Isand Drilling HSE Case Nov 08 Rev A02l
Short Description
Isand Drilling HSE Case Novl...
Description
KASHAGAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM AND FULL FIELD DEVELOPMENT
D-ISLAND DRILLING OPERATIONS HSE CASE
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 REVISION A02 OCTOBER 2008
ABSTRACT The D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case is intended to ensure compliance with the Republic of Kazakhstan Government’s legislation and demonstrate an integrated approach to HSE management for the D-Island drilling completions and commissioning (Perforations and Stimulations) program. It demonstrates to Agip KCO, stakeholders, staff, shareholders, the regulator and the public that essential controls are in place such that the major HSE hazards & risks arising from rig and Island drilling operations are both tolerable and reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
Revision Record A02
10/08
Issued for Approval
D Pashley
W Riizzi
P02
08/08
Issued for Review
D Pashley
W Riizzi
B Maggioni
A01
07/08
Issued for Approval
D Pashley
W Riizzi
B Maggioni
P01
05/08
Issued comment
D Pashley
W Riizzi
B Maggioni
Rev.
Date
Reason for Issue
Responsible
Accountable
B Maggioni
Endorsed
NOTE: When editing this document, as it contains various automatic fields / links, please ensure that the instructions in “AK Templates User Guide” (GE00.KST.K61.GL.0001.000) are followed. The copyright in this document is vested in Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company NV. ("Agip KCO"), as delegated Operator, for and on behalf of the Contracting Companies under the North Caspian Production Sharing Agreement dated 18th November 1997, as amended and supplemented. All rights reserved. Neither the whole nor any part of this document may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic, recording or otherwise) without the prior written consent of Agip KCO.
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 2 of 310
Document Verification RACIE Record
R
esponsible:
Name: D Pashley Job Title: : Head of Safety Signed:
Date:
A ccountable:
Name: W alter Rizzi Job Title: HSE & SD Director
Signed:
Date:
C
onsulted:
See distribution list on Page iii
I
nformed:
See distribution list on Page iii
E
ndorsed:
Name: Bruno Maggioni Job Title: Operations Director Signed:
Date:
RACIE Terms R A C I E
Responsible The person who actually produces the document. Accountable The person who has the answer for success or failure of the quality and timeliness of the document. Consulted Those who must be consulted before the document is published. Informed Those who must be informed after the document is published. Endorsed Those who must approve the document before publication.
Hold Record Marked
Page Number (e.g. if there are hold paragraphs in pages 4 and 6 specify 4, 6)
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 3 of 310
Document Distribution Consulted Distribution List Date
Format (1)
09/08
EC
D Island OIM
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
D island Drilling Superintendant
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
D Island HSE Coordinator
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
Well Completions and Intervention Superintendant
09/08
EC
Well Operations Senior HSE Advisor
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
Drilling Projects Engineer
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
Drilling Superintendant (AT)
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
District Logistics Manager
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
NCS OIM
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
Medical Response & Audit Coordinator
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
Head of Safety
AKCO
AT
09/08
EC
Head of Emergency Response
AKCO
AT
Addressee / Job Title
Company
Location
(2)
AT
Informed Distribution List Date
Format (1)
09/08
EC
Operations Director
Agip KCO
AT
09/08
EC
HSE & SD Director
Agip KCO
AT
09/08
EC
Well Operations Manager
Agip KCO
AT
09/08
EC
Well Construction
Agip KCO
AT
09/08
EC
Head of Well Operations Engineering
Agip KCO
AT
09/08
EC
Geosciences Manager
Agip KCO
DH
09/08
EC
EP HSE Manager
Agip KCO
AT
09/08
EC
Kashagan Safety & Risk Manager
Agip KCO
LN
09/08
EC
Health Services Manager
Agip KCO
AT
09/08
EC
SIMOPS Cordinator
Agip KCO
AT
09/08
EC
Francesco Doberti – Drilling Project Manager
Saipem
AT
09/08
EC
Serik Jumagaleyev – HSE Coordinator
Saipem
AT
NOTE:
Addressee / Job Title
Company
Location
(2)
(1) OHC – Original Hard Copy / EC–Electronic Copy / HC – Hard Copy / EDMS–Electronic Document Management System (2) AL-Almaty / AS-Astana / AT-Atyrau / BT-Bautino / DH-The Hague / LN-London / MI-Milan
Revision Tracking Rev.
Date
P01 A01 P02 A02
05/08 07/08 09/08 10/08
Description of Revision Issued for comment Issued for approval Updated and Issued for Review Issued For Approval
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 4 of 310
ACRONYMS Abbreviation
Meaning
ACV
Air Cushion Vehicle
AEGL-2
Acute Exposure Guidelines Level 2
Agip KCO
Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company N.V.
