Jean-Luc Marion-Cartesian Questions_ Method and Metaphysics-University of Chicago Press (1999)

Cartesian Question

JEA N -LU C m a r i o n is professor o f philosophy at the Sorbonne. Among his many books are

God without Being (1991) and On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism (1999), both published by the University o f Chicago Press. T he University o f Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 T he University o f Chicago Press, Ltd ., London © 1999 by T he University o f Chicago All rights reserved. Published 1999 Printed in the United States o f America 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 1 2 3 4 5 isb n : 0-226-50542-1 (cloth) ISBN: 0-226-50544-8 (paper) Originally published as Qiiestions cartésiennes: Méthode et métaphysique, © Presses Universitaires de France, 1991. Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Marion, Jean-Luc, 19 4 6[Questions cartésiennes. English] Cartesian questions : method and metaphysics / Jean-Luc Marion ; foreword by Daniel Garber. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-226-50542-1 (cloth : alk. paper).— ISBN 0-226-50544-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Descartes, René, 159 6 -16 50 . I. Title. B 18 7 5 .M 3 3 6 1 3

194— dc2i

19 9 9

98-38335 CIP

© T he paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence o f Paper for Printed Library Materials, a n s i Z 3 9 .4 8 - 19 9 2 .

Contents Publisher’s Note, vii

Foreword by Daniel Garber, ix

' Does Thought Dream? T h e Three Dreams, or

ch ap ter one

T h e Awakening o f the Philosopher

i

What Is the Metaphysics within the Method?

ch ap ter tw o

T h e M etaphysical Situation o f the Discourse on the Method ch ap ter th re e

20

What Is the Method in the Metaphysics? T h e Role

o f the Simple Natures in the Meditations

43

What Is the Ego Capable of? Divinization and

ch ap ter fo u r

Domination: Capable/Capax

67

Does the Cogito Affect Itself? Generosity and

c h a p t e r fi v e

Phenomenology: Remarks on M ichel H enry’s Interpretation o f the Cartesian Cogito c h a p t e r six

96

Does the Ego Alter the Other? T h e Solitude o f the

Cogito and the Absence o f Alter Ego c h a p t e r seven

118

Is the Argument Ontological? T h e Anselmian

Proof and the T w o Demonstrations of the Existence of G od in the Meditations Notes, 1 6 1

139 Index, 20s

Publisher’s Note Jeffrey L. Kosky reviewed the entire translation and provided En­ glish versions of Latin passages that were left untranslated in the French edition of this work. Chapter 3 (§§2-6) was translated by John Cottingham and ap­ peared in an earlier form as “ Cartesian Metaphysics and the Role of the Simple Natures,” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed­ ited by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 115-39 . It is reprinted here by permission. Chapter 5 was translated by Stephen Voss and appeared in an earlier form as “ Gen­ erosity and Phenomenology: Remarks on Michel Henry’s Interpreta­ tion of the Cartesian Cogito,” in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, edited by Stephen Voss (New York: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1993), 52-74. It is reprinted here by permission. The abbreviations CSM, CSM K, and PW used in the notes refer to the standard English translation of Descartes’ works, The Philo­ sophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984-91).

Foreword Jean-Luc Marion is one of the most important of the younger genera­ tion of philosophers working in France today, and one of the three or four most important living historians of modern philosophy. He is the author of numerous essays on Descartes and seventeenth-century philosophy, and his large-scale interpretation of Descartes’ philos­ ophy is systematically set out in a trilogy of monographs, Sur l ’on­ tologie grise de Descartes (Descartes’ Hidden Ontology) (Paris: Vrin, 1975, 1981), Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes (Descartes’ Blank Theology) (Paris: PUF, 1981), and Sur le prisme métaphysique de Des­ cartes, translated by Jeff Kosky as On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). He is also the author of Questions cartésiennes II: Sur l’égo et sur Dieu (Paris: PUF, 1996), a collection of recent essays; editor of a seventeenth-century French translation of Descartes’ Regulae ad directionem ingenii (Rules for the Direction of the Mind), with copious notes, a commentary, and mathematical notes by Pierre Costabel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977); and the coauthor of lexicons to the Regulae (with J.-R. Armogathe [Rome: Ed. dell’Ateneo, 1976]) and the Meditations (with J.-P. Massonie, P. Monat, and L. Ucciani [Besançon: Annales littéraires de PUniversité de Franche-Comté]). Marion has also been active in or­ ganizing and participating in gatherings of Cartesians around the world, and in stimulating Cartesian scholarship both in France, where he teaches at the Université de Paris IV (Sorbonne), and in the United States, where he teaches at the University of Chicago. In addition to his influential work on Descartes, Marion is the author of valuable books in phenomenology and philosophical theology, in­ cluding God without Being (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), and Etant donné: Essai d’une phénoménologie de la donation (Paris: PUF, 1997). Finally, he is the author of Hergé: Tintin le Terri-

XII

FOREWORD

springboard for independent philosophical reflection. French philos­ ophers have often used their commentaries on Descartes as a means of advancing their own philosophical agendas. While Marion is very concerned with Descartes as a historical figure, he is equally con­ cerned with Descartes the philosopher, and with the contributions that he can make to our own conception of the world. Marion writes in the opening paragraph of chapter 5 in this volume: “ No doctrine recovered from the history of metaphysics could grasp us as an au­ thentic thought. . . unless it intervened, always and without reserva­ tion, in the play of the thought being thought at present. Conversely, an older thought cannot gain such relevance unless the thought being thought today is carried out in essential dialogue with it. . . . Among those rare bodies of thought that are reborn from one century to the next . . . that of Descartes, powerful in its enigmatic simplicity, at once apparent and real, makes the most intimate contact with con­ temporary philosophy.” This, then, is one of Marion’s aims: to put Descartes in dialogue with the philosophy of the twentieth century. When reading his essays as philosophy, though, it is important to understand the particular philosophical tradition in which he is writ­ ing, the other half of the philosophical dialogue. Marion is a contem­ porary French philosopher, and his Descartes, not surprisingly, is a thinker whose philosophy addresses issues of concern to him and other contemporary French thinkers. In this book, Marion’s refer­ ences are to philosophers such as Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, authors central to contemporary French (and more generally Conti­ nental) thought, but less frequently read in the United States, partic­ ularly by those whose main interests are in Descartes. Because Marion is so clearly connected to the French tradition, his work will be difficult for the American reader. The genuine differ­ ences between the French and the American traditions in philosophy and in history of philosophy have led to an unfortunate split between the two communities. For many years, Anglophone historians of phi­ losophy have neglected work in French, and Francophone scholars have neglected work in English. But this situation is changing. Over the last ten or fifteen years we have seen increasing cooperation be­ tween specialists in Descartes in France and their counterparts in the United States. French and American scholars in the history of philosophy are increasingly realizing that although we may differ in training and orientation, we share the texts Descartes wrote, and we

FOREWORD

XIII

have a common interest in illuminating Descartes and the philosophy that he left us. I hope that this new translation will bring Marion’s important work to the attention of a wider audience, and help to bring these two communities together. Daniel Garber University of Chicago

CHAPTER ONE

Does Thought Dream? The Three Dreams, or The Awakening of the Philosopher i. Dreams of an Affected Consciousness Descartes teaches us, among other things, that consciousness can be affected by something besides just reason: First and foremost, con­ sciousness is affective— or, better, it is affected. In other words, it receives thought before producing it. There is no paradox here, for Descartes draws a specific picture of rationality, regarded henceforth as “ Cartesian,” only after first retrieving its self-evidence out of a chaotic obscurity. Obscurity? Not at all, for we are dealing here with three dreams. But whatever light is cast by dreams becomes clear only against a backdrop of darkness, which gives it its indispensable setting. Indeed, one of the first, if not the first, known texts by Des­ cartes is a description of a dream (actually three dreams), under the strange title of Olympica. Note that the initiator of clear, dis­ tinct thought does not exhaust himself in it, for he begins by think­ ing on this side of it, just as he probably will end up thinking be­ yond it. Thirty years later, as if on the other frontier of evidence, another work imposed from above, La Naissance de la Paix, in which a “ daughter of the night” plays with evidence, echoes the dreams of the Olympica: “All I need is a chimera / A dream or light shadow / which I send into their brains.” 1 Between dream and poetry, as be­ tween dawn and dusk, the light of evidence shines briefly— facing a consciousness which in this in-between area remains nevertheless an affected consciousness, affected by reason. Consciousness remains af­ fected, even in the case of rationalism. And the affection that reason exerts on consciousness helps to distinguish reason from two other affections, namely, dreams and poetry. If reason wins out, it does so as an affection that is preferable to the other two. In other words,

2

CHAPTER ONE

Descartes establishes reason as a privileged affection only in the midst of a dream, and against it. Does this mean that rationalism enters into philosophy only by means of a dream— as a waking dream? We should not, as some have been tempted to do, dismiss this paradox as a laughable incoherence.2 The charge of incoherence supposes that the critic knows the essence of rationalism and of dreams, in order to be able to contrast them, but did not the criterion for this distinc­ tion and the project of establishing it constitute the core of Descartes’ work? Did we not learn from Descartes himself how to distinguish dreams from thought? By feigning surprise at their initial commonal­ ity, do we not simply fail to recognize Descartes’ historical contribu­ tion? In order to judge any thought according to the “ standards of rea­ son” {Discourse, A T VI, 14, line 1) and thereby refute the claims of dreams, reason must emerge as a standard— which is the task Des­ cartes set for himself. In 1619, reason has not yet reached this height; we must therefore invert the relation between reason and dreams in order to be able to interpret dreams. We should not disqualify dreams in the name of a standard— that is, reason— that has not yet been established. Instead we should follow the inauguration of thought by a dream, which is the agent of its own submission to reason. For here simple peaceful coexistence by virtue of chronological succession— first a dream, then reason— will not do: The relevance of Descartes for philosophy stems precisely from the fact that he settled the ques­ tion of the essence of rationality in this movement— which as a result is not chronological, but quasi-phenomenological. We are dealing here with figures of the mind, a mind that dreams and then interrupts dreaming to begin thinking in accordance with “ the standards of rea­ son.” Thus, in the three dreams of 1619, it cannot simply be a matter of analyzing anecdotally, and after the fact, the affects of the supposed subject “Renatus Descartes, Picto.” 3 Freudian or Jungian psychoana­ lytic interpretations4 are undeniably legitimate, but they cannot es­ tablish the philosophical worth of these dreams, which only becomes apparent in relation to philosophy itself. Now, neither the uncon­ scious nor “ clear consciousness” has to settle the question of the es­ sence of philosophy: Our task is not to interpret Descartes’ dreams, but to understand their relation to his own philosophy. Similarly, let us be aware at the outset that the most erudite studies on potential antecedents in the literature on dreams will illuminate— and they make no claim to do more— only the divinatory framework of the

DOES THOUGHT

DREAM?

3

dreams, not their philosophical status.5 Once again, we are concerned here not with the role of the dreams of 1619 as raw material for psychoanalytical interpretation, nor with their place in a literary tra­ dition, but rather with their full-fledged inscription into a philosophi­ cal corpus— a corpus that they essentially inaugurate and that, more­ over, aims to abolish dreams. To put it another way, how can the search for rules for the direction of the mind and for a method to properly guide one’s reason— that is, the search for truth— originate in dreams viewed as philosophically relevant by the philosopher who dreams them?6 The relevance of this question becomes obvious only when, “ casting a philosophical eye” {Discourse, A T VI, 3 , 1. 15) on Descartes’ dreams, the interpreter considers them in relation to Descartes’ own philosophy. This must have appeared most clearly to Descartes himself, given his awareness of the two terms whose relationship defines the problem: dreams and philosophy according to the “ standards of reason.” Unlike a patient undergoing analysis, Descartes seems to be in a better position than his interpreter to interpret his own dreams, since he interprets them with only thought in mind, in order to turn them into philosophy. Philosophical dreams? Not quite, for the three dreams docu­ mented by Adrien Baillet do not actually reveal any content that could properly, directly, and unmistakably be deemed theoretical. Strangely, the dreams that affect the philosopher do not reveal any­ thing philosophical to him. Several facts suggest this. (a) The three dreams do not occur under the influence of inspira­ tion or enthusiasm. True, Descartes attests that he felt a powerful enthusiasm: “X. Novembris 1619, cum plenus forem Enthousiasmo” (AT X, 179, 11. 17-18), which Baillet translates as “ having gone to bed completely filled with his enthusiasm” (“ s’étant couché tout rempli de son enthousiasme,n AT X, 181, 11. 11- 12 ). But far from being a characteristic of the dreaming state, this enthusiasm precedes it; it belongs to the waking hours before the dream. Enthusiasm does not preside over dreams; rather, waking provokes an enthusiasm that is even more alive insofar as it results from the liveliest type of wak­ ing— from the discovery of a science, actually of the foundations of a wonderful science: “ cum plenus forem Enthousiasmo et mirabilis scientiae fundamenta reperirem,” etc. (AT X, 17 9 ,11. 17-18), which Baillet glosses very perceptively as: “ having gone to bed completely filled with his enthusiasm and wholly preoccupied with the thought of having found that very day the foundation of the wonderful science,

4

CHAPTER ONE

he had three consecutive dreams in the same night” (AT X, 1 8 1 ,11. i l —14). The expected common schema— enthusiasm of superhuman origin / inspiration of the human mind / vision of a hermetic or novel truth— is entirely absent here. In fact, it is completely reversed: Enthusiasm is not the cause of the dreams since it appears well before them, when Descartes is still wide awake, and, according to Baillet, also outlasts them (“His enthusiasm left him a few days afterward,” AT X, 18 7 ,1. 10). But enthusiasm does not reach its culmination or its plenitude in dreams either. On the contrary, it is nurtured by Descartes’ astonishment over the wonderful science: The “ mirabilis scientiae fundamenta” (AT X, 179, 1. 18; 181, 1. 12) produce a state of exalted jubilation of the mind, which, however, remains soberly rational. This leads to two conclusions. First, the dissociation between en­ thusiasm and the dreams,7 and the cause of enthusiasm (that is, sci­ ence), prevent us from accepting enthusiasm as the cause of the dreams. We must therefore abandon from the outset any thought of encountering “ dreams . . . from divine revelation” (Thomas Aquinas) or “ an extraordinary dream, a thing divine, sent by God” (Goclenius).8Thus, whatever crucial value these dreams may possess is not owing to their origin, which is in no way divine; we already sense that their importance will stem from their interpretation. The dreams, therefore, are valuable a posteriori rather than a priori, and not because of their obscure divine origin, but because of their mean­ ing, which is established rationally. Hence, we draw a second conclu­ sion: Waking could not have triggered enthusiasm if reason had not taken a decisive step. For Descartes speaks here of nothing less than a discovered science; or better, a wonderful science; or even better, a science that reveals itself in its entirety, down to its foundations. Foundations: The phrase appears repeatedly during the period of the dreams, as in an obsessive quest: “plures, opinor, et magis plausibiles [sc. rationes] ex nostris fundamentis deduci possunt” (“many more and much more admirable [reasons], I believe, can be deduced from our foundations, ” Compendium musicae, AT X, 134, 11. 4-6, in 1618); “XI. Novembris 1620, coepi intelligere fundamentum Inventi mira­ bilis” (“ 11 November 1620, I began to understand the foundation of a wonderful discovery,” Olympica, 17 9 ,11. 7-8; 7, 25); “Anno 1620, coepi intelligere fundamentum Inventi mirabilis” (“In the year 1620, I began to understand the foundation of a wonderful discovery,” Cogitationes privatae, A T X, 216, 11. 20-21); “Ut autem hujus scientiae

does t h o u g h t

DREAM?

5

fundamenta jjaciam” (“ As I was laying the foundation of this science,” ibid., 220, 1. 5). Descartes even extends the search for fundamental principles to Rosicrucianism since “it would have been improper for him to despise all those sciences, among which there might have been one of whose principles he was ignorant” (Studium bonae mentis, 193, 1. 32-194, 1. 2). Thus in November 1619 a lasting and authentic en­ thusiasm is born, as opposed to a mere intellectual satisfaction, be­ cause the discovery concerns foundations, and thus involves more than simply a difficulty or even a science. The foundations, more than the result, are worthy of praise. Science is mirabilis, penitus nova (“ thoroughly new,” 156,1. 8), only insofar as it reaches down to foun­ dations. Therefore, it is not an end but a beginning: “ an incredibly ambitious project. But through the confusing darkness of this science I have caught a glimpse of some sort of light, and with the aid of this I think I shall be able to dispel even the thickest obscurities” (To Beeckman, 26 March 1619, AT X, 15 7 ,1. 2 1- 1 5 8 ,1. 2). Enthusiasm, therefore, may be seen as a result (and clearly not a cause), as the effect of a rational cause, or to put it better, as an effect whose cause is produced by reason’s quest for it. We thus reach a first conclusion: The dreams must be interpreted without recourse to enthusiasm. They matter because of what they suggest or say, rather than because of their origin, which is no more than natural. (b) But there is more: A second argument prevents us from grant­ ing a theoretical status to the dreams. It is clear that the first two dreams teach Descartes nothing. The first dream, which is recounted at length, involves an “ evil spirit” (AT X, 182, 1. 4; see 185, 1. 20) that prevents Descartes from walking upright and forces him to pro­ ceed, bent to the left, toward the school church (AT X, 181, 1. 29) in which he seeks refuge. A simple physiological explanation, in fact borrowed from Plato (weight pressing on the liver when one lies on one’s left side),9 explains the phenomenon, without invoking super­ natural authority or concluding that it is relevant theoretically. As for the “prayer to God” (AT X, 182, 11. 6-7), its aim is simply a commonplace moral catharsis.10 The second dream, without the help of any clear imaginary representations, describes a “fright” (182, 11. 17, 27); this fright is visible only as “ sparks of fire scattered around the room” (18 2,1. 18). Here again the hypothesis of a revelation from on high cannot be supported. The “reasons drawn from philosophy” (182, 11. 23-24) should not mislead us. Since the word philosophy here means “natural philosophy” (that is, what we call physics), the

6

CHAPTER ONE

explanation for the phenomenon is purely physiological: “ after hav­ ing opened and closed his eyes in turn and observed what was repre­ sented to him” (182, 11. 25-26). Thus, this phenomenon is not ex­ traordinary and has occurred previously (182, 11. 20, 19), and it is rendered intelligible by the application of physics to physiology. Be­ sides, in 1637, the Optics will account for this phenomenon by devel­ oping the principle of differences in perception and by comparing light to an “ action” and the eye to a set of lenses: “ You will readily grant this if you note that people struck in the eye seem to see count­ less sparks and flashes before them, even though they shut their eyes or are in a very dark place; hence this sensation can be ascribed only to the force of the blow, which sets the optic nerve-fibers in motion as dazzling light would do.” 11 Thus two phenomena, which in another era, perhaps, would have qualified as dreams, are now relegated to the level of common physi­ cal effects and eliminated by proper measures. Their insignificance is such that they have no consequence: Descartes falls asleep again (182,1. 13), or better, “ he fell asleep again quite calmly” (182,11. 2728). We should note that, even after the reassessment imposed by the third dream, the first two dreams undergo a very limited reinter­ pretation. The attention paid to the fright that accompanied these two dreams (185,11. 14 -15) leads only to a strictly moral conclusion; in the first dream an “evil spirit” (185, 1. 20) was at work, a malus Spiritus (186, line 1), which is abruptly replaced by the “ Spirit of Truth” (186,1. 10) in the second dream. Nowhere do we find the least gain in theory, the slightest revelation. Although frightening (182, 1. 30), the first two dreams remain, strictly speaking, insignificant. But, as those in favor of a traditional analysis would argue, the third dream still requires explanation. It alone holds Descartes’ atten­ tion— as if recalling the biblical episode in which the young Samuel, asleep in the silent sanctuary, only answers Yahweh’s third call (Sam­ uel 1:3). Why is the third dream of 1619 privileged in this manner? Its special status may surprise the reader, but this surprise is itself surprising: The last dream is unique more because of its uncommon status than because of its extraordinary content. Even before any a posteriori interpretation, it appears from the outset as an interpretive exercise, as a textual exegesis. In his dream, Descartes encounters several texts that necessitate interpretation: first the title of a Diction­ ary, then that of a corpus poetarum, then the verse “ Quod sectabor

does th o u g h t

DREAM?

7

iter?” (what path am I to follow?) and finally an incipit from Ausonius, Est et Non (18 2 ,1. 30-184, 1. 10). In light of this fourfold task, the third dream distinguishes itself from the previous two by its dual theoretical significance: that of the texts themselves, and that of the interpretations they necessitate. This dream is not frightening (182, 11. 29-30), since its aim is not to train the moral sense but to disturb the intellect. The theoretical significance therefore resides in the ex­ pected textual hermeneutic: the third dream, or four texts in need of a hermeneut. Where, therefore, will the hermeneut, which an in­ spired dream must provide, be found? New surprise: No supernatural apparition speaks here, not even an undeniably inspired one. The only protagonists are Descartes himself and “ a man” (183, 11. 4, 10, 12; 18 4 ,11. 4, 10), also called “ a person” (184,1. 6). Descartes listens and attempts in vain to understand, while the “man” remains an anonymous, ignorant, and dubious intermediary. (An intermediary between what and what? Even that is unclear.) The theoretical valid­ ity of the dream remains therefore purely potential— awaiting an au­ thoritative interpretation, which neither the recipient of the dream nor the messenger can provide. This expectation remains unfulfilled, as the dream ends without having even begun to reveal its meaning: “It was at this point that the books and the man disappeared. They vanished from his imagination, although they did not awaken him” (184, 11. 10-12). The dream ends as it began: awaiting a hermeneut, the dream of an ignoramus confronting undeciphered texts. The dream ends without revealing anything. At this point in the Olympica (184, 11. 10-12), we reach the aporia of the three dreams and the paradox of the Cartesian experience of divinatory dreams: Nothing is revealed, either directly (inspired speech) or indirectly (deciphered text or authoritative hermeneut). Descartes is unique not because he experienced dreams— divinatory or otherwise— but because he perceived them, at first, as perfectly insignificant. 2. The Figures of Self-interpretation Yet the dreams are interpreted, and as a result Descartes gains a decisive self-assurance. Why then claim that the dreams were insig­ nificant? In fact, this is not a paradox. The dreams in themselves do not reveal anything. They eventually become meaningful through the intervention of Descartes himself, thinking lucidly and soberly,

8

CHAPTER ONE

rather than through their own self-evidence or the role of the authori­ tative hermeneut. The significance is found not in the dreams them­ selves (nor in the divinatory framework for their eventual interpre­ tation), but in the mastery exercised over them by a “mere man” {Discourse, AT VI, 3 , 1. 22 and 8 ,11. 16 -17 ; see letter to Voetius, AT VIII, 2, 91, 1. 28) who, while asleep, stops dreaming and begins to think. Strange moment, outside of dreams although still in sleep, in which the dream becomes the object, thought rather than dreamed, of a thought that is neither asleep nor awake. “What is most remark­ able” (184, 1. 12) here clearly originates not in dreams, but actually in the movement that distances them, metamorphoses them from impenetrable states of (unconscious) consciousness into objects to be apprehended by a thinking consciousness. With singular assur­ ance, Baillet points out that “what is remarkable” is precisely that “ doubting whether what he had just seen was a dream or a vision, not only did he decide while asleep that it was a dream, but he also interpreted it before he awoke” (184,11. 12—15). This mention of the two decisions made by Descartes points to a new direction in our analysis. First, Descartes portrays his dreams as mere dreams rather than visions. Moreover, the dreams remain insignificant as long as they are not interpreted. This decision, besides confirming our previ­ ous hypothesis on the intrinsic insignificance of dreams, underlines an essential pre-interpretation: Before interpreting his dreams, and in order to be able to do so, Descartes posits that they require inter­ pretation. Interpreting the need for interpretation, Descartes masters in advance all potential meaning, by submitting it to a condition of original possibility— namely, the interpretation itself as single locus of meaning. But any interpretation entails an interpreter, who is hypothesized to be superior to the passive and unintelligent recipient of the dream, and alone privy to meaning. The usual schema conjoins, and estab­ lishes a hierarchy among, dream, interpreter, and recipient of the dream. But here Descartes establishes himself as the interpreter of his own dreams. He folds into one the two roles of interpreter and recipient; or rather, since these roles are endowed with contradictory characteristics, he disengages himself from the role of recipient (pas­ sive and unintelligent) and raises himself up, in an act that shatters the divinatory framework, to the role of hermeneut, of an authorita­ tive producer of meaning. Moreover, the hermeneut could not pro­ vide an authoritative meaning if he were not privy to it and had not,

DOES THOUGHT DREAM?

9

therefore, already mastered it. By establishing himself as the hermeneut of his own dreams, Descartes actually raises himself up to the level of inspiration. He becomes his own inspiration. Eventually, this self-inspiration will lead to a new theory of enthusiasm (184, 11. 19 28), but it is deployed immediately through a multistranded selfinterpretation. By reexamining all the elements of the third dream that were insignificant until then, Descartes the hermeneut explicates meaning to Descartes the patient. And this meaning, as I shall try to demonstrate here, announces theses found in Descartes’ subsequent philosophy, in short, in Descartes the philosopher. Wearing the three masks of hermeneut, meaning, and recipient, Descartes comes for­ ward masked in his dreams: “ Actors, taught not to let any embar­ rassment show on their faces, put on a mask. I will do the same. So far, I have been a spectator in this theater which is the world, but I am now about to mount the stage, and I come forward masked” {Cogitationes privatae, 213, 11. 4-7). He is hidden from the gaze of the “ public” (AT I, 23, 1. 24), but especially from his own gaze, as if he were blind to the light that he already carries within him. Des­ cartes therefore first reveals his own thought to himself, a thought that comes forward hidden (to himself first of all) under the mask of insignificant dreams. By interpreting these dreams as meaning­ ful— in a Cartesian sense— he reveals himself to himself as a thinker. Let us retrace this interpretive path, step by step. (a) “ He judged that the Dictionary could only mean all the Sciences gathered together” (184,11. 15 -17 , examining the conundrum of 182, 1. 32). Rather than read this as a simple banality (the cumulative sum of knowledge), we should refer here to the inaugural thesis of the Regulae: “It must be acknowledged that all the sciences are so closely interconnected that it is much easier to learn them all together than to separate one from the other . . . ; they are all interconnected and interdependent” (361, 11. 12-18). This fundamental thesis actually appears before 1628, for instance in the Cogitationes privatae: “ If we could see how the sciences are linked together, we would find them no harder to retain in our minds than the series of numbers” (AT X, 2 1 5 ,11. 2-4). It also occurs in a probably contemporary fragment of the Studium bonae mentis: “ the things that I will have said hold together so tightly and are so interconnected that each one follows from the others” (204,11. 10 -11); and in another fragment mentioned by Poisson: “ For all the sciences are linked, so that no one of them can be possessed perfectly, without the others following of them­

10

CHAPTER ONE

selves, and the whole encyclopedia is apprehended at once” (255), in which the mention of “ encyclopedia” seems to echo that of the Dictionary. We should especially take note of the dates of the parallels mentioned here: They all precede the Regulae, and therefore probably date from 1619-20. The interpretation of dreams follows the same (theoretical) path as the conceptual discovery.12 (b) “He judged that . . . the anthology of the poets entitled the Corpus poetarum represented in particular and in a more distinct way the union of Philosophy and Wisdom” (184, 11. 17-19 , answering 182, 11. 33-37).13 In the cultural milieu of 1619, the identification of philosophy with wisdom was neither self-evident not common, for at least two basic reasons. First, philosophy enjoyed only a very loose unity, since it was divided according to its objects of study (ethics, logic, physics, metaphysics)14 and had to choose between the rigor of some of the abstract sciences and the inaccuracy of prudential knowl­ edge: This lack of unity prevented philosophy from claiming to be wisdom. In a second and related point, wisdom was opposed to sci­ ence (and therefore to philosophy) by the skeptic or hermetic under­ currents of the Renaissance, as infinitely more elevated (divine, se­ cret) and infinitely less learned (morals, ascetism).15 But after having established the principle of the philosophical unity of the sciences, Descartes wants, and is now able, to posit the principle of the identity of (unified) philosophy with wisdom. This continuity is explicitly present, from the Studium bonae mentis (“ considerations on our desire for knowledge, on the sciences, on the proper disposition of the mind for learning, on the order we must keep to gain wisdom, that is sci­ ence plus virtue, by joining the functions of the will with those of the understanding. His plan was to blaze a new path” [191, 11. 4-9]) to the preface to the French translation of the Principles (“ in time acquire a perfect knowledge of all philosophy and reach the highest level of wisdom” [AT IX, 2 , 11. 18, 20-22]). This ceaseless search is theoretically grounded in Rule I, which also establishes the unity of the sciences. The sciences are unified because of their origin in the mens humana, and therefore wisdom consists in knowing, nurturing, and developing the human mind: “the sciences as a whole are nothing other than human wisdom, which always remains one and the same, however different the subjects to which it is applied, it being no more altered by them than sunlight is by the variety of the things it shines on” (360,11. 7-12). The human mind unifies knowledge philosophi­ cally; it therefore produces wisdom which, although human, is also

does th o u g h t

DREAM?

II

by definition universal. Thus wisdom is only a matter of “ giv[ing] a thought to good sense— to universal wisdom” (“de bona mente, sive hac universalissima Sapientia, cogitare, ” 360, 11. 19-20);16 wisdom springs from the same mens that unifies the sciences. Without de­ scribing these two doctrines in detail, let us simply point out that, in addition to their relevance to the first two self-interpretations, they both refer mainly to Rule I and thus provide a solid cohesiveness to the first two elements of the last dream. (c) “Monsieur Descartes continued to interpret his dream while asleep, thinking that the piece of verse on the uncertainty of what sort of life one should choose, beginning ‘What road in life shall I follow’ (Quod vitae sectabor iter), represented the good advice of a wise person or even of Moral Theology” (184,11. 28-32). Two com­ patible conceptual theses seem viable here. In a more circumscribed interpretation, the search for a path in one’s life concerns only the ethical domain, “moral theology,” in the sense that in 1637 the ulti­ mate goal of the “most earnest desire to learn to distinguish the true from the false” is “ to see clearly into my own actions and proceed with confidence in this life” {Discourse, AT VI, 1 0 ,11. 9—11).17 In this hypothesis, the most acceptable conceptual argument comes from morals by provision, whose first maxim (to choose the most moderate opinions) allows one to “ depart less from the right path than I would if I chose one extreme when I ought to have pursued the other” {Discourse, 23, 11. 29-31). Yet the metaphor of the search for one’s path in life goes beyond the strictly ethical domain and actually seems iJ to be a particular instance of a more comprehensive attempt to orient jj oneself: to orient oneself in life by means of thought, or rather to jj orient oneself within thought by means of the experience of life itself, ij We could propose the formula veritati impendere vitam to summarize the desire to “ devote my whole life to cultivating my reason and advancing as far as I could in the knowledge of the truth, following the method I had prescribed for myself” {Discourse, 27, 11. 9—12). Advancing on the path implies proceeding toward the truth, which also implies following the method one has prescribed for oneself. Moreover, in Rule IV, disorderly roaming is a symptom of a lack of method, “ a senseless desire to discover treasure [such] that he continually roams the streets to see if he can find any that a passerby might have dropped” (3 7 1,11. 7-10). In Rule V the method, defined as a predisposition for order and a means for obtaining it, helps put a halt to the roaming of modern-day Theseuses, who have lost their

12

CHAPTER ONE

way in unreliable sciences. The search for a path does bear on the “road in life” (iter vitae), but first and foremost on the proper road of truth (rectum iter veritatis) and the road of truth itself (via veri­ tatis).n The widening of the question on the iter is a product of its deepening perspective: The point is not to find the truth simply for the sake of finding it, even by chance. We must identify it with cer­ tainty (that is, according to the method), choose the via veritatis ac­ cording to the method, that is, seek the odos according to the methodos that orders the search. The path follows the path of the path: This repetition makes the “ Quod vitae sectabor iter?” sound like the open­ ing of a question on the methodical essence of the path. We are here truly beneath the Regulae, although we already discern the future echoes of Rule I V and Rule V. (d) “By the verse ‘Est et Non,’ which is the ‘Yes and No’ of Py­ thagoras, he understood Truth and Falsity in human understanding and the profane sciences” (184, 1. 38-185, 1. 2). Rather than com­ menting on the allusion to the famous mathematician,19let us restrict our discussion to the purely Cartesian evidence of the text, especially insofar as it approaches (self-)evidence from a Cartesian perspective. The disjunction between yes and no is clear-cut and excludes a third term; on the basis of this oneiric fact, the interpretation reaches con­ clusions about the relation between truth and falsity “ in human un­ derstanding and the profane sciences,” in other words, in the very sciences that will be ruled by the method ten years later. But, pre­ cisely, the method defines the truth on the basis of self-evidence, which rejects a middle ground between true and false: “never to ac­ cept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its truth: that is, carefully to avoid precipitate conclusions and preconceptions, and to include nothing more in my judgments than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it” (Discourse, 18, 11. 16-23). Or as stated in the Regulae: “we reject all such merely probable cognition and resolve to believe only what is perfectly known and incapable of being doubted” (“nec nisi perfecte cognitis et de quibus dubitari non potest, statuimus esse credendum,” 362, 11. 14-16). And “ therefore, concerning all such matters of probable opinion we can, I think, acquire no perfect knowledge” (“De omnibus ergo quae sunt ejusmodi probabiles opin­ iones, non perfectam scientiam videmur posse acquiere,” 363,11. 14 16).20 Before self-evidence held as criterion of, and synonym for,

DOES THOUGHT DREAM?

