Jimenez vs. People

MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 209195 and 209215, 17 September 2014, SECOND DIVISION, (Brion, J.) In a motion to discharge an accused to become a state witness, it is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications satisfies the procedural norms. This is a symbiotic relationship as the trial court largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation. Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda naming Manuel J. Jimenez and several others as co-conspirators. His statements detailed where the alleged steel casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver near the place which he pointed. Montero filed a motion for discharge as a state witness for the prosecution, to which Jimenez opposed. The motion to discharge was granted by Judge Zaldy B. Docena stating that the prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of granting the said motion. Jimenez opposed Judge Docena’s ruling averring that the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to discharge because: (1)the requirements for granting a motion were not properly complied; (2)there is no absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero; (3)Montero’s testimony do not corroborate with the prosecution’s evidence; (4) and Montero is favored as a state witness though he appears to be the most guilty. ISSUE: Did Judge Docena gravely abuse his discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness? RULING: No. Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of discretion” as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner.To resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, itonly require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points.A trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of the accused. It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.

UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015

“Most guilty” refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized. Thus, as a rule, what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed. The Court draws attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only “appear to be the most guilty.”

UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015