ALARP
As Low as Reasonably Practicable
API
American Petroleum Institution
Arktos
Amphibious tracked escape vehicle
ASME
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
AUEB
Alberta Energy and Utilities Board
BA
Breathing Apparatus
BEPO
Best Environmental Practical Option
BOD
Basis Of Design
BOP
Blow-Out Preventer
Bopd/BOPD
Barrels (US) of Oil per Day
BOPDe
Barrels of Oil Per Day equivalent
CAC
Central Asia Centre
CALPUFF
California Puff Model (air quality dispersion model)
CAM
Congestion Assessment Method
CEP
Caspian Environmental Programme
CFD
Computational Fluid Dynamics
CMS
Corporate Management System
CHCD
Closed Hole Circulation Drilling
CONOP
Combined Operations
CPC
Caspian Pipeline Consortium
CT
Coiled Tubing
DCS
Distributed Control System
DeMS
Development Management System
DEP
Design Engineering Procedures
E&P
Exploration & Production
EC
Emergency Coordinator
EER
Escape Evacuation and Rescue
EIA
Environmental Impact Assessment
EP
Experimental Programme
ERT
Emergency Response Team
ERZ
Emergency Response Zone
ESD
Emergency Shut-Down
ESMP
Environmental, Social migration and Monitoring Plan
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KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 5 of 310
FEED
Front End Engineering Design
FERA
Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment
FFD
Full Field Development
FID
Final Investment Decision
GBS
Gravity Based Structure
GU
State Enterprise
H&ER
Hazard & Effect Register
HAZID
HAZard IDentification study
HAZOP
HAZard and OPerability study
HEMP
Hazard and Effect Management Process
HF
Human Factors
HFE
Human Factors Engineering
HIA
Health Impact Assessment
HRO
Human Resources Organisation
HRA
Health Risk Assessment
HSE & SD
Health, Safety, Environmental and Sustainable Development
HSE-MS
HSE Management System
HTHP
High Temperature High Pressure
IA
Impact Assessment
IB
Ice Breaker
IBSV
Ice Breaking Supply Vessel
IBSSV
Ice Breaking Supply Standby Vessel
IALA
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities
IBEEV
Ice Breaking Emergency Evacuation Vessel
IDLH
Immediately Dangerous to Health and Life
I,HUC
Installation, Hook-Up and Commissioning
ILO
International Labour Organisation
IPF
Instrument Protective System
IRPA
Individual Risk Per Annum
IVB
Independent Verification Body
LQ
Living Quarters
M-NC
Makat –North Caucasus
MAC
Manual Alarm Callpoint
MAH
Major Accident Hazard
MAEF
Major Accident Event Frequency
MANCOM
Management Committee
MODU
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
MOPO
Manual Of Permitted Operations
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
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KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 6 of 310
MPC
Maximum Permitted Concentration
MSL
Mean Sea Level
OGP
Oil & Gas Producers organisation
OIM
Offshore Installation Manager
OMCC
Offshore Marine Control Centre
OPCOM
Operations Committee
OPDS
Opportunity and Project Development System
OSC
On Scene Commander
PEM
Physical Effects Modelling
PEP
Project Execution Plan
PFEER
Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response
PFP
Passive Fire Protection
PMS
Project Management system
PSA
Production Sharing Agreement
PSD
Process Shutdown System
PPE
Personal Protective Equipment
PTD
Permanent Total Disability
PTW
Permit To Work
QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
RAM
Risk Assessment Matrix
RCH
Rotating Control Head
RoK
Republic of Kazakhstan
RTJ
Ring Type Joint
SAFOP
SAFe OPerating procedures
SBV
Standby Vessel
SCBA
Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
SCE
Safety Critical Element
SD
Sustainable Development
SDT
Shallow Draft Tug
SEP
Stakeholder Engagement Plan
SIA
Strategic Impact Assessment
SIL
Safety Integrity Level
SIMOPs
SIMultaneous OPerations
SOLAS
Safety Of Life At Sea
SPZ
Sanitary Protection Zone
TCP
Tubing Conveyed Perforating
TEMPSC
Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
TMS
Technology management System
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
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KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 7 of 310
TPD
Technical Project Documentation
TR
Temporary Refuge
TRIC
Toolbox Talk Risk Identification Card
TRIF
Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency
TWA
Time Weighted Average
VOC
Volatile Organic Compound
VMS
Value Management System
WES
Well Examination Scheme
WSE
Written Scheme of Examination
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 8 of 310
MANAGEMENT SUMMARY Background On behalf of seven companies and under the North Caspian Sea PSA (Production Sharing Agreement), Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (Agip KCO) is the Operator of the appraisal and development operations in the Kazakhstan sector of the North Caspian Sea. Successful exploration of the Kashagan Field, will lead to Full Field Development (FFD) via the Experimental Program (EP) phase. The principles governing Agip KCO operations are stated in the “EP Statement of Requirements”. The “EP Statement of Requirements” describes those requirement considered essential to ensure Safe and Efficient operations during the Construction, Drilling, Installation, Hook-Up, Commissioning, Operations and Logistics for “A” and “D” Blocks. The document addresses the minimum requirements to achieve the above i.e. transportation of offshore personnel, provision of temporary living quarters barges, temporary refuge systems, escape craft and logistical requirements, in order to ensure a safe, co-ordinated, cohesive and integrated approach for all EP Offshore related activities. The EP phase includes the development of D-Island drilling, production, and processing facilities, which are located 70 km south-south east of Atyrau on a 225m long and 221m wide artificial island in the north Caspian Sea. Construction of processing and utilities facilities, on barges connected to D-Island by bridges, is currently underway. A drilling, completions, and well commissioning programme commenced in 2006 and is scheduled to be completed late in 2009. The program will not include well testing. Therefore reservoir fluids are not expected at the surface unless there were to be a problem with well control e.g. a kick. Saipem has been contracted by Agip KCO to undertake the D-Island drilling program using the rigs 401 and 402 located on the man-made drilling island. The rigs have been designed and built by National Oilwell Varco (NOV) to meet the specific requirements of drilling at D-Island. SCOPE OF HSE CASE The focus of this HSE Case is to present an integrated approach to HSE management. This HSE Case covers drilling and completions on D-Island, the accommodation barges, third party equipment, other activities where they interface with D-Island activities, and marine (excluding those associated with construction activities) and helicopter operations within a 500m zone of the artificial island. All other activities required for the exploration program i.e. rig mobilisation/demobilisation, construction, aviation and marine operations outside the 500m zone and supply base operations, are also excluded. This Drilling Operations HSE case supersedes previous versions of the case and is complemented by HSE Execution Plans for the Installation, Hook-Up and Commissioning programmes. This Drilling Operations HSE case will be maintained as a “live” document and revised as appropriate during the development/operation of D-Island. OBJECTIVES OF HSE Case The main objectives of the HSE Case are as follows: 1.