13

truth, mere probability is relegated to the realm of falsity, since like falsity it falls short in the eyes of the agent of certainty, the intuitus, the gaze of the mind: Someone who has doubts about many things (de multis dubitat) is no wiser and possibly less wise (indoctior) than someone who is simply ignorant (Rule II, 362, 11. 5-7). In other words, “I thought it necessary to . . . reject as absolutely false every­ thing in which I could imagine the least doubt” (Discourse, 3 1 , 11. 2628). Thus, the fourth interpretation of the last dream anticipates Rule II, just as the third interpretation announced Rule IV, and the first two Rule I. Is it necessary to pursue the demonstration with the other dreams? Clearly not, for they do not provide any raw material for theoretical interpretation: They matter to Descartes only as a moral warning. The other details, which are sometimes trivial (the melon) or too subtle (the gusts of wind, etc.), call for other erudite studies.21 How­ ever, here also the principle of an anticipation of the philosophical theses by the interpretations of these elements of the dreams would probably be supported.22 We therefore reach the following conclu­ sion: the dreams of 1619 are not noteworthy for their revealed con­ tent; on the contrary, their relevance stems from two characteristics of their interpretation. First, the hermeneut and the recipient of the dreams are combined in a strange process of self-interpretation. Second, the meaning of the dreams, which is reached through self­ interpretation, can be linked to subsequent theoretical theses in Descartes’ philosophy, so that meaning, in the dreams, seems to be established by Descartes (as thinker) through a strange process of self-inspiration. Self-inspiration and self-interpretation confirm each other in a rather peculiar hermeneutical circle: Descartes the inter­ preter deciphers Descartes the dreamer in order to suggest the outline of some thoughts of Descartes the philosopher. Insofar as interpretive thinking controls their origin, the dreams already belong to the cor­ pus of Descartes’ philosophy. This point, however, raises two diffi­ culties. (a) Self-inspiration corroborates self-interpretation, but also con­ tradicts it: The dreams of 1619 lose their immediate content, as well as their first rationalized meaning reached at the time by Descartes, in favor of the later texts of his definitive philosophy. Can we bridge this chronological gap without taking any precautions or contradict­ ing the available facts? Besides, since it wipes out a period of at least

14

CHAPTER ONE

ten years, or presupposes its disappearance, self-inspiration appears retrospectively at best (to Descartes and his readers), but cannot de­ termine the Olympica as such. (b) Self-interpretation presupposes that the individual who dreams is also able to think conceptually. Bridging this gap actually raises the same difficulties as bridging the chronological gap imposed by self-inspiration. Thus, we may pose the following question: does the dream present a continuity with thought, which is the interpreter in 1619 and the source of inspiration thereafter? For, obviously, Des­ cartes could not cross from one side of the interpretive boundary between dream and meaning to the other if he postulated that dreams have no relation to thought. If he dreams a thought, Descartes must also think his dreams. 3. The Awakening of the Cogitatio Being able to think dreams— and we mean more than simply dream­ ing a thought— implies that one is able to pass from dreams to think­ ing, and back, without contradiction or exclusion. In the present case, what middle term is encompassed in this transition? The act of formulating this question helps throw into relief what constitutes, more than any dream, the fundamental discovery of the Olympica. Let us retrace the course of the last dream. Descartes has just experi­ enced it and has seen it disappear. Still asleep, he immediately under­ takes to interpret his dream: it is “singular that doubting whether what he had just seen was a dream or a vision, not only did he de­ cide while asleep that it was a dream, but he also interpreted it be­ fore he awoke” (184, 11. 12 -15 , emphasis added). We should note not only the presence of self-interpretation, but especially the con­ text of its occurrence, that is, sleep. Descartes does not need to wake up to move from dreams to (rational) meaning: Rational waking is not affected by physiological waking, to which it is unrelated. I can dream with my eyes open and think with my eyes closed: as far as thinking is concerned, sleep is irrelevant. We find proof for this in the fact that, conversely, the physiological act of waking up has no effect upon interpretive thinking: “Thereupon, uncertain whether he was dreaming or thinking, he awoke and calmly contin­ ued to interpret the dream in the same sense [sur la même idée]” (184, 11 . 33-35). Thought thinks, indifferent to both sleep and waking.

DOES THOUGHT DREAM?

15

This dual indifference, which alone makes self-interpretation pos­ sible, signals as early as 1619 the establishment of a fundamental the­ sis of Descartes’ subsequent philosophy— one that, if we succeed in outlining it, would justify self-inspiration. This thesis is the auton­ omy of thought (cogitatio) from all affections of consciousness, except ^ self-evidence. This independence is established, first of all, during the experience of dreams, which is inconsequential for thought inso­ far as “the very thoughts we have while awake may also occur while we sleep” (Discourse, 32, 11. 9 -11). “It is easy to recognize that the things we imagine in dreams should in no way make us doubt the truth of the thoughts we have when awake. For if one happened even in sleep to have some very distinct idea (if, say, a geometer devised some new proof), one’s being asleep would not prevent the idea from being true” (Discourse, 39,11. 9-17). As far as thoughts are concerned, the criterion is self-evidence itself, and absolutely not the affections of consciousness, for “ after all, whether we are awake or asleep, we ought never to let ourselves be convinced except by the evidence of our reason” (Discourse, 39 ,11. 26-29). As long as we view as determi­ nant the affections of consciousness, and the differences between them (including, first of all, the distinction between waking and sleeping), we radically misjudge thought, since it bears no relation to affection and acts according to reason, in light of self-evidence only. The indifference of thought to the pair waking/ sleeping consti­ tutes a decisive moment in the Meditations that, in a sense, simply pursues “ along the same lines” a strict self-interpretation of cogitatio ^ through the various dreams sent by an “evil spirit” 23 to the human ' mind. At the outset, even before the appearance of the hypothesis of an omnipotent God, we encounter the indifference of thought to every­ thing that is not decided in terms of what is evident: “ For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four sides. It seems impossible that such transparent truths should incur any suspicions of being false” (Medi­ tation I, AT VII, 20, 11. 27-31). And at the end of the Meditations, after the conclusion of the debate on the foundations of evidence, the same indifference reappears: “ So what is left to say? Can one raise the objection I put to myself a while ago, that I may be dreaming, or that everything which I am now thinking has as little truth as what comes to the mind of one who is asleep? Yet even this does not change anything. For even though I might be dreaming, if there is anything

i6

CHAPTER ONE

which is evident to my intellect, then it is wholly true” (Meditation V, 7 0 ,1. 2 8 - 7 1,1. 2).24Thinking begins when consciousness becomes indifferent to its own affections— when it refutes itself as an affec­ tive and, primarily, as an affected consciousness— and accepts self­ evidence as the single criterion; affection matters little, as long as evidence, the single cause of thought, figures prominently (even in its absence). A revelation occurs in the dreams of 1619, although not where the divinatory framework would have assumed (that is, in the oneiric content and the affections of consciousness). It is not found in self­ interpretation (and self-inspiration) either; instead, it appears in the condition that renders them possible— namely, the indifference of thought toward everything that is not decided in accordance with the standards of self-evidence, and, paradoxically, first and foremost toward the difference between waking and sleeping. The revelation of the dreams of 1619 therefore results in the awakening of the cogitatio. Dreams are apprehended simply and only as cogitationes, according to the subsequent conceptual definition: “By the term ‘thought’ I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, insofar as we have awareness of it” (“ Cogitationis nomine, intelligo omnia, quae nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est,” Principles of Philosophy, I, §9). Or also: “Thought. I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts” (Sec­ ond Set of Replies, AT VII, 160, 11. 7-10). The cogitatio consists not of a specific kind of thought, or a specific type of act or affection of the mind; rather, it is the processing of everything that consciousness experiences, and which it turns into an object of representation, a modus cogitationis. In the explanatory mode, the cogitatio treats every­ thing that consciousness experiences as an object. We can almost speak of a reduction, although not a phenomenological one (since it is precisely the phenomenon that here has to pay for reduction), but rather a cogitative one, which reduces all thought, regardless of its origin and character, to the rank of object for the mind in its quest for self-evidence. This cogitative reduction eliminates the differences between thoughts; it does not acknowledge origins, since “when we reflect . . . on the ideas that we have within us, we see that some of them, in so far as they are merely modes of thinking, do not differ much one from another” (Principles of Philosophy, I, §17; see A T VII,

does th o u g h t

DREAM?

ly

40, 11. 5-10). As early as 1619, dreaming and waking, dreaming and sleeping, interpretation and deduction no longer differ much from one another, for they are already viewed as modes of the cogitatio. Thus, in 1619, with the indifference of interpretation to the differ­ ence between waking and sleeping, we witness nothing less than the awakening of the cogitatio. Which may be just as valuable a discovery as that of the foundations of a wonderful science. If, paradoxically, the dreams of 1619 are a manifestation of the pure cogitatio in its sober reduction of all affections, we can make three additional remarks. (a) With the cogitatio as a given, can we infer an outline of the cogito, sum? In fact, in 1619, two of its elements have already ap­ peared, although in a disjointed fashion. On the one hand, we discern an outline of the egjas which in the exercise of self-interpretation (and self-inspiration) controls the realm of its own mind, gains an almost complete mastery over its thoughts, and already realizes “that noth­ ing lies entirely within our power except our thoughts” (Discourse, AT VI, 2 5 ,11. 23-24; see letter to Mersenne, 3 December 1640, AT III, 249, 11. 4-13). On the other hand, although it is exercised through the interpretation of thoughts, this power does not coincide with the certainty of the ego. The ego does maintain its primacy (self­ interpretation, etc.) and does discover the cogitative reduction, but does not yet experience its certainty in the actual exercise of the cogi­ tatio. The ego exerts control and the cogitatio reduction, but the inter­ vention of the ego has not yet become a cogitative reduction, nor has the latter culminated yet in the existing ego. The presence of this gap should not come as a surprise in 1619, especially since ten years later it is still not bridged in the Regulae, and it is perhaps not bridged either in the Discourse on the Method.1^ (b) If the cogitatio is the centerpiece of the three dreams, along with their dual and strict conceptual interpretation, what is the role of enthusiasm? We can say unhesitatingly that enthusiasm plays a very limited role at best. First, because it does not inspire the dreams. And also because it undergoes a radical critique, in the very passage that seems to consecrate it (184,11. 19-28): The “ divinity of Enthusi­ asm” (184,11. 23-24)— supposing that the expression is actually from Descartes, since the text glossed here by Baillet simply mentions “ enthusiasmum” (217, 1. 19)— intervenes simply to explain the “ graves sententiae” that are more often formulated by poets (“even by the most mediocre of them, ” 184, 11. 20-21) than by philosophers. In

i8

CHAPTER ONE

fact, the “ seeds of wisdom” (184, 1. 25) or “ semina scientiae” (217, 1. 20) support these incomplete and involuntary successes; they must and (thanks to the method) will be able to identify the adequate con­ ceptual treatment, which will be the task of the philosophy of the Regulae (AT X, 3 7 3 ,11. 3-24; 376,11. 8-20). Actually, philosophical analysis succeeds in relegating enthusiasm to its proper place, that of the imagination: “by enthusiasm and the force of imagination” (“ per enthusiasmum et vim imaginationis,” 217,1. 19); “the divinity of enthusiasm and the force of imagination” (184, 11. 23-24); “this last imagination surely had some element of Enthusiasm” (186, 11. 12-13). In the aberrant phenomenon of enthusiasm, the imagination affects consciousness so violently that the latter can no longer reduce thoughts to the cogitatio, thus cannot prevent them from becoming the victims of the illusion of a “ spirit.” When Baillet evokes “the Spirit that aroused enthusiasm in him [i.e., Descartes]” (186, 1. 19), we must keep in mind what Socrates’ spirit or daimon (“ the Genie de Socrate” )26meant to Descartes— namely, a manner of “following] his inner inclinations” (AT IV, 530, 11. 5-6, 13). Even the polemical statement that the “ human mind had nothing to do” with the dreams (18 6,11. 21-22) seems to be contradicted by Descartes, since for him only an objectively revealed theology has “the need to have some extraordinary aid from heaven and to be more than a mere man” (Discourse, AT VI, 8 ,11. 16-17). In other words, enthusiasm does not trigger the dreams and does not render them meaningful or authorita­ tive. On the contrary, it censors some of their elements. It would thus be prudent to cease portraying enthusiasm as the central question of the Olympica. (c) One last difficulty remains. If dreams achieve, “on the level of reason,” some conceptual results that guarantee the autonomy of rea­ son (self-interpretation, self-inspiration, cogitatio), how can we ex­ plain that they nevertheless inspire conclusions (“ Spirit of Truth” ) and attitudes (pilgrimage to Loretto) that are clearly religious? The relation to the divinity is established at the end, and as a result, of the process of self-interpretation: “ Seeing that the interpretation of all of these things succeeded so well to his liking, he was bold enough to persuade himself that it was the Spirit of Truth [God] that had wanted to open unto him the treasures of all the sciences by this dream” (18 5,11. 2-5). Let us be more precise. On his own, Descartes has interpreted his dreams in a way that supports his own (later) philosophy: Whenever he faces a difficulty, he can draw a meaning-

DOES THOUGHT DREAM?

19

ful response from within himself. This fourfold success constitutes a first— interpretive— result. In a second interpretation, which is just as controlled by autonomous thought as the first one, he builds on the first result to infer that the divinity inspired him in his first inter­ pretation. Let us note that the second interpretation, like the first, stems from self-interpretation, although now Descartes boldly impli­ cates “ the Spirit of Truth.” The divinity therefore does not inspire dreams by means of enthusiasm, nor does it inspire their interpreta­ tion. On the contrary, it is a conclusion reached at the end of a new self-interpretation, as a warranty. It then becomes clear that as early as 1619, since the divinity only intervenes externally and as mediator (as a warranty), the will (abstract and without content) becomes the only appropriate and possible relational mode between God and Descartes. Once the dreams have ended, Descartes has “ recourse in prayer to God, so that He might make His will known to him, en­ lighten him, and guide him in his search for truth” (186,11. 25-27). Or, what amounts to the same thing in terms of the will, he “makes a vow” (186, 1. 34) to undertake the pilgrimage from Venice to Loretto on foot. In fact, a warranty (without content) can only be made from will to will— from divine good will to a human will seeking the truth. This is especially so since unlike enthusiasm, which is stripped here of its false divine prestige, free will is one of the genuine wonders of God: “ The Lord has made three marvels: something out of noth­ ing; free will; and God as Man” (Cogitationes privatae, 218, 11. 19 20). The “ foundations of the wonderful science” (“ mirabilis scientiae fundamenta” ) produced enthusiasm, but they required, and obtained at the end, the warranty of a divine wonder— namely, free will. Au­ tonomy of the cogitated evidence and divine warranty through the will: Descartes would never again question this duality— or, perhaps, dichotomy. The cogitatio is awakened in the dreams of 1619. Although the ego only appears belatedly in the dreams, we can already discern in them the great theoretical decisions of the Regulae: They already have to be ratified by God, and the relation to God is already apprehended in terms of the will. In short, in his dreams Descartes thinks as such, his consciousness being freed from affections.

CHAPTER TWO

What Is the Metaphysics within the Method? The Metaphysical Situation of the Discourse on the Method i. The Metaphysical Discourse on the Method: The Issue At the outset of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Descartes elabo­ rates a method that he immediately begins to apply. In bringing the Meditationes de prima philosophia to a close, he achieves a metaphysical foundation that is supposed to be final. This dual elaboration— of a method and of a metaphysics— opens the door to many directly or indirectly verifiable theses; however, in terms of an architectonic re­ quirement, exigency, it raises a formidable difficulty, which can be formulated as follows: What are the interrelationships between the method and the metaphysics? Or, in two parallel statements: (a) Does the establishment of the method apply or presuppose a metaphysics, partial or complete, implicit or explicit? (b) In turn, has the comple­ tion of the metaphysics been carried out by means of a method, and if so, does this method coincide with the one produced by the Reg­ ulae? In other words, do method and metaphysics simply follow each other chronologically as two autonomous moments in Descartes’ thought, or, on the contrary, do they overlap partially, or even com­ pletely, in various guises? These important questions, the answers to which will either undermine or buttress the entire Cartesian edifice, go beyond the boundaries of a circumscribed study.1 However, this aporia may become more accessible and therefore better able to be answered if we formulate it in slightly different terms: Between the Regulae, hence the method, and the Meditations, hence metaphysics, a middle term— that is, the Discourse on the Method— can be found, at the very least chronologically. The Discourse is not only, or mostly,

WHAT

IS THE METAPHYSICS WITHIN THE METHOD?

21

a discourse about the method, but rather a discourse by the method on what, from then onward, appears as the domain that it will regulate. Descartes maps its regions: “because I claim that what they contain could never have been discovered without it [i.e., the method] and that one may know by them how much it is worth.” He is speaking of the three essays on the method, Optics, Meteorology, and Geometry; yet the method also extends to other areas, since Descartes has “ in­ serted a certain amount of metaphysics, physics and medicine in the opening Discourse in order to show that [my] method extends to top­ ics of all kinds.” 2 Thus, here, even metaphysics is subjected to the universal and primary method, which tolerates no exception or ex­ emption. For, as is confirmed in a contemporary text, it is a “ general Method,” which enables one to “ explicate topics of all kinds” in addi­ tion to those of the Essays— in the sense that the mathesis universalis exerts itself in “ any other object whatever” (AT X, 378, 1. 3), and the methodus extends “ to the discovery of truths in any field what­ ever” (AT X, 374, 11. 8-9). Hence, although it is omitted by the Regulae, metaphysics must be reintegrated into the realm shared by the objects of the method. This is stated very clearly in the Discourse, since “ in order to show that the method can be applied to everything, I have included some brief remarks on metaphysics, physics and med­ icine in the opening discourse.” 3 The question of interference between metaphysics and the method is now contained in a much more sharply delineated hermeneutical problem: How does the method approach metaphysics— for it is now clear that it does— in Part Four of the Discourse on the Method} In other words, what is the discourse of the universal project of the method with regard to metaphysics? But this formulation of the ques­ tion remains too vague: It implies that we should determine whether Part Four follows the same methodological principles found in Parts Five and Six, as well as in the other Essays and, further, whether these same principles coincide with the rules of the method formulated in Part Two— all rather difficult tasks indeed. We shall therefore choose a shorter path, which at the same time narrows the scope of our inquiry, and examine the variations, and perhaps the deviations, to which the method subjects metaphysics in Part Four of the Discourse. These variations— if any— can only be apprehended on the basis of the norm for the statements of Descartes’ metaphysics, namely, the Meditations of 1641.4 In short, we shall attempt to apprehend how in 1637 the method affects the metaphysics whose definitive state-

22

CHAPTER TWO

ment will only appear in 1641. In other words, does the metaphysics stated by the method coincide with the metaphysics stated by itself? In this context, the Discourse on the Method, especially Part Four, is akin to a closed arena in which method and metaphysics are en­ gaged in a struggle. This confrontation leaves us with only a limited set of possible positions, of which the most radical amounts to deny­ ing that a confrontation is taking place at all, insofar as the method for the first time unifies science, which is thereby finally freed from any metaphysical foundation. This was the thesis of L. Liard: “In Descartes’ thought, science taken in itself and limited to its own field is independent of any considerations on the essence and the origin of all things. . . . Conversely, Cartesian metaphysics is independent of science,” since “what characterizes his physics and makes it into something entirely new and without precedent is the absence of any metaphysical idea.” From Baillet to A. Boyce Gibson, many critics have solved the problem in this manner, by denying that it could actually be posited.5 The debate therefore cannot take place, for lack of a common battleground. Instances of interference are, however, too numerous to allow such an extreme and simplistic position to remain tenable in the long run. Yet, if we believe that method and metaphysics do indeed clash in the Discourse, we can still approach their confrontation in two quite different ways. We might accept “the necessity to continually search for a commentary on the Discourse in the Meditations,” which is what E. Gilson set out to do, while presupposing, with H. Lefèvre, that the metaphysics is constant and sufficiently intangible that it seems “impossible to base a history of [Descartes’] thought on a chronology of the works.” 6 In this hypothesis, the continuity between 1637 and 1641 is reinforced, so that any shortcoming of the Discourse or any divergence from the final statement of the metaphysics found in the Meditations simply reveals a temporary and insignificant imperfec­ tion, which can be corrected without a solution of continuity by a subsequent development.7 However, this reconciliation by means of continuity suffers from a considerable weakness, since it does not take into account an impor­ tant difference between 1637 and 1641: Whereas the Meditations raises its “ very slight and so to speak metaphysical reason for doubt” (AT VII, 36, 11. 24-25) to such a level that one has to invoke an omnipotent God (i.e., “ deceiving God” ) and genius malignus— in short, a summa dubitatio (460,1. 3)— the Discourse only acknowledges

WHAT

IS THE METAPHYSICS WITHIN THE METHOD?

23

the fact that we are often in error. This gap between the different levels of acceptance of doubt is repeated when the boundaries of doubt are drawn: In one case, doubt even affects common evidence, mathematical and logical truths, and all “ external” existences; in the other case, only sensory knowledge vacillates in the usual fallibility, but nothing else. Thus, in Part Four the Discourse lacks the theoreti­ cal moments that bring the Meditations into the hyperbolical, that is to say metaphysical, realm. This is an undeniable textual fact, which was conclusively established by Ferdinand Alquie. Besides, Descartes himself declares in 1637 that he “ thus doubts everything that is mate­ rial” — thereby admitting that he leaves all intellectual evidence un­ touched.8 We must therefore present a third hypothesis to account for this. Alquie gave it a famous, although rather extreme, formulation: If the Discourse is entirely silent on the “ deceiving God” and the genius malignus, as well as on doubt about the existence of the outside world and mathematical truths as they define the metaphysical starting point for the Meditations, one must logically conclude that, in 1637, Descartes had not yet formulated the definitive version of his meta­ physics. The usual counter argument— namely, that the Discourse is not unaware of the definitive metaphysics but limits itself to outlining it— actually contradicts itself, since “from the fact that Descartes did not present an elaborated metaphysics in the Discourse in 1637, we cannot conclude that he had at that time elaborated any metaphysics at all.” The undeniable absence of themes that are essential to the metaphysics of the Meditations prevents us from granting a meta­ physical status to the Discourse. Moreover, Alquie adds, when the Discourse enunciates a genuinely metaphysical theme, such as “I think, therefore I am” {DM, 32, 1. 19 = 33, 1. 17), we must suspect that, conceptually, it has not yet reached its full metaphysical role. Hence, “the cogito of the Discourse is not the foundation of all truth, but the most certain of all truths. The conclusions Descartes draws from this concern science rather than ontology.” 9Thus, in 1637, the themes we encounter either are not metaphysical or have not yet attained a metaphysical status, and strictly metaphysical theses are lacking. Thus, in Part Four of the Discourse the method absolutely forbids the deployment of metaphysics— except in the unrecogniz­ able form of metaphysical remnants stifled by the blind certainty of methodical science. We must now examine the metaphysical status of the Discourse in

24

CHAPTER TWO

light of these three hypotheses, and especially in light of the last one, which is the most powerful and best argued of the three. 2. The Explicitly Metaphysical Intention Yet— and this constitutes a clue rather than simply an anomaly— Alquie himself does not follow up on the logical consequences of his own hypothesis. While this hypothesis seems to be leading to the conclusion that the Discourse on the Method avoids any and all meta­ physics (almost in the sense of Liard), Alquie, curiously, introduces another compromise in fine: The Discourse remains partially meta­ physical in its theological developments, but, being unaware of the genuine ego cogito and doubt, is ignorant of the origin of metaphysics. The gap is no longer between the Discourse and the Meditations but, within Part Four of the Discourse, between the ego on the one hand and God on the other: “ although it contains a perfectly elaborated metaphysics concerning the proofs of the existence of God, Part Four of the Discourse . . . does not include a purely metaphysical statement concerning the doubt or even the cogito.” w Can we legitimately divide up in this way the metaphysical tenor attributed to the Discourse, especially in such a short text? Doesn’t this unexpected compromise suggest the existence of still hidden difficulty concerning either the interpretive hypothesis or the Discourse itself? And, in general, can the question of the metaphysical status of the Discourse find even the embryo of an answer in the strict framework of the three hypotheses we have examined so far, or should we, basing ourselves on them but going beyond them, assert a new one, which would be irreducible to heterogeneity, homogeneity, or absence? Besides, contrary to the claims of earlier interpretations, one thing is evident: The Discourse explicitly claims a metaphysical project, for it concerns itself, among other things, with “ a certain amount of metaphysics.” 11 Descartes’ correspondence is not as explicit as the text itself, whose introductory summary announces “in the fourth [part], the arguments by which he [the author] proves the existence of God and the human soul, which are the foundations of his meta­ physics” {DM, i, 11. 7-9). Moreover, in 1644, Descartes will let the Specimina transpose into Latin the following marginal note to Part Four: “Arguments by which the existence of God and of the human soul is proven, which are the foundations of metaphysics” (AT VI, 557-58). He had to do so, because the first lines of Part Four use

WHAT

IS THE METAPHYSICS WITHIN THE METHOD?

25

the term explicitly: “I do not know whether I should tell you of the first meditations that I had there, for they are perhaps too metaphysi­ cal and uncommon for everyone’s taste. And yet, to make it possible to judge whether the foundations I have chosen are firm enough, I am in a way obliged to speak of them” (DM, 31, 11. 14-20). Thus, as early as 1637 we encounter metaphysical meditations, which antici­ pate the (questionable) translation of the Meditationes de prima philosophia of 1641 by the due de Luynes in 1647. We also encounter an early parallel to the “metaphysical reason for doubt” of 1641 (AT VII, 36 ,11. 24-25). The metaphysical intention of the project of 1637 is thus borne out, as an intention, in the texts.12 A second fact supports this first conclusion: Beyond the Medita­ tions, the Discourse also anticipates the Principles of Philosophy, thanks to its discussion of the “principles of philosophy” (DM, 8, 1. 31). The Discourse does not simply debate the “principles of the other sciences” (DM, 29, 11. 28-29), but also “ doubt[s] the principles” (DM, 15, 1. 22; see 21, 1. 31; 70, 1. 29; 73, 1. 14)— that is, the usual principles— in order to replace them with “ simple and general . . . principles,” namely, the “ principles [I] had discovered” (DM, 64, 11. 27, 29). The ambition to substitute some principles concerning knowledge as a whole for others would in itself be sufficient to estab­ lish the metaphysical legitimacy of the Discourse, since it is specifically echoed in the 1647 preface to the French translation of the Principia: “ the principles of knowledge, i.e., what may be called ‘first philoso­ phy’ or ‘metaphysics’ ” (AT IX, 16, 11. 13-16 ) or, in other words, “metaphysics, which contains the principles of knowledge” (AT IX, 1 4 ,11. 8-9). But there is more: In 1637, where does Descartes unveil the “ principles of the philosophy [he] use[s]” (DM, 71, 1. 7), those he attributes to himself, “my principles” (DM, 7 7 ,1. 2 = 7 5 ,1. 17)? Precisely in Part Four, in which, “observing that this truth ‘I think, therefore I am’ was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking” (DM, 3 2 ,11. 18-23). Reiterating what was established in Part Four, Part Five confirms it with the “ resolution . . . to assume no principle other than the one I have just used to demonstrate the existence of God and of the soul” (DM, 41, 11. 1 4). This principle— which is indeed metaphysical, since it guarantees their true principles to all sciences— is also metaphysical for another reason: It clearly concerns two of the privileged objects of any spe­

26

CHAPTER TWO

cial metaphysics— especially that of Descartes in 1641— namely, God and the soul. Thus, if the search for principles does illustrate the metaphysical project, we have to conclude that the Discourse, en­ gaged in the discovery of a first principle, legitimately belongs to metaphysics. We should perhaps add a strange coincidence to these obvious facts. While setting out his first principle, Descartes writes, “ the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking” (DM, 32, 1. 23). This choice of wording can be taken to mean a philosophical principle that is being sought, which is how it has been read by the principal interpreters of Descartes. But it can also be taken to mean a philoso­ phy that is itself being sought. In this sense, in his search for a first principle, Descartes is in search of philosophy— itself being sought. This is how P. de Courcelles understood this passage, which he translated in the Specimina as “primum ejus, quam quaerebam, Philosophiae, fundamentum,” that is to say, “the first foundation of the philosophy I was seeking” (AT, 558, 11. 27-28). But then, given this second reading, can we not identify here something akin to an echo of what Aristotle did not yet name metaphysics but some­ times designated as a science that was being sought (f| em An indepth study alone will be able to test the accuracy of this hypothesis. (b) During his polemic with G. Voet, Descartes at the very least sketched a motif—namely, charity— that would justify the inversion mentioned above from the other viewed as a represented object to the other acknowledged as a “ free cause.” He defines charity as fol­ lows: “haec Charitas, hoc est, sancta amicitia, que Deum prosequimur, et Dei causa etiam omnes homines, quatenus scimus ipsos a Deo amari.” 27 That is, the charity by means of which we seek God causes us, because of God himself, to also seek all [other] men; and we do so only as a consequence and imitation of the love that we know God has for them. Thus, loving others does not result from a direct relation between the ego and others since, as we have seen, this relationship is regulated by the logic of representation, which reduces the other to a simple represented object, thus an alienated one, and prevents the strict love of an other. Loving others results from an indirect relation, mediated by God, between others and the ego: The ego loves God and knows that God loves other men; thus, imitating God, the ego loves these other men. We should therefore be less sur­ prised now with Descartes’ recourse to charity as an essential concept of any social and political relationship.28Rather, we should stress the theoretical function of charity: The other can be loved only if the ego gives up trying to represent it directly and accepts aiming for it indirectly through the unobjectifiable par excellence— that is, God. The ego loves the other precisely insofar as it successively gives up trying to represent it, loves the incomprehensible, and then comes back to the other as it is loved by the incomprehensible. Thus the function of charity is to enable the ego to pass beyond the ontotheol­ ogy of the cogitatio, in order to finally reach the other as such. These two possible arguments indicate at the very least that an essential part of Descartes’ moral doctrine has yet to be examined and understood. They indicate also that his strictly metaphysical situ­ ation still remains to be determined. To represent or to love— one must choose. Did Descartes in the end detect this?

CHAPTER SEVEN

Is the Argument Ontological? The Anselmian Proof and the Two Demonstrations of the Existence of God in the Meditations i. The Argument and Ontology For a long while, the argument was not called “ ontological.” Saint Anselm and Descartes both present it as “my argument.” 1 Leibniz speaks only of an “ argument frequently discussed by the scholastics not long since and renewed by Descartes.” 2 Kant, who from time to time actually continues to call it a “ Cartesian argument,” 3 was proba­ bly the first to characterize it as an “ontological argument” (ontologischer Beweis Why did it take so long for the argument to be called ontological? At the very least, this delay shows (though without ex­ plaining why) that the argument could very well have done without becoming “ontological,” since it was able to emerge and develop without the qualifier. But could the argument of Anselm and Des­ cartes have been made without the concept of ontology itself? From a purely historical standpoint, this question becomes even more important, since it took six centuries after Anselm for the term on­ tology to appear— even though Goclenius, Fontialis, Timpler, and Clauberg were making use of the word at the time of Descartes.5 Hence, the argument could for a time be used in demonstrations without the support of ontologia: This is a fact attested by the history of ideas. However, although this point illustrates a chronological gap be­ tween the appearance of the argument and its explicit qualification as “ ontological,” it does not resolve the purely theoretical question as to whether the argument could be functional and eventually con-

).4

140

CHAPTER SEVEN

elusive outside of any implicit or explicit ontology, whatever it might be. In other words: Does the argument absolutely, without exception or qualification, depend on the question of the Being of being, and thus the history of metaphysics, in the manner in which Heidegger used these two phrases? Or should we, on the contrary, envisage that the argument can be, or could have been, used successfully entirely outside the metaphysical domain, or without appearing in the horizon of the question of Being? This alternative hypothesis would lead to the question of whether or not the “ Cartesian” argument must always be the equivalent of an “ ontological argument” — in short, if it should always be understood as a (privileged) element of what could be called the ontotheological constitution of metaphysics. But since in philosophy only the question of right matters, it follows that a result stemming purely from historical scholarship cannot provide a satis­ factory answer to our question. In order to sketch a possible answer, one would have to analyze conceptually what Kant calls the “ ontolog­ ical argument.” This analysis should proceed in three stages: (a) de­ termining the characteristics that Kant attributes to this concept of “ ontological argument” ; (b) verifying whether, and how, some of the thinkers from the metaphysical tradition announce or sanction the characteristics of the “ ontological argument” ; (c) deciding whether or not some of its figures— in particular, those conferred on it by Anselm and Descartes, who do not use the qualifier “ ontological” — are exceptions to these characteristics. 2. The Ontological Interpretation When Kant invents and uses the term “ ontological argument” — thus, when he interprets ontologically the argument that until then had been called “ Cartesian” — he provides a precise definition for it: This argument amounts to “ arguing completely a priori, from mere concepts, to the existence of a supreme cause” ; in other words, it establishes the “ existence of a highest essence from concepts.” 6 The argument thus becomes ontological when it reaches the existence of a being that from then on is privileged by pure concepts. However, a difficulty appears immediately: If the argument is worthy of the qualifier “ ontological” simply because it concludes existence by means of concepts, then all the other proofs of the existence of God in rational theology are also worthy of this title, for do they not also reach the conclusion of existence? In fact, Kant here means some- *

is THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

14 1

thing else entirely: The argument becomes “ ontological” because it concludes the existence of a privileged being simply on the basis of the concept of its essence— by virtue of the “ concept of a highest essence,” the “ concept of the all-realest essence.” 7 The term ontologi­ cal here does not underline the basic fact of reaching Being as exis­ tence, but rather the extraordinary fact of reaching it a priori from Being taken as a pure essence— in short, of covering the entire range of the multiple meanings of Being, yet without leaving its unique meaning as essence. More precisely, the term ontological qualifies rea­ soning that passes from a mode of Being (essence) to another (exis­ tence), although simply by means of the concept of an essence— albeit the truest of them all. The argument thus becomes ontological only insofar as it aims at existence (and the other proofs) on the basis of two truly exceptional conditions: (i) starting from a pure concept, without recourse to experience; (2) starting from the pure concept of an essence. By identifying the two ultimate characteristics of the “ ontological argument,” Kant in fact simply and judiciously ratifies decisions that were already made by his predecessors and that many of his successors will eventually maintain. A proof of the existence of God becomes an “ ontological argu­ ment” only when it rests first upon a concept of God. This require­ ment was clearly assumed by Descartes. The a priori demonstration of the existence of God in Meditation V starts explicitly from a cogitatio de Deo; this thought claims to be a genuine idea (“bring forth the idea of God from the treasure house of my mind,” AT VII, 67, 11. 2 1 - 23 ) — that is to say, an idea that is no more and no less available and accessible to the mind than any mathematical idea (“ which I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number,” AT VII, 65, 11. 22-23). The idea of God thus belongs to the class of innate ideas, of which it represents a very peculiar, though not unique, example: We are still dealing here with “true ideas which are innate in me, of which the first and most important is the idea of God” (AT VII, 68, 11. 8-10). Common epistemic requirements bear so strongly on this idea of God that Descartes, in spite of his insistence on preserving divine incomprehensibility, eventually admits a Dei conceptus, “ concept of God” (Meditations, A T VII, 167, line 1); a divinae naturae conceptus, “a concept of the divine nature” (AT VII, 151, 1. 6); or a conceptus entis summe perfecti, “ concept of a supremely perfect being” (AT VII, 166, 1. 18). A decisive step has been taken: From now on the argument will rest on the presupposi­

142

CHAPTER SEVEN

tion that a concept of the divine essence is accessible to the mind. The definition that it claims to represent the logical rank that we give it is now almost irrelevant; what matters is the very assumption that a concept, whatever it may be, could reach the essence of God. All the subsequent debates, whether concerning the determination of this essence (Leibniz, Malebranche, Spinoza) or the transition of the con­ cept from essence to existence (Kant, Hegel, Schelling), will presup­ pose a certain concept of God— in short, that this concept can in general account for God and assign Him an essence. With the presupposition of this concept, the first characteristic of the ontological argument has been defined. We may now proceed toward the second characteristic, and ask what is the essence of God presented by this concept. But, even though the characteristic of the concept had sprung up all at once with Descartes, several additional stages would be needed to characterize the divine essence. (a) Descartes contents himself with a definition of God as supreme being or supremely perfect being: “ think of God (that is a supremely perfect being \_ens summe perfectum\)” “the first and supreme being [ens primum et summum],” “ supreme being, or God \summe ens sive Deus].” s This (conceptual) determination of the essence of God maintains a gap between essence and existence, which is designated and filled by the notion of perfection: God thus does not yet exist immediately as a result of his concept, but through the mediation of a supreme perfection, which encompasses, among other particular perfections, that of existing. The argument thus is not yet absolutely ontological, and Descartes very logically does not consider it to be so. In order to actually think the direct inclusion of existence in (the concept of) its essence— in order to actually think God as “that whose essence involves existence,” and thus formally to deduce from each other the two terms that Spinoza simply confuses,9 one has to take another step. (b) Malebranche manages to take that step by following and re­ peating the argument of Meditation V, although no longer simply from the concept of “ God or an infinitely perfect being,” but through the absolute identification of the essence with Being (in all its mean­ ings) in the divine concept: “ the idea of God, or of Being in general, of Being without restrictions, of infinite Being” 10is in radical opposi­ tion to the idea (or concept) of a given Being, insofar as the essence can be identified with the whole Being in God only, such that essence still reaches itself when it reaches its existence starting from itself.

IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

1 43

It will be helpful here to examine in more detail the fundamental ambiguity of what Malebranche means by the term Being (être), for the opposition of “Being in general” to “ this being” or even to “ these beings” may be understood to mean two very different things, or rather, may lead to two very dissimilar differences. On the one hand, an ontic difference between an absolutely being being (ÔVTCDÇ o v ) facing finite, time-bound, and derivative beings; on the other hand, a quasi-ontological difference between all beings and Being itself, which is universally abstract. Malebranche never tackles this ambigu­ ity, however patent it may be. But what is left unthought here calls for further thinking, for if one admits that any metaphysical construct must characteristically leave the ontological difference unthought within itself, Malebranche could thus possibly reveal himself to be, by virtue of his shortcoming, a genuine metaphysician. For our pur­ poses, what is unthought here does not modify the decisive first result that has now been reached: By positing that “Being without restric­ tions, in a word BEING, there is the idea of God,” 11 Malebranche abolishes any and all mediation between God’s essence and his exis­ tence by reestablishing— although in a manner that remains vague— the Thomistic identity between divine essence and Being (in action). God is (exists) as an immediate consequence of his essence, which consists only of Being; thus, the Cartesian argument becomes for the first time, by right if not by title, genuinely ontological. (c) However, Leibniz was the first to sanction the perfectly onto­ logical character of the argument by identifying divine essence not only with the concept of Being in general, but quite clearly with the concept of the necessary Being: “the existence of the Necessary Be­ ing, in whom essence includes existence, or in whom being possible suffices for being actual.” 12 Malebranche’s formulation (and the Cartesian argument even less) did not make clear the shift from es­ sence to existence within the concept of Being itself. Leibniz estab­ lishes this shift by positing the equivalence of possibility and neces­ sity, which is possible only in the concept of God. Far from being added on to possibility as from the outside, necessity springs from it intrinsically, as its intimate requirement: “If the necessary Being is possible, it exists. For necessary Being and Being through one’s own essence are simply one and the same thing.” 13 In order for the argument to become entirely ontological, the concept of divine es­ sence must coincide with the necessary Being, since only the neces­ sary Being exists, if we assume the minimal condition of its possibil­

144

CHAPTER SEVEN

ity. If the concept already encompasses the necessary Being, then and only then its very possibility as a noncontradictory concept produces, without a sufficient external reason, necessarily effective existence. This last formulation thus finally confers full ontological rank on the argument. Kant and Schelling, for instance, will understand the argu­ ment on the basis of its Leibnizian formulation, though in order to critique it: God exists by virtue of his concept of necessary existence, provided that this concept is possible. Let us note, however, that Descartes himself had anticipated this development: In a very peda­ gogical commentary on his a priori proof he reformulates in the hori­ zon of possibility and necessity the argument that was initially made on the basis of perfection: “Possible or contingent existence is con­ tained in the concept of a limited thing, whereas necessary and perfect existence is contained in the concept of a supremely perfect being.” 14 At any rate, the Cartesian argument eventually reaches an ontological status only to the extent that the concept of the essence of God im­ plies that the necessary existence necessarily exists, or as Schelling wrote: “ God is not only the necessary being, but he is necessarily the necessary being; this is a meaningful difference.” 15 These three stages on the road to an ontological interpretation of the argument still call for a fourth one. To review them, we have only to follow Hegel, who was the first to see that the two characteristics of the argument— to proceed from a concept of the divine essence and to identify the divine essence with (necessary) Being itself— do not constitute two independent and parallel demands, but rather eventu­ ally merge with one another. According to Hegel, Anselm, just like Descartes after him, does not present in his argument a demonstra­ tion that can be said to belong to rational theology. On the other hand, Anselm reaches on this occasion the essential speculative truth, “ the unity of thinking and Being [die Einheit des Denkens und Seins].” 16The— now ontological— argument discovers, in the partic­ ular case of God, what the cogito had already foreseen— namely, that thinking, as thought and independently of its factual representational content, passes from itself to Being, provided that it may reach speculatively the truth of the concept. The argument was actually antici­ pating the truth of science as a whole— that is to say, the metaphysi­ cal truth par excellence— although in an unsatisfying and almost' sophistic way, since it was held back in simple representations. In the particular case of God, Anselm— and Descartes after him— had foreseen no less than the move from the concept in general, according

IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

145

to its intrinsic requirement, to effectivity, as it is thought in itself and for itself by the accomplished science of logic.17 God does not come into existence so much through his concept— of a necessary and absolute Being— but rather through the concept itself, free from any and all determinacy. The ontological argument concerns and de­ fines first of all the concept as such, rather than God. To be sure, it can and must characterize God in particular, but even this results from the fact that God is not a concept, but the concept par excel­ lence, the concept personified. In his own way, Schelling will develop the same thesis: We should not proceed from the concept of God to his existence, but according to the order of positive philosophy; “ set out from the concept of pure undubitable existing and, inversely, prove the divinity of undubitable existing.” 18 The concept of the ex­ isting (I’existant) takes the rank of an absolute "prius, without speci­ fying the existence of God. It is only in a second movement that God’s divinity will follow from the concept of the existing. The onto­ logical argument, now brought back to its full speculative dignity, becomes not only the prime metaphysical proof of the existence of God, but also the dissolution of the essence of God in the concept, where metaphysics is accomplished. The argument becomes fully on­ tological only with the replacement (Aufhebung) of God by the con­ cept— what came to be called, shortly after Hegel and Schelling, the “ death of God.” 3. Beyond the Concept We may now pose our second question. In order for what Anselm called “my argument” to merit the title of “ontological argument,” it must conform to the requirements that have just been established by metaphysics: (1) it must reach existence starting from a concept | of the divine essence; (2) it must interpret this essence as the un-: restricted and universal Being in general. Did Anselm admit these I two presuppositions? Let us proceed with the first one: Does the Anselmian argument rest on a concept of the divine essence? The answer is an absolute no, for several related reasons: (a) The starting point for the argument explicitly depends on faith: “ faith seeking understanding” and “ an example of the reason belong­ ing to faith” inaugurate the approach common to the Proslogion and the Monologion, respectively, which consists in rendering rational

146

CHAPTER

SEVEN

(rather than simply explaining) what faith submits in advance to thought. Moreover, more than simply ensuring for rationality a given that it may eventually repossess and appropriate for itself, faith guides rationality in its speculative itinerary: “For I do not seek to under­ stand in order to believe but I believe in order to understand. For I believe even this: that I shall not understand unless I believe” (Proslogion, 1, 100,18-19). Intelligence proceeds from faith, since rationality consists precisely in recognizing the permanent precondition of intel­ ligence: Faith then rises to the second power and believes even that “one shall not understand unless one believes.” Insofar as it predates the subsequent opposition between philosophy and theology, this re­ lation between faith and reason inverts in advance the dialectic by means of which Hegel establishes their respective metaphysical fig­ ures: For Anselm, the concept does not replace faith as the simple content of a representation free from speculative elaboration (so that religion would have to disappear in order to become thinkable); the role of faith, on the contrary, is to provide the concept with its rule, in addition to its content.19 (b) The concluding point of the argument also explicitly escapes the concept, since it is a question of reaching he who remains in an “inaccessible light” (1 Timothy 6:16). The fact that God dwells in an inaccessible light defines not only the initial goal of the argument (Proslogion, I, 98ff.) but its conclusion as well (Proslogion, XVI, 112, i8ff.): Knowledge does not abolish inaccessibility; on the contrary, its aim is to establish the fact that inaccessibility is definitively unsur­ passable. Thus, wedged between the presupposition of faith and di­ vine inaccessibility, the argument is unable to presuppose a concept of divine essence, or to hope for one. In actuality, the argument never supposes any concept at all,20 since it rests precisely on the acknowl­ edged impossibility of any concept of God. What is here a nonconcept is stated in a first formula: id quo majus cogitari nequit or aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari possit, “that than which a greater cannot be thought.” The only thing that God admits as a quasi-concept is his own transcendence with regard to any thinkable concept. Thus as long as something can be thought within limits, thought cannot reach God. Conversely, thought can approach the question of God only when attaining the limit, the maximum, the upper limit of the think­ able. The only indication that thought might genuinely bear any rela­ tion to the supposed essence of God is the following: It would need to transcend any thinkable concept but also, especially, to experience

IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

1 47

the limit (and possibly a limit that must continuously be pushed far­ ther) of its own power to conceptualize. God may— eventually— appear in and for thought only when the limit of what thought can think, the maximum limit of the thinkable (id quod majus cogitari potest) has been reached, when thought encounters something it can­ not surpass and thus conquer, namely “that than which a greater cannot be thought” (id quo majus cogitari nequit). As long as thought can still think by means of concepts, it cannot grasp God; it does so only when it can no longer proceed, at least by using concepts. God begins when the concept ends. The fascination this argument imme­ diately exerts on us, regardless of, and previous to, any discussion of its eventual logical validity obviously derives from the authentically critical character Anselm assigns it. For “that than which a greater cannot be thought” (id quo majus cogitari nequit) does not define God, even negatively. It does not pretend to grant access to a transcendent term (or being); it simply designates the limit that will be encountered by any possible cogitatio when it attempts to think God— in other words, when it attempts to think beyond the maximum limit of the thinkable for a finite thought. Before exposing itself to God, and in order to do so, thought that reaches “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” reaches the limit of its own capacity to know. Hence, if, following Kant, “transcendental” “never means a reference of our cognition to things, but only to our faculty of cognition,” 21 then one must paradoxically conclude that the argument seeks a term that tran­ scends cogitatio only in the transcendental test of the limits of the power of this cogitatio itself. Any critique of the argument that would begin by neglecting its resolutely critical dimension, in order to dis­ qualify it as simply dogmatic, would immediately annul itself, and Kant, paradoxically, was the first to ignore the fact that his opponent could withstand his critique by using its own weapons.22 In other words, Anselm seeks what transcends all thought (God) only through the critical test of the transcendental and never conquers it as an object. Could this not be confirmed by making reference, by means of a second and similar paradox, to the other opponent par excellence of Anselm, namely, Thomas Aquinas? Does not Aquinas’ refuta­ tion of the argument rest on the fact that God is not known to himself for us (per se notum quoad nos), and hence, does it not acknowledge that Anselm did not use any concept or definition of the divine es­ sence? As opposed to the focus of the traditional debate, what opposes Aquinas and Anselm may thus hinge not so much on the recourse

14 8

CHAPTER SEVEN

to an a priori concept of God (which Anselm clearly does not use), as on the decision of whether this absence prevents (as Aquinas sup­ poses), or makes possible an a priori argument. Here again, Anselm anticipates the argument of his critic: He freely admits the impossi­ bility of an a priori concept of the divine essence; his genius consists in simply considering this very impossibility as the higher court of appeals for an argument. Unlike Aquinas, Anselm therefore does not need to resort to a posteriori concepts borrowed from Aristotelian metaphysics. He thus liberates himself, in advance, from any subse­ quent claims of the concept (a priori or a posteriori, it matters little) concerning the knowledge of God, and, in this sense at least, he be­ comes more familiar to us than Aquinas. The solidity of this nonconcept of God is attested by the three moments it engenders: (a) It is not possible to reject the critical nonconcept of “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” as a starting point for the argu­ ment: Whoever would do so because it cannot be understood (in intellectu) already contradicts himself; first of all because in order to con­ tradict it, one has to first understand it (“audit hoc ipsum quod dico” ); but whoever understands it can no longer refute it under the pretense that this statement is meaningless, since according to its strictest definition, the maximum limit of the thinkable does not and cannot have a defined and conceptually delimited meaning. To object that it cannot be understood or that there is nothing to understand does not disqualify it but rather acknowledges its unique character— i.e., that it surpasses the thinkable. If it admitted a conceptual and categorically explicable signification, “ that than which a greater can­ not be thought” (id quo majus cogitari nequit) would immediately lose its transcendental dignity as “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” (Proslogion, II, 101, 5-15). The first misunderstanding con­ sists in applying the common rules of signification to a statement whose very function is to be excepted from them. (b) The statement, from now on irrefutable, immediately gives rise to a second moment, as paradoxically necessary as the first one: “But surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be only in the understanding” (Proslogion, II, 101, igff.). For the maximum limit of the thinkable not only requires that, transcendentally, the cogitatio reach the limits of its power to know, but also that it should acknowledge that the “ greater” (majus) always transcends these lim­

IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

149

its. The cogitatio acknowledges this by admitting first that it cannot (nequit) think something that transcends transcendental limits. But to truly admit the term that the intellectus can no longer think, one must also concede that this term reaches beyond all understanding. How then can one designate what lies beyond understanding, if not by placing it under the heading of res, if not by admitting that it exists in reality (“ . . . esse et in re,” Proslogion, 101, 17)? True, an objection may immediately be raised: Why should what no longer belongs to understanding (i.e., the transcendental) exist in actuality (transcendence)? Why should the unthinkable, at the second degree, be thought as a real being? Should we not conclude, on the contrary, that what no longer exists according to the lowest degree of Being— Being in the understanding— has even less reason to exist according to the highest degree of Being— Being in reality? In spite of its appar­ ently self-evident character, however, this objection collapses as soon as it is raised. For, with “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” (id quo majus cogitari nequit), it is not a question of thinking a mini­ mum, but rather of thinking a maximum (majus). Now, the require­ ment of the maximum reverses the hierarchy of the degrees of Being against the objection, first by positing that Being exists in under­ standing alone (the first stage, the painter who has in his understand­ ing what is not yet beyond understanding, Proslogion, 101, 10-13); next by positing a Being greater than what exists in understanding (in intellectu) and also in reality (in re) (101, 15-10 2, 3); and finally by positing the ultimate stage of what exists in reality, yet without being confined within the strict boundaries of understanding. To be sure, this last moment in the hierarchy of the degrees of Being often eludes the readers of the Proslogion, since the vast majority of them do not continue the analysis past chapter IV. Anselm reaches it ex­ plicitly in chapter XV, in which is found the last determination of the logic of the maximum (majus): “Lord, not only are you that than which a greater cannot be thought, but you are also something greater than can be thought” (112, 14-15). If it is a question of God only from the moment when thought reaches its maximum (the transcen­ dental limit of its power to know), God is thus actually experienced only when thought acknowledges, without conquering it, the tran­ scendent that surpasses this limit— when thought thinks that it can­ not think what it cannot think and that what it cannot think surpasses it by being not only outside its understanding but beyond what it

15 0

CHAPTER SEVEN

will ever understand. God therefore is in re not because He is first, like the majority of finite beings, in intellectu, but rather, exception­ ally, because He could in no way be in intellectu. (c) A third moment confirms this paradox, if we read correctly the thesis that “ this being [God] exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist” (Proslogion, III, 102, 6). This text does not say that God so truly is that he could not not be, thereby supposing that understanding could think God as a being, and thus that finite thought would be able to think the infinite maximum. This interpre­ tation would contradict the crux of the argument, which hinges en­ tirely upon the acknowledgment of a transcendental limit to the fac­ ulty of understanding. This text therefore requires an altogether different reading. The issue is not to think that God is (even necessar­ ily is), as if thought transgressed its limits; the issue is to be unable to think that God is not, by respecting the limit of what is unthink­ able, and, by bouncing back off this limit, to think at the second degree that thought cannot deny that the transcendent exists in re even though it cannot be grasped by the concept in intellectu. Far from conquering the concept of an existing God by means of a tran­ scendental break-in, what must be thought (cogitari) according to the transcendental limit of the power to think is that esse in re can tran­ scend all concepts in the case of “ something greater than can be thought” (Proslogion, XV, 112 , 14 -15).23 Besides, the Anselmian project never claimed to achieve a knowl­ edge of the divine essence by means of concepts. Textual evidence confirms this, and it is made clearer when examined within a textual framework: (a) Given that at the outset Anselm simply aimed to “understand some measure of your [God’s] truth [aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam]” (Proslogion, I, 100, 17), then at the end he can only see “you [God] partially but not see you as you are [te aliquatenus, sed non . . . sicuti es]” (Proslogion, XIV, 1 1 1 , 21).24 (b) Far from asserting the notion or the word concept, Anselm asks only for a conjecture in order to support his argument: “Is not this the same as passing from those goods than which a greater can be thought to the conception of that Good than which a greater cannot be thought?” 25 (c) The Proslogion, far from closing with the initial argument in favor of the existence of God, notes that its very success raises a new objection: “If you have found him, why is it that you do not perceive

IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

151

what you have found?” (Proslogion, XIV, 1 1 1 , 13-14). Knowing God’s existence with certainty is in no way the equivalent of “ per­ ceiving” God in person, but actually makes his inaccessibility more strongly felt. Thus, the substitution of “ something greater than can be thought” for “that than which nothing greater can be thought” (Proslogion, XV, 112, 14 -15) forces us to acknowledge the definitive inaccessibility of the light in which God dwells (1 Timothy 6:16), which blinds our gaze: “it shines too much and [my understanding] does not grasp it” (Proslogion, XVI, 112 , 24-25). From then on, the certainty of the Being (esse) of God only makes the secret of his es­ sence more manifest.26 (d) The Monologion (chapter LXIV) had already encountered this limit; it had shown that, when it is a question of thinking a res incomprehensibilis, one must simply reach the point where the power of the intellect ends— namely, to “ recognize [that this doctrine] is most certainly true even if he is unable to comprehend how it could be true” (75, 2-3). All arguments, and especially the most powerful among them, can only, at the risk of contradicting themselves, claim in the end to “ rationally comprehend that it is incomprehensible” how divine wisdom alone can know itself (75, line n ).27 Hence, Anselm’s argument concludes that God exists starting from the very impossibility of producing any concept of God: God is known (as existing) as an unknown (through the concept of es­ sence). Not only does the argument fail to satisfy the first characteris­ tic of the ontological interpretation to which the later metaphysicians submitted it, but it also rejects it in advance. Thus appears the first discontinuity. 4. Beyond Essence We now must examine whether Anselm’s argument also departs from the second characteristic of its metaphysical interpretation. The question can be stated as follows: Can the presupposed existence of God be identified with the essence par excellence? In other words, does the Anselmian argument, like the ontological argument, rest upon a determination of God’s nature on the basis of essence, itself understood as an unrestricted Being par excellence? In short, can “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” be thought (even nega­ tively) starting from the question of essence, of ousia, of Being— or not?

152

CHAPTER SEVEN

We have already noted a first discontinuity: The formula “that than which a greater cannot be thought” (id quo majus cogitari nequit) contradicts the necessity of a concept of God. We must now note the presence of a new discontinuity, found in a second formula, “ [than] which nothing better can be thought” (Proslogion, XIV, h i , 9). This formulation differs from the first one by substituting melius for majus— i.e., it replaces a quantitative principle by a qualitative one. What we had defined as a logic of an undetermined maximum is now clarified into a logic of the greatest good, thus of a sovereign good. But before interpreting this new discontinuity, we must estab­ lish whether or not it is supported by the texts. In the Proslogion, the substitution appears as early as chapter III, which, in order to justify the majus, warns that “ if any mind could conceive of some­ thing better [melius] than you [i.e., God], the creature would rise above the creator and would sit in judgment over the creator— an utterly preposterous consequence” (103,4—6). Hence, melius does not contradict majus, but instead justifies it by specifying it. This is actu­ ally confirmed in chapter V, which posits the principle that God is “ whatever it is better [melius] to be than not to be.” 28 The principle of melius does not constitute a particular case of the principle of majus, but instead its explication, which is for the first time rigorously opera­ tional: the greatest in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. In order to decide whether or not a determination may be applied to God, one simply has to examine whether it would add an additional good to, or subtract from, the sovereign good: The maximum is a summum, but summum is defined in turn as a summum bonum— i.e., “You were seeking God, and you have found that he is something highest of all— than which nothing better can be thought.” 29 The passage to the maximum limit of the cogitatio would lack an opera­ tional criterion; hence the argument would remain abstract, without the interpretation of majus on the basis of melius?® Thus what lies beyond the essence, the eTteKeivoc Tfj^ oi>aia^ is revealed as the criterion of “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” (id quo majus cogitari nequit), and the good manifests itself as sovereign in any essential definition of God. Or rather, God excepts Himself from essence, just as He already was transcending the concept. God sur­ passes essence through the same gesture that frees Him from the concept—because He can only be thought as He offers Himself, as sovereign good, as sovereign insofar as He is the good, rather than as Being.

IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

153

These two discontinuities can be related to each other on the basis of the relation between the two syntagms that define their respective operations. The first discontinuity (with the concept) acknowledges a transcendental limit, comes up against it, and thus identifies it with a simple comparative: nihil majus cogitaripotest. Obviously, a compar­ ative is sufficient here, since thought confronts only one term— namely, its limit, its other par excellence. The second discontinuity (the majus) reaches, given that it cannot comprehend it, a transcen­ dent term. This transcendence goes beyond the transcendental limit of the power to know; it thus frees itself from any comparison and becomes absolute, so that it must be approached as an absolute com­ parative— i.e., summum bonum— and no longer as a simple compara­ tive. Transcendence requires a superlative, whereas the transcenden­ tal limited itself to, and was limited by, the comparative. But the summum bonum also influences what it has left behind, leaving its mark on it, by overdetermining the majus by a melius, which, so to speak, colors the “ greatest” for us by the light (or the shadow) of the absolutely best. “ O immense goodness, which so exceeds all under­ standing” (Proslogion, IX, 107, 26-27): Absolute transcendence is the equivalent of goodness, just as the superlative is the equivalent of summum bonum; the transcendental limit harks back to thought, just as the simple comparative harks back to ousia. This second discontinuity, even more fundamental than the first one, which it justifies in retrospect, structures Anselm’s entire proj­ ect. The Proslogion, from its preface onward, assigns only one objec­ tive to its argumentum— to establish that God is “ the supreme good, needing no one else yet needed by all else in order to exist and to fare well” (93, 6-9). If “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” (id quo majus cogitari nequit) intervenes first (chapters II—III), its tem­ porary formulation is immediately relayed by the second formula, for ultimately “thinking something better than you” (III, 103, 5) appears impossible, so that one concludes the existence of God on the basis of the maximum, “highest of all things, alone existing” (104, 12). This conclusion rests on the principle that “ God is whatever it is better [melius] to be than not to be” (104, 9, reiterated in 104, 16). Besides, the deduction of the divine attributes (chapter XII) and the theorization of the final incomprehensibility of God that immediately follows (chapters X III-X X III) are ruled by the principle of melius^ with an eye toward the supreme good (summum bonum) } 1 Hence, the conclusion very logically sends the injunction to think the maximum

154

CHAPTER SEVEN

back to the injunction to think the best: “ponder as best you can what kind of good this is and how great it is.” But, since thinking the best and the supreme good necessitates that thought not limit itself to its representative and conceptual functions, but rather bring to bear the function of love— since the blessed ones “ will love in the degree that they will know” — thought must dare deploy its desire: “Desire the simple good which itself is every good [bonum].” 33 If it is a question of knowing God as melius and supreme good, thought must not lean on the impossible concept of an inaccessible essence, but rather on its own desire, and thus, deprived of any other recourse, on its love. The same recourse to melius outlines the basic architecture of the Monologion. Let us simply mention two indisputable points: (a) The first demonstration, which here again aims to establish the existence of God, opens with the thesis that “there is something that is the best [optimum], the greatest, the highest of all existing things” (chapter I, 13, 3-4). It is deployed only on the basis of the question of the good and in the direction of the supreme good. The first chapter opposes various goods, for they are only through another (per aliud), to the one good, since it is through itself (per se), and thus reaches the supreme good; but the transcendence of this magnum is itself absorbed in the greatest good: “Now, what is supremely good is also supremely great” (15, 10 -11). The second chapter goes from relative quantities to “ something . . . supremely great” in order again to reduce the quantitative sovereignty to that of the greatest good: “it is necessary that something be both supremely great and su­ premely good” (15, 11. 17 and 21). The third chapter eliminates the kinds of good that are not in themselves like the sole thing that is through itself (ipsum unum per seipsum), and finally thinks the latter as an optimum: “Therefore, there is some one thing which . . . exists most greatly and most highly of all” (16, 26-28). The fourth chapter is based on the principle of eminence, concluding that: “Therefore, necessarily, there is a nature which is so superior to any other or others that there is no nature to which it is ranked as inferior” (17, 24-25). These four chapters are summarized in the definition of the existence of a “nature, or substance, or Being” that is indeterminate except insofar as it reveals itself, in decreasing order as “the supreme good, the supreme greatness, the supreme Being or subsistence— in short the highest of all things” (17, 32-33; 18, 2-3). The access to God as something that exists, or even as a substance, is therefore not set out according to the regulatory idea of the essence or even of a

IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

1 55

maximum, but, beyond essence and the majus cogitari nequit (which is properly speaking absent here), according to the regulatory idea of the good. Through the eminence of the good God transcends ev­ erything that exists. (b) This theoretical decision appears even more clearly, if possible, during the discussion of substance. Following Augustine, Anselm is reluctant to call God a substance, even a supreme and primary sub­ stance, since substance always implies a relation, at least a possible one, to the notion of accident. However, here he tolerates the name of substance, at the express condition that it be based on the principle of melius, thus seen in the perspective of the sovereign good. In this sense, “ just as it is blasphemous to suppose that the substance of the Supreme Nature is something which in some respect it would be better not to be, so this substance must be whatever in every respect it is better to be than not to be.” Substance can now be understood no longer as a relative category but as a particular (and probably privi­ leged) function of melius: to be such that nothing better, at least ac­ cording to the hierarchy of the categories, could exist that it itself is not— i.e., “it alone is that than which nothing is better.” 34Therefore, God can be granted the name of substance— that is to say, the meta­ physical title par excellence of ousia— only on the condition that He receives it as a particular case of melius— i.e., under the aegis of the good. By substituting melius for majus, the good for ousia, Anselm pre­ cludes, for the second time now, the possibility of a metaphysical interpretation of his argument. It is thus rather surprising to see that the best interpreters— at least as far as we know— have not stressed this radical decision. Actually, the sources that scholars have at times attempted to assign to the formula “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” (id quo majus cogitari nequit)iS confirm, on the contrary, that when Anselm passes to melius, he does so under the aegis of Augustine. Here are some examples: i . Confessions, VII, 4, 6: “ I had already established that the incorrupt­ ible is better than the corruptible, and so I confessed that whatever you are, you are incorruptible. Nor could there have been or be any soul capable of conceiving that which is better than you, who are the supreme and highest good. Since it is most true and certain that the incorruptible is superior to the corruptible, as I had al­ ready concluded, had it been the case that you are not incorrupt-

15 6

CHAPTER SEVEN

ible, I could in thought have attained something better than my God.” 2. De doctrina Christiana, I, 7 (translated by D. W. Robertson [New York, 1958], p. 71): “ For when the one God of gods is thought of, even by those who recognize, invoke, and worship other gods either in Heaven or on earth, he is thought of in such a way that the thought seeks to attain something than which there is nothing better or more sublime.” 3. De moribus Manichaeorum, 11, 24 (trans., vol. 4, p. 76): “ That God is the supreme good, and that than which nothing can be or be conceived better, we must either understand or believe, if we wish to keep clear of blasphemy.” 36 4. Moreover, Boethius’ Philosophiae consolatio, III, 10, may be said to bridge the gap between Augustine and Anselm: “The common concert of men’s minds proves that God, the principle of all things, is good. For since nothing can be imagined better than God, who doubts that that than which nothing is better is good? And reason demonstrates God to be good in such a way that it convinces us that He is perfectly good. For unless He were so, He could not be the principle of all things. For there would be something better than Him, having perfect goodness, which could seem to be of greater antiquity and eminence than Him” (trans. [Cambridge, 1946], pp. 267, 269 [modified]). This actually consti­ tutes more than simply an outline of the argument deployed by the Monologion

?1

Thus the second thesis we have favored in Anselm finds a specula­ tive articulation in the two treatises that concern the argument, and is also supported by the patristic tradition. Far from being simply a detail of formulation or an inconsequential originality, it actually constitutes its strictly theological identification, removed from any metaphysical interpretation. God is not defined by means of any con­ cept of the essence, and his presumed essence is not regulated by the ousia, but on the contrary can only be thought as it offers itself— beyond Being, in the horizon of the good.

5. The Cartesian Double Argument We have now reached enough conclusions to be in a position to an­ swer the last question we posed earlier.

IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

157

(c) At least one of the figures of the argument— i.e., the one origi­ nally provided by Anselm— does not satisfy the two distinctive char­ acteristics of the “ontological argument,” since it is not based on a concept of God and does not identify divine essence with, or through, Being. Anselm’s argument is therefore not ontological— that is to say, it does not belong to the metaphysical interpretation of the argument. This conclusion should not come as a surprise, given the abundant and constraining internal evidence that supports it. However, it can still be reinforced by the following three external confirmations: (a) The independence of Anselm’s argument with regard to ontol­ ogy in general (i.e., vis-a-vis the Seinsfrage) does not relegate it to a conceptual exile. Rather, it indicates that God’s transcendence must be understood starting from the overeminence of the good and no longer from the maximum of being. God is transcendent only through the overeminence of the sovereign good: “For that is su­ preme which so excels others that it has neither an equal nor a supe­ rior. Now, what is supremely good is also supremely great” (Monologion, I, 15, 9 - 1 1 ). Here Anselm echoes a fundamental Pauline paradigm: What overeminently goes beyond knowledge is called Christ’s charity (rather than divine essence or divine Being), “know the love of God which passes knowledge, that you might be filled with all the fullness of God” (Ephesians 3:19). The only overeminence to reach God does not belong to Being or to essence, but to what desig­ nates Him beyond being and essence, namely, the good or charity. (b) This transfer of the argument from the horizon of Being to that of love is accompanied by a refusal in principle to construct a concept of the divine essence, whatever it may consist of: If we know that God is, we attain this knowledge by means of the concept that we have no concept of Him, rather than through the concept that we do. This decision inscribes Anselm in the lineage of Dionysius and of speculative theology; here the moment of theological negation plays a purely critical role and establishes that, in the case of God, knowing exactly implies not only not knowing by means of a concept (of the essence), but also knowing that this very absence of knowledge represents the only appropriate knowledge. For it is a question of “ see[ing] and know[ing] in non-vision and non-knowledge non-vision and non-knowledge itself, which surpasses vision and knowledge; for this is what it means to truly see and know, and praise overessentially the overessential by making abstraction of all beings.” 38 Hence, An­ selm belongs to speculative theology rather than to a metaphysics

I

$8

CHAPTER SEVEN

constituted on the basis of ontotheology. The ambiguity of the usual debate on the status and the validity of the “ontological argument” arises because this essential distinction is generally ignored. Once it is termed “ ontological,” the argument uses presuppositions and has ambitions that are not only missing in Anselm’s argument but are actually contradicted by it. Conversely, the Anselmian argument takes its place in a theological tradition in which the transcendence of the good subjects all dogmatic pretensions of the concept to a criti­ cal test that metaphysics would always attempt to spare the “ ontologi­ cal argument” from, and thus spare itself from as well. Anselm’s ar­ gument differs from the “ ontological argument” as much as critical speculative theology differs from ontotheology, or as much as the acknowledgment of “that than which a greater cannot be thought” is opposed to the identification of being with thought, or that contem­ plation refutes absolute knowledge by means of concepts. (c) Yet this theoretical dilemma surfaced only as the result of a slow historical evolution. During this time of latency, can we identify thinkers who occupy intermediate and still indefinite positions? Actu­ ally we find at least one: Descartes. Meditation I I I and Meditation V both present a proof of the existence of God, although these two proofs actually outline two possible interpretations of the same Ansel­ mian argument. First, it is clear that Meditation V recapitulates Anselm’s argu­ ment, though perhaps without understanding it well. But it interprets it metaphysically, by introducing on the one hand a concept of divine essence that is given the same epistemological status assigned to mathematical ideas and, on the other hand, by assimilating divine essence to the necessary being. Descartes thereby opens the way that will lead to Kant and Hegel, and brings Anselm’s argument closer to the causa sui, therefore inscribing it in advance in an ontotheological constitution. Second, when developing the a posteriori proof on the basis of the i idea of the infinite within me— i.e., within a finite mind— Meditation \I I I recapitulates and maintains what Meditation V had missed and eliminated from Anselm’s argument— namely, the critical impossi­ bility of establishing any comprehensible concept of God. Defined as infinite, God escapes the hold of the concept; “ the idea of the infinite, if it is to be a true idea, cannot be grasped at all, since the impossibility of being grasped is contained in the formal definition of the infinite.” Here Descartes almost literally echoes Anselm, who

IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL?

