Jacob Hen-Tov-Communism and Zionism in Palestine during the British Mandate-Routledge (2012).pdf

Communism and Zionism in Palestine during the

British Mandate

Communism and Zionism in Palestine during the

British Mandate Jacob Hen-Tov With a new preface by Isaiah Friedman

0

Transaction Publishers New Brunswick (U .S A ) and London (U.K.)

New jn^terial this edition copyright © 2012 by Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey. Originally published in 1974 by Schenkman Publishing Company. All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conven­ tions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to Transaction Publishers, Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey, 35 Berrue Circle, Piscataway, New Jersey 08854-8042. www.transactionpub.com This book is printed on acid-free paper that meets the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials. Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2011045637 ISBN: 978-1-4128-4737-7 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hen-Tov, Jacob. Communism and Zionism in Palestine during the British Mandate / Jacob Hen-Tov; with a new preface by Isaiah Friedman, p. cm. 1. Communism and Zionism. 2. Zionism—Palestine—History—20th century. 3. Jews— Palestine—20th century— Politics and government. 4. Jewish Socialists—Palestine—History 20th century. I. Title. DS149.H4356 2012 320.53 ’209569409041—dc23 2011045637

To my mother, SONIA SCHUR HEN-TOV

CONTENTS Page Preface to the Transaction Edition By Isaiah Friedman

IX-XII

Preface

XIII-XIV

I.

II.

The Comintern’s International Revolutionay Posture 1927-1929 The Trauma of the Communist Fiasco in China and its Impact upon the Power Struggle Within the Soviet Leadership - The Comintern’s Sixth Congress in 1928: the Inauguration of the “New Course” - The Theoretical Framework of the Comintern’s New Revolutionary Line in the Colonial East Internal Developments in Palestine During 1926-1929: An Historical Overview The Legacy of the Early Years o f the British Colonial Rule in Palestine - The Rise of the Zionist Settlement in Palestine-Political and Economic Institu­ tions - The Emergence of Arab Nationalism in Palestine Vis-a-Vis the Jewish Community and the British Ad­ m inistration - The 1929 Riots: Background and Sequence of Events - The Aftermath of the Riots: Assessments of the New Political Reality in Palestine

1-10

11-26

III.

The Comintern’s Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine The Relationship of Zionism in Palestine to the Do­ mestic Political Developments in the Soviet Union - The Jewish Revolutionary Cadres of the P.C.P. and Their Role in the Comintern’s Struggle Against Zionism in Palestine

27—44

IV.

The Comintern’s Organizational Network in Palestine The Front Organizations of the Comintern and Their Role in the Comintern’s Struggle Against Zionism in Palestine: The League Against Imperialism-The ProfintemThe Fraction - The M.O.P.R. - The Ehud Clubs - The Com­ munist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTVO)

45-65

V.

The Visit of the “Workers’ Battalion” to the Soviet Union in 1926

67-77

The Circumstances Surrounding the Invitation to Moscow —The Soviet O.G.P.U. and Zionist Military and Political Activities in Palestine —The Shohat Attempt to Secure a pro-Zionist Soviet Declaration (the “Lenin Declaration”) — The P.C.P. and Shohat’s Deliberations in Moscow VI.

The Comintern’s Political and Ideological Struggle Against Zionism* in Palestine

79—107

The Utopian and Reactionary Character of Zion­ ism: Zionism in Palestine as a Stronghold of Social Democracy — The Reformist and Social Fascist Nature of the Zionist Labor Movement. The Aggressive De­ signs of Zionism: Jewish National Socialism: Zionist Nazism - Zionist Conspiracies Against the U.S.S.R. — The Soviet Model for the Solution of the Jewish Problem — Zionism as the Lackey of Imperialism — Zionism as an Economic Force of the Jewish Bourgeoisie — The Comintern’s Struggle Against the Zionist Settle­ ment in Palestine: “Kibush Ha’karkah” (the Conquest of the Land) — “Kibush Ha’avodah” (the Conquest of Work) — Zionist Immigration to Palestine — The Comintern’s Support of Arab Nationalism in Palestine. VII. The Comintern and the 1929 Riots in Palestine The P.C.P.'s Doctrine of “Yishuvism” — The P.C.P. and the Comintern’s New Course —The P.C.P.’s Political Posture on the Eve of the Riots —The Secret Mission of the Comintern’s Emissary to Palestine —The P.C.P.’s Collaboration with the Haganah During the Riots — The Debate of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the Palestine Riots.

109—129

Page VIII. The Post-Riot Assessments and Reactions

131—160

The Evolution of the P.CJVs Assessment of the Riots —The E.C.Ci.’s Resolution of October 25,1929: the Comintern’s Final Verdict on the Riots — The P.C-P.’s New Revolutionary Posture: Organizational and Policy Changes: The P.C.P.’s Seventh Congress of 1930—31 and the Changes in its Personnel — The P.C.P.’s Identification with Arab Nationalism — The P.C.P.’s Campaign on Behalf of the Convicted Arab Terrorists — The P.CJVs Criticism of the Reports of the Government’s Investigation Committees on the Riots — The Aftermath of the Arabization of the P.C.P.: the Fate of the Purged Jewish Leadership — World Jewish Communist Reaction to the Comintern’s Posture on the Riots: the Crisis Within the Jewish Communist Move­ ment in the United States. IX.

Conclusion

161—167

Bibliography

169—181

Index

183-186

P R E F A C E TO THE T R A N S A C T I O N E D I T I O N

The prime consideration that governed Soviet foreign policy was security. On June 23, 1918, the British landed a force at Murmansk, primarily to check German forces in the East and to protect Allied stores from falling into hostile hands. On 2nd August, the British and French captured Archangelsk and began to support the puppet government of northern Russia. The Americans too sent a force and during the spring of 1919 there was considerable fighting between the Allies and the Bolsheviks. However, on 30th September, the Allies abandoned Archangelsk and on 13th October, withdrew from Murmansk. These territories were quickly retaken by the Bolsheviks. The Allies’ retreat was of their own volition. Nonetheless, the Soviets feared that an Allied intervention could be repeated at any time. The Red Army was still in its infancy and the campaigns of Denikin and Wrangel were still raging in the Caucasus. Russia’s soft belly was in the south, not in the north. It was there that the confrontation with the British, or British imperialism as they termed it, was taking place. One of the most important aims of the Bolsheviks was to turn the Muslim world against the British Empire. They were making a determined effort to convince the Muslims that the Muslim world would benefit from an alliance with Bolshevism in a war against the British Empire. These attempts were being made—not without some success—in Turkey, Transcaucasia, Persia, Turkestan, Afghanistan, India, Syria, Arabia, and Egypt. By making skillful use of British mistakes, as well as by calculated misinterpretation and distortion o f facts, the Bolsheviks succeeded in making a large number of Muslims in the East believe that Britain was “the enemy of Islam.” The Bolsheviks used another weapon to try and disrupt the British Empire: nationalism. They endeavoured to convince the masses in the East that nationalism was synonymous with freedom from serfdom at home and libe­ ration from colonial imperialism abroad. The slogan of self-determination in Lenin’s interpretation proved enormously successful. Lenin realized that since Islam militated against the Communist doctrine, he had to play the nationalist card for all it was worth, targeting British imperialism as the main impediment to. the national emancipation of the people of Asia. In this matter the Soviets demonstrated greater astuteness than the British and, by making friends in Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey, they easily gained the upper hand. The Soviets projected an image of benevolent and IX

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

disinterested power. This, coupled with the promise to eject the British, made a strong appeal to the oriental mind. Concerned primarily with achieving their own independence, the Persians and the Turks, as well as other peoples in the Near East, viewed Bolshevik policy to be less dangerous than that of British. On February 26, 1921, the Soviet-Persian treaty was signed. Two days later a similar treaty was concluded with Afghanistan, and another followed with Turkey on March 1, 1921. The treaties signaled a triumph of Soviet diplomacy. The chief Soviet interest was that these countries should not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union. In a nutshell, Soviet policy boiled down to security. The second objective of Soviet foreign policy centered on Palestine. Pal­ estine was situated in a unique strategic position and Britain’s hold of it had to be undermined. However, in this case, the Soviets used entirely different tactics, quite the opposite of those used in Central Asia. Zionism—the Jewish national movement—was not trying to emancipate itself from British rule but quite the contrary—it legitimized British presence in Palestine; therefore, the Soviets needed to attack. Strategic considerations apart, Zionism was ideologically at odds with Communism. Karl Marx, himself an assimilated Jew, did not acknowledge the existence of the Jewish people and advocated their assimilation in the countries of their domicile. Lenin expanded on this theory and dismissed the idea of a Jewish nationhood as a myth. Zionism was the antithesis of Marxist-Leninist ideology and therefore could not be tolerated. Besides, the Jews were considered to be an alien element, different from the native Gentiles and linked with other Jews abroad. Therefore, in Soviet eyes the Jews constituted a “security risk.” Moreover, left-wing Zionist parties, like Poale-Zion, and the Histadruth, Trade Union organization, were linked to the Second International organization, a rival of the Communist, and this was another reason for bitter antagonism against Zionism as a whole. The role of combating the Zionists was delegated to Jewish Communists, called Yevsektsia, the Jewish section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In their zeal and dedication they surpassed their gentile comrades. They took upon themselves the task of uprooting Zionism in Russia proper: national-oriented schools were closed, cultural activities were forbidden, and Zionist activists were imprisoned and exiled. Jointly with the Comintern, the political organ of the Communist Party, they launched a virulent propaganda campaign against the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. Zionism was denounced as a “puppet of British imperialism,” a “lackey of British imperialism,” and an “agency of British imperialism.” It was a reactionary movement, financed by Anglo-Jewish capitalists whose aim was to exploit Arab masses. This kind of propaganda did not endear Communism to the Jewish com­ munity in Palestine. The Zionists were not inimical to the Soviet Union. A great many of them, perhaps the majority, had immigrated from Russia, they X

Preface to the Transaction Edition

spoke Russian, and felt more at home with Russian culture than British—like a considerable number of British, French, and other intellectuals, they naively believed that the October revolution would bring in its wake a new era for the betterment of mankind. However, the crude vilification, the innuendos, consistent distortions of facts, as well as narratives detached from reality had just the opposite effect than intended. The Soviet propagandists, as well as the ideologies, failed to understand the meaning of Zionism and respect its achievements. There was a miniscule Communist party in Palestine. It was predominantly composed of Jewish members. They were a young dedicated group imbued with the ideal that Communism was the creed of the future and that only under the banner of Communism would the Jewish problem be solved. They were faithful Stalinists/However, their lot was tragic. The Jewish commu­ nity in Palestine ostracized them, the British police persecuted them, and the Comintern, which was not free of anti-Jewish prejudice, kept them at arms-length. The results of their propaganda campaign were insignificant. The Comintern was pro-Arab oriented but, in spite of all its efforts, the Arab masses remained indifferent. Therefore, to curry favor with the Arabs, the Comintern intensified its anti-Zionist propaganda. It was not short of derogatory diatribes. They castigated the Zionists as chauvinists, fascists, and exploiters of Arab workers. This kind of incitement, however, failed to turn the Arabs into Communists. Thereupon, the Comintern fell upon the idea of the “Arabization” of the Palestine Communist Party. It caused a collision with the Jewish members of the Party. The end result was that the Jewish mem­ bers were expelled and the Party was staffed with Arab members, who, inci­ dentally, had nothing to do with the Communist ideology. The Jewish members remonstrated, but consequently they were recalled to Russia. There, they were accused of “Zionist inclinations,” imprisoned, and subsequently executed. The newly drafted Arab members disappointed their patrons. The Comin­ tern therefore sponsored some Arab students to study at Russian universities with the view of educating them for Communist leadership in Palestine. How­ ever, on their return, in order to escape persecution by the Palestine police, to a man, they turned into informers and agents in the Secret service. In August 1929, when riots broke out in Palestine, Stalin became interested and wished to find out what the causes were. For this purpose he dispatched Bohumil Smeral to Palestine as an emissary. Smeral was a high-ranking Czech Comintern leader. He was well qualified for his assignment. He was intelligent, erudite, and honest. He arrived in Palestine in disguise and was a witness to the rioting in Jerusalem and elsewhere. He saw how Jews in the Old City were being knifed, clubbed, and hacked to death by the Arab mob. He himself hardly escaped with his life. After a thorough inquiry he characterized the riots as a “pogrom” which had been engineered by Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the President of the Muslim Supreme Council. XI

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

On his return to Russia, Smeral submitted a report in this spirit. But this kind of presentation was not to the Comintern’s liking. They looked upon the riots not as an “anti-Jewish pogrom,” but as “an Arab uprising against British Imperialism and Zionism.” The violence was seen as “a preparation towards a new and a genuine uprising that would be carried out in the future by the proletariat and the Communist Party.” When Georgi Safarov was appointed as the deputy director of the Eastern Department of the Comintern in charge of the Near East, the propaganda campaign reached new heights. Safarov was an old-style Bolshevik who had been closely associated with Lenin. He was a devout Marxist-Leninist and was active in formulating the Soviet policy towards the nationalities in the East. In his view the Jewish community in Palestine constituted “a British Imperialist avant-garde” and “agents of British Imperialism.” In contrast, the Arabs were described as a “mass peasant and national liberation movement from foreign yoke . . . who fought heroically against the English occupation troops,” as well as against the Zionists. It was the latter who were the real cul­ prits of the 1929 riots—not the Arabs. Hajj Amin al-Husseini was portrayed as “a brave fighter” and his followers as devoted “patriots.” The responsibility for the riots was laid squarely at the door of the Zionists. Such a distortion of facts was as lamentable as it was ludicrous. It seems that facts were sacrificed on the altar of Marxist dogma and political expedi­ ency. The casualty was the truth. The absurdity of the Comintern’s propaganda reached its climax following Hitler’s rise to power. It described the Hagana, the Jewish Defence Organi­ zation, as “Zionist Nazism” and claimed to have discovered an ideological similarity between Zionism and Nazism. Moreover, the Comintern argued that there was an economic, political, and national interest between the two movements. They used the same language and “an understanding between Hitler and the Zionists could not be ruled out.” One activist went as far as to suggest that “Hitler should be elected honorary president of the Zionist Organization.” And yet, in spite of its “heroic” efforts the results of the Comintern’s pro­ paganda were negligible, if any. The Jewish community in Palestine was too intelligent to take this nonsense seriously, whereas Hajj Amin al-Husseini did not require any instruction from the Soviets on how to fight against the Jews and the British. Isaiah Friedman Emeritus Professor of History Ben-Gurion University Beer Sheva, Israel

X II

PREFACE

T his study explores a hitherto relatively unknown chapter in the history of the struggle of Communism against Zionism; namely, the Communist International's involvement through its local political arm, the Palestine Communist Party, in Palestine during the late 1920's, a period which culminated in what has come to be known as the 1929 Riots. T he study encompasses the rise of the Zionist settle­ m ent in Palestine, the gradual emergence of Arab nationalism, and the increasing difficulties facing the British Mandatory Government in reconciling the growing Arab-Jewish communal strife. T he Com­ munist International, in search for revolutionary situations in the underdeveloped world, seized upon the mounting friction and unrest in Palestine in an attempt to undermine the position of the British Mandatory Government. In the course of its efforts in this direction, the Communist International and the Palestine Communist Party found themselves confronted in addition with Zionism, the Jewish national movement, and its expanding popular support in the world Jewish community. Particular attention is given to two aspects of the Communist International's struggle against Zionism: the organizational network and personnel involved in implementing the Communist Interna­ tional's policies in Palestine and the ideological premises and policy considerations upon which the Communist International based its anti-Zionist activities in Palestine. Although the role that was played in this struggle by the Palestine Communist Party is largely a m atter of open historical record, the precise mechanisms of control and of policy influence that the Communist International exerted upon it have only recently been revealed by some survivors of this dramatic period, thereby enabling a reconstruction of the full picture of the Communist International’s involvement in the domestic political situation in Palestine during the political unrest of the late twenties. T he political hostility of Communism towards Zionism had been long-standing, confirmed even before the Bolshevik Revolution. How-

X III

ever, in its fierce struggle against Zionism, and in the position taken by the Communist International during the 1929 riots, its anti-Zion­ ism was embedded in very unique circumstances. During this time, the Communist International's anti-Zionist activities in Palestine were assigned to a local Communist Party who in its leadership and membership was predominantly Jewish and who frequently had great difficulty in accepting the Communist International's antiZionist policies which they perceived &s constituting a threat to the existence of the entire Jewish community in Palestine. Concomitantly, within the Soviet Union, the Soviets were themselves engaed in pro­ moting the establishment of an autonomous Jewish region in Biro­ bidzhan. From an analysis of developments of this period, it becomes clear that among the m ajor factors contributing to the Comintern's anti-Zionist stance in Palestine was the constant Soviet preoccupation with combatting all domestic manifestations of Jewish nationalism which continued to take hold of a large segment of the Russian Jewry. Although this book focuses on events transpiring in the 1920's, it also sheds light upon the roots of the strong anti-Israeli position taken by the Soviet Union in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East and relates as well to the causes of the current predicament of the Soviet Jewry. I wish to take this opportunity to thank the following institutions for their financial assistance in enabling me to complete my research and prepare this manuscript for publication: T he Merrill T rust Foundation from the Philip W. Lown Institute of Brandeis Univer­ sity, The National Fund for Jewish Culture, and the University of Haifa, Israel. I should also like to express my gratitude to Nahm an List and J. Berger-Barzilai of Tel-Aviv, Israel, key participants in the events of this period, for the generous time they gave me to clarify several of the issues dealt with in this book.

XIV

CHAPTER I The Comintern’s International Revolutionary Posture 1927—1929

The roots of the fcomintern’s involvement in the Palestine Riots of 1929 may be traced to the Comintern’s traumatic experience in China in 1927. At stake in China during 1927 was the degree of influence that the Communists could exert on a national liberation movement, their ultimate goal being that of domination. Stalin’s policies in China and the Comintern’s implementation of them had repeatedly called for close cooperation of the Chinese Communists (even to the point of diminishing their organizational identity and their independence of action) with the Kuomintang, the Chinese national front which had developed during these years "from an ineffective group of intellectuals into a well-organized military and political movement . . . patterned organizationally after the Russian Communist Party.” 1 It was thus a calamitous blow to the Comintern’s long efforts to build bridges to the east when, at the peak of Soviet influence in China and after long years of close military and political cooperation, Chiang Kai-Shek, leader of the Kuomintang, abruptly turned against his Communist allies, expelling them from the Kuomintang and forcing them into political isolation. China’s relationship with the U.S.S.R. was strained to the brink of war, and, in addition, a death strike was dealt to the Comintern’s revolutionary doctrine of alliance with national liberation movements in the underdeveloped world. The aftermath of this action was not less dramatic. On the domestic Soviet front, this disaster was coupled with “bitter recriminations and heart searching in the Comintern and in the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow,”2 to be followed later by a major shake-up in the C.P.S.U. leadership. This shake-up was preceded by sharp ideological strife between the radical revolutionary left wing of the Party headed by Trotsky and the right wing support given by leaders like Bukharin to Stalin’s more restrained and compromising position. Aside from mirroring the historical disagreement along theoretical and doctrinal lines, the strife reflected two diametrically opposed assessments of the actual revolutionary capabilities of the Comintern and its front organizations.

2

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Trotsky, in line with the orthodox Leninist international revolutionary approach, was convinced that revolution was immanent, despite the successive setbacks it had sustained in the European theater (particularly, the Comintern’s decisive failure in Germany in 1923 and 1924, after enormous political ground work and intensive military planning and preparation);3 he therefore called for uncompromising independent Communist action against the ruling imperialist forces and against their collaborators, the national bourgeoisie. Stalin’s position reflected a more realistic assessment of the situation, basing itself upon the aforementioned past experiences and lessons, putting little faith in the Comintern as a dependable revolutionary arm, and confining goals and aspirations to the more limited national needs of the Communist base in Russia, while paying only “lip-sen ice to the expectation of revolution.”4 Stalin’s approach was cautious, restrained, and consistently conservative, taking into consideration the world-wide reper­ cussions of his foreign policy for the interests of Soviet Russia. The Comintern, under the influence of Trotsky’s left-wing ideas, had pursued an unrealistic and dangerous policy of great risks, gambling on clumsy underground preparations, coupled with self-deceptive revolutionary expectations. Nor was Trotsky’s position in any way upheld by Stalin’s failure in China, for Trotsky’s historical analogies of the Chinese scene with the situation in Russia in 1917s were largely inaccurate (the situations bearing little resemblance to each other). Hence the policy of independent Communist action which he advocated would not have born fruit.6 On the other hand, Stalin’s refusal during the Sixth Comintern’s Congress in 1928 to admit failure in the China fiasco forced him to whitewash the whole controversy, by arguing that the Comintern’s line “had been right all along, and that only the application of it had been wrong.” 7 It implied that the error was essentially of a tactical nature, a failure to make the necessary tactical readjustments in response to a constantly changing situation. The broad theoretical analysis, however, as to the nature of the development in China as an underdeveloped country and the need to cooperate with the national front of the bourgeoisie as the only effective vehicle of national power was deemed correct. The Chinese debacle transcends the rather narrow, obscure, and confining doctrinal formulations into which it was thrown. It reflects rather a general historical truth, namely, that the developments in China were too remote for effective control from Moscow, and that, from a cultural point of view, “China was a different world and not readily intelligible.” 8 As Professor G. Kennan has observed, “the effectiveness of the power radiated

The Comintern’s International Revolutionary Posture 1927-1929

3

from any one national center decreases in proportion to the distance involved and to the degree of cultural disparity/’9 Stalin’s failure in China posed a serious challenge to his rule and leadership in the C.P.S.U. and in the Comintern. Thus the China problem, as Brandt expresses it, “assumed for the Soviets a purely Russian dimension reaching deep down into their affairs as a major domestic issue.” 10 With the new power struggle that evolved in the Soviet leadership of Russia, a pandora’s box opened up that led to a series of personal purges and major new ideological pronouncements. On December 27, 1927, the Fifteenth AH Union Congress of the C.P.S.U. convened in Moscow to reaffirm what had been decided upon and carried out by the Central Committee a month before, namely, the expulsion of the left-wing opposition and its leaders, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev from the Party,11 as well as to reaffirm the strong condemnation of all deviation from the General Party Line.12 Stalin’s doctrine of “Socialism in One Country,” which was vaguely -formulated during the Fourteenth Party Congress in March—April, 1925, was reconstructed, and later more strictly defined, implying that “Russia no longer figured a mere periphery . . . it was her destiny to become the center of new civilization . . . Bolshevik Russia was withdrawing into her national shell.” 13 Domestically, this doctrine signified the end of the liberal N.E.P. program and the inauguration, in October 1928, of the Five Year’s Plan of economic development. The Industrialization and the Collectivization were the core of the domestic economic revolution which was to transform the economic and social structure of Russian society into the Stalinist model of a centrally planned and tightly controlled system. With the abandonment of the N.E.P., the stage was also set for the purge of the Party’s right-wing advocates, Bukharin, Thomsky, and Rykov, on November 17, 1929. (This group came to be known in the history of Bolshevik Russia as the “Rightist Opposition.”) The Comintern underwent similar readjustments to the newly prescribed political line. The purge of the Comintern apparatus from left-wing Trotskyite elements was facilitated by the cooperation of the Rightists in November, 1927; its counterpurge followed during the summer of 1928 with the removal of the right-wing leader Bukharin and his followers.14 Thus the Comintern emerged more and more as a monolithic organization patterned after the C.P.S.U. model, experiencing the same totalitarian organizational controls and the accompanying stifling political climate, and gradually losing its capacity for careful discussion with genuine creative ideological debate.15

4

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Aside from furthering Stalin’s personal ambition to acquire a rigid control over the International Communist movement, this readjustment of the Comintern apparatus was also an attempt on his part to curb the rather independent role that the Comintern had played in diligently and consistently pursuing the revolutionary cause, a line of action that sometimes “could not but embarrass Soviet diplomacy.” 16 Stalin was also suspicious of the influence which the Comintern might have on the internal struggles within the Bolshevik leadership in Russia. The Comintern’s strict adherence to the Soviet Communist Party’s line and its total subjugation to the interests of the Soviet state were also to be in operation, as later analysis will indicate, when the Jewish national movement and the Zionist setlement in Palestine were to come under its consideration. The Zionist program in Palestine was not to merit the status of a genuine national liberation movement in the eyes of the Comintern’s leadership, precisely due to the fact that it was closely linked to Soviet security considerations and to unresolved domestic Soviet issues.17 The ups and downs that were to beset the Comintern’s policy with regard to the Middle East in general and the situation in Palestine in particular were to reflect the aforementioned power struggle that was waged within the Soviet leadership. Up to December 1927, the Comintern’s political outlook had been based upon the assumption that capitalism had reached a stage of relative stability, a fact that called for a more restrained attitude and for an attempt to develop peaceful coexistence between the two major world systems.18 Within the context of the specific historical conditions in Western Europe and in the Far East, the immediate implication of this outlook was a vigorous attempt to establish a “United Working Front” as a counterweight to the “increasing power of the bourgeoisie.” 19 In the domestic realm of the Soviet Union, this line was parallelled by the peaceful coexistence of the private and the national sectors of the economy. These were the ingredients which were blended into the compromising N.E.P. Program. Amidst the changing political posture in Europe and Asia at the end of the year 1927, the doctrine of peaceful coexistence was scrapped. At this point, the Soviet government developed a deep sense of insecurity that bordered on war hysteria. It was precipitated by the raid on the Soviet Mission in China which was interpreted by the Soviets as a “threat of counterrevolutionary conspiracy against the Soviet Union . .. from Peking to London ” 20 This Soviet war scare called upon the Comintern to alert the world proletariat to the “danger of a new counterrevolutionary war of imperialist powers on the Soviet Union,” and to “rise up in revolutionary struggle . . . to defend the Soviet fortress of world proletariat . . .” 21

The’Comintern’s International Revolutionary Posture 1927-1929

5

Stalin's isolationist doctrine of “Socialist in One Country” was formally introduced with the fanfare and under the smokescreen of the new radical and revolutionary banner that was adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern that gathered in Moscow from July 17 to September 1, 1928. This Congress, in its program and theses,22 envisioned the world entering into a new phase of major political and economic crises, a phase that was bound to lead to the inevitable destruction of the capitalist system. The program prophesied that as a result of this dislocation the forces of imperialist would clash with the forces of revolution; and that as a result of this struggle, a new social and political order would emerge, modelled after the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in the Soviet Union.23 Communists throughout the world, therefore, were called upon to intensify their struggle against the forces of capitalism and imperialism and to march forward towards the attainment of the new revolutionary order. The program gave special prominence to the Soviet revolutionary base in Russia, glorifying its power and its role in guiding the international revolutionary movement. The Sixth Comintern Congress urged its following to make an utmost effort towards the preservation and the growth of the Soviet base in Russia. This new revolutionary turn of 1928 that came down in the Comintern’s history as the “third period” paid special attention to the situation in the Colonial East by concluding that “the vast colonial and semi-colonial world has become an unquenchable, blazing hearth of the revolutionary mass movement,” 24 and by predicting the intensification of economic crises and the subsequent radicalization of the impoverished masses. While in Western Europe, at this same time, any collaboration with the Social Democrats was severely condemned as an act of betrayal to the cause of revolution, in the underdeveloped Colonial East, it was the bourgeois nationalists who were proclaimed as traitors serving the cause of national reformism and of imperialist interests. Hence both the Social Democrats and the bourgeois nationalists were singled out as the arch enemies of the revolutionary proletariat. In the Comintern’s analysis, in Western Europe it was the Social Democrats who compromised the interests of the working class people; in the Colonial East, it was the bourgeois nationalists, whose economic interests were closely linked with the colonial rule, who deliberately attempted to forestall any agrarian revolution by fanning empty nationalist slogans and by rallying the ignorant masses behind their nationalist leadership.

6

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Unlike the previous course of seeking the collaboration of the national bourgeoisie, the New Course in the Comintern’s outlook painted Arab nationalist leaders such as Nahas Pasha in Egypt, Hashim Al-Attasi in Syria, Jamal Husseini in Palestine, as the Chiang Kai-Shek’s of the Middle East, reformists and traitors to the revolutionary cause. The New Course called for class differentiation and genuine national anti-imperialist struggle to replace the “treacherous and misleading1’ Arab bourgeoisie nationalist line of compromise with imperialism.25 Despite the fact that both the Social Democrats and the bourgeois nationalists were in the forefront of political opposition to their respective governments, the role played by each of these movements cannot be equated, for the social, political, and economic circumstances in Europe and in the East were radically different. Although the Comintern’s new aggressive and uncompromising position (the “hard line”) resulted in major errors and even disasters in Western Europe (e.g. facilitating the rise of Nazism in Germany in 1928—33), it nonetheless continued to be relentlessly pursued because the Communist parties remained a viable social force in the political life of Western European countries. In the case of the Colonial East, however, the Comintern’s position proved to be a disaster at the very outset inasmuch as the Communist parties in this region were organizationally weak and politically insignificant. By its radical and isolationist policies, the Comintern was forfeiting the only chance that the Communists had in this area to participate in and influence the course of the respective nationalist resistance movements in their struggle against colonial rule. In view of this situation in the East, therefore, the Comintern had to subsequently moderate its earlier interpretation of the early Sixth Congress’ directives and their revolutionary implementation in the East and officially incorporate a more cautious and moderate revolutionary formula. While the basic ideological tenet of no compromise on the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the national revolutionary struggle still held in general for the Sixth Congress, it was coupled with the following modification: . . . that the bourgeois democratic revolution in Asia was bound up organically with the struggle for national liberation, and was, therefore, more “progressive,” than the parallel movement in the West.26

Though the Comintern adopted a more moderate revolutionary formula for the Colonial East in 1928, hinting at some degree of careful cooperation with “progressive” bourgeois nationalist movements, its devastating expe­ rience in Turkey in 1921 with the nationalist Kemal Pasha served warning against blindly plunging into alliance with nationalist movements.27

The Comintern's International Revolutionary Posture 1927-1929

7

The essential task of the later sessions of the Comintern’s Sixth Congress was thus to arrive at a formula that would strike an ideal and careful medium between the position of the United Front that was inaugurated during the Second Congress in 1920, and the position of independent and intensified revolutionary action adopted during the earlier sessions of the Sixth Congress in 1928.28 Stalin’s formula of cautious and moderate revolutionary action was therefore a middle of the road course, creating, on one hand, a revolutionary independent avant-garde, and on the other, urging alliance with the most progressive elements among the petty-bourgeoisie nationalists. The goal of this mixture of independent action and limited alliance was to be of a temporary nature, namely, applicable only during the period of the establishment of “democratic dictatorship” (the goal prescribed for the West was more radical and uncompromising, i.e. the immediate attainment of a “proletariat dictator­ ship1’).29 The Sixth Congress was convinced that the Colonial East was on the verge of a mass wave of revolutionary uprising, resulting from.the distressing social and economic conditions which prevailed under oppressive and exploitative colonial systems. The political and moral bankruptcy of the imperialist system, it was thereby believed, was intensifying the discontent of the impoverished masses; the Comintern became convinced that a chain of peasant and workers’ revolutionary uprisings Would ensue.31 The Comintern’s revolutionary expectations in the Colonial East were related to certain promising political signs, reflected in the shaky conditions that had prevailed earlier in the Colonial East. In 1926, for example, the Indian political resistance against the British government intensified and at a certain point became quite violent and explosive.31 In Morocco, the rebellion of Abd-el-Krim Rifs forces, although subsequently defeated in 1926, produced the impression that the French North African colonies were on the threshhold of a new revolutionary era.32 The Druze rebellion in Syria during the years 1925—26, the most violent and dangerous outbreak led by Sultan al Atrash, lasted for two years, and at certain points, the rebels were successful in repelling the French forces from large parts of the country. The Comintern gave considerable attention to the Druze uprising in its official publications and political pronouncements during those years.33 At the close of the Sixth Congress, the Comintern came up with the new doctrine that the revolution in the East, like the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in October 1917 (also predominantly agrarian), would skip its intermediary capitalist stage of political and economic development and would immediately enter the final stage of the construction of socialism. Its

8

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

call, however, for the intensification of the struggle against, the imperial colonial rule was for the immediate period a cry in the wilderness, for the masses in the Colonial East failed to respond. The small and weak Communist parties in the area remained underground and thus isolated and impotent, sharply opposed to the nationalist movements and their leadership. When in August 1929 the Arab riots suddenly broke out in Palestine, the Comintern and its P.C.P. therefore found themselves unexpectedly confronted with a serious dilemma, namely: how to respond to what appeared to be at least on the surface a desirable revolutionary situation and how to influence its future course of development, when the exact nature of its social and political make-up was not determinable, and when the necessary organizational and political support was difficult to muster.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I 1.

George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941 (New York: 1960), p. 72.

2.

George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: I960), p. 256.

3.

George Von Rauch, A History o f Soviet Russia (New York: 1957), pp. 193-94.

4.

Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York), p. 393.

5.

See Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise o f Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: 1964), pp. 81-82.

6.

"Contrary to widespread belief, Trotsky’s prophecies about China were either as false as Stalin’s or at best, only short range prediction." Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China 1924-27 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1958), p. ix.

7.

Walter Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 64.

8.

Kennan, Russia and the West, p. 258.

9.

Ibid., p. 261, and also Schwartz, op. cit., p. 80. Schwartz states: "Stalin’s error lay in his overweening confidence that from a distance of several thousand miles he could control and manipulate a centralized political machine whose leaders were quite as shrewd and strong-willed as he."

10.

Brandt, op. cit., p. viii.

11.

Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party and the Soviet Union (New York: 1964), p. 306.

12.

See Robert V. Daniels on Stalin and the expulsion of the left opposition. A Documentary History o f Communism (New York: 1960), pp. 299-301.

13.

Deutscher, op. cit., p. 293.

The Comintern’s International Revolutionary Posture 1927—1929

9

14.

Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Zazitch, “The Third International,” in The Revolutionary Internationals 2964-1943 (Stanford: 1966), pp. 183-184.

15.

J. Berger-Barzilai, Hatragedia Shel Hamahapecha HaSovietit (The Tragedy o f the Soviet Revolution) (Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1968).

16.

Deutscher, op. cit., p. 395.

17.

At the heart of the matter lay three basic historical facts: (1) Zionism was born among Russian Jewry (2) Russian Jewry had entertained strong sympathies towards Zionism in general and towards the Zionist settlement in Palestine in particular and (3) the fact that the Soviet Government failed to solve the Jewish problem left the Jews in the Soviet eyes as an alien element, with kinship links to the outside world, and whose loyalties to the system were doubtful at best. See Uri Ra’anan, “The Open Wound,” Hadassah, Vol. 46, No. 5, January 1965 as quoted in “Jews seen as a Security Risk,” Jewish News, January 22, 1965.

18.

These of the Seventh E.C.C.I. Plenum of the International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist International, December 13, 1926, in Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents, p. 320, Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press), 1960.

19.

In the case of China, for instance, it meant a “united front of all national-revolutionary forces, including the anti-imperialist strata of the bourgeoisie.” Ibid., p. 325.

20.

Extracts from an E.C.C.I. Manifesto, November 1947, Ibid. p. 409.

21.

Ibid.t p. 410.

22.

See the Programme of the Communist International Adopted at Its Sixth Congress, Ibid., p. 471 and “The Proletarian Dictatorship and its Soviet Form,” Ibid., p. 492.

23.

"The Chief Tasks of Communist Strategy and Tactics,” Ibid., p. 519.

24.

Laqueur, op. cit., p. 76.

25.

Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 82.

26.

It was based upon the realization “ that the national factor exerted a considerable influence on the revolutionary process in all colonies.” Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 77.

27.

The Communist leadership in Turkey was massacred in its attempt to collaborate with the Turkish nationalist movement and to influence its course o f growth. At the time of the Turkish experience, the Comintern’s position, inaugurated during its Second Congress, was that of the United Front. The Turkish experience highlighted the complexity and unpredictable nature of nationalist movements in the East. Laqueur maintains that “the Turkish Security Office organized the murders and went as far as threatening local Soviet representatives with lynching.” Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, p. 210.

28.

J.V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: 1954), pp. 146-154.

10

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

29.

George Lenczowski, “Evolution of Soviet Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East,” in Soviet Satellite Nations, John H. HalloweU (ed.), (Florida: Kallman Publishing Co., 1958), p. 167.

30.

See the Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semicolonial Countries adopted at the Sixth Comintern Congress, in Degras, op. cif./Vol. II, pp. 526^548.

31.

Degras, Ibid., pp. 11-14.

32.

Ibid,, pp. 220-221.

33.

Ibid., pp. 93-94., as well as Nahman List, "Tsadak Hakomintern,” (“The Comintern was Right”), Keshet, No. 27 Spring 1965, p. 81.

11

CHAPTER II Internal Developments in Palestine During 1926—1929: An Historical Overview Considering the underdeveloped state that the British Mandatory power inherited in Palestine from the decaying rule of the Ottoman Empire, its first ten years were marked by a considerable measure of development and progress, particularly in the economic sphere, until the onset of the grave economic crisis which beset the colony in 1926. The subsequent years witnessed the aftermath of the economic depression: large unemployment, social discontent, and insofar as the Jewish—Arab community relationships were concerned, growing communal tension. Though the Jewish Community and its various social and economic organizations reached their lowest point in terms of morale and hope during this economic crisis, they were accused by the Arab nationalist leaders of having initiated the troubling situation through their pursuit of a parochial nationalist policy of employment. This policy had allegedly aggravated the economic life of the Arab citizenry who were more vulnerable to the economic crisis and less capable of sustaining themselves through a joint communal recovery effort. The British administration thus far had failed to formulate a long range policy for Palestine, and it seemed to make little stride in its attempt to reconcile the growing conflict between the Jewish and Arab communities. During the period between 1925—29, three High Commissioners served in Palestine. Sir Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner, was an experienced politician whose administration was noted for its stability. He was succeeded by Field Marshal Lord Plumer in 1925, a professional soldier whose administration until 1928 was governed by the “law and order” principle. Although Lord Plumer’s administration initiated various domestic construction programs and improved the health and educational system, and though it was marked by years of relative peace and stability, it nonetheless failed to make a major breakthrough in the Jewish—Arab communal deadlock. In 1928, the third High Commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, the ex-governor of Southern Rhodesia, took office in Palestine.

12

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Early in 1929, the economic and political conditions in Palestine showed signs of recovery for the first time since 1926. Due to increased economic activity (mostly Jewish investments), the rate of unemployment decreased. Albeit Jewish—Arab communal tensions remained, despite attempts on the Zionist side to dispel Arab suspicion and fears and to establish a cooperative relationship,1 and despite certain developments within the Arab Community, such as the rise of new moderate, pragmatic elements at the expense of the Arab extremists who were for the most part religious fanatics. On the surface, then, it appeared that Sir John Chancellor’s administration was heading in the direction of stability and growth. In reality, however, all the major ingredients for a potential crisis lay only temporarily dormant beneath the facade of tranquility. They all stemmed from the following basic source — the growing imbalance between the dynamic social and economic development of the Yishuv (Hebrew term for the Jewish Community in Palestine) on the one hand, and the inherited backwardness of the Arab community, on the other, that left the Arabs suspicious, frustrated, and deeply concerned about the future. Sir Chancellor’s administration, which took off on an optimistic note, was caught unprepared for the violent developments which suddenly erupted in Palestine at the end of 1929. In order to understand the nature of the outbreaks, the two sides to the conflict will be examined in some detail, both in their relationship to internal developments, and in their relationship to the British administration during the last three years preceding the riots. The years 1926—29 within the Jewish Community in Palestine were marked by extraordinary activity. Its climax was shaped by the formation of the Jewish Agency, the political World Zionist Organization, representing some fifty-one national independent associations and maintaining unusual powers and status in Palestine that were “often regarded by the Administration as embarrassingly independent.”2 It drew its financial and political support from its world-wide following, and consequently, its branch in Palestine constituted a powerful organization beyond the control or influence of the Mandatory Administration. Because the Jewish Agency was in a position to influence the Administration policies in Palestine through its branches in London and in other major world capitals, the Arabs, themselves lacking an able or organized leadership, were inclined to attribute to it the imaginary plan of the world-wide Zionist Conspiracy and to evaluate the Zionist political and national ideal as a sinister ambition to conquer Palestine and the world.3

International Developments in Palestine During 1926—1929: An Historical Overview 13

On August 11, 1929, almost two weeks before the outbreak of the riots, the Jewish Agency scored one of its historical victories — the incorporation of non-Zionist elements into the organization. Because of this achievement, its appeal among the non-Zionist Jewry increased in the long run (until this agreement, many non-Zionist Jews in the West had maintained a strong hostile position towards Zionism). This agreement was signed on August 14, 1929, exactly at the time when in the same city, Zurich, the Sixteenth Zionist Congress took place,4 presided over by Dr. Chaim Weizmann, whose personal initiative and activities during this period brought the Zionist message into the mainstream of world Jewry. It was under the new vigor and strength of the Jewish Agency in Palestine that Jewish immigration and the Jewish agricultural settlement in Palestine reached a new momentum. Private and collective settlements were established on land that was purchased (sometimes at exorbitant prices) from Arab land owners. It was precisely this issue of land purchase and the ensuing forceful removal of Arab shepherds and occasionally peasants who had cultivated this land or used it for grazing, but who had no legal rights to it, that triggered the persistent conflicts between Jews and Arabs.5 At the same time, the various waves of Jewish immigration were absorbed by industry, which had begun to develop due to the influx of Jewish investment and the construction of new enterprises. The Jewish Federation of Labor (Histadruth) increased in size, and in addition to its professional and welfare undertakings, embarked upon various economic ventures, such as the establishment and promotion of cooperative enterprises. For its primary responsibility, the Histadruth attempted to secure decent working conditions for its members, to provide them with medical care and in particular, to guarantee them with unemployment payments. When the economic crisis of 1926 hit the country, the Histadruth was thus able to take care of its unemployed members by utilizing these unemployment funds, and by attempting to employ an additional working force in its network of economic enterprises and public work projects. Nonetheless, the severe economic crisis of 1926 left its mark upon the Jewish community by hitting at its most sensitive spot: the Jewish immigration to Palestine. This immigration was the life blood of the growth of Zionism in Palestine, but a the same time it also became a major issue of concern to the Arabs in their fear of Zionism and in their struggle to curb its growth. The Jewish immigration into Palestine had its ups and downs since 1920, its fluctuation due to political circumstances in Europe and to living conditions and government policies towards immigration in Palestine.

14

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Immigration was also a major issue of the policies of the Jewish Agency, which constantly struggled against any government attempts to restrict Jewish immigration by insisting that only free Jewish immigration to Palestine would facilitate the establishment of the Jewish National Home there. It would appear that the aims of the government in occasionally restricting immigration were furthered by the prevailing harsh economic conditions which at times precipitated emigration from the country. The European settlers in Palestine were beset with numerous other difficulties — bad weather conditions, plagues and disease, and a culturally hostile environment. Some of the settlers lacked the strong ideological commitment and the deep intellectual conviction in the cause of Zionism that was so necessary to withstand the pressures and mounting discouragement, and they saw so solution but to finally emigrate from Palestine. In 1926, 13,000 Jews immigrated into Palestine as contrasted with 7,000 who left the country. During the following year, 1927, emigration surpassed immigration (5,000 and 3,000 respectively), and in 1928, the rates approximated each other (2,000).6 In subsequent years, until the large immigration of 1932—33 which was a result of Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, there was a moderate steady rise in immigration, on the average of 5,000 a year. All in all, between 1922 and 1928, the Jewish population doubled (from 80,000 - 165,000).7 It should be noted that the economic development initiated by the Zionist settlers in Palestine during the period 1920-37 also led to a wave of Arab immigration from neighboring Arab states (about 100,000).8 The years 1926—29 were years of economic recovery and political struggle for the Zionist settlement in Palestine. In 1929, it appeared as if the crisis were over, but in actuality, this was precisely the moment when the greatest domestic upheaval was brewing, leading to the outbreaks of the riots of August of that same year. The Arab community as a national entity in Palestine differed radically in its structure from that of the Yishuv and in the role it played in the life of the country. The Arabs lacked any national representative authority and failed to develop any leading political community institu­ tions. As a result, the “Palestine Arab Community was not welded together as a body politic,” 9 It lacked proper leadership and a clear concept of its direction. To some degree, this was a result of the Arab community’s inability to define itself and its goals vis-a-vis the British Administration as well as of its highly emotional response to the presence of the Jewish people, particularly to the Zionist striving to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

International Developments in Palestine During 1926-1929: An Historical Overview 15

Although unorganized and poorly led, largely due to the fact that ethnic and national ties were not sufficient ground for representation and communal organization under the Mandate,10 the Arabs in Palestine did nevertheless maintain a deep sense of communal identity, whose institu­ tional expression was essentially religious, as Islam is a socio-political creed. The religious Muslim’s (highly centralized) administration came toprominence in Arab life to fill the gap of the missing representative political institution, and consequently, in addition to its religious responsibilities, achieved considerable political power (its jurisdiction extending to Christian Arabs as well). According to a government decree of December 20,1921, a Supreme Muslim Council was established, to which the Mufti of Jerusalem (a life-time appointment), Haj Amin al-Husseini, was also appointed president. Since the new office was poorly defined in terms of its power and authority, the Mufti was able to take advantage of his position to build up a personal countrywide religious-political machine animated by deep feedings, of religious hate, primarily towards the Jews though also towards the Mandatory government. The immediate propaganda targets of the Council were foreign and alien elements, the Western way of life and the wave of modernization brought to Palestine by the Zionist immigrants. The Mufti’s method of soliciting opposition to these non-Arab elements was the fanning of religious fanaticism in particular among the Arab rural masses in the mosques, inciting them to violently oppose the establishment of a National Jewish Home in Palestine. Fundamentalist religious conceptions and feelings thus dominated the thinking of the local Arab nationalist movement in Palestine, in contrast to the politically more sophisticated approach of its counterparts in the neighboring Arab states.11 It must be emphasized that the Palestinian Arabs were confronted with an unusual domestic situation. The Mandatory regime took upon itself the creation of a National Home for a people whom the Arabs regarded as foreigners. Indeed, most were European immigrants, ambitious, dynamic and aggressive, whose sheer presence threatened the more settled, passive, and rather static Middle Eastern traditional social and communal setting. The Arabs gradually developed a sense of insecurity and feeling of discrimination, that gave birth to strong xenophobic reactions. Their mosques, the only active communal institutions, turned into centers of brewing political discontent and resistance. The Muslim priests assume the role of political agitators and the religious services became an occasion for inflammatory oratory.