To ensure compliance with the Republic of Kazakhstan Government’s legislation and demonstrate an integrated approach to HSE management for the D-Island drilling operations programme.
2.
To ensure that all HSE inputs are provided at all stages of the decision making process.
3.
To provide the means for ensuring adherence to Agip KCO’s HSE policies and, in so doing, demonstrate compliance with them.
4.
To establish a common understanding of specific HSE requirements, and ensure awareness of these requirements.
5.
To demonstrate to Agip KCO management and staff, contractors, shareholders, the regulator and the public that essential controls are in place such that the major HSE hazards & risks arising from Rig and Island operations are both tolerable and reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
Major HSE risks are defined as those associated with major accident hazards which have the potential to cause multiple fatalities or massive environmental or socio-cultural effect. These consequences are intolerable and all possible causes need to be analysed and controlled and suitably documented in the HSE Case.
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 9 of 310
Workplace hazards arising from hazardous activities, e.g. hot work, electrical grinding, etc. are controlled through the Permit to Work (PTW) system, toolbox meetings and pre-job safety meetings and other safe working practices defined by the Agip KCO HSE Management System and are not assessed in the detailed hazard analysis. Environmental effects arising from the normal and abnormal operations will be controlled through operational, environmental and waste management procedures. These effects and their controls are identified in the HSE Case but are not assessed in detail. METHOD USED TO PREPARE HSE CASE This Drilling Operations HSE Case documents HAZIDs, Hazard and Effects Registers, and Bowtie analyses for major HSE risks. The Hazard and Effects Register and Bowtie diagrams have been reviewed as part of the HEMP activities for the development of this Drilling Operations HSE Case and additional items identified at the HAZIDs and HAZOP from the Perforation and Stimulations activities have also been incorporated. Structured risk reviews have been performed by multidisciplinary teams with representation from Agip-KCO and the Drilling Contractor – Saipem and other Service Companies (Halliburton, Schlumberger & Baker-Oil Tools). The reviews used a hazard checklist approach as a basis for the identification of potential HSE hazards that met the requirements of the Agip-KCO HEMP Standard. The studies determined whether adequate safeguards/mitigating measures were in place, or were required to be put in place. Those hazards with the potential to cause multiple fatalities or a major environmental effect were, where appropriate, further analysed by constructing hazard “bow-tie” diagrams to highlight the preventive and recovery measures. Of the major HSE risks identified, the release of reservoir fluids, (blowout), at D-Island presents the greatest societal HSE risk. The risk of blowout has been the subject of a large number of additional risk assessments and studies as well as the bowtie review mentioned above. A SIMOPs review of concurrent Rig 401 and 402 drilling activities has been completed. All possible sources of environmental impact were identified and their significance assessed, to ensure the adequacy of the control and mitigation measures. All occupational health hazards that may arise during normal operations were also identified, together with their associated controls. HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM This HSE Management System describes the system and arrangements in place for managing the HSE risks associated with drilling operations on D-Island. The HSE-MS ensures the identification and assessment of hazards throughout rig operations; that all reasonably practicable measures have been or are being taken to prevent, control or mitigate these hazards; that audits are conducted to provide the assurance that the HSEMS is being adhered to; and that all activities, engaged in or contracted to other companies, are managed in a comparable way. IDENTIFIED MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS The hazard identification process identified all potential HSE hazards and effects and recorded them in the Hazard and Effects Register. Ten of these hazards were ranked as major HSE risks requiring ALARP demonstration: •
Hydrocarbons in reservoir (Release of reservoir fluids);
•
Persons at height (Fall of personnel to a lower level);
•
Explosion (Damage to well bore);
•
Explosion (Injury to personnel);
•
Overhead equipment (Loss of control / dropped object);
•
On water transport (Loss of control);
•
On land transport (Loss of load);
•
Helicopter transport (Helicopter impact / ditching);
•
Asphyxiates (Loss of O2 atmosphere);
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 10 of 310
•
Toxic gas (Release of hydrogen sulphide from neighbouring facility); and
•
Health Hazards (Exposure to food and water borne bacteria); and
•
Lifting operations.