1 59

writes: “ our previous reflection rationally comprehends that it is in­ comprehensible how the supreme wisdom knows the things it cre­ ated.” 39Descartes was thus correct to not yet call the argument “ onto­ logical” : He knew how to respect the claims of the infinite to incomprehensibility. For one must make a choice when offering any proof of the existence of God: either reducing God to an essence that may be understood by means of concepts, thus reducing Him to an idol, or critiquing the power to know from the standpoint of the requirement of incomprehensibility of what is to be thought. We asked at the outset whether Anselm’s argument was ontologi­ cal or not. We can now provide at least the outline of an answer. Clearly, the argument uses a meaning of the Being of being, since it concludes that God is. This simple fact, however, is not enough to make the argument ontological. For historical reasons first of all: An­ selm’s reasoning develops in an intellectual context that lacks the very notion of ontology (which does not appear until the seventeenth century) and the interpretation of Being on the basis of existence (which by virtue of its excellence is here the opposite of essence). This historical point also throws into relief a deeper historical evi­ dence: Anselm does not apprehend the idea of God starting from the question of God’s being. It is clear that, like all his creatures, God must exist; but what is at stake in the argument ultimately goes be­ yond this meager result. If God exists— as He does—He does so as summurn bonum; thus, He appears as sovereign only as the primary and ultimate good, from which all creatures originate and to which they all return. The demonstration that God exists simply confirms intelligibly a dialogic interplay, a dialogic situation, in which, from the outset, even before God’s existence is confirmed, invocation, prayer, the request, and the giving of thanks had already designated Him as the absolute, anterior, preexistent interlocutor. The Proslogion, for instance, opens by a self-invitation to pray, as if God already existed, even before the argument begins: “ Speak now to God: ‘I seek your countenance, O Lord, your countenance I seek’ ” (Proslogion, I, 97, 9-10). It closes with an eschatological prayer: “until I enter into the joy of my Lord, who is God, three in one, blessed forever. Amen” (XXVI, 122, 1-2). Indeed, God must be: Yet this is not an objective or a glory, only a means, which enables one to pray to Him with the full realization that He is the transcendental good and, in this sense, the sovereign good. To be sure, one must know that God is, but only in order to use intelligibly the horizon that, in advance, He has always

i6 o

CHAPTER SEVEN

already opened to the listening mind. The question, even when set­ ting out to demonstrate that the sovereign good exists, does not pri­ marily consist in thinking it in terms of the two alternatives of being or not being; for being does not define or exhaust God’s essence, nor can it reach the eminence of the good. Being offers a path, a humbly indispensable path, to the overeminent good of a God who must be loved. Although the question of being also concerns God, God is never circumscribed within the “ question of being,” as a horizon that would precede or predetermine Him. God is, in order simply to give Himself and to receive praise. Then, if the argument is not properly speaking ontological, can what Anselm reaches by means of it, and what he calls God, belong to an ontotheology? Any ontotheology defines a locus and a function for the divine by maximizing the determinations of the being of be­ ing; hence, being par excellence concentrates and accomplishes in itself the common characteristics of any being. Evidently, an onto­ theology can only establish this predetermined figure of the divine as being par excellence on the basis of the conditions that are estab­ lished in general for common being, thus justifying and exemplifying it. But if Anselm’s argument does not define God by means of the norms of an ontology, it cannot inscribe Him in the architecture of any ontotheology either. Besides, the Proslogion could not include God in an ontotheology since in general it does not establish a mean­ ing of the being of being: How could it determine a being par excel­ lence on the basis of being, when it leaves the being of common being entirely indeterminate? The complete indifference of the Proslogion toward the “ question of being,” and particularly toward the determi­ nation of the being of being in general, prevents it and forbids it from pretending to determine God onto(-theo-)logically. The argument is therefore not ontological because, first of all, it does not belong to ontotheology. These two findings only confirm that Anselm’s enterprise is not concerned with the “ question of be­ ing” but instead with that of the sovereignty of the good. Thus, far from unconsciously inaugurating the metaphysical enterprise of the demonstration of the proofs of the existence of God— and hence the 'death of God” — Anselm’s argument marks, on the threshold or in the margins of the emerging metaphysics, a thought of God that is absolutely free.

Notes Chapter One 1. L a Naissance de la paix, A T V , 619, 11. 6 -9 . T h is ballet (which we attribute to Descartes, according to G . Rodis-Lew is, Descartes: Biographie [Paris, 1995], p. 349, in spite o f R. A. Watson, “ René Descartes D id N ot Write L a Naissance de la Paix, ” A P A Proceedings 62 [1989], and “ Descartes n’est pas l’auteur de L a Naissance de la paix, ” Archives de Philosophie 53, no. 4 [1990]) was performed on 9 December 1649, that is, about thirty years after the dreams. These two dates bracket the entirety o f Descartes’ strictly philosophical work. 2. Thus, J . Maritain: “ It is undeniably very annoying to find at the origin o f modern philosophy a ‘cerebral episode,’ to quote Auguste Comte, which would call forth from our savants, should they meet it in the life of some devout personage, the most disturbing neuropathological diagnosis” (The Dream o f Descartes, Together with Some Other Essays, translated by M . L . Andison [New York, 1944], pp. 1 5 - 16 ) .

3. AT X, 54, 1. 3ff.

4. M ore than in Freud himself, who remained very circumspect in his Briefe an Maxime Leroy über den Traurn des Descartes, in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 12 (Vienna, 1934) (French translation first published in M . L e R oy, Descartes, le philosophe au masque [Paris 1929], vol. 1, p. 89ff., and later in F . Pasche, “ Métaphysique et Inconscient,” Revue française de psychanalyse [19 8 1]), we find a significant example of this in D. Lew in Bertram, Dreams and the Uses o f Regression (New York, 1958), or (for a Jungian approach) in M . L . von Franz, Der Traum des Descartes, Zeitlose Dokumente der Seele (Zu­ rich, 1952). 5. See G . Poulet, “ L e Songe de Descartes,” in Etudes sur le temps humain (Paris, 19 51), vol. 1, p. 63ff.; J.-M . Wagner, “ Esquisse du cadre divinatoire des songes de Descartes,” in “ Descartes et le Baroque,” Baroque 6 (1973); J . Barchilon, “ L es songes de Descartes du 10 novembre 16 19 et leur inter­ prétation,” Papers o f French Seventeenth Century Literature 20 (1984).

IÓ2

NOTES TO PAGES 3 - 6

6. J.-M . Wagner’s question: “ D id Descartes actually dream or did he pretend that he did?” (“ Esquisse,” p. 89) does not seem pertinent here, for at least three reasons: (a) the verdict o f authenticity that has been repeatedly upheld by various critics, cf. A T X , 1. 175 , H. Gouhier and F. Alquié, Des­ cartes: Oeuvres philosophiques, (Paris, 1973), vol. 1, p. 6 1, etc.; (b) the charac­ teristics o f these dreams, whose importance resides less in themselves than in the conceptual interpretation they undergo (see below); (c) tradition, whose consistency has decided that, for us, the Olympica should be interpreted within the framework o f the Cartesian corpus; additionally, their rejection too entails a relation to Cartesian studies. T h e possibly apocryphal nature o f the dreams thus does not resolve the problem o f their Cartesian interpre­ tation. See G . Simon, “ Descartes, le rêve et la philosophie au X V IIe siècle,” Revue des sciences humaines 2 1 1 , no. 3 (1988), who clearly stresses the gradual disqualification of dreams and their status during the course o f Descartes’ evolution. 7. F . Alquié, in Descartes, vol. 1, p. 52, n. 3, supports M . de Corte, “ L a dialectique poétique de Descartes,” Archives de philosophie 13 (1937): 12 5 (against G . Milhaud, Descartes savant [Paris, 19 2 1], p. 5 gff.), and H. G ou­ hier, Les premières pensées de Descartes (Paris, 1958): “ not a religious experi­ ence, but a religious explanation o f an experience” (p. 53). 8. See, respectively, Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ha Ilae, q. 95, a. 6; and Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum (Frankfurt, 16 13 ), p. 1063. Sim i­ larly, the forms o f mania according to Plato, Phaedo, 244b-45c, and enthusi­ asm according to Democritus (“ met enthousiasmou khai ierou pneumatos,” Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, edited by H. Diels and W. Krantz [1966], vol. 2, p. 146, 68 [18 ]); or Cicero: “ For I have often heard that no good poet can exist without excitement (which they say is left behind in the writings o f Democritus and Plato) and without something like an inspired frenzy,” (De oratore II, 46). 9. Timaeus, 7 1a —72c. 10. We cannot help but compare this “ prayer to G od” to the well-known hymn of Compline: “ T e lucis ante terminum / Rerum creator poscimus / U t pro tua dementia / Sis praesul et custodia. / Procul recendant somnia / E t noctium phantasmata; / Hostemque nostrum comprime, / N e polluantur corpora. / Praesta, Pater omnipotens, / Per Jesum Christum Dominum / Qui tecum in perpetuum / Regnat cum Sancto Spiritu.” T h is hymn, which was so well known that it was cited by Dante, is an anonymous work from the sixth century a .d . according to F . J. E. Raby (The Oxford Book of Medieval Latin Verse [1974], p. 455ff.). A. Schwerd, on the other hand, attributes it to Gregory the Great (Hymnen und Sequenzen [Munich, 1954], pp. 4 4 -4 5, 94—95). See similar musings in J. Fontialis, De Idea mirabili Mathesêos de Ente (Paris, n.d.), passim. 1 1 . Optics V I, A T V I, 1 3 1 , 11. 1 0 - 1 7 , and perhaps also the use of the

NOTES TO PAGE

10

word espèces in the Studium bonae mentis, A T X , 2 0 1 , 1. gff. T h is connection was outlined (although without reference to the Optics) by G . Sebba in The Dream o f Descartes, assembled from manuscripts and edited by Richard A. Watson (Carbondale, 111., 1987), p. 23. 12. Connection suggested by F . Alquié in Descartes, vol. 1, p. 560. For other Cartesian and non-Cartesian texts on the unity o f the sciences, see the notes in Jean -Luc M arion, René Descartes: Règles utiles et claires pour la direction de l ’esprit en la recherche de la vérité (The Hague, 1977), pp. 9 8 10 1 (especially A T X , 193, 1. 12 and 2 17 , 11. 2 3-24). 13. Corpus poetarum corresponds here to the abbreviation o f the title of an anthology by P. Brossaeus (Pierre de L a Brosse), Corpus omnium veterum poetarum latinorum, 2 vols. (Lyon, 1603; Geneva, 16 11) . Descartes used it as a source o f quotations from the L a Flèche period onward, as demonstrated by J.-R . Armogathe and V. Carraud, “ Bulletin cartésien X V ,” Archives de philosophie 50, no. 1 (1987). Vagueness poses a problem here, since a second interpretation appears several lines later: “ B y the poets collected in the anthology, he understood Revelation and Enthusiasm, for the favors of which he did not despair at all” (184, 11. 3 5 -3 7 ). Does the difference stem from the fact that the first interpretation occurs during sleep (184, 11. 35—37), while the second occurs when Descartes is awake (184, 1. 34)? No, for this gap, as we shall see, is not significant. N or does the divergence come from a distinction between the “ Recueil de Poésie” and “ les Poètes” : noth­ ing supports this, while on the contrary everything occurs “ along the same lines” (184, 1. 34). We should therefore read this sequence from the per­ spective o f “ Revelation” with reference to the Discourse: “ I revered our the­ ology, and aspired as much as anyone else to reach heaven” (A T V I, 8, 11. 8-9 ), echoing “ for the favors o f which he did not despair at all” and “ to undertake an examination o f them and succeed, I would need to have some extraordinary aid from heaven and be more than a mere man” (8, 11. 1 5 17). These are similar expressions for two different positions on speculative theology. 14. L et us recall the quadripartite nature of philosophy in Scipio D u pleix, Logique, Physique, Ethique et Métaphysique (Paris, 1600—16 10), or Eustache de Saint Paul, Summa philosophica quadripartita, de rebus dialecticis, moralibus, physicis et metaphysicis (Paris, 1609). Ever since the Nicomachean Ethics, wisdom (morals) belongs to the “ material” and sublunary indetermi­ nacy, and as such is opposed to the abstract rigor o f the sciences. 15. E. Gilson, Commentaire du Discours de la Méthode (Paris, 1967), p. 93ff. See, for instance, Charron: “ Their first precept is kinder toward wisdom than toward science and art . . . T h e world, however, does just the opposite, pursuing art, science, learning . . . What greater folly o f the world than to admire science, learning, or memory more than native wisdom? However, not everyone commits this folly in the same spirit: Some are sim­

NOTES TO PAGES 1 1 - 1 2

ply led by custom, thinking that wisdom and science are not very different . . . those people should be ta u g h t. . . N ot only are the two quite different, but . . . they are almost never found together, . . . each usually prevents the other: someone who is very learned is scarcely wise, and one who is wise is not learned. There are indeed some exceptions, but they are quite rare.” And, later: “ Science is a great piling up of others’ goods; it is the careful collection o f what one has seen, heard said, and read in books” (De la sagesse, III, 14 [Bordeaux, 16 0 1; Paris, 1604; Paris, 1986], pp. 685-87). Or also: “ Science is in truth a fine ornament . . . but not everyone agrees on how to rank it . . . I place it well below . . . wisdom” (I, 61; ibid., p. 365). F o r Montaigne, similarly: “ Learned we may be with another man’s learning: we can only be wise with wisdom o f our own” (Essays, I, 25), and “ T ru ly, learning is a most useful accomplishment and a great one. Those who despise it give ample evidence o f their animal-stupidity. Y et I do not prize its worth at that extreme value given to it by some, such as the philosopher Erillus who lodged Supreme Good in it, holding that it was within the power o f learning to make us wise and contented. That, I do not believe— nor what others have said: that learning is the M other o f virtue and that all vice is born o f Ignorance” (Essays, II, 12 , “ A n Apology for Raymond Sebond,” p. 489). Pascal will maintain this opposition: “Jesus without wealth or any outward show o f knowledge has his own order o f holiness. . . . With what pomp and marvelously magnificent array he came in the eyes o f the heart which perceive wisdom” (Pensées, Br. §793, L . §308; translated by A. J. K railsheimer [New York, 1966], p. 124), with Descartes clearly in mind: “ write against those who probe science too deeply. Descartes” (Br. §553, L . 360/ 1; trans., p. 220). 16. We are following Leibniz here (see M arion, René Descartes: Règles utiles et claires, p. 96). Sapientia, although rarely encountered, is found in A T X , 375, 1. 24, “ studium sapientiae,” and 442, 1. 7, “ altior sapientia.” 17. T h is is F . Alquié’s interpretation in Descartes, vol. 1, p. 577. Compare with the theme o f the lost traveler, Discourse, 16, 1. 3 0 - 1 7 , 11. 4 and 24, 11. I8 -2 5 . T h is lends a very different conceptual dignity to the project o f a pilgrimage to Loretto (A T X , 186, 1. 3 4 -18 7 , 1. 2; 2 17 , 1. 25ff.), since it is a path determined by theology with an eye toward morals. See the comments by S. Breton in “ ‘Egarés en quelque fo rê t. . . ’ : L e problème du commence­ ment, ” in Libres commentaires (Paris, 1990) chap. 1. 18. Fo r “ rectum veritatis iter,” see A T X , 366, 1. 6; for “ veritatis via” see 36 0 ,1. 24; 399, 11. 2 2 -2 3 ; 4°i> H- 2 3 -2 5 ; 4 0 5,11. 1 5 - 1 6 ; 425, 11. 1 0 - 1 2 . Fo r this theme in the Discourse, see M arion, “ A propos d’une sémantique de la méthode,” Revue internationale de philosophie 103, no. 1 (1973). (See also G . Crapulli’s comments and my replies in “ Bulletin cartésien IV ,” A r­ chives de philosophie, 38, no. 2 (1975): 280-85.) 19. T h is recollection o f Pythagoras may perhaps be confused with others

NOTES TO PAGES

12- 18

o f famous texts o f the N ew Testament: M atthew 5:37, 2 Corinthians 1 : 1 7 — 19, Jam es 5:12. 20. See F . Alquié, Descartes, vol. 1, p. 586. 2 1. On the “ melon,” see the successive hypotheses proposed by G. Rodis-Lew is: the encyclopedia o f knowledge (in L ’oeuvre de Descartes [Paris, 19 7 1], pp. 5 iff., 452) and omnipotence (“ ‘L ’alto e il basso’ e i sogni di Descartes,” Rivista difilosofia 80 (1989): 2oyff.). G . Sebba suggests the possi­ bility o f an error in the text (“ melon” instead o f “ Melzm,” op. cit., pp. 14, 52). B ut the likely explanation for the “ wind” may be found in the actual yards o f the College o f L a Flèche (now used as a military academy): it really does blow through two arched doors, facing each other at two opposite sides o f a square yard, creating a strong stream o f air, which is really felt by those. who cross the yard to go to the college chapel. 22. In 16 19 the “ little portraits in copperplate” ( 1 8 4 , 11. 7 -8 ) resist selfinterpretation, since they enter into it only as a last-minute anecdote: “ he sought no further explanation for them after an Italian painter paid him a visit on the next day” ( 1 8 5 , 11. 6—8). A strictly theoretical interpretation will appear only in the Optics o f 1637, which uses this example to explicate what I have elsewhere termed “ defiguration” : “ Y ou can see this in the case of engravings: consisting simply o f a little ink placed here and there on a piece o f paper, they represent to us forests, towns, people, and even battles and storms; and although they make us think o f countless different qualities in these objects, it is only in respect o f shape that there is any real resemblance” (A T V I, 1 1 3 , 11. 8 - 1 5 ; see Marion, Su r la théologie blanche de Descartes [Paris, 19 8 1], section 12 , pp. 2 3 1 —63). Here the dream does seem to be premonitory, in spite of (rather than because o f) its original interpretation. 23. A T X , 1 8 2 , 1. 4; 1 8 5 , 1. 20; 186, line 1. See F . Alquié, Descartes, vol. 1, p. 59. We do not see why a connection between the “ malus Spiritus” of 16 19 and the “ malignus genius” o f 16 4 1 should a priori be incongruous. On this point J. Maritain, The Dream, p. 15: “ Could it be by any chance cousin to the Mischievous Genius o f the Méditations?” although an isolated occur­ rence, was quite pertinent. 24. Emphasis added. See the same indifference toward consciousness in A T V II, 461, 11. 2 1- 2 8 . 25. T h e history o f the cogito in the Cartesian textual corpus has yet to be written (see below, chapter 5, §2). Only then will it be possible to evaluate F . Alquié’s analyses o f the metaphysical distance between the cogito o f 1637 and that o f 16 4 1 (see below, chapter 2, §1). 26. See J. Deprun, “ Descartes et le ‘génie’ de Socrate (Note sur un traité perdu et sur une lettre énigmatique),” in L a passion de la raison: Hommage à Ferdinand Alquié, edited by N . Grimaldi and J .- L . M arion (Paris, 1983), p. I 3 5 f f , appearing also in De Descartes au romantisme: Etudes historiques et dogmatiques (Paris, 1987).

NOTES TO PAGES 2 0 - 2 2

Chapter T w o 1 . I have tried to answer these questions in Sur l ’ontologie grise de Des­ cartes (Paris, 1975), §30, pp. 18 1- 8 3 . See W. Rôd, “ L ’explication rationelle entre méthode et métaphysique,” in Le Discours et sa méthode, pp. 8çff. 2. Letter to Mersenne, M arch 1637, A T I, 349, 11. 2 3—28. 3. T o X , M ay 1637, respectively A T I, 3 7 0 , 11. 10, 2 2 - 2 3 , 2 5 -2 8 . Simi­ larly: “ In this Plan [i.e., Discourse] I explain a part of my method, I try to prove the existence o f God and o f the soul apart from the body” (T o M er­ senne, Leiden, M arch 1636, A T I, 3 3 9 , 11. 25—27). For a more general diag­ nostic, see the essays in Problématique et réception du Discours de la Méthode et des Essais, edited by H. Méchoulan (Paris, 1988), including my introduc­ tion, pp. 9 - 2 1 . 4. T h is hypothesis does not assume that the Meditations are deployed without a method, or even without the method. M any clues indicate the opposite, including the following statement: “ And finally, I was strongly pressed to undertake this task by several people who knew that I had devel­ oped a method for resolving certain difficulties in the sciences— not a new method (for nothing is older than the truth), but one which they had seen me use with some success in other areas; and I therefore thought it m y duty to make some attempt to apply it to the matter in hand” (Letter to the Sorbonne, A T V II, 3 , 11. 22—28). Similarly, see the formula “ rationum mearum series et nexus” (“ the proper order of m y arguments and the connection between them,” Preface to the Reader, A T V II, 9, 1. 29; see also 36, 1. 30, A T X , 383, 11. 2 4 -2 5 , 382, 11. 1 3 —14). See below, chapter 3, §6. 5. L . Liard, Descartes (Paris 1882), pp. 223 and 69, respectively. How­ ever, in all fairness, we should stress that Liard admits that “ a profound unity, which should be stressed, is hidden beneath this dualism” (p. 274); in fact, the unity— namely, the metaphysical sanction o f science— is very superficial. Which is exactly A. Boyce Gibson’s position: “ The appeal be­ yond science, however, leaves the details of science unquestioned. Meta­ physical sanction is one thing; metaphysical intrusion, another” (The Philoso­ phy o f Descartes [London, 1932], p. 8). A. Baillet was probably the first to propose this line o f interpretation: “ It is claimed nevertheless that what little he [Descartes] offered is more worthy o f the title logic or entry into Philoso­ phy and all the other sciences than Aristotle’s Organon, because it is more simple and less Metaphysical and it appears more proper to minds which are not yet prepared with any knowledge” (La vie de M. Descartes, IV , 2; [Paris, 16 9 1], vol. 1, p. 283). See, on the other hand, H. Caton, “ T h e Status o f Metaphysics in the Discourse on M ethod,” M an and World, 5, no. 4 (1972).

6. Respectively, E. Gilson, René Descartes: Discours de la Méthode, texte et commentaire (Paris, 1925), p. 284; and H. Lefèvre, Le criticisme de Descartes

NOTES TO PAGES

2 2 -2 5

167

(Paris, 1958), pp. 3 0 2 -3 . F . Bouillier clearly illustrates this thesis by stating that “ Descartes’ entire philosophy is present, in abridged form, in the Dis­ course on the Method” (Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne, 3rd ed. [Paris, 1868], vol. 1, p. 61). 7. Thus Bouillier: “ L et us now examine how in Meditation III, he devel­ ops and strengthens by new demonstrations what he had only alluded to and sketched in the Discourse on the Method” (op. cit., vol. i, p. 87; see also p. 67). In the same perspective, G . Rodis-Lew is stresses the continuity between the Discourse and the Meditations so much that a potential “ weakness in the argument” in 16 37 is simply explained by “ circumspection” ( L ’oeuvre de Descartes [Paris, 19 7 1], pp. 220, 228). See also, in spite of its great subtlety, the recent contribution by J.-M . Beyssade: “ Finally, against all the propo­ nents o f a chronological explanation, we maintain that as early as 16 2 8 1629 (the date assigned in the Discourse to these first meditations which are examined in Part Four), Descartes knew exactly what one could expect, and what one could not, from metaphysical doubt” (“ Certitude et fondement: L ’évidence de la raison et la véracité divine dans la métaphysique du Discours de la Méthode,” in L e Discours et sa méthode, op. cit., p. 363). T h e origin of this interpretation can probably be traced back to Father Nicolas J. Poisson: “ There are therefore many things in the Method that I will momentarily ignore when I know that I will encounter them somewhere else; at which point, M r. Descartes having spoken about them at greater length, I will also add the explanations that I deem necessary” (Commentaires ou Remarques sur la Méthode de René Descartes [Vendôme, 1670], p. 12 1). 8. T o Mersenne, M arch 1637, A T I, 3 5 3 , 1. 14. Although H . Lefèvre (Le criticisme de Descartes, p. 3o6n.i) criticized F . Alquié’s thesis (La découverte métaphysique de l ’homme [Paris, 1950, 1987], pp. 14 7-4 8 ), I follow Alquié who, besides, reaches conclusions similar to those o f O. Hamelin (Le système de Descartes [Paris, 19 1 1 ] , p. 116 ), E. Gilson (op. cit. pp. 286ff., 290, etc.), and H. Gouhier (Essais sur Descartes [Paris, 1937], pp. 294ff.)— in spite of his acknowledgment in L a pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris, 1962), p. 25. 9. Alquié, L a découverte, pp. 145, 146, 150 (see also p. 154 ; or Descartes: Oeuvres philosophiques [Paris 1963], vol. 1, p. 6o4n.i). In this sense, showing that the Discourse does not contradict the Meditations and even at times an­ nounces it (which J.-M . Beyssade saw so well) is not enough to prove the chronological invariance o f Descartes’ metaphysics between 1637 and 16 4 1. 10. Alquié, L a découverte, p. 147. 1 1 . A X , 27 April 1637(F), A T I, 3 7 0 , 11. 2 6 -2 7 ; or Letter to Mersenne, M arch 1637, A T I, 349, 1. 26. 12. Basing him self on the Dictionnaire de l ’Académie (1694 edition), vol. 2, p. 2 3 1, Gilson suggests that metaphysical here would simply mean abstract.

NOTES TO PAGES 2 6 - 3 1

Even Alquié contests this reductionist interpretation, arguing that “ the med­ itations mentioned by Descartes [concern] precisely metaphysics as such” (Descartes: Oeuvres, vol. 1, p. 6oin.3). Actually there is no contradiction between these two positions, since Descartes, in line with his contemporar­ ies, and following Aristotle, defines metaphysics as abstraction par excel­ lence; “ abducere mentem a sensibus” (“ withdrawing the mind from sensa­ tion” ) is the equivalent o f making the metaphysical meditation possible (see additional remarks in Su r le prisme métaphysique de Descartes [Paris, 1986], chap. 1, §2, especially pp. 2 3 -3 3 ). I f Descartes seems “ hesitant” here (Des­ cartes: Oeuvres, vol. 1, p. 602), it is not about the metaphysical character of this project, but rather about how to present it. 13. Aristotle, Metaphysics, A 3, 982 a 3; see also 982 b 8; B 2, 996 b 3— 4, b 3 1 - 3 3 . T h e occurrences o f K , 1059 a 35, b 13 , 1060 a 4, 6, etc. are probably apocryphal. P. Aubenque, who uses this formula as the central theme in his classic thesis, stresses that “ Aristotle him self presents the sci­ ence o f being as being a science that is only ‘ sought’ and probably ‘continu­ ally sought’ ” (Le problème de l ’être chez Aristote [Paris, 1962], p. 267). Let us note, however, that the text mentioned here (see Z 1, 1028 b 2) does not precisely concern the science that is being sought but the QV sought Çïjiovjievov. Another Cartesian formula is “ philosophy which I and other devotees are engaged in pursuing” (Letter to Voetius, A T V III, 2, 26, 11.

2-3). 14. On the emergence o f the causa sui, see the comments in Jean -Lu c M arion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes (Paris, 1981), §18. On its ontotheological function, see S u r le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, §§19—20. 15. T h e occurrences o f à cause que (DM, 32, line 1; 38, 11. 19, 27, 29; 39, 1. 2 1) cannot constitute an objection here, since they indicate only a relatively undetermined relation, rather than efficiency or a foundation. Effet appears only once in Part Four, meaning en effet (34, line 1). These data come from the indispensable computerized work o f P. A. Cahné, Index du Discours de la Méthode de René Descartes (Rome, 1977). Th e absence o f cause in Part Four must hold our attention, especially since the word appears twenty one times in the other parts o f the text (cause, 14 times; à cause, 7); the verb causer appears on three occasions (4 4 , 1. 8; 5 5 , 1. 13 ; 5 6 , 1. 27). Thus the scientific use of causality is deployed at the same time that metaphysics refuses causality. T h is paradox in itself would be worthy o f study. 16. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 3 2 2 -2 3 ; see also p. 324. 17. Alquié, L a découverte, p. 147. Same judgment, several years later, upon editing the Discourse: “ the idea o f God, being superior to me, can only have been caused by God. See Meditation / / / ” (Descartes: Oeuvres, vol. 1, p. 605). And again: “ T h e principle o f causality used here [DM IV] consti­ tutes for Descartes a rational evidence” (vol. 1, p. 606). Alquié here does exactly what he criticized Gilson for— namely, commenting on the Discourse

NOTES TO PAGES 3 1 - 3 5

on the basis o f the Meditations, against all chronological evidence. M y criti­ cism here simply repeats Alquié’s own precepts. J.-M . Beyssade does not hesitate to interpret dependency (DM, 34, 11. 16 —17) as if it were a causal relation (La philosophie première de Descartes [Paris, 1979], p. 284). 18. T o Mersenne, M arch 1637, A T I, 3 5 0 , 11. 1 - 5 ; also T o ***, M arch 1637, A T I, 353, 11. 2—8. In Descartes: Oeuvres, vol. 1, p. 58 7^ 2, Alquié comments: “ Descartes thus unequivocally admits the metaphysical short­ coming o f Part Four o f the Discourse on the Method” ; indeed— yet here this indisputable shortcoming concerns above all the existence o f God, which is mentioned first, rather than the whole of Part Four. Finally, see Letter to Vatier, 22 February 1638, A T I, 560, 11. 7 - 1 1 . 19. T o Mersenne, M arch 1637, A T I, 349, 11. 2 9 - 3 1 and 350, 1. 3; see Letter to ** *, M arch 1637, A T I, 353, line I- 3 5 4 , 1. 15. L et us note once again that Descartes him self admits the shortcomings o f the metaphysics of 1637 in the correspondence that immediately follows its writing; this ac­ knowledgment held the attention o f those commentators who were tempted to attribute Descartes’ speculative greatness to a repetitive immobility. There is no ground for assuming that Descartes had less critical sense or inventive subtlety than his modern readers. T h e issue is not whether or not to accept the existence o f a gap between the metaphysics o f 16 37 and 16 4 1, since Descartes him self acknowledges it, but rather to understand it, as he him self did. 20. Replies IV, A T V II, 219 , 1. 1 0 - 2 1 3 , 1. 7. T h e following difficulty persists between 1637 and 16 4 1: “ Without wrecking the order I could not prove that the soul is distinct from the body before proving the existence o f G od” (To Mersenne, 3 1 December 1640, A T III, 272, 11. 3—6). 2 1. See the analysis in Marion, Su r la théologie blanche de Descartes, §16, pp. 378 -8 3. See the clarification by J.-C . Pariente, “ Problèmes logiques du cogito” (in Le discours et sa méthode, pp. 229—69). 22. In 1637, doesn’t the “ think” contradict also, as first principle, the fact that “ the existence o f God is the first and the most eternal o f all possible truths and the one from which alone all others proceed” (To Mersenne, 6 M ay 1630, A T I, 1 5 0 , 11. 2—4)? There is not yet any reconciliation between the (epistemological and ontic) primacy o f the ego and that o f God (creator o f essences and existences). Th e radical nature o f “ this great principle, / think, therefore I am” was pointed out clearly by N . Poisson: “ his great prin­ ciple, which is the first truth he discovered and which is also the foundation for all the subsequent truths” (Commentaires, pp. 12 7, 12 1). 23. Substance occurs only once in Part Four o f the Discourse (elsewhere in 43, 1. 26, for celestial bodies); thus substance not only qualifies the “ I think,” but also ceases to qualify God; the situation is here the exact opposite o f that o f the Meditations (Marion, Su r la théologie blanche, §7, pp. n o —19, §16, p. 395). Descartes will hesitate for a long time between these two possi-

17 0

NOTES TO PAGES 3 6 - 4 1

ble variants o f substantiality (see M arion, Su r le prisme métaphysique de Des­ cartes, chap. 3, §13, pp. i6iff.). Contemporary texts confirm the hapax o f the Discourse, 3 3 , 1, 4: “ I know that the soul is a substance distinct from the body” (A T I, 349, 11. 3 0 - 3 1) ; “ the soul is a being or a substance which is not at all corporeal.” (A T I, 3 5 3 , 11. 16 —18). Gilson notes very perceptively: “ Descartes gives him self the benefit o f substantialist realism while expurgat­ ing the notion o f substance from what it could have held of obscurity and impermeability to clear thinking” (op. cit., p. 304). On the other hand, one finds it difficult to understand Alquié’s comment on DM , 33, 1. 4: “ Here there is no ontological foundation” (La découverte, p. 150); for what other, better ontological foundation than ousia itself? 24. Aristotle, De anima, III, 5, 430 a 18; Complete Works, edited by Jon a­ than Barnes, (Princeton, 1984), p. 684. 25. T h e parallel in Meditation I I I , A T V II, 35, 11. 3 - 1 5 ( = D M , 3 3 , 11. 12 -2 4 ), does not infer from the existence o f the ego that in order to think one has to exist, but simply states, with a circumspection lacking in 1637, the validity o f clear and distinct perception. T h e famous debate that sur­ rounded the formulation “ in order to think one has to exist” almost entirely privileged theoretical considerations about knowledge and neglected the for­ mulation’s ontological realm and metaphysical status. 26. See also these instances: “ the thoughts I had o f many other things outside me” (DM, 34, 11. 2 -3 ) ; “ consider . . . each thing of which I found in m yself some idea” (DM, 3 5 , 11. 9 -10 ). Descartes— in 1637, and in 16 37 only— supports the type o f interpretation offered by P. Natorp (“Die Entwicklung Descartes’ von den Regeln bis zu den Meditationen,” Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie 10 [1897]; and Descartes’ Erkenntnistheorie: Eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Kriticismus [1892]) and by E . Cassirer (Descartes’ Kritik der mathematischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis [1899]. See Jean -Lu c M arion, “ L ’interprétation criticiste de Descartes et Leibniz (Cri­ tique d’une critique),” in Ernst Cassirer de Marbourg à New York, edited by J. Seidengart (Paris, 1990). 27. Alquié, L a découverte, pp. 152, 155. 28. Th e letter to Mersenne o f 3 1 December 1640 confirms and claims the appearance o f “ causa efficiens et totalis” (efficient and total cause) in A T V II, 4 0 , 11. 22—23: “ It is certain that there is nothing in an effect which is not contained formally or eminently in its e f f i c i e n t and t o t a l cause. I added these two words on purpose” (A T III, 274, 11. 2 0 -2 4 ; emphasis in orginal); Descartes refers precisely to the passage in Meditation I I I in ques­ tion. Moreover, this formula appears in a similar statement of the principle o f causality in order to establish the a posteriori proof, in the Principles, I, §18: “ Fo r it is very evident by the natural light not only that nothing comes from nothing but also that what is more perfect cannot be produced by— that is, cannot have as its efficient and total cause— what is less perfect.”