16

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

The most prominent family among the Palestinian Arabs were the Husseinis, an extraordinary dynasty of leaders and public figures and a well-entrenched religious oligarchy. Their power traditionally rested in the office of the mayorship of Jerusalem, an office held by Musa Kazim Pasha, the leader of the clan until 1920. In April of that year, Musa Kazim was dismissed from this post, due to his involvement in nationalist riots which broke out in the city that month.12 His political activity henceforth remained confined to the newly instituted Arab political organ, the Arab Executive. The religious leadership of the Muslim community was then bestowed upon the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin-al-Husseini, through the Supreme Muslim Council, and thus the Mufti became the chief political spokesman for the entire Arab community. Until 1928, the Mufti’s powerful leadership was unchallenged. But in 1928—29, a new Arab nationalist group composed of the educated upper class Palestinian Arabs, more moderate and pragmatic, emerged in opposition to the Mufti’s leadership and to the Council he dominated. Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi, who replaced Musa Kazim as mayor of Jerusalem, was its leader and chief spokesman. His political support stemmed from the Arab landed gentry and from successful businessmen, some of whom held mayoral offices in various localities. They formed an opposition group by founding National Muslim Societies13 (which eventually merged into the National Party in 1923), challenging the Mufti’s leadership by advocating more realistic policies and by their efforts to work in harmony with the Mandatory government. This challenge resulted in an all-pervasive feud between the two rivaling groups which penetrated every Arab community, each segment attracting its followers into opposing networks of semi-feudal allegiances, presided over by overlords of the rural clannish networks. In the local council elections of 1928, the Opposition Party made an important breakthrough by securing municipal offices for many of its candidates. It failed, however, in its attempt to capture the Jerusalem municipality — a Mufti stronghold. In the summer of 1929, during this period of disunity and inner power struggle within the Arab Community, the Sixteenth World Zionist Congress assembled in Zurich. This was the occasion when the Jewish Agency broadened its base by bringing many non-Zionist elements into its ranks. The deliberations of this Congress did not escape the sensitive ears of the Palestinian Arabs whose “nationalist leaders took careful note of the Congress and the accord, misinterpreted much of what they noted and became panic-stricken.” 14 The remarks of Zeev Jabotinsky, the militant right-wing Zionist leader, concerning the goal of Zionism to be the

International Developments in Palestine During 1926-1929: An Historical Overview

17

attainment of an independent Jewish National State with a Jewish majority especially perplexed and troubled the Arabs, who tended to view the Congress and its goals as a huge world-wide clandestine plot, a systematic conspiracy to oust the Arabs from their homeland. Of major significance at this point was the increasing realization of the Arabs, primarily the educated ones of the Middle Class who formed the hard core of the rising Nationalist movement, that they, unlike the Zionists, had failed to cultivate similar opportunities to establish an Arab National Home, and that with the passing of time., the Zionists, would continue tp make considerable economic and political strides at their expense. The Arab nationalists became acutely fearful of Zionist land purchases and called upon their Arab brethren to resist the sale of land and the concomitant evacuation of its peasants.15 Also among the major Arab grievances, leading to great frustration on their part, was their failure to secure administrative government appoint­ ments, which were mostly held by the British, and their inability to successfully compete with better-educated and trained Jewish candidates. This competition between the Jews and the Arabs was even more serious in the field of business and trade. The Zionist immigrants, able to draw on more capital and to rely on the support of their community, emerged as overpowering competitors. Thus, for instance, unemployment among the Arabs was attributed to Zionist economic activities, primarily to the sucessful drive of the Histadruth (The Jewish Federation of Labor) to rely exclusively upon organized Jewish labor. The rivalry between the two main factions within the Arab community, the Husseinis and the Nashashibis, the extremists and the moderates, intensified the tension in Palestine.16 It was clearly detected during the meeting of the International Missionary Conference in Jerusalem (dealing with Christian Missionary work within the Arab world). The Mufti seized this opportunity to boost his popularity and support among the Arab masses and to demonstrate his dominance in the Arab power structure by turning against the gathering and stirring up mob passions. As a result of the agitation of the Mufti and his followers, violence broke out in the city of Gaza, and “police were compelled to open fire on the mob.” 17 It was an omen of the intention of the Mufti to make use of religious fanaticism as an instrument of power in advancing his political program, a tactic which was more fully exploited in the Mufti's campaign against the Jews which was launched throughout the country during 1928 and 1929. Several additional factors were in the background, the most important of which was the prevailing mood of discontent in the neighboring Arab

18

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

states of Syria, Egypt and Iraq where occasional violent disorders broke out against the ruling colonial powers. Although frequently designed to obtain political concessions from the British and the French, the prevalence of terror and violence reflected a grim historical fact — that violence and atrocities were an established phenomenon in the political culture of the area, a traditional feature of Middle Eastern conflicts.18 Terror was recognized not only as an acceptable way of struggle against an outside power, but valid as well in settling domestic power struggles within the Arab community itself. The large unemployment among Arab workers was another contribu­ ting social factor to the evolution of violence on a large scale, since there were masses of Arabs ever-present to respond instantly to the fanning of religious fanaticism. The political struggle began to escalate seriously in the latter part of 1928 when the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin-al-Husseini, alerted “all the faithful” that the Haram Ash-Sharif, the holiest Muslim sanctuary in the Old City of Jerusalem, was in danger of desecration.19 The incident that had precipitated the outrage of the Mufti was the placing of a partition by the side of the old Jewish Wailing Wall during the Jewish New Year Services. (The partition was in accordance with Jewish ritual observance which demanded the separation of men and women during worship, but it had never been placed in prior years.) The Wailing Wall was part; of the area of the Muslim Mosque of Omar, and all Jewish activity in this vicinity was carefully noted by the Arabs. The setting up of a small screeen by the Wall, in Arab eyes, reflected a change in the delicate balance or status quo that existed between the Jewish and Arab communities in the Muslim Holy shrine area.20 When the Arabs protested the erection of the partition on the morning of the Day of Atonement (the most holy day in the Jewish calendar), the British authorities, making an effort to maintain the status quo in the vicinity of the shrine, promptly removed it by force, amidst fierceful resistance on the part of Jewish women. The action of the British police was taken by the Jews as a grave religious insult, provoking a sense of “righteous indignation.” 21 In addition, probably in retaliation, the Mufti ordered the blind alley which led to the Wailing Wall turned into an open passage way. The fact that the Government found this act to be legal further infuriated the Jewish community. Fist fights began to break out quite frequently between the Jews and the Arabs in the vicinity of the Old City. The situation worsened dramatically in August, 1929. The confronta­ tion later to be known as the 1929 riots really began on August 15,1929, in Jerusalem (the ninth of Ab in the Jewish calendar, a fast day

International Developments in Palestine During 1926-1929: An Historical Overview 19

commemorating ^he destruction of the Jewish Temple), when a ZionistRevisionist (a right-wing group)22 protest demonstration headed in the direction of the Government office headquarters, protesting a Government decision concerning the legality of the pavement at the Wall. After delivering their message, the demonstrators proceded to the Wailing Wall, where they held a large gathering, demanding the ownership of the Wall and the taking of an oath to defend it at all costs. The following day, after listening to hours of inciting and inflammatory oratory in their Mosques, large Arab crowds in a massive demonstration moved towards the Wailing Wall. In the beginning, passions were confined to orderly protests. But soon an event provided a rationale for violence — a Jewish boy threw a ball into an Arab yard, a fight ensued when he went to retrieve it, and the ultimate result was the stabbing of one Jewish boy to death. A large Jewish counter protest demonstration was held at the funeral of the stabbed boy. Briefly, this was the immediate sequence of events which triggered the bloodshed known as the “riots” which broke out in Jerusalem when armed Arab peasants stormed the city on August 22, and which lasted for several days throughout the country until order was restored by the Police and the Army. On Friday, August 23, at the end of the services in the Mosque, a violent armed mob broke out suddenly on a rampage in the vicinity of the Old City in search of potential Jewish victims. A goodly number of Jews were found murdered in the streets in a public lynching, and Jewish property was destroyed or seriously damaged. Though the Mufti gave assurances to the British Chief of Police that peace and order would be maintained among the Arab population, the sequence of events that followed, and the unprecedented intensity of the violence and savagery, were directly related to the Mufti’s address in the Mosque,23 and “it is difficult and even impossible to believe that the sudden outbreak of savagery was unplanned.” 24 The violence quickly spread throughout the country, facilitated by two major factors — the response of the Police and the response of the Government. The Police took the Mufti’s calming assurances for granted, and they were consequently caught unprepared, failing to stop the riots and apprehend the rioters. Adhering to the policy of strict neutrality in the instances of communal strife, the Government refused the request of the Jewish population to enable them to bear arms in selfidefense.25 Whereas the Zionist agricultural settlements were better organized and better situated geographically, and thus able for the most part to defend

20

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

themselves successfully,26 the old Jewish communities, those religious segments who were confined to small and fully exposed quarters in the major cities of Palestine (Jerusalem, Safed, Hebron) were most subject to the massacre and sustained the bulk of the casualties. The nature of the massacre was clearly revealed in the destruction brought upon the Jews of Hebron and Safed. On August 24, Arab gangs reached Hebron in pursuit of the Jewish Community of the 700, who were associated with the famous religious academy of Slovodka. The academy was destroyed, and the following passage of an eyewitness depicts what befell the.Jews of the city: There was an inn in the town where some Jews had fled for safety. The Arabs killed and dismembered twenty three of them with daggers and axes in an upper room so that, according to a witness, blood ran down the stairs and soaked through the ceiling and splashed on to the floor beneath. This was not half the crime. In all, the Muslims killed sixty Jews including children and wounded nearly and many.27

A similar fate met the Jewish Community in Safed (a city in the Northern Galiilee), where “the Arab rioters committed a last abomination . . . twenty people including children were murdered and over a undred houses were burnt or otherwise destroyed.” 26 Several small agricultural settlements were also either totally destroyed or badly damaged, and their occupants murdered. Spontaneous Jewish resistance played a crucial role in sparing many Jewish lives, particularly in view of the fact that the Arab police refused to intervene during the riots for three days, and in view of the fact that the British police were waiting for military aid from Egypt to restore peace and order (they were far outnumbered during the first few days of the uprising).29 By the time that help arrived, 133 Jews lay dead and 330 were wounded.30 In the confrontation that followed between the Arab bands and the government forces, the Arabs sustained 116 dead and 232 wounded.31 In ruins lay all hope of Jewish—Arab cooperation or understanding together with the prestige of the British administration and its policies. All parties were forced to take a new and hard look at the political chemistry of the violent outbreaks. The wave of protest and indignation about the plight of the Jews in the riots that swept the world forced the British Government to take the initiative of ordering an investigation and to dispatch a Royal Commission, presided over by Sir Walter Shaw, to study the situation in Palestine. The mood in the Laborite administration in England at the time was clearly anti-Zionist,32 the chief proponent of which was Sydney Webb, or as he was commonly known, Lord Passfield, the Colonial Secretary in Ramsey

International Developments in Palestine During 1926—1929: An Historical Overview 21

MacDonald’s Cabinet. Among conservative elements, it was seriously feared that if a biased climate in London were to precede the investigation, the very basic tenets of British policy in Palestine might be jeopardized, resulting in very unfavorable consequences regarding the British promise of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.33 It is important to emphasize at this point the strong anti-Zionist feelings that prevailed in the British Government, inasmuch as the Comintern’s interpretation of British—Zionist relationships will later be assessed. Unlike the Conservatives and the Liberals, the British Labor Party had played no part in formulating the Jewish National Home Project. Due to their broad Socialist internationalist view of the world, they were ideologically inhibited vis-a-vis the Zionist (Jewish National) movement, due to its alleged, narrow, parochial, and nationalist character. They consequent­ ly .refused to listen to its complaints and protests and did not agree to receive Dr. Weizmann for discussion immediately following the riots. The clearest indicator of the Government’s anti-Zionist position in 1929 were the conclusions reached in Sir Walter Shaw’s investigation report. In its account, the Commission took little notice of strong Zionist evidence that members of the Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council had organized and incited the riots, and rather than recognize what was to be conclusively proven during the Arab Rebellion of 1936, that the Mufti was “in character a very crafty, ruthless, dedicated and evil man,” the Commission subscribed to the prevailing sentiment of the British administration in Palestine that he “was a positive factor in the unrest.” 34 The only implied criticism of the Mufti concerned his not having done more to stop the riots. The Commission instead laid the whole blame at the doors of Zionism. It accused the Zionists of ruthlessly expanding through mass immigration and large land purchases, subsequently inflicting great suffering upon the Arab community, producing a “landless and discontented class” of underprivileged Arabs.35 It was a total indictment of Zionism, a “gross misrepresentation of the Jewish attitude,” and more serious, an “implied exoneration of the Arab mobs.” 36 In its recommendations, the report called upon the British government to “redefine” the future of the Jewish National Home, to severely restrict Jewish immigration to Palestine in the meantime, to halt the land purchases and to stop the forceful removal of Arab shepherds and peasants from the land they were cultivating or utilizing in some other way, and to exclude the Jewish Agency from any share in the Government of Palestine. Although the recommendations also called for stopping inflammatory propaganda by imposing curbs upon the press, and

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although it embarked upon a special study with regard to the rights at the Wailing Wall, the judgment cannot but be that the recommendations had a pro-Arab and anti-Zionist tendency. The anti-Zionist position of the Shaw Commission was reiterated in the second commission’s report and recommendations, that of Sir John Hope Simpson, released during the summer of 1930. Simpson’s Committee sharply criticized Zionist employment policies, claiming that they resulted in discrimination against Arab workers, and subsequently in a high rate of unemployment among them. The Committee referred to the Histadruth’s attempt to institute employment of organized Jewish labor, i.e. first securing work for its organized labor force.37 Although the labor practices of the Histadruth were nationalistic and primarily geared to serve Zionist economic and political interest in Palestine, they were not the major factor involved in the high rate of unemployment among the Arabs, nor was the Jewish immigration into Palestine primarily responsible for it (in fact, the influx of cheap Arab laborers into Palestine from neighboring Arab countries was a significant factor), but the Simpson report tied these issues together, calling for the restriction of Jewish immigration to Palestine as the most immediate remedy for the prevailing tense situation in the country.38 Both Commissions paved the way for the emergence of the White Paper that the British Government issued on October 21, 1930. The White Paper incorporated the specific recommendations of the two Commissions, going so far as to redefine the basic premises of the commitment given to the Jewish National Home. It argued that such a commitment was never meant to “underestimate the rights of the non-Jewish community” in Palestine. The Paper gravely acknowledged the spirit of animosity and mistrust that dominated Jewish-Arab relations following the Riots, and called for curtailment of Jewish immigration and Jewish land purchases in Palestine. The White Paper was clearly an anti-Zionist document that infuriated Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish public opinion throughout the world. In the eyes of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Jewish Agency, who resigned his position as an act of protest against it, the White Paper was “rendering and intending to render our work in Palestine impossible.” 39 Dr. Weizmann realized that the Zionist effort in Palestine and the relationships between the Zionist movement and the Mandatory British Government had reached a very critical and dangerous impasse; in Dr. Weizmann’s words: Then began an intense struggle with the Colonial Office, which having been unable to guarantee the security of the Jewish community in

International Developments in Palestine During 1926—1929: An Historical Overview 23 Palestine, having ignored our repeated warnings concerning the activities of the Mufti and his friends of the Arab Executive, having made no attempt to correct the indifference or hostility of British officials in Palestine, now proposed to make us pay the price of its failure. We realized that we were facing a hostile combination of forces in the Colonial Office and in the Palestine administration, and unless it was overcome, it was futile to think of building on the foundations which we had laid so solidly in the previous years.40

A stormy debate was precipitated over the White Paper in the House of Commons, with sharp exchanges between the opposing Conservative members and the supporters of the Labor Government, forcing the Government to make certain conciliatory gestures to ease the impact of its harsh condemnation of Zionism, as well as to make several concessions which almost amounted to the repudiation of the White Paper itself.41 Although the years that followed the 1929 riots and the White Paper of 1930 were years of economic recovery in Palestine as well as years that brought growth and stability to its population (particularly because of the new influx of Jewish investments from Western Europe and from the United States), the situation in Palestine was never the same again. Zionism had undergone a profound change in its outlook and orientation. Its original approach of the “idealist, modernist devoted to liberal and socialist beliefs, opposed to violence”42 became unsettled by the grim experience of 1929—30, and it was forced to take a more realistic and determined position vis-a-vis the surrounding hostility and potential violence. The extremist elements within the Zionist ranks, Jabotinsky and his Revisionist followers, gradually gained ground and influence over the more moderate Zionist elements, who sought cooperation and accommodation with the British Government. The original Zionist orientation was slowly replaced by deep mistrust and by an increasing tendency towards self-reliance. Any hopes of reaching some sort of accord or modus vivendi with the Arabs that were previously entertained by many Zionist leaders were shattered. The construction of the Jewish National Home was on a clear collision course with Arab nationalism in Palestine. The Arabs for their part emerged from the Riots in a state of bewilderment, pervaded by the misconception that violence can always be profitable. The voices of moderation and cooperation, the Nashashibi orientation, were overcome by extremest, fanatic elements of the Mufti’s following, who advocated hatred and violence. Out of the 1929 bloodbath, no positive or constructive goal emerged; their dealings with the Mandatory power were marked by the rejection of new approaches and experiments such as the British demand for an elected legislative or representative organ. The Arab nationalist movement turned down a Zionist proposal to meet in

24

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a Round Table Conference in December 1930 for a discussion of the issue of a Constitution. The Arabs exercised a policy of boycott and obstructionism. Under the slogan of religious fanaticism, the Arab National movement thus bent itself in the direction of reaction and violent hatred, directed not only against the Zionist movement, but as the massacres of the non-Zionist Jews in Hebron, Safed, and Jerusalem indicate, against the Jewish community in Palestine as a whole. The struggle of the Arab nationalists changed its patterns of action from a political anti-British mandate, into a distinctly fanatic religious movement, basing its actions on the Jihad (“Holy War” in the Islamic religious tradition), legitimizing its violence by the holy principles of the Koran. The lack of a firm and positive political conviction, the absence of a constructive political program, caused the movement to lapse into the hands of the reactionary leadership of the Mufti, eventually leading the Arab National Movement in Palestine to drift into the direction of an alliance with the Fascist and Nazi forces, whose political shadow already loomed over the Arab Middle East in the early 1930’s.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II 1.

2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10.

11.

F.H. Kisch, Palestine Diary (London: 1938); Colonel Kisch served as the chairman of the Palestine Zionist Executive between 1923—31. Further reference to this effect may be found in James Parkes, A History o f Palestine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 303. Ibid., p. 307. For all practical purposes, they accepted the thesis of the anti-Semitic allegation incorporated in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. “The Mufti firmly asserted his belief in the authenticity of it.’* Joseph Schechtman, The M ufti and the Fuehrer (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1965), p. 36. Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (London: Hamish and Hamilton, 1949), p. 409. G. Z. Yisraeli,MOPS, PCP, MAKI (Tel-Aviv: 1953), p. 53. Parks, op. cit., pp. 310-11. The main rise actually took place during Lord Samuel's tenure as British High Commissioner, 1920-25, when the Jewish population increased from 55,000 to 108,000. See The New Hebrew Encyclopedia, p. 535. Ibid., p. 538. J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: W. W. Norton, Inc., 1950), p. 51. This was in contrast to the preceding Ottoman system that did recognize them as separate entities and that granted them considerable measures of local autonomy. See Kemal S. Abu Jaber, “The Millet System in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire,” The Muslim World, Vol. LVII, No. 3, July 1957, pp. 212-23. Schechtman, op. cit., pp. 39-41.

International Developments in Palestine During 1926—1929: An Historical Overview 25 12. 13. 14.

Vaakov Shimoni, Arviyei Eretz Yisrael (The Arabs of Palestine), (Tel-Aviv, Palestine: Am-Oved), 1947, p. 278. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 59.

Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (London: Mentor, The New English Library, 1965), p. 114. 15. For the Arab view of Zionist growth, see George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (NY: Capricorn Books, 1965), pp. 386—98. 16. Shimoni, op. cit., p. 284. 17. Parkes,op. cit., p. 314. 18. As Manfred Halpern notes: ‘‘Traditional Islam endured for about 1300 years, because of continual internal warfare,” in Communism .and Revolution, Cyril E. Black and Thomas*P. Thornton (eds.), (Princeton: 1964), p. 303. In fact, in the later riots of 1936, much bloodshed resulted from the struggle among the various Arab factions. 19. “It was a resurrected religious issue to be used as counter in a national and political struggle.” Schechtman, op. cit., p. 34. 20. For a recent Arab account of the implications of this Jewish action for the Status Quo of the area, see A.L. Tibawi, ‘‘Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab History,” The Arab World, Volume XIV, Special Issue, No. 10-11, pp. 18-20. 21. Sykes, op. cit., p. 109. 22. Revisionism refers to militant right-wing Zionist activity - actively calling for a speedy immigration to Palestine and for the immediate attainment of the sovereignty of a Jewish state, as well as strongly opposing the British rule in Palestine, particularly after 1929. 23. The Government held the misconception that the Mufti was a peace-loving leader, but in the minority report written by Lord Snell and taken by the Jewish representatives, the Mufti was held responsible. Sykes, op. cit., pp. 118-123. 24. Ibid., p. 118. 25. The New Hebrew Encyclopedia, p. 541. 26. Due to the defense arrangement carried out by the Jewish Defense organization, the Haganah. See Ibid., p. 541. The Haganah was ‘‘the semisecret militia of the Jewish Community in Palestine under the Mandate.” Ben Halpern, The Idea o f the Jewish State, (Harvard University Press: 1961), p. 43. 27. Sykes, op. cit., pp. 118-119. 28. Ibid., p. 119. 29. Ibid. 30. The New Hebrew Encyclopedia, p. 541. 31. Sykes, op. cit., p. 119. 32. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, in his memoirs Trial-and Error, p. 411 recalls the response of Lady Passfield (the former Beatrice Webb) to his rather alarmed inquiry: “I can’t understand why the Jews make such a fuss over a few dozen of their people killed in Palestine. As many are killed every week in traffic accidents, and no one pays any attention.”

26

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33.

This was expressed in a letter in The Times, December 20, 1929, by Arthur Balfour, Lloyd George, and General Smuts. Parkes,op. cit., pp. 122-23. Ibid. Ibid. This was in referenoe to the Zionist campaign called Kibush Ha'avodah, an effort to persuade Jewish employers to hire members of the organized Jewish labor force. See Yisraeli, op. cit., p. 53. Sykes, op. cit., p. 125. Weizmann, op. cit., p..41 3. Ibid. Sykes, op. cit., p. 127, as formulated in a letter sent by the British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, to Dr. Chaim Weizmann as well, read in the House of Commons on February 13, 1931. Also see Weizmann, op. cit., pp. 412-13. Sykes, op. cit., p. 131.

34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41.

42.

27

CHAPTER III The Comintern’s Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine Within the period of the post-World War I political partition of the Middle East into colonies, Palestine was perhaps the least politically developed country in the area. On the surface it might have appeared that the Comintern, dedicated to the cause of revolutionary anti-colonial struggle, would focus its political attention on countries like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Surprisingly, however, it was Palestine that attracted most of the Comintern’s attention and that occupied a special place in its Middle Eastern posture.1 There were two major reasons for this. Unlike the national liberation movements in the other Arab countries, which were primarily local and confined to their physical boundaries, Zionism, the Jewish national liberation movement in Palestine, was a world-wide organization that had sprung originally from Russia and its neighboring East European countries and that was still held in high esteem among many Jews in the .Soviet Union. Ideologically, emotionally, and in terms of kinship, the large populace of Soviet Jewry and the small Jewish community in Palestine were strongly linked. As the history of the early years of the Bolshevik regime indicate, Zionism remained a powerful, influential factor in Russian—Jewish life, continuing to recruit young Jewish pioneer settlers to Palestine, negotiating and securing for them permission from the Soviet authorities to leave their State.2 The rise of Zionism in Palestine was therefore closely tied to the domestic situation in the Soviet Union.3 The other major factor accounting for the Comintern’s focus on Palestine was that there existed in Palestine the largest, and politically, the best organized Communist Party in the entire region.4 Its leadership and following were Jews who originally came from Russia both before and after the Bolshevik revolution. Most of them were ex-Zionist-socialists Who had embraced Communism during the period of the Russian Revolution and who were involved in the historical polemics and political struggle between Zionism and Communism, well-versed and experienced with regard to the realities of Zionism in Palestine as well as with regard to the future of the Proletariat Revolution throughout the world. As Jewish Communists, many of them were formally recruited by the Comintern in the Soviet Union to be

28

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sent to Palestine to carry out various political assignments, among which was the organizing of a strong Communist Party in Palestine which would bring the Communist message to the broad Jewish masses.5 The Jewish Communists distinguished themselves to such an extent in this task, that, in the absence of Arab Communist leaders in Egypt and Syria, several of them were sent to those countries to organize and lead a local Arab Communist movement.6 It is interesting to note that there was an historical correlation between the gradual strangulation and persecution of Zionism in the Soviet Union and the intensification of the Comintern’s struggle against the Zionist settlement in Palestine, particularly from 1924 ownwards. In both cases, the task was assigned to Jewish Communists: to the Yevsektsia (the Jewish Section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)7 in the Soviet Union; and to the Palestine Communist Party (P.C.P.), the Comintern’s arm, dominated by Jewish Communists, in Palestine. In 1924 the Yevsektsia, with the blessing of the Soviet authorities, cracked down on Zionism, its official organ complaining that “there are scarcely any Jewish Communists .. . while the Zionists are strongly organized.” 8 Four thousand Zionist leaders and members were arrested, jailed, and exiled, a small number of them deported to Palestine.9 At the same time, the Zionist pioneer movement, Hechalutz, was forced to terminate its agricultural training program and to close down a host of agricultural training centers which were previously legally operating with governmental permission. Members of these centers were arrested in 1926—27, and famous farms in Crimea were dissolved as part of the ruthless campaign of the Yevsektsia to uproot the “contaminating influence” of Zionism from the Soviet scene.10 Similarly, a moral blow was inflicted upon the Hebrew language by the vindictive pursuit of the Yevsektsia, sometimes even to the great dismay and embarrassment of. the non-Jews among the Government authorities,11 who failed to follow or to comprehend the reasons for these actions and the extent of their severity. Concurrent with the struggle and persecution of Zionism in Russia was the Soviet Government’s inauguration of a new program of agricultural settlement of the Jewish masses. While the Soviet authorities were experimenting with this project in an economically productive fashion, attempting to alleviate the depressing social and economic conditions of the uprooted and dislocated Jewish masses, the Yevsektsia and the Yevkom (the Jewish Committee in the Ministry of National Minorities) tried to turn the project into an official anti-Zionist crusade. As Dimanshtein, the Jewish Commissar, openly declared, “We must create a Palestine in Moscow.” 12 This project became known as the Jewish Colonization in the Ukraine and White Russia.13

The Comintern’s Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine

29

Despite the warm official support given to it by the President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Kalinin,14 on November 17, 1926, and the strong endorsement by the Yevsektsia and other domestic and foreign Jewish organizations such as Komset15 and Ozet16 in the Soviet Union, and Icor, Ort, and the Agro JO INT17 in the United States, the project failed to attract a sufficient number of settlers to justify the great hopes and the publicity that was given to it.18 Paradoxically, it was the same Jewish Communists in the Soviet Union endorsing the Ukraine project, who had previously viewed the colonization project in Crimea with great alarm and fear, lest it might arouse a strong nationalistic tendency within the Jewish Community in Russia, thereby undermining their genuine Marxist prescription for the solution of the Jewish problem, namely, total assimilation into Soviet Society.19 For its part, the P.C.P. opened an office in Palestine called AERD (For the support of Jewish Colonization in the U.S.S.R.)20 urging the support of the project by the Jewish community in Palestine which had so far been the only Jewry that excluded itself from this Jewish national endeavor in the U.S.S.R. The result of the P.C.P. effort was a rather mild response, predominantly the emigration of Communist and Communist supporters who left Palestine for agricultural settlements in Russia.21 (A further reference to the strong anti-Zionist activities undertaken by the Comintern to encourage the emigration of young ex-Zionist pioneers from Palestine to the Soviet Union will be taken up in Chapter Six, in connection with the Soviet attempt to establish an autonomous Jewish National District in Birobidzhan.) Official Zionist organizations in Palestine and abroad displayed a cautious attitude towards the Soviet colonization project, showing interest and even some support, but viewing it as a local matter that did not and should not interfere with the major Zionist effort in Palestine. The Jewish Agency in Palestine during 1926 dispatched Dr. Arthur Rupin to inspect and report about these new Jewish agricultural settlements.22 For the aforementioned reasons, therefore, the Comintern continued to pay close attention to the developments in Palestine through its organizational extension there, the Palestine Communist Party (P.C.P.) The relationship between the Comintern and its affiliated parties had been explicitly defined in Lenin’s Twenty-One Conditions of Admission to the organization during the Second Congress.23 It called for unconditional obedience to the Comintern’s decisions from its following (referring to the decisions formulated by the Congresses as well as by the Executive Committee), regarding them as binding on all parties belonging to the

30

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Communist International. In its tight and rigid central control, the Comintern exercised extraordinary power over 'its affiliates, not only in terms of long range political goals and strategy, but also with regard to its tactical and local political maneuverings, by prescribing specific blueprints for action, propaganda, and techniques of penetration into the local centers of power. Specific instructions were given as to the quality of the respective party’s membership, calling upon the parties to purge themselves from time to time of “unreliable elements,” and specifying the precise organizational procedure for expulsion. The Conditions of Admission called for extended illegal activity in areas where the party was legal, by creating a parallel illegal organization, which at a decisive moment would help the party do its duty to the revolution. The governing internal principle within the party was based upon the rule of as much centralization as possible. It was stated in the conclusion of the Conditions of Admission that “every party which wishes to join the Communist International is obliged to give unconditional support to any Soviet Republic in the struggle against counter-revolutionary forces.” 24 To secure the implementation of its instructions, the Comintern resorted to the special checkup practice of “dispatching special secret emissaries to foreign countries with instructions affecting the entire future of individual Communist parties - without the knowledge of the local leaders themselves.” 25 These emissaries, as one of the prominent Italian Communist leaders observed, “never work with the leadership of individual Communist parties, but always behind their backs and often against them . . . the E.C.C.I. acts as Chrezvychaika (i.e., Checka, the original Soviet Secret Police) projected outside the Russian border.” 26 The P.C.P., which adhered strictly to the Comintern’s instructions, was also subjected to several unexpected visits of the Comintern’s emissaries during its formative years of 1926—29. It appears that the Party’s Secretariate was recruited in Moscow and sent by the Comintern for active duty in Palestine. A biographical note on the background of the membership of the Party’s Secretariate and of the role each member played in the Comintern’s activities in Palestine during this critical period of 1926—29 sheds light upon the intricate association of Zionism and Communism at this stage. The four major members of the Party’s Secretariate were its founder and leader, Wolf Averbach (also known as “Daniel” and “Abusian”); Nahum Leshchinsky (“Nadab”); J. Berger-Barzilai, and Moshe Kuperman.28 The biography of Nahman List is also most relevant, for though he was not a member of the Secretariate, he was also a veteran member in the Party from its inception and admission to the Comintern in 1924.

The Comintern’s Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine

31

Wolf Averbach (“Daniel”),29 the chief architect of the Party’s unification in August 1923 (to be discussed in Chapter Seven) and its most influential older leader until 1930, was born in Russia in 1890. At the age of 15, he joined, the Russian revolutionary movement, and subsequently became a member of the Poale-Zion (a left-wing Jewish labor movement).30 During the first World War, he was drafted to the Russian armed forces and captured and imprisoned by the Germans. Upon his return to Russia, he witnessed the aftermath of the revolution and the political confusion which spread throughout the Jewish workers’ movement —in particular, the split of Poale-Zion into left and right-wing factions. Although Averbach* was a Zionist, he gradually gravitated to the left, adopting a Communist stand; he became the Secretary-General of the left-wing of Poale-Zion, which subsequently changed its name to the Jewish Communist Party (Y.K.P.),31 still maintaining its relationship to the Zionist mother party Poale-Zion. During the famous struggle of the Poale-Zion to join the Comintern in 1921—1922, Averbach voted in favor of the Comintern’s stance,32 adhering to Lenin’s dictate that the movement give up its Zionist aspirations, and abandon its Palestinian provision, an ultimatum that eventually split the movement. While in Russia, he took the active party line, participating in various revolutionary security and police organizations, including xY&Druzhim and the Red Guardia which attempted to contain the anarchy that was spreading in Russia during the Civil War. In November, 1922, Averbach was dispatched by the Y.K.P. (Jewish Communist Party) to sway the Jewish workers there away from Zionism. He participated in the Second Congress of the Histadruth, where he took an anti-Zionist position, and as a result of which he was forced to go underground. His followers, however, organized the “Workers Fraction” in the Histadruth, a Communist front organization, and at the time, the only legal party organization .. .^ It was during these years that Averbach developed his revolutionary background as well as his conceptual political outlook as to the future of the Jewish labor movement in Palestine. It appears that he was a “revolutionary romantic,” thoroughly versed in the Yiddish language and literature, with deep sentimental affection for the Jewish people, to such a point that when he later rose to an important position in the P.C.P. and in the Comintern, he was suspected by his superiors of being a Zionist, He developed a blend of mystical utopian-messianic revolutionary vision for the Middle East, in which he saw a potentially great anti-CoIonial movement transforming itself into a revolutionary proletariat, carried out jointly by the Jewish and the Arab masses.34 Realizing the progressive nature and strength of the Zionist

32

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Working Movement in Palestine, he hoped that it would play the historic role of leader, arousing and guiding the underdeveloped Arab masses to their revolutionary destiny. He considered himself to be the “Lenin of Arabia.” 35 To his friends, he appeared as an honest and dedicated revolutionary, devoted to the cause of social justice, firmly believing that it could be achieved only within the framework of the World Communist revolutionary movement. Averbach was the P.C.P.’s representative during the Comintern’s Sixth Congress held in Moscow in the summer of 1928, a critical moment in the relationship between the Party and the Comintern, a relationship which was strained as a result of the Party’s failure to purge itself of its Jewish leadership and to substitute that of a predominently Arab one. Averbach was the leader who attempted to reorganize the party upon his return from the Comintern’s Congress in Moscow, causing a major crisis within the party’s leadership.36 In 1929, a few months before the outbreak of the riots, he was recalled by the Comintern to its headquarters —a trip that kept him out of the country during the riots — to report on the Party’s revolutionary progress and to give an overview of the situation in Palestine. Although he was subjected to considerable pursuit by the police, Averbach still managed to go in and out of Palestine on forged documents, constantly closely protected by the Party members’ bodyguards.37 After the riots, Averbach became, a Comintern functionary and trouble shooter in various European assignments, and when major changes in the Comintern's personnel took place in the early thirties, he was given the responsibility of managing production in a large tractor factory in Rostov. In 1936, during the great purges, he was arrested and accused of “Zionist Imperialism,” and sentenced to five years imprisonment in the Lubianko jail in Moscow. In 1941, at the end of the five years, he was re-sentenced on alleged new incriminating grounds, and in the confusion of the war, was executed shortly after.38 Josef Berger-Barzilai, the second in command, joined the P.C.P. upon its inception in 1922. Politically, he was the most radical member in the Party. Like his comrades, he drifted into the Communist movement from the Jewish labor movement ranks. After the Bolshevik Revolution, in 1920, as a member of Hashomer-Hatzair (a Zionist pioneering organization)39 he immigrated to Palestine, where he persistently fought other pro-Zionist leftist groups. After the unification of the various radical left factions and their merger into the united P.C.P. and its subsequent admission as a Communist Party into the Comintern, Barzilai went to Moscow to attend

The Comintern’s Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine

33

the plenum session of the Comintern, representing the P.CP. in December 1924. In contrast to the rather mild and compromising united P.C.P. line at the time, Barzilai remained the chief spokesman of the ultraradical elements that consisted of ex-KPP members (a militant left-wing group that existed during 1922—23). It appears that Barzilai’s arrival in Moscow and his activities there were surrounded by great secrecy.40 His duty was to report to the E.C.C.I. on the situation in Palestine.41 In March 1925, Barzilai was again sent by the Comintern on a mission to Palestine, where after careful observation of his activities, he was promptly arrested by the police and accused of illegal activities in the Communist Party and the Comintern. Barzilai read a major statement in the court accusing British imperialism and Zionism, and after being fined and released, he was recalled again by the Comintern to Moscow. When he returned to Palestine on August 16, 1926, police authorities refused to let him in, and as a stateless citizen, he was forced to remain aboard an Italian ship that sailed back and forth for six weeks. The M.O.P.R. (the International Aid Organization for Arrested Revolutionaries),42 aided by strong Jewish public opinion in Palestine and by threats to bring the case before the Crown in London was finally able to obtain his release. Somewhat surprisingly, out of feelings of Jewish solidarity, the Zionist organization and its leaders generally opposed government detention and ‘deportation of P.C.P. members and followers upon their arrival in Palestine and fought for and defended successfully their right to remain in Palestine.43 Once admitted, Barzilai stayed in an Arab village, Beit Safafa, under conspiratorial identity, away from the watchful eyes of the government detectives. He continued to organize and direct the Party’s activities, frequently meeting the Comintern’s emissaries.44 During the spring of 1928, Barzilai was hastily recalled again by the . Comintern back to Moscow, and with the aid of a forged passport he went to Russia via Western Europe. Barzilai briefed the Comintern Middle Eastern experts on the situation in Palestine, and on March 5, 1929, met Stalin to discuss it at greater length. As Barzilai states, Stalin had shown a special interest in the unrest in Palestine and personally ordered the mission of anemissary to study the situation on the spot. Stalin also ordered a careful study of the possibility of publishing a popular periodical in Arabic to serve as the spokesman of anti-imperialism in the area and to focus opposition to the reactionary forces in the Arab World. Barzilai claims that this was the only meeting that Stalin attended where he discussed the developments in Palestine in great detail and where he formulated the Comintern’s position with regards to it. The important result of this meeting was the severing of

34

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

the P.C.P. of its relations with the Arab Executive Committee and with other reactionary segments of the Arab Nationalist Movement.45 After deliberations in Moscow and the meeting with Stalin, Barzilai returned to Palestine to take command of the Party during the riots of 1929. His personal account of the Comintern’s involvement in the riots is an extremely important piece of evidence in a rather obscure and confusing chapter of the Comintern’s role in the events.46 Barzilai left Palestine for Moscow in 1931 where he assumed a key administrative role in the Comintern headquarters as a Comintern expert on Middle Eastern Affairs. Prior to that assignment, he had served for a short period as a lecturer in the University of Moscow of the Toilers in the East, and later became the head of the Middle Eastern section in Varga’s Institute for World Economics and World Politics until his arrest and trial in 1935 during the great purges when he was imprisoned in labor camps for twenty one years.47 He was released in 1956 and subsequently came to Israel, where he lives presently, engaged in publishing his memoirs of the P.CP. days in the twenties and of his ordeal in the later years of the Soviet Union. Nahum Leshchinsky (Nadav) was regarded as the chief theoretician of the Party, an expert on propaganda and in charge of foreign relationships, an able and dedicated revolutionary of rare calibre, held in high esteem by the Comintern. He was born in Russia to a wealthy Jewish family, graduated from a Russian high school, and had an extraordinary command of the Russian culture. Leshchinsky was a humble person in his private life who shunned attention, and who wgs constantly preoccupied with his studies.48 Leshchinsky arrived in Palestine in the early 1920’s as a young Zionist pioneer, and under the persuasive political spell of Averbach, joined the P.CP. close to its inception in 1924. During the riots of 1929, he was one of the P.CJP. leaders who closely worked with Bohumil Smeral, the Comintern’s emissary, and he was highly praised in the emissary’s report as one who was responsible for the high ideological level of the Party’s activities. In 1926 he was elected to the Central Committee of the P.C.P. and also became a member of its Secretariate. In this capacity, Leshchinsky undertook several important missions abroad as an emissary of the P.CP. In 1930, Leshchinsky was expelled from Palestine and moved to organize the Egyptian Communist Party where he was again arrested when his identity was disclosed by one of the large number of police agents who “joined” the Party.49 From Egypt he moved to Russia where he became an executive member of the NIA (Scientific Research Association), part of the University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow. At the same time, Leshchinsky published articles under the pen name of Nadav, commenting

The Comintern’s Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine

35

on the situation in the Middle East. In assessing the riots in Palestine, he upheld the original position taken by the Party, that they were led by the most reactionary elements within the Arab comunity,50 entering into an ideological polemic with the official Comintern position represented and elaborated by “Shami” (Jacob Tepper, also known as the chief organizer of the Communist Party of Egypt and frequent Comintern emissary and trouble shooter to the Middle East.) During the great purges, like almost all the Jewish members of the P.C.P. who moved to Russia, he was arrested in the 1936 trials, and sentenced to a prolonged imprisonment. He died on the way to a labor camp.51 Moshe Kuperman (also known as Emek), the organizational manager of the P.C.P. and in charge of its communication and security, was born in Poland. In the early twenties, at the age of twenty, as a young pioneer, he arrived in Palestine with the Zionist wave of the Third Aliyah (Immigra­ tion). He joined a group of pioneers called the Borochov Company51 which was engaged in constructing new roads in Palestine. In 1922, Kuperman joined the Y.K.P. — Poale Zion which became known as M.OP.S. (Mifleget Poalim Sozialistim — Socialist Workers Party), the forerunner to the P.C.P.. Due to his outstanding organizational skill, he became a member of its Central Committee, in charge of implementing its decisions and maintaining the necessary security measures of its underground apparatus.53 Among his various security assignments was the organisation of the arrival and stay of the Comintern’s emissary B. Smeral in 1929 as well as his secret evacuation from Palestine when the riots broke out. Under Kuperman’s control were the specially trained “fighting brigades” or battle units, called Boyvka (Russian for fighting units), well-trained and highly loyal party members, whose prime responsibility was to evacuate the Party’s leadership at moments when their gathering was suspected of being disclosed to the Police. The Boyvka successfully guarded Wolf Averbach upon his arrival in 1929, and on another occasion spared the life of J. Berger-Barzilai in Jerusalem.54 Kuperman was assisted in his task by Yerachmie] Lukacher-Horazo. Lukacher-Horazo was born in Russia, and immigrated to Palestine* graduating the Hertzliah High School in Tel-Aviv and joining the Workers’ Battalion. He served as an officer in the Ottoman Army and was trained by the Haganah in Germany in 1923—24. In the Party, he was in charge of special assignments relating to the Haganah, to the Druze uprising in Syria in 1925, etc. During 1925—27, he was also directly connected with the Comintern’s agencies in Berlin, a center of some Red Jewish intellectuals who successfully established strong links with the German intellectual

36

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

community. In 1932, he was expelled from Palestine by a government administrative order after his activities in the Party were revealed to the British intelligence service.55 When back in Russia, he was arrested during the great purges and spent several years in jail with Berger-Barzilai. After serving five years in jail, he was released, during which time he considered escaping from Russia through Persia. He died during the war. LuckacherHorazo was the most mysterious personality among the P.C.P. functionaries, and even today, all of his activities have not yet been revealed. The fifth leader of the P.C.P. during this period, who was not a member of the Party’s Secretariat but who was a key intermediary between it and the Comintern, Nahman List, has left us a detailed description of what happened in the Party during this period, and inasmuch as he was the man in-between, his documented analysis of the Comintern’s involvement in the troubles in Palestine is one of the richest sources of data available on this period. Nahman List, who was a member of the Zionist labor movement, Poale-Zion, was drawn to Bolshevism right after the revolution out of the deep conviction that the revolution had opened a new era in the history of mankind. Accepting the tenets of Bolshevism at their face value, he volunteered to serve in the Polit-Otdel (Political Section) in the Red Army,56 as a lecturer on political and cultural themes, and later in a similar capacity in the Voenkom (the Commissariat for Military Affairs). In 1922, he went to Palestine.57 As List himself testifies, regardless of his broad political convictions, the rise of a Jewish pioneer settlement in Palestine attracted his attention as it did nost of the P.C.P. leaders and members, but as List emphasizes, they were all tormented between loyalty to their party and its ideological stance and their comradely sentiments to the construction effort carried out by the Zionist pioneers in Palestine.58 In 1923, after joining the left wing of the Poale-Zion group, he was invited by J. Berger-Barzilai to join the newly created P.C.P. During his party tenure, List fulfilled various administrative and political assignments, being particularly active in the M.O.P.R. organization, representing the Palestinian chapter in the World Congress of the organization in Moscow in 1928. In Palestine, the police were constantly after him, and List kept moving under various names from one place to another. During the summer of 1928, his identity and activities were disclosed to the government intelligence by an informer, and after a surprise search in his flat, the Party’s secret protocols and other documents were found in his possession. List was promptly arrested, tried, and sentenced to imprisonment. Later the prison

The Comintern’s Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine

37

sentence was changed into deportation (a rather customary procedure in the case of most P.C.P. arrestees) back to Russia. Since List’s role in the party was essential, the Comintern ordered him to marry his girl-friend, in order to avoid deportation. (Unlike many of his comrades in the P.CJP. who were illegally smuggled into Palestine via Turkey and Lebanon, his future wife was a legitimate citizen in Palestine.59) His prompt marriage though did not spare him the deportation, and he was placed by force aboard a Soviet liner in the port of Jaffa which brought him back to Russia. In Moscow, List participated in the M.O.P.R. Congress, briefing the organization on the political conditions in Palestine, publishing in this context articles in Pravda, attending the Comintern’s Sixth World Congress and taking part in its deliberations. Of great importance were List’s connections with the Profintern (the International Communist Trade Union Organization) particularly its Middle Eastern section, as well as his visits to the Jewish agricultural settlements in Crimea. In April 1929 List was dispatched from Moscow to Syria to organize the Syrian Communist Party where he stayed until 1933. Afterwards, he moved as a Comintern emissary to France, assuming an active role in the French Communist Party. In 1936 he broke with the Communist Party, and in 1956, he settled in Israel. Jacob Tepper (“Shami”) was another member of the Party’s Secretariate up until January 1926. During the Druze uprising in Syria he travelled to Beirut but was caught and accused of maintaining contact with the rebels. He was almost sentenced to death, but at the last moment was expelled from Syria to Moscow. Thereafter he became well known in the Comintern circles, was dispatched for a short visit to Egypt, and upon his return to Moscow, assumed a professorship at the University of Moscow. He later became the head of the department of Studies of the East. The last member of the P.C.P. Secretariate was Joseph Galach (“The Priest”) who was the only member of a distinctly proletariat origin. He was active primarily in various missions abroad, and travelled to Moscow as the Fraction representative (a front organization representing the P.C.P. in the Histadruth) to the various Profintern gatherings. He was arrested by the police in Palestine and forced to leave the country back to Moscow. In 1928 he was sent once again to Palestine, and in 1930, returned to Moscow for studies. He was arrested during the great purges and met his death around 1936.60 As a review of their biographies indicates, the leadership of the P.C.P. was predominantly Russian-born, Russian-educated, and all associated at one point or another with Zionist nationalist labor movements. Thus, at the

38

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

time of the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, they were posed with a dilemma in regard to their broad political outlook and their immediate loyalties to the Jewish masses. Each was deeply committed to the cause of solving the Jewish problem, particularly in view of the widespread social and economic dislocation among them. Although in later days, after they had arrived in Palestine and assumed active work towards the cause of advancing communism among the predominantly Zionist Jewish community in Palestine, they “all were faithful Stalinists,” 61 they by and large remained at the same time people of immense concern and feeling for their fellow Jewish-man and for the masses of Jewish workers in particular. It is true that the P.C.P. leaders were “doctrinaire in approach” but as Professor Laqueur points out, it would be wrong to dismiss them as mere “apparatchiki” and “bureaucrats” since they were indeed, as the record of history shows, genuine revolutionaries, performing and operating in the most dangerous of circumstances. They attempted, though without much success, to rally the support of their own people and made great efforts to arouse the Arabs to carry out the Comintern's revolutionary program in Palestine. This generation of Jewish Communists in Palestine had embraced Bolshevism while the civil war in Russia was raging, during the year of “Bezvolstvo” (breakdown of law and order), at a time when the anarchists and local ultra-nationalists unleashed an anti-Semitic campaign of extermi­ nating Jews.62 Progressive Jews of all denominations were forced to support the Soviet effort, therefore, which was committed to the cause of equality, justice, and tolerance, and which consequently held a great promise of hope for the Jewish people.63 The fact that this entire leadership and most of its following chose to move to Palestine to carry out their revolutionary program there, rather than in Russia itself, suggests that emotionally they cherished the successful Zionist pioneering effort in Palestine, not in its political context, but in its purely human and social one, i.e. in its practical and limited goals of seeing Jewish workers and farmers engage upon the building of a healthy, constructive, and productive communal life. Some of these leaders embraced Communism as the only cultural bridge to their deep roots in Russian culture, rather than from purely ideological considerations. Their admiration for Marx, Engels, and Lenin stemmed not so much from ideological conviction but rather from their admiration of the Russian writers and the Soviet poets. Others, more politically minded, regarded the Soviets as a potentially more feasible ally to the Jewish workers in Palestine64 in their efforts to carry out major social reforms in a predominantly backward region, and they sought by adopting

The Comintern’s Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine

39

Communism to secure a close alliance with Russia rather than with England, towards whose alliance the Zionist leadership was striving. Some even cherished an altruistic approach; they felt, as Averbach did, that it was the prime moral and intellectual responsibility of the enlightened and progressive Jewish labor movement to bring the message of social change and progress to the Arab masses and to alert them to the task of anti-Colonial revolutionary struggle. It was only at a later stage in their political career, when confronted with politically minded Zionist organizations and parochial Jewish national aspirations, that their cosmopolitan, idealistic, and romantic notions came into sharp conflict with the political reality in Palestine and forced them to become arch enemies of Zionism. Ostracized, persecuted not only by police but by the Zionist labor movement, their zealous conviction was sharpened that Zionism must be crushed, and knowing so much about the history, ideology, and its struggle, they became the most outspoken, most informed, and hence the most dangerous enemies of it. They had their share of political frustration from inside their own ranks as well. They failed to understand why the Comintern implicitly discriminated against them by constantly demanding that they Arabize the Party’s leadership, and they had great difficulty in accepting the fact that racist considerations, motivated by political expedience, were to prevail over the international principles of their revolutionary cause. Although they always conformed to the Comintern’s demands, it was* not, on many occasions, without a fierce ideological and political argument.65 When these founders and leaders of Communism in the area as a whole and in Palestine in particular were forced to go back into Russia, they remained an influential group which took part in shaping the Comintern’s foreign policy in the area.66 They held key political and research positions which played a major role in formulating the Comintern’s political thinking during the 1930’s up until the great purges silenced them and swept them from the scene.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III 1.

See the Public Record Office, London, War Office 106, Pile 208, Document CX/7751, No. 24, which gives a description of the financial and political support given by the Comintern to M.O.P.S. in Palestine in 1921 (the forerunner to the Palestine Communist Party) and File 205, Document No. 41, dated January 28, 1921, describes the military aid given by the Comintern to certain elements in Palestine so as to promote a military uprising o f radicals. An intelligence report dated January 7, 1921, File 204, Document 57, describes Jewish and Arab Communist functionaries who were sent from Moscow to Palestine after a certain training period in propaganda and agitation.