IDENTIFIED SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS No residual environmental effects from normal operations were assessed as significant. Three significant residual environmental effects from accidental events were identified: •
Blowout
•
Hazardous material spill
•
Spill as a consequence of fire
ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES The primary objective of the HSE Case has been broken down into four specific objectives and assessed against defined acceptance criteria, as follows: 1. Demonstrate that suitable HSE studies have been undertaken and suitable HSE management arrangements are in place to ensure that the specification and conduct of the drilling operations, well services, local marine and helicopter operations are fit for purpose and safe for operation: Industry standard frameworks were used to review the operations HSE management arrangements against the essential requirements of an effective HSE-MS. The operations HSE-MS has been structured as a series of expectations and demonstrates how Agip KCO will meet these expectations through its management, policies and operational procedures. Where such essential arrangements are either not in place or of the required standard, then corrective actions have been identified in the Remedial Action Plan (Part 6). All arrangements will be subject to continuous performance monitoring, regular auditing and periodic management review to assure that practice meets the agreed standards. It is concluded that, on completion of the identified Remedial Action items, suitable HSE management arrangements will be in place to ensure that the specification and conduct of the drilling operations, LQ arrangements, and local marine and helicopter operations are fit for purpose and safe for operation. 2. Demonstrate that all foreseeable and credible HSE hazards, including Major Accident Hazards, have been identified, assessed and are suitably controlled such that risks to people and the environment are ALARP: Nine major accident risks have been identified, based on comparisons with industry hazard checklists and formal reviews by experienced specialists, and the major hazard register is considered to be complete. Sufficient risk reduction measures in the form of independent and effective threat barriers, recovery preparedness measures and escalation factor controls have been identified to meet the acceptance criteria for hazards, where it is practicable to do so. The HSE-critical tasks identified as essential to provide or maintain these barriers and controls have been or will be included in appropriate written operating procedures, job safety analyses, working practices, job task lists or training standards. A Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) has been prepared which defines the limits of concurrent drilling operations and simultaneous construction operations. For less severe, workplace health and safety hazards, reference has been made in Parts 3 and 4 of the HSE Case to the arrangements in place to manage these hazards. For less severe environmental effects arising from normal and abnormal operations, reference has been made in Parts 3 and 4 of the HSE Case to the controls and procedures in place to manage them. It is concluded that all credible and foreseeable major accident hazards have been identified and, subject to the completion of the Remedial Action Plan, suitable and sufficient barriers and controls will be in place such that risks to people and the environment are ALARP. 3. Demonstrate that there is adequate provision for the full and safe sheltering, escape, evacuation, rescue and recovery of all personnel to a place of safety in the event of a major accident:
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 11 of 310
Hydrocarbon related hazards (blowout during drilling) and toxic gas hazards (hydrogen sulphide release from A-Island) were evaluated as requiring sheltering of personnel and, in the worst case, evacuation. Sufficient provisions and arrangements have been identified for the sheltering, escape, evacuation, rescue and recovery of personnel to a place of safety. Where certain areas identified require confirmation of detailed issues, then corrective actions have been provided in the Remedial Action Plan (Part 6). It is concluded that subject to the completion of the Remedial Action Plan there will be adequate provision to assure a high probability of successfully achieving safe sheltering, escape, evacuation, rescue and recovery of all personnel in the event of a major accident. 4. Demonstrate that continuous improvement in the management of HSE hazards will occur in the workplace: Effective application of the HSE-MS arrangements will be required to enable continuous improvement in the management of all HSE hazards and effects at the workplace. The management of workplace hazards must be subject to continuous performance monitoring, regular auditing and periodic management review to assure that practice meets the agreed standards. It is concluded that provided that the HSE-MS is effectively implemented continuous improvement in the management of all HSE hazards and effects will occur in the workplace. CONCLUSION The methods used to develop the HSE Case provide a systematic and thorough assessment of the potential hazards associated with D-Island drilling and completions operations. Competent multi-disciplinary personnel were involved throughout the process, supported by independent HSE specialists. The HSE Case demonstrates that, to the extent possible, all relevant hazards and effects, particularly those with the potential to cause a Major Accident Hazard, have been identified and assessed, and suitable and sufficient controls will be in place, together with plans for recovery in the event that control is lost. There are no action items identified in the Remedial Action Plan which prevent operations continuing although these actions should be completed as soon as practicable. The objectives of the HSE Case are considered as to be met and, therefore, the drilling and completions operations are safe to continue.
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 12 of 310
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION
20
1.1
GENERAL
20
1.2
HOLDER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE HSE CASE
20
1.3
BACKGROUND
20
1.4 1.4.1 1.4.2 1.4.3 1.4.4
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES Scope Main Objectives Detailed Objectives Demonstrating Achievement of the Objectives
21 21 21 21 22
1.5 1.5.1 1.5.2 1.5.3
APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT OF HSE CASE Project HSE Management System Formal HSE Assessment Outstanding Actions
22 22 22 23
1.6
STRUCTURE
23
1.7
USES
24
1.8
REVIEW PERIODS AND UPDATES
25
2 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES
27
2.1
INTRODUCTION
27
2.2
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
27
