Joan C. Tronto - Moral Boundaries - A Political Argument For An Ethic of Care-Routledge (1993) PDF

 

M

O

R

BOUND

L R IE S

 

R

M

A

BOUND

R IE S

A Polit Political ical Ar Argument gument for an Ethic

Joan

C

Care

Tronto

ROUTLE New York•

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GE

London

 

Published in r99 r993 3 by Routledge An imprint of Routle Routledge, dge, Ch Chapman apman and Hall Hall,, Inc. 29 West 3 5 Street New York, NY 1 1 Published in Great Gre at Britain by Routledge 1 I New Fetter Lane London EC4P 4EE Copyright@ 1993 by Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc. Cover art: Thomas Col Cole, e, The Voyage o Life: Childhood Ailsa Melon Br Bruc ucee Fund, ©1993, N Natio ational nal Gallery of A Art, rt, Washington. Printed in the United States on acid fre freee paper. All rights reserved. N o part o f this book may be reprinted o r reproduced o r utilized i n any form o r by any electronic mechanical o r other means, now known o r hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, o r in any information

storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Library o Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Tronto Joan C.

Morall boundaries: a politica Mora politicall argument for an ethic of car caree / Joan C Tronto p. cm. . Includes inde index x p. IS ISBN BN o-4 o-4r5r5-906 9064141-5 5 acid acid-fr -free ee paper) IS ISBN BN 0-415-90 0-415-90642-3 642-3 pbk.: acidacid-free free paper) 1. Feminism-Moral and ethical aspects. 2. C a r i n g  Moral and ethical aspects. I. Title. HQ1206.T75 1993

3. Sex rol rolee 4. Women-Attitudes

305.42-dc20

93-10700 CIP British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data also available.

 

  o

o

y Parents

the Staff Doctors Doctor s an and d Nurses o f

the Westchester County Medical Center o

y Sisters Brothers-In-Law

Nephews and Niece o

y Relatives Friend Friendss Lovers Lover s an d Colleagu Colleagues es

Who Have Cared and Shared With Me

 

  ONTENTS

PREFACE

PART ONE

Introduction

Chapter 1: Moral Boundaries and Politica Politicall Change Chang e

I

The Power o f Context and the Context o f Power • Three Moral Boundaries • Women s Morality A s a Strategic Predicament • Argument o f Thi Thiss Boo k

PART

Two:: Against Women's Morality Two

Chapter 2: Universalistic Morality and Moral Sentiments Morality and Forms o f Life • Universalistic Morality and Eighteenth Century Life • Social Distance and the Demise o f Moral Sentiments • The Containment o f Women and the Engendering o f Mora Morall Sentimen Sentimentt • Lessons for an Ethic o f Care

Chapter 3: Is Morality Gendered? r Lawrence Kohlberg: The Virtuous Elite • Carol Gilligan s Different Voice and its Limits • Gender l cieology and Forms o f Privilege A t Work

PART THREE

For An Ethic o f Care

Chapter 4: Care

O

Defining Care • Marginalizing Care • The Promise o f Care Care s Power

tt

5

 

Chapter

:

n Ethic of Care

I

7

The Practice o f n Ethic o f Care • Moral Dilemmas in the Practice o f Care • Expanding Our Moral Terrain • Ethics and Politics

Chapter

6:

Care and Political Political Theory

r

7

Again st a Morali Against Morality ty Firs Firstt Stra Strategy tegy • Care s a Political Ideal o Care n d Political Strategy • Moral Boundaries and a Political Concept o f Care

NOTES

IN

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PREF

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n American who came o f age while the United States

waged w r in Southeast Asia, I have long wondered how my fellow citizens could meet questions o f profound global n d domestic injustice with acquiescence. In a society structured by racism n d sexism, where only lip service is paid t o the dignity o f ordinary people and workers, I ended my own pas sivity by becoming active in the feminist movement. Feminism for me embodied a concern with justice n d celebrated the ordinary lives o f women, children, n d men from all races, religions, and ethnic backgrounds. I chose t o become a political theorist because I thought it would help me t o make sense of the world. Given the sense o f urgency t o understand the world th t impelled me t o study politics, I am often disappointed by how tame and irrelevant theory the ory become becomess for those who live outside of academe. In this book I obviously write as a political theorist to others within the academy, but I hope as well t o write t o the women and men who are looking for another way to understand n d t o act against the continued injustices of our world. In one sense, the feminist movement is a p rt of the global global wave o f movement movementss for liberation th t have marked the second half of the twentieth twentie th century. century. Theorists within these movements have often built their claims for justice o n pre-existing social social X

