Court.   Power  of  Court  to  permit  appearance  of  an  individual:  As  regards  the  entitlement  of  an     individual  to  appear  before  the  Court  in  a  given  case,  Sec  32  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW lays  down  that  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  Court,  authority  or  person  to  permit  any  person     to  appear  before  it  or  him  in  a  particular  case.  The  provisions  confer  a  monopoly  right  of     pleading  and  practising  law  only  on  the  enrolled  advocates.  A  private  person  who  is  not  an     advocate  cannot  or  has  no  right  to  argue  for  a  party.  He/she  must  get  the  prior  permission     of  the  Court  for  which  motion  must  come  from  the  party  itself.  It  is  open  to  the  Court  to     grant  or  withhold  or  withdraw  permission  in  its  discretion.   Right  to  Practise  is  different  from  Right  of  Appearance:  Right  to  practise  is  different     from  the  right  of  appearance  in  a  particular  case.  The  right  to  practise  is  a  right  given  to  the     advocate  to  practise  the  profession  of  law  before  all  Courts,  Tribunals,  authorities  etc.  The     right  of  appearance  in  a  particular  case  depends  upon  the  permission  granted  by  the  Court     under  Sec  32  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961  which  is  an  exception  to  the  right  of  practise  by     the  advocates.   Permission  once  granted  to  appear  may  be  withdrawn:     In  the  case  of  Harishankar  Rastogi  Versus  Giridhari  Sharma  (1978)   Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  held  that  a  private  person,  who  is  not  an  advocate,  has  no  right  to     barge  into  the  Court  and  claim  to  argue  for  a  party.  He  must  get  the  prior  permission  of  the     Court,  for  which  the  motion  must  come  from  the  party  himself.  It  is  open  to  the  Court  to     grant  or  withhold  the  permission  in  its  discretion.  In  fact,  the  court  may  even  after  grant  of     permission,  withdraw  it  halfway  through  if  the  representative  proves  himself  reprehensible.     The  antecedents,  the  relationship,  the  reason  for  requisitioning  the  services  of  the  private     person  and  a  variety  of  the  other  circumstances  must  be  gathered  before  the  grant  or      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW refusal  of  permission.   Advocates  alone  entitled  to  Practise:  As  per  Sec  33  of  Advocates  Act,  1961  it  is  clear  in     language  laying  down  that  “except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  Act  or  in  any  other  law  for     the  time  being  in  force,  no  person  shall  on  or  after  the  appointed  day,  be  entitled  to     practise  in  any  Court  or  before  any  authority  or  person  unless  he/she  is  enrolled  as  an     advocate  under  the  said  Act”.   A  recognised  representative  cannot  claim  to  appear  as  of  right.  Previous  permission  of     Court  is  necessary.  There  is  no  warrant  whatsoever  to  place  a  recognised  agent  holding  a     general  power  of  attorney  to  take  proceedings  in  Courts  in  the  same  position  as  an     advocate  to  whom  a  vakalatnama  has  been  given.   The  legal  capacity  of  an  advocate  to  practise  the  profession  of  law  in  Court  and  his     competency  to  act  in  Court  for  his  client  are  not  derived  from  any  contract  but  from  his     legally  recognised  status  as  an  advocate.  On  account  of  his  status,  his  duties  are  threefold     –  to  the  client,  to  the  Court,  and  to  the  public.   The  expression  “practise”  clearly  contemplates  practising  as  a  profession  for  gain.  That     neither  precludes  a  party  in  person  in  Court  to  argue  his  own  case  or  appoint  an  agent     who  is  acceptable  to  the  Court  to  present  his  cases  other  than  a  lawyer.  Prohibition  is  to     practise  as  a  profession  and  not  for  mere  appearance  in  an  isolated  case.   The  right  of  the  advocates  to  practise  in  all  Courts  including  Supreme  Court  as  of  right  is     always  subject  to  the  rule  making  power  of  the  High  Court  laying  down  conditions  subject     to  which  an  advocate  shall  be  permitted  to  practise  in  the  High  Courts  and  the  Courts      

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JANHIT COLLEGE OF LAW subordinate  thereto.  

 

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