2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.3.4
GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION, GEOLOGY AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS Geographical Location Safety Zone Geo-technical Information Meteorological Conditions
29 29 30 30 30
2.4 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3
WELLS CHARACTERIZATION Post-Salt Section Salt Section Pre-Salt Section (Reservoir Section)
31 31 31 31
2.5 2.5.1
DRILLING AND COMPLETIONS PROGRAMME Drilling Methodology
32 32
2.6
COMPLETIONS METHODOLOGY
34
2.7 2.7.1 2.7.2
COMMISSIONING METHODOLOGY Perforation System Stimulation System
35 35 35
2.8 2.8.1 2.8.2 2.8.3
INSTALLATION LAYOUT Island/LQ Orientation Main Dimensions Island Layout
35 35 36 36
2.9 2.9.1
ISLAND STABILITY AND INTEGRITY Well Design
37 37
2.10 2.10.1 2.10.2 2.10.3 2.10.4 2.10.5 2.10.6 2.10.7 2.10.8 2.10.9 2.10.10
DRILLING RIGS Driller’s Cabin and Control Panel Rotary equipment Pipe Handling System Drill Floor High Pressure Mud System Mud Treatment System Pressure Control System Choke Manifold and Mud-Gas Separator Trip Tank Cementing System
38 38 39 39 39 40 40 42 43 44 44
2.11
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
44
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
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2.12 2.12.1 2.12.2 2.12.3 2.12.4
POWER GENERATION AND UTILITIES Main Power Generation System Island Emergency Power and Lighting Systems Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) Lighting And Small Power Requirements
45 45 46 46 47
2.13 2.13.1 2.13.2 2.13.3
TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY Navigation Aids Communication Systems External Communications
47 47 47 48
2.14 2.14.1 2.14.2 2.14.3 2.14.4
FIRE & GAS I EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN Fire and Gas Detection Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) Hazardous Area Classification Active Fire Protection Systems
49 49 50 50 50
2.15 2.15.1 2.15.2 2.15.3 2.15.4 2.15.5 2.15.6
WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Liquid waste Drains Solid Wastes Sewage System Spillage Management Airborne Emissions
52 52 52 52 52 53 53
2.16 2.16.1 2.16.2 2.16.3
UTILITY SYSTEMS AND PIPING REQUIREMENTS Diesel Oil Filling and Transfer System Water Systems Rig Air System
53 53 54 55
2.17 2.17.1 2.17.2 2.17.3 2.17.4 2.17.5 2.17.6
COMMON SYSTEMS Mud Mixing System Barite Storage Bulk Storage Drum and Sack Storage Island Paint Store Island Explosives and Radioactive materials store
55 55 56 56 57 57 57
2.18
EMERGENCY EVACUATION AND RESCUE
57
2.19 2.19.1 2.19.2
PERSONNEL SAFETY AND HEALTH Safety Showers and Eyewash Stations Personal Protective Equipment
57 57 57
2.20
SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED AS HSE CRITICAL
57
2.21 2.21.1 2.21.2 2.21.3 2.21.4 2.21.5 2.21.6 2.21.7 2.21.8 2.21.9 2.21.10 2.21.11 2.21.12 2.21.13 2.21.14 2.21.15 2.21.16 2.21.17
SHAPAGAT LIVING QUARTERS (LQ/TR) BARGE Shapagat Particulars Power systems Emergency Power Escape Lighting CCTV F&G detection system Active Fire Fighting Passive fire protection system Helideck Temporary Refuge (TR) Shapagat Sanitation and Drains Diesel systems Seawater system Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System Potable Water System Ballast System Breathing Air
58 58 59 59 59 59 59 60 60 60 60 60 61 61 61 61 62 62
2.22 2.22.1
KARLYGASH LQ/TR BARGE Karlygash Particulars
62 62
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2.22.2 2.22.3 2.22.4 2.22.5 2.22.6 2.22.7 2.22.8 2.22.9 2.22.10 2.22.11 2.22.12 2.22.13 2.22.14 2.22.15 2.22.16 2.22.17 2.22.18 2.22.19
Power systems Emergency Power Escape Lighting CCTV F&G detection system Active Fire Fighting Passive fire protection system Helideck Temporary Refuge (TR) Diesel systems Seawater system Liquid Waste Management System Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System Potable Water System Breathing Air Medical Facilities - Hospital Telecommunications Public Address and General Alarm System
63 63 63 63 63 64 64 64 64 65 65 65 65 65 65 66 66 67
2.23 2.23.1 2.23.2 2.23.3 2.23.4 2.23.5 2.23.6 2.23.7
ICE BREAKING EMERGENCY EVACUATION VESSEL (IBEEV) IBEEV Particulars Power distribution systems Combustion air System Emergency Breathing air system Active Fire Fighting Passive fire protection system Diesel Engine Exhaust Cooling system
67 67 68 68 68 68 69 69
3 HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
90
3.1 3.1.1
INTRODUCTION Agip KCO HSE MS Model
90 90
3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2
POLICY AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES Policy HSE Strategic Objectives for D-Island
93 93 93
3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5
RESOURCES, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Resources Roles and Responsibilities Management of Personnel HSE Advisor Organisational Structure and Responsibilities
95 95 95 96 96 96
3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4
HSE SPECIFIC PROCESS HSE Cases Hazard and Effect Management Emergency Preparedness & Response (ER) Incident, Investigation and Reporting (IIR)
99 99 100 104 106
3.5 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3
PLANNING (PLAN) Objectives, Targets and Programmes HSE Planning Legal & Other Requirements
107 107 107 108
3.6 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3 3.6.4 3.6.5 3.6.6 3.6.7 3.6.8 3.6.9
IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION (DO) Contractor Management Training Communication Control of documents Procedures HSE At The Workplace Medical Fitness Maintenance and Inspection Waste Management
109 109 110 111 113 114 115 115 115 116
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3.6.10 3.6.11
Security Management Simultaneous Operations
116 116
3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 3.7.6 3.7.7
CHECKING (CHECK) Evaluation of Compliance Asset Integrity Drilling Operational Monitoring Management of Change Nonconformity, Corrective & Preventative Action Control of Records Internal Audit
118 118 118 119 120 120 121 122
3.8
MANAGEMENT REVIEW (ACT)
123
4 HAZARD AND EFFECTS MANAGEMENT PROCESS
125
4.1
OVERVIEW OF HEMP PROCESS
125
4.2
HEMP DURING DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
125
4.3
HEMP ACTIVITIES DURING PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL PHASES
127
4.4 4.4.1 4.4.2 4.4.3
HEMP ACTIVITIES FOR DRILLING ACTIVITIES Identification of Potential Hazards Risk Assessment Hazard and Effects Register
127 127 127 131
4.5 4.5.1 4.5.2 4.5.3 4.5.4
IDENTIFIED MAJOR HSE RISKS Control of Major HSE Risks HSE Critical Tasks Technical Integrity Release of Reservoir Fluids at D-Island
131 132 133 133 135
4.6
WORK PLACE HAZARDS
139
4.7
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE WORKPLACE
139
4.8 4.8.1 4.8.2 4.8.3 4.8.4 4.8.5 4.8.6
DEMONSTRATION OF ALARP ALARP Concept ALARP Principles Good HSE Practice in Design and Implementation Good HSE Practice in Operations Assessment of ALARP Continuous Improvement