40 2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

7.

8.

9.

10. 11. 12 .

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE Dan Pines, Hechalutz B ’Hur Hamahpecha (The Pioneer in the Crucible o f the Revolution), (Tel-Aviv, Palestine: Davar, 1938), pp. 276-79. Also Guido G. Goldman, Zionism Under Soviet Rule 1917-1928 (NY: Herzl Press, 1960), pp. 79 and 105. Ibid., pp. 100-103 and Solomon Schwartz, The Jews and the Soviet Union (Syracuse University Press: 1951), p. 117. See Josef Barzilai, “ Yerushalayim Av Tarpat” (Jerusalem August 1929), Keshet, No. 29,1965, p. 123. Public Record Office, London, War Office 106, File 204, Document 57. Watter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1961), p. 37 and Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (Ptaeger: 1959), pp. 82-83. This is to be distinguished from the Yevkom (the Jewish Commissariate Section within the People's Commissariat for National Affairs), founded in 1919. The major difference between the two organs was that the Yevsektsia was a branch of the party and as such included only Jewish Communists, while the Yevkom was a government department and also included non-Communist Jews. See Goldman, op. cit., pp. 23-24. See Ernes, June 16, 1922, as quoted by Goldman, Ibid. p. 78. In addition, the Yevsektsia's Chemerinsky complained that "the great wants in which the Jewish small town population lives create a favorable basis for the development of Zionism, whose influence on the patey-bouigeois elements o f the Jewish Youth is now very large." Ernes, October 27,1925, as quoted in Ibid., p. 84. The arrests were in two major waves: 1000 Zionist leaders were arrested in September, 1920, while another 3000 were arrested in September, 1924. The trials were held secretly, many among the arrested sentenced to hard labor and long jail terms. From 1920-22, a certificate of deportation was secured for some Zionist leaders by Professor David Schur, the noted musician, through personal contacts with the Sovnarkom (the Soviet Commissariate o f Nationali­ ties). In 1922, an official and legal arrangement was reached for immigration to Palestine through the newly constituted agency of Yedgeskom (Yidisher Gezelschaftlicher Komitet), a welfare agency jointly maintained by the Soviet Yevkom and the outside JOINT organization. The arrangement divided the task of facilitating the emigration of Zionists: the Yevkom was responsible for all the arrangements up to the Soviet border, and the JOINT received the immigrants at the frontiers. See J.B. Schechtman, “Tsionut Vetsionim Berusiya Hasovietit" (Zionism and Zionists in Soviet Russia), Cesher, September’ 1966, No. 23, p.121. Guido Goldman,op. cit., pp. 105-106. Itzhak Rabinovitch, Mimoskva ad Yershalayim (From Moscow to Jerusalem), (Jerusalem: 1957), pp. 72-73. Goldman, op. c i t p. 110.

The Comintern’s Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine 13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29.

41

A. Tartakover describes three Jewish autonomous districts, one in the Ukraine and two in Crimea, where the local government was transferred to Jewish authorities, and where the official spoken language became Yiddish. In “ Hahitiashvut Hayehudit Hahaklait Berusiya Ybebiit-Hamoatsot (The Jewish Agricultural Settlement in Russia and the Soviet Union), Gesher, September 1966, no. 2—3, p. 37. Izvestia, July 1,1926. Komitet po Zemernomu Ustroistvu Trudyashchikhsay Yevreiv (Committee for the Rural Placement of Toiling Jews). Vesoyuznve Obshchestvo po Zemel'nomu Ustroistvu Trydyashchikhsa Yevreiev V SSSR (All Union Society for the Rural Placement of Toiling Jews in the USSR). B.Z. Goldberg, The Jewish Problem in the Soviet Union, (New York: 1961), p. 365, and Tartakover, op. ciu, p. 38. Ibid., p. 37. Tartakover argues that the original plan was to settle 100,000 Jewish families, whereas statistics show that as late as in 1928, there were only 2,312 families. See the proceedings of the first Conference of Gezerd, particularly the Yevsektsia's position represented by Al. Chemerisky and Abram Merezin. In M. Talmi, Hashe’elah Haleumit Vehamtsiut Hayehudit Beyamenu (The National Question and the Contemporary Jewish Reality), (Merhavia, Israel: 1956), pp. 160-162. G.Z. Yisraeli, MOPS - PCP - M AKI (Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1953), p. 48. Nahman List, “Tsadak Hakomintern" (The Comintern was Right), Keshet, 1963, part (2), pp. 159-61. Ibid., p. 157. See Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International, Vol. I, 1919-1922, (Oxford University Press: 1956), p. 166. Ibid. Milorad M. Drachkovitch, The Revolutionary International 1964-1943, (Sanford University: 1966), p. 167. Ibid. See Paul Levi’s testimony before his expulsion from the German Communist Party on grounds of “breach of discipline." Also Raphael R. Abramovich, The Soviet Revolution (Hebrew Edition), (Tel-Aviv: 1966), pp. 240-242, describes specific instances of the Comintern’s direct intervention in internal party developments, of its power manipulations, supporting leaders who had no following or appeal, while completely ignoring the local interest of the masses. See Josef Barzilai, op. cit., pp. 123-124. Ibid, p. 124. According to Nahman List, "Tsadak Hakomintern", (4) Keshet, No. 24, 1964, p. 107, Averbach was the brother of Alexander Hashin, one of the founders of Poale-Zion in Russia and a close friend of David Ben-Gurion and Itzhak Ben-Zvi, the most noted labor Zionist leaders in Palestine. Also see the detailed biography of A. Hashin - his gradual leaning towards Communism, his stay in

42

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Palestine until his return to the Soviet Union in 1933, and his work as an interpreter o f the World Jewish Press in the Soviet Jewish press, in J. Barzilai, “Aharito Shel Alexander Hashin” (The End o f ‘Alexander Hashin), Molad, Nos. 201, 202, Vol. 23, July—August 1965, pp. 214-220. Also Yisraeli, op. cit., p. 16. 30. Ibid. 31. In Russian, Yevreiskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partya (YKP), founded in January 1919, in defiance o f all Bolshevik Tradition, by the Central Bureau o f the Communist Party in White Russia. See Solomon M. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 99. The membership of the party consisted primarily of Poale-Zion members who approved the Soviet regime, assuming that Zionism’s political ideals could be materialized with Soviet aid. They entertained in their semi-Zionist program the hope that the Soviet Red Army would eventually conquer Palestine with the help of Jewish volunteers and set up there a “Jewish Soviet State.” See Zeev Abramovich, Besherut Hatnuah (in the Service o f the Party), (Tel-Aviv: 1965), p. 183. The YKP had some following in Palestine who later formed the M.O.P.S. and subsequently the P.C.P. 32. A vote that earned him the title of “ Liquidator” by his opposers of the Poale-Zion Left and of •‘traitor” by the Poale-Zion Right. See lis t, op. cit. (2), p. 166. 33. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, p. 77. 34. J. Barzilai, “Communism v. Zionism,” Israel Magazine, Vol. I., No. 3, May 1968, p. 38. 35. List, op. cit., p. 109. 36. J. Berger-Barzilai, Hatragedia Shel Hamahapecha Hasovietit (The Tragedy o f the Soviet Revolution), p. 82. He accepted the Comintern’s verdict, but attempted to delay its implementation, with the explicit intention to undermine it. See Chapter Eight. 37. List, “Tsadak Hako min tern,” (3) Keshet, Winter 1964, p. 152. 38. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 84. 39. J. Barzilai, Zohar Behatsot (Midnight Shine), Tel-Aviv: 1963); see the biographical note on the inside cover. These are Barzilai’s memoirs o f twenty years in Stalin’s jail. 40. Ester Feldman, Kele Beli Sugar (A Prison Without Pars), (Tel-Aviv: 1964), p. 20. Miss Feldman, who was Barzilai’s wife, described the ordeal of her life in Russia in these memoirs. 41. His appearance before members of the Y.K.P., a group that still entertained some sentiments towards Zionism, aroused great interest, excitement, and sympathy towards Palestine. Ibid. 42. In Russian: Mezhdunarodnaya Pomoshch Revolutioneram. 43. They could have collaborated with the British Government and gotten rid of an internal rival, but they preferred to uphold the basic Zionist conception of free Jewish immigration to Palestine regardless of political affiliation. List, op. cit. (2), p. 166.

The Comintern's Revolutionary Cadres in Palestine 44.

43

The center was in Beit Safafa, southwest of Jerusalem, where the Party maintained its printing machines. See Y. Barzilai, “ Yerushalaim Av Tarpat,” p. 132. 45. For the detailed description of his meeting with Stalin, see Barzilai, Hatragedya Shel Hamahapecha Hasovietit, and his forthcoming volume of Memoirs to be published shortly by Am-Oved Press, Tel-Aviv, Israel. 46. ibid. 47. For a detailed account of his imprisonment, see Joseph Berger, Nothing But the Truth, New York: 1971. 48. Barzilai, Hatragedya Shel Hamahapecha Hasovietit, p. 92. 49. Laqueur, op. cif., p.. 84. 50. Ibid., p. 103. 51. Ibid., p. 84. 52. Named after Ber Borochov, a leading Jewish-Marxist theoretician whose Jewish, Marxist, Zionist doctrine sought a Marxist solution to the Jewish problem in Palestine, namely, the establishment of a viable Marxist social and economic order. Borochov’s theory of reconciliation between Zionism and Marxism was embraced by the Poale-Zion movement. 53. Barzilai, op. cit., pp. 93-94. 54. List, op. cit., (3), p. 152, presents a detailed description of thsBoyvka*sfunction and role in the Party's organization. 55. Barzilai, op. cit., p. 55. Kuperman left Palestine about the same time as Lukacher-Horazo for Russia, and for a period of time his whereabouts were unknown. 56. See Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Harvard University Press: 1963), p. 471. 57. It was precisely during this same year that the most noted and celebrated modern Soviet Middle Eastern scholar, V.B. Lutskii, went to Palestine, and after spending a year there returned to Russia. 58. List, "Tsadak Hakomintern,” (1), Keshet No. 18,1963, p. 140. 59. Ibid., p. 133. 60. Biographical data on Tepper and Galach was derived from conversations with the survivors of the period. 61. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 84. 62. Z. Abramovich, Besherut Hatnuah, p. 224, presents the impact of the pogroms upon the Jewish Community. Many thousands fled from the Ukraine into areas held by the Red Army. 63. It is interesting to note that not only the Poale-Zion Left, who ideologically maintained a strong pro-Soviet position with only one reservation - in regards to the Palestine of the White Pogromists, but even the Poale-Zion Right who had considerable misgivings about the Soviet approach to the Jewish problem, cooperated with the Soviets for the same reason. It should be noted, however, that the Soviet authorities did not let the attacked Jews organize self-defense units, an obstacle that made the Jews especially vilnerable to attacks. See List, op. cit. (3), pp. 155-156.

44

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

64.

Sefer Toldot Hahaganah (The History o f the Hagtmah) (Tel'Aviv: 1964), Vol. 2, Part One, pp. 224-22$, describes the mission of two pro-Soviet left-wing Jewish workers, Shohat and Eikind, who actually went to 4inegotiate” a military deal with the Soviet government in 1926 in Moscow. See Chapter Five of the dissertation. Yisraeli, op. cit.t pp. 66-67. It even led to open defiance o f the Comintern’s policy and break away from the Party by its formation of independent splinter groups, as in Haifa in 1929. Laqueur argued that though in the thirties **they continued to wield considerable influence in Moscow in shaping the Soviet image of the Middle East,” however, “they did not influence Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arab countries and Palestine, because Moscow did not yet have a policy towards these countries, for they did not yet matter enough.” The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 85.

65.

66.

45

CHAPTER IV. The Comintern’s Organizational Network in Palestine The extent of the respectability that the P .C i\ acquired during the 1920’s in the politics of the Middle East can best be illustrated by the role it played during the Comintern’s involvement in the Druze uprising in Syria in 1925—26. This uprising was the only serious political unrest in the Middle East since the end of the first World War and constituted a serious challenge to the French colonial administration in Syria. The unrest that broke out in May 1925 in Jabel Druze, led by Sultan al-Atrash, as a result of local power struggles coupled with certain grievances against the French authorities erupted in the course of two years into a major military and political conflagration. It spread through the hinterland of Syria into the district of Homs and engulfed the capital Damascus, posing a serious threat to" the adjacent territory of Lebanon. The rebellion, intellectually inspired by Professor Faris Bey el-Khuri, was immediately endorsed by prominent Arab nationalist leaders such as Amir Shakib Arslan, the Lebanese Druze PanIslamist writer, and by Dr. Shahbander, the Syrian nationalist who went so far as to call for the establishment of a Syrian national government. When it appeared that the Druze uprising had evolved into a Syrian national upheaval, the insurrection was also supported by other organizations like the Interlslamic Committee of Berlin and the Comintern in Moscow. At this particular juncture, the P .C i\ played the role of an intermediary between the Comintern and the Syrian rebels, using its good offices to secure Communist and Soviet support for the rebels. The P.C.P. was the best organized Communist party in the area, with the best connections in the Comintern and the Soviet Government, and apparently the rebel leaders made the first contacts with the P.CJP., as one of the sources discloses, “not for ideological reasons,” but for very pragmatic and practical ones: obtaining political and military support from the most militant anti-CoIonial movement.3 The Comintern did not miss this unique opportunity that was immediately interpreted by its theoretician as the long overdue anti-Colonial revolution, later to be regarded as “the last uprising headed by the national bourgeoisie.” 4 For that purpose, a special Comintern emissary, a German by the name of Ernst (who later became in 1927 an assistant to the renown Soviet General Biuecher in China)5 was dispatched to Palestine to meet the

46

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

representatives of the rebellion through local P.C.P. intermediaries. For some reason, the aid that was promised to the rebels arrived late, (if at all); and inasmuch as the French authorities speedily attempted to quell the rebellion, in Damascus as early as May 1926, by the end of that year the revolt was virtually over, except for scattered bands operating in remote areas. The rebels were furious over the Comintern’s and Soviet’s delay, afterwards accusing them for it. The Comintern thus mismanaged one of the most opportune moments to promote a potentially explosive and promising revolutionary situation. The Druze uprising was also a significant arena of focus for Comintern revolutionary aspirations in that it provided a context for developing new channels of communication to the masses, and it was here at this time that the Comintern first established one of its numerous front organizations in the region. Because the P.C.P. and its sister parties in the Arab world were illegal, heavily outnumbered, politically isolated and persecuted by the govern­ ment, the Comintern found it necessary to set up a wide-ranging network of local and international front organizations, whose main task was to rally the support of the masses and the workers for generally acceptable and popular causes. It is essential in our study to explore the nature of these front organizations, their goals and functions, so as to understand the role they played in the Comintern’s struggle against Zionism in Palestine, as well as the impact the Comintern had through them upon the political situation in the country and in the whole Arab Middle East. As noted, it was in the context of the Druze uprising in Syria that the first, and perhaps the most well-known front organization came into being, namely, the League Against Imperialism, in an attempt to ally the Comintern with the national liberation movements in the Colonial world. In the background of this effort and of the establishment of this League was the Comintern’s expectation of a new revolutionary wave in the East. The Imprecorr,6 the official news organ of the Comintern, throughout 1925 was playing on the theme of these revolutionary situations, taking particular comfort in the political unrest in India, where as a result several labor leaders joined the League. Similarly, the situation in China in 1925—26 was still quite favorable to the Comintern.7 The organized and directed revolutionary fervor in China was for the first time spreading into the countryside among the peasants,8 a fact that was regarded by the Comintern as a most encouraging revolutionary sign. In Morocco, Abd el Krim’s rebellion against the French stirred a civil war that spilled over into Spanish-held Morocco, a rebellion immediately politically backed by a

The Comintern's Organizational Network in Palestine

47

combined force of the French and British Communist parties in Syria, Palestine and Egypt. The latter were asked to organize a joint conference and to set up a committee of action, but with no results, for Abd el Krim finally surrendered to a joint French and Spanish military assault. In Palestine, the League Against Imperialism was designated by the Comintern to provide the predominantly Jewish controlled Communist Party with a springboard into the Arab masses and into its nationalist movement. After the P.C.P.’s failure to respond to early Comintern demands to Arabize its leadership and membership alike, transforming itself from a “party of Jewishimmigrants,” as ordered by Karl Radek, the head of the Comintern’s Eastern Section, it appeared that the only way to influence the course of Arab nationalism was to bring it into some united anti-colonial front. The League provided an arena where moderate and nationalist leaders in the colonies could carry out a resistance movement side by side with radicals and Communists. The League was originally conceived in February 1926 as the “League of Oppressed People,” and held its first worldwide congress in Brussel in February 1927. Professor Albert Einstein was elected President of the organization. It was a large gathering of representatives of trade unions, Communist and socialist alike, as well as of representatives from the colonies. In its resolutions, it called upon “the working classes in imperialist countries to support all movements for national independence.” 9 The Comintern, among all other labor organizations, was represented in the congress by a large delegation. Palestine was represented by two opposing delegations (signifying the polarization of the local political bi-national struggle): on the Arab side, by Jamal-al-Husseini of the “Arab National Congress of Palestine” and on the Zionist side, by Poale-Zion, the Jewish Labor Party of Palestine. A clash between the two delegations occurred at the beginning of the Congress,10 inaugurating a series of confrontations between Zionist delegates on one hand and representatives of Arab nationalists and members of the P.C J . on the other. During the first Congress, the Poale-Zion strongly protested to the League’s organization committee of the presence of a representative of the “feudal-reactionary forces” in the Middle East, a contention that was supported by some British Communists and which resulted in a decision to expel Jamal-al-Husseini from the Congress.11A similarly interesting exchange of accusations and counter-accusations took place during the meeting of the League’s Council in December 1927, again in Brussels. This time the conflict occured when a delegate from Poale-Zion described the conditions in

48

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Palestine under the British mandate, accusing British imperialism as well as all the parties and organizations of Arab nationalism in waging a joint anti-Zionist struggle and in attempting to obstruct the peaceful Zionist settlement in Palestine. The representative of the Syrian nationalist movement, Amir Shakib Arslan, took issue in an attempt to rebuff the accusation and defend the Arab position, exclaiming angrily “What is on the agenda — the Jewish immigration to Palestine or the struggle against Imperialism!” 12 The representative of the French Trade Union, a supporter of the Yevsektsia (the strongly anti-Zionist Jewish Section of the C.P.S.U.) further demanded that the League make a clear choice and decide whose position it endorses, the one of the “Jewish nationalists or the Arabs.” 13 The Comintern’s support of the Arab position was manifested in a n . attempt to discredit Zionism and its growing settlement in Palestine. The task was assigned to the representatives of the P.C.P. and its spokesman, Averbach, who made a motion demanding the expulsion of the Poale-Zion representation in the Congress. A strongly worded anti-Zionist resolution was suggested for adoption by Averbach in which Zionism in Palestine was accused of being a tool of British imperialism and of being the source of the racial strife and sectarian animosity in the country. Zionism was labled in this proposed resolution as “very dangerous, because of its misleading humanitarian facade” and because of its social reformism in Poale-Zion style, concealed by an allegedly revolutionary mask of support for the working people, but actually supporting the Jewish bourgeoisie and British imperialism.14 M. Erem from Poale-Zion reacted in a strongly worded protest against this accusation, stating that the proposed resolution of the P.C.P., which was concealed as an objection to Zionism, was in reality a “wild anti-Semitic manifestation,” a proposal initiated against the Jewish workers by reactionary and anti-Semitic Effendis.15 He argued that the anti-Zionist accusations were plain lies and malicious, attributed to genuine workers by the sons of Arab bourgeoisie “who had never worked a day in their lives.” 16 After long deliberations in the organization’s executive council, the Poale-Zion delegation was ousted from the League, when the representatives of the P.C.P. together with the representatives of Arab nationalists from Egypt, Syria, and Palestine formed a solid anti-Zionist coalition during the vote. The history of the League Against Imperialism serves as an additional manifestation of how the Comintern, in completely allying itself with the cause of Arab Nationalism against the major colonial powers, made a strong attempt to discredit Zionism as a genuine national liberation movement of

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the Jewish people, by accusing even its left wing, the strong Zionist Jewish labor movement, of being a spearhead of Social Reformism in the midst of the revolutionary East, subservient to the Jewish bourgeoisie and the British imperialists. Another major political front organization, utilized by the Comintern as a bridge into the working class in the Western world as well as in the colonies was the Red International of Labor Unions, or as it is commonly known, the Profintern-Rilu.17 The establishment of this organization was originally proposed by Zinoviev in March 1920 before the Congress of the Russian Communist Party and formally instituted in August 192018 as an alternative to the Western International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), with its headquarters in Amsterdam. It was headed by S.A. Lozovsky,19 the first Secretary-General. The stated purpose of the Profintern was a revolutionary one, the “overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, the creation of a world republic of Soviets.” It also called upon the working people to wage a “resolute struggle against those who are distorting the workers’ organization into instruments of bourgeois policy . . . Hence it follows that the Amsterdam centre . . . must be destroyed.” 20 In Palestine, it was the Histadruth (the General Federation of Jewish Labor), the only labor organization which was also a member of the Amsterdam International, which was a target for the Profintern’s attacks. The alliance of the Zionist labor movement in Palestine with the forces of social democracy in Europe was especially disturbing to the Comintern. And when as early as 1921, the Poale-Zion approached the Profintern for the first time through its Polish delegation that was invited to Moscow with regard to the possibility of joining the organization, its request was turned down.21 It is important to note that the appeal was made in the name of various Jewish labor organizations in Poland, as purely local trade unions with no mention of Zionism. Consistent with the Comintern’s rejection of the Poale-Zion’s bid to join its ranks during the Second Congress of the Comintern in Moscow a year before, the Profintern refused recognition of a local Jewish national labor organization by stating in its letter of August 1921 that such recognition and membership could only be secured after the Poale-Zion had qualified for membership in the Comintern.22 In April, 1925, a joint Anglo-Soviet trade union organization, known as the Anglo-Russian Committee, emerged as an effort of the Profintern to break the self-imposed political isolation that resulted from its independent revolutionary line of action. This collaboration lasted for two years^

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collapsing in September 1927 when England broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It was in 1925 when a British representative of the opposition wing within the British trade Union movement, an official emissary of the Anglo-Russian Committee, arrived in Palestine in an attempt to organize a pro-Profmtern bloc within the Histadruth. This emissary, Thompsohn, entertained the idea of establishing a united revolutionary front between the Fraction (the Communist labor front organization in the Histadruth)23 and the Poale-Zion movement in Palestine. His mission was an attempt to break the isolation of the P.C.P., and with the support of Poale-Zion and the Profintem, to build a bridge into the Zionist labor movement in Palestine for revolutionary agitation.24 Thompsohn ran into considerable difficulty with the Poale-Zion members during the course of the deliberation, with their stubborn and consistent demand as a pre-condition that the Comintern and the Profintern accept and endorse Zionist immigration to Palestine, and that they recognize the Jewish Zionist labor movement in Palestine as an antiimperialist and revolutionary force. Thompsohn attempted to avoid this issue by stating that as far as he knew, the “Comintern does not object to the immigration” ; his advice to Poale-Zion was to join the front first and to argue about the issue later. He promised that a special committee of the Profintern would be dispatched later to Palestine to thoroughly study the problem of the Zionist immigration.25 The Profintern later dispatched Herkle (also called Mischle), a Comintern member and French Labor leader, to Palestine to settle the controversy with Poale-Zion and to finalize the establishment of the revolutionary front. In his deliberations, the Profintern’s motives became apparent; specifically, when Herkle supported the Fraction’s anti-Zionist position, arguing against Poale-Zion that the issue of Zionist immigration into Palestine was a religious matter rather than an economic one and consequently out of the jurisdiction of a proposed united workers’ organization.26 He argued that the Fraction’s opposition to Zionist immigration was motivated by economic considerations rather than political ones, particularly pertaining to the fear of unemployment. Herkle concluded that the Fraction, in its activities, was not anti-Zionist.27 It was an attempt to white-wash the castigated P.C.P. and to secure its readmission to the Histadruth through the back door. When the negotiations collapsed, Mischle accused the Poale-Zion of nationalism, of being subservient to the bourgeoisie. As in the case of the Poale-Zion’s attempt to join the Comintern, Communism and Zionism were at odds with one another even on a tactical issue of cooperation within the trade union

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activity. The Profmtern’s failure to penetrate and to influence the Zionist labor movement in Palestine did not stop its persistent interest in establishing a foothold in it. Insight into the Profintern’s interest in the rise of Zionism in Palestine may be gleaned from the Memoirs of Nahman List.28 In 1928, List was recalled by the Comintern to Moscow to report on the developments in Palestine, and he was scheduled to meet, among many others, Lozovsky, the chief of the Profintern. For some unexplained reason, after waiting for an hour for the meeting, List was met by the head of the Profintern’s Middle Eastern section, rather than by Lozovsky. He was a young man, an exmember of the Poale-Zion who later joined the Soviet Communist Party. He spoke with List in fluent Hebrew and discussed the situation in Palestine in great length. It appeared that he was very well-informed about the topic, keeping up with the Zionist Palestinian press, covering matters such as life in the Zionist communal settlement, the Poale-Zion movement, the Zionist movement, and general cultural developments in Palestine. List writes that his curiousity exceeded his trade union responsibility, and that most of the conversation appeared to be quite friendly. This young man, according to J. Berger-Barzilai, under the impact of the purges and fearing his early Zionist background, later committed suicide. Through such ex-Zionist functionaries in the Profintern and in the Yevsektsia, the Comintern kept a dose eye on the developments of Zionism in Palestine, its prospects at home and its impact abroad. In light of the actual political power exercised by Zionism in Palestine at the time, the direct involvement of the Comintern’s front organization in it clearly indicates that other considerations were closely related to the matter, which went far beyond the actual Palestinian frontiers. It was not only a one-sided interest on the part of the Comintern. The Poale-Zion movement as well was constantly striving to reverse the Comintern’s position with regards to Zionism, in order to pave the road for its admission into the ranks of the international revolutionary club. The Poale-Zion had a strong following in the Soviet Union, and until 1928, its members were permitted to function as the only Zionist Marxist group in Russia, precisely due to the fact that their movement was a worldwide one.29 After 1924, though, it gradually came to lose its influence and following to the Communist Party. Poale-Zion members in Russia were harrassed by the Yevsektsia, whose Communist leadership regarded the Poale-Zion as challengers and rivals. It was a power struggle within the Jewish community between two competing leaderships and between two

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diametrically opposed political programs. The fact that most members of the Yevsektsia and the Yevkom were ex-Poale-Zion members or members of other ex-Zionist factions, as well as members of the non-Zionist, but Jewish nationalist Bund,30 intensified this struggle into a fierce battle for political survival. The Soviet authorities were extremely suspicious of the Poale-Zion movement for additional reasons. During the civil war in Russia, members of the Poale-Zion successfully performed various espionage activities in the White-held territories in Russia, in the Ukraine, as well as in Poland, due to their connections with the outside world and thus they worked intimately with the Soviet security establishment. Although they rendered valuable service to the Soviet government, their Zionist background, combined with their worldwide organization relations, placed them after 1924, in Soviet eyes, in the category of a serious security risk. Even those Poale-Zion members that joined the Communist Party and served it faithfully throughout the years were exterminated during the great purges; they were accused of disloyalty and Zionism during their tenure in office in the Yevsektsia and in other Soviet governmental party organizations. They were never fully trusted by the Soviet authorities.31 The fact that the left wing of Poale-Zion (after the split) was not only a Zionist but an avowed Marxist movement posed the Soviets with a serious ideological threat concerning its rival influence over the masses of Jewish workers. The P.CJ . members and its entire leadership, upon returning to Russia, were also purged and executed for the very same reasons. Against this background, it is possible to understand the ambiguity and misgiving that marked the Soviet and the Comintern’s attitude towards the Poale-Zion. While in Russia the years 1924-28 were marked by the gradual closing in on the Poale-Zion and its total organizational purge; abroad, through its various agencies, in this case the Profintern, the Comintern continued to maintain contact with the Poale-Zion. This was the only way the Soviet government could carefully watch the activities of the Poale-Zion abroad and ascertain their possible implications for Russian Jewry. It was an open secret that the Zionist movement, through its affiliated pioneering organizations, made all attempts to keep Zionism in Russia alive. It might be of interest to note that during this period, in 1927, two emissaries of the Hechalutz movement were smuggled into the Soviet Union to organize Zionist pioneers and to replace the Zionist leadership that was jailed. The two emissaries, David Homstein and Shmuel Shneorsohn, were caught by the Soviet authorities and executed.32

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In 1928, the Profintern held its congress in Moscow, with various non-member trade unions invited to attend. The Poale-Zion in Russia, facing the mounting harrassment of the Yevsektsia and the Soviet authorities, was anxious to secure at least an invitation for the Poale-Zion in Palestine as well as for the Poale-Zion in Poland to attend the Congress. With the presence of the Poale-Zion in the Congress, they hoped to achieve at least a partial political rehabilitation,33 and a relaxation of the government pressures in Russia. Such an invitation was finally extended to the Poale-Zion in Palestine, and Z. Abramovich, a Poale-Zion leader and veteran negotiator with the Comintern and the Profintern, was dispatched to Russia. His prime purpose was to take advantage of this opportunity to help the Russian Poale-Zion who were in trouble. In Moscow, one of the individuals that Z. Abramovich met was Solomon Lozovsky, the Profintem’s Secretary-General. The conversation with Lozovsky centered on the situation in Palestine. Abramovich described the failure of the P.C.P. to achieve any influence in the Jewish community, while Lozovsky argued that the P.C.P. did have some influence that should not be underrated. Lozovsky inquired with considerable concern about the progress of the construction of the Port of Haifa, asking whether the purpose of “constructing this port was to compete with the Soviet port of Odessa.” 34 Abramovich dispelled that fear by contending that such competition was not the aim, the proof of which could be stated in that geographically such a competition was an impractical thing. It was a far-fetched remark on Lozovsky’s part and of a very naive character, an indicator that the whole phenomenon of Zionist construction in Palestine was viewed as posing a direct threat, in this case of an economic nature, to the Soviet Government. The comradely discussion with distinguished Jewish Soviet officials did not reflect the mood and the manner in which Abramovich was treated in the Profintern Congress or by the authorities. He was deprived of his mandate as a delegate despite previous official promises to the contrary.35 The Profintern contended that Abramovich represented a political party rather than a trade union, a situation that deprived him from the status of a legitimate mandate. To avoid any misunderstanding, Abramovich was abruptly deprived of his hotel accomodations, rudely physically forced out, with no explanation or apology. Abramovich noted that it was done at once, in order to cut the contacts between him and members of the Poale-Zion in Russia, who made constant efforts to keep in touch with him. Abramovich immediately moved to the apartment where his mother and sister had lived, and he spent the last few days in Moscow in seclusion, out

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of fear that he might encounter further difficulties upon leaving the country. It was obvious that the Profintern was reluctant to bestow a title upon a Poale-Zion representative from Palestine that might legitimize its role and its activities in the eyes of a Comintern’s organization. An important role in the Communist struggle against Zionism in Palestine was also assigned to the Fraction, the P.CP. front organization in the Histadruth. Since the Party was illegal, operating underground, the Fraction was its only legal extension, and it participated in the most important Zionist labor organization. The Fraction enabled the P.CP. to maintain a dual facade, playing a soft anti-Zionist tune within the Jewish Community, while disclaiming any legal responsibility for the violent anti-Zionist, strongly pro-Arab position maintained by its mother under­ ground organization, the P.CP.36 It gave the Fraction a freedom of action within the Jewish Zionist masses in Palestine, without its being held formally liable to the pro-Arab, anti-Zionist position of the Party or for that matter the Comintern. Nevertheless, the Fraction was ultimately accused of holding an anti-Zionist position, and it was expelled from the Histadruth.37 The Fraction carried out political agitation in favor of turning the Histadruth into a pure trade union, attempting to force it to relinquish its political Zionist goals, such as the promoting of Zionist immigration into Palestine, the colonization of the land, and the building of various national economic cooperative enterprises. In 1923—24, the Fraction went so far as to take an implied pro-capitalist stand, accusing Zionism of hindering the capitalistic course of economic development of the country through the various Histadruth rivaling enterprises. The Fraction preferred to view the growth of the Jewish community in Palestine in non-Zionist terms, and rather in terms of a general trend towards the productivization of the uprooted Jewish masses. Hence it viewed the struggle of the Jewish labor movement in exclusively trade union terms. This line of thinking was a rather mild one, one might say almost pro-Zionist,38 in contrast to the virulent anti-Zionist, for that matter anti-Jewish, position it took during the critical years of 1926—29. (The fluctuation in the political stance of the Fraction, the P.C.P., and the Comintern as a whole towards Zionism in Palestine during this period will be dealt with extensively in the next chapters.) The core of the Fraction’s following consisted primarily of disappointed and frustrated Jewish workers, all of ex-Zionist stock, “more anti-Zionist than Communists,” List states.39 Bearing the banner of revolutionary anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism, the members of the

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Fraction carried out separate demonstrations on May 1 of 1925 and 1926. The first attempt to carry out a separate demonstration was rather unimpressive but in 1926 they managed to hold a most successful one, in addition to holding a mass celebration on the Bolshevik Revolution anniversary. The success that the Fraction scored during these two years and the relative increase of its popularity can be attributed to the economic crisis in Palestine, to the rise in unemployment among the Jewish workers as well as to the cultural sentiments cherished by most of its members towards Russia.40 An additional important factor in the Fraction’s success was its dynamic and dedicated* leadership, who sought to capitalize on the distressing conditions in Palestine. Their slogan emphasizing the trade union struggle rather than Zionist aspirations appealed to some workers, and the mass of literature they published in Hebrew and in Yiddish was frequently effective.41 But the Fraction's greatest asset was its formal dissociation from the P.C.P. with its strongly pro-Arab position. This enabled the Fraction to advocate a positive attitude in regards to the Zionist communal settlement (the Kibbutzim) and to the use of the Hebrew language, as well as to criticize freely the reactionary character of Arab nationalism within the Jewish community.42 This tactic of a two-level approach was an established feature in the Comintern’s revolutionary activities, but in the case of the Fraction, it was facilitated and strengthened by a constant stream of Jewish Communist agitators from Russia, particularly of representatives from the various agencies of the Comintern (many of whom later volunteered for another Comintern assignment, that of joining the International Brigade in the Civil War in Spain). The Secretary-General of the Fraction at the time was Derfl, who had considerable misgivings about the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine. Shortly before the outbreaks of the riots, he was recalled by the Comintern back to Moscow, and when he refused to accept the Comintern’s line of support of the Arab nationalists during the riots, he was purged and later liquidated as an “opportunist” and “Trotskyite.”43 Nahum Leshchinsky (see Chapter III for his biography) was the Fraction’s chief ideologist and theoretician until 1925. The organizational work of the Fraction, including recruitment and agitation, was assigned to one of the most popular members, Ze’ev Birman. Birman was in charge of the various publications of the Fraction and a frequent speaker at its meetings, as well as at many Histadruth gatherings. He was arrested by the police and expelled to Russia, where upon his arrival, he assumed a lectureship position in the Communist University of the

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Toilers of the East. He later undertook various Comintern assignments abroad, several of which took place once again in Palestine. He was shot during the great purges in Russia in 1937.44 As previously mentioned, the P.C.P. and its agency in the Histadruth, the Fraction, functioned under harsh conditions. Many of their leaders as well as members were arrested and expelled by the British government. This situation forced them to organize another local front organization, entitled the M.O.P.R.45 The M.O.P.R. was defined as “an international public organization for helping the victims of the bourgeoisie terror,” rendering assistance to the arrested and exiled. It was established in 1922 and was divided into national sections, most of which were illegal. In Russia it was called Krasnaya Pomoshch or “Red Help,” and its ultimate political goal was to enlist the support and help of non-Communist people and leaders on a humanitarian basis to assist the Red prisoners throughout the world. In Palestine, many members of the P.C.P. were arrested and sentenced, some of whom were tortured in the process or clubbed46 (a mandatory punitive measure) and afterwards expelled to their country of origin,47 which in most cases of the P.C.P. members was Russia. The expulsion of Jewish Communists from Palestine aroused the indignation of the whole Jewish community. From the Zionist point of view, these expulsions were regarded as most dangerous measures, morally and politically unacceptable, particularly for a movement that earnestly struggled to open the gates of the country to Jewish immigrants. The Communists seized upon this humanitarian national sympathy to enlist the support of some distinguished Zionist leaders, including Dr. Magnes, the president of the Hebrew University, Professor David Shur, the noted Russian Zionist leader, and even the Jewish Minister of Justice, Norman Bentwich. David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the Histadruth, also voiced his protest against these expulsions on various occasions. The M.O.P.R. secured legal aid for the arrested and organized demonstrations and petitions to aid the victims. It advertised the conditions of the arrestees, and their several hunger strikes, galvanizing the support and the sympathy of the Jewish community and its leadership. The Communists attempted to secure the collaboration of some Arab leaders in regards to their campaign to aid the Red and Arab nationalist prisoners jointly. It should be emphasized that the P.C.P. and its local and world front organizations, in promiting their cause among the Arabs, frequently engaged themselves in a strong effort to demand the release of Arab saboteurs and criminals, labeling them as freedom fighters of a just cause (against imperialism and Zionism).48 They thus tried to cultivate good

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will among the Arabs by aiding their jailed comrades. At some point, the M.O.P.R. in Palestine, which was an underground organization, negotiated with the prominent Arab lawyer Awni Abdul Hadi49 the possibility of legalizing the activities of the Red Help by extending its legal and political aid to the Arab nationalist prisoners. This was an attempt to form an Arab—Jewish joint venture, inspired by Jewish Communists and supported by the Arabs.50 The M.OP.R. work had a priority in the activities of the Comintern’s program in Palestine. Its significance and urgency can be derived from a hasty visit that N. List made to Moscow when he was recalled by the Comintern to report to the M.O.P.R. headquarters in 1928. It was in July that year that the M.O.P.R. held an Executive Committee Plenum session, and List was assigned to its gathering as a representative of the M.O.P.R. chapter in Palestine. On the occasion of this visit to the M.OP.R. meeting, List reported in great detail on the special conditions in Palestine to Yelena Stasova,51 the chairman Qf the Central Committee of the organization. In the plenary sessions of the Executive Committee, List gave a detailed account of Communist prisoners in Jerusalem and of the prolonged hunger strikes of several other detainies. One of the plenum decisions was to establish new M.OJP.R. chapters in Beirut and Damascus in addition to the one that was already operating in Egypt,52 empowering the Palestinian representative to coordinate its activities in the new centers. The M.O.P.R. in Moscow published a monthly magazine to which List contributed an article during his stay for the plenum. List was asked to make the contribution in accordance with prescribed instructions and guidelines, some of which called for deliberate exaggeration of the persecution of the prisoners for propaganda purposes.53 It appears that the Palestinian chapter of the M.O.P.R. was the most active in the whole area, directly linked with to Moscow headquarters which kept a close eye on developments in the country. Another front organization of the Fraction and the P.CP., similar in function to the M.O.P.R., were the Ehud (in Hebrew “Unity”) Clubs that were formed in 1926 in the major cities in Palestine. They took the form of non-partisan workers’ gatherings for the purpose of discussing current social and political problems. They were actually aimed to provide a neutral platform for get-togethers and to carry ideological dialogue to the many dissatisfied workers among- the ranks of the various Zionist worker organizations.54 In these gatherings, special emissaries of the Fraction and of the P.CP. took an active part, in an attempt to intensify the dissatisfaction among the Zionist workers and to spread anti-Zionist

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propaganda, attempting to recruit the workers as members or sympathyzers to their cause. The Fraction never denied the fact that the Ehud Club was in a sense its own metamorphosis, but it argued that this fact should not be held against the philosophy of the Ehud, that allegedly was peaceful, comradely, and legitimate.55 It was the Ehud that spontaneously initiated the workers’ appeal to the Histadruth, by organizing a petition to readmit the Fraction to its ranks. The Ehud Clubs developed and advanced the doctrine of the professionalization of trade union responsibilities of the Jewish workers’ movement and of the Histadruth, demanding that they dissociate themselves from the political Zionist platform and activities. It was a period of serious unemployment among the workers, and the call for massive trade union pressures was atractive to many workers, a call which successfully concealed the Ehud’s ultimate anti-Zionist political goals. These calls were accompanied by conciliatory notes towards the Hebrew language, a concession that made the Ehud’s ideology more palatable to an average disillusioned Jewish worker. The Ehud Clubs were run by an unusual cast of characters. In Haifa, for instance, the head of the Ehud Club was an ex-Zionist named Elenbogen. He had been an active Zionist in Russia, engaged in the Zionist pioneering organization, and during the twenties, was arrested, imprisoned, and finally expelled from the Soviet Union whereupon he came to Palestine.56 People with backgrounds such as that of Elenbogen successfully concealed the Communist-inspired and Communist-led Ehud Gubs acti­ vities. In Tel-Aviv, the Ehud Club was led by Leopold or Leib Trepper, a Jew from Galicia who came to Palestine in 1926. As a Zionist pioneer with a strong left-wing affiliation, he jointed the P.C.P. and became one of its most active front operators. Subsequently his identity was revealed to the police and he was expelled from Palestine to France where he took up a Comintern assignment and later joined the Soviet espionage organization. In the middle thirties, he was assigned to be the political watchdog in the Jewish Communist paper Ernes. ^ During the Second World War, he directed the most important Soviet espionage ring in Germany and Switzerland, which consisted primarily of Jewish recruits, some of whom were ex-Zionists originally from Poland who migrated to Palestine, and who at some point were expelled or voluntarily left the country to serve the Comintern and later the Soviet security organs.58 This ring was responsible for breaking the

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news to Stalin about the Nazi plan to invade the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. After the War, Trepper returned to Poland where until recently he served as the head of the organization of the Jewish Communists. He is presently engaged in an effort to secure an exit permit to Israel where one of his sons lives. It was the strong pro-Arab position adopted by the Comintern after the riots of 1929 that inflicted a mortal blow upon organizations like M.O.P.R. and Ehud within the Jewish community, despite the relative successes that they scored in the early years of their operation. An important place in the Comintern’s activities in Palestine, as well as in the Middle East as a whole, not only in the realm of ideological guidance but even on the operative and organizational level, was carried out by an ostensibly scientific scholarly institution which served as a major training center for Comintern functionaries, agents, and agitators, the Communist University of the Toilers of the East - K u t v o It was based in Moscow and was later named after J. Stalin. The Kutvo was established in Moscow in 1921 by a government decree and had an enrollment of about 700 students, representing 57 different nationalities.60 It was attached to the Narkomants (Peoples’ Commissariate for the Affairs of Nationalities). Closely linked with the Soviet minorities problem, it subsequently established branches in Turkes­ tan, in Baku, and in the Far East, to “prepare persons without mastery of the Russian language for political work.**61 Its program of studies was carried out in native languates, intended to last for four or five years, the principle being that a period of eight or nine months instruction in Moscow should alternate with shorter periods of practical propaganda work in the field. Within a few years, this institution developed into a major center for the study of the East, founding the “Scientific Research Association” (NIA) in 1927, and publishing a new magazine entitled “The Revolutionary East.” It became an established tradition in the Soviet Communist Party to address the institution whenever major colonial issues arose. Stalin delivered a major speech on May 18, 1925 on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the institution on the subject o f “The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East,” 62 and Bukharin addressed it in 1926, predicting revolutionary developments in Asia.63 The University, in its political role, was closely linked with the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Comintern, and with the Communist Academy in Moscow. In its capacity as a center of political activities and as a revolutionary ideological guide for the Peoples of the East, it trained cadres of leaders and agitators drawn from various

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Caucasian and Central Asian nationalities in Russia and from the Middle Eastern and Asian colonies. It is in this respect that the Kutvo became involved with the Comintern’s activities in Palestine during the period of the riots. At first, the Kutvo absorbed some of the P.C.P. members who were at one time or another expelled by the British government from Palestine, such as Nahum Leshchinsky and Ze'ev Birman. Like the Comintern, the Profintern, and the M.O.P.R., this institution had a section that closely watched political developments in Palestine. With the aid of the ex-P.C.P. ‘"newcomers,” and close contact the leadership of P.C.P. maintained with it, the Kutvo was able to be constantly kept up to date. This contact was clearly revealed in one of List’s accounts of his visit to Moscow in 1928, where, in a solemn reception, he addressed the students, and on other occasions, the faculty of the University.64 Most of the students were Arabs from Palestine, with one from Lebanon. Also present was an editor of Izvestia, who carefully listened to List's account on Palestine and who later took part in deliberations that followed. Since 1924, when the P.C.P. was instructed by the Comintern to Arabize its leadership, the University had been attempting to recruit young Arabs, though without much success. It was only in 1926 that the P.C.P. succeeded in establishing contacts with some circles of the National Arab intelligentsia, promising many of them free scholarships to the Kutvo. In 1927, the first Palestinian Arab group went to Moscow to study in the University and in other training institutions sponsored by the Comintern. This group included the future Arab Palestinian leaders Sidqi Najali (pseudonym of Mustafa Sadi)65 and Ridwan-al-Hilu (pseudonyms of Musa66 and Yosef).67 The second large group left Palestine to study in Russia in 1931, at the height of the Arabization process of the P.C.P.,its contingent including Bulus Farah and Yihye-Abu-Aisha.68 Upon its return in 1934 to Palestine, a third group was sent to Moscow. The nature of the tasks carried out by the Moscow University of the Toilers of the East was revealed by B.A. Vasiliev, the executive-secretary of the Comintern, in an article written on the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution: The whole world knows of the existence in Moscow of the Communist University of Toilers of the East. Its students occupied and occupy many of the responsible posts of the Chinese revolution . . . There are many such “Moscow Agents” now in the capitalist and colonial countries.” 69

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In May 1931, during court proceedings in Palestine, an informer of the British intelligence, Ahmed Sedky, revealed his personal experiences as a student in the Moscow University of the Toilers of the East. He laid heavy emphasis upon the connections of the school with the Soviet security organ of the G.P.U. and the Comintern, and he described the extent of military and propaganda training extended to foreign students in general and to the Communist Arab recruits from Palestine in particular.70 It is intersting to observe that during the years prior to 1934, when it was difficult to recruit Arabs for Comintern assignments,71 the University of the Toilers of the East was prepared to send some of its native Muslim and other Arab members*of the academic personnel on various organiza­ tional assignments to Palestine. The University was not only a training center for Communist cadres but was also a research center as well where, on various occasions, the Comintern’s position was sent to be studied and amended. With the Jewish Communists who had been expelled from Palestine comprising a good segment of the Faculty, and with the various Palestinian Arab groups as students, the Kutvo was an effective arm of the Comintern’s involvement in Palestine during the twenties and early thirties.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9.

Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, a Political Essay (Oxford University Press: 1946), pp. 187-188. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca: Cornell Uni­ versity Press, 1962), p. 312. List, "Tsadak Hako mintern!" (5) Keshet, No. 27,1965, p. 36. Walter Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 102. Ernst served in China during the years of Soviet cooperation with Chiang Kai-Shek. He later joined the volunteer brigade during the Civil War in Spain, where he served as Colonel in the Republican forces. During the Second World War, he escaped the Nazis, returned to the Soviet Union for a period, and after the war went to East Germany. Here he held several appointments in the East German security organs, later joining the East German Cabinet under Otto Grotewohl. He died in the late 1960*s. See List, op. cit. (5), p. 87. The International Press Correspondence, since 1922 the official organ of the Comintern. In December 1926, during the plenum session of the E.C.C.I., the Chinese delegate boasted that out of the total number of 278 members in the Kuomintang, 165 were Communists or supporters. Set Ibid., p. 276. It was during this year that Mao Tse-tung inaugurated his first school to train Chinese peasants as agitators. Ibid. Degras, op. cit., p. 354.

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10.

Yelkut Poale-Tsion: Hama’avak Bazirah Haproletarit ffebein-Leumit (Antho­ logy o f Poale-Zion: The Struggle in the International Proletarian arena), Y. Peterziel, (ed.), (Jerusalem: 1954), Vol. 1 ,1907-1927, p. 276. Ibid. Ibid., p.280. Ibid. Ibid., p. 283. A title of an Arab landlord. It usually signifies the ultraconservative and reactionary Arab local chiefs. Yalkut Poale Tsion, Vol. I, p. 283. For an historical background of its founding, see Franz Borkenau, World Communism (Ann Arbor, Michingan: 1962), pp. 196-198.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

26.