NOTES TO PAGES 4 1 - 4 4

This principle and this extreme form of causality make it possible to attain God from his idea, because God Himself, since 1630, is defined as an effi­ cient and total cause; the conceptual weakness of the Discourse is evident in its inability to incorporate this existing given. On the significance o f this formula, see M arion, Su r la théologie blanche de Descartes, §1, pp. 286—89. On the essential, yet obscure, link between substance and causality, see Norman Kem p Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy o f Descartes (London, 1952), chap. 12: “ ‘ Substance’ and ‘ Causality’ : T h e Roles Assigned to Them in Descartes’ Philosophy.” 29. Except that dépendance (DM, 34, 11. 8 -9 , 1 6 - 1 7 ; 35, 11- 25, 26) re­ places effet, and that dépendre (34 ,1. 29; 3 3 ,1. 6; 36, line 1) encompasses être causé (see note 17 above). On the conflictual relationship between the various Cartesian concepts o f God, see M arion, Su r le prisme métaphysique de Des­ cartes, §18, pp. 253-57 (perfection), and §19 (contradiction). That work, which concentrated on the completed metaphysics, did not attempt an analy­ sis o f the Discourse; this study aims to remedy the shortcoming. 30. H. Lefèvre notes that “ the demonstration o f the Discourse is thus simply stopped at the level o f Meditation I I ” (Le criticisme de Descartes, p. 312). But, in addition to the essential differences that remain even in this common section, one must above all determine why the Meditations could thus be “ split.” It is, and can be, only because o f the irruption o f the principle o f causality.

Chapter Three 1. Fo r an overall treatment o f this question, see Marion, Su r l ’ontologie grise de Descartes. 2. T h is was clearly shown by J.-R . Armogathe, “ Sémanthèse d ’ lD EE/ id e a chez Descartes,” in ID E A — I V Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellectuale Europeo (Rome, 1991). T h is also answers E. M . Curley’s lucid pronouncement that “ the Regulae is an early work and is inconsistent with the teaching o f Descartes’ mature works” (Descartes against the Skeptics [Cambridge, M ass., 1978], p. 103). 3. See also A T X , 4 1 5 , 11. 16 -2 0 , and 4 4 1 , 11. 9 - 1 2 . T h e interpretation o f the idea as figure goes back to the beginning o f Descartes’ career: “ the imagination employs figures in order to conceive o f bodies” (Cogitationes privatae, A T X , 2 17 , 1. 12); The World, A T X I, 176, 11. 9 -2 5 , and A T X I, 178 and 714 ; Conversation with Burman, §31: “ ideam seu potius figuram” (A T V, 162; ed. J.-M . Beyssade [Paris, 19 8 1], p. 83). See also the commen­ tary in Règles utiles et claires pour la direction de l ’esprit, translated and edited by M arion, p. 2 3 1. 4. Obviously, this characteristic o f Descartes’ figura / idea as real differs

17 2

NOTES TO PAGES 4 4 - 4 9

from Aristotle’s eidos or skhema, for the figure is imposed on the thing by the knowing mind as a means o f knowing, rather than emanating from the thing as its own phenomenon. (See M arion, Su r Vontologie grise de Descartes,

§21.) 5. See A T X , 4 1 4 , 11. 1 6 - 1 7 ; 4 1 5 , 11. 2 0 - 2 1 , 27ff. See also “ the ‘ common

sense’ where these ideas are received,” Discourse, A T V I, 55, 11. 20—21. 6. For instance, A T V II, 34, 1. 23; 35, line 1; 40, 1. 7; 4 1, 1. 20; 78, 1. 27, etc. See also Principles o f Philosophy, I, §17, A T V III, 1, 1 1 , 7, etc. 7. Examples: “ ideas sive notiones,” A T V II, 440, 1. 14; “ our ideas or notions,” Discourse, A T VI, 38, 1. 2 1, and 40, 11. 8 -9 ; “ there were certain thoughts within me which . . . came solely from the power o f thinking within me; so I applied the term ‘innate’ to the ideas or notions which are the forms o f these thoughts” (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, A T V III, 2, 3 5 8 , 11. 1 — 5). See also A. Hart, “ Descartes’ Notions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 1, no. 1 (1970). 8. “ Omnis rei idea sive conceptus,” A T V II, 166, 1. 14. 9. “ [I]deas or sensations,” A T V I, 85, 1. 18; 2 10 , 1. 16, etc. 10. Respectively, the marginal addition to the Latin translation of the Discourse (1644), A T V I, 559; T o Mersenne, 16 June 16 4 1, A T III, 383, 11. 2 - 3 ; T o Mersenne, Ju ly 16 4 1, A T III, 392, 1. 2; Replies, A T V II, 18 1, 11. 7 - 8 , and 160, 11. 7 - 8 . 1 1 . Cf. Marion, Su r Vontologie grise de Descartes, §22, pp. i32 ff.; and Des­ cartes, Regies utiles et claires pour la direction de Vesprit, translated and edited by Marion, pp. 239^ See also Hamelin, Le systeme de Descartes, pp. 8 5 !; and B. O’Neil, “ Cartesian Simple Natures,” Jou rn al o f the History ofPhiloso­ phy 10, no. 2 (1972). 12. Should we add to these lists the recapitulation, or rather the brutal transformation, o f the Aristotelian categories outlined in Rule VI, (A T X , 38 1, 11. 2 2 ff.: C S M I, 2 1 - 2 2 ) ? T h e answer is yes, insofar as the procedure here conforms only to epistemological requirements; but a negative answer is suggested insofar as the categories in question are for Descartes contami­ nated by the source from which they are derived, and will shortly disappear completely from the Cartesian system, taking on a wholly new significance. 13. Th e letter to Mersenne o f 15 April 1630 introduces both the term metaphysics (and its associated philosophical issues) and the doctrine of the creation o f the (mathematical) truths regarded as “ eternal” (A T I, 144, 11. 4 and 15 ; and 145, 11. 7 ff). 14. See, respectively, letter to Mersenne o f 13 November 1639 (A T II, 622, 11. 13 - 1 6 ) , and Principles o f Philosophy (dedicatory letter: A T V IIIA , 4 , 11. 3—6: C S M I, 192). See also the same distinction, in an extremely trun­ cated form, in the letter to Elizabeth o f 28 Ju ne 1643: “ Metaphysical thoughts, which exercise the pure intellect, help to familiarize us with the notion o f the soul; and the study o f mathematics, which exercises mainly

NOTES TO PAGES 4 9 —5 5

173

the imagination in the consideration o f shapes and movements, accustoms us to form very distinct notions o f body” (A T III, 6 9 2 , 11. 10 —16). For this distinction, and other references, see Marion, Su r le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, pp. 14 —33. 15. Alquié, L a découverte métaphysique de l ’homme chez Descartes, p. 78. F o r an analysis o f the strengths and weaknesses o f Alquié’s interpretation o f the Discourse, see M arion, “Le statut métaphysique de Discours de la méthode,” in Le Discours et sa méthode, edited by Grimaldi and Marion. ' 16. See also Rule X I I and Rule X I I I (A T X , 422, 11. 2 -6 ; 432, 11. 2 4 27: C S M I, 46 , 53). 17. Cf. letter o f end M ay 1637: “ to show that this method can be applied to everything, I have included some brief remarks on metaphysics, physics and medicine in the opening discourse” (A T I, 3 7 0 , 11. 2 5 -2 7 : C S M K , 58). 18. Cf. letter to Mersenne o f 27 M ay 1638 (A T II, 138, 11. 1 - 1 5 ) . 19. O f course, the role of the simple natures in the First Meditation re­ mains invisible unless we read it in the light o f Descartes’ earlier theory of sense perception (Rule X I I ; Optics, §1 and §4; and The World, chap. 1. In his Demons, Dreamers and Madmen, chap. 6, Frankfurt denies that the simple natures are involved here, and his French translator S. Luquet (Démons, reveurs et fous [Paris, 1989]) goes further astray by construing this position in an even more radical way (p. 78n.) (Frankfurt is, however, correct in pointing out a misunderstanding in Gueroult’s interpretation o f A T V II, 19, 11. 3 iff. in Descartes selon l ’ordre des raisons, vol. 1, pp. 34—35, and vol. 2, p. 10 1). See further M arion, Su r la théologie blanche de Descartes, §14, pp. 32of.) T h e only textual evidence for Frankfurt’s claim is that the First Meditation employs the neuter adjective Simplicia (A T V II, 20, 1. 1 1 ; C S M II, 14); or the noun res (1. 25). But this proves nothing, since in the Regulae too we find the term res as well as natura (see references in Marion, Sur Vontologie grise, p. 132). M oreover, the Fifth Meditation reintroduces the same concepts as the First, under the label “ true and immutable natures” (“ verae et immutabiles natura,” A T V II, 6 4 , 1. 1 1 : C S M II, 45). A full discus­ sion o f the issue would require a detailed account o f the concept o f “ la figuration codée,” cf. Marion, Su r le prisme. Fo r a contrasting view, cf. L a porte, Le rationalisme de Descartes (Paris, 19 45,198 8 ), pp. 13 - 4 4 ; and Curley, Descartes against the Sceptics. 20. T h e term encoded is used to underline the correspondence without resemblance that obtains between particular sensibilia and geometrical fig­ ures— a correspondence that unites, yet at the same time separates, the two sets o f related items. For this notion, see further M arion, S u r la théologie blanche, chap. 12 , pp. 2 3 iff. 2 1. T h e term incommensurable signifies irreducibility to a common stan­ dard o f measurement (immensus Lat., negative o f mensus, from mensus, from metior, to measure); the goal o f mathesis universalis in the Regulae had been

174

NOTES TO PAGES 5 6 - 5 8

just such a reduction to a common order and measure (A T X , 378). See further M arion, Sur le prisme, chap. 17 , pp. i42ff. 22. “ [NJatura corporea quae est purae Matheseos objectum” (Fifth Medi­ tation, A T V II, 7 1 , 1. 8: C S M II, 49). C S M translates pur a mathesis as “ pure mathematics,” a rendering that is debatable and, in my view, too restrictive: see the Sixth Meditation (A T V II, 7 1 , 1. 15; 74, 1. 2; and 80, 1. 10: C S M II, 50, 5 1, 55). There is an unavoidable connection here with the mathesis univer­ salis o f Rule IV , but it does not follow that the two notions are identical. T h e mathesis o f the 16 41 meditations (which is not characterized as “ universal” ) is explicitly restricted to the material (and common) simple natures, and in­ volves the use o f imagination, whereas the mathesis o f the 1627 Regulae, explicitly described as universalis, extended in principle (if not de facto) to all the simple natures, including the intellectual ones. T h e restricted scope of this science or mathesis in the Meditations nevertheless goes hand in hand with an enlarging o f the effective use made o f the simple natures. For mathesis universalis in the Regulae, see M cRae, “ Descartes: T h e Project o f a Universal Science” ; Crapulli, Mathesis universalis, genesi di una idea nel X V I secolo; M arion, Sur l ’ontologie grise, § 11; and M arion (éd.), Règles utiles, pp. 144—64, 30 2 -9 ; Perini, IIproblem a della fondazione nelle Regulae di Des­ cartes; Lachterman, “ Objectum Purae Matheseos: Mathematical Construc­ tion and Passage from Essence to Existence,” in Essays on Descartes’ M edita­ tions, edited by A. O. Rorty (Berkeley, Calif., 1986), pp. 4 35-58 . 23. As for the material simple natures, they are necessarily limited to existence, and hence to the real common simple natures, when the Sixth Meditation attempts the move from possible existence (posse existere) to ac­ tual existence (res corporeae existunt) (A T V II, 7 1, 1. 15 ; 80, A 4: C S M II, 50, 55). Even the Fourth Meditation can be reduced to a variation on the simple natures in the discussion o f cognitio, dubitatio, and ignorantia. Fo r cognitio (knowledge) and ignorantia (ignorance), see A T V II, 56, 1. 22; 57, 1. 17 ; 5 8 , 1. 9; 5 9 , 11. i7 ff. For dubitatio (doubt), see A T V II, 59, 1. 26. T h e intellectual simple nature voluntatis actio (act o f will) or volitio (volition), which appeared in the Regulae (A T X , 4 1 9 , 11. 14 —15), returns in that Fourth Meditation at A T V II, 56, 11. 28ff.; 57, 1. 12; 58, 1. 2 1; 59, 1. 2; 60, 1. 5. 24. Fo r other formulations, see A T V II, 27, 11. 2 0 -2 3 (a list o f things I am not); 34, 11. 1 8 - 2 1 (where the French translation adds “ that loves, that hates [qui aime et qui hait]” ); Principles o f Philosophy, Part I, arts. 9, 65, (C S M II, 18, 24; C S M I, 195, 216). These latter formulations allow us to get a clearer idea o f what the passion of love consists of; cf. Marion “ L ’unique Ego et l’altération de l’autre” in Archivio di filosofia 54, nos. 1 —3 (1988): 607-24. 25. T h e allusion is o f course to the title o f Gueroult’s Descartes selon l ’ordre des raisons. Gueroult stresses a contrast that is fundamental (though seldom formulated explicitly in Descartes’ writings) between the order o f

NOTES TO PAGES 5 8 - 6 4

175

the subject matter (“ l’ordre des matières” ) and the “ order of reasons” (“ celui des raisions” ) (letter to Mersenne, 24 December 1640: A T III, 266). Without contesting Gueroult’s basic thesis, I would claim that even the “ order of reasons” is worked out in terms o f certain fixed structures. 26. A T V II, 25, 11. n - 1 3 , and 27, 11. 9 - 1 0 (C S M II, 17 - 18 ) . F o r an interpretation o f these phrases, which are unique in Descartes’ work, see my analysis, M arion, Sur la théologie blanche, §16, and Su r le prisme, §§11—12. 27. Principles, Part I, art. 49. Cf. Book I, art. 10, where the ego cogito ergo sum is explicitly classified among the very simple natures (notions simplicissimae), following the order of knowledge (“ to anyone who philosophises in an orderly way [cuilibet ordine philosophandi]” ); the passage goes on to invoke intellectual simple natures (thought, certainty) and common simple natures both real (existence) and logical (the impossibility o f something’s thinking without existing). T h e famous, but sterile, debate over the status o f the presupposition pour penser il fau t être is surely due to a misunder­ standing: What is at stake here is not the formal or syllogistic premises for the cogito, but the simple natures that the cogito utilizes and, in this sense, presupposes. Cf. the evidence cited in Su r la théologie blanche, §16, pp. 372ff. 28. Note in particular that the famous highest level o f doubt in the First Meditation (the deceiving God, A T V II, 2 1 , 11. 1 —16: C S M II, 14) refers only to material simple natures (extension, shape, size, place, and arithmetical and geometrical notions); there is never any mention o f intellectual simple na­ tures (knowledge, thought, etc.). 29. Th e term substance (substantia) appears only in the second part of the Third Meditation (A T V II, 43, 1. 20: C S M II, 30); throughout the first two Meditations it has remained unknown. Leaving aside the Discourse (A T V I, 33, 1. 4; 4 3 , 1. 26: C S M I, 127, 133), it is really only in the Principles o f Philosophy that substantia is finally reintegrated among the simplicies notiones, duration, number, order, etc. (Part I, arts. 48, 49: C S M I, 208-9). On this crucial point see Becco, “ Première apparition du terme de substance dans la Meditation III de Descartes,” Annales de VInstitut de Philosophie, Bruxelles (1976); and “ Remarques sur le ‘Traité de la substance’ de Descartes,” in Recherches sur le X V IIèm e siècle, vol. 2 (Paris, 1978). See also Marion, Sur la théologie blanche, §16, pp. 395ff. and Su r le prisme, §10, pp. 1 3 1 ff. and §13, pp. i 6 i f f 30. See, respectively A T V II, 3 7 3 , 11. 5 -6 : C S M II, 257; Principles, Part I art. 54: C S M I, 211; and letter to Arnauld o f 4 Jun e 1648, A T V , 193, I.17 C S M K , 355. There are similar expressions elsewhere: “ souveraine intel­ ligence” (letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, A T IV , 608: C S M K , 309), “ idea intellectionis divinae” (A T V II, 188, 1. 19: C S M II, 132), “ nature intelligente . . . qui est D ieu” (letter to Mersenne, 15 November 1638, A T

II, 435: CSM K, 129). 3 1. Hence, the importance o f refusing to attribute any kind o f extension

iy 6

NOTES TO PAGES 6 4 - 6 8

to God; contrast H enry M ore in his letter to Descartes of n December 1648: “Deus suo modo extenditur” (A T V , 238-39). Such an attribution, by confusing material and intellectual simple natures, would, for Descartes, abolish the distinction between metaphysics and physics. 32. A T X , 378, lines 1, 6: C S M I, 19. C S M omits the “ some” (aliquis) that Crapulli restored to the text in his critical edition o f the Regulae, p. 15. See also my commentary in Su r l ’ontologie grise, §12, pp. 72ff., and the refer­ ences to other formulations in my own edition, Marion, Règles utiles, pp.

159-60.

33. F o r other instances, see A T V II, 55 , 11. 2 o ff; 5 6 , 1. 4; 5 7 , 1. 1 1 ; n o , 1 19 1- 13 ; 1 8 8 , 1. 23; 2 3 1 , 11. 26ff.; 1 4 3 , 1. 20 (C S M I, 38 -4 0 , 79, 85, 152 , 162, 299). Fo r further discussion o f these passages see Marion, “ T h e Essential Incoherence o f Descartes’ Definition of D ivinity,” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, edited by Rorty, pp. 30 9 ^ 34. I should like to record m y thanks to John Cottingham for his helpful comments and suggestions for improvement, and for his limpid translation o f the original French version o f §§2-6 o f this chapter.

11. 2 6 -2 7 ;

Chapter Four 1. Concerning these questions, one may consult the issue of Revue inter­ nationale de philosophie 103 (1973), “ Etudes philosophiques et informa­ tiques,” including m y contribution, “ A propos de la sémantique de la méth­ ode” (pp. 27—48), on the Discourse. 2. Fo r an overview o f the indexing work on the Cartesian corpus, see “ Bulletin cartésien III,” in Archives de philosophie (1974), in particular the contribution b y J.-R . Armogathe, pp. 453ff. See also Computers and Humani­ ties 5 (19 7 1): 3 15 . Unfortunately, as o f 1990 there are still very few sources available for this kind o f work: A. Robinet, “ Cogito 75, in Méditations méta­ physiques: Texte définitif avec indexation automatisée. . . (Paris, 1975); J.-R . Armogathe and J .- L . M arion, Index des Regulae ad directionem ingenii de René Descartes (Rome, 1976); and P.-A . Cahné, Index du Discours de la Méthode de René Descartes. Compared to the situation for the works of Montaigne, Pascal, Spinoza, Malebranche, Bacon, Bruno, or Kant, the fate o f the in­ dexing efforts for the works o f Descartes is disappointing. T h e hopes of the 1970s have in this case not materialized. Nevertheless, add now Concordance to Descartes’ Meditationes de prima Philosophia, prepared by K . M urafumi, M . Sasaki, T . Nishimura (Hildesheim, 1996); and J.- L . M arion, J.-P . M assonié, P. Monat, L . Ucciani, Index des Meditationes de prima Philosophia de R. Descartes (Besançon, 1996). 3. See the attempt by A. Robinet, and the philogrammes extracted from the variants o f the text o f Malebranche, from edition to edition, particularly

NOTES TO PAGES 6 8 - 6 9

177

in “ Malebranche et Leibniz à l’ordinateur: D e P IM yi à M O N A D O 72,” Revue internationale de philosophie 103 (1973): 49—56; “ Hypothèse et con­ firmation en histoire de la philosophie,” Revue internationale de philosophie (19 7 1): 119 -4 6 ; “ Premiers pas dans l’application de l’informatique à l’étude des textes philosophiques,” in 1° Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intelletuale Europeo, edited by M arta Fattori and M. Bianchi (Rome, 1976); and “ Ordo / ordre dans l’oeuvre de Malebranche,” in 11° Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intelletuale Europeo (Rome, 1979); and finally “ Res et nihil dans ‘Ethica 77’,” in I I P Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intelletuale Europeo (Rome, 1982). 4. I am following the Saussurian terminology. T h e issue here is to deter­ mine the “ linguistic value” o f capable and then o f capax; i f the linguistic values do not overlap, one may conclude that the meanings are not equiva­ lent. B ut “ linguistic value” itself can only be detected after the completion o f a syntactic study: “ In all these cases what we find, instead o f ideas given in advance, are values emanating from a linguistic system. I f we say that these values correspond to certain concepts, it must be understood that the concepts in question are purely differential. T h at is to say they are concepts defined not positively, in terms o f their content, but negatively by contrast with other items in the same system” (Course in General Linguistics, trans­ lated by Wade Baskin [London, 1974], part 2, chap. 4, p. 115 ) . This study utilizes the same methodology as the “ translation according to the Cartesian lexicon” o f the Regulae, published as Règles utiles et claires pour la direction de l ’esprit ou la recherche de la vérité. T h is methodological option was dis­ cussed and for the most part approved by G . Sebba in “ Retroversion and the History o f Ideas: Jean -L u c M arion’s Translation o f the Regulae o f D es­ cartes,” Studia Cartesiana 1 (1979). See the approval, in spite o f a few reser­ vations, given the present study by P. Costabel, “ Bulletin cartésien V I,” Archives de philosophie 40, no. 3 (1977): 29—3 1. 5. Gargantua, I, 20, in Oeuvres complètes, edited by G . Demerson (Paris, 1973), p. 94; translated by Donald M . Fram e (Berkeley, 19 91), p. 47— which transcribes Horace exactly: “ Bring us bigger [capaciores] cups, m y boy” (Epodes, IX , 33; translated by David M ulroy, Horace’s Odes and Epodes [Ann Arbor, 1994]). L iv y also contributes to this oenological semantics by speak­ ing o f an individual “ vini capacissimus” (IX , 16, 13), who in other words “ holds his wine well.” 6. Brantôme, Des dames, I, Discours V, Marguerite, reine de France et de Navarre, in Oeuvres complètes, edited by M érim ée (Paris, 1890), vol. 10, p. 188. 7. Calvin, Institution chrétienne, III, p. 130 (15 4 1; reprint, Paris, 19 11 ) , and III, 7, 14 (1560 edition, in Corpus reformatorum, vol. 22, col. 188). See also the texts cited by E. Huguet, Dictionnaire de la langue française du X V Ie siècle (Paris, 1932).

NOTES TO PAGES 6 9 - 7 1

8. O. Bloch and W. von Wartburg, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1950); and M . Rat, in Défense de la langue française 37 (1969): 14. See also J . Dubois and R . Lagarre, Dictionnaire de la langue française classique, 2nd ed. (Paris, i960). 9. A more detailed study o f the chronological evolution of the semantics o f capable will be possible only when the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century volumes of the Trésor de la langue française are examined. 10. Lucan, Pharsalia, translated by S. H. Braund (Oxford, 1992). Saint Ireneus, Adversus haereses, I, 7, 5; IV , 20, 5; 32, 2; etc. Other examples o f a receptive capax are found in A. Blaise, Le vocabulaire latin des principaux thèmes liturgiques (Turnhout, 1966), §462, pp. 252, 256, 257. 1 1 . Juret, Syntaxe de la langue latine (Paris, 1926), §2, chap. 1. 12. Ernout and Thom as, Syntaxe latine (Paris, 1939), pp. 57-5 8 . 13. T h e Thesaurus linguae latinae (Leipzig, 1907), vol. 3, col. 304, how­ ever, cites four exceptions to the passive syntax o f capax: (a) Statius, Silvae, HT, 1, 85, “ capax operire.” (b) Rufinus, translation o f Origen, In Genesim, IV , 1, in Patrologia latina (hereafter cited as P L ), 12, 184a): “ N on enim capiebat Loth meridianae lucis magnitudinem. Abraham vero capax fuit ple­ num fulgorem lucis exciperé’’’ (For L o t was not capable o f receiving the mag­ nitude o f the noonday light [Non enim capiebat . . . magnitudinem]. Abra­ ham, however, was able to take up the full splendor o f the light [capax fuit plenum fulgorem lucis excipere]). In these two cases, the infinitives exhibit an unusual construction in order to confirm semantically the receptivity o f capax (to open up, to receive), (c) Commodus, “ Numine de tanto [Deus] se fecit videri capacem” (By his divine will alone, God made him self capable o f being seen; Carmen apologeticum, 118 ). (d) Tertullian, “ Caro capax restitui, divinitas idonea restituendi” (the flesh may be quite capable o f being restored [capax restitui], and the Deity may be perfectly able to effect the restoration) (De resurrectione, X IV ; Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vol. 15, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson [Edinburgh, 1880], p. 237). The last two authors both use a passive infinitive, which, far from stressing a human power to see God, or to resuscitate, underlines the fact that only God gives him self to be seen and grants salvation: these verbs admit agents only outside the realm of capax. In all these cases, therefore, the syntax preserves in the end the originally “ passive” semantics o f capax. T h e legal meaning o f capax does not appear to constitute an exception either; capacity here designates the responsibility by which the dole (capax doli, culpae) or inheritance (capax dotis), etc., can affect or be granted to a given individual who is a subject from the perspective o f the law. Before allowing the writing of deeds, capacity first constitutes the person as the recipient for future actions. See Vocabularium ju rispru dence romanae (1903), vol. 1 1 , p. 615. 14. “ Henrico Des-M ares, Ju ris Vtriusque Licenciato,” according to G .

NOTES TO PAGES 7 8 - 8 4

179

Crapulli, in G . Crapulli and E. Giancotti Boscherini, Ricerche lessicali su opere di Descartes e Spinoza (Rome, 1969), p. nn.4, against the Habert de Montmort hypothesis proposed in A T X , 489. 15. Meditation IV , A T V II, 58, 1. 20; PW II, 40. 16. Regulae ad directionem ingenii, V, A T X , 380, line 1: “ Haec régula non minus servanda est rerum cognitionem aggressuro quam Thesei filum labyrinthum ingressuro” (Anyone who sets out in quest o f knowledge of things must follow this Rule as closely as he would the thread of Theseus if he were to enter the Labyrinth), granted that we read the text literally (which may be justified; see Règles utiles et claires, p. 166). 17. See below, §4, for a reference to the uses o f capax + -endi by Des­ cartes himself. 18. M oreover, we should also note the following: (a) T h e three transla­ tions use a decreasing number o f formulas: Ü ! (A, B , C, E , E ', F), D 2 (A, A ', D , F), D 3 (E, F); hence, the translator o f the third formula cannot be confused with any o f the other translators, (b) T h e term capax gradually disappears between D i and D 2 and then between D 2 and D 3 (7/15, 5/13, 0/5), while the occurrences o f posse (or occurrences that may be reduced to posse) follow an opposite progression (4/15, 8 /13, 2/3); the intermediary formulations (A', B , C, D , E ') disappear. These may be indications that The Search fo r Truth may be a later text, contemporary at least with the Passions o f the Soul, (c) Given that D constitutes the most balanced compromise between the semantics o f capable and the syntax of capax, Descartes’ original Latin texts should present the Latin capax only under the form of D , where the semantics o f capable quietly subverts it. 19. See A T X , 396, 1. 12 ; 400, 1. 8, etc. See Règles utiles et claires, pp. 13 2 and 18 3—84. 20. T h is is a clear case o f metaphorization (“ transferre ad meum sensum,” A T X , 369, 1. 9), announced by Rule I I I about the intuitus, but also valid for other concepts. See Règles utiles et claires, pp. 12 6 -2 7 . 2 1. Letter to F. de Beaune, 20 February 1639, A T II, 4 1 8 , 11. 24-26 . Other occurrences in the Regulae echo this one, as in A T X , 4 5 3 , 1. 15: “ subjectum . . . infinitarum dimensionum capax” (a su b ject. . . capable o f infinite dimen­ sions [infinitarum dimensionum capax]). However, capacitas areae (422, 1. 22) does refer to capacity (i.e., content); see Meteorology, V: “ de toutes les figures, c’est la ronde qui est la plus capable, c’est-à-dire celle qui a le moins de superficie à raison de la grandeur du corps qu’elle contient” (of all these figures, it is the round one that is the most capable, that is to say, the one that has the least surface on account o f the size o f the body that it contains; A T V I, 2 8 2 , 11. 6—8, translated in the Specimina as capacissimam and contenti, respectively, A T V I, 677). Was the ancient meaning maintained to express the passivity o f extension, as opposed to the activity of thought?

18o

NOTES TO PAGES 8 4 - 8 6

22. Which confirms, by simply inverting the development, the addition by de Courcelles in D ! (4) and D i (5) o f a gerundive to cap ax to translate the simple capable o f Descartes. 23. See summe potens, A T V II, 2 1 , 1. 2, and Principia, I, 14, etc.; see also A T V II, 36, 1. 9; 45, 1. 13 ; 109, 1. 4; n o , 1. 27; h i , 11. 4, 19, 13 ; 2 3 6 , 11. 9 and 1 1 ; 237, i, 11. 8 -9 ; 2 4 1, 1. 3, etc. 24. T h e following analysis— this entire study, in fact— is meant as a marginal note to the magisterial and fundamental work o f H. de Lubac in Le mystère du surnaturel (Paris, 1965) and in Augustinisme et théologie moderne (Paris, 1965). 25. See, in addition to the usual abundant literature on this topic, my outline, “ Distance et béatitude: Sur le mot de capacitas chez Saint A u­ gustin,” Résurrection 29 (1969): 58-80 (in spite o f the partly justified criti­ cism o f G . M adec, “ Bulletin augustinien pour 1969,” Etudes augustiniennes 16 [1970]: 317 ). 26. Respectively, De civitate dei, X X II, 1, 1, Bibliothèque augustinienne (hereafter cited as B A ), 37, p. 526; translated by Henry Bettenson (London, 1984), p. 1022 (modified). De trinitate, X III, 8, n , B A , 16, p. 294; trans. (Grand Rapids, 1980), p. 173 (modified). See also Confessiones, X , 9, 16: “ immensa ista capacitas memoriae meae” (this immense capacity of m y memory); X III, 22, 32: “ doces eum jam capacem videre Trinitatem unitatis vel unitatem Trinitatis” (now that he has the capacity for it, you teach him to see the Trinity o f the U nity and the U nity o f the Trinity; B A , 14, pp. 168, 484; quoted from Confessions, translated by Rex Warner [N ew York, 1963], pp. 220, 336); De trinitate, X III, 6, 9: “ qui de bonis quorum capax est humana natura . . . , desiderat” (who longs to rejoice in those good things o f which human nature is capable); X II, 15 , 24: “ [m ens]. .. videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea . . . , cujus lucis capax eique congruens est creatus” ([the mind] sees by a sort o f incorporeal light of a unique sort . . . , o f which light it is created so as to be capable o f receiving it and adapted to it) (BA, 16, pp. 288 and 256ff. [trans., pp. 17 1 , 164 (modified)]). De civitate dei, X I, 2: “ donee de die in diem renovata atque sanata fiat tantae felicitatis capax” (it must first be renewed and healed day after day so as to become capable o f such felicity); X II, 3: “ natura, cui mens inest capax intelligibilis lucis” (that nature in which there is a mind capable o f the intel­ lectual light); X X II, 1: “ oculus . . . capax luminis” (the eye . . . capable o f receiving light; BA , 35, pp. 36, 158; 37, p. 528; quoted here from The City o f God, translated by Bettenson, pp. 430, 474, 1023 [modified]). 27. Respectively, De trinitate, X IV , 4, 6; 8, n ; 12, 15 (BA, 16, pp. 358, 374, 386); trans., pp. 186, 189, 19 1 (modified). See also Tractatus in Johannis Evangelicum, X X X I X , 8: “ Quando capit anima ex Deo unde sit bona, partici­ pando fit bona, quomodo tuus oculus participando videt. Nam lumine substracto non videt, cujus particeps factus videt” (When the soul receives from

NOTES TO PAGE 8 7

l8 l

God the elements o f its goodness it becomes good by participation, just as by participation thine eye seeth. F o r it sees not when the light is withdrawn, while so long as it shares in the light it sees; Corpus christianorum, series latina, 36, p. 349; quoted here from Select Library . . . , vol. 7 [Grand Rapids, M ich., 1983], p. 224). We notice here the possible equivalence be­ tween capax and imago on the one hand and between participatio and similitudo on the other. (See the note by Father Agaesse, ad loc., BA , 16, pp. 630—32): capacity constitutes man as marked with a gift, by means o f which he reaches toward the giver of the gift, and whose image is manifest on his own— human— face. Capacity and image, because they constitute the hu­ man given, remain inadmissible. 28. Respectively, Sermo 3 6 1 (P L , 39, 1599); translated by Edmund Hill, O.P. (Hyde Park, N .Y ., 1995), vol. 10, p. 225; Tractatus in Epistulam Jfohannis ad Parthos, IV , 6; trans. (Grand Rapids, M ich., 1983), vol. 7, p. 485: “ Quod autem desideras, nondum vides: sed desiderando capax efficeris, ut cum venerit quod videas, implearis” (That which you seek, you do not yet see: but by seeking you shall be made capable, so that when the time comes that you may see, you shall be satisfied; SC , 75, p. 230; trans., vol. 7, p. 484 [modified]); Enarratio in Psalmum C II, 10. See also Tractatus injohannis Evangelicum, X X X IV , 7: “ Extendat anima cupiditatem suam et sinu capaciore quaerat comprehendere quod oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis adscendit” (Let the soul extend her desire, and with more capa­ cious bosom seek to comprehend that which ‘eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath entered into the heart of m an’; CS, p. 3 14 ; op. cit., p. 202); Confessiones, X III, 1 , 1 : “ animam meam, quam praeparas [Deus] ad capiendum T e ex desiderio” (my soul which you are making ready to receive you by the longing which you yourself inspire; BA , 14, p. 424; op. cit., p. 316); etc. Thomas Aquinas develops this theme brilliantly in Summa theologiae, 1 a, q. 12, 1, resp. T h is semantic o f capax {Dei), although thematized by Augustine, nonetheless belongs to the common stock o f theology. Thus Saint Bonaventure, Breviloquium, Prologue 3; Commentaire des Sentences, 1, d. 3, 1, 1, ad im ; d. 1, 2, 3, concl.; II, d. 18, 1, 1; IV , d. 49, 1, 2: “ Quia enim facta est [sc. anima humana] ad participandam beatitudinem . . . , facta est capax D ei” (Since [the human soul] is made for participating in blessedness . . . , it is made capable o f receiving God [capax Dei]; Opera omnia, ed. Quaracchi, vol. 4, p. 1003); d. 49, 1, 3; etc. Also Saint Bernard, Sermo de conversione ad clericos, V III, 15: “ egregia natura, capax aeternae beatitudinis et gloria magni D ei” (an excellent nature, capable of receiving eternal blessedness and the glory o f the great God [capax aeternae beatitu­ dinis et gloria magni Dei]); De consideratione, V, 24: “ summa beatitudo, creans mentem ad se participandum, dilatans ad capiendum” (supreme blessedness, creating minds to share in himself, enlarging their capacity; P L , 182, 843a, 802b); and especially the remarkable Sermo 80 in Cantica, II, 3: “ E o anima