 

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theories. Feminist theorists are not alone in feeling that the old paradigms cann ca nnot ot adequately describe describe the realiti realities es that exist and thatt require transformation. tha transformation. ost of us who devote devote our time to thinking about these questions would agree that there needs to be a shift in our vis vision ion so that th at we can see the world differently. While I do not offer a complete alternative in this book my hope is t o provide a glimp glimpse se into int o a different world worl d one where the daily caring o f people for each other is a valued premise o f human existence. I have used the metaphor of boundaries deliberately. To call attention t o moral boundaries raises two sets o f questions both o f which inform what I try to do in this book. The first question is strategic: by noticing boundaries boundari es we notice what they include and exclude. What shall we d o if w e wish t o change what is included and excluded by them? The second question is visionary: what alternative vision informs our account o f what moral life should be? y answer to this question is simple: our account o f moral life should provide us

with a way to respect and deal justly with others. In order to do so w e must honor what most people spend their lives doing: caring cari ng for themse themselves lves for others and for the world. In this glimpse into a n alternative vision of life one cencentered o n human care and interdependen interdependence ce questions of gender and other categories o f social life that structure our realities such as race and cla class ss remain rema in pivotal. In most mos t societ societies ies care distribu ributed ted by gender gender by caste and class class and often by work is dist race and ethnicity s well. In this book I lay the ground for more thorough descriptions and analyses o f the actual practices o f caring in various societies. I invite readers t o think care to their own lives about the application of my account of care to their own situations and t o their own societies. y work may not seem revolutionary t o those for whom i t describes daily life. I start from assumptions about the need for a liberal democratic pluralistic society society in order for all humans t o flourish. In this regard I part company with some

 

PREF CE

feminist theorists who have turned away from traditional political analyses, who find the liberal democratic state corrupted, o r who have moved towards romanticized commitments t o community. Yet a radical argument exists within this framework; even conventional liberal thought will be transformed if we take caring seriously. I have learned so much from my teachers a t Oberlin College and Princeton University, from my colleagues and students at Bowdoin College and for the past ten years) at Hunter College, from my activist and academic friends, and from my family, that I cann ca nnot ot possibly acknowledge everyone everyone s contr co ntriibution to m y thinking. Nevertheless I would be remiss i I did not specifically mention some people whose influences o n this book have been profound. Berenice Fisher and I spent a great deal o f time thinking together about caring. Our jointly published ideas play a central conceptual role in this book. I believe that he herr contribution contributi on t o our mutual work was much greater than mine; I am forever indebted t o her for her intellectual generosity and supportive friendship. Mary Dietz has indulged my endless discussions o f these questions with the kindness and critical perspective that make her m y most valued friend. She helped me especially to clarify the arguments of the book; she also sometimes rescued me from overstating my positions. positions. Most of this book was written while I served as a Research Associate a t the Beatrice M . Bain Research Group a t the University Universit y of Californi Cal iforniaa at a t Berk Berkel eley ey.. I am grateful to them and t o Hunter College for their institutional. support. Laura Stoker, Dianne Sadoff, Susan Okin, Molly Shanley, and Mark Tunick al also so provided provi ded comments o n some earlier earlier drafts of chapters and related papers. I have presented my work wherever someone was kind enough t o invite me t o speak: special thanks for such opportunities g o t o Jennifer Nedelsky a t the University o f Toronto Law School, Selma Sevenhuijsen a t the University o f Utrecht, Valeria Russo a t the European University Institute, the x

 