At the same time, the Second Congress of the Comintern took place in Moscow. Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, a member of the Poale-Zion, later became a prominent Oommunisty Party member from its early years. He spent from 1909—1917 in exile due to the Czarist police persecution and returned to Russia in 1917, gradually rising to the top position in the Profintern through the Soviet Trade Union organization. Losovksy carried out several diplomatic assignments abroad on behalf of the Comintern, and he became Vice Commissar of foreign affairs. In 1949, during Stalin's anti-Semitic campaign, he was purged, lately to be rehabilitated by the C.P.S.U. On his relationship to the Anti-Fascist Jewish organization during the Second World War, see B.Z. Coldberg, op. cit„ p. 285. Degras, op. cit., pp. 187-188. See the Poale-Zion’s memorandum to the Comintern in this matter, in Yalkut Poale-Tsion, Vol. I, pp. 197-201. The adherence of Poale-Zion to the Zionist ideology was the major issue of controversy. See Vasher's statement in Yalkut Poale-Tsion, Vol. I, p. 203. The Fraction was expelled in April 1924 from the Histadruth for its anti-Zionist stand and activities, some of which were an open incitement for Arabs to resist the Zionist agricultural settlement by force. It was through the various Communist front organizations and due to the spirit of collaboration betwen them that the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union accord was produced and through which the Fraction sought ie-admission to the Histadruth. The Fraction is discussed further in this chapter. See Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, p. 77. For details of the negotiations by a leading Poale-Zion member who participated in them, see Z. Abramovich, Besherut Hatnuah, pp. 276-277. The purpose of this negotiation was to reach an accord between the Fraction and the Poale-Zion Left so as to form a Trade Union alliance (a bloc) in the Histadruth. It is interesting that it was the Fraction and its representatives, rather than the official mediators of the Profintern, who violently objected to the Zionist immigration to Palestine. Yalkut Poale-Tsion, Vol. I, pp. 202-203. Z. Abramovich admits that in the course of the negotiations, he became convinced that essentially the Profintern emissaries tried to break the political

The Comintern’s Organizational Network in Palestine

27. 28. 29.

30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

63

isolation in which the P.C.P. found itself, by first rehabilitating the Fraction and bringing it back into the Histadruth through the back door. It was a purely tactical move, politically motivated, to serve the long range goals of the Comintern struggle against Zionism, in this case, from Inside a Zionist labor stronghold. Op. cit.t p. 277. See the proceedings in Yalkut Poale-Tsion, Vol. I, p. 207. For a biographical sketch of his role in the Comintern’s activities in Palestine, see Chapter III. Guido G. Goldman, Zionism Under Soviet Rule 1917-1928, (New York; Herzl Press, I960), p. 96, argues “that the party existed until 1928 only because the Government believed it could exploit such status by attracting Jews to Communism and for forcing propaganda purposes.’’ The Bund members who sought admission to the Communist Party in the Soviet Union split with the movement and formed a new Communist League Komfarband - in May 1919, which finally joined the Communist Party. Its leaders assumed key positions in the Yevsektsia. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 99. As Barzilai testifies in regards to Alexander Hashin — he always suffered from this element of ambiguity, the dual loyalties, between his official affiliation with the Comintern and his sentiments to Palestine, and hence to the pioneering socialist element in Zionism, a fact that was not denied by his brother Wolf Averbach, Hatragedia, p. 78. Schechtman, “Tsionut Vetsionim Berusiya Hasovietit,” Gesher, September 1966, No. 23. Ze’ev Abramovich, Besherut Hatnuah (In the Service o f the Party), (Tel'Aviv: Y.L. Peretz —Sifriat Poalim, 1965), pp. 291-292. Ibid., p. 295. Ibid. Yisraeli, op. cit., p. 23-24. The Fraction apparently denied all these specific allegations in its following publication, “Mi Hem Maharivei Hahistadrut” (Who are Those that Destroy the Histadruth), April 18,1925. Ibid. Yisraeli defines this position as the “Zionist Deviation” ; it became a commonly used phrase in subsequent criticism of the Party by the Comintern. Ibid., p. 26. List, op. cit., (6), 0.100. Ibid., (1), p.146. For a detailed list of its publications (11 in all), see Yisraeli, op. cit., p. 26. List, op. cit. (2), p. 164 argues that the very same time the P.C.P. took an opposite view of these issues. List, op. cit., (6), p. 101, and Barzilai, “ Yerushalayim Av Tarpat,” p. 137. Ester, Feldman, Kele Beli Sugar (A Prison Without Bars), (Te-Aviv: 1964), p. 42. In Russian: Mezhdunarodnaya Pomoshch Revolutsioneram. For its scope and function, see Politicheskii Slovar (Political Dictionary) (Moscow: 1940), p. 339. See the clubbing of Koish in Imprecorr, Vol. 11, No. 14, March 8,1928, p. 283, and Imprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 40, July 26,1928, p. 722.

64

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

47.

E.g., the expulsion of Panitch Pressmann Arie Karp (the editor of the Red Help bulletin) and Zakariah Koish,Ibid. See J.B., “Corporal Punishment for Political Prisoners in the 4Holy Land,* ” Imprecoh, Vol. 8, No. 14, March 8, 1928, p.283, and J. Crossley, “British Reign of Terror in Palestine,” Imprecarr, Vol. 8, No. 40, July 26, 1928, pp. 721-722. One of the founders of the Arab Nationalist and militant party, Istiqulal (the Independence Party), who was arrested in 1933 for inciting to riot. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism, p. 89. List, op. cit. (2), pp. 167-168 claims that the Arabs showed great interest in M.O.P.R. because of its successful work on behalf of the arrestees, and they tried to benefit from this connection. An ex-Comintem agent in Germany in 1921-25 and later a member of the E.C.P.I., List, op. c i t, (7) p. 127. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 37. List Joe. cit. Among those attending were radical pro-Communist elements from the ranks of Gdud Ha'avodah (The Workers* Brigade) and Hashomer-Hatsair (The Young Guards) who did not wish to openly join the P.C.P. See List, (2), pp. 162-163. See Tshuvah Lehatkafot Ha'Ehud (An Answer to the Attacks on the Ehud) (Tel-Aviv: 1926), as quoted by Yisraeli, op. c i t, p. 31, note 12.

48.

49.

50.

51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56.

See Goldman, op. cit., p. 79, for the circumstances and the procedure o f the expulsion from Russia to Palestine.

57.

It was the official organ of the Yevsektsia, in which quite a few ex-P.C.P. members who were expelled from Palestine participated as writers and commentators. List, op. cit, p. 162. Gilles Perrault, “ L’orchestie Rouge,” describes a Jewish pro-Soviet spy ring, some of whom had been in Palestine before as Comintern agents. Review in Ha'Aretz, “Yehudei Hatizmoret Ha’adumah,” (The Jews of the Red Orchestra), June 7,1968. In Russian: Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudyashchichsya Vostoka. The Kutvo should not be confused with the Congress of Peoples of the East (the Baku Congress, that was set up in August 1920). This organization had only a council of propaganda and published a journal, “The People o f the East.** E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. Ill (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 269. J.V. Stalin,Sochineniya (Moscow), Vol. VII, pp. 133-152. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 66. List, op. cit., (7),p. 129 and pp. 134-135. After his arrest in 1930, he left the Party and strongly opposed Communism, laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, p. 100. Yisraeli, loc. cit. He became its leader in 1934 after the complete Arabization o f the Party. Laqueur, op. cit, p. 322.

58.

59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

The Comintern’s Organizational Network in Palestine 68. 69.

70. 71.

65

Most of them are presently in Lebanon and Jordan, several of them having abandonned the Communist cause altogether. Yisraeli, op, cit„ p. 79. Degras, op, cit.t Vol. II, pp. 182-183. In addition to the Kutvo, there was a specialized institute to train young Chinese Communist cadres, the Su Yat Sen University (enrollment in 1925 was 147 students), directed by Karl Radek, the head of the Eastern department of the Comintern and Pavel Mif, one of the key assistants in the Eastern Department who was sent as an expert to China in 1926 to set up Communist Party Schools. This Eastern Department o f the Comintern, to which both Radek and Mif belonged, consisted of 24 active members representing eight Eastern countries and was run by a collegium which had its own organization and propaganda departments. Degras, p. 247. Bob, “ Arabian Communists Before the Court, Imprecorr, Vol. 11, No. 28, May 28.1931, p.515. # Many of those who were recruits were actually provocators, planted by outside powers to help identify the Communist leaders and hand them over to the Police. List mentions one of them, Fuad from Beirut, who later on handed List over to the Syrian Police. List, op. cit, (7), p. 134.

67

CHAPTER V The Visit of the “Workers’ Battalion” to the Soviet Union in 1926 In the preceding chapters, the focus has been on teh intricate relationship between the Comintern and Zionist settlement in Palestine as reflected in the unique political background of the Comintern’s Jewish Communist cadres and in the special role they played in the elaborate network of the Comintern2s front organizations. As noted Palestine received more that its proportional share of the Comintern’s attention in the area, for reasons having to do with the internal political situation of the Soviet Union. In the Comintern’s thinking, Zionism in Palestine, irrespective of its concrete economic and political strength, was psychologically linked with the unresolved Jewish problem in Russia and with the strong sense of national identity (though not always affiliated with Zionism) that prevailed among the Jewish masses. Zionism in Palestine, therefore, was not merely viewed as a local nationalist movement whose revival took place in some remote corner of the globe, but rather its development was experienced as a viable, relevant, and potentially quite dangerous issue linked directly to the very heart of the Soviet political system. In its struggle against Zionism in Palestine, the Comintern had at its disposal an extensive system of Communist front organizations, as well as a local Communist Party Organization, predominantly Jewish (much to the dislike of the Comintern’s bosses). Its elite of revolutionary cadres, who were primarily Jewish and ex-Zionists, for personal, political, and ideological reasons, zealously carried out their anti-Zionist mission, in a fervently committed, dedicated, and violent manner, surpassing, in all probability, any conceivable non Jewish Communist anti-Zionist activity. As Professor L. Schapiro has observed: In general, Jewish Party members were as much if not more opposed to the fostering o f Jewish nationalism and to Zionism than non-Jewish members.1

In addition, as previously pointed out, the Comintern had the benefit of the help rendered whole-heartedly by the Yevsektsia, a body comprised of vast numbers of Jewish Communist personnel in various propaganda as well as other related agencies of the Comintern, from which recruits for the struggle against Zionism in Palestine were drawn.

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COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

All these organizational resources with their prolific activities were of a political nature. Their main purpose was to undermine Zionist political claims, demoralize its following, and inflict a mortal blow upon the flickering hopes of the revival of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The struggle against Zionism, however, was not only an ideological or political issue but indeed was to become a security matter of a very high priority. Zionism was not just another outside nationalist movement in an area dominated by a native and reactionary nationalist bourgeoisie. Rather it was a nationalist movement of a progressive social democratic nature,2 whose birthplace and hence ethnic and cultural roots lay in Russia proper. The majority of Russian Jews gave it strong emotional support, and between them were also strong family bonds. The whole future of Zionism depended upon this human reservoir of Russian Jewry, and particularly upon its numerous Zionist pioneering organizations.3 It was this unusual blend of alien and rival political affiliations (social democracy) of Russian emigres, building a base for the hopefully coming waves of Jewish Russian immigrants, that turned Zionism in general and the rise of the Zionist settlement in Palestine in particular, with its worldwide connections with the Western powers and support, into a serious security matter.4 As such, Zionism was also dealt with by the appropriate security organs of the Soviet system, as the following case study reveals. Nineteen-twenty-six was the year in which the P.CJ?. and the Fraction intensified their struggle against Zionism in Palestine. In addition to embarking upon massive activities through their front organizations, they made a strong attempt to penetrate the most vulnerable wings of the Zionist Labor movement, in order to encourage the mood of frustration and disappointment that prevailed among many Jewish workers as a result of the economic crisis. The first and most promising target was Gdud Ha’avodah (The Workers’ Battalion),5 a group of several hundred pioneers who fulfilled an important role in the history of the Zionist collective settlements in Palestine.6 The Battalion was founded in 1920 by a group of Zionist pioneers initially engaged in various construction projects until they were able to form collective agricultural settlements.7 Ideologically, a segment of members of the Battalion entertained left-wing radical views, questioning to some extent the whole purpose and future of building Zionism in Palestine. The future of the pioneering socialist order in Palestine began to appear illusory to them, and they felt they were making a highly idealistic but wasteful sacrifice in light of the ever-increasing role which the Jewish middle class and its capital began to play in the country.8

The Visit of the “Workers’ Battalion” to the Soviet Union in 1926

69

It was an economic crisis coupled with a grave ideological dispute.9 The Fraction and the P.C.P. argued relentlessly that the Battalion's goal of constructive Zionist socialism was obsolete, due to the rapid capitalist growth in the country, and with this development, they emphasized, the “romantic nationalist illusion” of the Zionist communal settlement would shortly fade away, with Palestine simply emerging as another developing economy, based upon class differentiation and rivaling economic interests.10 In December, 1926, largely as a response to the influence exerted upon it by the Fraction, a fierce ideological debate took place within the Battalion, resulting in a split among its ranks. The pro-Communist minority group11 scattered — some Vent back to the Soviet Union,12 others drifted aimlessly in Palestine, taking part in the Comintern's front organizations. It was at this point, quite unexpectedly, that an invitation reached the Battalion from the Soviet Tsentrosoyuz13 to send a delegation of three of its members to visit Soviet communal cooperatives and agricultural settlements. In examining the background to this significant Soviet invitation, several related developments must be considered. Among the disillusioned and radical elements of the Battalion, some of whom clearly identified themselves with the Fraction, there emerged a group that called for close cooperation with the Comintern.14 Many joined the call in the hope that it might influence and ultimately change the Comintern’s position towards Zionism. The rationale behind the argument of closer ties with the Soviets was, as some defined it, to reach a political accord with the Soviets based upon an alliance of action against their common enemy: British imperialism. This was not the first time in the history of Zionism in Palestine that such an idea was entertained; considering the fact that most Zionist pioneers were Russian-born, of a Slavic temperament, it thus is not surprising that many were emotionally inclined to have the Russians on their side, rather than the alien British. Y. Meirson, a romantic revolutionary in the early twenties in Palestine,15 dared to hope “that the Red Army [wouldjcross the Caucasus and the Taurus and [would] bring to them a Soviet Palestine.” 16 One source states that Meirson’s friends in Moscow were even engaged in actually acquiring arms for that eventuality.17 Nahman List also writes that similar sentiments were held by certain members of the P.CJ?. who sought a political and military alliance with Russia instead of with England.18 In addition to those motivated towards alliance with Russia out of ideological or intellectual inclinations, there were also veterans of the Zionist settlement and defense organization who felt that Soviet and Zionist

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collaboration was politically feasible and militarily desirable against the British. The remnants of the Hashomer group, a pre-war Zionist self-defense organization,19 shared this orientation. With a growing militant position towards the British, whose attitude towards Zionism became evidently hostile, they refused to accept the moderate line of the Haganah20 that limited itself exclusively to defensive efforts, and instead took an activist position of seeking avenues for new political and military opportunities. The leader of this group and its spokesman was Yisrael Shohat, a veteran Poale-Zion member, and a long-time self-defense leader in Jewish communities in Russia and later in Palestine.21 To protect the Jewish communities in Palestine, Shohat deemed it necessary to train Jewish pilots and to build an army. After the British and the French respectively rejected his request for aid, he appealed to the Russians for their help.22 Shohat and his friend Shneorsohn went to Berlin at the end of 1924 to introduce the plan to Professor Albert Einstein, who listened sympathetically to their plan and gave them a letter of recommendation to the Soviet Ambassador, Christian Krestinsky. Shohat and Shneorsohn told the Soviet envoy that Zionist and British interests in Palestine were on a collision course, and inasmuch as the Zionist community was socialistically oriented, the Soviet government ought to extend its helping hand for the plan. After submitting a detailed proposal in writing to Ambassador Krestinsky, they were told that it would be presented to the Soviet Government for consideration. During the summer of 1925, some Soviet tourists later identified as the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey23 and his Jewish wife, allegedly came on a visit to Palestine, and as guests, spent most of their touring time with the Shohats and other members of the Battalion. The purpose of this visit, it appears, was in reality to closely study the situation in Palestine, particularly the relations between the Jewish community and the British Government before deliberating on the arms issue. Several months after their departure, the invitation from the Soviet Tsentrosoyuz arrived, in which the Battalion was asked to send three of its members for a visit to Moscow.24 The delegation, consisting of Yisrael Shohat, Mendel Elkind, and Dov Mechonai (representing the three major political positions in the Battalion)25 arrived in Moscow on April 2 7 ,1926.26 The delegation’s stay in Moscow was taken care of by Michael Triliser, a right-hand man to Felix Dzerzhinsky, the chief of the Soviet Political Secret Service, the O.G.P.U. It appears that Triliser was in charge of the foreign section of the O.G.P.U. Upon their arrival, the delegation was told that Triliser was a “veteran Jewish Bolshevik” in the Communist Party, and

The Visit o f the "Workers’ Battalion” to the Soviet Union in 1926

71

they received the impression that he was associated with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than with the O.GiMJ.28 During their stay in Moscow, the delegation was engaged in rather prolonged and elaborate political discussions with Triliser. Triliser displayed great interest in the extent of Zionist military capabilities and in their sources of support, while attempting to speculate on the possiblity of an armed conflict between Zionism and the British government. In view of his long political and military experience in Zionist affairs in Palestine, Shohat was the member who drew the most attention and interest on the part of the Soviet hosts. He was also the only member in the group that attempted to secure Soviet support and collaboration. Shohat suggested a concrete plan, according to which the Soviet Government would first “make public a political declaration that would inflict a mortal blow upon the Balfour Declaration,” by publicly stating that “the Soviet Government favors the idea of the establishment of a Jewish Communist state in Palestine based upon an alliance of workers and peasants.” 29 Shohat proposed to call this document “Lenin’s Declaration,” 30 emphasizing that such a declaration might mobilize the support of the Jewish masses throughout the world, including many non-socialist groups, which had recently become disillusioned with the British. It seems that Shohat was in total disagreement with his two colleagues, Elkind and Mechonai, who preferred to ignore Zionism in their discussion, talking mostly in terms of “Communist masses in Palestine” and “Palestinian proletariat” It is also apparent that when they had some personal exchanges in Hebrew among themselves, Triliser was able to follow them, inasmuch as he understood some Hebrew;31 and thus he was able to detect the nature of the disagreement among the members of the delegation. As to the proposed “Lenin’s Declaration,” Triliser responded by emphasizing that it required rather “deep plowing” within the Soviet Government — specific study would be needed to assess its impact upon the Jewish community in Palestine, as well as on world Jewish public opinion. He proposed that Shohat stay in Russia for several years to cultivate the ground for it. Regarding the request for military help, Triliser was able to communicate an affirmative answer to Shohat, specifically with relation to the training of Jewish-Palestinian pilots in Soviet schools, on the provision that Shohat present a detailed list of candidates with full information about them, and that the Soviet Security authorities be able to screen them carefully.32

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Shohat promised to provide the list as soon as possible but immediately afterwards, he encountered some unexpected difficulties. Perhaps they were related to the fact that he displayed great curiousity about Jewish life in Russia or to his efforts to carry out the missions asked for by Colonel Kisch and Dr. Magnes.33 As they requested, he went to visit Jewish farmers in Crimea, meeting members of the Hechalutz organization, and he also made attempts to clear some information about the Library of Baron Ginzburg, in the course of which he was detained by the police. When he was invited to the O.G.P.U. headquarters for further talks, it sounded more like an interrogation to him this time, with explicitly threatening undertones. The O.GP.U. official tried to persuade him to prolong his stay in Russia, and when Shohat refused, he was informed that his wife Mania (who had remained in Palestine) was being sought by the Soviet authorities for counter-revolutionary charges, which she allegedly committed while being in Russia.34 Shohat did not yield to the threats, but at this point he began to question the sincerity and good will of his hosts, as well as to doubt the value of the results of his missions. His suspicions were reinforced when he met Eisig Altshuler.35 To Shohat’s great dismay, Altshuler, who at that time had already graduated the pilot school and who wore his Soviet air force military uniform, refused to go back to Palestine. Dov Mechonai, the third member of the group, decided suddenly to remain in Russia as well, by applying to a medical school. Elkind, who throughout his stay in Moscow, had been constantly in touch with the Yevsektsia, was paving the way to make a similar move, to be carried out four years later with a group of 70 ex-members of the Battalion, who were all to return to Russia.36 The whole mission turned into a fiasco. Shohat’s meetings with Triliser became more difficult due to the fact the Triliser’s phone numbers were changed every two weeks for “security reasons.” After several harrowing weeks, Shohat at last returned to Palestine. There sare some conflicting interpretations as to his conclusions and the recommendations he made upon his return. One source claims that he kept entertaining the hope of cooperation with Russia and that he recommended that the Fraction be readmitted to the Histadruth, also that Zionism be abandoned for this purpose in favor of socialism.37 The other source, based upon a personal interview with Shohat in 1960, argues that Shohat was determined to cut all further contact with the Soviets, although the Soviets insisted upon maintaining contact in Switzerland, a contact that was only maintained for a short while, during which time the Soviets continued to ask for the lists of recommended future pilots.38

The Visit of the “ Workers' Battalion" to the Soviet Union

73

If there was ever any question as to the direct implication of the involvement of the Soviet security organs in this attempt to spy on the Zionist military and political plans in Palestine and in their attempt to enlist to their aid some additional Palestinian recruits, it was completely dispelled in 1930, when G.A. Agabekov, a former O.GJP.U. resident in Turkey and later the head of the O.G.P.U. Eastern Section, defected from the Soviet Union through Turkey to France and made his espionage memoirs public.39 With reference to Shohat’s visits to Moscow, Agabekov testified as follows: In 1926, three Zionist members came to Moscow from Palestine and made contacts with the O.G.P.U. In the course of their conversations with the foreign section of the O.G.P.U., the Zionists pointed out the incipient disagreements between the British and the Jews in Palestine and requested assistance from the O.G.P.U. in their efforts to achieve an independent state in Palestine. They requested arms and financial aid to carry out propaganda. The Soviet Government was very interested in this proposal, but in the course of the negotiations, information reached the O.G.P.U. that the Zionists were British agents deliberately sent to mislead the Soviet Government. Since no specific evidence was found as to their guilt, the Foreign Section of the O.G.P.U. decided to cut relations with them, suggesting that they leave the boundaries of the Soviet Union.40

In April 1926, two other Palestinian groups were also in Moscow — one was a P.C.P. group headed by Wolf Averbach, and the other, an ex-splinter group from the P.C.P. tjiat moved to Moscow and settled there permanently. Both became involved with the Shohat mission during the course of his stay there. The key man in this involvement was B.A. Vasiliev, the executive-secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, who alerted Wolf Averbach to the matter. Averbach recommended to Vasiliev that the negotiations with Shohat be continued in order to reveal as much vital information as possible, and perhaps to integrate several of them into the Soviet spying network.41 He also recommended that the disagreement within the delegation be intensified, in order to further split the Workers* Battalion, inducing additional numbers of immigrants back to Russia. Elkind was persuaded to collaborate in this cause. Vasiliev kept in constant touch with Triliser on the progress of the talks, and most likely it was he who was interested in enlisting the help of Shohat in the Comintern’s activities in Palestine. The second group consisted of two ex-P.C.P. members, both of whom held key positions in the Soviet security establishment. The leader of this group was Moshe Levin, an ex-Poale-Zion left member who was expelled from the M.O.P.S. in Palestine in 192142 for upholding the Arab pogromist position in the riots of April 1920 in Jerusalem. He arrived in Poland via Moscow in 1926 and in the Comintern’s service, he was sent to organize the

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Polish underground Communist movement. The second member was Yosef Finkelshtein, who left Palestine for the same reasons and who later became an executive in the O.GJMJ.43 Finkelstein and Levin were unofficial watchdogs of the P.C.P. activities, and in this instance, Finkelshtein persuaded Agabekov to get rid of Shohat, acusing him of being a British agent.44 It appears that Agabekov was indeed persuaded by Finkelshtein, letting his decision prevail over that of Vasiliev, and hence the negotiations with Shohat came to an end. Shohat’s trip to'Russia in 1926 reveals the intricate relationship which existed between the Security organs of the Soviet Government and the Comintern and their attitude towards the rise of Zionism in Palestine. For reasons that are almost unrelated to the position of the Fraction and the P.C.P. in Palestine, they initiated action on their own in order to carefully study the Zionist political plans and military preparations in Palestine. They attempted to win friends, even to trap them into active collaboration of an espionage nature, and to intensify the inner strife and political confusion with the Workers* Battalion, in their efforts for a major breakthrough into the Zionist labor movement. Most significant of all, it was a clear attempt to confuse and demoralize the Zionist workers, and to persuade them to leave Palestine and go back to Russia. This effort was only partially successful. The Workers’ Battalion split but very few left the country to return to Russia. The Communists failed to benefit from the temporary disarray that prevailed in Palestine during the economic crisis of 1926. The Fraction and the P.CJP. remained as isolated as they had been before. The loyal Jewish Comintern agents, Wolf Averbach, Michael Triliser, Moshe Levin, Yosef Finkelshtein, Mendel (Menachem) Elkind, as well as Eisig Altshuler and Dov Mechonai, at one point or another, perished during Stalin’s great purges in Russia. NOTES TO CHAPTER V 1. 2.

3.

Leonard Schapiio, The Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (New York: Vintage, 1964), p. 537. Both the Zionist Socialists, the most dynamic and ideologically oriented group within the Zionist camp, and the Histadruth (the Jewish Labor Federation) were affiliated with the social democratic Amsterdam International, an organization to which most of the Western social democratic labor movements belonged. Besides the Poale-Zion (Left and Right), Hashomer Hatsair (The Young Guards) and Hechalutz (the Pioneers), there was also “the most influential of the various youth movements,n the Tseire-Zion (Young Zionists), the majority of whom, despite the movement's split into right and left wings, remained associated with the world Zionist organization, preserving their secret underground work “and

The Visit of the “Workers* Battalion” to the Soviet Union

4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

75

preparing Zionists for the arduous journey to Palestine.** This group in particular was regarded by the Soviet Security organs as most dangerous and was consequently primarily dealt with by the Soviet security organ G.P.U. See Benjamin West, Naftule Dor (The Struggle o f a Generation) (Tel-Aviv: 1945), Vol. I, pp. 330-333, as quoted by Guido Goldman, Zionism Under Soviet Rule, p. 77. Also see in this matter, A.L. Tsentsiper, BaMa'avak Ligeulah (The Struggle for Redemption: the History o f Zionism in Russia During the Bolshevik Regime (Tel-Aviv: 1956), pp. 86-95. As an expert on the subject oommunicated to me, “The frontiers of Zionism in Palestine stretch all the way from the city of Jerusalem to within the perimeters of Moscow and Leningrad.** For the historical background, see Sefer Hashomer Hatsair (The Book o f the Young Guards), Vol. I, 851 on. Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 80. In this political program, it was stated that their aim was “ to build Palestine by establishing Jewish workers* communes.** G.Z. Yisraeli, MOPS - PCP - M AKI (Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1953), p. 43. This was the fourth wave of immigration to Palestine in 1925 that brought 36,000 newcomers to the land, most of whom were middle class, resulting in large scale property speculation. This later had a demoralizing effect on the Zionist pioneers who were engaged in settling the new Zionist frontiers. See Inyenei Ein Harod (The Ein-HarodMatters), published by the Battalion in 1926. It exposes the sharp ideological controversy that led to the split within its ranks, in Archion Ha’avodah, Tel-Aviv, IsraeL See “Michtav Galuy Lehavrei Gedud Ha’avodah Me’et P.C.P.,” (An Open Letter to the Battalion from the P.C.P.) as quoted by Yisraeli, p. 47. The platform in spirit and in content was very dose to the Communist position. It reflected a sharp turn to the extreme left, by calling for the ultimate establishment of a “ Communist Society in Palestine.** Yisraeli, p. 46. This group, led by a Communist sympathizer, Mendl (Menahem) Elkind, eventually organized a migration o f Jewish pioneers back to the Soviet Union in 1930 where they established a Jewish agricultural commune in Crimea. See HashomerHatsair, Vol. I, p. 848. This was the Soviet “Consumer Cooperative Sodeties” organization, a “ central powerful organ” as Professor E.H. Carr has observed. The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-23 (New York: Macmfflana, 1952), pp. 125 and 237-241. Sefer Toldot Hahaganah (The History o f the Haganah), (Tel-Aviv: 1964), Vol. II, Part One, p. 234. Y. Meirson, also called “Professor,” arrived in Palestine before the First World Was and served as a teacher in various communities. He subscribed to an ideology defined as “ Proletarian Zionism,** a radical socialist program that gradually moved away from Zionism and became the platform of the early Jewish Communist group in Palestine, the M.O.P.S. (the forerunner to the Fraction and the P.C.P.). Meirson became the representative of the M.O.P.S. in the 'Comintern's gathering in Moscow early in 1921. He became disillusioned

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with Palestine quite early and left the country in 1921, returning to Russia where he taught Yiddish Literature in Odessa. In 1952, he made an attempt to contact the representatives of the Israeli Diplomatic Corps in Russia, expressing regret for his mistaken views and moves in the past, and wishing the newly established Jewish State of Israel well. For his contact with the Israeli diplomats in Russia, see Davar, May 25, 1952. For further biographical references, see N. List, "Tsadak Hakomintern,” (3), p. 162, and Yisraeli, op. cit.t p. 15. 16. Yisraeli, p. 18. 17. Hatnuah Hakomonistit Bepalestinah (The Communist Movement in Palestine), Vo!. I, (Warsaw: "Der Funk” publishing House, 1930), as quoted by Ibid. 18. List, op. cit., (2), p. 162. 19. This was a pioneering defense organization, established before the First World War to protect the Zionist Jewish settlement in Palestine. For further background information, see Sefer Toldot Hahaganah, Vol. I. 20. In 1920, the Hashomer group merged with the Haganah to form a United defense organization, a larger and better outfit, that played its first defensive role during the riots in Jerusalem that year (the Nebi Musah Riots of April 4 which assumed the form of an anti-Jewish massacre.) 21. Yisrael Shohat, b. in Russia in 1886, joined the Poale-Zion movement during the Pogroms of 1903-04 and was among the organizers of "Jewish Self-defense.” He immigrated to Palestine in 1904, and in 1908, he organized the "Hashomer” defense organization that undertook upon itself daring defense assignments. In 1920, after the merger of his organization with the Haganah, he left all organized political activity and remained an individual outsider. His wife Mania Shohat, a veteran of the Russian Labor movement since 1899 left for Palestine with the Poale-Zion, organizing the Hashomer with her husband, and she joined the Workers’ Battalion. During the Second World War, she was active in the League V., a friendship organization with the Soviet Union, that was engaged in soliciting military and material aid for the Red Army. Both died in 1961. See Ze’ev Abramovich, Besherut Hatnuah (Tel-Aviv: 1965), p. 429. 22. Eisig Altshuler was one of the Hashomer members who was designated as a future pilot. He was admitted to a French pilot school; after the government’s rejection of the pTan, however, (out of the fear that it would arouse British objections), he was turned down. At this point, Altshulter was admitted to a Soviet school and thus returned to Russia (his place of origin). See the latter part of this chapter for further reference. Haviv Kna’an, "Raion ’Hatsharat Lenin* Lemdinah Yehudit Be’eretz Yisrael,” (The Idea of Lenin’s Declaration of a Jewish-Communist State in Palestine), Bitzaron, Volume LV, NovemberDecember, 1966, No. 2 (262), p. 105. 23. Sefer Toldot Hahaganah, p. 234 identifies them as tourists, while Haviv Kna’an, op. c/r., p. 105, argues that they were the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey and his wife. 24. Sefer Toldot Hahaganah, p. 234. 25. Kna’an argues that they were deliberately chosen in order to reflect the diversity of opinion in the Battalion. Accordingly, Shohat was the right winger, Elkind left, and Mechonai was somewhere in the middle, with a slight inclination towards the left. In Russia he usually upheld Elkind’s contentions. Kna’an, op. c i t p. 106.

The Visit of the “Workers’s Battalion” to the Soviet Union 26.

27. 28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. •34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

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Right before their departure, the delegation was contacted by two prominent Zionist leaders in Palestine — Colonel F. Kisch, the head of the Jewish Agency who wanted them to contact the Zionist pioneer organizations in Russia, namely, the Hechalutz, and Dr. Judah Magnes, the rector of the Hebrew University, who requested that they look for a Hebraic Library of the late Baron Ginzburg. Kna’an, p. 106. Sefer Toldot Hahaganah, p. 234. The Haganah sources, aware of the nature of the sponsoring organ, argued that the delegation was used for the purpose of spying on the secret defense plans of the Haganah. See/hid. Kna’an confirms this suspicion, p. 106. Kna’an p. 108 and Sefer Toldot Hahaganah, pp. 234-235. Ibid. , Shohat testified to this fact in his interview with Kna’an. P. 107. Sefer Toldot Hahaganah, p. 234. See footnote 6 above. The charge was that she participated in the Zubatov movement, a Czarist attempt to establish control over the Russian labor force and to counter any revolutionary outbreaks. The fact is that Mania Shohat did participate in the movement, but inasmuch as the whole plan was secretly conceived by the Czarist government, she had no knowledge of the Government’s involvement in it. Barzilai, Hatragedia Shel Harmhapecha Haso vietit, p. 87. See footnote 22. Yisraeli, op. cit., p. 48. Sefer Toldot Hahaganah, p. 234-235. Kna’an, op. cit., p. 109. Agabekov was murdered in Belgium in 1938 under mysterious circumstances which were undoubtedly manufactured by his former employers. See Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, (Macmillan: 1968), p. 437. Agabekov, as quoted by Kna’an, op. cit., p. 109, as well as Sefer Toldot Hahaganah, p. 235. Shohat stated to Kna’an that he was convinced that members of the P.C.P. was not told about the invitation that was extended to the Battalion and probably found it out at some later time, when the delegation was already in Moscow. See Agabekov, Zapiski Chekista (Chekists Notes), (Berlin, 1930). Kna’an, op. cit., p. 110. “Mifleged Poalim Sotsialistit,” the Socialist Labor Party, a left wing splinter group of Poale-Zion, that formed the core of the P.C.P. in 1924. Kna’an, op. cit., p. 111. Ibid.

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CHAPTER VI The Comintern’s Political and Ideological Struggle Against Zionism in Palestine Communist indictment of Zionism is as old as the Bolshevik movement itself, and hence there exists a vast literature of ideological pronouncements on Zionism in the various Marxist-Leninist writings. The early Bolshevik struggle against Zionism in 1905 was primarily theoretical in form and ideological in content; and even during the first ten years of the Soviet regime, Bolshevism was as yet confronted with a relatively helpless Jewish national mass movement in its midst coupled with various pioneer organizations. In both periods, the struggle against Zionism in Russia took place in a hostile environment for the Zionists. A new dimension was present in the struggle of the Comintern against Zionism in Palestine, however: here the Comintern had to deal with a hard core of determined and stubborn settlers in an area that was beyond the direct power control of the Soviet government as well as beyond its immediate political influence. In Palestine, for the first time, Zionism was fought on Zionist territory, mostly in an underground fashion. The Comintern faced an oppressive Colonial government, it was surrounded by hostile Jewish Zionist masses, and despite its strong pro-Arab position, it failed to penetrate or influence the Arab masses. The Comintern was confronted with the ever-increasing historical realization that Zionism was making significant, though gradual, social, economic, as well as political headway in Palestine; and that the idea of the revival of Jewish national life on its homeland was being translated into a living reality. The only tangible weapon which the Comintern had at its disposal in its struggle against Zionism in Palestine was the anti-Zionist, MarxistLeninist conceptual framework regarding this issue.1 Internal conditions in the Soviet Union dictated a sense of urgency in carrying out the struggle in an effective manner, and the Soviet Government hurriedly engaged in experimentation with various counter-Zionist projects to solve the pressing Jewish problem within its frontiers.2 Zionism was labeled by the Comintern as a most reactionary movement for basically three reasons: for its alleged bourgeois social origin, for its nationalist ideology, and for its collaboration with the imperialistcolonialist forces. The Zionist movement, in the view of the Comintern, was the creation of some misguided “Jewish petty-bourgeoisie and intel­ lectuals/’3 supported by the representatives of “Opportunism and of

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petty-bourgeois Poale-Zionism.”4 According to the Comintern’s interpreta­ tion, the political base where Jewish nationalist ideology was most prevalent was West European Jewry,5 a Jewry who in the Comintern’s opinion tried to capitalize on the suffering and economic misery which the Jewish masses encountered in various parts of Europe — from which “Zionism and other forms of Jewish nationalism drew their strength.”6 The Comintern consistently regarded the Zionist program as illusionary and dangerously misleading: Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a legal home in Palestine. This formulation serves to awaken among the Jewish petty-bourgeoisie and intellectuals the illusion that Palestine was a completely unpopulated country, only waiting for the immigration of Jews.7

The Comintern did not deny that the rise of Zionism during the years following the Balfour Declaration was a result of the considerable appeal that it had among the broad Jewish masses or that Zionism enjoyed the support of diverse strata of Jewry. However, this rise was placed by the Comintern in the historical perspective of a merely temporary stage of growth: Zionism entered on a boom period. The waves of nationalism rose high. Hundreds of thousands of Jewish workers and petty-bourgeoisie, especially in the U.S. were reached by Zionist propaganda, and vast sums flowed into the Zionist coffers.8

The “boom period” in the Comintern’s eyes, though, was to be doomed by the inherent contradictions in the goals of Zionism and by its deteriorating political and economic fortunes in Palestine. As the Comintern later wrote in its official organ,Imprecorr: Due to its inner contradictions, Zionism, supported by the imperialist Balfour Declaration, was for many years in a state of decline. This movement guided by the Anglo-Jewish financiers who were followed by considerable masses of illusioned petty-bourgeoisie, had already lost a considerable amount of its influence owing to its miserable financial collapse in the years 1925-27, and its inability in any way to achieve its aim.9

The reactionary “political and economic role” that Zionism played, in the Comintern’s terms, was “a complete fiasco of its so-called effort to build a home for the Chosen People.” 10 The Comintern was convinced that, in view of its mounting difficulties in Palestine, Zionism would lose its vitality and “lead a sham existance,” because “Zionism [wasjcompletely played out as an attempt to solve the Jewish question within the confines of the capitalist society.” 11 Although the most frequent theme in the Comintern’s criticism of Zionism was the utopian nature of the movement, on occasion the

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Comintern would deny this utopian character on dialectical grounds, claiming that utopianism was a passive and innocent dream, whereas Zionism, which organized its masses in the name of its reactionary, chauvinistic and adventurist program, was actually a dangerous fraud.12 If Zionism was so unrealistic in its aspirations and “doomed” to failure as the Comintern propounded, why therefore was the Comintern so obsessed with the Zionist menace and so zealously engaged in struggling against it? It appears that what actually concerned the Comintern most in regards to Zionism was its diversion of the attention of the Jewish masses from the cause of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, thereby directly playing into the hands of reaction*and counterrevolution: The Palestine objective, the attempt to divert the Jewish working masses from the class war by the propagation of mass settlement of Jews in Palestine, is not only nationalist and petty bourgeois, but in its effects counter-revolutionary: for, broad masses of workers are captivated by this idea and have been enticed away from an effective prosecution of class war against their Jewish and non-Jewish capitalist exploiters.13

In essence it was the fact that Zionism was not just the movement of “Jewish capitalist, reactionaries, and bourgeoisie,” but to a great extent also the movement of a large following of Jewish laborers that most seriously disturbed the Comintern. Hence Zionism was accused of an attempt to quiet the class-consciousness which was awakening among the Jewish working masses by means of nationalist phrases and utopian thinking about the growing Jewish State in Palestine. The Zionists were also successful in creating a labor wing, the “Poale-Zion,” which was affiliated with the Second International. It was precisely the strong socialist character that the Zionist settlement in Palestine assumed during this period, closely identified with the Western Social Democratic Labor Movement, that was the deadly enemy of the Comintern throughout the world, particularly after its isolationist-revolutionary posture was adopted by its Sixth Congress. Zionism became a major obsession and fear. Out of the foregoing considerations, the Comintern launched its extensive propaganda campaign against Zionism under the following banner: “Fight against imperialism and against the Zionist and Social Democratic agents of Imperialism.” 14 The Comintern called upon its followers to make a major onslaught against “the ideologically bankrupt Zionism, which has discarded its socialist mask and acts openly as an agent of capitalism.” 15 It was the Western socialist political program of struggling within the existing political and constitutional frameworks, “reformist” as denoted by the Comintern, that was so alien to the Comintern’s revolutionary spirit and

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so dangerous for its revolutionary prospects. The fact that Zionism cast its lot with "social democracy and reformism” placed Zionism in the following light: In the performance of their function as the lackeys of imperialism, the Zionists have received the whole-hearted support of the Social=Democratic parties of the II International. The Reformist leaders of the Jewish Workers Organizations in Palestine have systematically played upon the racial sentiments of the latter and used them as tools of British imperialist policy. The Zionists and the Social Democrats have been the most bitter enemies of the Arab national revolutionary movement.**

The Comintern attributed its failure to penetrate and influence the local labor movement in Palestine to the “reformist organization and tendencies” that appeared to be exceptionally strong in Palestine.17 The Comintern was forced to concede that the Histadruth and “reformist” developments among the workers of Palestine had become quite influential and powerful.18 Haidar, the P.C.P. delegate to the Comintern’s Sixth Congress, testified to this account in his speech, with this interpretation of events: There have been strong reformist organizations run by European imperialism and relying upon the Zionist movement, which has created for itself a strong basis . . . reformism is still stronger in Palestine. In the struggle against the Communist influence it sticks at no means - from cruel persecution of revolutionary workers to the hoodwinking of the workers by the illusion that a “Communist paradise*’ would be set up in Palestine. They are building a “communist society” under the protection of the British Mandate.19

Nonetheless, he praised the Histadruth as “an excellent organization with several thousands of members, political and trade union organizations which ensure the further development of Amsterdam and Second International Ideology.” 20 In the late twenties, the Comintern unleashed a new line of attack against the Zionist labor strength in Palestine. Realizing the important role that organized Jewish labor played in the life of the country, the Comintern identified it with Fascism. When Zionist organized labor opposed the Fraction and the P.C.P., the Comintern accused it of being fascist and predicted that “Fascist Zionist organizations will be armed as a volunteer corps against the possibilities of a united revolutionary movement.” 21 With the spread of Zionist militancy, the Comintern aigued that there emerged a strong “influence of social fascism upon the Jewish worker.” Hence “the propaganda of various leaders of the II International (Vandervelde, Brailsford, etc.) in favor of Zionism,” according to the Comintern’s interpretation, was but a sheer lie.22

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The Poale-Zion, who had a long record of fierce ideological dispute with the Comintern, upon their merger into a new united Zionist workers’ party, “Ahdut-Avodah,” was labeled by the Comintern as an affiliate of the Yellow Amsterdam in form and of the “social fascist” party in content.23 The social fascist character attributed to the Histadruth and to the Zionist labor following stemmed from the fact that the Jewish labor in Palestine volunteered in self-defense to take arms. The real significance behind the self defense ideologically, argued the Comintern, was that “Zionist Fascists played upon the national chauvinism of the young generation of Jews educated on the imperialist line.” 24 The Jewish laborer in Palestine could not be compared to his European counterpart, because in Europe the worker innocently pondered between the revolution and reformism, while in Palestine the Jewish laborer was a “chauvinist, exploiter and expropriator, deeply imbued with the most reactionary instincts and dark messianic illusions.” ?5 Thus the Zionist slogans of economic independence and self reliance, in the eyes of the Comintern’s agents, were pioneering acts in the realm of the “Fascization of the Jewish Community.” 26 Hashomer, the pioneering Zionist defense organization, was regarded as “the first military formation of the Jewish National Socialism,” and its military sector was labeled as Zionist Nazism.27 The theme was carried on after the riots and during the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany to a point of great extremes. In the Comintern’s analysis, the Zionist Congress in 1933 was a “peculiar mixture of national and social fascism, both movements united under the roof of Zionism . . . the third group is the Jewish clerical group.” 28 The identification of Zionism with Nazism, so the argument went, stemmed from the fact that both had a terrific national appeal.29 The ideological resemblance between Zionism and Nazism, the Comintern concluded, sprung from an identity of economic and political national interests, for, as stated in the Comintern’s organ, im precorr , “in reality they talk the same language, and in fact the possibility of an understanding between Hitler and the Zionists is not out of question.” 30 The Comintern also speculated on the reciprocal benefits of such a relation: “The ‘Promised Land’ helps Herr Hitler in his endeavors to revive economy, whilst in return the rich Jews are allowed to their banking accounts.” 31 The Comintern’s suspicion that Zionism and Nazism were collabora­ ting to produce mass hysteria, a situation most favorable to Zionist plans of mass immigration into Palestine, in its view, reached its climax when Avigdor, a prominent Middle Eastern agent of the Comintern, writing in one of the theoretical Comintern periodicals, suggested that “Hitler should be elected honorary president of the Zionist movement.”32

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Accusing Zionism of developing along faspist-Nazi patterns was essentially an extreme move to discredit the movement in relationship to the genuine fears of the Comintern, namely, that the Zionist movement, with its strong influence upon Soviet Jewry who were still confronted with the unresolved issue of the Jewish problem, was essentially a grave security matter. For this reason, it was necessary to discredit most severely the Zionist Socialist wing, because emotionally, and in terms of its social outlook, it was very close to the Soviet line of thinking and hence to the broad Jewish masses in Russia: A sininster role is played by the Zionist socialism, the Palestine section of the II International This is the instrument o f the Zionist bourgeoisie with the help of which they keep in check the Jewish workers who are roused to indignation by the Zionist policy. The Zionist socialists and the so-called Left Poale-Zion have long since entered on the path of social fascism* they are not only the advance troops of Zionist robber companies in driving the fellahin off the soil, but also carry on a furious incitement against the Communists and the Soviet Union.33

The last phrase makes abundantly clear the added dimension upon which the attack against Zionism was based: Zionism was accused, in very strong terms, of attempting to undermine the Soviet system and of embarking upon a Zionist worldwide anti-Soviet campaign, for “in the fight against the Soviet Union and against Bolshevism, the Jewish bourgeoisie, Zionism, and its social fascist agencies form a single whole.” 34 On another occasion, the Comintern stated: “Zionist threats and war preparations against the Soviet Union, one must not belittle them.” 35 Zionism therefore became accused of taking part in the intervention schemes.36 Inasmuch as the Comintern could not prove its allegation by directly related evidence, it used circumstantial evidence in its argumenta­ tion, such as the piece of information that the Histadruth in its conference had assumed the role of protector of the counter-revolutionaries that were arrested in the Soviet Union,37 or that in Palestine the Soviet newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia, were banned.38 A more serious accusation was that the British were preparing an invasion of the Soviet Union from the Middle East with the aid of “organized troops in the shape of Zionist reformists.” 39 When a wave of Zionist immigrants reached Palestine in 1933, the Comintern declared: “50,000 British-Imperialist-Fascist soldiers are con­ quering Palestine in preparation of an armed atack against the Soviet Union.”40 On yet another occasion, the Comintern’s organ developed the theory that Zionists were actually collaborating with White Guardists against the Soviet Union 41 citing as an example of its proof an alleged White Guardist

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attack in Siberia in 1929 where the first act committed by the Guardists was the carrying out of a pogrom against the local Jewish community. The rationale behind this action allegedly was to create a climate of panic among the Jewish public such that Zionism would become the direct and immediate beneficiary, (i.e. Russian Jews would be eager to emigrate) The Comintern claimed that in its collaboration with imperialism, Zionism put itself at the full disposal of the adventurers who conspired against the Soviet regime. It specifically cited a secret plan in which the Zionists were training one hundred thousand Jewish soldiers to be placed under British military command for an attack against the Soviet Union. The document called upon the working masses to rise against the plan of turning Palestine into an “anti-Soviet armed military base.” The statement concluded, “Down with Haganah, the Fascist and Imperialistic Zionist army.”42 Two major Zionist construction projects in Palestine were deemed to be a part of the alleged military plan to attack the Soviet Union. The first was the Rutenberg electrification plant along the Jordan river,43 which the Comintern labeled as a classical example of cooperation and harmony between Jewish Zionist capital and British strategic interests. A Zionist attempt to establish agricultural settlements on the Eastern bank of the Jordan river was also defined as a strategic settlement, designated to protect the British pipeline which carried oil from Iraq to Palestine.44 The Comintern was extremely sensitive to any criticism made by the Zionists of the Soviet Union of the conditions of Jewish life in the Soviet Union. It took that criticism as a real threat, always interpreting it in the light of some grand aggressive design, as the following quote indicates: [Zionistsjare conducting a savage incitement against Communism and the Soviet Union. The Zionist papers are openly discussing the question of the participation of the Zionists in the coming war of intervention against the Soviet Union.45