140 140 140 141 141 142 143
5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE
145
5.1 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4
EER FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Escape Temporary Refuge(s) Medical facilities Evacuation
145 145 147 148 149
5.2
RESCUE AND RECOVERY
149
5.3 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.3.4
ESCAPE, EVACUATION, RESCUE AND RECOVERY (EERR) PROCEDURES EERR Philosophy Emergency Response Plan (ERP) ERP Responsibilities of Personnel Medical Evacuation
150 150 150 151 152
5.4 5.4.1 5.4.2 5.4.3 5.4.4 5.4.5 5.4.6
MAJOR EERR SCENARIOS Toxic Gas Release from Neighbouring Facility Shallow Gas Blowout Helicopter Crash / Ditching within 500m Zone Marine Incident within 500m Zone Man Overboard Food Poisoning
152 152 153 153 153 153 153
5.5 5.5.1
EERR SYSTEMS’ PERFORMANCE AGAINST GOALS Communication
154 154
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Escape Routes Temporary Refuge Evacuation Rescue
156 156 157 157
6 REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN
178
6.1
INTRODUCTION
178
6.2
REMEDIAL ACTIONS
178
7 CONCLUSION & STATEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION FOR OPERATIONS
184
7.1
INTRODUCTION
184
7.2 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.3 7.2.4 7.2.5 7.2.6
CONCLUSIONS Operations HSE Management System Major Accident Hazard Identification and Assessment Temporary Refuge, Escape, Evacuation, Rescue and Recovery Workplace Hazard Management Leadership and Commitment Authorization
184 184 184 184 185 185 186
7.3
STATEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION FOR OPERATIONS
187
8 REFERENCES
188
TABLES Table 2.1 : Drill Rig Dimensions
38
Table 2.2 : Systems Monitored by Rig SCADA system
45
Table 2.3 : UPS Endurance Times
46
Table 2.4 : Fire Extinguisher Provision on the Island
51
Table 2.5 : Main Island Storage Tanks
56
Table 3.1 : Incident Investigation Authority Matrix
106
Table 3.2 : D-Island HSE Meeting Schedule
113
Table 4.1 : Design HAZID Documents
125
Table 4.2 : Design Consequence Modelling / Risk Assessment Documents
126
Table 4.3 : Design HAZOP Documents
126
Table 4.4 : Frequency Definitions
127
Table 4.5 : Detail definitions of Consequence Severity
130
Table 4.6 : Major HSE Risks Identified Requiring ALARP Demonstration
131
Table 4.7 : Summary of HSE Critical Elements
133
Table 4.8 : Estimated Blowout Frequencies
136
Table 4.9 : Summary of Toxic Dispersion Modelling from Well Release and Blowouts
137
Table 4.10 : Radius of Radiation Flux End Points (m) for Vertical Jets
138
Table 4.11 : Qualitative ALARP Scoring
142
Table 6.1 : Remedial Action List
179
FIGURES Figure 2.1 : D-Island General Arrangement
28
Figure 2.2 : Kazakhstan Sector of the Caspian Sea
29
Figure 2.3 : D-Island Location
29
Figure 2.4 : Windrose for the field
31
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Figure 2.5 : Primary Well Barrier for Conventional and CHC Drilling
33
Figure 2.6 : Secondary Well Barriers for Conventional and CHC Drilling
34
Figure 2.7 : Principal Components of the Installation
36
Figure 2.8 : Karlygash Liquid Waste Management System
65
Figure 2.9 : Casing & Liner Profile Schematic
70
Figure 2.10 : Simplified Completion Schematic
71
Figure 2.11 : D-Island Drilling Programme (August 2008)
72
Figure 2.12 : DES and DSM layout West elevation
73
Figure 2.13 : Feeding DSM with Pipe
74
Figure 2.14 : Assembling pipe stands on DSM
75
Figure 2.15 : Hoisting Pipe to Pipe Rack
76
Figure 2.16 : Drill-pipe Deployment
77
Figure 2.17 : Common Area lighting System
78
Figure 2.18 : DES Hazardous Zone Layout
79
Figure 2.19 : DSM Hazardous Zone Layout
80
Figure 2.20 : Hazardous Area Overview
81
Figure 2.21 : Shapagat LQ Barge
82
Figure 2.22 : Karlygash Barge Lower Deck
83
Figure 2.23 : Karlygash Barge Main (Level 1) Deck
84
Figure 2.24 : Karlygash Barge Level 2 Deck
85
Figure 2.25 : Karlygash Barge Level 3 Deck
86
Figure 2.26 : Ice Breaking Emergency Evacuation Vessel
87
Figure 2.27 : IBEEV General Arrangement
88
Figure 3.1 : The PDCA Cycle
90
Figure 3.2 : Structure of Agip KCO HSE-MS
92
Figure 3.3 : Agip KCO HSEQ Policy Statement
94
Figure 3.4 : Agip KCO Organisation Chart for Drilling Operations on D-Island
97
Figure 3.5 : Drilling Team
98
Figure 3.6 : Agip KCO Risk Assessment Matrix
102
Figure 4.1 : HEMP High Level Process
125
Figure 4.2 : Agip KCO Risk Matrix
128
Figure 4.3 : Example Major HSE Risk Diagram
132
Figure 4.4 : ALARP Solution Matrix
143
Figure 5.1 : D-Island Station Bill (an example)
159
Figure 5.2 : Location of LQ and TR facilities
160
Figure 5.3 : Escape Routes from Drilling Area to Muster Stations
161
Figure 5.4 : D-Island Fire Fighting Equipment
162
Figure 5.5 : Layout of Common Services Area
163
Figure 5.6 : Common Area Escape Routes
164
Figure 5.7 : DSM Level 1 Layout
165
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Figure 5.8 : DSM Level 2 Layout
166
Figure 5.9 : DSM Level 3 Layout
167
Figure 5.10 : DSM Level 3 Layout
168
Figure 5.11 : DSM Level 4 Layout
169
Figure 5.12 : DSM Level 5 Layout
170
Figure 5.13 : DES Level 0 Drill Floor Layout
171
Figure 5.14 : DES Level 1 Layout
172
Figure 5.15 : DES Level 2 Layout
173
Figure 5.16 : DES Drill Floor Layout
174
Figure 5.17 : DES Drill Floor Roof Layout
175
Figure 5.18 : Mast Escape Route
176
APPENDICES Appendix A Hazard Checklist Appendix B Hazard and Effects Register Appendix C Safety Critical Task Catalogue Appendix D MOPO Appendix E Major Accident Bowtie Diagrams
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1
INTRODUCTION
1.1
GENERAL This HSE Case, prepared by Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (Agip KCO), is intended to demonstrate the highest level of Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) attention during the drilling phase at D-Island. Agip KCO’s aim is to: HAVE AN HSE PERFORMANCE TO BE PROUD OF; AND EARN THE CONFIDENCE OF CUSTOMERS, STAKEHOLDERS AND SOCIETY AT LARGE. In the context of this document, the focus of risk is on the potential loss of life and environmental damage. The HSE Case also establishes the manner in which Agip KCO demonstrates compliance with: LEGISLATION, THE REQUIREMENTS OF AGIP KCO AND ITS COMPANY SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY. More specifically it establishes a common understanding of the hierarchy of the HSE-MS for the drilling phase of operations, and identifies the goals and objectives that have been set, the risks that are present, and the systems in place to achieve a high standard of HSE performance. The HSE Case reflects the current status of the equipment and systems, HSE studies, and understanding of the hazards associated with D-Island during drilling operations This Drilling Operations HSE case covers the in drilling programme that started in 2006 and that will be completed during 2009. The Drilling operations HSE case is being maintained as a “live” document and revised as appropriate during the development/operation of D-Island.