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Beatrice M Bain Research Group and the Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program at the University of California at Berkeley Pomon Po monaa College College Susan Okin Ok in at Stanford Stanfo rd Univer Universit sity y and an d Patricia Benner a t the University o f California a t San Francisco. Over the years many students have helped me with research tasks. Cece Ce celi liaa Cancellaro and a nd the staff a t Routledge have been encouraging and patient. aging p atient. Christine Christine Trost prepa prepared red the th e index. One comes to appreciate care best by being involved in relationships of car care. e. In this regard I owe owe more than th an I can express to my parents par ents Eugene Eugene and Leah Leah Tronto Tron to t o my sisters Eloise and Susan and their the ir famili families: es: Fred Janette Jane tte and Curtis Arnemann and Andy Ben and AJ Seitz; t o Annmarie Levins t o Trish Hastings; and an d to my dear friend friendss Kenneth Sherrill Sherrill Gerald Otte Ot te Berenice Bere nice Fishe Fisherr Linda Mark Ma rkss Melanie Fife Fife Susan Koen Barbar Bar baraa Beckelmann Scott Sawy Sawyer er and an d Mary Dietz. I literally owe my life life to the care I received received from the staff staff doctor doc torss and an d nurses of the Westchester Westchester County Cou nty Medical M edical Center Center.. I hope that readers will will find this this book boo k an openin op ening g to exciting exciting possibilities for revaluing what is important in human life and how we might move towards a more just world that embodies good goo d caring. New York New York

x

 

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ntroduction

 

 

MORAL BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL CHANGE HOW MIGHT

N ETHIC OF C

RE BECOME POSSIBLE

many advocates for women have tried to use the common notion that women are more moral than men as a political tool t o improve women's standing in the public sphere. sphere. Fro From m the suffragist suffragist claim claim that if women voted there would be n o more war, t o the 1992 U election slogans proclaiming the year of the woman, many have proclaimed that politics would wou ld be more moral mor al if only more women wom en were involve involved. d. Women's morality, then, has not only T H R O U G H O U T T H E TWENTIETH CENTURY,

appeared to be a fact of life, it has also appeared t o be a powerful strategy for creating political change. 1 The content of this this women's morality is never precisely set, butt the term bu te rm refers refers loosely loosely to a collection of idea ideas: s:  values placed o n caring and nurturance, the importance o f mothers's love, a stress o n the value of sustaining human relationships, the overriding value o f peace. 3 It is also not clear if women's greater mora mo rall sensitivity derives derives from simply being fema female, le, from fr om being a mother or a potential mother, 4 o r f r ; m women's particular cultural role role and setting setting,, for example, that women can be more moral becaus becausee they are outside o f the marketplace. 5 Yet despite its longevity and its great appeal, the strategy o f women's wome n's morality cannot be counted as very successful. Women remain almost entirely excluded from power in political, economic, and cultural institutions o f importance in the United

 

MORAL BOUNDARIES BOUNDARIES

States, despite the small gains of the year of the woman. " 6 A century old strategy t o gain a share o f power that remains so small does not seem to be a very effective strategy a t all. Not only has this strategy not been so successful, but it has also incurred fairly high costs. A companion t o the argument that women are more moral than men is a n image o f that has historically (and, I shall argue, necessarily) excluded many women from its purview. In the United States, forr example, the morality of women was tied t o motherhood, fo and was tied to combatting the influence of immigrant, Black, and working class men. 7 As a result, the image o f moral women often excluded excluded women of col color or,, immigrant immi grant women, poo p oorr women, lesbians, and women who w ho were not "fit" mothers. The strategy o f women's morality has required for all o f its limited success, that some women's realities (to say nothing o f their sense women

o f morality ) be sacrificed t o ach achiev ievee othe ot herr women's inclusion. From Fro m such an indictment, it would seem seem that there is no point i n pursuing the prospects o f "women's morality" any further.

this argument argume nt continues to exert a pu pull ll in popular popul ar culture, in everyday conversation, and in some scholarly circles. N o doubt partt of this par this appeal is that it seems more positive than many other arguments made by feminists, stressing women's contribution, rather than dwelling upon the wrongs done by men and the anger these wrongs elicit. Many women, no matter how carefully they have thought about these issues, find something appealing about such cl clai aims ms as as: "Cooper "Coo perati ation on among amon g women is the force force that sustains civilization. " 8 Another part o f the appeal of women's morality rests within the ideas upon which it is based. The values o f caring and nurturance, o f stre stressi ssing ng the importance import ance of human relationships as key elements o f the good life, remain enticing possibilities in a culture that stresses, as its bottom line, a n unlimited concern with productivi pr oductivity ty and progress. progress. What woul would d it i t mean in late late twentieth twen tieth century centu ry American soc sociiety to take seriously, as part o f our definition o f a good society, et

 