This fear, perhaps bordering on paranoia, can be further illustrated by the following example. On behalf of the hundreds of thousands of Zionist arrestees in the Soviet Union, the Zionist movement formed an aid organization which, in general terms, resembled the Comintern’s front organization, the M.O.P.R.46 — the only difference being, of course, that the- Magen (meaning “defense”), unlike the M.O.P.R. was a Zionist organization, thereby meriting the following interpretation on the part of the Comintern: . . . (ThejZionist bourgeoisie and the Jewish socialists are endeavouring to secure a place in the intervention army of the Grand Duke Cyril. This is shown by the approaching Congress of the Magen Society, founded

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COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE two years ago. This society is allegedly engaged in rendering aid to the “victims of the red Terror.” Now, however, the question o f active political fight against the Soviet regime is to be placed on the agenda. The Zionist Socialists who are the head of this anti-Soviet society apparently hope, by openly lining up in the intervention front to obtain more effective support from British Imperialism in crushing the Arab national movement.47

It is almost self-understood that the whole issue of arresting a great many Zionists in the Soviet Union and the Comintern’s fierce attacks against Zionism in general and the Zionist settlement in Palestine in particular were closely linked to each other. This link comes across most clearly when it is realized that during the Comintern’s persistent attacks upon the Zionist settlement in Palestine, it would also, in the same breath, unveil the successful Soviet model for the solution of the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union. As may be gleaned from the sources to follow, in the background of the Comintern’s violent attacks upon Zionism in Palestine was the Zionist-Soviet race to solve the Jewish problem — along two diametrically opposed models and along two sharply opposing political philosophies. On frequent occasions, the Comintern called upon the Jewish masses to abandon the “Zionist hell” and to migrate back to their respective countries of origin.48 It has already been mentioned that in 1925, the Soviet Government inaugurated the A.G.R.O. organization to promote the migration of Jewish workers from abroad into Jewish agricultural settlements in the Soviet Union.49 A strong attempt was also made, though without much success, to attract Zionist workers from Palestine. Somewhat later on, a leitmotif in the Comintern’s literature can readily be detected, that of the counsel that “the best thing the Jewish workers could do would be to quit Palestine altogether.” 50 In order to attract the migration of Jews from Palestine, more concrete arguments were required; hence the Comintern embarked upon a comparative review of Soviet and Zionist accomplishments in their respective attempts to solve the Jewish problem. On one such occasion, the Comintern lamented the lag of Zionism behind Bolshevism in the following way: The miserable result of the Zionist efforts and their complete fiasco can be seen particularly clearly when one compares them with the great speed with which the Jewish working masses in the Soviet Union are taking up agriculture.51

Vital statistical data to substantiate the above-mentioned claim was provided accordingly: By way of comparison with what is being done for the Jewish population in Soviet Russia it should be mentioned that the land held by the Jews in

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Palestine amounts to 100,000 hectares, only 20,000 hectares of which belong to the national fund and which cannot be sold. After 15 years of colonization, the number of Jews living on the land in Palestine amounts to a little over 30,000. After the big years of emigration which followed the Balfour Declaration, there were in Palestine 165,000 Jews, that is less than have been settled in the Soviet Union since 1920. The arable land in Birobidjan alone is larger than Palestine and is almost unpopulated. The free land in Crimea is almost as large as the arable land in Palestine (according to the White Paper): and nobody lays a claim to this land, it is free.52

When several Palestinian Zionist Workers went back to Russia, the Comintern hailed them as “Jewish workers who have deserted the Zionist camp,” and triumphantly declared that “groups have been formed (from amongst the Zionist Jewish workers) who have applied to the Soviet Government for permission to enter the Soviet Union and: settle in Birobidzhan, the Jewish agricultural settlement established by the government of the Soviet Union.” 53 The Comintern felt confident and optimistic that in its race with Zionism to solve the Jewish problem, time was on its side, and that eventually the Soviet model would prevail for primarily two reasons, as the following pronouncements will indicate; the first consideration was that the Soviet solution was ideologically sound (i.e. the building of a Jewish proletarian community) and thus from a Marxist point of view historically correct; the second consideration lay in the fact that, unlike Zionism, Soviet Russia had unlimited resources at its disposal with which to carry out its model. *

While Zionism formerly was able to record only trifling successes in regard to settlements, this sphere of work is now entirely closed to it. To this there is to be added the fact that another country, the country of the proletarian dictatorship has shown how the national question can be really solved, and with it also the Jewish question. With scarcely a fraction of the huge sums which Zionism has squandered, the Soviet Union has achieved in a few years, on a sound socialist basis, far more than Zionism has accomplished on an unsound basis, in the course of decades in regard to the settlement of Jews.54

It is abundantly clear, that so far as the Comintern was concerned, the Soviet Union had found an ideal solution to the as yet unresolved dilemma of the Jewish masses. In its evaluation, the Soviet Union had brilliantly constructed a “super-Zionist” model, which in comparison to the original Zionist program had successfully realized all the fundamental tenets of Zionism with one notable exception: the reactionary chauvinistic Zionist ideology associated with the Palestine adventure which bred threats and hatred. In the Soviet Union, this ideology had been supplanted by the

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Marxist—Leninist world outlook of peace and harmony of all working people throughout the world. Hence the conclusion was that all true Zionists should eagerly turn to the Soviet Union, the only place which could successfully provide them with refuge from the agony of frustration and illusion associated with the Palestine adventure, and where their highest national dream would find its genuine fulfillment: If we add that the agrarisation activity of the Soviet Government in Russia has done much more in two years for the solution of the Jewish question on that territory than Zionism has effected in fifty years, and that the healthy development of the Jewish colonies in the Soviet Union affords such an attraction for many of the disappointed Jewish emigrants to Palestine, that they are anxious to return to the Soviet Union by the hundreds, it may serve as an indication as to where the Jewish masses, who have hitherto been dazzled by Zionism, must turn to find escape from national and social oppression.55

A central theme in the Comintern’s conception of Zionism was its long and inherited association with imperialism. According to the Comintern, it was the imperialists who transformed the Zionist "mixture of theology and Metaphysics” into a political and economic force, out of the consideration that Zionism, in its striving to realize its program, would well serve the political, military, and economic interest of imperialism. Bolshevism had never forgiven Zionism the support it sought in the form of the Balfour Declaration during the Bolshevik Revolution period.56 The Comintern, for that matter, could not forget that this Balfour Declaration had had a most profound impact upon a great many Russian Jews or that strong pro-British sentiments had developed among them, giving a major boost to Zionist activities in Russia, including the plans for mass immigration to Palestine.57 The Comintern’s organ frequently cited Lord Balfour’s speech in the House of Commons in which he praised Zionism with "great eloquence,” paying tribute to "the genius of the Jewish race” and promising to redeem his government’s "debt to Jewry” ; and it concluded that "British Imperialism [hadjbeen busy preparing a plan for the creation of a Hebrew Fatherland in Palestine... (exploiting) Zionist ideology, this extremely reactionary petty-bourgeois Utopia, for its own imperial ends.” 58 The establishment of British public committees in support of the Zionist cause was another proof of how intimately Zionist fate was tied to the good will of British Imperialism.59 Weizmann’s subsequent contact with the Marshall group in the United States on philanthropic and humanitarian grounds was interpreted by the Comintern as: "The Zionist organization loses the halo of a political renaissance movement and sinks politically to the level of a pronounced tool of British Imperialism.” 60

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Thus the whole Zionist settlement in Palestine was viewed by the Comintern in terms of an imperialist intrigue and political exploitation for economic, military, and colonial gains. Any appeal made by the Zionist community to the British Government to secure its vital interests was appraised in the following way: This is no mere diplomatic formula, it was the open pledge of loyalty from the vassal to his lord and master. The Zionist movement is a pawn in the colonial game of British imperialism in the Near E ast.. .they are doing their best to implant illusions in the minds of the Jewish masses with the slogan: “Palestine is our only hope.”61

However, it was not only Zionism that owed its gratitude to the British imperialists, the Comintern emphasized, but it was also the British Imperialists who owed their gratitude to the Zionists for the opportunity they provided them in fostering their grip over Palestine as a colonial possession. In the Comintern’s words, The Labour Government.. .knows that Zionist policy formed an integral part of the imperialist rule in Palestine. Imperialism is linked up with the mandate resting on the basis of the “Zionist National H om e.. .It is clear to every working inhabitant of Palestine that Zionism is only upheld by Imperialism and that it must be crushed together with the Imperialists.62

In the Comintern’s evaluation, it was the Balfour Declaration and Zionist policy which secured the position of “all-powerful rull” for the British High Commissioner in Palestine,63 and in return the Zionists “realized their national Jewish ideals with the assistance of the English bayonets.” 64 Zionism, stated another Comintern source, was actually the excuse the British used to justify their colonial rule in Palestine, in which the Jewish community constituted a buffer zone between the mandatory regime and the hostile and dissatisfied Arab masses.65 The Zionists, who were a minority group in Palestine at that time, constituting only 13% of the total population, were regarded by the Comintern as a favorite and most privileged minority,66 treated as such so that British imperialism could make use of Zionist organization. The Comintern argued that the British Imperialists “lied about the National home of the Jews,” 67 and it never took the British promise of promoting the cause of a Jewish national home seriously, calling this cause an “illusion,” and reiterating that there was a “practical impossibility of such a home under British rule.”68 What the Comintern took more seriously was the economic cooperation between the British and the Zionists, and the prospects of building a strong Zionist-capitalist base in Palestine. As noted before, these

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Zionists were the “Jewish capitalists who, with the aid of the Jewish social traitors of the Second International [took] the tutelage of the Jewish masses,’”69 promising to them “a land flowing with milk and honey, an island of the blest in a sea of economic crisis, knowing neither unemployment nor bankruptcy.’’ Palestine, under the imperialist British yoke and its “Zionist agents of British imperialism” became a heaven for the Jewish bourgeoisie.70 It was in the Jewish bourgeoisie in Palestine that British imperialists found a willing instrument for the oppression of the Arab working masses, and it was precisely this coalition of “British force of occupation with the help of the reactionary Zionist bourgeoisie,” that enabled the “Anglo-Zionist imperialist policy to preserve Palestine under the guise of a National Home for the Jews, as a strategic.. .” 71 In his report to the Seventh Comintern Congress in Moscow, Comrade Yussuf presented the following description of the Zionist-bourgeoisie economic conquest in the cause of British Imperialism. The British, argued Yussuf, also make good use of the Jewish Zionist bourgeoisie, using the Jewish national minority in the interest of its imperialist policy. The Jewish national minority in Palestine in essence is really the colonizing and ruling nation with the support of English imperialism. Beginning from 1921, English Zionist finance capital was able to settle in Palestine 250,000 Jewish immigrants.72

It was for this reason that the Comintern claimed that the Arabs had the full right to view Zionism as the main instrument of British imperialist exploitation of their country. As the Comintern wrote, “With the help of Zionist capitalists and fascist organization, the Arabs are being systematically expropriated and impoverished.” 73 The Comintern was also sympathetic to the “the poor Jewish workers,” who were being imported to work for the Zionists and for the British naval military and strategic enterprises in Palestine74 and to the “the povert-striken Jewish workers [who were] incited . . . against the small Arab peasant ”75 Hence, in the outlook of the Comintern, Zionism was an “agency of British and world imperialism” 76 which succeeded in establishing its economic base in Palestine due to the imperialist penetration into the area. The fate of British imperialist rule and of its subservient Zionist economic conquests, Jewish colonization, and agricultural expansion, were bound together: British imperialism required the aid of a Jewish National H om e.. .The British imperialists have.. .given their servants, the Zionists, to understand that if a Jewish conialisalion is to be tolerated at all, then it must proceed along agricultural lines.77

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The Comintern’s position in regard to the two major issues of controversy in Palestine during the years that preceded the riots of 1929, namely, the problem of the Zionist land acquisition and settlement and the issue of Jewish immigration to Palestine, was closely linked to its assessment of the symbiotic relationship of British imperialism and Zionism. On both issues the Comintern took a clearly anti-Zionist or rather pro-Arab position, and with the aid of its agencies in Palestine, the P.C.P. and the Fraction, it engaged itself in a violent attempt to incite the Arabs against the Jews, with the ultimate hope of stirring an agrarian-peasant uprising. On the issue of the Zionist land acquisition and agricultural settlement, the Comintern opportunistically took an anti-Zionist position, in the hope that this would facilitate its influence on Arab Nationalism and the Arab masses in Palestine. On various occasions, the P.C.P. openly admitted its failure to reach the Arabs in Palestine, despite the fact that they constituted an overwhelming majority at the time. The reason given for this “extremely difficult” task was that the Arabs were “inaccessible material.” 95 Inciting the Arabs to resist Jewish land purchases and agricultural settlements, by force if necessary, was thus an ideal opportunity to influence and even to lead them.79 This policy rested on two major assumptions. The first was that Palestine was an Arab land, and if there was to be any future to the Comintern’s revolutionary and anti-colonial struggle, it lay only in its capacity to cast its lot with the majority of the Arabs rather than with a small uprooted “bunch of Jewish colonizing immigrants.” 80 The second assumption was that, inasmuch as an Arab industrial urban proletariat was almost non-existent, the revolutionary potential in Palestine, as well as throughout the Middle East, consisted of an agrarian stock. Hence any unrest or violence that might be stirred up in the countryside could be viewed by the Comintern as the coming of the expected agrarian revolution.81 For its part, the P.C.P.’s rationale in undertaking upon itself the incitement of the Arabs to resort to force in this mater was to prove to the Comintern’s bosses that it was capable of extricating itself from the narrow confines of the “Jewish Ghetto,” within which it had been confined prior to the outbreak of the violence in the countryside. The party herein tried to validate its claim that it subscribed to the theory of the radicalization o f the peasants,82 and that it was determined to lead them on the path of agrarian-revolutionary struggle. The “revolutionary” struggle for the land began in November 1924 when the Zionist Jewish National Fund Organization purchased land in the Valley of Jezreel near Afula, an uninhabited area of swampland plagued by

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malaria, which the Zionist settlers hoped to dry and develop into an agricultural settlement. The purchase was followed by a series of incidents that became known as the Afula case.83 Several Arab Bedouins who were grazing their flock on that land (although with no legal rights) and Arab Fellaheen from nearby villages attacked the Jewish settlers upon their arrival. A clash developed between the two groups in which the police were forced to intervene, and during the course of which one Arab was killed and several Jews and Arabs wounded.84 The Arabs> resistance to the land settlement was to some extent due to the Communist incitement that preceded the bloody confrontation in Afula. After the violence, the P.C.P. argued that “the Zionist bourgeoisie dipped its hands in the blood of Arab and Jewish workers,” and “that the Jewish workers should not let themselves become a Zionist conquering army.” 85 To incite the Arabs, the P.C.P. played upon their nationalistic feelings, calling their resistance “heroic” and “just” . To promote racial tension, the party went so jar as to accuse the Jews of killing the Arab victim, although it was an established fact that the victim was killed by the British police.86 The Comintern’s goal was accomplished — the racial tension that was unleashed in Afula was the beginning of a road which led to the riots of 1929. While the P.C.P. engaged in promoting agrarian revolution in Palestine on the spot, the Comintern analyzed these developments, providing its followers with theoretical guidance. “The Zionist capitalists are taking possession of Arab lands,” and the “Zionist Organization is using innocent and helpless Jewish Workers as cannon fodder for its aggressive, unjust enrichment.” The Comintern declared that the Arabs were being systematically expropriated and impoverished” . . .on the philanthropic pretext of providing a home for the poor, down-trodden Jews of the world.” 87 The Comintern's major purpose was to discredit Zionism as a humanitarian movement and to uncover its alleged vicious, inhuman motives which were concealed behind its idealistic program, in the following way: Thus the Zionists have been given the hint to place once again in the foreground the expropriation campaign against the Arab peasants, which ever since the inception of Zionism has constituted the foundation of this idealistic movement.®

The Comintern drew the conclusion that . . .the Truth as to the Zionist colonization of Palestine.. .means a moral death sentence for Zionism, which is still concealed behind idealistic phrases.®

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The mechanisms and stages of the Zionist Imperialist land conquests were described at great length. In the first stage, the land which Arab peasants were allegedly cultivating was surrendered to the Zionists by the Arab feudal landlords, a wealthy group of reactionary profiteers,90 for large sums of money.91 Then in the second stage, the Arab feudal landlords, also called Effendis, who held the legal title to the land, called the police to come and clear the land, aided by the “Zionist colonizing troops/* This second stage was defined by the Comintern as the “land robbery” stage. Immediately afterwards, in the third stage, the Jewish bourgeoisie, by employing cheap Jewish and Arab workers, rushed to enrich themselves from the conquered land.* It was in the light of the foregoing analysis on the part of the Comintern that the second land clashes occured in Wadi Hawarit (or Havaras), situated midway between Haifa and Tel-Aviv.92 The Comintern gave a rather big spread to this new violent outbreak. It argued that the renewed Zionist “act of conquest” resulted in “serious agrarian disturbances.93 This time, it claimed, the Zionist conquerors, in the form of Halutzim (pioneers) attempted to evict twelve thousand Arab fellaheen from their land. The fellaheen reacted by resorting to “desperate resistance,” in which women and children shouldered together in the struggle. The Comintern’s organ praised the fact that the Arabs succeeded in inflicting casualties upon the invaders.94

Unlike the case of Afula, here the Comintern did not conceal its direct aim in involving itself in this struggle. The P.C.P., in a report to the Comintern, boasted that “the party is making use of actions such as the ejection of the Arab settlers from “Wadi Hawaras” in order to give concrete form to and popularise the slogan of the agrarian revolution and the union of the workers and peasants.” 95 The Comintern was convinced that it had seized upon a revolutionary opportunity “to give additional impetus to linking the chain of peasant uprisings against imperialist colonization in all colonial countries.” 96 To justify the Arab peasants’ resistance, the P.C.P. resorted to a quote from the holy Koran in which it was stated that the “land is the property of God, his prophet, and the Muslim people as a whole,” 97 whereas in reality the fruits of the land went to the feudals, in their exploitation of the poor peasant. It is hard to conceive of the P.C.P. undertaking a religious campaign upon itself to rectify a social evil, but in any event, it appears certain that all justifications of violence and all contentions which might precipitate racial strife in Palestine were endorsed by the Comintern in its fight for the cause of the “anti-Imperialist-Zionist agrarian uprising.” 98 Innocent Jewish

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workers who stood by the Zionist conquerors, in the logic of the Comintern, should pay with blood for the sins of the adventurist, reactionary land expropriation acts of Zionism in Palestine." It is against this background that the Comintern’s struggle against the attempt of the Histadruth (Federation of Jewish Labor) to institute organized labor practices, the so-called drive for Kibush Ha’avodah (“conquest of labor”), should be read. The Histadruth’s activities have already been dealt with in the second chapter, in which the various benefits and compensations extended by it to its members were described. An important effort was made in the late twenties to persuade Jewish citrus growers to hire organized Histadruth labor, rather than to resort to the importation of a cheap and unorganized Arab labor force from the neighboring Arab countries (mostly season workers), called Houranis (foreigners).100 It was a Zionist nationalist drive aimed at “increasing the absorbing capacity” of the Jewish economy, by providing jobs to Jewish newcomers who came to settle in Palestine permanently. During the period of 1927—29, there were several serious conflicts between the Histadruth and the private Jewish citrus growers over the Histadruth’s policy, not always a success, of forcing the citrus growers to hire organized Jewish labor in their plantations. The Comintern and the P.CJP. seized upon this conflict to attack the Histadruth and to side with the imported Arab laborers, although by doing so they found themselves in an unholy alliance with the Jewish citrus owners, some of whom were quite wealthy.101 The P.C.P., in siding with the interests of the poor and underprivileged Arab workers, also sought to undermine the morale of the Jewish labor force and discredit its institution, the Histadruth. The Comintern argued that the Palestinian economy could not absorb new workers, and that because there was no work market for the immigrant Jewish worker, in desperation, and as a result of hisjotal dependence upon the Zionist political institutions and Jewish National funds, he was forced to become a tool for “land conquest” in the Zionist colonization campaign and for other Zionist labor manipulation such as the Kibush Ha’avodah 102 The thesis was that the helpless Jewish workers, victims of the selfish Jewish bourgeoisie, in desperation and misery, had to become colonizers. The Comintern pointed out that labor conditions in Palestine were extremely poor. The large unemployment of 1926 had led to a mass exploitation of cheap labor, because there were no labor laws in the country to regulate and protect the labor market.103 Nevertheless, the Comintern was forced to admit that the Histadruth earnestly attempted to assist its members, but inasmuch as it was in great financial difficulties, it fell short

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of its goals. Its major criticism of the Histadruth was that it pursued nationalistic-Zionist narrow parochial policies by excluding and discrimina­ ting against Arab workers. The whole drive of **Kibush Ha’avodah” therefore, was labeled by the Comintern as “Zionism sinking to its lowest point of bankruptcy.” 104 The Zionist efforts to establish a national economic as well as social unity of the Jewish community were regarded by the Comintern as a failure: Zionism is unable to feed and shelter its own workers, and in desperation, resorts to the drive of Kibush Ha’avodah. Zionism is feeding the hungry Jewish labor with empty nationalist slogans, to conceal its own helplessness.105

Throughout its criticism and review of Zionist efforts in this area, the Comintern seldom acknowledged the pioneering nature (“chalootsivt”) of the new agricultural settlements (Kibush Ha'karkah - the conquest or cultivation of the land) and the drive for Jewish work (Kibush Ha’avodah), preferring to evaluate these drives as motivated by hidden capitalistic interests. In the light of the Comintern’s struggle against th&Kibush Ha’avodah and the Kibush Ha’karkah, it is not difficult to follow its objections to and criticism of the Zionist Jewish immigration to Palestine. It should first of all be noted that the Comintern and the P.C.P. embarked upon a worldwide campaign to halt the Zionist immigration to Palestine. The foremost reason for the Comintern’s opposition to such immigration was its basic ideological conviction that the idea of a Jewish nation was a myth, and that the Jewish people would eventually assimilate in their countries of origin. As far as the Jewish workers were concerned, in the Comintern’s analysis, their fate was tied to that of the working class in their respective countries, and hence they should not be misled by the empty Zionist nationalist slogan — they should remain where they are. But the fact remained that Jewish immigrants and pioneers kept coming to Palestine, in rather considerable numbers, forcing the Comintern’s struggle against the Zionist immigration to shift to Palestine itself. The Comintern sharply condemned such immigration to Palestine, in that “it not only does not solve the problems of the Jewish masses, but it brings destruction and misfortune upon the existing Jewish community in Palestine.”107 In order to discredit the Zionist ideology which brought the immigrants to Palestine, the Comintern preferred to attribute their move to social and economic dislocations, and to the chauvinistic tendencies (anti-Semitic) which were characteristic of the collapsing old capitalist system.108 Palestine had no room to absorb the immigrants, the Comintern argued, because there was already vast unemployment in the country in 1926. It also emphasized that the vast numbers of immigrants who did come

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to this overpopulated and predominantly Arab society found themselves in conflict with the native population. The national tension caused by the Zionist immigration, according to the Comintern, played into the hands of the British imperialists, whose policy was based upon the “maintenance of the Balfour Declaration as a means of stiring up the hatred of the Arabs against the Jewish minority, to rouse to the highest point the nationalreligious antagonism.”109 This Zionist immigration played as well into the hands of the Jewish capitalists and exploiters, who took advantage of this cheap labor force for their own selfish cause. It is perhaps ironic to note that the official Arab objection to Zionist immigration to Palestine was based upon the exact opposite contention. The Arabs looked with disfavor upon the Zionist immigrants who came to Palestine for they were people “whose ideas and habits [were] influenced by the social and bolshevik principles which they [brought] with them .. a strong bolshevik element lias already established itself in the country and has produced an effect on the population.. .” 110 Jamal Husseini, Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, in testimony before the Royal Commission in 1937, confirmed these fears in the following words: As to the communistic principles and ideas of the Jewish immigrants most repugnant to the religious customs and ethical principles o f this country.111

As was mentioned briefly before, the Comintern’s strong campaign against Zionist immigration to Palestine was deeply connected with the Soviet agricultural settlement of the Jewish people in Russia. Emigration from Palestine to the Soviet Union was endorsed by the Comintern and actually carried out by the P.C.P., but Zionist immigration to Palestine was banned! The answer to this paradox, according to the Comintern, lay in the very difference in the nature of the two movements: migration of Jewish workers into Russia was progressive, constructive, in harmony with the socialist construction of the working class as a whole, which was the wave of the future; Zionist immigration to Palestine, on the other hand, was nationalistic and reactionary, in disharmony with the Arab Palestinian environment, and in service of Jewish Capitalism and British Imperialism, and thus doomed .with them both to collapse. Thus in its pervasive anti-Zionist stand, the Comintern totally identified itself with the cause of Arab nationalism in Palestine. It is indeed difficult to assess the extent of influence that the P.C.P. gained among the Arab masses, in upholding a fierce oposition to Zionism, to Jewish immigration, and to the Zionist settlement in Palestine. If the extent of influence was not impressive, it was not due to the Comintern, for its part, during the above-mentioned period, stood behind the Arabs and cham­ pioned their cause with almost no reservation. It is useful at this point to

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briefly examine the Comintern’s attitude towards Arab Nationalism as a whole in Palestine. The Comintern held no illusions about the revolutionary prospects within the Arab community in Palestine, and as early as 1923 (a year before the founding and the admission of the P .C i\ to the Comintern), the Comintern observed that the Arab community as an entity was most “primitive.”112 Inasmuch as they were a rural, stable, and traditional community, the Arabs had no real proletariat (a by-product of an urban, industrial base), and, consequently, no revolutionary following.113 The Arab community was essentially comprised of two classes: the upper class, the landlord oligarchy, well-entrenched economically and socially, conservative in its political outlook, and reactionary in terms of its social attitudes; and beneath them, the masses of Arab peasants, the Fellaheen, who lived in misery and ignorance. At the very same time, although politically quite discouraged with regards to the state of economic and social development of the Arab community and the subsequently bleak prospects for revolutionary action in their midst, the Comintern nevertheless made it explicitly clear that “the Arab nation that lives and labors in Palestine has the sole right over that land.. .Palestine is an Arab land!”114 The explanation for the Comintern’s position was simple: “There are many millions of Arabs in the area, but there are only a few hundred thousands of Jews,” and “The Arabs are Muslims, and Islam is the religious and social base in the Near East.”115 As far as the Comintern was concerned, the Arabs therefore had the absolute right to demand the establishment of a “large and free state of their own,” in accordance with their own particular desires.116 Furthermore, because the Arabs had the legitimate claim for the land, it was the responsibility of any progressive Jewish worker to uphold the Arab cause and to support their struggle for liberation.117 A similar directive based on the foregoing was issued to the P.C.P., the Comintern’s arm in Palestine. From the inception of the Party in 1924, the Comintern demanded that the Party apply the principle of territorialization and therefore Arabize itself.118 Up to 1927, the Comintern’s urge for Arabization meant that the P.C.P. should recruit more Arab members into the Party. The P.C.P., with its Jewish leadership and following, tried hard to accomplish this task but with no results.119 The Comintern argued that the difficulties in recruiting Arabs were subjective rather than objective, and now demanded that there be not only an Arab following in the Party, but also an Arab leadership.120 And indeed, an utmost effort was made by the Jewish leadership of the P.C.P. to recruit young Arab leaders, some of

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whom were sent* to Moscow to attend the University of the Toilers of the East.121 The trouble was that promising young Communist Arab leaders were scarce, and of the few who were recruited, most did not last long in the party, while several became government informers and agents.122 (The forceful Arabization of the Party after the riots and its impact upon, the party’s cause in Palestine will be dealt with in a later chapter.) Stalin’s famous speech before the University of the Toilers of the East in 1924 established the fact that the dominant bourgeois class in the East consisted of both a revolutionary-progressive wing and of a counterrevolu­ tionary one, and that it wthe task of the Communist Parties to form a united front with those progressive elements.123 In Palestine, this posed the P .C i\ with a serious dilemma, namely, to find that progressive group from amongst a predominantly reactionary leadership. The Comintern denounced the treacherous activities of some of the Arab Palestinian leaders, like Jamal Husseini124 of the Arab Higher Committee, for maintaining a compromising position with the British and it criticized the Arab feudal Effendis for conspiring against the Fellaheen by selling land to the Zionist colonizers.125 It also severely critized the Arab bourgeoisie for their overriding concern with their businesses rather than with the political struggle of the Arabs in Palestine for freedom.126 The Comintern argued that these dangerous bourgeois compromisers were capable of selling the Arab national cause for some privileges or other benefits.127 In short, the Comintern discredited the Arab feudal leadership as reactionary, clerical and bourgeois, considering them as fraught with peril as the “Zionist social fascists.” 128 The only progressive element that the Comintern spotted in Palestine was Hamdi Husseini, one of the founders of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, who became known as its left-wing leader.129 Hamdi Husseini became the secretary of the League Against Imperialism in Palestine (a Comintern front organization), and in this capacity took a militant anti-British, as well as an extreme anti-Zionist-Jewish position. He maintained personal contacts with the P.C.P, and the Comintern and attended various international anti-imperialist gatherings sponsored by the Comintern, during the course of which he even visited the Soviet Union in the early thirties. According to a Comintern source, when Hamdi Husseini was arrested on one occasion by the British Government, he was hailed as a great and brave hero by the Communists. 130 Nonetheless, the relationship between Husseini and the Comintern was by no means perfectly harmonious,131 and he was later regarded by the Comintern as belonging to an ‘intermediary group’ in the Arab power

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structure, looked upon as part of the petty-bourgeois-revolutionary group, between the Arab Executive Committee on the side of reaction, and the new national liberation, agrarian revolutionary group of workers and peasants on the side of progress.132 The last group existed more in the Comintern’s imagination that in the political reality of Palestine, and was utilized in particular after the 1929 riots as a postscript for the allegedly revolutionary situation in the country. In any case, the fact conclusively remains that the Comintern did not approve of the existing Arab leadership, nor did it have any serious allies or mass following with the Arab community. The only possible ’avenue open before the Comintern to reach the Arab masses was the popularity it gained as a result of its militant anti-Zionist, and for that matter, (although denied by the Comintern), anti-Jewish stand,133 as well as its fierce anti-British position. tTo restate the Comintern’s position vis-a-vis Zionism, the Comintern endorsed a line of anti-Zionist agitation that evoked emotional Arab sympathy as a result of their fears, some imaginary and some tangible grievances. With regards to the Arab fears, the Comintern asserted that “the Arab workers see in the Jew not only a competitor but a Gendarm.’’134 Furthermore, “it is only the protective British shield of tanks and planes that keep the Arabs intact, and enables at the same time the Jewish bourgeoisie to display acts of courage by attacking the Arabs.”135 The Comintern depicted the Arab workers and peasants as the helpless victims of the Zionist—Imperialist colonizing forces, who were jointly and viciously exploiting the poor Arabs. In order to stir up Arab excitement against the British government, the Comintern reminded the Arabs of their long-lasting grievances resulting from the unfulfilled deceitful promises of the Mandatory Government, The Comintern cited the British promise of 1916 to grant the Arabs independence, and cynically reiterated to the Arabs that the Balfour Declaration was the Government’s activation of this promise.136 In sum, the Comintern, time and again, put forth the thesis that it was the unholy alliance of Zionist Social fascists and British imperialists that was responsible for the unfavorable situation in which the Arabs in Palestine found themselves. Apart from championing the Arab cause on the propaganda level, the Comintern instructed its following to take an active part on many issues. The Communist incitement of the Arabs in Afula and in Wadi Hawarat has already been noted. In both cases, the P.C.P. agitators in advance encouraged the Arab Bedouins to forcibly resist the land settlement, thereby paving the way for the. bloodshed.137 In an attempt to lead the resistance, the P.C.P. published pamphlets calling upon various Arab groups and parties to join forces.138

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Similarly, in regards to the Comintern’s struggle against the Histadruth’s drive for Kibush Ha'avodah (the Conquest of Work), the P.C.P. engaged itself in several actual conflicts on behalf of the Arab workers, arguing that any attempt to lay off Arab workers should be resisted by force.139 Likewise, a pro-Arab position was adopted by the Comintern with regard to the issue of Zionist immigration to Palestine. The Jewish immigration, it was claimed, was directed to drive the Arabs from their work, and it was a deliberate attempt to expropriate the Arabs in order to make room for more Zionists in the land.140 The Comintern’s support for the Arab cause can be seen in other forms as well. Although it boycotted almost all the elections within the Jewish Community, the P.C.P. did participate in local Arab elections.141 In 1924, during the elections in Jerusalem, the Party agitated in favor of Husseini’s candidacy for the mayorship of the city.142 In 1929, right after the riots, it supported the Arab terrorists who were arrested and convicted by the Government. It initiated a campaign designed to exert pressure upon the Government to pardon those who were sentences to death, and it glorified those patriots who were jailed.143 The Comintern identified its own members who were jailed with the Arab terrorists, calling them brothers and comrades for the cause of Arab freedom.144 The Grand Mufti Haj Amin al—Husseini’s newspaper, G'arm 'h-el-Arabiya, complimented the Comintern for its help and support in this regard.145 The Comintern constantly strove to keep the pot boiling in Palestine, by sustaining Arab moral and anti-Zionist belligerency, sending to the Arabs during the 1929 riots“Cardinal Greetings to all fighters for Arab national emancipation.” 146 The Comintern’s hope that the Arab disturbances would turn into a genuine social struggle within the Arab community (leading to a radicalization of the class struggle) and that the attacks against the Jewish settlement would evolve into a revolutionary anti-imperialist uprising of peasants and workers did in no way materialize. NOTES TO CHAPTER VI 1.

For a detailed expose of Its Marxist-Leninist position, see Moshe Sneh, Sikumim Bashe’elah Halumit (On the National Question: Conclusions in the Light o f Marxism-Leninism), (Tel-Aviv: 1954), Chapter Five, pp. 85-147.

2.

“The Proletarian Solution of the Jewish Colonization and National Question,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 61, October 25,1929, p. 1319. Leo Katz, “The Last Phase o f Zionism,” Imprecorr, Vol 11, No. 39, July 23,1931, p.724.

3.

The Comintern’s Political and Ideological Struggle Against Zionism in Palestine 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

101

Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 61, October 25,1929, p. 1322. The emphasis upon Western European Jewry was an obvious attempt to identify the Jewish problem with the capitalist system. Otto Heller, “The Solution of the Jewish Question in the Soviet Union,” Imprecorr, Vol. 11, No. 17, March 26,1931, p. 339. Katz, loc. c it.. Ibid. J.B., “ Zionism is Bankrupt” (A Book Review), Imprecorrf Vol. 10, No. 41, September 4,1930, pp. 865-66. Ibid. Katz,/oc. c it.. “Michtav Galuy Shel P.C.P. Lechol Havrei Gdud Ha’avodah,” (An Open Letter to the Members of the Workers’ Battalion from the P.C.P.), October 25, 1926, as quoted by Yisraeli, MOPS-PCP-MAKI, p. 38. “To the Jewish Proletariate, from the E.C.C.I.,” Moscow, July 25, 1922, as published in the Imprecorr, Vol. 2, No. 63, August 1,1922, p. 63. “Against British Imperialism in Palestine,” Manifesto of the League Against Imperialism, Imprecorr, Vol. 19, No. 47, September 6 , 1929,p. 992. “ Resolution of the Political Secretariate of the E.C.C.I.- on the Insurgent Movement in Arabistan,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 6, February 6, 1930, pp. 104-106, “ Against British Imperialism in Palestine,” pp. 991-92. Imprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 72, October 17,1928, p. 1310. “Questions of the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies (the Sixth World Congress),” Imprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 72, pp. 1310-11. Ibid. Comrade Heidar (Palestine), “Tenth Session of the Communist International,” Imprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 48, August 11,1928, p. 851. “Against British Imperialism in Palestine,” op. cit., p. 992. J.B., “ Zionism is Bankrupt,”op. cit., p. 866. P.K., “The Struggle of the Arabs in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 13, No. 49, November 10,1933, p. 1088. “The Revolt in Palestine,” Communique by the OC of the C.P. o f Palestine, Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 54, September 27,1929, pp. 1161-63. Y.Z. Kolton, “Sotsial Demokratism o Baderech Le-Fashism,” (Social Demo­ cracy or on the Road to Fascism), in Ha'or, Vol. 3, No. 10, July 4, 1933, p. 32. A. Lerner, “Skirat Mahne Ha'oyev,” (Review of the Enemy’s Camp), Ha'or, Vol. 3, No. 13, Aug. 17,1933, p. 25. Ibid, and Moshe Hashomroni, “Leumiyut Vesotsialism,” (Nationalism and Socialism: The Ideology of Zionist Labor Movement), Ha'or, Vol. I, No. 14-15, November 1931, p. 10. Karl Franz, “ Anti-Soviet Incitement at the XVIII Zionist Congress,” Imprecorr, Vol. 13, No. 38, September 1,1933, p. 824. Richard Kisch, “ The Intelligent Man’s Guide to Jew Baiting,” Imprecorr, Vol. 15, No. 7, February 16,1935, p. 224.

102 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Franz, loc. c it.. Ibid,. Walter Laqueui, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 103. J.B., “ Zionism is Bankrupt/’ op. cit., p. 866. J.B., “Zionism in the Camp of the White Guardists,” Imprecorr, Vol. 12, No. 22, May 19,1932, p. 427. 35. Ibid. 36. J.B., “Lord Balfour, His Zionist Lackeys and the Toiling Masses in Palestine/' Imprecorr, Vol. 5, No. 36, April 23,1925, p. 476. 37. J.B., “Intensified Reaction in Palestine/’ Imprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 5, 1928, pp. 6 -7 . 38. Ibid. 39. Comrade Heidar, (Palestine), loc. cit. as well as VoL 9, No. 47, pp. 991 -9 9 2 . 40. Yisraeli, op.cit., p. 95. 41. J.B., “ Zionism in the Camp of the White Guardists,” loc. cit., argued that Zionism collaborated with the White Guardist movement on two historical occasions. The first was in 1917 when allegedly Mr. Pasmanik, a Zionist leader, joined the Russian Monarchists. On the second occasion, it was Vladimir Zhabotinsky who allegedly collaborated with Petljura, the reactionary leader of the Ukraine, With regard to Zhabotinsky's involvement, see the Zionist account in Itzhak Rabinovich, Mimoskva ad Yerushalayim, (From Moscow to Jerusalem), (Jerusalem: 1957), pp. 38-41. 42. See “Brit Ha'noar Hakomonisti," (The Young Communist League in Palestine) in the CC's Statement of June 1932, in Archion Ha’avodah, Tel-Aviv, Israel. 43. The Comintern did not fail to remind its readers that Rutenberg was a Russian engineer, a member of the Social Revolutionaries during the February Revolution, and that Alexander Kerensky, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Russion Government, had appointed him to be a Chief of Police. See F. Kapeliush, “English Imperialism in Palestine," Imprecorr, Vol. 2, No. 65, August 4,1927, pp. 486-87. 44. “The Trans-Jordanian Adventure/’ Ha'or, Vol. 3, No. 5 -6 , March 10, 1933, pp. 5 -6 . 45. H., “The Terror Against the Revolutionaries in Palestine/* Imprecorr, Vol. 12, May 26,1932, pp. 463-64. 46. See Chapter Four.47. Katz, op. cit., p. 724. 48. Hatnuah Hakomonistit Bepalestina (The Communist Party in Palestine), (Warsaw: 1930) in Yiddish, as quoted by Yisraeli, p. 28. It deals with a group of P.C.P. members who in 1924 were openly advocating mass emigration from Palestine. 49. See the A.G.R.O. Appeal to the Jewish Community in Palestine, Tel-Aviv, 1926. (pamphlet) Archion Ha-avodah. ' 50. Bob, “The Communist Party in Palestine and the Arab Revolt,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 61, October 25,1929, p. 1322. 51. P. Kitaigorodski, “The Bloody Events in Palestine/’ Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 47, September 6,1929, pp. 990-1.

The Comintern’s Political and Ideological Struggle Against Zionism in Palestine 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57.

58. 59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67.

68.

103

Otto Heller, “The Solution of the Jewish Question in the Soviet Union - Part IV* Imprecorr, Vol. 11, No. 19, April 9,1931, pp. 370-71. J.B., “The British Reign of Terror in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 11, No. 63, October 10,1931, p. 1141; Katz, loc. c it.. J.B., “The Bankruptcy of Zionism,” op. c i t, pp. 428-9 . It was a matter of historical coincidence that the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia at the very same time that the Balfour Declaration was issued, symbolizing the two alternative paths towards the solution of the Jewish problem. See The Intelligence Reports in The Public Record Office, London, War Office 106, File 189, Document No. 35, dated February 1, 1918, titled “ Notes on Zionism.” This is an intelligence research study of the strength of the Zionist movement in Russia for that year. It describes the excitement that swept the Russian Jewry when the news of the Balfour Declaration reached them, and it reveals a plan conceived by Russian Zionist Jews to establish a company to acquire land in Palestine, and establish a maritime line that would sail between the Black sea area and Palestine, to facilitate Zionist immigration to Palestine. F. Kapeliush, “ English Imperialism in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 2, No'. 65, August 4,1922, pp. 486—87. J.B., op. c it.. Ibid. Franz, loc. cit. J.B., “The Palestine Programme of the British Social Imperialists,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 50, November 6,1930, p. 1041. J.B., “Political Regroupings in Arabia,” Imprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 43, August 2, 1928, p. 758. A.B., “ Autocracy in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 4, No. 4, January 24, 1924, p. 32. J.B., “The Imperialists and the Revolutionary Movement in Syria and Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 5, No. 40, April 29, 1925, pp. 531-32. Alini, “The Political Situation in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 50, September 3, 1929, pp. 1055-1057. Among the most important privileges the author notes the following: an exclusive right for unlimited immigration, the right to establish tax-free agricultural settlements on governmental land, administrative autonomy and local government in areas where the Jews formed a majority, and an increase in the number of Jews holding government office, including the police. “MacDonald's Hypocritical Palestine Declaration: an Appeal of the League Against Imperialism,” issued on November 1, 1930, in Berlin, Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 51, November 13,1930, p. 1056. “ The Revolt in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 54, September 27, 1929, pp. 1161-63.

104 70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

79. 80. 81. 82.

83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE B.R., "The Bloody Events In Palestine,” Imprecorr; Vol. 13, No. 48, November 3, 1933, pp. 1058-59. The sources enumerate: intellectuals, doctors, engineers, lawyers, as well as Jewish traders and businessmen. J. Crossley, “British Reign of Tenor in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 40, July 26,1928, pp. 721-72. Imprecorr, Vol. 15, No. 54, October 17,1935, pp. 1344-45. “ Against British Imperialism in Palestine: Manifesto of the League Against Imperialism,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No, 47, September 6,1928, pp. 991 -9 2 . Ibid. J.B., “The Fight for the Land in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 30, August 9,1929, pp. 809-10. M.Z., “Biro-Bidjan - An Autonomous Jewish Province,” Imprecorr, Vol. 14, No. 32, June 1,1934, p. 856. J.B., loc. cit. “The Labor Movement in Palestine,” Imprecorr, VoL 3, No. 50, 1923, pp. 518-519, as well as Alini, loc. cit who argued “that there is no national-revolutionary political party in Palestine.” Hatnuah Hakomunistit Bepalestinah (The Communist Party in Palestine), Vol. 1, p. 42, as quoted by Yisraeli, op. c it, p. 34. Ibid., p. 33. “The Revolt in Palestine,” loc. cit . Bob, “The Fight Against the Right Deviation in the C.P. of Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 29, June 21, 1929, pp. 647-48 as well as Yisraeli, op. c it p. 31. Bob argued that the revolutionary developments in Palestine which resulted from the radicalization of the masses took place as early as 1920 during the riots of Nebi Musah in Jerusalem. Yisraeli, op. cit, p. 32. Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, p. 78. “ Kruz Ha’va'ad Hayafoie Shel P.C.P.” (An Appeal of the Jaffa Committee of the P.C.P.), November 29,1924, Archion Ha’avodah, Tel-Aviv. See the Freiheit, New York, January 19,1925. “ Against British Imperialism in Palestine,” op. c it J.B., loc. c it.. . J.B., “The Zionist Terror in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 5, No. 5, January 15, 1925, pp. 43-44. It should be emphasized that most of the lands were totally uncultivated. See J.B., “The Fight for the Land in Palestine,” op. c i t . “The P.C.P. Open Statement in regards to events in Afula 1928” in Kovetz Pirsumei P.C.P., (Tel-Aviv: 1950). Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, p. 81. Bob, “The Agrarian Disturbances in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 43, September 13,1930, p. 960.

The Comintern's Political and Ideological Struggle Against Zionism in Palestine 94

95. 96.

97.

9 8. 99.

100. 101.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

109. 110.

105

The following description is cited for illustration. MFor four years the Zionist colonizers are conquering under the shield of the British bayonets and the soldiers of the Haganah, step by step, the Wadi Hawarat; the Bedouin retreat, but after an heroic resistance.” Yisraeli, p. 52. Bob, “ Advances of Communism in the Arabian Countries,” Impresorr, Vol. 10, No. 49, October 30,1930, p. 1018. “Hashelah Ha’agrarit (The Agrarian Question),” OC, P.C.P., February 1929, and in Kovetz Pirsumei P.C.P., 1923-24, The C.C. P.C.P. Statement of September 1920, pp. 67-68. “She’elat Hakarka - Tsionut o Komonism’* (The Land Question - Zionism or Communism), issued by the c.c. of the P.C.P., February 1929. Archion Ha’avodah, Tel-Aviv. , See Ko vetz Pirsumei P. C.P., 1923—24. The drive was called Kibush Ha'karkah (“Conquest of the Land”) and meant breaking the new frontiers of the Zionist settlement. See the P.C.P. Appeal of September 1930 as quoted by Yisraeli, p. 52. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 81-82. The Jewish citrus growers, for economic reasons, sought inexpensive labor, and it was much cheaper to hire the foreign Arab migrant workers that the organized Jewish workers of the Histadruth. See Yisraeli, p. 54. Avigdor, “The Labor Movement in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 3, No. 33, April 19,1923, p. 283-4. Alini, “The Situation of the Workers in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 54, September 27,1921, p. 1161. Yisraeli, op.cit., p. 54. Ze’ev Berman, “ Lekakh Meoraot Petah-Tikvah” (The Lesson of Petah-Tikvah), as quoted by Ibid. “She’elat Ha'karkah,” loc. cit. “Michtav Galuy Shel P.C.P. Lechol Havre Gdud Ha’avodah”, as quoted by Yisraeli, op. cit., p. 38. In actuality, they drew a basic distinction between “consciousness” immigration that resulted from propaganda and immigration that resulted from fear of persecution. See N. List, “Tsadak Hakomintern” (The Comintern was Right), Keshet (4), p. 112. J.B., “ MacDonald’s Palestine Report,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 18, April 10, 1930, pp. 347-48. M.E.T. Mogannan, The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem (London: 1937), pp. 217-18, as quoted in Palestine: A Study o f Jewish, Arab and British Policies, The ESCO Foundation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), Vol. I, p. 529.

111. Minutes of the Palestine Royal Commission,*p. 236, as quoted by Ibid., p. 529. 112. Avigdor, “The Labor Movement in Palestine,” p. 284. 113. Ibid. The Comintern was forced to admit that the only labor movement in Palestine was the Jewish one, consisting exclusively of Jewish immigrants. The Arab peasants, according to the Comintern's assessment, were incapable of

106

114. 115. 116. 117.

118.

119.

120.

121. 122.

123. 124. 125.

126. 127.

128. 129. 130. 131.