NOTES TO PAGES 8 7 - 8 9

magna est, quo capax aeternorum. Neque enim illius aliquando non capax erit, etiamsi numquam capiens fuerit” (The soul is great in proportion to its capacity for the eternal [quo capax aeternorum]. F o r even i f it never attains to it, it never ceases to be capable o f it; translated by Irene Edmonds [Kalamazoo, M ich., 1980], p. 148). All these confirm the equivalence be­ tween capacitas and imago. 29. Respectively, Summa theologiae, Ilia , q. 9, a. 2, resp. (see ad 3m) trans. (New York, 1966), vol. 49, p. 89 (modified); la Ilae, q. 1 1 3 , a. 10, c. (trans., vol. 30, pp. 198—99 [modified]), which again confirms the equiva­ lence between capax Dei and ad imaginem (Dei). 30. T h e relation between capacitas and participatio is accomplished in desire, understood in the sense o f the epektasis o f Gregory o f Nazianzus and Saint Paul (see J. Daniélou, Platonisme et théologie mystique [Paris, 1944], pp. 309 ff.). 3 1. Contra gentes, I, 7; trans. (London, 1924), vol. 1, p. 14 (modified). See the exposition o f the same thesis, without the explicit mobilization of the concept o f capax Dei / capacitas, successively in: Summa theologiae, la Ilae, q. 9 1, a. 4, resp.: “ homo ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae excedit proportionem naturalis facultatis humanae, ut supra habitum est” (man is designed for the goal o f eternal bliss, which exceeds the proportions o f natural human faculties, as was held above; q. 5, a. 5 [this text, which we examine below, uses capax]); Contra gentes, III, 148: “ Sed ulterius ultimus finis hominis in quadam veritatis cognitione constitutus est, quae naturalem facultatem ipsius excedit . . . Si igitur homo ordinatur in finem qui ejus facultatem naturalem excedit, necesse est ei aliquod auxilium divinitus adhiberi supernaturale per quod tendat ad finem” (man’s ultimate end is fixed in a certain knowledge of truth which surpasses his natural faculty . . . I f man is ordered to an end which exceeds his natural faculty, some help must be divinely provided for him, in a supernatural way, by which he m ay tend toward his end; The Summa Contra Gentiles [London, 1924], p. 147). 32. Respectively, Summa theologiae, la Ilae, q. 5, a. 5, ad 2m; trans., vol. 16, p. 13 3 ; and De malo, q. 5, a. 1; translated by John Oesterle (Notre Dame, Ind., 1995), p. 2 1 1 . See also De veritate, q. 8, a. 3, ad 12m , which hierarchizes the various degrees o f blessedness without taking into account one’s power to attain it. 33. Respectively, Summa theologiae, Ilia , q. 1, a. 3, ad 3m; trans., vol. 48, p. 19; then H a Ilae, q. 24, a. 3, resp.; trans., vol. 34, p. 43. We should note the parallel with the clear opposition between capacitas and power in Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, prol., pars 1, q. unica, n. 75: “ Igitur in hoc magis dignificantur natura, quam si suprema sibi possibilis ponetur ilia natural is [sc. perfectio]; nec mirum est, quod ad majorem perfectionem sit capacitas passiva in aliqua natura, quam ejus causalitas activa se extendat” (In this, nature is much more dignified than if it is supposed to be the highest possible

n o t e s to pa g es 9 0 -9 1

183

natural perfection. N or is it to be wondered at that in a certain nature there is a passive capacity for a greater perfection than its active capacity could extend itself; Opera omnia [Rome, 1950], vol. 1, p. 46, and the entire discus­ sion). 34. Respectively, Suarez, De ultimo fine hominis, d. X V I, s. 1, n. 1 (Opera omnia, ed. Vives [Paris, 1856], vol. 4, p. 149); d. X V , p. 144, d. X V I, s. 1, n. 2, p. 150. 35. De ultima fine hominis, d. IV , s. 3, n. 4: “ homo sic creatus haberet aliquem finem ultimum, et ilium posset suis actionibus aliquo modo attingere cognoscendo et amando ilium: ergo esset capax alicujus beatitudinis proportionatae et connaturalis sibi: ergo in humana natura datur aliqua beatitudo naturalis praeter supernaturalem” (Man was thus created with some ultimate end, and he could attain it in some way through his actions by knowing and loving it [posset suis actionibus]. Therefore, he was capable [capax] o f some blessedness proportionate to and connatural with it. Therefore in human nature there is found some natural blessedness in addition to the supernatu­ ral one; p. 44); d. V II, s. 2, n. n : “ fieri autem potest, ut eadem potentia, quae capax nobilissimi actus, sit etiam capax ignobilioris si in modo actuandi conveniant” (It can happen that the same power [potentia] which is capable o f the most noble act [capax nobilissimi actus] is also capable o f a more ignoble act i f they agree in their mode o f acting [in modo actuandi]; p. 92; see Des­ cartes D i, no. 1); d. X V , s. 2, n. 5: “ Tandem in hoc differt naturalis beati­ tudo a supernaturali, quod ilia consistit in actibus, ad quos natura dedit facultatem, et capacitatem in suo ordine proportionatam” (Finally, natural blessedness differs from supernatural in this way: it consists in acts [consistit in actibus] for which nature gave the faculty [facultatem] and a capacity [ca­ pacitatem] proportionate in its own order; p. 147); etc. Interestingly, given the meaning o f the term in Roman law, we should note that Suarez also inverted the semantics o f legal capacitas: Dejustitia etjure, d. 2, q. 12: “ Actus autem elicitus vere est subhominis dominio, quia simpliciter est liber, et potest homo illo uti ut voluerit, juxta capacitatem naturae” (The act is elicited under the mastery [dominio] o f man, since he is simply free, and man can use it [potest homo illo uti] as he likes, in consequence o f the capacity [capacitatem] o f his nature); d. 2, q. 16: “ Etiam pueros esse capaces dominii . . . quia licet non possunt pro tempore ea exercere per se, possunt tamen per alios; et expectatur tempus, quo per se possunt” (Even boys are capable o f mastery [capaces domi­ nii] . . . since even if for a while they cannot [non possunt] exercise it by themselves, nonetheless they can [possunt] through others; and a time will come when they can [possunt] do so by themselves; edited by J . Giers, in Die Richtigkeitslehre des jungen Suarez [Freiburg im Breisgau], pp. 34, 17; see also p. 85). 36. See De gratia, prol. IV , c. 1, n. 17 (Opera omnia, vol. 7, p. 184); n. 2 1: “ appetitus obedientalis non sufficit, est enim quasi potentia neutra” (an

18 4

2

NOTES TO PAGE Q

obedient appetite is not enough; for there is something like a neutral power; p. 185); c. 1, n. 5 (p. 180). See also the explicit discussion o f the two mean­ ings o f capacitas in De ultimo fine hominis, d. X V I, s. 1, n. 8 and n. 9: “ Deinde si intelligantur termini, est aperta repugnantia, nam appetitus innatus non dicit rem aliquam, aut realem modum a capacitate naturali; sed explicat per metaphoricam vim et naturam ipsus potentiae naturalis; si ergo sub nomine capacitatis non dicitur naturalis, sed obedientalis, cur potest dici in ilia fundari appetitum naturalem?” (If they are understood fully, it is clearly a contra­ diction, for the innate appetite is not said to be some thing or a real mode in terms o f the natural capacity. Rather, it is explained by means o f metaphor and the very nature o f the natural power. Therefore, if by the term capacity one does not mean the natural but the obedient, why can it be said that the natural appetite is founded on it?; vol. 4, p. 153). This could not be stated more directly: any capacitas that is not the equivalent o f a potentia remains purely metaphorical. T h e liquidation o f the Thom istic and Augustinian doc­ trine is now complete. 37. Cited by H. de Lubac in Augustinisme et théologie moderne, p. 197; and by J. Rondet in “ L e problème de la nature pure et la théologie du X V Ie siècle,” Revue des sciences religieuses 25 (1946): 517 . 38. Cited by de Lubac, Augustinisme et théologie moderne, p. 19 7 ^ 7 . 39. A T X , 370, 11. 16 -2 5 . See Gilson, R. Descartes: Discours de la M é­ thode, texte et commentaire, pp. 2 6 1—64; and note in Règles utiles et claires, pp. 12 9 -3 0 . See also another text: T o ***, 27 April iÔ37(?), A T I, 3 6 6 , 11. 17 -2 0 . F o r another relationship, polemical this time, between Descartes and Suarez, see Su r la théologie blanche de Descartes, 1, pp. 3—7. 40. Respectively, T o Mersenne, 16 October 1639, A T II, 59 9 , 11. 6 -7 , and the parallel text of Rule II, A T X , 3 6 5 , 1. 10. We should note that the famous development on the prolongation of life, related in the Conversation with Burman (A T V, 178, 11. 14 -22 ) is entirely framed within the question of pure nature: The clear distinction between the state o f man before the Fall (theological ques­ tion) and the study that “ considérât naturam ut et hominem solum prout jam est, nec ulterius ejus causa investigat” (studies nature, simply as it is now; he does not investigate its causes at any more levels; PW III, 353) echoes precisely Suarez, De gratia, prol. IV, c. 3, n. 7: “ dicendum enim est primo, statum justitiae originalis multum différé a statu purae naturae. Patet, turn quia includit integritatem naturae; turn etiam quia omnes effectus seu privilégia numerata nullo modo dici connaturalia homini; quia nec ex principiis naturae oriantur, neque sunt débita purae naturae ac nude spectatae” (It is to be said first that the state of original justice differs greatly from the state of pure nature. This is obvious, since the one includes the wholeness o f nature while the other includes all effects or private laws that can in no way be said to be connatural to man; for they would not arise from the principles o f nature nor would they be due to pure nature; vol. 7, p. 193). Similarly, the Cartesian sequence— “ for, since we

NOTES TO PAGES 9 2 - 9 7

18 5

were born men before we became Christians we cannot believe that anyone would seriously embrace opinions which he thinks contrary to that right reason which constitutes being a man, simply in order to cling to the faith which makes him a Christian” (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, A T VIII, 2, 353, 1. 26—354, line 1)— opposes faith and reason, favoring the latter, because it has admitted the primacy of nature over grace— forgetting, with the theologians of pure na­ ture, that nature itself, as the first gift given to the believer, stems from the single grace that is the filial adoption, comprised in the original recapitulation. Similarly, in the Conversation with Burman, again: “ We must leave the latter point for the theologians to explain. For the philosopher, it is enough to study man as he is now in his natural condition” (A T V, 159, 11. i6 ff). 4 1. T o Mersenne, M arch 1642, A T III, 54, 11. 1 1 —17; emphasis added. Descartes, in order to avoid any possibility o f confusion, clarifies: “ I have said nothing about the knowledge o f God except what all the theologians have said” (544 , 11. 17 - 19 ) . We find the same gap between natural knowledge and supernatural blessedness in the Letter to [Silhon], M arch -A p ril 1648, A T V, 136, 1. 1 4 - 1 3 7 . See Règles utiles et claires, pp. 296-98. 42. T o Descartes, 13 September 1637, A T I, 408, 11. 2 6 -28 . 43. Other mentions: “ the natural happiness” reserved to the “ pagan phi­ losopher” (To Princess Elizabeth, 4 August 1645, A T IV, 267, 11. 24—26); “ with regard to the present life” (T o Chanut, 1 February 1647, 608, 1. 4). 44. Respectively, Benedict of Canfeld, L a Règle de perfection, II, 2, edited by J . Orcibal (Paris, 1982), p. 290; François de Sales, Traité de l ’amour de Dieu, III, 15 (edited by A. Ravier [Paris, 1969], p. 522; translated by John K . Ryan [Rockford, 111., 1975], vol. 1, p. 199); Bérulle, Discours de l ’état et des grandeurs de Jésus, V III, in Oeuvres complètes (edited by J.-P . Migne [Paris, 1856], col. 297), and Elévation sur sainte Madelaine, X III (ibid., col. 579). 45. Traité de la nature et de la grâce, II, 18, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. 5, pp. 79, 80. Note the hesitation between “Je me communique à tous les esprits autant qu’ils en sont capables; et par la Raison dont je les fais participants, je les unis entre eux et même avec mon Père” and “ notre force, notre capacité vient de vous” (Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques, II, 13 and V , 19, vol. 10, pp. 22, 56). 46. Principles on Nature and Grace, §1 (see 14); trans. (London, 1973), p. 195.

Chapter Five i. M artin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (New York, 1962), §6, p. 46. German text at Sein und Zeit, 24, 11. 2 2 -2 4 . See m y study “ L ’ego et le Dasein: Heidegger et la ‘ de­ struction’ de Descartes dans Sein und Zeit,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 92, no. 1 (1987).

i8 6

NOTES TO PAGES 9 7 - 1 02

2. Respectively, Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures, translated by Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague, 1964) pp. 1 2 - 1 3 ; and Cartesian Meditations, translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague, i960), §14 p. 33. German texts in Husserliana: Edmund Husserl, Gesammelte Werke, edited by S. Strasser (The Hague, 1950), I, 13 and 7 1 (henceforth abbreviated Hua). 3. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §15, p. 36 (translation modified); Hua I, 74. 4. Ibid., §18, respectively, pp. 42 and 43 (translation o f the latter modi­ fied; H usserl’s emphasis); Hua I, 80, 8 1. 5. Respectively, Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §15, p. 37; Paris Lectures, 15; Inhaltsübersicht im Urtext, 190— in English, “ T h e ego, plunged into phe­ nomenological meditation, is the transcendental spectator o f its own life and its own being, which are themselves turned toward the world” (Hua I, 197). Commenting on the sequence “ Obviously one may say I, as naturally insti­ tuted I, [I] am also and always transcendental I, but I know this only by first carrying out the phenomenological reduction” (Hua I, 75), R . Ingarden has emphasized the difficulty more than anyone else: “ the great problem o f identity is found here, the problem o f the very identification o f these two Is. What is this ‘also’ worth in relation to this ‘I = subject o f transcendental consideration’ ? . . . B ut then the great difficulty exists, which to m y knowl­ edge no one has yet pointed out, [namely] how a pure constituting I and a natural constituted I can be at the same moment one and the same thing [ein und dasselbe], when the properties that are attributed to them are mutually exclusive, and cannot coexist together in the unity of a single object?” (Be­ merkungen, in Hua, I, 2 13) 6. Nietzsche, translated by Frank A. Capuzzi, 4 vols. (New York, 1982), IV , 107. German text at Nietzsche (Pfullingen, 19 6 1) II, 154. For information about the Heideggerian interpretation o f Descartes, see “ Heidegger et la situation métaphysique de Descartes,” Bulletin cartésien IV , Archives de phi­ losophie 38, no. 2 (1975). 7. Nietzsche, 106 (German text, 153). T his expression appears in an al­ most identical form. “ Descartes’ cogito me cogitare rem,’’ ’ in Sein und Zeit, §82, p. 4 3 3 , 1. 14. Can we locate the Cartesian texts that directly or indirectly confirm this? In addition to A T V II, 5 9 9 , 11. 3 - 7 (to be discussed later), two passages in the Meditations: “ cum cogitem me videre,” “ quamvia concipiam me esse rem cogitantem” (A T V II, 33, 11. 12-14; 44 > k 24); and finally, from the Conversation with Burman, “ Conscium esse est quidem cogitare et reflectare supra suam cogitationem . . . ad cogitationes suas reflectare, et sic cogitationis suae conscia [anima] esse” (A T V, 149, 1. 17). For a summary o f this topic see Marion, Su r la théologie blanche de Descartes, 391. 8. Critique o f Pure Reason, B 1 3 1 —2 (and see A 12 3 and A382). 9. Ibid., A346 = B404. 10. Ibid., B 15 5 . [In this translation, the pair I, i is used to render the

NOTES TO PAGES I O 4 -I O 5

187

original J e , je .\ — T h e Opus postumum may be regarded as developing the aporia o f a representative ego cogito with the formula, contradictory in its terms, which ceaselessly recurs there: “ Consciousness of self [apperceptio] is the subject’s act o f making itself an object, and is purely logical \sum\ without the determination o f an object [apprehensio simplex], . . . Conscious­ ness o f myself, that is, to represent m yself who thinks. Subject, at the same time as object, as object o f thought” (Ak. A. X X II, 89 = Kant, Opus postu­ mum, Fr. translation by F . M arty [Paris, 1986], p. 157). Again, “ I think [cogito]. I am conscious o f m yself [sum]. I, the subject, make m yself object (X X II, 95; Fr. trans., 162); “ I am the object o f my own representation, that is, I am conscious o f m yself” (X X II, 98; Fr. trans., p. 165). Would it not be better to choose between two hypotheses: either I am conscious of m yself [moi] as a represented object, and this moi in no way coincides with the Je , or I am conscious o f a me [moi] equivalent to the Je , and this is not a repre­ sented object?— It may be that the alternative between consciousness and ego constructed by Sartre can only repeat the Husserlian, but also Kantian, aporia (“ L a transcendence de l’ego: Esquisse d ’une description phénoméno­ logique,” in Recherches philosophiques [1936; revised, Paris, 19 8 1]).— T h is interpretation has found partisans among the most qualified o f commenta­ tors on Descartes; thus, M. Gueroult consistently thinks o f the cogito in terms o f representation: “ knowledge o f my nature, such as understanding legitimately represents it to me” (Descartes selon l ’ordre des raisons [Paris, 1953], vol. 1, p. 82; and see pp. 75, 86-87, 87m 105, 95, etc.). M oreover, against P. Thevenaz’s phenomenological interpretation, in “ L a question du point de départ radical chez Descartes et chez H usserl” (in Problèmes actuels de la phénoménologie, Acts o f the Colloque International de Phénoménologie, 19 5 1 [Brussels, 1952]). Gueroult recovers, under the pretext o f distinguish­ ing Descartes from Gassendi, the position Descartes condemns in his re­ sponse to F r. Bourdin (Gueroult, p. 62). T h e primary and nearly the only textual argument here advanced consists in a short sequence from the Praefatio ad lectorem: “ the human mind, when directed towards itself, does not perceive itself to be anything other than a thinking thing, [mens humana in se conversa non percipiat aliud se esse quam rem cogitantem]” (A T VII, 7, 1. 20—8, line 1); but this evidence implies (1) neither that percipere is equiva­ lent to reflectare; (2) nor that the res cogitans is reduced to intellectus; (3) nor, above all, that this is a formulation o f the cogito, ergo sum as such. He is thus led to conclude by repeating literally the Heideggerian interpretation: “ cogito as reflected knowledge: mens in se conversa” (Gueroult, p. 64); “ re­ flection on my first reflection” (94). 1 1 . Seventh Responses: A T V II, 5 5 9 , 11, 3 - 1 0 ; C S M I I , 382 (my empha­ sis). Clerselier’s translation is “ elle pense qu elle pense,” in Descartes, oeuvres philosophiques, edited by F . Alquié (Paris, 1967), II, 1070. 12. M ichel Henry, “ Phénoménologie hylétique et phénoménologie maté-

i8 8

NOTES TO PAGES 1 0 5 - 1 0 6

rielle,” Philosophie 15 (1987); also in Phénoménologie matérielle (Paris, 1990), chap. 1. T h is magisterial presentation picks up in a precise manner much earlier themes: “ Immanence is the primitive mode by which the revelation o f transcendence itself is accomplished and, as such, the primitive essence o f receptivity” ( L ’essence de la manifestation [Paris, 1963], I, §30, 278, 288). 13. Généalogie de la psychanalyse (Paris, 1985), p. 35 (see p. 2 1); the phe­ nomenological commentary on videre videor begins on p. 24 and governs the whole o f chaps. 1 —3. These chapters develop a position that was already essentially gained in 1963: “ Thus the actuality o f form made manifest in the cogito, that is, on the plane o f pure thought itself and precisely as the affectivity o f that thought, is in a significant way recognized by Descartes, and at the same time denied by him” ( L ’essence de la manifestation, IV, §57, II, pp. 642ff.). M ore recently, see “ Descartes et la question de la technique,” in Le Discours et sa méthode, edited by Grimaldi and Marion, 2 8 5 -3 0 1. 14. T o Plempius for Fromondus, 3 October 1637: “ He supposes that I think that animals see just as we do, i.e. sensing or thinking they see, which is said to have been Epicurus’ view. . . . But . . . I explain quite explicitly that my view is that animals do not see as we do when we are aware that we see” (A T I, 4 13 , 11. 14 - 2 0 ; C S M K , 6 1-6 2 ). 15. Fo r example, A T V II, 2 8 , 1. 22; V II, 3 4 , 1. 21; “ that mode o f thinking which I call ‘sensory perception’ ” (A T V II, 74, 1. 8); “ faculties for certain special modes of thinking, namely imagination and sensory perception” (A T V II, 78, 11. 2 1- 2 3 ) ; etc16. Généalogie de la psychanalyse, p. 3 1. T h is formula should appear less surprising when, in addition to its intrinsic phenomenological relevance, it accords with certain statements by authoritative commentators who are in agreement here even though elsewhere their viewpoints diverge. One is A lquié, who, in the course o f denying all “ reflexive redoubling,” emphasizes that “ the cogito’s evidentness therefore rests upon such an intimate presence o f consciousness to itself that no reflection, no doubt, no separation, no logical subtlety can prevail against it” (La découverte métaphysique de l ’homme chez Descartes [Paris, 1950], p. 189). Another is J.-M . Beyssade, who com­ ments as follows on the videre videor (A T V II, 2 9 , 1. 14), which H enry singles out: “ What is indubitable in thought is pure appearance insofar as it wards o ff all . . . distance between two terms,” to the extent that it “ identifies thought with perception” (La philosophie première de Descartes [Paris, 19 7 1], pp. 234, 235; see 252, and 253). Another is J .- L . Nancy, who firm ly empha­ sizes that “ Descartes denies nothing so obstinately as the introduction of thought about thought, or reflexivity, into the cogito,” thus stigmatizing the standard misunderstanding that has governed the subsequent fate o f his metaphyics: “ And the entire history o f the cogito, including Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Lacan [omitting Heidegger!], has

NOTES TO PAGES

IO 7-II3

189

been nothing but a history o f various, indeed antithetical, ways o f denounc­ ing, avoiding, reflecting, suspending, or mediating the immediacy o f the cogito” {Ego sum [Paris, 1979], p. 34 and n. 8). In the purely phenomenological field, Henry may be said to accomplish what M erleau-Ponty was only able to sketch: to think the cogito sum as “ the absolute contact o f the I with the I ” (Phénoménologie de la perception [Paris, 1945], p. 342). 17. Généalogie de la psychanalyse, p. 58: “ the clouding o f the videor by the videre and its progressive neglect” ; pp. 6 1, 70, 82, 106, etc. 18. Respectively, to Mersenne, 28 January 16 4 1: A T III, 2 9 5 , 11. 24—27; C S M K , 172 ; and to Regius, M ay 16 4 1: A T III, 3 7 2 , 11, 1 3 - 1 6 , CSM K, 182. See also “ as I agreed before, we never will anything o f which we have no understanding at all” (to Hyperaspistes, August 16 4 1: A T III, 4 3 2 , 11. 5 - 7 ; C S M K , 19 5— a text all the more remarkable because its concern is to distin­ guish will and understanding, not to confuse them!); or “ I have never said that all our thoughts are in our power, but only that if there is anything absolutely in our power, it is our thoughts [Discourse, A T V I, 2 5 , 11. 2 3 -2 4 ; C S M -I, 123], that is to say, those which come from our will and free choice” (to Mersenne, 3 December 1640: A T III, 2 4 9 , 11. 4 -8 ; C S M K , 160). T h ere­ fore, it is legitimate to speak, in both cases, o f a reversibility of will and perception, both in the case o f perception o f volitions and in that o f the volition to master thoughts. 19. Th e rapprochement between generosity and Aristotle’s |l€YaA,0\jA)% ia is obvious, which makes the divergences all the more significant. We may begin with this one: the A,eya?i0\j/'6%0^ is not amazed and does not admire: oi)G 0 oa)fiacra.xoÇ ODcrèv jœq (leya à w ® eaxtv (Nicomachean Ethics IV , 8, 112 5 a 2-3). In M artin Ostwald’s translation (Indianapolis, 1962), “ H e is not given to admiration, for nothing is great to him” (p. 98). 20. In fact Descartes hesitates on this point: T h e emotions interior to the soul “ differ from these passions, which always depend on some movement of the spirits” (a. 147), but this does not keep them from being “ often joined with the passions which are like them” (ibid.). It remains true that esteem and scorn can occur either “ without passion” (a. 150) or with a “ movement o f the spirits” (a. 149; the same ambiguity recurs in aa. 160 and 16 1). 2 1. See to Elisabeth, 1 September 1645; “ there is no [passion] which does not represent to us the good to which it tends” (A T IV , 285, 11. 24— 25; C S M K , 264 ). It is here especially that generosity is distinguished from 'üeyaÀ,o\|/'D%ia: generosity recognizes as (non-) object only its good use and its own will, whereas |i€Ya^o\|/'ü%ia admits toce%ToÇ ayocGoc (Nicomachean Ethics IV , 1 1 2 3 b i7 and 20), or, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, res exteriores (Summa theologica Ha, Ilae, q. 129, a. 1, c), res exterius existentes (ibid., a. 2, c.), res humanus exteriores (ibid., a. 3, c). Paradoxically, here it is D es­ cartes who seems exempt from the essence o f representation, by freeing

igo

NOTES TO PAGES

II4-II7

himself from objectivity, and Aristotle who submits to it; is this mere appear­ ance?— Bonne volonté: a. 154: A T X I, 446, 1 . 22 and 4 4 7 , 1. 3; a. 187: A T X I, 4 7 0 , 1. 5; a. 192: A T X I, 4 7 3 , 11. 1 0 - 1 1 ; C SM I, 384, 395, 397, respectively. 22. See Passions de l ’âme, a. 83: “ to distinguish among loves by the esteem one has for what one loves in comparison with oneself” ; a. 204: “ For seeing that one is esteemed by others is a reason for esteeming oneself.” We observe that the |ieyaA,o\|/\)%oÇ is also said to know— eTCiaxfuxom eoi%ev (Nicomachean Ethics IV, 4, 112 2 a34). “ A magnificent man is like a skilled artist: he has the capacity to observe what is suitable and to spend large sums with good taste” (Ostwald trans., p. 90). 23. To Christine, 20 November 1647: A T V, 8 5 , 11. 1 - 3 ; C SM K , 3 2 5 26. Moreover, the Discours de la méthode already understood esteem as an imprecise mode of cogitatio: A T VI, 2 4 , 11. 12 - 17 , and 7 4 , 11. 18 —19; C SM I, 123 and 149. 24. To Mersenne, 15 April 1630: A T I, 145, 11. 2 1-2 4 ; C SM K , 23. 25. To Elisabeth, 6 October 1645: A T IV, 305, 11. 4 -5 ; C SM K , 268. 26. To Christine, 20 November 1647: A T V, 8 5 , 11. 6—12; C SM K , 326. 27. Respectively, to Chanut, 1 November 1646: A T IV, 536, 11. 27-28; C SM K , 299; to Elisabeth, 1 September 1645: A T IV, 284, 11. 25—27; C SM K , 264. 28. To Elisabeth, 1 September 1645: A T IV, 284, 11. 24—25; C SM K , 264; see vrai usage: A T IV, 286, 1. 25; C SM K , 265. 29. To Elisabeth, 15 September 1645: A T IV, 2 9 3 , 11. 6-7; C SM K , 266. No doubt this text advises the moderation, for reaspns at once moral and social, of solitary survival (subsister seul), but then the point is precisely that Descartes would not have had to issue this warning if the ego could not already claim such an autarchy on its own. Therefore the latter is acquired. 30. Passions de l ’âme, a. 152, and to Christine, 20 November 1647: A T V, 8 5 , 11. 14 - 16 ; C SM K , 326. On this thesis, its other formulations, and its ambiguity, see Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, §17, pp. 4 1 1 — 26. 31. Respectively, to Christine, 20 November 1647: A T V, 8 4 , 11. 2 1- 2 2 ; C SM K , 325 (and cf. en cette vie, Passions de l ’âme, a. 212); to Elisabeth, 1 September 1645: A T IV, 287, 11. 5-6 ; C SM K , 265. 32. This study owes much to discussions with M. Henry, to remarks by J.-M . Beyssade and S. Voss, and to the impetus provided by my master F. Alquié (discussion with him echoed in Alquié, Le Cartésianisme de Malebranche [Paris, 1974], p. 365) and, later, G. Rodis-Lewis in her article “ L e dernier fruit de la métaphysique cartésienne: L a générosité,” Les etudes philosophiques (January-M arch 1987): 43-54. A further discussion of my thesis by D. Kambouchner appears in “ Bulletin Cartésien X IX ,” Archives de philosophie 54, no. 1 (1991): 61-70.

NOTES TO PAGES I l 8- I

26

19 1

Chapter Six 1. Pascal, Pensées, 597. 2. On the inclusion of metaphysics in its Cartesian embodiment in the hierarchy of orders, see Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, chap. 5, §§22-24. 3. The question arises of exactly where, for instance, M. Gueroult thinks he can juxtapose two characters of the ego that are, in my view, incompatible. On the one hand, its absolute solipsism: “ I alone am known; I alone exist. Do there exist other substances outside of me . . . I know not, I cannot speak of this.” On the other hand, a so-called universalism: “ One sees how little this self is individual; for the ‘I ’ of the individual implies the ‘you’ of the other, that I exclude from myself certainly, insofar as I posit myself as substance, but that I am positing, at the same time (outside of myself). One sees by this to what extent Descartes is at the ends of a transcendental inter­ subjectivity” (Descartes’ Philosophy Interpreted according to the Order o f Rea­ sons, vol. 1, p. 71). What we actually see is to what extent Gueroult is here closer to Fichte than to Descartes, as is often the case elsewhere. 4. On the fundamental invisibility of what is not in the mode of objectiv­ ity, see J.-L . Marion, “ L ’ intentionalité de l’amour,” in Prolégomènes à la charité (Paris, 1986, 1991). 5. Respectively, Letter to Mersenne, 1 1 November 1640, A T III, 235, 11. 1 5 - 1 8 and 239, 1. 7. 6. See the clarification on this point in Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, pp. 319 —23. 7. It is utterly remarkable that Pascal, without doubt purposely, used and reversed the Cartesian example in Pensées, 688: No longer does the ego inspect men from above in search of identification, but on the contrary the ego, from below and reduced to the rank of a seen self, withstands the gaze of another ego, which it definitely is not. See Marion, Sur le prisme métaphy­ sique de Descartes, chap. 5, §24, pp. 344ff. G. B. Matthews has clearly estab­ lished that in the episode of the hats and the coats that were (eventually) animated, Descartes was not approaching the question of the otherness of other people, but simply that of the animation or the pure mechanism of bodies (“ Descartes and the Problem of Other Minds,” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, edited by A. O. Rorty [Berkeley, 1986], pp. 14 1—52). 8. Besides, otherness or diversity does not directly concern souls or peo­ ple (in the sense of the otherness of another person) but “ things,” res a me diversae (39, 1. 15; 40, 1. 2; 73, 11. 9 -10 ; 75, 11. 8-9), or substances (79, 1. 15); similarly, for separation (29, 1. 4) and exteriority (25, 1. 26; 38, 1. 12), it is a question of simple nonidentity rather than a relationship between two egos. As for an animated being, its otherness from the ego is mentioned only

ig2

NOTES TO PAGES

126-134

to be immediately refuted: “ do not require me to posit a source distinct from myself” (44, 11. 9—10). 9. For example, Recherche de la vérité, Eclaircissement X I, in Oeuvres com­ plètes (Paris 1964), vol. 3, pp. i63ff. See the analysis in which Alquié brings Descartes and Malebranche together on a point that seems to divide them, in Le cartésianisme de Malebranche (Paris, 1974), pp. 9 1—101. Conversely, on the phenomenological “ difficulty” of such a representation of the self, see above, chapter 5 , §1. 10. See Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, chap. 2. 1 1. Besides, if the we reappears at the very conclusion of the Meditations, it is precisely to point out its weakness: “ we must acknowledge the weakness of our nature” (90,11. 15 -16 ). The weakness of the we reciprocally underlines the strength of the ego. The same analysis of the solitude of the ego and the reduction of others could be conducted from the Discourse on the Method and the Principia, probably with the same results. 12. Respectively, letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, A T IV, 606, 1. 12; 605, 11. 2 0 -2 1; 6 0 2, 1. 27-603, line 1; and Principles o f Philosophy, IV, §190, AT VIII, 1, 317, 11. 24-25. 13. Letter to Regius, May 1641, A T III, 372, 1. 12. 14. The Passions o f the Soul, §§27 and 29, A T X I, 350, 11. 16, 18, 24. 15. Ibid., §79, A T X I, 3 8 7 , 11. 4 and 12; and §80, 3 8 7 , 11. 20-24. See also letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, A T IV, 603, 11. 9—12. 16. The Passions o f the Soul, §79, A T X I, 387, 11. 3—6. See §80, 387, 11. 18-24. On the relationship between the theoretical ego and the ego of affection, see two different approaches: K . Hammacher, “ La raison dans la vie affective et sociale selon Descartes et Spinoza,” Les études philosophiques (1984, no. 1); and, especially, Henry, Généalogie de la psychanalyse, chaps. 1 and 2. 17. As stigmatized by D. Dubarle, this is, to say the least, a “ lacuna, a serious lacuna in the Cartesian philosophy of the human other” (“ Ontologie de la subjectivité,” Revue de VInstitut Catholique de Paris [April-June 1988]: 126). 18. The Passions o f the Soul, §80, A T X I, 387, 11. 23-26, and §82, 389, 1. 17. See §79, “ join itself willingly to objects that appear to be agreeable to it,” “ things it deems bad,” A T X I, 3 8 7 , 11. 4 -6 and 8. It is noteworthy that love mobilizes first a representation and then a will, thereby mimicking the two moments of the true theoretical judgment, as found in Meditation IV. 19. The Passions o f the Soul, §81, A T X I, 388, 11. 1 0 - 1 1 . 20. Ibid., §82, A T X I, 388, 1. 24—389, 1. 6. 21. Letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, A T IV, 6 11, 11. 3—4. See The Passions o f the Soul, §81: “ to some object, whatever its nature may be,” A T X I, 388, 11. h —12; §82: “ Nor do we need to distinguish as many kinds of

NOTES TO PAGES I 3 5 - I 3 9

193

love as there are different possible objects of love,” A T X I, 3 8 8 , 11. 22-24. It is noteworthy that the diversity of its objects unifies love rather than divides it, for the same reason that science— according to Rule I — remains one, in spite of the infinite diversity of its objects: for it is always a question of a single and same spirit (“ mens humana . . . universalissima” ), regardless of the objects to which it is applied. Thus the doctrine of univocal love transposes the doctrine of the unity of science from the theoretical to the ethical domain. The fundamental option— the preeminence of the mens hu­ mana as an ego— is still at work in both cases. 22. Respectively, The Passions o f the Soul, §82, A T X I, 3 8 9 , 11. 7—8; and letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, A T IV, 610, 11. 5—8. 23. The Passions o f the Soul, §82, A T X I, 389, 11. 10-20. 24. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, respectively, §44, p. 125, and §62, p. 175. 25. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, 111., 1968), pp. 77—78. See also other formulations: “ The reflection suppresses the inter­ subjectivity” (p. 48), or “ philosophically speaking, there is no experience of the other” (p. 71). See Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris, 1945), pp. 4 iff. 26. It is assumed here that the division in two of Descartes’ ontotheology, which I tried to establish in Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, chap. 2, is still valid. 27. Letter to Voetius, A T VIII-2, 112 , 11. 21-29 . 28. “ The laws of charity [leges charitatis],” ibid., 99, 1. 23; 1 1 4 , 11. 6—7; 1 1 6 , 1. 29; 13 0 , 1. 27. On this strange return by Descartes to a strictly theolog­ ical theme and its use in political philosophy, see my remarks in the preface to the excellent edition (based on the translation by V. Cousin) by T . Verbeek of La querelle d ’ Utrecht (Paris, 1988), pp. 7—13; and the remarks by P. Guenancia, “ Descartes accusé se défend,” Critique 510 (November 1989).