MOR L BOUND RIES

ND POLITIC L CH NGE

the values o f caring-attentiveness, responsibility, nurturance, compassion, meeting others' needs-traditionally associated with women wom en and an d traditionall tradit ionally y excluded excluded from public consideration? consideration? I argue that to take this question seriously requires a radical trans formatio form ation n in the way we concei conceive ve o f the nature and boundaries o f morality, and a n equa equally lly radical rethinking rethinki ng o f structures of power and privilege in this society. What I propose t o do, in other words, wo rds, is t o offer a vision vision for the good goo d soc societ iety y that th at draws

upon feminist feminist sensib sensibilit ilities ies and upon tradit tra dition ional al women's women 's moral ity without falling into the strategic traps that have so far doomed this approach. The core argument o f this book, then, can be expressed in paradoxical terms: I argue that we need to stop talking about women's morality and start talkin talking g inste instead ad about a care ethic includes des the values values traditionally tradit ionally associated associated with women. In that inclu this chapter chapte r I explain why the the switch switch from from women's morality t o a care ethic is necessary. Here is a further paradox: parado x: In order t o take morality seri seriou ousl sly, y, we need t o stop thinking about it as only morality. Because I hope t o take mora m orall arguments argument s more seriou seriousl sly, y, I submit that we havee to understa hav un derstand nd them in a politic l context. While I am mind ful that we usually assume moral arguments will be corrupted by association with politics, we will return to that assumption shortly. What is much more important at the outset is that all moral arguments are made in a political context, and feminists ignore the political setting of their moral arguments at their peril. s femin feminist ist thinkers thinker s have begun to scrut scrutinize inize Western thought, they have continual cont inually ly discovered discovered that the questions that have traditionally tradit ionally informed in formed the lives lives o f worrien, and servants, slaves, and workers, have have not informed the philosophical philosophical tradition traditi on o r political theory. While there are some notable exceptions,9 for the most part, p art, questions questions o f natality, mortality, and the needs o f humans t o be cared for as they grow up, live, and die, have not informed the central questions of philosophers. Because the ques tionss of caring have tion have not no t been been central central to t o most previous previous thinkers in

 

MOR L BOUND RIES

the Western philosophical tradition and to Western political theorists, they have been been peripheral peripher al issu issues es within with in the vision vision o f mostt political mos political theorists. theorists. So to take these questions seriou seriously, sly, as I propose t o d o with the question of caring, requires that we rethink theories so these aspects of human life can be brought into our focus. 1 Yet the process by which we make some questions central and others peripheral o r marginal is not simply a benign

process o f thought. Theorists' exclusions operate forcefully to set boundaries between those questions and concerns that are central and those that are peripheral. While our current concepts could be extended t o include concerns o f care, the boundaries that circumscribe how moral concepts might be used in our current modes of thought foreclose such thinking. Theories and frameworks exert a power over how we think; if we ignore this power then we are likely to misunderstand why arguments ents seem seem ineffectual. ineffectual. our argum T H E POWER OF CONTEXT AND THE CONTEXT O F POWER

The easiest way to account for the lack of success o f women's morality arguments would be t o assume that they are inherently flawed as arguments; that they rest upon unproven facts o r unsupportable principles. For the most part, this tactic has nott been no been the one used to defeat women's wom en's morali mor ality ty arguments. To att_ack motherhood, care care,, nurturance, and so forth would wo uld not be a very effective political tactic. The more usual tactic has been to dismiss women's morality as irrelevant t o genuine moral argument, o r as irrelevant to t o given political circumstances. circumstances. Certain ways in which we think about moral life influence what kinds o f moral arguments we find persuasive. In this regard, all moral theories have a ontext that determines the conditions for their relevance; even those moral theories that claim to be universal must establish the basis for this claim. 11 Since a context does not consist simply simply of o f a detailing o f facts,

 

MORAL BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL CHANGE

we need t o be clear about what we mean by a context. 12 I insist through thr oughout out this this book that th at we need need to take seriousl seriously y the politica politicall context, and the inherent power relationships, within moral theories and situations. 3 How can political context affect the acceptabili acce ptability ty of o f moral arguments? arguments? Two examples examples illuminate illuminate how ho w some of the characteristics that we attribute to morality work to preclude us from taking tak ing seriously seriously the arguments of o f women's morality. Jane Addams was a n immensely popular woman i n the