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE organizing themselves. See “The Crisis in the Arab National Movement,” (in Yiddish) in Arbeter Klasen, October 1924, as quoted by Yisraeli, p. 40. See the P.C.P. Memorandum to the Seventh Arab Conference that gathered in Jerusalem in June 28,1928, in Kovet2 Pirsumei P.C.P., pp. 41 -4 2 . Franz, op. tit., p. 824. “For the Struggle of the Freedom of Arab People, Appeal of the League Against Imperialism,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 64, November 15,1929, pp. 1372-73. J.B., “Partisan and Mass Fights in Palestine,” and J.B., “The Palestine Programme o f the British Social Imperialists,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 50, November 6,1930, p. 1041. It was Karl Radek, the head of the Eastern Section in the Comintern, who argued that the party's future was vitally linked to a rapid Arabization. Yisraeli, p. 29. It appears that other Middle Eastern Communist Parties were even less Arabized than the P.C.P.. In all of them, members of the minority groups assumed the leading positions. List, op. cit., (5), Keshet, 27,1965, p. 89. List argues that the Comintern’s accusations were totally unfounded in the reality of Palestine, and only alienated and frustrated the Jewish leadership of the P.C.P.. Ibid, p. 90. See Chapter Four. In Jaffa in 1931, the British arrested Sidqi Najati, one of the P.C.P. Arab leaders. In the course of the trial, his brother Ahmed Sidqi (a police informer) testified that he studied in the Moscow University of the Toilers of the East, and as such became an expert about Communist affairs. He disclosed all contacts he had with the Comintern and with the Soviet Security organ, the O.G.P.U., and disclosed the military training program that was extended in Moscow to the foreign students in the above-mentioned school. For the details, see Bob, “Arabian Communists Before the Court,” Imprecorr, Vol 11, No. 28, May 28, 1931, p.515. Yisraeli, p. 39. J.B., “Partisan and Mass Fights in Palestine,” op. c it, pp. 1478—79. “ Resolution of the Political Secretariate of the E.C.CI. on the Insurgent Movement in Arabistan,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 6, February 6, 1930, pp. 104—08, and J.B., “The Fight for the Land in Palestine,” loc. cit. . Bob, “The Communist Party of Palestine and the Arab Masses,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 16, March 27,1930, pp. 325-26. J.B., “ McDonald's Palestine Report,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 18, April 10, 1930, pp. 347-48, and Alini, “The Political Situation in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 50, September 13,1929, pp. 1055-57. J.B., “The Pacification of Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 58, October 11, 1929, pp. 1242-1243. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 90, and List, (5), p. 85. “ Against Imperialist Terror in Palestine,” issued by the League Against Imperialism, Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 62, November 1,1929, pp. 1339-40. List, op. cit., (5), pp. 85-86, argued that there was never a real accord between the P.C.P. and Hamdi Husseini.

The Comintern’s Political and Ideological Struggle Against Zionism in Palestine 132. 133.

134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146.

107

Mustapha Sadi, “The National Question at the VII Ffcuty Congress of the C J\ of Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 11, No. 3, January 22,1931, p. 64. List, (5), p. 91, states that the Comintern’s policy in this matter amounted open national discrimination against the Jewish group. Why could the Jews represented in the Bolshevik Revolution in large numbers and not represented in the Comintern work there as well! (particularly when there were no Arab leaders available) J.B., “Lord Balfour, His Zionist Lackeys and Toiling Masses of Pales­ tine,”op. cit., p. 476. Ibid. “ MacDonald’s Hypocritical Palestine Declaration,” an appeal o f the League Against Imperialism,Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 51, November 13,1930, p. 1056. Yisraeli, p. 32. Ibid., p. 52. J.B., “The British Reign of Tenor in Palestine,” p. 1141. Sadi, op. cit., p. 64. lis t, (5), p. 81. Yisraeli, pp. 40-41. J.B., “ Bloodshed and Treachery of the MacDonald Government in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 30, June 26,1930, pp. 540-41. J.B., “MacDonald’s Gallow and Knot in Palestine,” Imprecorr, VoL 9, No. 63, November 8,1929, pp. 1356-57. List, (5), pp. 85-86. “For the Struggle for Freedom of Arab People,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 64, November 15,1929, pp. 1372-73.

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CHAPTER Vn The Comintern and the 1929 Riots in Palestine From its very inception, as the previous chapter has shown, Zionism had unreservedly been condemned by the Comintern as a reactionary movement. This condemnation persisted throughout the years 1926—1929. Although the Comintern’s arm in Palestine, the P.C.P., with its Jewish leadership as well as its Jewish following, took great pains to uphold the Comintern’s position, they did so with considerable misgivings and at great political costs. By upholding the Comintern’s platform, they automatically excommunicated themselves from the Jewish Community living in Palestine, and inasmuch as this was the only constituency within which the party could function, they thereby condemned themselves to near isolation and impotence. Despite their objection to Zionism in principle as an ideology and a political program, many Jewish party members as well as the party’s Jewish leadership had in the past greatly admired the idea of building a new, constructive, and pioneering Jewish life in Palestine,1 entertaining emo­ tional and sentimental ties with the bulk of the Zionist workers’ pioneering endeavors, and on various occasions sharing the burden by taking an active part in it.2 After all, the pioneering Zionists were their own kin, emanating from the same country of origin, and dedicated to the building of socialism (albeit of a Zionist brand) so as to attain a dignified and just life. By drying swamp lands and eliminating diseases, by cultivating and farming desolate lands, by building communal agricultural settlements for Jewish refugees, the Zionist settlers in Palestine hardly fited into the terrifying negative image portrayed by the Comintern in its official pronouncements (which by and large systematically ignored the positive achievements of the Zionist settlers). For the majority of the P.CJP. membership, this dilemna of struggling between their loyalty to the Comintern line and demands and their sentiments to their fellow Jewish men fighting for survival was difficult to reconcile.3 The P.C.P.’s pro’Zionist feeling (reference is made to a sympathy for the Zionist pioneers rather than to an advocacy of Zionist ideology) emerged from time to time on the surface, even filtering into the Comintern’s publications in the form of casual statements which clearly reflected an element of deep sympathy and even admiration for the progressive and humane pioneering endeavors of the Zionist workers in

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Palestine. Thus when commenting about a Jewish—Arab rapprochement, the Comintern stated in its publication: “Only within democratic institutions can be all that is best in the heroic work of the Jewish settlers be conserved and strengthened as a force for progress and of benefit to the Arabs as well as the Jews.”4 On yet another occasion, the Comintern suggested that the Histadruth (the Jewish Federation of Labor) might serve as a model to the Arabs, encouraging them to set up similar institutions in order to advance the cause of the Arab workers.5 Although appearing in the context of a generally severe criticism of Zionism, the following paragraph illustrates a tone and line of thinking far from hostile towards the Zionist pioneering work in Palestine: Much valuable pioneer work has been successfully undertaken by the immigrants, notably in the reclamation of malaria — breeding swampy land . . . and the creation of thriving agricultural communes. In this task unstinted praise must be given to the Young Jewish Pioneers, the Haluzim, for their hard work and splendid idealism. Nor can it be denied that the Jewish workers, experienced in the class struggle of the countries of their origin and persecution, have built up in Palestine a strong, virile labor trade union and co-operative movement, which has had the effect of also raising the working class level of the Arabs in the country, and has built up strong bonds of mutual understanding and sympathy between broad masses of the Arab and Jewish workers.6

These sentiments were reflected in the P.CiVs doctrine of “Yishuvism,” 7 the theoretical approach which dominated the history of the Party’s struggle against Zionism from 1924 until the Sixth Comintern’s Congress. In principle this doctrine approached the Jewish community in Palestine in positive terms, by attributing to it a major progressive role in the social and economic development of Palestine. Accordingly, the doctrine regarded the Jewish labor movement, although dominated by Zionism, as a significant factor and a positive influence in the cause of revolution in the East. It was an original theory developed by the P.CJE\ leadership in its attempt to justify before the Comintern its persistent activity within the Jewish Community against the insistence of the Comintern that the Party abandon the “Jewish Ghetto,” and entrench itself within the Arab masses. In essence, the doctrine of “Yishuvism” attempted to draw a dividing line between Zionism on one side, and the rise of the Jewish community in Palestine on the other, thereby upholding the pioneering Zionist construc­ tion and activities, while dissociating this achievement from the Zionist movement and the Zionist ideology.8 In reality, it was almost a full endorsement of the Zionist program and its accomplishments in Palestine; and, at the same time, a rejection of the tenets of Zionist nationalism, asserting to the contrary that the interests of the Jewish and the Arab communities in Palestine were identical. Such a compromise enabled the

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P.C.P. on the local level, at least for a period of time, to achieve a certain measure of acceptability and to score several modest temporary political victories.9 With the increasing influx of capital into Palestine after 1927, and the growing capitalist enterprise in the country, the P.C.P. modified its doctrine of Yishuvism along the lines of traditional Marxist analysis, thus assigning a positive role to the capitalist development in Palestine and regarding it as a major positive social and exonomic force in the country’s transition from under-development to socialism. The P.C.P. argued, in line with the Marxist theory of revolution, that capitalist development in Palestine rather than the Zionist program was the answer to the problems of the country.10 Zionism, with its selfish and parochial policies, was denounced as a hindrance to the normal economic development of the country, for it attempted to centrally control and plan Zionist agricultural settlements. The source of all economic dislocations, including the large unemployment that Palestine experienced during the period lasting from 1926—28, was seen in Zionist insistence on large, organized Zionist immigration to Palestine and in its drive for Kibush Ha'avodah. 11 According to the P.C.P., the only solution to the economic crisis in Palestine was the abandonment of Zionism with its dream of a national Jewish economy. Instead, the P.C.P. urged a merger with the Arabs into a joint capitalist venture. The Kibutzim (Jewish collective agricultural settlements) and all the industrial enterprises of the Histadruth (Jewish federation of labor), in this analysis, were subsequently to be swept away by the dynamic development of capitalism. Hence, Jewish workers of Palestine, rather than to assume upon themselves the great burdens of a pioneering socialist economy as dictated by Zionism, were urged to exclusively engage themselves in capitalist enterprises and to secure for themselves the rewards and profits of their labor. Furthermore, so the analysis went, only in a capitalist course of economic development would class differentiation take place, and as a consequence, would class-consciousness emerge among the Jewish as well as among the Arab working masses, leading to the inevitable “class conflict” which would radicalize the workers to a point where anti-colonialistimperialist uprisings would become feasible.12 In line with its advocacy of natural capitalist development the P.C.P. made serious efforts to de-Zionise the Histadruth and its projects, calling upon it to renounce its Zionist political activities and to concentrate upon its trade union responsibilities. Instead of embarking upon an effort to stimulate the economy by offering public work and by handling

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unemployment benefits, the Histadruth, according to this formulation of Yishuvism, should concentrate on organizing the workers and improving their lot. This was part of a concerted effort to shove a wedge between the mass of Jewish workers and the Zionist political institutions. A similar interpretation was accorded the issue of immigration to Palestine. The doctrine of Yishuvism argued that immigration to Palestine was essentially a direct result of changing economic conditions in Europe, rather than the result of a well-planned, coordinated Zionist effort to settle Palestine in accordance with its political goals. In other words, immigration to Palestine was to be viewed as a normal phenomenon, resulting from “objective” historical conditions in Europe and it was basically unrelated to Zionism or to any other ideology. The doctrine acknowledged that social and national pressures, in the form of religious persecution or ethnic discrimination in Europe, might have accelerated the immigration waves, but it emphasized that the arrival of these many thousands of Jews was in its core due to the fact that they were weak, helpless and “incapable of waging a social struggle” in their countries of origin. Under most circumstances, persecution of a minority group would encourage civil struggle rather than^emigration, which was deemed the easy way out. The doctrine labeled the Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe as “ Luftmentchen” (uprooted), a term signifying those who lacked ties to their countries of origin and who had left for purposes of personal convenience. There was thereupon no reason to block such an immigration to Palestine.13 A parallel interpretation was given for the influx of Jewish capital. The doctrine argued that this capital had nothing to do with Zionism; it was attracted to Palestine out of sheer economic, profit-oriented calculations because Palestine was a developing territory with an attractive, large, cheap labor market.14 For all the above-mentioned reasons, the P.C.P. maintained that the immediate tasks of the Jewish Community were to extricate itself from the Zionist spell, to abandon the illusionary and misleading Zionist ambitions and to confine itself to its immediate economic and social needs which were in harmony with the majority Arab population. It was assumed throughout this doctrine of Yishuvism that Zionism found itself entangled in a web of self-destructive contradictions. On the one hand, Zionism benefited from the feudal social and economic order in Palestine by acquiring lands from Arab feudal landlords which might be extended into Zionist settlements. Yet at the very same time, by its insistence upon mass Zionist immigration, and by virtue of its precipitation of modernization tendencies, Zionism was destroying the very feudal system from which it derived its benefits and its power.

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In addition, so the analysis went, Zionist goals lay at cross-purposes with those of the Jewish bourgeoisie. The Jewish bourgeoisie, as they were by and large motivated by profit considerations, resorted to hiring cheap Arab labor, and by doing so, constantly dealt with the Arabs, hence undermining the national barriers which Zionism attempted to erect between the two communities. In this respect, although motivated by selfish economic pursuits, the Jewish bourgeoisie were to be regarded as playing an “objectively” progressive historical role —helping to unite the Jewish and the Arab communities by a viable economy, which would eventually lead the country to the road of independence. At such a point, the Jewish bourgeoisie would conclusively turn against Zionism, so the doctrine assumed, for Zionism attempted to lead the Jewish masses in Palestine on the opposite course, namely the subjugation by its patron, the British imperialists. At the same time, the Jewish bourgeoisie would clash with the British government, in a drive to protect its economic interests against the Government-protected influx of cheap British goods. The political future of Palestine, therefore, lay in ridding the country of both British imperialism and its subservient Zionist lackeys.15 The doctrine of Yishuvism formulated by the P.CP. was congruent with the underlying ideological pronouncements of the Comintern in regard to the capitalistic model of economic development envisioned in the underdeveloped colonies. According to this theory, the national bourgeoisie in the East, unlike their counterpart in Europe, were bound to play, from an “objective” historical point of view, a progressive social, economic, and political role. Therefore it was imperative, from a long-range revolutionary vantage point, according to the Comintern, to free the national bourgeoisie to chart its democratic course of growth to the point where its interests would conflict and ultimately clash with the oppressive colonial rule. Through its doctrine of Yishuvism, the P.CJ\ both sought to retain its membership in acceptable standing in the Comintern and simultaneously to achieve a limited degree of respectability within the Jewish-Zionist community in Palestine. The doctrine of Yishuvism, for all practical purposes, was shattered immediately following the Soviet fiasco with the Kuomintang in China;16 it formally came to an end when the Sixth Comintern’s Congress in August 1928 adopted the new line of independent revolutionary Communist struggle. At the basis of the Comintern’s new line was the conviction that the world had entered a new phase of economic and political development - the era of “capitalist stabilization.” In the underdeveloped world, particularly in the colonies, this new era implied the collapse of the united

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anti-colonial front, which had consisted of Communists and other progressive elements from the ranks of the national bourgeoisie. As far as the Communist parties were concerned, the Comintern’s new revolutionary struggle meant the “Bolshevization of the Comintern, the transformation of the Comintern’s organizational and action patterns, as well as those of its affiliates, into the Leninist model patterned on professionalism and on highly centralized conspiratorial revolutionary activities.17 This marked a turning point as well in the history of the Comintern from a relatively autonomous revolutionary organization into a distinct tool of Soviet foreign policy. In Palestine, the Comintern’s new line meant an immediate Arabization of the P.C.P.,18 and an all-out political war against Zionism and the Jewish community. The conception of Yishuvism that attempted to differentiate between Zionism and the Jewish community was abolished, and henceforth Zionism and the whole Jewish community were considered by the Comintern and in turn by the P.C.P. as identical. The reason for this identification, and fqr the veering away from the. attempt to separate between Zionist and non-Zionist elements within the Jewish community in Palestine, was the emphasis given to the measurement of “revolutionary potentialities’’ as the sole criterion by which the Jewish community was to be evaluated.19 The Comintern came to the conclusion that all efforts to wage a revolutionary campaign within the Jewish community were fruitless, inasmuch as the Jewish community had no promise whatsoever of any revolutionary potential. It was further assumed that the Jewish community was thoroughly saturated with Zionist reactionary aspirations. The tenets of Yishuvism were completely reversed, and everything associated with the Jewish community —immigration, agricultural settlement, etc. — was thus regarded as counter-revolutionary. The P.C.P. and its leadership, despite repeated assurances to the contrary, appeared as an unreliable element in the eyes of the Comintern, suffering from nationalistic (Jewish) tendencies, and for this reason, preferring to remain within the confines of the Jewish community. In the Comintern’s new outlook, the Arabs in Palestine loomed most favorably. Until this point, the rationale for the Comintern’s demand to Arabize the P.C.P. had been on the grounds that Palestine was an Arab country in the midst of an Arab world.20 In 1928, a new dimension was added to the mere demographic one: the Arabs were now regarded as the only political factor capable of producing a revolutionary situation in Palestine.21 The emerging Arab nationalism was evaluated as the major factor in the anti-imperialist struggle in Palestine, and hence entitled to the full attention and support of the P.C.P.

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It was not until March—April 1929, following a formal communica­ tion from the Comintern22 that the P.C.P. officially examined the Comintern's new revolutionary guide line (also referred to as the New Course), in order to implement it within the Party's program. In the deliberations which took place, the doctrine of Yishuvism was totally repudiated, along with several other major well-established political lines of action, such as the Party's traditional call for peace and harmony between the Jewish and the Arab cgmttiunities and its call for the establishment of representative democratic’ institutions to lead the country on the path of independence. The deliberations precipitated a considerable wave of self-criticism within the Party's ranks which to some extent reflected old feuds and controversies among its various factions.23 The most important aspect of these discussions was the Party’s reorientation in its political outlook towards developments in Palestine. .In addition to its rejection of the doctrine of Yishuvism, in accord with the Sixth Comintern’s Congress’ resolutions, the P.C.P. repudiated all Arab nationalist groups. Prior to this, the P.C.P. had advocated a generally “mild” line among the Arabs, by urging them to call for the termination of the Mandatory administration,24 resistance to Zionist Imperialism, and the abolition of.the Balfour Declaration.25 The Party had deliberately avoided criticizing the Arab leadership in Palestine, for this Arab leadership was the only viable political force in the Arab community, and it was clearly stirring its masses along an anti-British path.26 In March—April 1929, however, the Arab national leadership came under heavy political attack within the P.C.P. It was regarded as reactionary, clerical, feudal, and compromising, selling out the Arab cause to British Imperialism.27 The leaders of Arab nationalism in the Middle East, Nahas Pasha in Egypt, Hashim Al-Attasi in Syria, Jamal Hussein in Palestine, now emerged as the Chiang Kai-Shek's of the area. The P.C.P. particularly singled out the treacherous role played by the Arab Higher Executive. The newly prescribed line was undertaken by the Comintern and the P.C.P. so as to promote class differentiation within the Arab community, sharpening the conflicting economic interests between the masses and the Arab bourgeoisie. An intensification of class conflict, in the eyes of the Comintern and the P.C.P. would arouse the proletariat class-consciousness of the Arab masses, thereby radicalizing and promoting their political resistance. A new political goal was set: the establishment of a “ revolutionary front of workers and peasants,” which would demand the immediate formation of a revolutionary government of workers and peasants.28

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These new revolutionary slogans were introduced at the Party’s demonstrations on August 1, 1929, an event declared as “Comintern Day.” The Comintern press celebrated it as a Red Day in which “Imperial­ ism . . . Zionism and reformism” as well as “Arab Nationalist treachery” were openly denounced, and the day when the new revolutionary era in Palestine was formally inaugurated. Realizing that there was no Arab industrial proletariat to stand in the forefront of the revolutionary uprising, the Party emphasized that the revolutionary development would be of an agrarian nature, and it hastily published its call demanding the distribution of land to the peasants and the formation of an agrarian revolutionary front. During the establishment of this new revolutionary line, the Party also purged itself of a “defeatistic” element which had “underestimated the strength of the proletariat in Arabian countries in general and in Palestine in particular.” 29 In its Central Committee plenum session, the Party denounced what was labeled as the Right Wing deviation in the Party, a faction that had urged moderation and greater reliance upon the “petit-bourgeois” element, and who had advocated the establishment of a “Democratic Republic.” This group, it was argued at the plenum session, had overestimated the strength of the bourgeoisie and had ignored the “constant radicalization of the Arab masses.” 30 At the plenum it was announced that the Party was finally able to rid itself of “all remnants of Zionist and Poale-Zion tendencies, liquidate boycottism and putschism, put an end to the theories of immigration .. .31 The Party also addressed itself to the issue of Jewish—Arab relations in the country. Despite their criticism and active (sometimes violent) struggle against Zionism, the Comintern and the P.C.P. up until the Sixth Comintern’s Congress did not advocate any Arab—Jewish communal confrontation.32 They held that in any instance of communal hostilities and unrest it was the British government who encouraged the ethnic strife so as to justify its tightening of the Government reins: .. .maintenance of the Balfour Declaration is a means of stirring up the hatred of the Arabs against the Jewish minority, to rouse to the highest point the national-religious antagonism, and therfore to keep in check the Jewish minority itself by fear of massacres by the Arabs.33

On another occasion, the Comintern argued in very clear terms that “the British authorities artificially inflamed the national hatred and religious fanaticism of the backward Arab masses against the Jews,” and hence “Imperialist antagonisms [were] increasing in Arabia and Palestine.34 The Comintern regarded the inflammation of religious communal passion as a political trap of the British mandatory regime, and it subsequently viewed with great alarm the increased tension between the two

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communities which arose as a result of the incidents that occured in August 1928 (to be repeated again a year later with far-reaching consequences) at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, when the Jewish community during its observance of the High Holiday services erected a partition between the men and the women. The Comintern published an article on this matter, denouncing in strong words the overreaction of the British authorities to this incident, and considering the whole matter to be a “government provocation.” 35 The article^jdid condemn the Zionists for violating the status quo at the Wailing Wall, and it pointed out that by doing so, they had played directly into the hands of the “British Imperialist provocators.” It condemned as well the harsh and brutal government reaction of forcefully removing the partition and disrupting the peaceful “Jewish religious ceremony.” According to the Comintern’s interpretation, the Government had become increasingly concerned to find a move towards understanding between Jews and Arabs, for such a move, as regarded by the British, was of an anti-imperialist nature and thus very dangerous and perilous for the future of the Mandatory Regime. In overreacting, the British Government was “forcing the Jewish population back into the discipline of the Zionist organization.36 As far as the Zionists were concerned, the Comintern argued, they should take this as a lesson that they were being used by the British for their selfish political manipulations in Palestine and that the British would not hesitate to sacrifice Zionism in their own interest. A second incident near the Wailing Wall occured during the Jewish Fast of Ab on August 15, 1929, exactly a year later, when a Revisionist group (Zionist Right-Wing party) held a ceremony at the Wall that was later followed by Arab demonstrations and riots.37 This was the incident that ultimately led to the killing of a Jewish boy, to the Jewish counter­ demonstrations, and eventually to the outbreak of the August 1929 riots. (See Chapter Two.) On this occasion, the P.C.P. issued an urgent appeal, published on August 19, 1929, calling upon the Jews and the Arabs to calm things down.38 The Party condemned both the Zionist leadership, who had instilled a chauvinistic spirit in the Jewish and aroused the Jewish masses, and those “treacherous Arab leaders” who had instigated the Arab masses to fight the Jews for the sake of controlling the Burak (a common Arabic name for the Wailing Wall).39 A call was made for a united Jewish—Arab effort against British Imperialism. This pacifistic appeal of the P.C.P. was no longer altogether in line with the Comintern’s general revolutionary expectations as formulated in its New Course during the Sixth Comintern’s Congress. The Party’s assessment of the riots somewhat later, however, was to bear the imprint of the new revolutionary line.40

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It was precisely during this period of unrest in Palestine, several days before the riots, that the Comintern, under the explicit instructions of Stalin, sent an emissary to study the situation in Palestine and to later report on his findings in Moscow. As was mentioned in Chapter Three, one of the leaders of the P.C.P., J. Berger-Barzilai, met Stalin personally in Moscow in March 1929, and on that occasion, briefed him in some detail on developments in Palestine. Stalin displayed a great interest in this issue and promised to send someone on a study mission to Palestine. As it happened, this emissary was finally sent by the Comintern in August 1929, when Palestine was already embroiled in trouble, with yet more serious clashes to follow. The Comintern’s emissary was Bohumil Smeral, a noted, popular ex-social Democratic Czechoslovakian leader, and its representative during the pre-First World War period in the Austrian Hungarian Parliament. He had been the acknowledged leader of a small radical group within the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party until the Party split, whereupon he joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and assumed its leadership. Although an avowed Marxist, “who knew of no national allegiance,” Smeral nonetheless had high regard for Czechoslovak nationalism, and subsequently came into violent conflict-with the “dogmatic, revolutionary leadership” of the Third International.41 J. Berger-Barzilai, a P.CP. leader, who was personally well-acquainted with Smeral, testifies that his appointment to the mission appeared some awkward, and he reveals that behind this appointment was an intrigue in which Stalin was directlinvolved.42 As a member of the E.C.C.I. (the Executive Committee of the Communist International), Smeral ran into increasing conflict with the new forces in the Czechoslovak Party under its leadership of Kelement Gottwald. Stalin, who supported the new Czech leadership, wished to move" ’Smeral into a position far removed from the Czechoslovak scene and thereby ordered him to move to Moscow. In August 1929, he “promoted” him with a mission to Palestine, which kept him even further away from the East European arena. Smeral arrived in Palestine on forged documents, allegedly as a business man representing a major European industrial firm. His appearance and manners matched this identity quite well so as to avoid the suspicion of the British authorities, who during this period carefully inspected all visitors suspected of being Coirfmunist agents.43 In Smerel’s case, other exceptional precautions were taken due to the fact that he was a high ranking Comintern functionary.44 He was placed in an apartment in one of the quiet suburbs of Jerusalem, making no contacts with people around him, except

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of course for his meetings with the P.C.P. leadership which took place in the nearby Arab village of Beit-Safafa, where J. Berger-Barzilai lived and where the Party’s printing operation was located. During his stay in Jerusalem, Smeral developed a close relationship with the P.CJ . leaders, speaking with them at great length; he kept a detailed record of the deliberations. Smeral was particularly interested in the Arab peasants and attempted to find out to what extent they were politically alert, and whether they were capable of following the Party’s propaganda line. He also met with several Arab members of flie Party, and it appears quite certain that one of his objectives was to ascertain if the Comintern’s reliance upon the Arab peasants as a driving political and revolutionary force was feasible. Smeral was present in Palestine during the outbreak of the August riots, and his reactions and participation during those days are carefully chronicled by Barzilai in his memoirs. This account, in addition to being written by a man intimately involved in the Comintern’s activities, is also most important in that it is the sole source of information concerning the Smeral mission. On the morning of August 22, 1929, from the Party’s hiding place in Beit Safafa, Smeral saw large numbers of Arab fellaheen (Arabic for peasant) armed with sticks, converging from the countryside on Jerusalem. As Barzilai, who was also present, records in his memoirs, Smeral displayed considerable nervousness about the safety of their hiding place. About noontime, M. Kuperman (a member of the Party’s Secretariat) arrived, breathless and pale as Barzilai describes him, with the news that “1 was there . . . I saw with my own eyes . . . sliced by knives . . . bleeding . . . they were brought to Hadassah . . . dead . . . seriously wounded.” 45 Kuperman reported all that he knew concerning the outbreak of the riots from the moment the Arab masses left their mosques, and on a rampage, began to slaughter the Jews. He also reported that the Haganah (the Jewish Defense Organization) was desperately trying to protect Jewish lives. At the same time, he told of how massacred Jews in Hebron were being brought to Jerusalem. From Kuperman’s eyewitness account, it appeared to the Party’s leaders “that the riots were a pogrom.”46 During the afternoon of the same day, the Party’s Secretariat opened its session, with Smeral present. It was agreed upon by all the participants that “the Arab population was under the control of the Mejlis (Muslim Supreme Council)” whose Mufti, the religious leader of the' Moslems, was calling upon the faithful to wage a Jihad (holy war) against the Jews.”47 The P.C.P.’s Secretariat sat and deliberated the situation when news reached the group that an Arab mob was converging upon Beit-Safafa, and

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that it was necessary to evacuate the Party’s printing operation. The P.C.P. leaders and Smeral were informed about the defense efforts of the Haganah once again, and they discussed “whether the members of the P.C.P. should join the Haganah, and what the Party should do with its small arms depot.”48 These issues remained momentarily undecided. On the following morning, August 23, the Haganah headquarters in Jerusalem was informed about several Jews who were in danger of being attacked in Beit-Safafa, and without knowing their exact identity, a unit rushed with a truck to evacuate them. Smeral and the P.C.P. Secretariat were brought safely to Jerusalem, where they established a new secret residence. In the evening, the P.C.P. leaders issued an immediate appeal to all party members in Jerusalem, stating: Because there is a danger of riots and massacres, it is the obligation of all members to join the Haganah in the parts of the city that are in danger.49

Official representatives of the P.C.P. also reached Yitzhak Ben-Zvi,50 who was in charge of the Haganah operations, informing him of the fact that the P.C.P. was assuming an active part in the Jewish defense effort and placing at his disposal the Party’s arms cache. Smeral endorsed all the Party’s directives and decisions in this mater, and he also participated in formulating the appeals of the Party and its official pronouncements, in which the Party called for the defense of the Jewish quarters that were under Arab attack as well as issuing a call for peace. At one point, Smeral added the following amendment to a proposed statement: The destructive and dangerous influence of the clerical elements in the Arab nationalist movement should be emphasized, and it should be especially noted that any accord or united front with the Mufti and his men is out of the question.51

In the midst of the riots which lasted several days, Smeral expressed a desire to leave Palestine without delay. He was escorted to the railroad station which led to Qantara (near the Suez Canal) and from there, he returned safely by boat to Europe. The circumstances surrounding the appearance and departure of Bohumil Smeral, the official emissary of the Comintern, reflect the confusion that prevailed within the P.C.P. at the outbreak of the riots which took them completely by surprise.52 The Party, perhaps due to the ideological confusion pervading its ranks,53 did not have a clear position during the critical days of August 1929. Instead of analyzing the major ingredients that contributed to the rapidly deteriorating situation and coming to grips with its essential factors, the Party for the most part held on to its traditional paeifistic line,54 calling upon Jews and Arabs alike to avoid

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bloodshed. Although it advocated joining the defense efforts of the Haganah in the midst of the riots, the Party nevertheless continued to accuse Zionism and its policies of precipitating the tension by aggravating relations between the Jewish and the Arab communities. It also maintained its old anti-Government line, accusing the British of playing one group against the other. An echo to this confusion can be found in one of the rare documents composed by the Party arjcHiastily published as the news of the riots became known.55 In this document, the Party lamented the innocent Jewish victims who were killed during the first days of the riots and endorsed the Party’s active participation in “the defense of poor, innocent Jewish workers against their attackers.” 56 The statement asserted, nonetheless, that the riots had stemmed from genuine agrarian revolutionary sources, which at some point had apparently assumed the character of a pogrom. The Party gave high praise to the Arab urban community, “who possessed a high degree of political awareness” and who were the least involved in the riots, detesting their pogromian nature.57 The most significant conclusion of the Party’s statement was that the violence which broke out all over the country was “a preparation towards a new, genuine uprising that (would) be carried out in the future by Arab workers and peasants, organized not by the Mufti, but by the proletariat and the Communist Party.” 58 It is evident from the document that in the period shortly after the riots, the Party had not yet crystallized a consistent conceptual framework for evaluating the riots. After its immediate pronouncements following the riots, the Party found itself at odds with several of the World Communist Press reports about the riots. The official press organ of the German Communist Party, the Rote Fahne, published in Berlin, portrayed the riots in a positive light. It described them as an Arab uprising, stemming from genuine grievances on the part of the masses, stirring themselves against British Imperialism.59 It was in clear sympathy with the Arabs and by implication with the position that “the anti-Jewish concomitant of the revolt was a natural development which should not be regretted.” 60 The Imprecorr, the Commintern’s organ, took a similar position though somewhat more cautiously, while the U.S. Jewish Communist paper, the Morgen Freiheit, advocated a milder and more restrained position.61 The P.C.P.. had great difficulty in reconciling the varying interpretations. The Jewish public in Palestine which was informed at length about the Rote Fahne’s implied anti-Jewish position turned in rage against the members of the P.C.P., some of whom were physically attacked in public places.62

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From the limited historical evidence that is available, it appears that not only was the P.C.P. critical of the riots and the atrocities commited by the Arab mobs, but also that its leaders took part in the Haganah defense operations to resist the Arab pogrom and to spare Jewish lives. As events were played out, it so happened that the P.CP.’s participation during the riots was witnessed and approved by the Comintern’s official emissary, Bohumil Smeral, who had the opportunity to personally observe the situation and to share the responsibility for the Party’s immediate decisions and response.63 However, the situation in the Party was not so simply resolved. Even before the Comintern interceded and imposed a radically different interpretation by issuing new instructions to the P.C.P., a difference of opinion arose within the Party as to the exact nature of the riots and as to their causes.64 The controversy arose when a letter arrived from Wolf Averbach, the founder and head of the P.C.P. at the time, who was in Moscow on an assignment of the Comintern during the riots, hinting that the Comintern’s leaders in Moscow were inclined to regard the riots as an anti-imperialist uprising (rather than agreeing with the prevailing P.CJP. position that they were national-religious-fanatic pogroms, and hence reactionary and objectionable).65 Averbach’s information was rather preliminary inasmuch as Bohumil Smeral had not yet returned to Moscow with his report from his Palestinian assignment. Averbach’s letter precipitated a debate at the meeting of the Party’s Secretariat, where some members were already entertaining second thought about the party’s original position and searching for corroborating evidence that the riots were an anti-imperialist uprising rather than a pogrom.66 The E.C.C.I. in Moscow, in the meantime, scheduled a special session that was called “top secret” 67 to discuss the recent developments in Palestine and to hear the report of Smeral.68 Averbach attended the meeting, and later, upon his arrival back in Palestine with the Comintern’s new instructions, disclosed the following account of the E.C.C.I. meeting. Smeral’s appearance and report on his mission to Palestine before the Comintern was totally unconvincing. He was apparently still fresh from the impact of the events in Palestine, sticking to a factual description of what he witnessed and talking about “the Mufti’s incitement, the early Arab attacks, the bloodshed that followed, etc.” 69 When he was questioned by the E.C.C.I. members as to the political meaning of the riots and their place in relationship to the British Government, Smeral failed to present a cohesive analysis. His report amounted therefore to a journalistic factual description of events which the E.C.C.I. regarded as irrelevant to the broader issues

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involved, particularly with respect to their attempt to place the riots in Palestine into a perspective congruent with their broad revolutionary expectations.70 Averbach explained the Comintern’s International political posture, especially emphasizing the influence of Stalin’s political theory that the world was entering a new era in 1928-29,71 the “Third Period” - an era of massive revolutionary uprising, resulting from the sharpening conflicts of economic and political interests in the world, an era of “peasant uprisings, workers’ strikes^ and anti-imperialist revolts.” 72 Hence for the events in Palestine — regardless of the details —to be politically meaningful to the Comintern, they should have been analyzed and interpreted with regard to their general relevance for the Comintern’s revolutionary conceptual framework. The general consensus of the E.C.C.I. members, therefore, was that the P.C.P. had committed a grave error in approaching the riots as an “anti-Jewish pogrom,” rather than evaluating them in their “proper” historical-revolutionary perspective as an “Arab uprising against British Imperialism and Zionism.” 73 The Party’s participation in the Haganah defense effort and the rendering of its arms in this purpose bordered with heresy. The Party’s earlier pacifistic line had thus been dangerously misleading.74 Averbach also rendered an account of what transpired at the meeting of the Eastern Department of the Comintern, whose task it was to formulate the E.C.C.I. decision in specific terms and to dispatch fresh directives in accordance with it to the P.C.P. This task was associated with Georgi Safarov, the head of the Comintern’s Eastern Department. Georgi Safarov was an old Bolshevik who had been closely associated with Lenin, accompanying him in his famous sealed train trip to Russia before the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution.73 A Soviet expert and scholar on Asian affairs, he was the father of the historical theory that Russia was designated to bring European Communism to Asia because of her semi-Russian and semi-oriental character, enabling her to bridge East and West. Safarov participated in the early years of the Bolshevik Regime in the Party’ debates on Asian and colonial questions and ’was active in formulating the Soviet government’s policies toward the nationalities of the East.76 He was a devout Marxist—Leninist, criticizing the Russian emmigration into the Asian territories as a colonial crime; adhering to Lenin’s position of self-determination for the national minorities; and urging them to develop local Communism independently. Later he realized the power and appeal of nationalism upon the young workers in the East, and he admitted that nationalism could stand in the way of Communism and hinder Communist chances to penetrate and influence the native labor movements.77

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During the years of 1925-27, Safarov was associated with the opposition groups within the Soviet Communist Party and therefore held in political isolation and disgrace. In 1929, his political standing was once again upheld when he was appointed (although only in his late twenties) as a deputy director to the East Department of the Comintern in charge of the Near East, an area that was regarded by the Comintern as ‘‘blank” (signifying its lesser importance in the Comintern’s International posture).78 As deputy director, Safarov interpreted the new information about the uprising in Palestine in a manner which upheld the Comintern’s general line of the “Third Period.” Safarov was the main speaker deliberating the Palestinian situation, and in setting the tone of the debate, he was responsible for the strong condemnation of the P.CP.’s position during the riots.79 Safarov’s basic assumption was that the riots from the very beginning were a genuine, spontaneous uprising, and that “all the fairy tales that newspapers published about massacres of Jews in Hebron and Safad were strickly imperialist propaganda80 Safarov criticized the P.CJP.’s call for Jewish-Arab friendship and argued that the Party’s call lent “invisible support” to imperialism. Directing his comments on this issue to the leader of the P.C.P., Wolf Averbach, (who was present at the debate), he uttered sarcastically: This [the P.C.P.’s line Reflects a tendency which the leadei of the P.C.P. brought with him from his previous party affiliation.81

This was a direct hint, as Barzilai argues, to the membership of Averbach in Poale—Zion-Y.K.P. groups.82 In line with his condemnation of the Russian presence in Central Asian territories as unjustified, Safarov argued that the presence of Jewish workers in Palestine was a “grave imperialist sin.” 83 As recorded by Barzilai on the basis of the detailed account given him by Averbach, at one point, Safarov lashed out at the Jews in Palestine by asking: “What are they doing there altogether? In response to Safarov’s criticism, Averbach took the floor to explain the developments of the Jewish Communal settlements, the growth of the Jewish Trade Union, etc. This was a presentation very much in line with the P.C.P.’s earlier doctrine of Yishuvism. Safarov intervened and exclaimed: You are repeating the idealistic arguments of the Poale-Zion,8* but I am asking you about the political meaning of those Zionist colonies in Palestine. Is it not clear to you, that, from an objective point o f view,the Jewish community in Palestine is a British Imperialist Avant-garde?85

Safarov’s comments were a reflection of the Comintern’s long-standing frustrations with the Jewish leadership of the P.C.P., as well as an unequivocal denunciation of the whole Zionist settlement in Palestine.

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Safarov’s criticism against the Jewish leadership of the P.CP., as well as against the whole Jewish influence on the Party was indicated in the greetings that the Comintern sent 'to Forois, the P.C.P.’s organ published in Yiddish, on its Twenty-Fifth issue, dated September 1929:86 It should be explained to the masses of Jewish workers that it is not enough to be a Communist from an ideological point of view; this must be translated into the language of day to day living, that the confidence of the Arab local proletariat be secured. It is the task of Forois to systematically and patiently make this dear to the Jewish revolutionary workers, that the main deficiency and the main weakness of the P.C.P. lies in its failure to penetrate the native masses, the Arab workers and peasants. The historical and the central task of the Avant-garde of Jewish workers in Palestine is to secure the confidence of the Arabs and accelerate the process by which the P.C.P. will become a mass movement party of the local Arab proletariat.87

The E.C.C.I/s decision to immediately Arabize the P.C.P., not only in principle as was decided after the Sixth Comintern’s Congress but in actuality, by transforming the bulk of the Party’s membership and leadership — together with its detailed assessment of the riots, was communicated to the P.C.P.88 This decision was also presented for approval before the Students of the Moscow University of the Toilers of the East. Some of the Arab students who were present at this University were designated on the spot to substitute the Jewish leadership of the P.C.P. upon their return to Palestine.89 NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 1. 2.

3.

See the biographical sketch of the P.C.P. leadership in Chapter Three. During the 1920 Riots in Jerusalem, the Nebi Musa outbreaks that were instigated by the Mufti of Jerusalem, members of the M.O.P.S. (forerunner to the P.C.P.) took part in the defense of the Jewish sections of the city. See the M.O.P.S. appeal concerning these riots, as quoted by G.Z. Yisraeli, MOPS-PCPMAKI, (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1953) p. 19 as well as N. List, “Tsadak Hakomintem/1 (The Comintern was Right), (3), Keshet, Winter, 1964, p. 165. The P.C.P. was already faced with a major conflict and rivalry within its ranks in 1922 over this issue, when an extremist splinter group, the K.PJ*. (“Kumunistiche Partei Palestina/* The Communist Party of Palestine), advocated abandoning Palestine altogether as the only salvation from the “ Zionist Hell/1 arguing that there was no future for a Jewish Proletariat in Palestine. The K.P.P. regarded the Jewish Zionist labor movement as an uprooted, airfloating “Halootzion,” lacking any proletariat revolutionary consciousness. The remain­ ing majority group of the P.C.P., on the other hand, engaged itself in a search

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for a revolutionary mission within the Zionist—Jewish community in Palestine, looking favorably upon the establishment o/ a Jewish Workers* center in Palestine called these more moderate P.C.P. members “Tsionistlach,” (in Yiddish, “petit-Zionists”), whereas the P.C.P. members labeled their K.P.P. rivals as “traitors, liquidators, and despicables ” This ideological feud was ultimately settled in favor of the P.GP.’s milder anti-Zionist formula, and its leader, Wolf Averbach, dominated the party’s thinking until immediately after the riots. Ibid. 4. I. Renap, “The Prospective Conference of Arabs and Jews,** in World News and Views (formerly Imprecorr), Vol. 19, No. 2, January 14,1939, pp. 36-38. 5. List (4), Keshet, No. 24, p. 117. 6. Observer, “The Jewish National Home and the Arab Problem,1” Imprecorr, Vol. 16, No. 27, June 6,1926, pp. 727-28. 7. It stems from the Hebrew word Yishuv, a collective name for the organized Jewish community in Palestine. . 8. List defines this position as “Zionist without Zionism,*’ namely, searching for a Palestinian solution outside the Zionist ideology. Op. Cit., (5), No. 27, Spring 1965. 9. During the elections for Representative Council, for instance, held in November-December 1925, the P.C.P. scored a relative victory, getting slightly over 7% o f the total votes cast. Yisraeli, op. cit., p. 36. 10. Yehiel Halpern, Yisrael Ve-ha-Qomunism (Israel and Communism) (Tel-Aviv: 1951). 11. Hebrew for “the conquest of the land,** a campaign initiated by the Histadxuth to encourage Jewish employers to hire Jewish labor in their enterprises. 12. Central Committee of the P.C.P., “Materyain Tsu An Arbeter Program,” (Materials for a Workers’ Program) (Tel-Aviv: 1925). 13. It is attempted to downgrade the immigrants and prove that they were incapable of adhering to a political program of action or to any ideology. List, Ibid, pp. 111-2. 14. Ibid., p 115. 15. “Against British Imperialism in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 47, Septem­ ber 6,1929, p. 992. 16. See Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China 1924-27 (Cambridge, Mass: 1958). 17. List, op. cit., (5), p. 93. 18. The Comintern had consistently called for the Arabization of the Party’s work, but the P.C.P. had not upheld their specific orders. 19. Yisraeli,op. cit., p. 59 and List, op. cit. (4), p. 114. 20. Karl Radek, head of the Eastern Department of the Comintern had explicitly stated in the directives in 1924: “The future of the Party depends upon its territorialization.” Yisraeli, p. 29. 21. List, op. cit. 22. Forois (Forward) in Yiddish, May 19,1929, p. 13. 23. Bob, “The Fight Against the Right Deviation in the P.C.P. in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 29, June 21,1929, pp. 647-8.

The Comintern and the 1929 Riots in Palestine 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42. 43.

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P. Kitaigorodski, “The Bloody Events in Palestine,*' Imprccorr, Vol. 9, No. 47, September 6,1929, pp. 990-91. “ Against British Imperialism in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 47, Septem­ ber 6,1929, pp. 991-92. Zlini, “The Political Situation in Palestine,*' Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 50, September 13,1929, pp. 1055-57. Bob, “The 1st of August in Palestine,’*Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 42, August 23, 1929, p. 899 and “ For the Independence of the Arab Countries,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 2, January^,"T930, p. 24. J.B., “The Fight for the Land in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 30, August 9, 1929, pp. 809-10. The call for a Parliament was now declared as a “Rotten slogan.” Yisraeli, op cit., p. 62. Bob, “ Against the Right Deviation,” loc. cit. The argument was that the Nebi Musa Riots of 1920 in Jerusalem were a revolutionary uprising. Ibid. Ibid. J. B., “Imperialistic Provocations in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 73, October 19,1928, p. 1330. J. B., “MacDonald’s Palestine Report,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 18, April 10, 1930, pp. 34708. Kitaigorodski, loc. cit. J.B., “Imperialistic Provocations in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 8., No. 73, October 19, 1928, p.1330. The Comintern attempted to persuade the Jewish Community that they would be forsaken eventually by the British Government. Ibid. See Chapter Two for greater detail. Kovetz Pirsumei P.C.P. 1923-1934 (Anthology o f the P.C.P. Publications) (Tel-Aviv: 1950) pp. 59-60. Ibid. “Tnuat Hamered Ha’aravi Vtafkid Haproletarion,” (The Arab Rebellion and the Task of the Proletariat), in Hebrew, issued by the P.C.P. 1929, Archion Ha’avodah. With regard to Smeral’s activities in the early twenties, see Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion o f Czechoslovakia 1938-48, (New Jersey: Princeton, 1959), pp. 20-25. Joseph Barzilai, “ Yerushalayim Av Tarpat,” (“Jerusalem 1929”), Qeshet, No. 29,1965, pp. 122-137. The vigilance of the British Police in this matter can be illustrated by the following episode: When the Police identified two Jewish persons, Panitch and Pressman, as Communist agents, they immediately forced them aboard the Soviet freightor Chicherin that was anchored in Jaffa, despite the fact that the captain protested that two suspects were not Soviet citizens and did not possess Soviet visas. The British Police in this matter acted swiftly upon intelligence reports. See Imprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 14, March 8, 1928, p. 282 as well as List, op. cit. (2), p. 168.

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44.

Yerachmiel Lukacher-Horazo was the P.C.P. security man who arranged the necessary security precautions. See Beigei-Barzilai, Hatragedia Shel Hamahpekha Ha-Sovietit (The Tragedy of the Soviet Revolution), p. 95. (Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1968). Ibid., p. 98. Ibid. Berger-Barzilai, op. cit., p. 98. Ibid.,p. 100. Ibid. He later became the second president of Israel. Barzilai, op. cit., p. 101. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 101. Yisraeli, op. cit., p. 64. Qovetz Pirsumei P.C.P. 1923-1934 (Anthology of P.C.P. Publications) (Tel-Aviv: 1950), pp. 59-60. "MUhemet Hadamim Ba-aretz Uma’amad Ha-po’alien," (The Bloody Struggle in the Land and the Working Class,”) issued by the Central Committee of the P.C.P., September 1929, Arkhion Ha'avodah, Tel Aviv, Israel. Ibid., p. 2. “Milhemet Hadamim,” op. cit., p. 3. Ibid., p. 7. Barzilai, op. cit., p. 102. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism, p. 84. Barzilai, loc. cit.. Ibid. B. Smeral's arrival in Palestine was only revealed recently, for it had been a tot) secret of the Comintern and of the P.C.P. Barzilai, op. cit., p. 103. For the revised PCP assessment in accord with the Comintern, see "Tnu’at Hamered Ha’aravi Vetafqid Haproletarion,” (The Arab Rebellion and the Task of the Proletariat), issued by the P.C.P., 1929, Arkhion Ha’avoday, Tel-Aviv. Ibid. Ibid. Barzilai, “Yerushalayim Av Tarpat,” p. 135. This description is based upon a detailed account presented by Averbach upon his return to Palestine from Moscow. Barzilai, op. cit., p. 135. Barzilai, Hatragedia. . . » p. 120. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 76 -7 7 . Ibid., p. 76. Barzilai, op. cit., p. 104. Ibid. Laqueur, op cit., p. 13.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 5 3. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 15.

The Comintern and the 1929 Riots in Palestine 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

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Barzilai, loc. cit. Laqueur, op. cit. , p. 43. Barzilai, op. cit., p. 121. Ibid., p.122. Ibid.,pp. 122-23. 76W., p.122. A left-wing Zionist organization to which Averbach belonged before joining the Communist movement and*founding the P.C.P.. Ibid. ^ This comment was in reference to the ideological controversy between the Comintern and the Left Po'ale-Zion during the Comintern's Second Congress in 1920. Barzilai, op. cit. Published between 1926-1932. Forois, November 29, 1929, p. 27* as quoted in Hebrew by Yisraeli* op. cit., pp. 67-68. Ibid.t p.66. Barzilai, op. cit. , p. 105.