1.2
HOLDER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE HSE CASE Holder The Holder is ultimately responsible for the HSE management of the operations covered by the Case and is the final approval authority for the contents of the Case. The Holder is responsible for issuing the Statement of Justification for Operations, thus accepting accountability for the HSE management of the operations and declaring that all known major HSE hazards that could occur have been identified and are under control, subject to the close-out of the outstanding actions in the Remedial Action Plan. The Holder is Agip KCO’s Operations Director. Administrator The Administrator is responsible to the Holder for management of the HSE Case. The Administrator is responsible for initiating the appropriate programmes to ensure awareness and proper use of the Case by the project. The Administrator is responsible for the technical accuracy of the contents of the HSE Case and for ensuring that revisions and updates are prepared when necessary. The Administrator is responsible for ensuring that distribution of the Case and its revisions and updates are adequately controlled. The administrator is Agip KCO’s HSE & SD Director
1.3
BACKGROUND On behalf of seven companies and under the North Caspian Sea PSA (Production Sharing Agreement), Agip KCO is the Operator of the appraisal and development operations in the Kazakhstan sector of the North Caspian Sea. Successful exploration of the Kashagan Field, will lead to Full Field Development (FFD) via the Experimental Program (EP) phase. The principles governing Agip KCO operations are stated in the “EP Statement of Requirements” [1]. The “EP Statement of Requirements” describes those requirements considered essential to ensure Safe and Efficient operations during the Construction, Drilling, Installation, Hook-Up, Commissioning, Operations and Logistics for “A” and “D” Blocks. The document addresses the minimum requirements to achieve the above i.e. transportation of offshore personnel, provision of temporary living quarters barges, temporary refuge systems, escape craft and logistical requirements, in
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order to ensure a safe, co-ordinated, cohesive and integrated approach for all EP offshore related activities. The EP phase includes the development of D-Island drilling, production, and processing facilities, which are located 70 km south-south east of Atyrau on a 225m long and 221m wide artificial island in the north Caspian Sea. Construction of processing and utilities facilities, on barges connected to D-Island by bridges, is currently underway. A drilling, completions, and well commissioning programme commenced in 2006 and is scheduled to be completed late in 2009. The program will not include well testing. Saipem has been contracted by Agip KCO to undertake the D-Island drilling program using the rigs 401 and 402 located on the man-made drilling island. The rigs were designed and built by National Oilwell Varco (NOV) to meet the specific requirements of drilling at D-Island. 1.4
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
1.4.1
Scope The focus of this HSE Case is to present an integrated approach to HSE management. It is a Drilling Operations HSE Case covering the HSE risks arising from the drilling operations for the DIsland drilling rigs, LQ arrangements, and the marine and helicopter operations associated with the drilling operations within a 500m zone of the artificial island. The HSE Case excludes passenger and freight loading at the heliport or marine base and in-transit transportation of personnel; transport of materials and equipment; and heliport, marine base and supply base activities.
1.4.2
Main Objectives The main objectives of the HSE Case are as follows: 1. To ensure compliance with the Republic of Kazakhstan Government’s legislation and demonstrate an integrated approach to HSE management for the D-Island drilling programme. 2. To ensure that all HSE inputs are provided at all stages of the decision making process. 3. To provide the means for ensuring adherence to Agip KCO’s HSE policies and, in doing so, demonstrate compliance with them. 4. To establish a common understanding of specific HSE requirements, and ensure awareness of these requirements. 5. To demonstrate to Agip KCO management and staff, Contractors, shareholders, the regulator and the public that essential controls are in place such that the major HSE hazards & risks arising from Rig and Island operations are both tolerable and reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Major HSE risks are defined as those associated with major accident hazards which have the potential to cause multiple fatalities or massive environmental or socio-cultural effect. These consequences are intolerable and all possible causes need to be analysed and controlled and suitably documented in the HSE Case. Workplace hazards arising from hazardous activities, e.g. hot work, electrical grinding, etc. are controlled through the Permit to Work (PTW) system, toolbox talks and pre-job safety meetings and other safe working practices defined by the Agip KCO HSE Management System and are not assessed in the detailed hazard analysis. Environmental effects arising from the normal and abnormal operations will be controlled through operational, environmental and waste management procedures. These effects and their controls are identified in the HSE Case but are not assessed in detail.