United States States prior t o World War I Her work a t Hull House was widely known, and she seemed t o embody the higher higher moral standards that women popularly seemed t o possess. Popular magazines included Addams in their lists o f the ten most impor tant women in the United States. Yet after the United States entered World War I and Jane Addams stubbornly clung t o her pacifistic view, a view that she saw as part o f her notion o f women's women 's morality, Addams' Adda ms' popularity popularit y plummeted. She was red-baited and vilified. 14 Althou Although gh she was awarded the Nobel N obel Prize for Peace in 1931, her reputation and political influence influence never recovered thei t heirr prewa pr ewarr level levels. s. One o f the most moving images o f women engaging i n

political activity in in recent time is th thee story st ory of the the Mothers Mothe rs o f the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, who were instrumental in focus ing international attention of the plight o f their disappeared chi.ldren. Yet having played a role n delegitimizing the corrupt military regime, the Mothers have had less influence in shaping Argentine politics than we might have expected expected.. They Th ey appeared, appeared , it seems, as moral actors o n the political pol itical stage, stage, but then they were ushered off the stage when it ca me time t o return t o the main action action o f politics. 15 Both o f thes thesee examples stand as testament test ament t o the power that sometimes accrues to women when they make moral arguments in politics. The political importance o f these moral arguments does not depend upon the constancy o f the women s moral views, the rightness o f their cause, o r what they do. Instead,

 

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political realities shape how seriously arguments made from women's morality are taken by political actors and the public. If women argue from a moral perspective, they are likely t o encounter opposition from political actors who insis insistt that, tha t, whil whilee morality is an important part of human life, it has no place (or (or a limited place) in the nasty world o f politics. While sometimes women will be admired for their stands, often they will also be dismissed because their stands grow out o f sentiment o r rest upon upo n pre-political, private, associations associations.. Once w e realize that moral arguments have a political context, we begin to recognize how boundaries shape moralities. Widely accepted social values constitute the context within which we interpret all moral arguments. Some ideas function as boundaries to exclude some ideas o f morality from consideration. consideration. In I n this book I focus focus on three such moral mora l boundaries. boundar ies. 6 THREE M O R A L BOUNDARIES

The first boundary that we consider is the boundary between morality and politics It is difficult to describe this boundary, because both the notions o f morality and politics are essen essen tially contestable ideas.17 Roughly, morality refers, i n Dorothy Emmet's language, t o considerations as to what one thinks it important to do and in what ways; how to conduct one's relations with other people; and being aware and pre pared par ed to be critical of one' one'ss basic basic approvals o r disapprovals. 8 W e could also define morality in, a more social context, as John Dewey did when he concluded that interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essential essential moral interest. 19 Politics, o n the other hand, is usually conceived in Western -thought as the realm in which resources are allocated, public order is maintained, and disputes about how these activities should occur are resolved. 20 O n the face o f it, politics and morality seem to concern quite different aspects of human life. fact, t, morality moral ity and politics politics are deeply intertwined inter twined in Western Western In fac 6

 

MORAL BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL CHANGE

life. Aristotle described political association as the way in which societies created the capacities for ethical practices and modes o f existence; for this reason Aristotle called the polis the

highest form o f association. 21 A good polis was n o guarantee that citizens would be ethical, but for Aristotle it was almost impossible that good men could exist in a bad polis. While few thinkers in a contempo cont emporar rary y liber liberal al societ society y would defend defend the kind of close close fit between politics politics and an d morality morali ty that th at Aristotle described described,, neither is the notion that political life shapes moral views and practices completely foreig foreign n to cont c ontemp empora orary ry political discourse discourse.. Instead o f view viewing ing morality moralit y and politics as a set o f congruent and intertwined ideas, most contemporary political thinkers would view the relationship of politics and morality i n either one of two ways. In the first case, the morality first view, thinkers begin by asserting the primacy of moral values. After mor al views moral views are fixed, fixed, rightr ight-think thinking ing individuals should suggest suggest t o the state how political life should conform t o these moral principles. In the second secon d case, case, the th e politics politi cs first vie iew w, political thinkers assert the primacy o f political values such as gaining power and preserving it through thro ugh force force and strength. In this view moral values should only be introduced into politics in accor dance with the requirements o f thes thesee political poli tical concerns. Most Mo st contempo cont emporar rary y political political thinkers, influence influenced d by the the liberal account o f the state and with a knowledge chastened by twenti eth century totalitarian systems, would probabl probably y fal falll into the moral mor alit ity y first category. category. Insofar Insof ar as the state stat e becomes becomes in liberal though tho ughtt an arena are na where the disputes disputes that tha t have have emerg emerged ed in other realms o f life are settled o r otherwise resolved, the Aristotelian relationship between between the primacy o f political life to direct ethical practices is revers reversed. ed. Instead, Inst ead, liberal political philosopher ph ilosopherss view view their task as to fix clearly what moral principles should be, and then t o press the political world to accept their view o f this prop er moral account. account. 22 The politics first view is perhaps best exemplified by the writingss of such thinkers as Niccolo Machia writing Machiavelli, velli, but the notion not ion