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CHAPTER VIII The Post—Riot Assessments and Reactions The immediate reactiprr of the P.C.P. to the riots was marked by utter confusion and bewilderment, that was further intensified by the arrival of the first news and the interpretation of events from the E.C.C.L. The fear of finding itself totally out of step with the Comintern’s policy and the mounting pressure from its polarizing membership (between the faithful supporters of the Comintern1 and a group of dissenters —the right deviators — who argued for an independent policy of denouncing the riots as a pogrom2) forced the Party to discuss the whole issue hastily so as to come up with an official statement. It was an almost impossible task to reconcile the conflicting positions and the different pressures, particularly in view of the fact that the Party had taken a very decisive position during the riots by supporting the Jewish defense efforts against what was labeled as a pogrom, and by committing itself to a pacifistic program to calm the excitement, a position which left almost no room for maneuverability in interpretation. An analysis of the changes in the evolution of the Party’s thinking after adoption of the “New Course” set by the Comintern’s Sixth Congress can be made by closely examining the Party’s various scattered reports as well as the official pronouncements emanating from its enlarged plenum sessions which convened in mid-September and early December of 1929. The P.C.P. formally embarked upon the “New Course”by celebrating the Red Day (the Comintern Day) on August 1, 1929.3Several days later, when an Arab Nationalist demonstration was held in Jaffa in protest against the “Zionist land expropriation;” it was reported in the Comintern’s official press organ, the Imprecorr, that “the Communists had immediately placed themselves at the head of the movement,” setting an example of resistance to the “perfidious—imperialist—Zionist feudal, reformist game,” and taking the lead in the workers—peasant revolutionary movement which was eventually to be channeled into a mass uprising against Britist imperialism.4, The dispatch concluded that the P.C.P. had seized the revolutionary initiative by taking over the radical leadership of the Arab National movement and be replacing all the compromising, bourgeois and pseudo­ radical Arab National leaders, who were actually engaged in dealing and cooperating with the British government. The Party was successful in

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creating a workers-peasant revolutionary front to counteract its new revolutionary orientations and its slogans had “had a great impact upon the Arab masses in Palestine.” 5 Shortly after, on August 22—23,1929, the riots broke out in Palestine in Jerusalem. The first dispatch from Palestine following the riots, dated September 6, 1929, reflected a mood of doubt and confusion.6 Though accusing Zionism of being historically a British lackey, championing the British cause during the First World War,7 and of being an instrument for the oppression of the Arab working masses,8 it shifted the emphasis of its criticism from Zionism to British imperialism, which deliberately misled naive Zionists to shed “their blood in the conviction that they were fighting for the ‘future of the Jewish nation’” ;9 but the British “showed no inclination to consider the ideals and hopes of the Zionists.” 10 In this line of criticism, a sympathetic undertone towards Zionism as an innocent victim can be detected, far milder than the anti-Zionist line preached by the Party before the outbreak of the riots. “The British authorities artificially inflamed the national'hatred and religious fanaticism of the backward Arab masses against the Jews,” 11 the report continued, implying that the Jews were a minority, 100,000 against 600,000 Arabs, and hence helpless and desperate. In its description of the actual outbreak of the riots, it argued that the Zionists provocation at the Wailing Wall was “the spark which caused the powder barrel to explode,” and that in some way or another, the forceful Zionist colonization was the deep cause for the violent Arab outbreak which the article described as an “insurrection” (a far milder and more cautious term than “revolutionary uprising” which was later used to describe the same event.) It is interesting to note that the author of the dispatch explicitly stated that “at the moment it [was] very difficult to assess the situation with precision.” 12 Although he wrote that the “insurrectionists stormed the barracks and attacked British troops,” (in fact, a gross exaggeration of a rather side aspect of the violence), the author added the following historical parallel: “in 1921, not without the responsibility of the British police, there was a serious anti Jewish pogrom.. ” 13 This admission was contrary to the Comintern’s line in which it regarded the Nebi-Musah riots o f 1920 as a revolutionary uprising,14 and thus this dispatch insinuated that there was an ominous character to the 1929 riots. A similar note of caution appeared in the Imprecorr a week later on September 13, 1929. Apart from the standard criticism that was leveled against Zionism as a reformist movement and against the Poale—Zion labor organization as a pseudo-revolutionary movement, and exploiting arm of the

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Jewish bourgeoisie, the author attempted to focus his attention on the riots themselves.15 He argued that the unrest in Palestine was in line with the general unrest in the Middle East as a whole, drawing a comparison with the Druze Revolt in Syria of 1925—26, as well as with the political unrest in Egypt, Iraq, etc.. Upon closely examining the nature of the August 1929 riots, the author stressed that an element of the radicalization of the Arab masses could be detected which was-due to genuine economic and social grievances (as previously illustrated-^y the Party's demonstration of August 1st or by the series of strikes in Haifa and Jerusalem16), but he admitted that at some point, the riots were successfully derailed* by the British from their original revolutionary destination, due to the “lack of Arab Mass Organization” — there was no national-revolutionary political mass party in Palestine.17 In regard to the, radical—revolutionary outbreak, he sounded an explicit note of reservation and warning: . . . the extent of this radicalization must, however, not be overestimated. It shows the growth of the revolutionary movement, but has not yet reached the stage of a victorious class conscious revolutionary offensive of the toilers of Palestine against their enemies.18

At the very same time, the League Against Imperialism (see Chapter Four) came out with a manifesto moving a definite step towards the radical position adopted by the E.C.C.I.. The League admitted that although the riots were a national uprising against Imperialism, the British had succeeded in breaking the “alliance of Arab and Jewish workers and peasants” through religious strife. As stated in the.manifesto, “A bloody conflict on hitherto unprecedented scale has broken put between the Arab inhabitants and the immigrant Zionist population artificially imported into Palestine under the notorious Balfour Declaration.” 19 The manifesto urged the Arabs not to be carried away by this religious strife, which was an imperialist intrigue, but rather to wage a “fight against imperialism,” as well as against the Zionist and Social Democratic “agents of Imperialism.” The blame for the bloodshed was placed squarely by the Manifesto at the door of the “fascist Zionist organizations” who were armed by Imperialism “as a volunteer corps against the possibility of a united revolutionary movement.” 20 An attempt to assess the. causes as well as the escalations of the riots was made by a more analytical and critical dispatch from Palestine entitled “The Communist Party of Palestine and the Arab Revolt.” This was the first attempt of self criticism of the Party’s actions and omissions during the course of the riots.21 Although it paid tribute to the Arab members of the Party and to their attempt to turn the uprising into anti-imperialist

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channels, it admitted that their effort had failed, inasmuch as reactionary elements had managed to turn it into a reactionary pogrom.22 The uprising, according to this assessment, had “deep social roots” related to the agrarian character of the Arab society in Palestine, and hence, the revolt “was the first stage of the great revolutionary movement preparing in all Arab countries.. However, something had miscarried in its development: “The rate of development was far more rapid than the Party leaders had expected,” and the Party’s attempt to turn to the left and seize upon this revolutionary situation was “greatly impeded by discussion with the Right Opposition.. .’,23 The Right Opposition within the Party referred to particular groups whose stronghold was in Haifa,24 who had underestimated the extent of the radicalization of the Arab masses, and who had refused to believe that the Party was capable of taking over its leadership. At the same time, apparently, others had erred in overestimating that potential; 25 and as a “situation that from an objective point of view was ripe for a far more energetic and comprehensive offensive of the workers” was missed.25 These right-wing P.C.P. members, as assessed in this report, subscribed to the“outcry of the Zionist and Poale—Zionist agitation apparatus,” solely emphasizing “the instances of national fights and cruel assaults, purposely overlooking all social motives . . . and the anti-imperialist outbreaks.” Not only was this conceptual perception wrong, they erred from a tactical point of view as well by “declaring that the only possible tactics would have consisted in remaining at home and waiting for the end of the pogroms.” 26 It was also wrong, asserted the report, to advocate “quitting Palestine” instead of actively taking part in the outbreak and giving it a sense of direction and purpose. From among all the aforementioned fragmentary reports and interpretations emanating from Palestine, there were none that had denied the predominantly violent anti-Jewish pogromist character of the riots. They all agreed that the riots had taken, at some point or another, a reactionary turn of religious fanaticism, and that they were led by the most reactionary elements within the Arab society. The only area where they differed from each other was as to the party that had to be blamed for the riots, accusations ranging from British Imperialism, Zionism, and Arab Fanaticism, to the P.C.P. passivity and defeatistic tendencies. The Party, at this point still predominantly Jewish, was* forced to struggle with the recurring dilemma: how to reconcile an obviously repulsive and criminal bloodshed of innocent Jewish people and thereby its early pro-Jewish position in the riots, with the Comintern’s revolutionary dogmas of the New Course that appraised the riots as a welcome revolutionary uprising.

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In late September 1929, the P.C.P. came up with two lengthy major ideological commentaries about the riotsin an attempt to synthesize the criticism into a general acceptable formulation. In one Communique dated September 2 7 ,192927 the P.C.P. gave its own interpretation of the riotsin relationship to the role played by the P.C.P. The focal issue in the analysis was Zionism. After according its standard ideological rebukes to Zionism, it depicted a rather miserable future as far as its settlement effort in Palestine was concerned. It spelled^out how Jewish immigrants suffered from exploitation and hopelessness, misled by leadership consisting of i(Jewish capitalists... with the aid of the Jewish social traitors of the Second International.” 28 The Zionist agricultural settlements were poor and weak (despite the enormous capital invested in them) and in time of trouble, defenseless. The Communique claimed that the riots originated from the protest of expropriated and exploited Arabs who rose against their deteriorating economic and social conditions, and that it was the British government who had succeeded in diverting what was originally a development of revolutionary radicalization that swept the Arab masses from an anti-British uprising into an anti-Jewish pogrom.29 The Jewish and the Arab reactionary leadership had respectively contributed their share to what turned out to be a religious struggle by “turning the Wailing Wall into a symbol of power.” 30 The Arab reactionary leadership “took advantage of the backwardness and the almost complete illiteracy of the fellahs and the bedouins for the purpose of depicting the fight against the Jews in the light of a ‘holy war,”' 31 while the “Zionists fascists played upon the national chauvinism of the young generation of Jews.. .to make the fight for the Wall a matter of national honor.” 32 The Zionists were to be held partially responsible for the slaughter of Jews, because “Zionism [had] caused the mob in Palestine to treat the words ‘Zionist’ and ‘Jew* as synonymous.” (The assumption probably being that the killing of Zionists was permissible and that of Jews not!) Hence the Arab mob, instead of calling for “death to the Zionists” had called for “death to the Jews.” The Communique argued that the violence and killings stemmed from the fact that the Government gave the Arabs the impression that it would not intervene in the fighting.33 The Communique presented a frank account as to how the outbreaks evolved into a death call to the Jews, which was . . . uttered with all the fanaticism of a dohehad or holy war. It now became regarded a sacred duty to slaughter as many Jews as possible, whether guilty or innocent, Zionists or workers... The Jews had to be killed because they were Jews. The savage senseless mutilations.. .on old

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COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE men, women, and children (the bedouins singing in religious ecstasy while they slit abdomens and struck off the heads of little children)..

The above description is extremely significant, insofar as it portrays without inhibition the actual atrocities that occurred, the picture being based upon a careful deliberation of the issue by the authoritative organs of the P.C.P.. The Party’s analysis of the riots similarly laid the ultimate blame before what it called the “Zionist extremists” or the “ Fascists”35 for allegedly committing “counter murders” against “innocent Arabs,” but it conceded that the Jews, unlike the Arabs, refrained from attacking whole Arab villages. It argued that the Jewish fascists made an attempt to prevent the riots from turning into an anti-imperialist revolt, though apparently without much success, for the insurrection transformed itself into an anti-imperialist uprising.36 As concerned the Party’s role, the Central Committee’s Communique explained that because the Party was in its infancy, it had called for a Jewish—Arab understanding and a joint anti-British effort, realizing only later, that the Zionist Social fascists, as well as the Arab feudal bourgeoisie were both collaborating with the British Government. The Party paid tribute to Hamdi Husseini, the Secretary of the Palestine Branch of the League Against Imperialism, who in the course of the riots called for an all-out rebellion against the British. It is interesting to observe that the statement lashed out particularly hard at what it labeled as the “Zionist Socialists, the Left Poale—Zion,” accusing them of carrying out various military efforts as well as of helping the British indict innocent Arabs for committing exaggerated acts of terror.37 The Communique did not dispute the pogromistic acts that accompanied the riots, but it attempted to view them in the broader context of the conditions in Palestine. It was a gloomy account, underlined with a serious measure of frustration and disappointment. The official line of the Comintern only became fully apparent in the P.C.P. deliberations and pronouncements with the publication of its major pamphlet entitled “The Arab Revolutionary Movement and the Task of the Proletariat.” Here the Party embarked upon the difficult task of reconciling its own earlier communique with the Commintern’s radical and revolu­ tionary line by exploring the theoretical issues involved in the assessment of the riots.38 The document addressed itself to the question: Pogrom or Revolt?and took the position that mass uprisings could not be, measured by their outward appearance, quoting the noted social democratic thinker Otto Bauer, who already in 1912 had predicted that “mass uprising in the East [would] assume a reactionary form.” 39 It also quoted Karl Kautsky,

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another social democrat, who argued that “any revolutionary uprising in Palestine [would] definitely be accompanied by a terrible slaughter of Jew,” comforting himself, however, by saying that themumber of Jews in Palestine was not large.40 That which counted in uprisings, the analysis went, was their “extent, their tempo and length of time.” Thus an uprising such as the 1929 one should be viewed in terms of whether “the outbreak assumed the form of a mass and popular one, whether it spread all over the country, the speed with which it spread, and whether it engulfed all national walks of life.”41 If the insurrection assumed a momentum of its own, and if it was capable of perpetuating itself and persisting over time, then the situation was one of a radical and deeply rooted social upheaval, reaching the dimension of a rebellion.42 The 1929 riots were to be compared to the Syrian revolt of 1925—27 and hence to be definitely regarded as a revolt which was bound to “engulf in its flames the whole Arab East.”43 The statement did not deny the atrocities committed by the Arabs against the Jews, but by using the dialectics of its revolutionary analysis, it argued that it was not Hebron44 or Motsa that determined the essence of the riots, but rather the clashes with the British police. The real issue, according to the pronouncement, was whether a genuine revolutionary situation should be sacrificed on account of several minor accompanying pogromist manifestations. The overriding conclusion was that anyone who endeavored to “tie the issue of revolution with the pogroms.. .displays a rather superficial understanding [of the situation]which has nothing at all to do with revolutionary Marxism.”45 Anyone who opposed a revolution and the revolutionary slogans of the Party because of the accompanying manifestations of atrocities or pogroms was by implication “encouraging the pogroms, and [wasJan accomplice to the murderers of Hebron.. .as well as provocator of the British.” 46 In principle, the Party condemned the pogroms, considering them to be counterrevolutionary and reactionary, but it nonetheless proclaimed as heretic any attempts to utilize them in such a way as to overshadow the potentially revolutionary situation. On the actual developments in Palestine during the riots, the Party took issue with the Zionist interpretation of the events. It denounced the Zionist argument that the riots were precipitated by savage, dark forces that attacked an innocent and peaceful Jewish community. Zionism, in this interpretation, particularly its labor wing, was neither innocent nor peaceful. In Palestine, Zionism was a puppet of and the spearhead of Imperialism, and thus responsible for the split Jewish workers’ blood, that served as oil for the Zionist reactionary and misleading aspiration.47

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What was the explanation, it was asked in the pamphlet, for the fact that the “Jewish workers who elsewhere in the world always in the forefront of the revolutionary struggle, turned in Palestine into a reactionary and imperialistic battalion”?48 Contrary to its earlier dispatches from Palestine, this Party account declared that the Arab discontent had spread from the country into the city.49 The difficulty, however, was that the proletariat were not ready to face the revolutionary challenge —lacking the proper leadership and a sense of direction — and this was the decisive factor which sealed the fate of the revolt. (The previous version was that the revolt was solely of an agrarian nature, and that the Arab peasantry stood in the forefront of the uprising.) The Arab masses, despite their weakness and perplexity, it was asserted, were basically “progressive” and bound to find their way in the future. It was stressed that the Arab future lay in the hands of the masses of workers and peasants. The lesson to be learned by the Jewish masses (particularly the workers) from the August events was that the choice it faced in the future was “national pogroms or social revolution, Zionism or communism.” 50 In another document entitled, “The Mufti Mattathias and the Great Peasant Uprising Two Thousand Years Ago,” 51 an attempt was made to draw an historical parallel between the Hasmonaean rebellion in 166 B.C. against the Syrians and the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini’s riots of August 1929 against the Jews. To the author, the Jews during the Mufti’s uprising were metaphorically the Syrians during the Hasmonaean rebellion. The symbol that motivated Mattathias as well as the Mufti “ may have been religious, but the true content of the two movements was that both were mass peasant uprisings and national liberation movements from foreign yoke ” 52 This interpretation carried the Comintern’s line to a somewhat ridiculous extreme, but it clearly reflected the efforts of the Party to readjust its line of reasoning as much as possible in the direction of the Comintern’s position. ' All the above-mentioned sources reveal a gradual evolution in the Party’s interpretations of the riots, beginning with its bold denunciation of them as an anti-Jewish pogrom, through the theory of an agrarian revolution and to the evaluation of an urban proletarian revolution. Nevertheless, as the record shows, the reformulations, the repeated reinterpretations were to fall short of what the Comintern was to declare late in October and to spell out in great detail in many of its subsequent actions. For the Jewish leadership of the P.C.P., this was to be the period of their greatest agony during the six years of their Party affiliation.

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The Comintern’s verdict was crystallized in the form of a Resolution of the Political Secretariate of the E.C.C.I. on the Insurgent Movement in Arabistan, adopted in its session of October 16,1929, but made public only in early February, 1930.53 In general, the developments in Arabia, according to this resolution, “fully confirmed the correctness of the analysis made by the Sixth Comintern Congress,” 54 which envisaged a ‘‘sharpening of the struggle between imperialism and the working masses of the colonial countries.” 55 Although fro nr a socio-economic point of view, the character of the revolution in Arabia was of a bourgeois-democratic nature, “the main driving forces of the revolution [were] the working class and the peasantry,” who were bound to turn the bourgeois—democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.56 It seems, however, that this theoretical assumption was not so simple when it came to an analysis of the specific situation in Palestine. An echo of this sense of perplexion in the case of Palestine can be detected in D. Z. Manuilsky’s57 report before the plenary session of the Executive Committee of the Youth Communist International (Y.C.I.), held in Moscow during November—December 1929.58 In his report, Manuilsky admitted that in the event of any discontent in the colonies, its social make-up would be difficult to analyze, because of “the element of foreign admixture.” 59 This admixture would most likely be composed of “reactionary influences of the clergy as well as of imperialist intrigues,” plus “religious, national, and social prejudices.” 60 It was therefore the task of the Communists to uncover the external forms of the movement in the colonies and discern its class content. Difficulties were to be encountered in this task of “sweeping away all the excrescences which distort its real class content, and in raising the movement to such a level that every worker taking part in it can comprehend its general class tasks.”61 Accordingly, the Palestine uprising was seen to have begun as an Arab national protest. The Arab reactionary leadership, composed of the clergy and the feudalists, united in the Mejlis under the leadership of teh Mufti of Jerusalem, was originally “directed into the channel of an Arab-Jewish national feud,” but according to the report, the movement soon assumed a momentum of its own, “rapidly . . . moving on to a higher level” in a quick move and “turning against the Mufti, the Mejlis, Islam . . . against. . . the Arab Executive . . . condemning their treachery and their surrender to Imperialism.”62 The Arab uprising did not stop at this point, and evolved into what the Comintern regarded as its genuine and crucial phase: The movement is changing rapidly from a Zionist-Arab conflict into a national peasant movement, in which the nationalist urban petty-bourgeoisie are also taking part. The Fellaheen and particularly the Bedouin are the most active participants in the insurrection -movement.” 63

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While the resolution allegedly untangled the web of mysteries surrounding the birth, the social composition, and the evolution of the Arab insurrection, the undenied element of pogromism that led to the bloodshed of many innocent Jewish victims required some clarification. The original blame for this bloodshed was placed upon the Zionists and the British; the Arab insurrectionary movement was a response to their provocations.64 In specific terms, the Resolution thrust the responsibility for the bloodshed upon the Zionist bourgeois colonizers and their lackeys, [who]played their role of direct agents of British imperialism *... and the “Left” wing of Zionism, the Poale—Zion [who] merged with Jewish Fascists and took the position of British Imperialism and the Zionist bourgeoisie . .

In other words, it was only in response to Zionist fascist provocation that the “Arab reactionaries (feudalists and priesthood,)” played a “treacherous, provocative and counter-revolutionary role,” and “tried to answer with a pogrom.” 66 (An action that, according to the Resolution, did not alter its national liberation character, for the Arab insurrection remained an “anti-imperialist-all-Arab movement. . . peasant movement).67 Comrade Manuilsky, in the above-mentioned report, pointed out that the Arab peasants and bedouins initially reacted in a way that “took the form of massacres of Jews,68 but emphasized that it was far-fetched to draw from this small observation the conclusion that the insurrection was a “reactionary movement” or an anti-Semitic “pogrom,” 69 especially insofar as the “Arabs fought heroically against the English occupation troops” 70 only two days later (i.e. on August 25). The Comintern’s method of dealing,with this aspect of the Palestine events clearly assumed the form of shifting the burden, attempting to avoid confronting the issue specifically and directly, although the following reference was made in a later assessment of the Comintern, having to do with the riots of 1933: Contrary to the disturbances in the year 1929, no anti-Jewish excesses [were] permitted.71

How ticklish the issue of the pogromist character of the riots was for the Comintern (and to which it frequently appears that it gave its whole-hearted blessing) can also be ascertained from its violent objections to the McDonald’s Palestine Report (or Shaw Report) which asserted, among other matters, that the “savage Arabs attacked and slaughtered the peaceable Jews,” 72 and which attempted to portray the Arab population in Palestine as “bloodthirsty.” 73 In its attempt to conceal the pogromist by-products of “the Arab uprising,” the Comintern pinpointed the exact responsibility for the violence upon Zionism:

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The August revolt of 1929, in which Zionism was responsible for the death of hundreds of the poor Jewish inhabitants of Hebron, Safed, etc. who had to pay with their lives for the Imperialist crimes of the Zionist leaders who are allied with the British . . P*

Although the Resolution of the Comintern portrayed a very optimistic picture of the revolutionary nature assumed by the Arab riots, it still had to grapple with the question of what went wrong, how to account for the movement’s failure^Apart from the respective undermining roles played by the Zionists in^freir provocations (being “imperialist lackeys”),by the Mufti and his religious Mejlis (“treacherous, provocative and counter­ revolutionary”),75 as well as by the All-Arab National Congress76 and the Arab Executive Committee (who “entered on the path of a treacherous contest with Zionism.. . national reformism . .. being more and more counter-revolutionary and capitulationary”),77 the circumstances sur­ rounding the “revolution” were quite obscure. In its analysis, the Comintern admitted that the revolutionary situation in Palestine erupted in an unexpected way (i.e. caught Party members off-guard). The revolutionary coalition of fellaheen and bedouins78 was searching for an appropriate leadership for direction and guidance, a leadership which failed to materialize. The peasant movement of fellaheen and bedouins was fragmentary and unorganized, and did not coincide in time with an organized, independent class action by the urban proletariat. The most disheartening contributory factor to the revolutionary failure in Palestine, however, was attributed to the role which the P.C.P. played in the unfolding events. The Comintern’s criticism of the P.C.P. must be examined in great detail, for this criticism sealed the fate of its Jewish leaders as well as the . fate of its Jewish following, transforming the Party into an almost purely Arab political entity. The resolution pointed out how the Comintern had always warned the Party of the “dangers of opportunism,” of its “conciliatory attitude to Poale—Zion,” and of its “tendencies of Jewish— Zionist chauvinism,” 79 and it clearly indicated that if there were ever doubts about these weaknesses of the Party, they were all openly exposed during the riots.80 The greatest failure of the P.C.P., as mentioned in the previous chapter, was its failure to Arabize, despite the repeated demands placed upon it to do so by the Comintern. This failure, in fact, was the main reason for the Party’s lack of preparedness at the outbreak of the “uprising” ; the Party was ineffective because “it [wasj composed in the main of Jewish elements who had no contact with the Arab masses as a whole,” 81

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particularly lacking contact with the peasantry. By failing “to steer a bold and determined course towards the Arabization of the Party from top to bottom,” the Party thus “concentrated its work primarily on the Jewish workers.” 82 The slow rate of Arabization was even more seriously impeded by a deliberate attempt on the part of some Party gleaders to wash themselves of their responsibility by mechanically including several Arab comrades on the Central Committee:83 The Jewish members of the Party and the Central Committee did not always realize that their role in relation to the Arabian labour and Communist movement' must be that of aids and not of leaders, as Lenin told the Russian Bolshevik working among nationals in the USSR.8*

The Party, charged the Comintern, at the time of the “uprising” was imbued with a “spirit of pessimism and scepticism. . . of passive sect­ arianism”85 that rendered any political work among fellaheen and bedouins impossible. In addition, the party suffered from an extreme polarization of views, which was made manifest in the form of serious Left and Right wing deviations. On one hand, there-was a leftist group, who, unlike the majority of the Party leaders, argued “about the proletarian character of the revolution” 86 which in the context of the political development in Palestine was premature' and unrealistic, and hence, as appraised in the Comintern’s organ . . . [reflected] a manifestation of Trotsky's permanent revolutionary idea, and in the existing conditions in Palestine would signify a dictatorship of a handful of Jewish workers over the great bulk of the Arabian people.87

Of a far more dangerous nature and far-reaching consequences was the right-wing deviation, which was the prevalent body within the Party’s leadership at the time of the riots. This group, as noted before, was accused of under-estimating the revolutionary potential of the riots and of exaggerating the influence of the reactionary bourgeoisie on the Arab masses. This right wing, in addition, bore the responsibility for all the following: . . . concealed resistance to Arabization of the Party, pessimism and passivity in regard to work among the Arab masses, fatalism and passivity on the peasant question, failure to understand the role o f Jewish comrades as a subsidiary force but not as leaders of the Arab movement. . . exaggeration of the influence of the large landlords and priesthood on the Arab masses, a conciliatory attitude to opportunistic errors, "failure to understand the need for courageous and vigorous self-criticism of the mistakes committed by the Party.88

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The fact that Jewish Party members were urged to leave the country at the time of the riots was an additional error viewed with great misgiving — such a departure should have been regarded as a desertion from a battlefield.89 The most serious error of all, however, was the Party’s appraisal of the uprising as a pogrom.” 90 This constituted proof of Zionist and Imperialist influence on the Communists.91 The Resolution of the E.C.C.I. also came up with specific recommendations and a bjueprint of action for a renovated P.C.P.. In the section dealing with the Tasks o f the Party, the Comintern placed the issue of Arabization on the highest priority. It demanded an immediate and drastic “Arabization of the Party from top to bottom.” 92 (The actual changing of the guards within the ranks of the P.CP. will be examined later.) It urged the Party to eradicate its scepticism and passivity on the peasant question, to draw up an agrarian program, and to build bridges to the revolutionary alliance of the fellaheen and bedouins. The Party was also to purify itself from the left and right-wing deviations (“the Iiquidationists and the Opportunists”).93 The Resolution called upon the Party to wage a relentless struggle against Zionism, particularly its left wing, as well as against the reactionary Arab leadership of the Mejlis and the All-Arab Congress. In its effort to secure the Arabization of the Party so as to enable it to join the mainstream of the native population, the Comintern came up with an important organizational proposal, the “formation of a federation of Communist parties of the Arab countries,” (to include the Communist Parties of Palestine, Syria, and Egypt).94 The Party meanwhile was urged to intensify the revolutionary struggle in Palestine by identifying itself with qualification with the cause of the Arab masses and their political aspirations. This task was carried out in three major arenas of activity: (1) in a campaign to radicalize the Arab masses in order to resume the revolt (2) in the Party’s strong drive to aid Arab prisoners arrested by the government and accused of various terrorist acts and (3) in the Party’s efforts to bring itself closer to the Arab masses by changing its Jewish image, and by becoming involved in internal Arab affairs. These three areas will be examined primarily on the basis of the Party’s and the Comintern’s reports, inasmuch as these reflect the Comintern’s new line of action guided by the principles of the October Resolution of the E.C.C.I. The major propaganda campaign undertaken by the P.C.P. was to rekindle the revolutionary struggle of the Arabs (despite the fact that it was apparently bound to assume an anti-Jewish pogromist nature)95 and a vast propaganda literature in this area was published between 1929-1931. The

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strong anti-Zionist (and anti-Jewish) undertones in this propaganda campaign leave no doubt as to the realization on the part of the P.C.P. that this was the only line of agitation with the potential of stirring the Arab “revolutionary fervent.” The militancy and strong advocacy of violence, bordering on incitement for pogroms,96 confirm the fact that this time the P.CJP. was determined not to be caught by surprise should an uprising take place, but rather that it would take the initiative in the form of a calculated, revolutionary leadership.97 This propaganda campaign was at the same time an attempt to surpass the Arab National leadership in militancy, by accusing them of not displaying adequate anti-Zionist zeal, and of pursuing policies of pacification and capitulation.98 The P.C.P. was clearly trying to take over the leadership of Arab Nationalism in Palestine, and it upheld Arab national political aspirations by backing their right to demand a free and independent Arab State.99 The Party praised “the powerful developments of the national movement in the Arab countries,” by declaring that the Arab problem had emerged as one of the major international political problems, and it praised the outstanding revolutionary capacity of the Arab people, sending “Cardinal greetings to all fighters for Arab national emancipation.” 100 It optimistically reported that the revolutionary uprising in Palestine was rapidly spreading into the neighboring Arab lands, and it called upon the Arabs to arm themselves in preparation for the final and decisive round against Imperialism. When some Arab workers went on strike in several cities in Palestine, pressing for political as well as economic demands, the Party urged the strikers to turn the strike into an “Anti-Imperialist insurrection.” 101 Similarly, when the Government tightened security measures in the country and proclaimed martial law to uphold the efforts against the repetition of bloodshed, the P.C.P. unleashed a torrent of accusations against the “treacherous national leaders of the Jews and Arabs” who collaborated with the British government to curb further violent outbreaks.102 In a propaganda fanfare, the Party declared that Palestine was entering a new revolutionary era, the anti-imperialist struggle assuming new dimensions. The new dimension was attributed to the increasing radicalization of the Arab masses, as a result of the process of proletarization. The economic growth in Palestine, which was accompanied by rapid expro­ priation of the land of peasants, as well as by the ever-increasing exploitation and impoverishment of the Arab workers, increased their political and social awareness.103 This awareness, which developed along the lines of revolutionary discontent, was leading towards the formation of a new Arab revolutionary leadership that would consist of workers, peasants

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and bedouins.104 The Arab masses, argued the Comintern, were becoming more revolutionary, turning away from the reformist and nationalist traitors; Communist influence was growing.105 This was a desperate attempt to identify the alleged mentioned tendencies within the Arab community with Communism and the P.CP.. To popularize its propaganda line, the P.CP. championed specific Arab causes. It intensified its struggle against Zionism by organizing an active resistance to Zionist -Knd purchases,106 and it called upon the Arabs to attack members of the Haganah when they came to the rescue of attacked Jewish pioneers.107 An active campaign was waged against Jewish immigration to Palestine and against the Histadruth’s drive for Kibush Ha'avodah (Conquest of the Land). In all these matters, the P.CP.’s official line and formal pronouncements were in line with the Party’s struggle against Zionism during the years preceding the riots. (See Chapter Five of the thesis.) The riots, however, produced a new political reality in Palestine, accompanied by new issues immediately seized upon by the P.C.P.. The first new issue explored by the P.CP. was»the various Government investigation committees and their respective recom­ mendations. In one major document, the Party argued that the investigation committees were politically motivated and deliberately established to block all potential revolutionary uprisings in the country.108 In attacking the Shaw Commission Report, entitled “Disturbances in Palestine and the Means to avoid their Repetition,” 109 the P.CP. criticized it as an arbitrary and one-sided attempt to put the blame for the violent consequences of the riots upon the Arabs.110 The report, according to the P.CP. interpretation, was an effort to exonerate the British and the Jews from all responsibility for the violence, when it was common knowledge that at the heart of the matter lay the notorious Balfour Declaration, and the various privileges accorded to the Zionists in Palestine.111 In the Comintern’s commentary, the Shaw Report was accused of trying to tarnish the revolutionary character of the riots by exposing them as riots and savage acts. Even the Commission’s recommendation to curb Jewish immigration into Palestine was discredited by another Comintern’s report as a British attempt to temporarily appease the Arab Nationalist leaders.112 The other major effort of the P.CP. (fully endorsed by the Comintern) was the struggle it initiated on behalf of the Arab terrorists who were arrested, convicted, and sentenced by the British authorities. In a dispatch dated May 8, 1930, the Comintern reported that 1500 Arabs were arrested (compared with only 150 Jews).113 These were mostly innocent people, according to this source, who happened to be caught with arms; the

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true pogromists from the Arab side, as well as the Jewish social fascists, who were the group responsible for the violence, were undetained. The dispatch concluded: Needless to sa y . . . the justice practiced here is imperialist class justice.114

In a solidarity move, the Party and the Comintern paid tribute to two Arab Nationalist leaders, Hamdi-al-Husseini and Kemai Daschani, on their declaration of a hunger strike in a British jail.115 The Comintern called Husseini a “brave fighter/’ who had been jailed in place of the “revisionist Zionist inciters/’ and demanded his immediate release.116 In another instance, when three Arab terrorists were sentenced to death for their role during the disturbances in Safad, the Comintern claimed that these Arabs were “innocent victims” who were condemned to death by “brutal imperialist vengeance/’117 Throughout this campaign, the Comintern stressed the fact that Communists and Arab national freedom fighters were being jointly pursued by the police, implying of course that both constituted the hard core of the Arab national liberation movement.118 It was the Social Democrats and the Poale-Zion members who desired this barbaric torture of Communist and Arab freedom fighters.119 This reign of terror, according to the Imprecorr report, condemned 30 Arabs to death, with other hostages held in the hands of the British government in order to bar further revolutionary uprisings.120 The Government comdemned those “Arab patriots” according to the principle that fit wasjbetter to hang innocent people than not to hang anybody at all.121

The dispatch emphasized that not only the Arab prisoners but the Communist ones as well were being tortured (some to death) in the jails, and it demanded that the “repression against revolutionary workers and Arab national revolutionaries” cease.122 The Comintern displayed pride and even satisfaction about the news concerning the arrest and torture of Communist members along with Arab arrestees, for this clearly demonstrated that the “influence of Communism upon the Arab masses [was] increasing.” 123 It also stated that the new waves of Communists that were arrested were mostly Arabs, yielding proof that the Arabization of the Party was bearing fruit.124 Nadschati Sedky (Sadi) and Mahmud Mograbi Dshesaierli, both of. whom drew a two year sentence in a Jaffa court, were declared as the “leaders of Arab Communism.” 12S The Party’s ability to change its image and thereby penetrate the Arab masses hinged on this vital issue of Arabization of the Party. The Comintern

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tried to prove to the Arab national bourgeoisie that the P.C.P. was no longer a Jewish Tarty and that it had begun in earnest to fight for the cause of the Arab people.126 The Party pointed to the new Arab membership of the Party's Central Committee as well as to the sharp increase in Arab membership within its ranks. The extent of the Arabization process of the P.C.P. was revealed in great detail during the Party’s Seventh Congress early in 1931 (the actual Congress convened in the middle of December 1930). This Congress officially adppted the Comintern’s Resolution of October 26, 1929, and dwelt at some length upon the issue of the “proper understanding of the national problem in Palestine.” 127 According to the Congress, the national problem came to a sharp focus during the riots of August 1929, “in connection with the revolutionary emancipation movement of the Arab masses.”128 In the Comintern’s interpretation, “the essence of the national question in Palestine [consisted]in the peculiar position of the Jewish national minority in Palestine.”129 This minority had not quite adhered to its relative proportional position in the Party’s hierarchy and hence did great damage to the Party’s position within the Arab majority of the population in Palestine.130 The composition of the delegates to the Party’s Seventh Congress reflected the expected change (the achievement of a more representative balance between Jewish and Arab members), both groups, unlike the previous Congresses, having the same number of representatives.131 Nevertheless, despite the sharp radical rise in Arab representation, the Congress did not quite live up to the Comintern’s expectation; a fifty-fifty split still represented a gross imbalance. The locus of the problem was identified as follows: . . . the main danger at the present stage of Party development is the influence of Jewish Zionist national chauvinism, which finds its expression in the slow rate of Arabianization of the Party.132

The Party outlined .the task of its new re-inforced pro-Arab orientation, calling upon its functionaries to penetrate the Arab working masses through their trade unions and to extend themselves to the Arab peasantry in the country. With an Arab majority in the Party’s Central Committee for the first time in its history, the Party felt confident of its prospects to lead the Arab masses on the path of revolution. In a later review by the Comintern of the progress of the Arabization of the Party, it was predicted that by the time the new revolutionary development in Palestine would mature, the Arabized P.C.P. would be able to meet its leadership challenge. As evidence of this, it cited the fears of the British authorities which were evoked by the rise in the Party’s popularity in the

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Arab villages and Arab workers’ quarters.133 The report sounded an encouraging note about similar developments taking place in the Syrian Communist Party (which had also suffered from acute ethnic imbalance, and had been undergoing a thorough Arabization process). Another significant victory proclaimed by the Comintern in the context of the Party’s Arabization was that at the very same time “more and more Jewish workers [werejturning away from Zionism and coming over to Communism.” 134 The Party’s Seventh Congress was a moment of reckoning on the whole issue of the Jewish role in the life of the Party. In its resolutions, it was acknowledged that the Party had scored considerable successes among the Jewish workers during the years 1926-29 (in reality, their influence was negligible). The Congress praised the various clubs that the Party sponsored (particularly the Ehud), as well as its successful May 1st demonstrations held during that period. The Resolutions also praised the inroads the Party had made among Jewish workers as reflected in its successes in the elections to the Histadruth in 1927 and to the municipalities in Jerusalem and Jaffa during the same year. The Jewish leadership of the P.C.P., despite its failure to Arabize the Party, scored some unexpected compliments by the E.C.C.I. Resolution of October 26,1929. It was stated that “the P.C.P. showed itself to be a firmly welded organization of devoted revolutionaries, anxious to fulfill their revolutionary duty in an honorable* fashion.”13S With reference to the quality of its ideological work, it was mentioned that in “its theoretical level, its devotion to Communism, the Communist Party of Palestine certainly stands high.. .” 136 AH the above-mentioned qualities and accomplishments, however were dwarfed when compared with the issue the Comintern regarded as of the prime importance for its political interests in Palestine: the Arabization of the Party. The Party’s Seventh Congress, therefore, sounded a stiff warning to all those that tried to undermine the process of the Party’s Arabization.137 Any manifestation of Jewish chauvinism, the Resolution stated, would be mercilessly eradicated. In retrospect, the Comintern’s Resolution of October 26,1929 (the E.C.C.I. Resolution), and the P.CiVs Seventh Congress in December 1930, with all their criticism of the Jewish Communists, nevertheless seem mild compared with the fierce attack leveled against them somewhat later by the Arab members of the P.C.P. during the Comintern’s Seventh Congress, held in Moscow in 1935. This criticism reveals the deep mistrust of the P.C.P. Jewish leaders, precisely because of their Jewish background, and shows how they were essentiaUy used as political scapegoats for all the Party’s previous errors as well as for its ongoing difficulties. Despite the fact that

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these Jewish leaders were removed from power in the Party, their spirit perpetually seemed to haunt the new Arab leadership. Their criticism and accusations of sabotage and disloyalty had alarming discriminatory and prejudicial undertones, bordering on racialism. As one example of many, the Syrian delegate, Comrade Nadir, during the tenth Session of the Comintern’s Seventh Congress in Moscow, upon reporting on the CP. of Syria (dominated in its early stages by Jews and other minority members), stated the following withjpgard to his party: . . . up to 1930 (it had) to wage a struggle against opportunism and the tendency to form narrow circles and against the self-isolation from the masses. When this stage was paved and an approach to the masses began, the leadership of the Party was captured by elements which came from the camp of counter-revolutionary Zionism. Not content with hindering the development of the fraternal Communist Party in Palestine, these elements, penetrated into Egypt and Syria in order to obstruct the developments of the Communist Parties in these countries.138

Hence Comrade Nadir was pleased to report that necessary measures were taken against this subversive activity when the Party outlined its policy on the national-liberation movement, broke up anti-Party groupings and removed Zionist and Dashnak elements from the leadership. Since then the Party has achieved serious successes . . . in particular succeeded in creating a solid base among the Arabian proletariat.139

On the same occasion, Comrade Haidar of Palestine declared that in Palestine, “the decisive role in this revolution belongs to the masses of the Arab people” but because of certain influences which had previously dominated the Party, the Party had missed some revolutionary opportu­ nities: As a result, although there were powerful revolutionary events in the country, the Party took the .path of sectarianism, Jewish nationalism, keeping away from the broad masses of the Arabs. This opportunist semi-Zionist leadership of the C.P. of Palestine was removed.140

During the twelfth Session of the Congress in Moscow, Comrade Yussuf of Palestine expanded on the background of the Jewish ex-leadership and its implications for the subsequent damage inflicted upon the P.CP.: But the party suffered from Jewish nationalism for a period of many years. At the head o f the party leadership stood comrades who mainly came from Zionist parties, who ideologically never changed their line, qftd continued from the time of the founding of the Party up to the very last days, i.e. up to the time they were relieved from party work in Palestine openly, and concealed, to struggle against the line of the Comintern and hinder the political and organizational growth of the Party, and consequently hindered the revolutionary liberation movement of the Arabian masses.

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COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE The leadership of the Party with all the means at its disposal sabotaged carrying into effect the Arabization of the C.P. of Palestine and continued adhering to their former political and organizational line which had been condemned.141

The past association of the Jewish Communists with various Zionist organizations was thus never forgotten and never forgiven in the eyes of the Comintern. The Communist Jewish leadership was well exploited by the Comintern in its efforts to lay the foundation for a Communist Party in Palestine, since there were no Arabs at the time to do the job. Most of them were sent from Moscow precisely for that purpose. When the organizational task was accomplished, however, the leadership had to be forcefully turned over to the representatives of the native Arab majority who were to carry the revolutionary struggle among their own people, and with whose struggle the Comintern identified itself fully after the riots of 1929. If the alterations in the Party’s line and style of action were painful and complicated, the forceful and abrupt changes in the P.CJP. leadership resulted in open wounds among the deposed Jewish comrades that were never to be healed.142 The composition of the Central Committee, consisting of an Arab majority, that was finally elected by the P.C.P.’s Seventh Congress was originally “proposed” by the Comintern itself.143 The Jewish Communist leaders reacted, though not openly, with a deep sense of indignation and resistance; it was felt that the Comintern was practicing open racial or national discrimination.144 Most of the purged Jewish Communists evaluated this move on the part of the Comintern as opportunistic, an act of expediency. This move was blatant evidence to them that qualification for leadership in the P.C.P. was to be based not upon merit, but upon the principle of national origin, in open defiance of the comradely principles of equality and fraternity of the working people. All that the Jewish Communists were permitted to accomplish by rising to leadership in Communist parties throughout the world, including the Soviet Union, was clearly denied to them in Palestine. The Jewish leaders of the P.C.P. who had remained in the Party after the riots145 refused to accept the Comintern’s decision to Arabize the Party because they regarded it as arbitrary and discriminatory.146 An echo to the dissatisfaction among them is found in a conversation that took place between the two top Jewish P.C.P. leaders, Wolf Averbach (Daniel) and J. Berger-Barzilai, in Palestine early in 1930, upon their return from Moscow to implement the October 16,1929 Resolution of the Comintern.147 Averbach, who had already received word from the Comintern about his removal from the P.C.P. leadership early in 1930, expressed his discontent

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with the resolution, and realizing that nothing could be done to frustrate the Comintern’s instructions, both he and Barzilai nonetheless decided to slow down the Arabization process and to undermine it whenever possible. Alexander Hashin (Averbach’s brother) displayed his criticism and displeasure of the P.C.P.’s purge by the Comintern and hinted that it was a sign of more serious troubles to come. In view of the fact that the Comintern was swept by an atmosphere of fear and suspicion at the time, there was no channel through-'which reservations about the Comintern’s instructions to the P.CJ\ could be registered. Jewish leaders were thus helplessly purged from the ranks of the Party. The new Party leadership, after purging the Haifa branch, carried the campaign to Tel-Aviv and to many other Party cells. Some ex-Jewish leaders were offered jobs as assistants to the new Arab Party leaders.148 An overwhelming majority of the Jewish members of the Party broke completely away from it. Several joined Zionist labor parties, while others remained outside any political affiliation.149 Some Party members, out of deep disappointment from the whole ordeal in the Party, left Palestine altogether.150 Many Jewish leaders were recalled to Moscow by the Comintern. The very few Jewish members who remained in the Party could not alter the fact that the P.C.P. of the twenties was dead immediately after the riots. The Comintern’s imposed changes in its personnel was an act of De Jure, confirming a situation that already existed De facto, namely, that the Party right after the riots had lost any chance of functioning within the Jewish community in Palestine. In December 1930, elections were held to the Jewish Assembly of Representatives (Asefat-Hanivharim). The P.CP. took part in this election in the form of a front organization called the Proletarian Party (Harishima Haproletarit) and was decisively beaten.151 These results sealed off the Party’s fate in the Jewish community. During 1930—31, the P.C.P. was plagued by a wave of government arrests and persecutions, and many of the newly elected Arab members of the Party’s Central Committee were sentenced to years in prison.152 It was a period of profound crisis n the history of the Party, that was slightly overcome only in 1934 when a new group of graduates from the Moscow University of the Toilers of the East arrived in Palestine, including its new Arab Secretary-General, Ridwan-al-Hilu (Musa).153 The ex-Jewish members of the Party’s Secretariat , including its leader, Wolf Averbach, Nahum Leshchinsky, J. Berger-Barzilai, Moshe Kuperman, as well as Nahman List, returned to Moscow on the orders of the

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Comintern, as did many other Jewish party functionaries.154 After taking up various assignments in the Comintern’s service, they were arrested by the N.K.V.D. during the Stalinist great purges and accused of “being members in the P.C.P., the Zionist imperialist organization.”155 Averbach, Leshchinsky, Kuperman, Hashin, and almost all the other members were executed. List and Barzilai, after spending twenty years in Soviet jails and labor camps, are the only ones who have survived, and they have carefully chronicled the events of these stormy years. The Comintern’s anti-Jewish position in the 1929 riots in Palestine also had pervasive repercussions among world Jewish Communists. What transpired as a reaction to the Comintern’s position among the American Jewish Communists is perhaps one of the most interesting case studies of Jewish Communist reaction to the event. The Jewish Communists in the United States traditionally upheld a strong anti-Zionist position, and repeatedly attacked Zionism in their press, the Morgen Freiheit, on ideological grounds. However, “the Yishuv (the Jewish Community in Palestine) as such was never attacked,”156 and on many occasions the Jewish Communists in the United States called for granting minority rights to the Jews in Palestine.157 When the riots in Palestine broke out on August 22 and the news about the “ massacre of 40 young students of an Orthodox Yeshiva in Chevron” were revealed, the Freiheit, reacting innocently to the news, labeled the Arab attacks on Jewish settlements in Palestine a “pogrom.”158 This reaction was coupled with a considerable measure of sympathy for the victims, and on August 26, the Freiheit paid tribute to the heroic Jewish defense effort, arguing that “when a pogrom breaks out, there is no other choice.” 159 The final responsibility for the pogroms was initially placed by the Freiheit on the British imperialists, who, it was felt, possessed sufficient police and military forces to prevent the massacres.160 The fact that the Freiheit at the same time continued to blame Zionism for contributing to the unfortunate consequences of the riots by expropriating the Arabs aroused Jewish public opinion against the Jewish Communists. With the arrival of the Comintern’s new instructions, the American Communist Party’s position had to be sharply reversed, and hence the early Freiheit pronouncements about an anti-Jewish pogrom were discredited with rather strong words by the Party’s Secretariat : We sharply condemn the position of our Communist Jewish daily, the Morning Freiheit, as absolute opportunist and hardly, if at all, different from the stand of the Jewish nationalist, Zionist and the capitalist press. . . 161

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Commenting on the paper’s early argument that the whole tragedy could have been averted had the British acted decisively and swiftly with force, the Secretariat reacted: These views are counterrevolutionary Zionist views, characteristic of the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie. This line is sharply condemned by the political committee of the C.P., and all responsible for such articles . . . will be taken to task by the party.162 *

The Party unleashed a barrag^of accusations against Zionism, referring to it as a “fig leaf of British infperialism” 163 and exploiter of peaceful Arabs, maintaining that “the Zionist Fascists [had] provoked the Arab up­ rising.” 164 Melech Epstein, one of the leaders of the Jewish Section of the Party, regarded the above statements as “driving the Freiheit into a pro-Arab position,” as well as of rushing the paper “into a policy with clear anti-Jewish overtones,”165 particularly in its publication of the following: You (the Zionists) are playing with the blood of misled people . . . You are out to satisfy your nationalistic robbery instincts at the expenses of an alien people on an alien land . . . the blood will fall on you . . . you are murderers . . , W6

The Jewish Section of the C.P. in the United States outraged American Jewry. Hundreds of Party members deserted its ranks, particularly those within the Jewish labor movement, but the most distinctive break occurred when a group of prominent Jewish writers, long associated with the Freiheit, publicly severed relations with the paper in protest against the strident anti-Jewish position.167 Abraham Raisin, H. Leivick, Menachem Boroisha, David Ignatoff, and many others were among this group. The Freiheit denounced their departure, calling them “the enemies of the working camp class, all pety-bourgeois elements who formerly posed: . . as supporters of the C.P. joined the camp of the enemy.”168 Aside from this standardly-worded denunciation came a statement that probably had more than a grain of truth to it, though not in the sense that the Party worded its interpretation: When they had to choose between counterrevolutionary Zionism and the national liberation movement. . . and the struggle of the exploited Jewish masses . . . they became open supporters of imperialism and reactionary Zionism.169

In actuality, such a choice was not really available, for the distinctly strong anti-Jewish position the Party took left their sympathies with the Jewish people .Paralleling the reaction of these American Jewish Comunist writers, precisely during this period, the noted Jewish scientist, Professor Albert Einstein, who had joined the League Against Imperialism and Fascism and been elected its president, resigned and left the organization in protest when its Secretariat upheld the Comintern’s line on the riots of 1929 in Palestine.170

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NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII 1.