Chapter Seven 1. Respectively, Proslogion, I, edited and translated by J. Hopkins and H. Richardson (Toronto, 1974). See the following: “ uncomplicated arguments [vulgaribus argumentis]” (Monologion, preface; ed., 7, 9); and “ the logic of my argument [connexionem hujus meae argumentis]” (Reply to Gaunilo, III, 133, 9); and Descartes, A T VII, 1 1 5 , 1. 22; see also A T VII, 6 5 , 1. 20. Here I follow A. Koyré, for whom Anselm’s argument “ does not seem to be an ontological proof in the exact sense of the term” (L ’idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de saint Anselme [Paris, 1923 and 1984], p. 193). 2. “ Meditatione de cognitione, Veritate et Ideis,” in Die philosophischen Schriften, edited by C. J. Gerhardt (Hildesheim, i960), vol. 4, p. 425.

194

NOTES TO PAGES 1 3 9 - 1 4 3

3. For instance, “ argumento Cartesiano,” Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio, II, 7, Ak. A. I, p. 395; or “ cartesianischer [Beweisgrund],” Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, III, 5, Ak. A. II, p. 162; and even “ the famous ontological argument of Descartes,” Kritik der reinem Vernunft, A 602/B 630; translated by Norman Kemp (New York, 1965), p. 507. 4. Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Got­ tes, III, 4, Ak. A. II, p. 16 1; and Kritik der reinem Vernunft, A 592/B 620. The use of the formula “ ontological argument” becomes standard from then on. Hegel retrospectively applies it to Descartes (“ thus we there have the unity of thought and Being, and the ontological proof of the existence of God,” Vorselungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, edited by E. Moldenhauer and K . Markus Michel, vol. 20 [Frankfurt, 1971], p. 138; translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances Simson [New York, 1974], p. 235) and even to Anselm (“ the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God,” Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, vol. 3: Medieval and Modern Philosophy, edited by R. Brown [Berkeley, 1990], p. 54). Moreover, Schelling sometimes juxta­ poses in the same page the old formulation (“ Cartesian proof” ) and the new one “ (Descartes has become decisive for the whole of subsequent modern philosophy . . . through the setting up of the ontological proof,” Zur Gesch­ ichte der neueren Philosophie, Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 10 [Stuttgart, 1861], p. 14; translated by Andrew Bowie [Cambridge, 1994], p. 49). 5. On these questions, see the classic works of P. Petersen, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland (Leipzig, 19 21, and Stuttgart, 1962); M. Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Ja h r­ hunderts (Tübingen, 1939); E. Vollrath, “ Die Gliederung der Metaphysik in eine Metaphysica generalis und eine Metaphysica specialisZeitschrift fü r philosophische Forschung 16, no. 2 (1962); Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, chap. 1; and J.-F . Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphy­ sique (Paris, 1990), in particular pp. 436—57. 6. Kritik der reinem Vernunft, A 590/B 619, A 602/B 630; trans., pp. 500, 507 (modified). 7. Kritik der reinem Vernunft, A 601/B 629 and A 596/B 624; trans., pp. 506 and 503 (modified). 8. Meditations, A T VII, respectively, 6 6 , 11. 1 2 - 1 3 (= 6 7 , 11. 9 - 1 0 or 54, 11. 13 -14 ); 67, 1. 21 (= 1. 27); and 69, 1. 8. 9. Ethica, I, def. I (= section 1 1 , dem. 1); translated by Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis, 1992), p. 31. 10. Recherche de la vérité, respectively, IV, 1 1 , §1 and §2, in Oeuvres com­ plètes, vol. 2, edited by G. Rodis-Lewis (Paris, 1962), pp. 93, 95. 1 1. Entretiens sur la métaphysique et la religion, II, §4; ibid., vol. 12, edited by A. Robinet (Paris, 1965), p. 53.

NOTES TO PAGES

143-146

195

12. Monadology, §44; G. W Leibniz’s Monadology, edited by N. Rescher (Pittsburgh, 1991), p. 22. 13. D iephilosophischen Schriften, edited by C. J. Gerhardt, vol. 4, p. 406. 14. Replies, A T VII, 166, 11. 16 -18 . It is remarkable in this regard that Schelling sanctions the Leibnizian dimension of Descartes’ argument by criticizing the Cartesian formulation that best anticipates Leibniz: “ But nec­ essary existence is contained in the concept of God. . . . Therefore it may be truly affirmed of God that necessary existence belongs to him or that he exists” (AT VII, 166, 1. 25—167, 1. 3; cited in Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Sammtliche Werke (SJV), vol. 10, p. 16. 15. Philosophie der Offenbarung, I, 8; SW, vol. 13, p. 159. “ God is not just the necessary being, but he is necessarily the necessary being” ; see French translation under direction of J.-F . Marquet and J.-F . Courtine (Paris, 1989), vol. 1, p. 185. See the comments by X . Tilliette, “ Argument ontolo­ gique et onto-théologie, Notes conjointes: Schelling et l’argument ontolo­ gique,” Archives de philosophie 26, no. 1 (1963), which also appeared in L ’absolu et la philosophie: Essais sur Schelling (Paris, 1987), chap. 9. 16. Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, vol. 3: Medieval and Modern Philosophy, p. 54 (p. 34 in Hegel’s text). See also the comment about Des­ cartes: “ Here in the form of God no other unity is expressed than the one found in cogito ergo sum— being and thinking inseparably linked” (ibid., p. 143 [p. 96 in Hegel’s text]). 17. Wissenschaft den Logik, III, 2: It is self-evident that this latter transi­ tion [from concept to objectivity] is identical in character with what formerly appeared in Metaphysics as the inference from the notion [Begriffe concept] namely the notion o f God to his existence, or as the so-called ontological proof of the existence o f God” (Hegel’s Science o f Logic, translated by A. V. Miller [London, 1969], p. 705. 18. See note 15 above. 19. The theme of the fides quaerens intellectum comes from Isaiah 7:9, “ Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis” (“ I f you will not believe, surely you shall not understand” ), through the intermediary of Augustine, among others: “ Do you wish to understand? Believe. For God has said by the prophet: ‘Unless you believe, you shall not understand’ . . . I f you have not under­ stood, I said, believe. For understanding is the reward of faith. Therefore do not seek to understand in order to believe, but believe so that you may understand” (Injohannis Evangelicum, X IX , 6, p. 287; trans. [Grand Rapids, Mich., 1983], vol. 7, p. 185; see X L V , 7; X V , 24; X X V II, 7; L X IX , 2; ibid., pp. 273, 391, 500—501). Saint Augustine chose the version of the Septuagint on purpose, reconciling it with the Hebrew version: “ Nisi credideritis, non permanebis” (“ Unless you believe, you shall not be established” ; De doctrina Christiana, II, 12, 17; PL, vol. 34, col. 43). See F. Thonnard, “ Caractères

NOTES TO PAGES

146-147

augustiniens de la méthode philosophique de saint Anselme,” in Spicilegium Beccense I (Le Bec-Hellouin and Paris, 1959). This can be understood as an anticipation of the inversion of the Hegelian problematic of the relationships between faith and concept. 20. Nor does it suppose a divine name, as was unequivocally stated by E. Gilson, against the thesis of K . Barth (Fides quaerens intellectum: Anselm Beweis der Existenz Gottes [Munich, 1931]; French translation by J. Corrèze, Saint Anselme: Fides quaerens intellectum: La preuve de l ’existence de Dieu [Neuchâtel and Paris, 1958]; with preface by M. Corbin [Geneva, 1985], especially pp. according to which id quo majus cogitari nequit would be a name for God: “ There is no need to be a great exegete to know that Scripture never gives God such a name; the theologians o f the Middle Ages collected and commented on them, in the wake of Dionysius, in their De divinis nominibus, and it is never found in any of them” (“ Sens et nature de l’argument de saint Anselme,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 9 [1934]: 2Ôff.; reprinted in Etudes médiévales [Paris, 1983], pp. 74ff.). This objection should be maintained against the recent radicalized version of Barth’s thesis put forth by M. Corbin (“ Cela dont plus grand ne puisse être pensé,” Anselm Studies 1 [1983]; “ Nul n’a de plus grand amour que de donner sa vie pour aimer: Essai sur la signification de 1’ unum argumentum du Proslogion,’’’ Revue de l ’institut Catholique de Paris 16 [1985]; and introduction to the Proslogion in L ’oeuvre de Anselme de Cantorbéry, vol. 1 [Paris, 1986], pp. 210, 214, 216, 22off). Even though I agree completely that Anselm should be read as he himself understood himself— that is to say, in large part starting from Dionysius’ corpus and the theology of divine names— it seems to me problematic to compare the three “ ways” (affirma­ tive, negative, and of eminence) to three “ divine names,” which would be hidden or interspersed in the Monologion and the Proslogion. 21. Prolegomena, §13; trans. (Indianapolis, 1977), p. 37. When one ig­ nores this critical dimension, the argument becomes dogmatic again, but it still remains empirical by using “ the greatest.” Thus Gaunilo: “ you say repeatedly that I argue that which is greater than all others is in the under­ standing. And if it is in the understanding, it exists also in reality; for other­ wise that which is greater than all others would not be that which is greater than all others” {Reply, V, 134, 24ff). Thus in the same terms, Bergson: “ I conceive, said Saint Anselm, the greatest Being, therefore it exists. For if it did not exist, I could conceive one that did” (Leçons de psychologie et de métaphysique, lecture 17, in Cours I, edited by H. Hude and J.- L . Dumas [Paris, 1990], p. 368). Conversely, the critical interpretation and the parallel with Kant are suggested by P. Naulin: “ The paradox of the Proslogion is that it develops a properly dogmatic line of argument within a perspective which, by reference to self-consciousness, is already critical” (“ Réflexions sur la portée de la preuve ontologique chez Anselme de Cantorbéry,” Revue

NOTES TO PAGES 1 4 7 - 1 5 0

197

de métaphysique et de morale [1969]: 19). See also C.-E. Viola: “ It is wrong to identify Anselm’s argument with the Cartesian or Leibnizian proof that sets out from the idea of God conceived as ens perfectissimum, the idea of the most perfect . . . In effect, for Anselm, it is not a question of analyzing a concept as with most of the defenders of the ontological argument” but rather “ of analyzing our way of comprehending God” (“Journées internationales anselmiennes,” Archives de philosophic 35 [1972]: 153). 22. Strangely, it is when Kant thinks he is refuting Anselm’s so-called ontological argument that he almost literally repeats its terms, one negation excepted. What Kant sees as the weakness of the argument coincides with its greatest strength for Anselm: “ When I think something, whatever and however numerous the predicates by means of which I think it (even in its complete determination), by the sole fact that I additionally [binzusetze] posit that this thing exists, the end result is absolutely the same for the thing [so kommt . . . binzu]. For otherwise it would no longer exist as the same but as something more than what I originally thought in the concept, and I could no longer say that it is exactly the object of my concept which exists [sonst würde nicht eben dasselbe, sondern mehr existieren, ais ich im Begriffe gedacht hatte, und ich konnte nicht sagen, dass gerade der Gegenstand meines Begriffs existiere]” (Kritik der reinem Vernunft, A 600/B 628). For Anselm, in the case of “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” (and especially of “ something greater than can be thought,” Proslogion, X V , 112 , 14—15), there precisely exists more than what I can conceive in the con­ cept— in short, there is much more than simply existence in the concept. This paradox— a unique case of ontic negantropy— neither weakens nor disqualifies the argument, but rather defines it. 23. The same transcendental treatment— to the second degree— of the cogitatio is set forth in the reply to Gaunilo: “ Yet, even if it were true that [in one sense] that than which a greater cannot be thought could not be conceived or understood, nonetheless it would not be false that [in another sense] ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ can be conceived and understood. Nothing prevents our saying [the word] ‘unsayable,’ even though what is called unsayable cannot be said. Moreover, we can think [the concept] inconceivable, even though what is rightly called inconceivable cannot be conceived. By the same token, when that than which nothing greater can be thought is spoken of, without doubt, what is heard can be thought and understood, even if the thing than which a greater cannot be thought could not be thought or understood” {Reply to Gaunilo, IX , 138, 4 -11 ). Concerning the move from “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” to “ something greater than can be thought” (Proslogion X V , C. E. Viola writes of a transition from the “ overcoming by the understanding of all finite objects” to the “ overcoming of the understanding by itself” (“ La dialectique de la grandeur: Une interprétation du Proslogion,” Revue de théo-

198

n o t e s to p a g e

150

logie ancienne et médiévale 27 [1970]: 4off.). In his first scholarly work, Alquié stressed and perfectly understood the critical and transcendental status of the thought as applied to God: “ Saint Anselm does not intend to define God in thought but outside thought. . . . God is defined not in thought but by relation to it. He is defined as exterior to thought, or at least as constitut­ ing for it a limit that cannot be crossed,” as “ an obstacle to thought, some thing that thought will be aware of as a limit, which it will run up against, which will block it from proceeding further” (“L ’argument ontologique chez saint Anselme: Les critiques de Gaunilon et Saint Thomas d’Aquin” [diss., 1929 ], pp. 17 -18 ). 24. See Reply to Gaunilo: (a) It is not rational to deny what one only understands to some extent (aliquatenus): “ For is it reasonable for someone to deny what he understands [and to do so] because it is said to be identical with that which he denies because he does not understand? Or if he ever denies something which to some extent he understands, and if that thing is identical with something which he does not at all understand, is not what is in question more easily proved about that which to some extent he under­ stands than about that which he does not at all understand? Therefore, [on the one hand] it cannot even be plausible for someone to deny any knowledge of that than which a greater cannot be thought (which when he hears of, he understands to some extent) because he denies any knowledge of God (in no respect thinking the meaning of the word ‘God’). On the other hand, if he denies any knowledge of God because he does not at all understand [the meaning of the word ‘God’], then is it not easier to prove what in some sense is understood than what is not at all understood?” (VII, 136, 1. 25— 137, 1. 3). (b) It is no more rational to accept only what one fully (penitus) understands: “ But if you say that what is not fully understood is not under­ stood and is not in the understanding, then say as well that someone who cannot stand to gaze upon the most brilliant light of the sun does not see daylight, which is nothing other than the sun’s light. Surely that than which a greater cannot be thought is understood and is in the understanding to the extent that the above statements are understood about it” (Reply to Gau­ nilo, I, 132, 5-9). 25. Reply to Gaunilo, VIII, 137 (27; see 14 ,18 ). Gilson stressed this point: “ Saint Anselm simply said that taking a look at things was enough to permit making the ‘conjecture’ of quo maius cogitari nequit, and that starting from this notion, even if it is only conjectural, the proof could be developed com­ pletely” (op. cit., p. 8; see also p. 56). A. Koyré also admits that the proof “ starts from an indirect concept and is not expressing the essence of God” and remains an “ indirect demonstration” (op. cit., pp. 2 0 1 - 2 ) . Similarly, J. Paliard writes: “ God resembles nothing else, belongs to no other conceptual classification. The idea of God must be understood in an entirely different way: not the essence being offered to the gaze of man, but the designation

NO TES TO P AG E 1 5 1

1 99

of the essence. . . . This unsurpassable . . . is the unique and privileged idea” (“ Prière et dialectique: Méditation sur le Proslogion de saint Anselme,” Dieu vivant 6 [1946]: 55); H. Bouillard: “ this notion does not any longer say what God is, states nothing concerning his essence, . . . consequently nothing can be drawn from it analytically” (“ La preuve de Dieu dans le Proslogion et son interprétation par K. Barth,” in Spicilegium Beccense I, p. 196); H. U. Von Balthasar: “ No more than Being is a concept . . . no more, indeed far less, is God a concept. . . . I f the negative formula (id quo majus . . . ) could be taken at most as designating a limiting concept, then the comparative (majus) clearly expresses the fact that it is in no sense a static concept, but rather points to a dynamic movement of thought” (Herrlichkeit, II, Fächer der Style [Einsiedeln, 1962], p. 2 1 1 ; trans. [New York, 1984], vol. 2, pp. 2 3 1-3 2 ); M. Kohlenberger also writes of a “ concept limite” (Similitudo und ratio: Überlegungen ur Methode bei Anselm von Canter­ bury [Bonn, 1972], p. 84); and I. U. Dalferth: “ Neither a concept of God nor a name of God, but rather a rule, some instructions, how one must think, whenever one wants to think God” (“ Fides quarens intellectum: The­ ologie als Kunst der Argumentation in Anselms Proslogion,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 81 [1984]: 78 ff; see also 86n.i36). On the other hand, it is a flaw of the otherwise remarkable study by J. Vuillemin to have presup­ posed that Anselm based his argument on a concept of God: “ It will be observed that from here on out, we are not speaking of the proof for the existence of God, but of its condition: namely of the rational construction of the concept or of the description of God .. . Anselm’s argument supposes, given by faith, a certain concept or at least a certain description of God that must be examined as to whether or not it responds to the requirements of reason, especially in regard to non-contradiction” (Le Dieu dAnselme et les apparences de la raison [Paris, 1971], p. 54); but, precisely, Anselm’s entire argument rests on the impossibility and the uselessness of such a concept. See the pertinent critique by R. Payot, “ L ’argument ontologique et le fonde­ ment de la métaphysique,” Archives de philosophie 39, nos. 2—4 (1976): 78, 83, 167, 434 ff. 26. Our background here is the definitive demonstration by H. de Lubac, who asks: “ Why is it so heavy with absence, even in the most intimate pres­ ence? Why . . . this unbridgeable distance?” (“ Sur le chapitre X IV du Proslo­ gion, ” in Spicilegium Beccense I, p. 300) and concludes the existence of “ two moments or two characteristics: on the one hand, an extreme rationality; on the other, in the very success of the rational endeavor, an extreme dissatisfac­ tion” (“ Seigneur, je cherche ton visage: Sur le chapitre X IV du Proslogion de saint Anselme,” Archives de philosophie 39, no. 2 [1976]: 203). 27. With this thesis Anselm joins a long tradition, illustrated among oth­ ers by Gregory of Nyssa: “ This is the true knowledge of what is sought; this is the seeing that consists in not seeing” (Life o f Moses, §163, Patrologia

200

NOTES TO PAGE 1 5 2

graeca, vol. 44, p. 377, A, edited by Daniélou, S C I bis [Paris, 1987], p. 210; translated by Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson [New York, 1978], p. 95); Dionysius: “ I f only we lacked sight and knowledge so as to see, so as to know, unseeing and unknowing, that which lies beyond all vision and knowledge. For this would be really to see and to know; to praise the Tran­ scendent One in a transcending way, namely through the denial of all beings” (Mystical Theology, II, PG, vol. 3, p. 1025 A; translated by Colm Luibheid [New York, 1987], p. 138); Augustine: “ We are talking about God, so why be surprised if you cannot grasp it? I mean: if you can grasp, it isn’t God” (Sermo 117 , 5, P L , vol. 38, col. 663; trans., vol. 3 part 4, p. 2 11); “ Is He perhaps to be sought even when found? For things incomprehensible must be investigated, lest one think he has found nothing, when he has been able to find how incomprehensible that is which he was seeking. Why then does he so seek, if he comprehends that which he seeks to be incomprehensible . . . ?” (De trinitate, X V , 2, 2; trans., p. 199). This tradition is continued by Nicholas of Cusa (“ that which satisfies the intellect, or that which is its end, is not that which the intellect understands. Nor can that which the intellect utterly does not understand satisfy it, but only that which it under­ stands by not understanding; . . . only the intelligible which the intellect knows to be so intelligible that this intelligible can never be fully known can satisfy the intellect,” De visione dei, X V I; Philosophisch-theologische Schriften, edited by L . Gabriel; German translation by D. and W. Dupré [Vienna, 1967], vol. 3, p. 166; translated by H. Lawrence Bond [New York, 1977], pp. 266—67) and Descartes (“ the idea of the infinite, if it is to be a true idea, cannot be grasped at all, since the impossibility of being grasped is contained in the formal definition of the infinite,” A T VII, 368, 11. 2—4). 28. Proslogion, V, 10 4 , 1. 9. See the following instances: “ Therefore You are truly . . . whatever it is better to be than not to be” (XI, 110 , 11. 1-3 ); and “ Is there anyone, for example— even if he does not believe in the real existence of what he conceives— who is unable to think that if there is some­ thing good which has a beginning and an end, then that good is much better which has no end though having a beginning. And just as the latter is better than the former, so something having neither beginning nor end is better still” (Reply to Gaunilo, VIII, 137, 18-22); or “ For we believe about the Divine Substance whatever, absolutely speaking, can be thought to be better than its contradictory. For example, it is better to be eternal than not to be eternal, better to be good than not to be good— or rather, to be good­ ness itself than not to be goodness” (Reply, X , 139, 11. 3-6). We should therefore proceed carefully when speaking of a “ movement of thought to­ ward an optimum and a maximum posited as the Absolute” (P. Vignaux, “ Structure et sens du Monologion, ” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 31 [1947]: 2 1 1 ; reprinted in De saint Anselme a Luther [Paris, 1976], p. 95); here we must not distinguish between the two terms, but we note

NOTES TO PAGES I 5 2 - 1 5 4

201

that neither of them appears in Anselm’s text. Koyré introduces, somewhat carelessly, an Ens perfectissimum that one would be hard pressed to locate in the text (op. cit., pp. 41, 43-44, 46-47), since neither summe perfectum nor perfectissimum seems to appear even once in Anselm’s text (according to G. R. Evans, A Concordance to the Works o f St. Anselm [New York, 1984], vol. 3, p. 1032; and Opera omnia, edited by F. S. Schmitt, vol. 6: Index generalis personarum et rerum, p. 275). This confirms my hypothesis in Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, pp. 2Ô6ff. 29. Proslogion, X IV , n i , 11. 8—9. The same reduction is encountered elsewhere: “ No one denies that God is the highest good, since something that is less than something else is by no means God, and anything that is not the highest good is less than something else since it is less than the highest good” (Epistula de incarnatione Verbi, VIII, 22, 11. 24—26); or “Just as from the highest good nothing comes except goodness and all goodness is from the highest good, so too from the highest essence nothing comes except essence, and all essence is from the highest essence. Hence, since the highest good is the highest essence, it follows that all goodness is essence and all essence is good” (De casu diaboli, I, 2 3 4 , 1. 29—2 3 5 , 1. 3). Here minus/ majus (less/more) are to be understood explicitly starting from summum, (highest) and summum starting from bonum (good). 30. The indeterminacy of “ that than which a greater cannot be thought” left to itself is made clear when it is confused, which is actually inevitable, with a simple “ greater than all things [majus omnibus]” ; thus Anselm firmly rejects this error of Gaunilo (Reply, V, 134, pp. 24ff.; see above, note 21). On the contrary, the principle that “ nothing is greater or better than God” (Cur Deus homo, I, 13; translated by Eugene Fairweather [Philadelphia, 1956], p. 181): “ It [God’s mercy] cannot be conceived to be greater or more just” ; see II, 20) should be specified with precise attributes, such as justice (“ You are so just that you cannot be thought to be more just,” Proslogion, X I, 109, line n ) and clemency (“ You are more clement than I could ever imagine,” Oratio, XIV, 56, 29-30) or kindness (“ God is so kind . . . that nothing kinder can be conceived,” Cur Deus homo, 1, 12, 70, 7; trans., p. 121). 31. See chap. VI, 104, 1. 20; chap. IX , 107, 1. 10, and 108, 1. 12; chap. X IV , i n , 1. 9 (“ highest of all things, than which nothing better can be thought” ; translated by Thomas Williams [Indianapolis, 1995], p. 108 [mod­ ified]), chap. X V III, 1 1 4 , 1. 21. This same principle is repeated in chap. XI, n o , 1. 2. The occurrences of melius are inventoried in G. R. Evans, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 852ff. (p. 8i9 ff for majus). 32. Summe bonus: chap. IX , 107, 1. 20, and chap. X , 109, 1. 5. Summum bonum: chap. X X II, 117 , line 1, and X X III, 117 , 1. 5 (appearing as “ the complete, one, total, and unique good” ; trans., p. 114). 33. Respectively chap. X X IV , 11. 25—26; chap. X X V I, 1 2 1 , 11. 9 -10 ; and chap. X X V , 118 , 1. 17.

202

NOTES TO PAGE

15 5

34. Monologion, X V , 29, 18-20. See also chaps. X X V I-X X V II. Here Anselm follows Augustine (De trinitate, V, 2, 3; VI, 5, 7; and VII, 5, 10) and Boethius: “ Relation for instance cannot be predicated at all of God; for substance in Him is not really substantial, but supersubstantial” (De trinitate, IV, edited by H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester [Cambridge, 1978], p. 16; trans. [Cambridge, 1946], p. 17). He also anticipates Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, la, q. 29, a. 3, obj. 3 and ad. 4. On this question, see a few indications in Koyré, op. cit., p. 172; and Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, p. 23off. 35. Curiously, F. S. Schmitt (op. cit., p. 102, n.) quotes Monologion, L X X X , 86, 19 - 2 1, for majus, where it is not mentioned, as well as Monologion, X V, 29, 17 - 2 1, which precisely uses only melius and melior, just as the texts by Augustine and Boethius that I have cited. Seneca, a nonChristian author, is the only one among the texts cited to confirm the majus: “ What is God? The mind of the universe, all that you see and all that you do not see. Let his greatness be held to account, that than which nothing greater can be thought [nihil majus excogitari potest], he alone is above all, he maintains his work both within and without” (Naturales quaestiones, I, Praefatio, in Oeuvres complètes, edited by M. Nisard [Paris, 1877], p. 391). This is the best indication that Anselm’s theoretical decision simply went unnoticed. Other authors cite the texts that privilege the use of melius, al­ though they never seem to detect the importance of this decision: A. Daniels, “ Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im dreizehnten Jahrhundert, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Argu­ ments im Proslogion des heiligen Anselm,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philo­ sophie des Mittelalters 8, nos. 1 - 2 (1909). See also J. Chatillon, “ De Guil­ laume d’Auxerre à saint Thomas d’Aquin: L ’argument de saint Anselme chez les premiers scolastiques du XHIe siècle,” in Spicilegium Beccense I ; Alquié: ‘“ Quo nihil majus,’ Saint Augustine said, ‘Quo nihil melius.’ Saint Anselm’s majus is more vague, more undetermined,” op. cit., p. 17; K . Barth, op. cit., pp. 65 and 75; N. Malcom, in The Ontological Argument: From Anselm o f Canterbury to Contemporary Philosophers, edited by A. Plantiga (New York, 1965), p. 142; J. Vuillemin, op. cit., p. 157; W. L. Gombocz, whose argument follows that of Vuillemin (Zu Semantik des Existenzprädi­ kates und der ontologischen Arguments fü r Gottes Existenz von Anselm von Can­ terbury [Vienna, 1974]); and even K . Kienzier (Glauben und Denken bei An­ selm von Canterbury [Freiburg, 1981]). It is true that H. U. Von Balthasar and P. Gilbert clearly pointed out the primacy of summum bonum in the Monologion, as well as its Augustinian origin, but they unfortunately do not pursue the same reasoning for melius in the Proslogion (respectively, Herrlich­ keit, II, op. cit., p. 255; and Dire l ’ineffable: Lecture du Monologion de saint Anselme [Paris, 1984], p. 63fr.). As for R. Brecher, although he clearly made the distinction between majus and melius (“ Anselm was generally careful to

NOTES TO PAGE

156

203

distinguish between them” ) and identifies the latter with the sovereign good even in the Proslogion (“ This distinction between God’s ontological suprem­ acy and his goodness is retained throughout the Proslogion” ), in the end he only considers melius to be a gloss for majus (“ Greatness in Anselm’s Onto­ logical Argument,” Philosophical Quarterly 24/95: 97, 98). 36. Respectively P L, vol. 32, col. 735 (C SE L, vol. 32, p. 145; and BA, vol. 13 [Paris, 1962], p. 588, noted by F. S. Schmitt, op. cit.); then P L, vol. 34, col. 22 (mentioned by F. S. Schmitt, op. cit.; and J. Vuillemin, op. cit., p. 93); and P L, vol. 32, col. 1355 (cited by Koyre, op. cit., p. 17 2 ^ 3; and by J. Vuillemin, op. cit., p. 17, without commentary); finally, cited edition, p. 276. See also the parallel with: “ nothing is better than God himself” and “ It is therefore to be wished that men would bring to these inquiries such a clear intellectual perfection as might enable them to see the highest good, that than which nothing is better or higher, next in order to which comes a rational soul in a state of purity and perfection” (De moribus Manichaeorum, I, 1 1 , 19, then II, 1, 1; P L , vol. 32, cols. 1319 and 1345; trans. [Grand Rapids, Mich., 1983], vol. 4, p. 69). Or even: “ the highest good is that than which there is nothing higher. But God is good and than Him nothing can be higher. God is therefore the highest good” (De duabus animabus contra Manichaeos, V III, 10; P L, vol. 42, col. 10 1; trans. [Grand Rapids, Mich., 1983], vol. 4, p. 101). Or still: “ the highest good, than which there is nothing higher, is God” (De natura boni contra Manichaeos, I; P L, vol. 42, col. 551; trans. [Grand Rapids, Mich., 1983], vol. 4, p. 351). For reference, let us mention Cicero as a possible non-Christian source: “ there is nothing supe­ rior to the universe, there is nothing more excellent or more beautiful. Not only is there nothing better, but nothing better can even be thought” (De natura deorum, II, 7 , 1. 18; translated by Horace C. P. McGregor [Harmondsworth, England, 1972], p. 131). But if melius corrects Seneca’s majus, it nev­ ertheless remains in the same cosmological dimension. 37. Boethius, op. cit., p. 276. Obviously, the use of the formula “ than which nothing better can be thought” continues after Anselm. Let us cite, for instance, Saint Bernard: “ What is God? That than which nothing better can be thought” (De consideratione, V, 7; P L , vol. 182, col. 797 A); William of Saint-Thierry: “ We call that highest of all than which nothing is greater, nothing better” or “ For nothing is better than charity, nothing more perfect than charity,” “ just as nothing is better than charity, so too is nothing more pleasing than charity” (De trinitate, respectively I, 1 1 and III, 2, then 3; PL, vol. 196, cols. 896 and 9 17 -18 ); Livre des X X I V Philosophes: “ God is that than which nothing better can be thought” (chap. V, edited by F. Hudrey [Paris, 1989], p. 104, which shows the parallels with the texts of Augustine); or even Mersenne, “ whoever apprehends the best necessarily conceives an actual being; for in understanding the best, the soul conceives that than which nothing better is or can be” (Quaestiones in Genesim, chap. 1, q. 1, v.

NOTES TO PAGES 1 5 7 - 1 5 9

i, ratio, V [Paris, 1623], fol. 35, who cites Proslogion, II, III, IV, V, and X V ); and explicitly Anselm’s definition: “ God is that than which nothing greater can be thought” (ibid., fol. 37). 38. Dionysius, Mystical Theology, II; PG, vol. 3, 1025a (see above, note 27). This thesis was developed at length by P. Evdokimov, “ L ’aspect apophatique de l’argument de saint Anselme,” in Spicilegium Beccense I, particu­ larly p. 239 and pp. 249ff. 39. Respectively, A T VII, 368, 11. 2 -4 ; and Monologion, L X IV , 75, 11. n -12 .