 

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of the primacy of rai raison son d eta t has long informed writers o n politics. The point of the politics first view is that, insofar as moral principles explain to us ho how w we should treat tr eat others morally, morally, such principles may be irrelevant, and are a t least subsidiary, t o the central concerns o f politics, which involve a struggle for power and the control o f resources, territory, etc. In current political discussion, this set of arguments discussion, argum ents is most mos t clearly found fou nd in discusdiscussions o f international politics politics,, but it often informs discussions o f domestic politics as well. In this situation, ethical questions might arise, arise, but b ut they will will only aris arisee when wh en power po wer disputes disputes have been bee n resolved, resolved, or o r when whe n there is a strategic advantage t o be gained by appearing t o be moral. From either the morality moral ity first o r the politics politic s first versions versions of the relationship o f morality and politics, it is clear why it will be difficult for the simple assertion of the existence o f a women's women 's moralit mora lity y to be a way t o ach achieve ieve political change. In the morali mor ality ty first versions versions,, no claims claims are made about how t o keep politics from recorrupting the moral perspective, o r t o require that political actors pay attention to moral arguments. In the politics first versions versions,, the containm cont ainment ent and dismissal o f moral arguments is already legitimated legitimated by tthe he starting star ting point. In the Aristotelian framework, questions o f power and questions o f what is right are intricately intertwined in both o f the separated modern versions o f the argument, morality becomes a n aspect o f life that is separate from politics. Either politics becomes a means t o ach achiev ievee mora mo rall ends, o r moral morality ity become becomess a means to t o achiev achievee political ends. ends. But the notion that politics and morality are similar ends and means is incomprehensible. In modern thinking, either one o r the other o f these two realms o f life becomes instrumental to the other, o r the two should be as separated from fr om each eac h other othe r as possible possible..   3 Thus, t o view politics and morality as two t wo separate realms o f life will make it extremely difficult for moral arguments ever to have much political po powe wer. r. Jane Addams los lostt her he r moral authorauthor ity when her pacifist pacifist leanings leanings seemed seemed a naive naive type type of morali mor ality ty 8

 

MORAL BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL CHANGE

first politics. politics. Can Ca n such a moral mor al bound bou ndary ary ever ever be be changed chang ed in a more promising direction? For Aristotle, the same values inform both moral and political realms; in Aristotle's writings that value is the pursuit o f the good goo d life life.. While we we may not n ot wish to accept Aristotle's particular values, this example is instructive. A concept that can describe both a moral and a political version o f the good life can help us t o escape from the dilemmas o f seeing morality and politics as separate spheres. I argue that care can

serve as both a moral value and as a basis for the political achievement o f a goo g ood d society society.. h e second moral boundary I shall describe is the moral point o f view boundary. This boundary requires that moral judgments be be made from a point poin t o f view that is distant and disinterested. It arises out o f our shared understandings o f wha whatt we expectt moral theory t o be. Since the eighteenth century, most expec philosophers have accepted Immanuel Kant's view o f what a moral theory should be: it should arise not out of the concrete circumstances circumsta nces of any give given n socie society ty,, but bu t out o ut of the requirements of of reason. 24 Mo Mora rall theory, theory, above all, all, must be from the moral point poin t o f vi view ew,, which means from a standpo stan dpoint int o f disinterested and disengaged moral actors.   5 Seve Se vera rall consequenc consequences es follow from this notion not ion of what constitutes morality. In the first place, morality becomes a realm beyond the the world o f emotions and a nd feeli feeling ngs, s, and a nd thus th us par p artt of reareason only. In the second place, morality understood in this way should not be shaped by local customs o r habits, and should appear to be as universal as the capacities of humans to reason. In the third thi rd place, place, insofar as there are l