2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

These were mostly the members of the Party’s Secretariat . See J. Berger-Barzilai, Hatragedia Shel Hamahapecha Hasovietit, (The Tragedy o f the Soviet Revolution) (Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1968), p. 105. This was the Haifa Committee, a stronghold of opposition to the Comintern’s New Course and strongly opposed to the Arab massacres. G.Z. Yisraeli, MOPS-PCP-MAKJ (Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1953), pp. 66—67, and Jane Degras, (ed.) The Communist International 1919-1943, Vol. Ill, p. 77. Bob, “The 1st of August in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 42, August 23, 1929, p. 899. J.B., “The Fight for the Land in Palestine "Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 30, August 9, 1929, pp. 809-810. Ibid: P. Kitagorodski, “The Bloody Events in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 47, September 6,1929, pp. 990-91. This was in reference to the Jewish Legion, consisting of Jewish battalions organized in the U.Si and U.K. which participated in the British conquest of Palestine. See Ben Halpern, The Idea o f the Jewish State (Harvard University Press: 1961), pp. 292-94. The Comintern argued that the Jewish bourgeoisie conceived the idea, and that it arranged for the recruits. Kitagorodski, loc. cit.. ■ Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 991. Ibid. J.B., “Imperialist Attacks in the Near East,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 30, June 28, 1929, p 658. Alini, “The Political Situation in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 50, September 13,1929, pp. 1055-57. This refers to the Arab strikes which occured in a large tobacco factory in Haifa and in the construction o f the Rockefeller Museum in Jerusalem. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. “ Against British Imperialism in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 47, Septem­ ber 6,1929, pp. 991-992. Ibid. Bob, “The Communist Party of Palestine and the Arab Revolt,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 61, October 25,1929, pp. 1321-1322. Ibid. Ibid. They were expelled from the Party, see footnote 2.

The Post-Riot Assessments and Reactions 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54.

155

See the Eastern Secretariate of the E.C.C.I.*s letter to the P.C.P. in Bob, op. cit., p. 1322. Ibid. “The Revolt in Palestine/* Communique of the Central Committee of the C.P. of Palestine, Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 54, September 27, 1929, pp. 1161-63. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. ^ Ibid. s' Ibid. During the riots, the Arabs declared “Dola Maana” (in Arabic, “The Government is with us.”) Ibid. Ibid. It particularly singled out for condemnation Davor, the organ of the Histadrut (the organ of the Social-Fascists in the Communique's words) for mourning the deaths in a fashion that would incite more riots Ibid. Ibid., p. 1221. Ibid. “Tnuat Hamered Ha’arvi Vtafkid Haproletarion,” The Arab Revolutionary Movement and the Task of the Proletariate), issued by the P.C.P., 1929 (no month), Archion Ha’avodah, Tel-Aviv. as quoted from Kampf, 1912, in Ibid., p. 5. as quoted from Arbaiter Zeitung (Vienna), in Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 8. It quoted Lenin who said that the popular character o f an uprising determines its revolutionary orientation. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid.,p. 9. See Chapter Two. “Tnuat Hamered,"op. cit., p. 11. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 24. Ibid. The argument sustained by the Party before was exactly the opposite, namely, that the urban Arab Community did not lend its hand to the pogromists. “Tnuat Hamered,” op. cit., p. 21. Yisraeli, op. cit., p. 69. Ibid. The Resolution was published in the Imprecorr on February 6,1930. This version deliberately omitted the parts which dealt with the P.C.P.'s early reaction to the national revolutionary tendencies in Palestine. Jane Degras, The Communist International 1929-43, Documents (Oxford: 1965), Vol. Ill, p. 79.

156 55.

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Among other centers of revolutionary ferment, the Comintern cited the crisis within the Indian working class, a crisis in the Chinese “counter-revolution” and a “rising wave in the revolutionary labour movement of the West.” Ibid., p. 80. 56. It is not quite clear what the Comintern meant in this context by a “socialist revolution” in view of the fact that in concurrent pronouncements, it always emphasized the potential outbreak of an “agrarian revolution.” Ibid. 57. He was the leader of the Comintern during the New Course era and one of the key political figures in the Soviet Union after Stalin*s purge of Bukharin (the ex-Comintern chief) in November 1929. He remained the Comintern’s chief until its Seventh Congress in 1935, whereupon he continued to serve in an unofficial capacity. 58. Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 15;March 21,1930, p. 268. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. Degras, op. cit., p. 80. 63. Ibid. 64. The Resolution of the Secretariat of the E .C .C .IImprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 6, February 6,1930, pp. 104-106. 65. Ibid. 66. Degras, loc. c it.. pp. 80-81. 67. Resolution of the Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., loc. cit. 68. Plenary Session of the E.C. of the Y.C.I. (November-December 1929), Report of Comrade Uanvdlsky, Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 15, March 21,1930, p. 268. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid. 71. W.R., “The Beginning of the Revolutionary Crisis in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 13, No. 50, November 17,1933, pp. 1110-1111. 72. J.B., “McDonald’s Palestine Report,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 18, April 10, 1930, pp. 347-48. 73. Ibid. 74. J.B., “ Zionism is Bankrupt,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 41, September 4,1930, pp. 865-866. 75. Ibid. 76. Degras, op. cit., p. 81. 77. “Tasks of the Communists in the All-Arab National Movement,” Imprecorr, VoL 13, No. 1, January 5,1933, pp. 16-19. 78. These groups were the most backward elements in the Arab society, but upon their active participation in the riots, they were described in the Comintern’s analysis as having developed class-consciousness. 79. Degras, op. cit.. 80. Resolution of the Political Secretariate of the E.C.C.I., loc. cit., and Ibid. , pp. 82-83.

The Post-Riot Assessments and Reactions 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98. 99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

157

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. db\d. Degras, op. cit., p. 82. Resolution of the Political Secietariat of the E.C.C.I., loc. cit.. Ibid. Degras, loc. cit.. Among some members of the P.C.P., there always prevailed a mood of resignation, that resulted in a position advocating emigration from Palestine. Yisraeli,, p. 48. Resolution of the Political Secretariate of the E.C.C.I., op. cit.. Ibid. Degras,op. cit., p. 83. Ibid. One precondition for such a federation advanced by the Comintern was “the Arabization of the CP. of Palestine and of Syria.” Ibid. Yisraeli, p. 82. Ibid. It was a Leninist conception that a revolutionary party should avoid what he called (in Russian) “Khvostism,” namely, trailing behind events; rather effective control must be assumed over an evolving revolutionary situation. uTasks of the Communists in the All-Arab National Movement,” Imprecorr, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 5,1933, pp. 16-19. “For the Struggle For Freedom of Arab People,” Appeal of the League Against Imperialism,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 64, November 15, 1929, pp. 1372-1373. J.B., “McDonald’s Gallows and Knont in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 63, November 8,1929, pp. 1356-57. The Comintern called upon the Jewish people to rally their support behind the Arab cause. See J.B., “Partisan and Mass Fights in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 70, December 20,1929, pp. 1478-79. J.B., “McDonald’s Prison Law in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 64, November 15,1929, p. 1372. “ Before the First Congress of the Arab Workers in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 2, January 9,1930, p. 24. “For the Struggle for Freedom of Arab People,” loc. cit.. A.M., “The Anglo-Zionist Terror in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. TO, No. 22, May 8,1930, pp. 402-403. Yisraeli, p. 82. Ibid. “Lekakh Hahakirah” (The Lesson of the Investigation), issued by the P.C.P., 1930, Archion Ha’avodah, Tel-Aviv, Israel.

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109.

J.B., “McDonald’s Palestine Report,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 18, April 10, 1930, pp. 347-48. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid: 112. J.B., “Bloodshed and Treachery of the McDonald Government in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 30, June 26,1930, pp. 540—541. On balance, the Shaw report in reality was judged to be more anti-Zionist than anti-Arab. 113. J.B., “The Pacification of Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 58, October 11, 1929, pp. 1242-1243. 114. Ibid. 115. 116. 117. 118.

119. 120. 121. 122.

123. 124. 125.

126. 127. 128. 129. 130.

“ Against the Imperialist Terror in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 62, November 1,1929, pp. 1339-40. Ibid. J.B., “McDonald’s Gallows and Knots in Palestine,” op. cit., pp. 1356-57. J.B., “McDonald’s Prison Law in Palestine,” op. cit., p. 1372.“The arrestees were defined by the Comintern as “ Revolutionary Arabian and Jewish workers.” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 3t), June 26,1930, pp. 540-41. J.B., “McDonald’s Prison Laws in Palestine,” loc. cit.. A.M., “The Anglo-Zionist Terror in Palestine,” op. cit., pp. 402-403. Ibid. Among the alleged tortured prisoners, the Comintern reported, was a Jewish worker Miaskovitzky who was seriously wounded in police beating and an 18 year old Communist girl, Anna Milstein, who was allegedly tortured to death in the Jerusalem Jail. A.M., loc. cit.. Bob, “ Arabian Communists Before the Court,” Imprecorr, Vol. 11, No. 28, May 28,1931, p.515. Prior to this arrest, almost all the previous ones had been Jewish Communists. Ibid. Ibid. Also see the Comintern’s report concerning 80 “revolutionaries” who were Jews and Arabs arrested during the P.C.P. May 1st demonstration. Most o f them were sentenced to prison and then to exile at the end of their jail terms. The demonstration resulted in clashes between Arab fellaheen and the police near Jerusalem, apparently supported by several Jewish P.C.P. members. See H., “The Terror Against the Revolutionaries in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 12, May 26,1932, pp. 463-64. Bob, “The Communist Party of Palestine and the Arab Masses,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 16, March 27,1930, pp. 325-326. Bob, “The 7th Party Congress of the C.P. in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 11, No. 2, January 15,1931, p. 44. Mustapha Sadi, “ The National Question at the VII Party Congress of the C.P. of Palestine,” Imprecorr%Vol. 11, No. 3, January 22,1931, p. 64. Ibid. The report accused the Party of dealing with the national problem in an "abstract way.” Ibid.

The Post-Riot Assessments and Reactions

159

131. Bob, “The 7th Party Congress,” loc. tit.. 132. Ibid. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145.

146. 147. 148. 149. 150. _ 151. 152.

153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158.

159. 160. 161. 162.

Bob, “The Fight of the Arab Communists,” Imprecorr, Vol. 11, No. 11, March 5,1931, p. 215. H., “The Terror Against the Revolutionaries in Palestine,” Imprecorr9 VoL 12, May 26,1932, pp. 463-64. Degras, op. tit., p. 83. Ibid. Yisraeli, p. 216. Imprecorr, Vol. 15, No. 52, October 10,1935, pp. 1299-1330. Imprecorr, Vol. 15, No. 65, December 2,1936, pp. 1617-1618. Ibid. Imprecorr, Vol. 15, No. 54, October 17,1935, pp. 1344-45. N. List, “Tsadak Hakomintem” (5), Keshet 27,1965, pp. 90-91. Yisraeli, p. 81 argues that they were actually appointed by the Comintern. List, “Tsadak Hakomintern,” (5), pp. 90-91. The Haifa Committee, a group that refused to accept the Comintern’s New Course and who argued that the riots were a pogrom, had been expelled. See footnote 2, p.142. Bob, “The Communist Party of Palestine and the Arab Revolt,” Imprecorr, Vol. 9, No. 61, October 25,1929, pp. 1321-22. Barzilai, op. tit., p. 81. Ibid., p. 82. Ibid. Ibid., p. 106. Ibid. In this election, the Party lost a total of 66% of its strength as based upon the results of the 1925 elections. Yisraeli, p. 83. A.M., “The Anglo-Zionist Tenor in Palestine,” loc. tit., as well as J.B., “Bloodshed and Treachery of the McDonald Government in Palestine,” Imprecorr, Vol. 10, No. 30, June 26, 1930, pp. 540-41. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, p. 87. Barzilai, op. tit., p. 106. Ibid. Melech Epstein, The Jew and Communism 1919-1941 (New York, Trade Union Sponsoring Committee), p. 223. Ibid. Marie Syrkin, “The Communists and the Arab Problem,” The Labour Palestine Pamphlets, No. 2, New York, p. 3. In the Zionist Archives in New York. Apparently, the first news published in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia in Moscow about the events of August 23, 1929, appeared under the following headline: “Pogrom in Palestine.” Epstein, op. tit., p. 223. As quoted by Marie Syrkin, op. cit., p. 3. Epstein, op. cit., p. 223. As quoted in Ibid., p. 224. Ibid.

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163. Daily Worker, August 30,1929, as quoted by Epstein, p. 225, 164. Freiheit of August 28,1929, as quoted by Ibid, 465. .The Party's new slogan dearly endorsed the Arab massacres. Typical to a common reaction of a Jewish Party member to this new line was a letter sent to the Freiheit by a reader, B. Wachtfogel, that stated the following: Everything that you write about the Zionists is true. But for Heaven sake, it is Jews who are being beaten . . . Zionist colonies, why not say Jewish colonies. . . Jewish blood is being shed. . . I beg of you, don’t justify the shedding*of Jewish blood. As quoted in Epstein, p. 225. 166. freiheit, August 29,1929,Ibid., p. 226. 167. Epstein, p. 229. 168. Ibid,ap. 230. 169. Daily Worker, September 2,1929, as quoted by Ibid, 170. Z. Abramovitch, Besherut Hatnuah, p. 290.

\

\

161

Conclusion

CHAPTER IX Conclusion The Comintern’s involvement in Palestine during the riots of 1929 was consistently marked by a zealous adherence to the cause of Arab nationalism, even to the point of the Comintern upholding the massacres of Jews at the hands of Arab terrorists as heroic acts of progressive revolutionary struggle whereas vehemently attacking Zionism as a re­ actionary and counter-revolutionary force. In light of the historical record of the events, as verified even by the Comintern’s own emissary, B. Smeral, it must be asked, what prompted the Comintern to distort the factual evidence at its disposal to such a point that Arab murderers and terrorists were evaluated as revolutionary heroes whereas innocent victims of the riots, religious students, Zionist workers and agricultural settlers, were labeled as imperialist pawns, oppressors, and representatives of the dark forces of reactionTThe fact that the Comintern’s position during the riots was not the result of an error of judgment, or of a misreading of an obscure political reality in Palestine in a moment of confusion, but rather a deliberate and premeditated stance, carefully conceived and clearly spelled out long before the outbreak of the riots, reflects a prejudice on its part that had implications reaching far beyond that which transpired in Palestine in 1929. The answer to the nature of the Comintern’s involvement in the riots of 1929 must be sought not only in an assessment of traditional foreign policy considerations based on expediency and opportunism but also on domestic Soviet political considerations related to sensitive and unresolved issued in the U.S.S.R.. The Comintern’s position in the 1929 riots was a pragmatic, calculated move that was largely based upon the Comintern’s unequivocal committment to support any local uprising in the colonies as part of its anti-colonial drive against imperialism. This was the cornerstone in the Comintern’s foreign policy posture when it seized upon local uprisings in North Africa, in the Middle East, and in Asia during the twenties to promote what it considered to be promising revolutionary situations. The rios of 1929 in Palestine were directly related to this framework of revolutionary expectations and, as such, merited the full Comintern support. Palestine, according to the Comintern’s view, was an Arab-Muslim

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country, an integral part of all other Arab countries in the Middle East, and hence the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine, as were all other Arab nationalist movements in the area, was deemed completely justified in waging a national liberation, anti-colonial struggle. The fact that these national liberation uprisings were led by what were regarded as bourgeois nationalist elements (some of whom, as in the case of Palestine, were of the most reactionary character) did not alter their “revolutionary” and “progressive” nature in the Comintern’s outlook. The Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, by inaugurating the New Course era of revolutionary development in the world, legitimized the Comintern’s longstanding identification with the cause of the Arab masses, and Palestine in 1929 proved to be no exception to it. The Comintern’s point of view was based upon the following reasoning. Promoting and taking part in the anti-colonial struggle with the native masses enabled t\A Communist Parties to penetrate the national liberation movements, and V en, in some instances, to assume responsible positions of leadership. This was the only means whereby the Comintern was able to deliver its revolutionary message and direct its course of action to the broad masses of the Arab East. Palestine, in this respect, was a small part of a large Arab world, and it was thus imperative for the Comintern to champion the Arab case in Palestine. This issue, in addition, had a domestic dimension to it - by strongly supporting the liberation cause of the Muslim countries aborad, the Soviet regime at home was able to master the sympathy and loyalty of its own vast Muslim minority that was concentrated in the Repulic of Caucasus and in the Central Asian territories. The situation in Palestine, however, was far more complicated than in the other colonies in the East, for the Comintern was confronted here with a new political factor: the existence of a small Jewish community and the rise of Zionism in the midst of an Arab ocean. Under ordinary circumstances, the Jewish minority would have been regarded by the Comintern as a minor local factor, which, if possible, should be attracted and enlisted in the general cause of the revolutionary anti-colonial struggle. In this instance, it was not only the fact that it was a Jewish community and, as such, a group regarded by the Comintern with great misgivings and apprehension, due to its strong cultural and ethnic independent-minded traditions and qualities which persistently resented all centralist authorita­ rian and absolutist dictates, traditionally associated with the Marxist dogmas and Soviet policies;1 but it was the fact that Zionism had deeply pervaded and continued to spread among the Jewish community in Palestine and elsewhere that so intensively engaged the Comintern’s attention.

Conclusion

163

In combating Zionism, the Comintern followed a well-established legacy of hostility that can be traced as far back as the early days of the rise of the Bolshevik movement.2 Up to the October Revolution, Zionism had been discredited as a reactionary doctrine and hence in those early years primarily fought on ideological grounds, but since the Revolution, it was interpreted by the totalitarian Soviet government and the Comintern in addition as a grave domestic security risk. That an alien ideology, should have an enormous appeal upon the Jewish masses in Russia, that the rise of the Zionist settlement in Palestine should orignally be based upon the human and intellectual resources of predominantly Russian Jewry, and that the future of Zionism in Palestine should be dependent upon the encouragement of mass Jewish migration from Russia to Palestine for its reservoir of supporters, was perceived as a direct challenge to the validity of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist program at home, as well as a threat to the security of the Soviet regime itself. The Zionist movement, for its part, had never dispelled Soviet fears in these matters. On the contrary, with its vast Zionist and pioneer organizations in Russia, it actively engaged itself in recruiting new pioneers, by seeking legal and illegal avenues of migration from Russia. Most active in this effort were the Zionist leaders in Palestine. The first effort was made by the noted British Zionist leader, Dr. M. Eder, in a visit to Moscow in January ,1921 in an official attempt to alleviate the conditions of Zionism in Russia.3 David Ben-Gurion’s visit that followed in late 1923, when he organized a Zionist-Palestinian pavillion on behalf of the Histadruth in an international agricultural fair in Moscow, proved to be alarming to the Yevsektsia as well as to the Soviet authorities, when mass enthusiasm and pro-Zionist sympathies arose among Russian Jews. Of particular concern to the Government was Ben-Gurion’s close contact with Hechalutz and other Zionist-pioneer organizations during his stay in Moscow, in an attempt to coordinate their joint efforts in the face of increased hostility on the part of the Soviet Government.4 A similar attempt was made by two other prominent Zionist Palestinian labor leaders, David Remez, and Levi Shkolnik (later known as Eshkol), when they attended the All Russian Congress of the Tsentrosoyuz5 at the end of 1924. Their contacts with Hechalutz representatives were detected by the Soviet security organs when the Government cracked down upon the illegal pioneering Zionist groups in Russia.6 The printed Zionist propaganda that reached the Soviet Jewry and the illegal attempts on the part of the Zionist movement to send Zionist emissaries into the Soviet Union7 was interpreted as evidence of a dangerous underground spying network by the Soviet security organs. Hence the

164

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

struggle against Zionism assumed an intense and fierce character at home as well as abroad that far exceeded the original dimension of rivalry, as Professor Ulam has observed: Any attachment of a group of Soviet citizens to a foreign country, even be it on purely sentimental grounds, was . . . equated with treason, the "Zionist spy network" now became recognized as yet another agency of the Imperialists. Schwartz, Solomon, The J em in the Soviet Union, Syracuse University Press: 1951. Sefer HashomerHatsair, Vol. I., Merhavia: Sifriat Poalim. Sefer Toldot Hahaganah (The History of the Haganah), 2 vols., TelAviv: 1964. Sh., A., The Socialist Parties in Palestine. Tel-Aviv: 1923. Shaheen, Samad, The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory o f National SelfDetermination, Bandung, Indonesia: 1956. Sherman, B., Communism and the Jews, New York: Labor Zionist, October, 1950. Sherman, Bezalel, 'The Communist in Palestine - The M ufti's Moscow Allies, New York: 1939. Shimoni, Yaakov, Arviyei Eretz Yisrael, (The Arabs of Palestine), Tel-Aviv, Palestine: Am-Oved, 1947. Sneh, Moshe, Sikumim Bashe'elah Halumit (On the National Question: Conclusions in the Light of Marxism-Leninism), Tel-Aviv: Central Committee of the Left Socialist Party of Israel, 1954.

Documents and Archival Materials

177

Spector, Ivar, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World 1917-1958, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959. Stalin, J. V., On the National and Colonial Question (in Hebrew), Tel-Aviv: Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel, 1954. , Works, Moscow: 1954. Sworakowski, Witold S., The Communist International and its Front Organisations, The Hoover Institute Bibliographical Series, XXI, The Hoover Institute, Stanford: 1965. Sykes, Christopher, Crossroads to Israel, London: Mentor, The New English Library, 1965. Talmi, Meir, Hashe*elah Halumit Vehamtsiut Hayehudit Beyamenu (The National Question and the Contemporary Jewish Reality), Merhavia: 1956. Tartakover, Axye,The Jewish Settlement in the Diaspora, (in Hebrew), Tel-Aviv: M. Newman, 1959. Taylor, Alan R., Prelude to Israel: An Analysis o f Zionist Diplomacy 1897-1947, New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Teller, Judd L., The Kremlin, the Jews, and the Middle East, New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1957. Troyanovsky, Alexander A., The Jewish Question and the U.S.S.R., (an address of the Soviet Ambassador), New York: 1936. Tsentsiper, Aryeh, Leib, Bama'avak Legeulah (The Struggle for Re­ demption: the History of Zionism in Russia During the Bolshevik Regime), Tel-Aviv: 1956. Waschitz, J., Ha'aravim Be-erez Israel (The Arabs in Palestine), TelAviv: 1947. Von Rauch, George, ,4 History o f Soviet Russia, New York: 1957. Weizmann, Chaim, Trial and Error, London: Hamish and Hamilton, 1949. West, B., and M. Shtarkman, (ed.), Hechalutz Berusiya (The History of the Illegal Hechalutz Movement in the Soviet Union). Yefimov, G. V. and A. D. Novichev, (eds.), Noveishaia Istoriia Stran Zarubezhnoy A zii I A friki (Modern History of Countries of Asia and Africa), Leningrad: 1963. Yisraeli, G. Z. M.O.P.S. P C P - M.A.K.I., Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved, 1953. Zander, Walter, Soviet Jewry, Palestine and the West, London: Victor Gollancz, 1947.

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

178

ARTICLES Abus Jaber, Kemal S., “The Millet System in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire/* The Muslim World, Vol. LVII, No. 3, July 1957, pp. 212-23. Akhigar, Y., “The Debate Began in a Tent at the Seashore,” (in Hebrew), Ma'ariv, August 13,1965. Altshuler, M., “The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Jewish National Existence,” (in Hebrew), Molad, October—November, 1967, No. 3, pp. 324-332. Ascher, Abraham, “Pavel B. Axelroad: A Conflict Between Jewish Loyalty and Revolutionary Dedication/* The Russian Review, July 1965, Vol. 24, No. 3. Barzilai,J., “Aharito Shell Alexander Heshin,” (The End of Alexander Heshin), Molad, No. 20^-203, Vol. 23, pp. 214-220. , “Communism ^ Zionism/’ Israel Magazine, Vol. I., No. 3, May 1968. , “Yerushalayim Av Tarpat,” (Jerusalem August 1929), Keshet, N o.29,1965. , “Conversation with Dimanshtein of the Yevsektsia/’ (in Hebrew),H e’avar No. 15,1968. Ben-Tsur, Abraham, “The Jewish National Revival in the Light of Leninism,” (in Hebrew),Hedim, April 1952, pp. 122-35. Drachkovitch, Milorad M. and Branko Zazitch, “The Third International” in Revolutionary Internationals 1864-1943. ed. by Drachkovitch, Stanford: 1966. Ebon, Martin, “Communist Tactics in Palestine,” Middle East Journal, July 1948, pp. 255-269. Erez, Yehudah, “The Jewish Labor Movement in the Russian Revolution,” (in Hebrew), Molad, Vol. 13, No. 89-90, December 1955, pp. 549-556. Greenberg, Hayim, “To the Communist internation,” in The Jewish Frontier Anthology, 1934-1944, New York: 1945, pp. 13-25. , “The End of the Comintern,” Jewish Frontier, June 1943, Vol. X, No. 6,(101), pp. 9-11. , “Why Not Biro-Bidjan?” in Jewish Frontier Anthology, 1934-1944, New York: 1945, pp. 26-33.

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Halpern, Ben, “Die Hard Anti-Zionists,” Jewish Frontier, December 1944 No, 11 (118), pp. 32-38. Kna’an, Haviv, “ Raion ‘Hatsharat Lenin’ Lemdinah Yehudit Be’eretz Yisrael,” (The Idea of “Lenin’s Declaration” of a Jewish-Communist State in Palestine). Bitzaron Vol. LV, November-December, 1966, No. 2,(262). Laqueur, Walter, “The Appeal of Communism in the Middle East,” Middle East Journal, 1954, No. 4. Lenczowski, George, “Evolution of Soviet Foreign -Policy Towards the Middle East,” in Soviet Satellite Nations, ed. by John H. Hallowell, Florida: Kallman Publishing Co., 1958. Lenin, V. I., “International Situation and Fundamental Tasks,” Report to the Second Comintern Congress, July 19, 1920. Selected Works, X., New York: 1938. , “In Support of the Tactics of the. Communist Internation,” Selected Works, X., New York: 1938. Lewis, Bernard, “The Consequences of Defeat,” in Foreign Affairs, January 1968, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 321-335. List, Naham, “Tsadak Hakomintern,” (The Comintern was Right), Keshet, 7 parts —Part 1: No. 18, Winter 1963; Part 2: Summer 1963; Part 3: Winter 1964; Part 4: No. 24, Summer 1964; Part 5: No. 27, Spring 1965; Part 6: 1967; Part 7: 1968. Peffer, Nathaniel, "Lenin and the Course of Colonial Communism,” The Yale Review' September 1955. Peri, Eliezer, “ On Zionism and Communism,” Al-Hamishmar, SeptemberOctober 1949. Perrault, Gilles, “L’Orchestre Rouge,” Review in Ha’A retz “Yehudei Hatizmoret Ha’adumah,” (The Jews of the Red Orchestra), June 7, 1968. Pinkos, B., “The Nationalities Problem in the U.S.S.R.; Theory and Practice,” • (in Hebrew), Molad, October-November 1967, No. 3, pp. 312-323, Ra’anan, Uri, “The Open Wound,” Hadassah, Vol.46, No. 5, January 1965, as quoted in “Jews Seen as a Security Risk,” Jewish News, January 22,1965. “The Revolutionary Outlook in Palestine: The Social-Political Background of the Recent Events,” The Communist International, Vol. 6, No. 22, 1929,pp. 864-871.

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Schapiro, L., “The Role of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement” The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.XL, No. 94, December 1961. Schechtman, J. B., “Tsionut Vetsionim Berusiya Hasovietit,” (Zionism and Zionists in Soviet Russia), Gesher, September 1966, No. 23. Tartakover, A., “Hahitiashvut Hayehudit Hahaklait Berusiya YBebritH am o atso t(T h e Jewish Agricultural Settlement in Russia and the Soviet Union), Gesher, September, 1966, no. 2—3. Tibawi, A., “Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab History,” The Arab World Volume XIV, Special Issue, No. 10—11, pp. 9—22. i

Yodfat, Arye, “The Soviet Union and the Arab States 1917—1960,” Hamizrach Hekhadash, Vol.15,1965. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS Arabic publications. V Al-Difa Jaffa 1934-31T, spokesman of the Istiqlal Party. Al-Jami’ah al-Arabiyyah, Jerusalem, 1927—1935, organ of the Husseini’s. Al-JamVah al Islamiyyah, Jaffa 1932—39, organ of the National Defense Party, (the Nashashibi). Ila'l Aman, Arab weekly published by the P.C.P. irregularly between 1925-1932. English publications. The Anti-Imperialist Review, organ of the League Against Imperial­ ism, published by the International Secretariate. The Communist International, The Comintern’s monthly journal, 1919-1941. Davar English Supplement 1929-1931, Palestine Labor Daily. Imprecorr (International Press Correspondence 1921—December 1938), weekly organ of the Comintern, also published in Russian and German. World News and Views (continuation of Imprecorr), from January 1939. Zionist Review 1917-1927. Hebrew publications. Davar, Tel-Aviv, a Hebrew daily of the Histadruth, from 1925. Gesher Quarterly Review of the Nation’s Problems, published by the Israel Executive of the World Jewish Congress since 1954. The September 1966 issue, No. 2—3 (47—48) is devoted to Soviet Jewry.

Documents and Archival Materials

181

Ha'or, (The Light in Hebrew), 1930—1934, an independent but Communist-oriented publication of Palestine. Molad, a bi-monthly publication of Miph’alei Molad, published in Jerusalem. Russian publicatons. Jzvestia. Novi Vostok (New East). Pravda. Revoliutsioni Vostok (Revolutionary East). Yiddish publications. Forois (Forward in Yiddish), 1926—1932, organ of the P.C.P.. ENCYCLOPEDIAS AND DICTIONARIES Russian. Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 2nd Ed., particularly the entries “Palestine” Vol.31, pp. 600—602, and “Zionism,” Vol. 39, p. 138. Politicheskii Slovar (Political Dictionary), Moscow: 1940. Hebrew. The New Hebrew Encyclopedia, Vol. 6, Eretz-Yisrael.

Index Abramovich, Z., 55 AERD (For the Support of Jewish Colonization in the USSR), 29 Afula case, 92 Agabekov, G. A. 75, 74 Agro-JOINT, 29, 86 Aisha, Yihye-Abu, 60 All-Arab National Congress, 141, 145 Altshuler, Eisig, 72, 74 American Communist Party, 152-55 Anglo-Russian Committee, 49-50 Arab Communist leaders, 146 Arab Community of Palestine, 14-18, 97, 154 Arab Executive Committee, 16, 21, 25, 34, 99, 115, 159, 141 Arab National Movement, 162: de­ monstrations, 131; leadership, 14445; and Nazi forces, 24; prisoners, 143; terrorists, 145-46, 161 see also Comintern, Palestine Communist Party, and Zionism Arab rebellion of 1936, 21 “Arab Revolutionary Movement and the Task of the Proletariat", 136 Amir Shakib Arslan, 45, 48 Atrash, Sultan al, 7, 45 Attasi, Hashim al, 6, 115 Averbach, Wolf, (“Daniel'*, “Abusian*1) , 30-55, 48, 73-74, 122-24, 15052 Avigdor, 83 Balfour Declaration, 80, 88-89, 96, 99, 115-16, 133, 145 Barzilai, J. Berger, 30-32-36, 50, 11819, 124, 150-52 Bauer, Otto, 136 Bedouins, 92, 139-41 Beit Safafa, 33, 119-20 Ben-Gurion, David, 163 Bentwich, Norman, 56 Bcn-Zvi, Yitzhak, 120 “Bezvolstvo** (breakdown of law and order), 38 Birman, Ze*ev, 55, 60 Birobidzhan, 87, 166 Bolshevik Regime, 123 Bolshevik Revolution, 38, 123, 165 Bolshevism: appraisal of Zionism, 79, 88 Borochov Company, 35 Boroisha, Menachem, 153 Boyvka (“fighting brigades"), 35 Brandt, Conrad, 3 British: Government investigation commmittees, 145; Labor Adminstration, 20; Mandatory Adminstration in Palestine, 11, 12, 23, 82, 99, 117, 135, 144, 146-47; troops in Pal­ estine, 132, 137, 140 Bukharin, 1, 3, 59

Bund, 52 Chancellor, Sir John, 11-12 Chiang Kai-Shek, 1, 6 China, 1, 2, 113: and Soviet Mission, 4 Civil War in Russia: and Jews, 38, and Poale-Zion, 52 Comintern: and Arab nationalism, 97100, 111, 145-46, 161-62; Arabization of Palestine Communist Party, 14243,146-48,150-51, 167; Bolshevization of, 114; China, l, 4; Colonial East, 5-8, 113, 161; Druze uprising 45-46; Eastern Department, 123-24; Execu­ tive Committee of, 30, 33, 118, 12225, 131, 133, 139, 143, 147-48;,Ger­ many, 2. 6, 35; Jewish Communists. 165; Jewish immigration to Pales­ tine, 91, 95, 100; Jewish leadership of Palestine Communist Party, 12425, 141-42, 150, 152; Jewish problem,/ 166; Kibttsh Ha’avodah, 94-96; Len­ in's Conditions of Admission to, 29, 30; Nebi-Musa Riots of 1920, 132; Poale-Zion, 51; Riots of 1929 in Palestine, 100, 122, 23, 131, 134, 136, 138-41, 161: assessment of Palestine C om ^un;st Party role in riots, 14143; Riots of 1929 and World Jewish Commun:sts, 151-52; Seventh Con­ gress, 1*8-49; Qixth Congress, 2, 57, 32. 81-82, 110, 113, 115-17, 125, 131, 139, 162; Turkey. 6; United Working Front, 4, 7; Worker's Bat­ talion, 69; Zionism: and British in­ terests, 84-90; Zionist Capitalism, 8990; ideological appraisal of Zionism, 79-89, 161-64; identification of Zion­ ism with Nazism, 83-84; Zionist land acquisition, 91, 93, 145; Zion­ ist Socialist wing, 84, 86 “Comintern Day" (Red Day) ,116, 131 Communism: and Arab masses, 138, 146; Arab nationalists, 146; and British imperialism, 131; and indict­ ment of Zionism, 79; and Jewish workers in Palestine, 148 see also Comintern, Palestine Communist Party Communist International; see Comin­ tern “The Communist Party of Palestine and the Arab Revolt," 133 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, I: Fifteenth All Union Congress, 3; Fourteenth Party Congress, 3; Leftwing opposition, 3; Rightist opposi­ tion, 3; opposition groups, 124 Cyril, Grand Duke, 85 Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, 118 Damascus, 45-46 183

184

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Daschani, Kemal, 146 Derfl, 55 Dimanshtein, 28 Druze Rebellion of 1925-26, 7, 35, 37, 45-46, 133 Druzhina, 31 Dshcsaierli, Nahmud Mograbi, 146 Dzerzhinsky, Felix, 70 Eder, Dr. M„ 163 Effendis, 93, 98 Egypt, 20 Egyptian Communist Party, 34 Ehud (“Unity") Clubs. 57-59, 148 Einstein, Professor Albert, 47, 70, 153 Elenbogen, 58 Elkind, Mendel, 70. 71, 72, 73 Ernes, 58 Engels, 38 Epstein, Melech, 153 Erem, M., 48 Ernst, 45 Executive Committee of the Cpmmunist International, 30, 33, 118, 122, 123, 125, 131, 133, 139, 143, 147-48 Executive Committee of the Youth Communist International, 139 Federation of Communist parties of the Arab Countries, 143 Fellaheen, 139, 141 Finkelshtein, Yosef, 74 Five Year’s Plan, *3 Forois, 125 French Communist Party, 37 French Trade Union, 48 Galach, Joseph ("The Priest"), 37 G’ama’h-el-Arabiya, 100 Ginzburg, Baron, 72 Gottwald, Kclement, 118 Great Purges (Stalinist), 34-35, 39, 52, 56. 74, 152. 167 Greenberg, Hayim, 164 Hadi, Awni Abdul, 57 Haganah, 35, 70, 85, 119-123 Haidar, Comrade, 82, 149 Haluzim (Zionist pioneers), 110 Haram Ash-Sharif, 18 Hashin, Alexander, 151-52 Hashomer, 70, 83 Hashomer-Hatzair, 32 Hasraonaean Rebellion of 166 BC, 138 Hebron: Jewish Community of, 119, 124, 137, 141: Yeshiva. 152 Hechalutz, 28, 52. 72, 163 Herkle (Mischle), 50 Hilo, Ridwan-al, ("Musa", "Yosef1) , 151 Histadruth (Jewish Trade U nion)» 13, 17, 22: Comintern’s evaluation of, 82, 84, 110; elections of 1927, 148; Ehud, 58: Kibush Ha’avodah,

94, 111-12, 145, 124; Profintern, 4950; Second Congress, 31; Workers' Fraction, 31 Hitler, 83 Hornstein, David, 52 Houranis, 94 Husseini, Haj Amin al; see Mufti of Jerusalem Husseini, Hamdi al, 98, 136, 146 Husseini, Jamal, 47. 96, 98, 115 Husseini’s, 17 Ignatoff, David, 153 Imprecorr, 46, 80, 83, 121, 131-32, 146 166 Inlerlslamic Committee of Berlin, 45 International Missionary - Conference, in Jerusalem, 17 Intervention Schemes against the So­ viet Union, 84 Islam, 139 Istiqlal Party, 98 Izvestia, 60, 84 Jabotinsky, Zeev, 16-17, 23 Jewish Agency, 12-14, 21, 29 Jewish Assembly of Representatives (Asefat-Hanivharim), 151 Jewish Colonization in the Ukraine and White Russia, 28-29 Jewish Communists in the United States, 152 Jewish Immigration to Palestine, 13, 14, 21, 50, 91, 95-96, 100, 112: Arab opposition to, 96; and Shaw Report, 145; see also Comintern, Palestine Communist Party Jezreel, Valley of, 91 Jihad, 24, 119 Kalinin, Michael, 29 Kazim, (Pasha), Musa, 16 Kamenev, 3 ICautsky, Karl, 136 Kemal Pasha, 6 Kennan, Professor George, 2 IChuri, Professor Faris Bey el, 45 Kibush Ha’avodah ("conquest of la­ bor") , 94-95. 100, 111, 145 Kibush Ha’Karkah (cultivation of the lan d ), 95 Kisch, Colonel, 72 KPP, 33 Koran, 93 Krasnaya Pomoshch; see M.O.P.R. Krestinsky, Christian, 70 Krim (Rif). Abd-el, 7, 46 Kuomintang, 1, 113 Kuperman, Moshe, (Emek), 30, 35, 119, 151-52 KUTVO; see University of Moscus of the Toilers in the East Laqueur, Professor Walter, 38

Index League Against Imperialism, 46-48, 98, 133, 153 Leivich, H., 153 Lenin, 38, 142: Conditions of Admis­ sion to Comintern, 29-30; on selfdetermination for national minor­ ities, 123 “Lenin's Declaration", 71 Leshchinsky, Nahum ("Nadab"), 30. 34-35, 55, 60, 151-52 Levin, Moshe, 73, 74 List, Nahman. SO, 36, 50, 54, 57, 60, 69, 151-52 Lozovsky, S.A., 49-50, 53 Lubianko jail, 32 Lukacher-Horazo, Ycrachmiel, 35-36

185

Palestine: economic crisis of 1926, 13, 14; Riots of 1929, 18-20, 23, 131. 139-40, 150, 167; Riots of 1929 and the Comintern, 100, 122-23, 131, 134, 136, 138-43, 151-52, 161; Riots of 1929 and the Palestine Communist Party, 117-24, 181-38, 141-43; Riots of 1929 and Zionism, 132-143; see also Arab Community of Palestine; Riots of 1933, 140 Palestine Communist Party: Afula case, 92-93; Arab masses, 91, 143, 147, 149; Arab members, 148-151; Arab nationalism, 115, 144, 146; Arabization issue, 32. 97-98, 114, 125. 141-43, 146-48. 150-51, 167; Central Committee of, 147-48, 150; MacDonald, Ramsey, 21: Palestine Re­ Dashnak elements, 149; doctrine of port, 140 Yishuvism, 109-113; Druze uprising in Syria, 45-46; Government invest­ Magen ("Defense") Society, 85-86 Magnes, Dr. Judah, 56, 72 igation committees, 145; Haifa Manuilsky, D.Z., 139-40 branch, 151; Histadruth, 94, 100; Jewish Colonization in Russia, 29; Marshall Group in the United States, Jewish immigration to Palestine, 88 145; Jewish leadership of, 148-52, Marx, 38 165-66; masses, 166; Kibush Ha* Marxism, 79, 111, 137, 162 avoda, 145; KUTVO. 60, 73; League Marxist solution to Jewish problem, Against Imperialism, 48; Left Wing 166 Deviation, 142-3; Marxist theory of Mattathias, 138 revolution. 111; M.O.P.R., 56-57; May 1st demonstrations, 148 Prof intern, 53; Right Wing Devia­ Mechonai, Dov, 70-72, 74tion, 116, 131, 134, 142-43; Riots of Meirson, Y., 69 1929. 117-24, 131, 141; Assessment Mejlis (Muslim Supreme Council), of role of Arab masses in Riots, 15, 21, 119, 139, 141. 143 133-38; Assessment of British role M. O.P.R. (International Aid Organi­ zation for Arrested Revolution­ in Riots, 132-37; Assessment of Party's role in Riots, 134-36, 141-43; aries), 33, 36-37. 56-59, 85 Assessment of Zionist role in Riots, Morgen Freiheit, 121, 152-53 132-37; Seventh Congress, 147-48, Motsa, 137 150; Wadi Hawaras issue, 93, 99; Mufti of Jerusalem (Haj Amin alWorkers' Fraction, 54-55 Husseini), 15-21, 23, 100, 119-22, 138, 139. 141 "Mufti Mattathias . . . ", 138 Passfield, Lord (Sydney W ebb), 20 Muslim Supreme Council (see Mejlis) Phimer, Field Marshal Lord, 11 Poale-Zion (Y.K.P.). (M.O.P.S.), 31, 35-36, 47-54, 81-82. 84, 116, 124, 132, Nadir, Comrade, 149 134, 136, 140-41, 146 Nahas Pasha, 6, 115 Pogroms in Eastern Europe, 165 Najalis, Sidqi (Mustafa Sadi), 60 Poland, 58 Narkomants (Peoples' Commissariat Polit-Otdel (Political Section in the for the Affairs of Nationalities), 59 Red Army), 36 Nashashibi, Raghib Bey al, 16, 23 Nashashibis, 23 Port of Haifa, 53 Pravda, 84 National Muslim Societies, 16 Nazism, 83 Profintern-Rilu (International Com­ munist Trade Union Organization), Ncbi-Musah riots of 1920, 73, 132 37, 49-54 New Course, 6, 115-117, 134, 162, 164 Proletarian Party (Harishima HaproNEP Program, 3, 4 letariat), 151 NIA (Sicntific Research Association), 59 Radck, Karl, 47 N. K.V.D., 152 Raisin, Abraham, 153 Red Guardia, 31 October Revolution, 163 Remez, David, 163 O. G.P.U., 70, 71-74

186

COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE

Resolution on theInsurgent Movement in Arabistan, 139-43, 148-50 Revisionists, 117 “Revolutionary East", (magazine of N IA ), 59 Riots of 1929 (see Palestine) Rote Fahne, 121 Rupin, Dr Arthur, 29 Russian presence in Central Asia, 124 Rutenberg electrification plant, 85 Rykov, 3 Qantara Railroad Station, 120 Safarov, Georgi, 123-25 Safed, 124, 141-46 Samuel, Sir Herbert, 11 Schapiro, Professor Leonard, 67 “Scientific Research Association,'* (NIA), 59 Second International, 81-82, 84, 90 Scdky, Ahmed, 61 S-dky, Nadschati (Sadi), 146 Shahbander, Dr., 45 Shaw Investigation Report, 20-22, MO145 Shkolnik, Levi (Eshkol), 163 Shneorsohn, Shmuel, 52, 70 Shohat, Mania, 72 Shohat, Yisrael, 70-74 Shur, Professor David, 56 Simpson, Sir John Hope, 22 Sixth Comintern Congress, 2, 5-7, 32, 81-82, 110, 113, 115-117, 125, 131, 139, 162 Slovodka, Academy of, 20 Smeral,' Bohumil, 34-35, 118-20, 122, 161 Socialist Zionism, 84, 86, 136, 165 Social Democrats, 5, 164 Soviet Mission in China, 4 Soviet Regime: and Jewish Affairs Department, 164; and Jewish prob­ lem, 86-88, 166; Muslim minority, 162; “Zionist spy network," 164 Stalin: and China. 1-3; Comintern, 3-4, 7; doctrine of “Socialism in One Country", 3, 5; emissary to Palestine, 118; KUTVO, 59; meet­ ing with Barzilai, 33-34; political theory of “T hird Period", 123 Stasova, Yelena, 57 Syria, 45-46 Syrian Communist Party, 37, 148, 149 Syrian revolt of 1925-27, 138 Tepper, Jacob (“Shami"), 35, 37 “T hird Period", 5, 123, 124, 164 Thompsohn, 50 Thomsky, 3 Trepper, Leopold (Leib), 58 Triliser, Michael, 70-74 Trotsky, Leon, 1-3 Tsentrosoyuz, 69-70; All Russian Con-

gress of, 163 Ulara, Professor Adam, 164 University of Moscow of the Toilers in the East (KUTVO), 34, 56, 5961, 98. 125, 151 Varga's Institute for World Economics and World Politics, 34 Vasiliev, B.A., 60, 73-74 Voenkom (Commissariat for Military Affairs), 36 Wadi Hawarit, 93 Wailing Wall, 18, 22, 117, 132. 135 Webb, Sydney (Lord Passfield), 20 Weizmann, Dr. Chaim. 13, 21-22, 88 Western International Federation of Trade Unions, 49 Western Social Deocratic Labor Move­ ment, 81 White Guardists, 84 White Paper, 22 Workers' Battalion (Gdud H a’avod a h ), 35, 67-69, 72-74 Workers* Fraction (of the Histadru th ), 31, 37. 50, 54-58, 69. 72 Yellow Amsterdam, 83 Yevkom, 52 Yevsektsia, 28-29, 48, 51-53, 67, 72, 163, 165-66 Yiddish, 125 Yishuv, 12, 14, 152 “Yishuvism", 110-15, 124 Youth Communist International (Y.C.I.), 139 Yussuf, Comrade, 90, 149 Zinoviev, 3, 49 Zionism: and American Communist Party, 153; appeal to Jewish mas­ ses, 80, 162-63; Arab nationalist demonstrations, 131; Bolshevism, 79, 163; Comintern's appraisal of, 7991, 93, 145, 161-65; Communist Parties of Arab countries, 149; doc­ trine of Yishuvism, 111-113; ideo­ logical changes in, 23; Jewish Com­ munists, 165; Marxism-Leninism, 79, 163, 165-66; Morgen Freiheit, 152; Riots of 1929 in Palestine; 132-43; role of Zionism as interpreted by E.C.C.I.. Resolution, 139-43; as in­ terpreted by Palestine Communist Party, 133-138; in Soviet Union, 68, 84, 163-65; and Soviet security or­ gans, 74; .Sixteenth Congress, 13, 16 Zionist Tewish National Fund Organ­ ization, 91 Zionist land purchases: 21, 91-93; and Arab resistance to, 92; Communist incitement of Arabs against, 92; and Palestine Communist Party policy, 145