Index Adam, Charles, 71 Alquié, Ferdinand: on Anselm’s onto­ logical argument, 1980. 23; on causal­ ity in the Discourse, 3 1, i68n. 17; on the cogito in the Discourse, 23, 32, 37; on the Discourse and metaphysics, 23, 24, 26, 3 1, 37-38 , 39, i67n. 8, i68n. 12, lôçn. 18; on the dreams of the Olympica, 162ml. 6, 7; on immediacy of the cogito, i88n. 16; on metaphys­ ics as absent from the Regulae, 49, i73n. 15; on substantiality of the soul, i7on. 23 animal sensation, 106, i88n. 14 Anselm, Saint: concept of divine es­ sence in ontological argument of, 14 5 - 5 1; Descartes’ ontological argu­ ments compared with, 158—59; Hegel on ontological argument of, 144-45; love as foundation of ontological argu­ ment of, 157; ontological argument as characterized by, 139; “ ontological ar­ gument” as not ontological, 158—60; relation of God’s existence and es­ sence in ontological argument of, 15 1- 5 6 a posteriori proof for existence of God, 27, 28-29, 6 1-6 2 appetite, 90, i83n. 36 a priori proof for existence of God, 27, 29 Aquinas, Thomas: on Anselm’s ontolog­ ical argument, 147-48; on blessed­ ness, 90, 93; on dreams from divine

revelation, 4; on man capax Dei, 87, 89; Wigger’s criticism of, 92 Aristotle: Baillet comparing Descartes with, i66n. 5; Descartes adopting psy­ chological terminology of, 44; Des­ cartes’ generosity compared with “ magnificence” of, 189ml. 19, 2 1, i9on. 22; on ideas, 43, 46, i72n. 4; on metaphysics, 26, i68n. 13; simple natures and categories of, 1720. 12; on thought as activity, 36; on truth expressing a meaning o f being, 36 Armogathe, J.-R ., i63n. 13, 17m . 2, i76n. 2 Arnauld, Antoine, 33 Aubenque, P., i68n. 13 Augustine, Saint: capax Dei in Augustinian theology, 8 5 -9 1; on faith and reason, I95n. 19; on God as sub­ stance, 202n. 34; on incomprehensibil­ ity of God, 200n. 27 auto-affection: Descartes on the soul affecting itself, 108-9; generosity as, 112 ; thought as auto-effective for Henry, 105—7 axioms, 53 Baillet, Adrien, 3-4 , 8, 18, 22, i66n. 5 Baius, 91 Balthasar, H. U. Von, i9çn. 25, 202n.

35 Barth, Karl, i96n. 20 Being: Anselm’s hierarchy of, 149; in Anselm’s ontological argument, 1 5 1 -

INDEX

2 q6 Being (continued) 56, 159; in the cogito, 96-97; Leibniz on necessary Being in ontological ar­ gument, 14 3—44; in Malebranche’s ontological argument, 142-43. See also ontology Benedict of Canfield, 94 Bergson, Henri, igôn. 21 Berkeley, George, 35 Bernard, Saint, 203n. 37 Bérulle, Pierre de, 95 Beyssade, J.-M ., 167ml. 7, 9, 169m 17, i8 8 n .16 blessedness: Baius on, 91; finite versus infinite, 90, 92-93; human capacity for, 88-89, 9° Bloch, O., 69 bodies: corporeal ideas, 44; as reducible to simple natures, 47. See also exten­ sion; shape; movement Boethius, 156, 202n. 34 Bouillier, F ., 167ml. 6, 7 Brecher, R., 202n. 35 Brossaeus, P., 163m 13 capable/capacité: change in meaning of, 68-69; correspondence with capax/capacitas, 70, 77, 81; in the Discourse, 7 0 -7 1, 72, 74; in the Medi­ tations, 83-85; in Passions o f the Soul, 72, 75, 77; posse as Latin translation of, 7 7 -8 1; in The Search for Truth, 7 1 —72, 76, 77; in seventeenth-century philosophy, 94-95; shift of meaning in works of Descartes, 8 1-8 5 capax/capacitas: capax Dei in Augustinian theology, 8 5 -9 1; correspondence with capable / capacité, 70, 77, 8 1; in the Discourse, 72, 74, 80, I79n. 18; as implying a gift, 86; Latin semantics of, 69-70, 178m 13; in the Medita­ tions, 83-85; in Passions o f the Soul, 72, 75, 77, 80; posse used in place of, 77—81; as reduced to power, 89—91, 93-95; in The Search for Truth, 72, 76, 77, i79n. 18 Carraud, V ., iÔ3n. 13

Cartesian circle, 60 Cassirer, Ernst, I70n. 26 causality: as absent from the Discourse, 2 9 -3 1, 4 1, i68nn. 15, 17; causa sui, 27, 28, 29-30, 158, i68n. 14; God as efficient and total cause, 39 -4 1, I70n. 28; other minds as free causes,

137-38 causa sui, 27, 28, 29—30, 158, i68n. 14 certainty: of the cogito, 34; in Des­ cartes’ search for a path in life, 12; of perception, 106 charity, 138, 157, i93n. 28 Charron, Pierre, i63n. 15 Chatillon, J., 202n. 35 Cicero, i62n. 8, 203n. 36 Clauberg, Johannes, 139 clear and distinct ideas, 36 cogitatio. See thought cogito, ergo sum: common simple na­ tures in, 50, 58, 175m 27; in the Dis­ course, 23, 24, 32—37, 38; elements o f in dreams of the Olympica, 17; ele­ ments of in the Regulae, 50; ethical implications of, 1 17 ; as first princi­ ple, 34, 40, i69n. 22; generosity in nonrepresentational interpretation of, m - 1 7 ; Hegel on ontological argu­ ment and the, 144—45, i95nn. 16, 17; Heidegger on Being in, 96—97; Hei­ degger’s intentional interpretation of, 9 9 -10 1; Henry’s nonintentional inter­ pretation of, 10 5 -7 , i88n. 13; Hus­ serl’s intentional interpretation of, 97-99; intellectual simple natures in, 50, I75n. 27; intentional and repre­ sentational interpretations of, 9 7-10 5; Kant’s representational interpreta­ tion of, 10 2 -3 , 187m 10; and other minds, 12 0 -2 1; as performative in the Meditations, 33, 58 common sense, 44, 45 common simple natures (notions): in the cogito, 50, 58, i75n. 27; defined, 48; in eternal truths, 53; in mathemat­ ics, 52; and metaphysics, 55; Princi­ ples o f Philosophy on, 59; in Second

INDEX Meditation, 58-59; types of, 48. See also logical common simple natures; real common simple natures Compline, hymn of, i 6zn. 10 Concordance to Descartes’ Meditationes de prima Philosophia (Murafumi, Sa­ saki, and Nishimura), iy6n. 2 consciousness: as affected, 1; as auto­ effective for Henry, 105; as inten­ tional for Husserl, 97; reason affect­ ing, 1 - 2 ; redoubled intentionality of self-consciousness, 98-99. See also thought Conversation with Burman (Descartes), i84n. 40, i86n. 7 corporeal ideas, 44 Corpus omnium veterum poetarum latinorum (Brossaeus), 10, i63n. 13 Costabel, P., i77n. 4 (Nottingham, John, i76n. 34 Courcelles, Etienne de, 26, 70, 7 1, 78, 80 Crapulli, G ., i76n. 32 Curley, E. M ., 17 m . 2 Dalferth, I. U ., 199m 25 Daniels, A., 202n. 35 “ death of God,” 145, 160 demented, the, 1 2 1 —22 Democritus, i62n. 8 Descartes, René: Cartesianism as mate­ rial phenomenology for Henry, 105, 117 ; computerized indexing of works of, 67, i70n. 2; as founder of modern idealism, 43; Suarez as influence on, 91, 92; as theologian of pure nature, 9 1—95. See also works by name desire, 87, 88 Desmarets, Henri, 7 1, i78n. 14 Dionysius, 157, 200n. 27 Discourse on Method (Descartes): capable / capacité in, 7 0 -7 1, 72, 74; capax/capacitas in, 72, 74, 80, I79n. 18; causality as absent from, 3 0 -3 1, 41, i68nn. 15, 17; the cogito of, 23, 24, 32—37, 38; continuity with the Meditations, 2 2-2 3, i67n. 7; Desc­ artes on shortcomings of metaphysics

207 of, 3 1- 3 2 , 16911. 19; doubt in, 2 2 -2 3, 24, 25, 38; explicitly metaphysical in­ tention of, 24—27; God’s attributes in, 27-28, 39-40; metaphysical situa­ tion of, 20-42; method and metaphys­ ics in, 20-24, 42; as middle term between Regulae and Meditations, 2 0 2 1; Principles o f Philosophy antici­ pated by, 25; proofs for the existence of God in, 2 7-32; and solitude of the ego, i92n. 1 1 ; on theology, i63n. 13; as transition, 37-42; universality of method of, 2 1, i66n. 3 doubt: in the Discourse, 23, 24, 25, 38; in the Discourse and the Meditations, 2 2 -2 3; indubitability as criterion of belief for Descartes, 12 —13; ° f intel­ lectual simple natures, 60, i75n. 28; and the material simple natures, 56 57; in the Meditations, 55; and repre­ sentational interpretation of the cog­ ito, 10 1 dreams: dreaming as mode of thought (cogitatio), 17; thought as occurring in, 15; and truth in the Meditations, 15 -16 dreams of the Olympica, 1 —19; authen­ ticity of, i62n. 6; in Descartes’ philos­ ophy, 2 -3 ; as dreams not visions, 8; elements of the cogito in, 17; enthu­ siasm as not the cause of, 3 -5 , 18; God as not the source of, 4; rele­ vance of, 13; religious aspects of, 1 8 19; as requiring interpretation, 8; the revelation of, 16; self-interpretation of, 7—14; theoretical significance of, 5 -7 ; thought {cogitatio) awakened by, 14 - 19 Dubarle, D., i92n. 17 Duns Scotus, i82n. 33 duration, 61 ecstasy: in auto-affections of the soul, 1 0 9 - 1 1; in Heidegger’s intentional in­ terpretation of the cogito, 100, xoi; in Husserl’s intentional interpretation ofthe cogito, 98, 99; in representa-

2 o8 ecstasy (continued) tional interpretations of the cogito, 103, 105 ego: as center of any possible world, 119 ; in dreams of the Olympica, 17, 19; Ichspaltung of Husserl and Hei­ degger, 99, 100, i86n. 5; in inten­ tional and representational interpreta­ tions of the cogito, 99—105; and love, 13 1- 3 8 ; material simple natures as subordinated to, 61; as objectifying the other, 12 5-2 9 ; real common sim­ ple natures as subordinated to, 61; solitude as conceptually necessary state of, 12 9 -3 1; as thinking sub­ stance, 32, 34 -35, 57, 58-59, i69n. 23. See also cogito, ergo sum egoism, 1 1 8 - 2 1 enthusiasm: as not the cause of dreams of the Olympica, 3 - 5 , 18; radical cri­ tique of, 17 - 1 8 ; as relegated to imagi­ nation, 18 equality, 52, 59 Essays (Descartes), 2 1, 48 essence: and existence in ontological argument, 140-60; as linked to exis­ tence by simple natures, 63 esteem: as a cogitatio, 114 ; as defined in terms of value, 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; generosity as depending on, 1 1 1 , 112 ; and love, 134; object of, 11 3 eternal truths, 53, 55 evil spirit. See genius malignus existence: as common simple nature, 48, 58, 59, 63; and essence in ontolog­ ical argument, 140-60; as linked to essence by simple natures, 63; neces­ sary link with thought, 59 extension: as not attributable to God, i75n. 3 1; passivity of, 179m 2 1; as simple nature, 47, 52, 54, 56, 60; as subsumed under the ego, 61 faith: in Anselm’s ontological argu­ ment, 145-46; Descartes as favoring reason over, i85n. 40; lumen naturale

INDEX contrasted with, 93; and reason for Anselm, 146, 195a. 19 falsity: Descartes rejecting middle ground between truth and, 12; proba­ bility equated with by Descartes, 13 Fontialis, 139 François de Sales, 94-95 Frankfurt, H. G ., i73n. 19 free will, 19 Freud, Sigmund, 2, i6 in . 4 Froimond, L ., 92, 93 Gaunilo, i96n. 2 1, 197m 23, 20m. 30 Généalogie de la psychanalyse (Henry), i88n. 13 generosity: and Aristotle’s “ magnifi­ cence,” 189ml. 19, 2 1, i9on. 22; as auto-affection, 112 ; the cogito inter­ preted in terms of, i n —17; as de­ pending on esteem, h i , 112 ; ethical primacy of, 112 ; as modifying the manner of being, 116 ; object of, 1 1 2 — 13; ontic implications of, 1 1 5 - 1 7 ; and thought, 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; well-being as determined by, 116 genius malignus: in the Meditations, 22, 23; in Olympica and Meditations, 15, 165m 23 Geometry (Descartes), 21 Gibson, A. Boyce, 22, i66n. 5 Gilbert, P., 202n. 35 Gilson, Etienne, 22, 3 0 - 3 1, I07n. 12, i7on. 23, i90n. 20, i98n. 25 Goclenius, Rudolf, 4, 139 God: a posteriori proof for existence of, 27, 28—29, 6 1—62; a priori proof for existence of, 27, 29; as within the bounds of rationality, 62; capacitas Dei, 85; capax Dei in Augustinian the­ ology, 8 5 -9 1; contemplation of, 94; “ death of God,” 145, 160; deceiving God o f the Meditations, 22, 23; Des­ cartes’ definition of, 142; Descartes on three marvels of, 19; the Discourse on the attributes of, 27—28, 39-40; as efficient and total cause, 39 -4 1,

INDEX 1 7011. 28; existence proofs in the Dis­ course, 27—32; extension as not attrib­ utable to, i75n. 3 1; as infinite sub­ stance, 30, 62, 130; intellectual simple natures as relevant to, 64; logical com­ mon simple natures as relevant to, 64; love of, 135; love o f leading to love of others, 138; natural reason attaining knowledge of, 92—93; as nonmeasurable, 65; and other minds, 12 7-2 8 , 129—30; power of, 85; prop­ erties as expressible by real common simple natures, 63; as thinking, 64; as \J transcending material and intellectual simple natures, 63; as transcending scientific thought, 40; the will as rela­ tional mode between Descartes and, 19. See also ontological argument Gombocz, W. L ., 202n. 35 good will, 1 1 3 - 1 4 Gouhier, Henri, 1621m. 6, 7 grace: and knowledge of God through natural reason, 92; and nature, 86, 87, i85n. 40 Gregory o f Nazianzus, 87, i82n. 30 Gregory o f Nyssa, i99n. 27 Gueroult, Martial, i74n. 25, i87n. 10, 19m . 3

Hamelin, O., iÖ7n. 8 happiness, 116 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: and Anselm on faith and reason, 146; on ontological argument and the cogito, 144-45, i95nn. 16, 17; “ ontological argument” attributed to Descartes by, i94n. 4 Heidegger, Martin: on Being in the cogito, 96-97; Descartes’ rejection of formulation of cogito of, 104; inten­ tional interpretation of the cogito of, 9 9 -10 1 Henry, Michel: on Cartesianism as ma­ terial phenomenology, 105, 117 ; nonintentional interpretation of the cogito

209 of, 10 5 -7 , i88n. 13; on thought’s in­ determinacy in the cogito, 97 human nature, capax Dei and the para­ dox of, 85-91 Husserl, Edmund: intentional interpre­ tation of the cogito of, 97-99; and other minds, 129, 136; on redoubled intentionality of self-consciousness, 98—99 Ichspaltung, 99, 100, i86n. 5 idealism, Descartes as modern founder

of,

43

ideas: as belonging to imagination, 44, 46; clear and distinct ideas, 36; corpo­ real ideas, 44; for Descartes, 43—46; as figures, 44, 46, 17 m . 3; as form, 45; of God in ontological argument, 14 1; innate ideas, I72n. 7; in the Meditations, 45-46; the mind as hav­ ing the potential to produce, 84; in the Regulae, 43-44, 46; as thought, 45-46, I72n. 7. See also representation imagination: enthusiasm as relegated to, 18; ideas as belonging to, 44, 46; and material simple natures, 48, 49 Index des Meditationes de prima Philosophia de R. Descartes (Marion, Massonié, Monat, and Ucciani), i76n. 2 Index des Regulae ad directionem ingenii de René Descartes (Armogathe and Marion), i76n. 2 Index du Discours de la Méthode de René Descartes (Cahné), i7Ôn. 2 infinite, the: God as infinite substance, 30, 62, 130; as incomprehensible, 62 Ingarden, R., i86n. 5 innate ideas, 172m 7 intellectual joy, 109 intellectual simple natures: as absent in the Meditations, 55; in the cogito, 50, i75n. 27; defined, 48; and doubt, 60, i75n. 28; God as transcending, 63; linking with real common simple na­ tures, 59, 66; metaphysical function of, 58; metaphysics and understand­ ing associated with, 49, 52; objects of

2 10

intellectual simple natures (continued) metaphysics as, 64; the Regulae as passing over, 60; as relevant to God, 64; in Second Meditation, 57—58 intentionality: difficulties with inten­ tional interpretations of the cogito, I03~5; as fundamental property of consciousness for Husserl, 97; Hei­ degger’s intentional interpretation of the cogito, 9 9 -10 1; Husserl’s inten­ tional interpretation of the cogito, 9 799; redoubled intentionality o f selfconsciousness, 98-99 intersubjectivity, 12 1, 13 1 , 136 intuitus. See knowledge by intuition joy, intellectual, 109 Kant, Immanuel: Anselm and transcen­ dental method of, 147, i96n. 2 1, I97n. 22; on Leibnizian ontological argument, 144; ontological argument as defined by, 140; “ontological argu­ ment” as used by, 139; representa­ tional interpretation of the cogito of, 10 2 -3 , i87n. 10 Kienzler, K ., 202n. 35 Viknowledge by intuition (intuitus)'. the i cogito as, 50; and other minds, 120, 12 4 -2 5 Kohlenberger, M ., i99n. 25 Koyre, Alexandre, I93n. 1, 20m . 28 La Brosse, Pierre de, i63n. 13 Lefevre, Henri, 22, i67n. 8, 17 m . 30 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 47, 95, 136, 139, 14 3-4 4 Lessius, 91 letters of 1630 (Descartes): God recog­ nized as infinite in, 39; on mathemati­ cal truths, 5 1- 5 2 , I72n. 13; on mathe­ matics as subordinate to metaphysics, 55; on simple natures as metaphysi­ cal, 53; term “ metaphysics” intro­ duced in, 51, i72n. 13 Liard, L ., 22, i66n. 5 „¡^linguistic value, 177m 4

INDEX logical common simple natures: and the cogito, 175m 27; defined, 48; as relevant to God, 64 Loretto, pilgrimage to, 18, 19, 164». 17 love: in Anselm’s ontological argument, 157; and charity, 138; concupiscent and benevolent, 134; defined, 132; the ego’s claim to be the focus of, 118 ; formal univocity of, 134 -35 , i92n. 2 1; forms of, 134 -3 5 ; ° f God, 135; and other minds, 13 1 - 3 8 ; as a passion, 1 3 1; representation of object of, 135; and res cogitans, 132, 133, i74n. 24; the will in, 132, i92n. 18 Lubac, H. de, i8on. 24, ig8n. 26 lumen naturale, 93 Luynes, duc de, 83 madmen, 1 2 1-2 2 , 123 Malebranche, Nicolas: “ capacité” as used by, 95; Cartesian metaphysical situation as paradigmatic for, 35; love as defined by, 136; on ontological ar­ gument, 14 2-4 3; on our idea of our own soul, 126, i92n. 9; Robinet’s analysis of texts of, I76n. 3 Maritain, Jacques, i6 in . 2, i6sn. 23 material simple natures: in classifica­ tion of simple natures, 48; in First, Fifth, and Sixth Meditations, 53-57, i74n. 23; God as transcending, 63; in mathematics, 49, 52; the sciences as dealing with, 49; in Second Medita­ tion, 59-60; as subordinated to the ego, 61 mathematics: in First Meditation, 54; and material simple natures, 49, 52, 57; metaphysics distinguished from, I72n. 14; as subordinate to metaphys­ ics, 55; truths of as created, 5 1-5 2 , i72n. 13 mathesis universalis: egoism as practical consequence of, 119 ; God as beyond the bounds of, 63; and metaphysics, 63-65; order and measurement in, 64—65; and pura atque abstracta

INDEX mathesis of Fifth Meditation, 56; sim­ ple natures specifying conditions of, 48 Matthews, G. B., 19m . 7 measurement, 64—65 Meditations (Descartes): capable / ca­ pacité in, 83-85; the cogito o f the Dis­ course compared with that of, 33 -3 5 , 37, i7on. 25; continuity with the Dis­ course, 22—23, 167m 7; Discourse as middle term between Regulae and, 2 0 -2 1; doubt in, 2 2-2 3, 55; on dreams and truth, 1 5 - 16 ; as figure composed of different types of simple natures, 53, 65-66; ideas in, 45-46; material simple natures in First, Fifth, and Sixth, 53-57 , I74n. 23; as metaphysical, 65-66; method in, i66n. 4; method of the Regulae and the metaphysics of, 20; the mind as active power in, 83-85; as norm for Descartes’ metaphysics, 2 1; ontologi­ cal argument in Fifth, 14 1, 158; onto­ logical argument in Third, 158 -59 ; other minds as conceptually impossi­ ble in, 12 9 -3 1; other minds as omit­ ted in, 12 1- 2 5 ; proofs o f existence of God compared with those of the Dis­ course, 2 7 -3 2 ; simple natures in, 4 3 66; simple natures in First, i73n. 19; simple natures in Third, 60—66; thought as indifferent to waking/ sleeping in, 15 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 136 -3 7 , i8gn. 16, i93n. 25 Mersenne, Marin: God described as ef­ ficient and total cause to, i70n. 28; on the highest good as existing, 203n. 37. See also letters o f 1630 metaphysics: as confronting method in the Discourse, 22; as defined by Des­ cartes, i68n. 12; in the Discourse on Method, 20-42; egoism as practical consequence of Cartesian, 119 -2 0 ; ex­ plicitly metaphysical intention o f the Discourse, 24-27; as foundation of the sciences, 49; intellectual simple na­

211 tures as objects of, 49, 64; mathemat­ ics distinguished from, i72n. 14; and mathesis universalis, 63—65; the Medi­ tations as metaphysical, 65-66; Medi­ tations as norm for Descartes’, 2 1; and method in the Discourse, 20—24, 42; order without measurement in, 65; in the Regulae, 4 9 -5 1; simple na­ tures’ function in, 53; term as intro­ duced in letter of 1630, 51, i72n. 13. See also ontology Meteorology (Descartes), 2 1, i79n. 21 method: as confronting metaphysics in the Discourse on Method, 22; Des­ cartes’ search for a path in life and, 1 1 ; in the Meditations, i66n. 4; and metaphysics in the Discourse, 20—24, 42; Rule V of the Regulae on, 1 1 - 1 2 . See also mathesis universalis Montaigne, i64n. 15 moral theology, 1 1 More, Henry, I76n. 31 movement: as simple nature, 47, 54, 56, 60; as subsumed under the ego, 61 Naissance de la Paix, La (Descartes), 1, i6 in .1 Nancy, J.-L ., i88n. 16 Natorp, Paul, i70n. 26 nature: Descartes as theologian o f pure nature, 9 1-9 5 ; and grace, 86, 87, i85n. 40 Naulin, P., i96n. 21 necessary Being, 143—44 Nicholas of Cusa, 200n. 27 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 91 number, 61 Olympica (Descartes), 1. See also dreams of the Olympica ontological argument, 139 —60; An­ selm’s argument as not ontological, 158—60; characterized as ontological, 139-40; concept of divine essence in Anselm’s, 14 5 - 5 1; a concept of God as required in, 14 1-4 2 ; in Discourse

212

INDEX

ble/capacité in, 72, 75, 77; capax/ ontological argument {continued) capacitas in, 72, 75, 77, 80; on and Meditations compared, 28; the depth of passion and enjoyment of essence of God in, 14 2-4 3; in pleasures, 93 ;passio in, 71 Fifth Meditation, 14 1, 158; God as ^¿¿perceptions: animal sensation, 106, summum bonum in Anselm’s, 15 2 i88n. 14; certainty of, 106; external 54, 159-60, 20m . 29; God as “ that / and internal causes of, 108, 110 ; as than which nothing greater can be passions, 108; of volitions, 1 1 0 - 1 1 thought” in, 14 6 -5 1; Kant’s defini­ perfection: in Descartes’ definition of tion of, 140; love in Anselm’s, 157; God, 27-29; in ontological argument, as ontological, 139 -4 5; relation of 142 God’s existence and essence in An­ phenomenology: Henry on Cartesianselm’s, 15 1- 5 6 , 159; in Third Medita­ ism as material phenomenology, 105, tion, 158 -59 117 ; Henry’s nonintentional inter­ ontology: Anselm’s argument as not on­ pretation of the cogito, 10 5 -7 ; inten­ tological, 157, 159; in the Discourse, tional and representational interpreta­ 37, 38, 42; ontological argument as tions of the cogito, 9 7-10 5 ontological, 139 -4 5 philosophy: Descartes as modern ontotheology, 39, 4 0 -4 1, 138, 160 founder of idealism, 43; quadripartite Optics (Descartes), 6, 2 1, i65n. 22 division of, 10, i63n. 13; and wis­ Opus postumum (Kant), i87n. 10 dom, 10. See also metaphysics ordering, 64-65 physics: and material simple natures, other minds: charity in relationship to, 49, 57; order without measurement 138; the cogito as raising the problem in, 65 of, 12 0 - 2 1; as conceptually impossi­ physiology, 65 ble in the Meditations, 12 9 - 3 1; in Plato, 5, i62n. 8 First Meditation, 12 1- 2 2 ; in Fourth Poisson, Nicholas j ., 9, i67n. 7, i69n. Meditation, 122; as free causes, 1 3 7 22 38; love as approach to, 13 1- 3 8 ; the power: capacity as reduced to, 89-91, Meditations as omitting discussion of, 93-95; Descartes’ shift from receptiv­ 12 1- 2 5 ; objectifying of, 12 5-2 9 ; in ity to, 8 1-8 5 ; Posse used for capable Second Meditation, 12 2 -2 5 ; in Sixth in Latin translations of Descartes, Meditation, 122—23 7 7 -8 1 Principles o f Philosophy (Descartes): on Paliard, J., i98n. 25 common simple natures, 59; the Dis­ parents, 128-29 course as anticipating, 25; on feeble­ Pascal, Blaise: on egoism, 118 -2 0 , 136; ness of our nature, 93; God as effi­ on holiness versus wisdom, i64n. 15; cient and total cause in, 41; on on human capacity to know God, 95; simple natures, 52 -53 ; and solitude on self and other, 19m . 7 o f the ego, I92n. 1 1 ; substance in, passions, 10 7-9 ; as concerning the i75n. 29; thought as defined in, 16 very fact of being, 116 ; as confused probability, 12, 13 thoughts, 13 1 ; defined, 107; as en­ protology, 36, 37, 38 tirely absorbed in the soul, 132; gen­ Pythagoras, 12, I04n. 19 erosity as, 1 1 2 - 1 3 , i89n. 20; love as, 13 1 ; representation required in, 109. Rat, M ., 69 See also generosity; love; perceptions Passions o f the Soul (Descartes): rationality. See reason

INDEX real common simple natures: and the cogito, i75n. 27; defined, 48; God’s properties as expressible by, 63; link to intellectual^simple natures, 59, 66; as subordinated to the ego, 61; sub­ stance as, 61, 62 reason: Christian faith as exceeding ca­ pacity of, 88; Descartes as favoring over faith, i85n. 40; distinguishing from dreams and poetry, 1 - 2 ; and faith for Anselm, 146, I95n. 19; God as within the bounds of, 62; knowl­ edge o f God through natural, 92-93; rational creatures as capable of bless­ edness, 88-89; as a standard, 2 Recherche de la vérité (Descartes). See Search for Truth, The Regulae (Descartes): Discourse as mid­ dle term between Meditations and, 2 0 -2 1; on ideas, 43-44, 46; intellec­ tual simple natures passed over in, 60; and metaphysics, 4 9 -5 1; meta­ physics of the Meditations and the method of, 20; the mind as active power in, 82—83; on simple natures, 4 6 -5 1. See also rules by number representation: difficulties with repre­ sentational interpretations o f the cogito, 10 3 -5 ; in Heidegger’s inten­ tional interpretation of the cogito, 9910 1; in Husserl’s intentional interpre­ tation of the cogito, 97-99; Kant’s representational interpretation of the cogito, 10 2 -3 , i87n. 10; love as de­ pending on, 135; passions requiring, 109; and volitions with their termi­ nus in the soul, n o ; without an ob­ ject when the will attends to its own nature, i n res cogitans: cause of, 128; the ego as, 32, 34 -35 , 57, 58-59, 16911. 23; and intellectual simple natures, 57—58, 59; and love, 132, 133, i74n. 24 revelation, 92 Robinet, A., 176ml. 2, 3 Rodis-Lewis, Geneviève, i6 in . 1, iÔ7n. 7, igon. 32

213 Rosicrucianism, 5 Rule I (Regulae), 9, 10, I93n. 21 Rule III (Regulae)'. intellectual and com­ mon simple natures linked in, 50; on revelation, 92; on simple natures,

5i Rule IV (Regulae)'. on lack of method, n ; on mathesis universalis, 48, 49, i74n. 22; the mind as active power in, 82 Rule V (Regulae), n —12 Rule V II (Regulae)'. on capacity o f the human mind, 83; the mind as active power in, 82 Rule V III (Regulae): on capacity of the human mind, 82; the mind as active power in, 82-83 Rule IX (Regulae), 83 Rule X II (Regulae): on ideas, 46; intel­ lectual and common simple natures linked in, 50; list of simple natures, 48, 57; the mind as active power in, 82, 83; simple natures encoded as sen­ sations in, 54, i73n. 20 Rules for the Direction o f the Mind (Descartes). See Regulae Sartre, Jean-Paul, i87n. 10 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von: on Leibnizian ontological argu­ ment, 144, i95n. 14; “ ontological ar­ gument” attributed to Descartes, i94n. 4; on order of movement in ontological argument, 145 sciences: Descartes’ discovery of foun­ dations of a new science, 3 - 5 ; in­ commensurability of, 55, 173m 2 1; material simple natures as objects of, 48-49, 56; in the Meditations, 55; metaphysics as foundation of, 49; physiology, 65; unity of, 9 -10 , 22, 193m 2 1; wisdom as opposed to, 10. See also mathematics; physics Search for Truth, The (Descartes): capable / capacité in, 7 1 —72, 76, 77; capax/capacitas in, 72, 76, 77, i79n. 18

214

INDEX

in Third Meditation, 34, 61, I75n. 29. Sebba, Gregor, 16311. x i, 17711. 4 self-evidence: as criterion of truth, 13; See also res cogitans summum bonum, 15 2 -5 4 , 159-60, 20m. o f principles of logic, 59; as sole de­ 29 terminant of thought, 15, 16 supernatural, the: and capacity, 88. See self-inspiration: as confirming self­ also God interpretation, 1 3 - 1 4 ; and thesis of Thevenaz, P., i87n. 10 autonomy of thought, 15 thought (cogitatio): as auto-affection for self-interpretation: conceptual thought Henry, 10 5 -7 ; autonomy of, 15 - 1 6 ; presupposed by, 14; of the dreams of as awakened by the dreams of the the Olympica, 7 - 14 ; self-inspiration Olympica, 14 -19 ; as beginning when as confirming, 13 - 1 4 ; sleep as con­ consciousness becomes indifferent to text of, 14 its own affections, 16; a concept of Seneca, 202n. 35 God as required in ontological argu­ sensory perceptions. See perceptions ment, 1 4 1—42; as defined by Des­ sensus communis, 44, 45 cartes, 16; esteem as, 114 ; and gener­ shape: as simple nature, 47, 52, 54, 56, osity, 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; God as thinking, 64; 60; as subsumed under the ego, 61 ideas identified with, 45-46, i72n. 7; Simon, G ., i62n. 6 as indifferent to sleeping and waking, simple natures: and Aristotelian catego­ 1 4 - 1 5 ; and intellectual simple naries, i72n. 12; characteristic features of, 47-48; in First Meditation, i73n. , \J tures in Second Meditation, 57; inten\ tional and representational interpreta­ 19; as hierarchically ordered, 61; list tions of the cogito, 9 7-10 3 ; necessary of in the Regulae, 48; in the Medita­ link with existence, 59; passions as tions, 43-66; metaphysical function confused, 13 1; as a reduction, 16; of, 53; in the Principles o f Philosophy, self-evidence as sole determinant of, 52 -53; in the Regulae (Descartes), 15, 16. See also cogito, ergo sum; 4 6 -5 1; in Second Meditation, 57-60; ideas in Third Meditation, 60-66. See also Timpler, 139 common simple natures; intellectual translation, 68, I77n. 4 simple natures; material simple na­ truth: of clear and distinct ideas, 36; tures Descartes devoting his life to pursuit Smith, Norman Kemp, 17 m . 28 of, 1 1 ; Descartes rejecting middle solipsism, 137, 19m . 3 ground between falsity and, 12; and Specimina philosophiae (Descartes), 24, dreams in the Meditations, 1 5 - 16 ; 26, 70 eternal truths, 53, 55; self-evidence Spinoza, Benedict, 136, 142 as criterion of, 13 Studium bonae mentis (Descartes), 5, 9, 10, 163m 1 1 understanding: and intellectual simple Suarez, Francisco, 90, 91, 92, 94, natures, 49; and will, n o , i8gn. 18 i83n. 35, i84n. 40 substance: Anselm on God as, 155, value, 1 1 4 - 1 5 202n. 34; as common simple nature, Vatier, Father, 31 52; the ego as thinking substance, 32, Viola, C .-E., 197ml. 2 1, 23 34 -35, 1690. 23; God as infinite, 62; Voet, G ., 138 in Principles o f Philosophy, i75n. 29; volition. See will as real common simple nature, 61, Vuillemin, J., i99n. 25 62; as subsumed under the ego, 61;

INDEX

Wagner, J.-M ., 16211. 6 Wartburg, W. von, 69 Watson, R. A., iö in . 1 well-being, 116 Wigger, John, 92 will: attending to its own nature, 1 1 1 ; esteem in auto-affecting of, 115 ; as formally infinite, 130; free will, 19; good will, 1 1 3 —14; internal and ex­

ternal volitions, n o ; and love, 132, i92n. 18; perceptions of volitions, n o —n ; as relational mode between God and Descartes, 19; and under­ standing, n o , i89n. 18; volitions as auto-affections, 108-9 William of Saint-Thierry, 203n. 37 wisdom, 10—1 1 wonder, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 1 3, 1 1 4