1.4.3
Detailed Objectives More specifically, the objectives of the Case are to: •
Demonstrate that suitable HSE studies have been undertaken and suitable HSE management arrangements are in place to ensure that the specification and conduct of the drilling, LQ D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
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arrangements, and local marine and helicopter operations are fit for purpose and safe for operation.
1.4.4
•
Demonstrate that all foreseeable and credible HSE hazards, including major accident hazards, have been identified and that suitable and sufficient barriers and controls will be in place such that risks to people and the environment are ALARP.
•
Demonstrate that there is adequate provision for the full and safe sheltering, escape, evacuation, rescue and recovery of all personnel in the event of a major accident.
•
Demonstrate that HSE management arrangements are in place to define responsibilities for procedures to ensure the control of, and continuous improvement in the management of, all HSE hazards and effects at the workplace.
Demonstrating Achievement of the Objectives The criteria used to determine whether each of the HSE Case objectives has been met are as follows: 1. HSE Management Arrangements - Agreement between Agip KCO and contractors, on the required standards of design and operation (as per the agreed Combined/Simultaneous Operations Bridging Document); and the commitment of all parties to meeting these standards. 2. Major Hazards - The acceptance criteria used, to determine whether all foreseeable and credible major accident hazards have been identified, are industry hazard checklists and formal reviews by experienced specialists. 3. Sheltering and Evacuation - Identification of major accident risks requiring temporary refuge and evacuation of D-Island, and suitable and sufficient recovery preparedness measures in accordance with the major hazards acceptance criteria. 4. Workplace Hazards - Agreement between Agip KCO, and contractors, (as per the Combined/Simultaneous Operations Bridging Document) of the required standards for continuous improvement in the management of workplace HSE hazards and effects; and the commitment of all parties to meeting these standards.
1.5
APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT OF HSE CASE
1.5.1
Project HSE Management System The Agip KCO Corporate Management System (CMS) is supported by an HSE Management System Execution Strategy which defines how the CMS is implemented at the operational level with respect to HSE. An EP Offshore HSE Plan [58] has been developed to set out the activities necessary to implement the HSE-MS for the Kashagan EP phase including D-Island drilling and to ensure that appropriate Contractor HSE Plans have been developed. An assessment was carried out of existing Agip KCO HSE procedures against the operational requirements of the project to identify any missing procedures that needed to be developed. Additionally, the HSE-MS interfacing arrangements for key areas of the project (e.g. training and competence, permit to work, well control, emergency response, etc.) were reviewed to ensure that the HSE responsibilities of Agip KCO and contractors were fully understood and that the associated procedures were adequate. The HSE-critical tasks that put in place or maintain controls for the identified major accident hazards have been defined and included in operational procedures as appropriate. Finally, a comprehensive site audit will be undertaken to verify that all controls exist in reality and that the HSE-critical tasks are accurate and assigned to the correct responsible party.
1.5.2
Formal HSE Assessment A hazard identification study was undertaken to systematically examine the proposed rig layout and operations with the purpose of identifying any hazards or operability problems that could result in either injury to personnel, environmental pollution, release of hydrocarbons or damage to equipment/structures. The study determined whether adequate safeguards/mitigating measures were in place, or were required to be put in place.
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Those hazards with the potential to cause fatalities or a major environmental effect were further analysed, where appropriate, by constructing hazard “bow-tie” diagrams to highlight the preventive and recovery measures. An assessment of the hazards associated with the uncontrolled release of reservoir fluids from DIsland and neighbouring facilities was undertaken to estimate the hazard distances, analyse the mitigation measures and make recommendations for design improvements. A review of the sheltering, evacuation, escape, rescue and recovery arrangements was also undertaken to assess the adequacy of the arrangements for toxic gas hazards that would require evacuation, and make recommendations for design improvements. All possible sources of environmental impact were identified and their significance assessed, to ensure the adequacy of the control and mitigation measures. All occupational health hazards that may arise during normal operations were also identified, together with their associated controls. Finally, a Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) was distilled from the hazard analyses to define limitations on activities during periods of abnormal operating conditions. 1.5.3
Outstanding Actions Any outstanding actions not resolved during the project design and construction phase or issues identified during the preparation of this HSE case are included in the Remedial Action Plan with responsibilities and target completion dates assigned.
1.6
STRUCTURE The HSE Case is contained in a single volume with the following sections Management Summary The Management Summary provides a brief overview of the major findings during the preparation of the HSE Case, a summary of the areas for improvement and the conclusions. Part 1 - Introduction The Introduction describes the scope, objectives and structure of the HSE Case, including a brief explanation of the contents of each part of the HSE Case. Part 2 - Description of Operations and Facilities The description provides sufficient information to enable a clear understanding of the drilling, LQ arrangements, and local marine and helicopter, with an emphasis on aspects relevant to HSE. Design HSE features are documented, including the merits of the HSE configurations, systems and components. The main barriers and controls mentioned in the Hazard and Effects Register are described. External circumstances are also described, such as meteorological conditions. This information promotes an understanding of how major hazards and effects could affect the operations and the facilities. Part 3 - HSE-Management System This describes the system and arrangements in place for managing the HSE risks associated with drilling operations at D-Island. The HSE-MS ensures the identification and assessment of hazards throughout rig operations; that all reasonably practicable measures have been or are being taken to prevent, control or mitigate these hazards; that audits are conducted to provide the assurance that the HSE-MS is being adhered to; and that all activities, engaged in or contracted to other companies, are managed in a comparable way. Part 4 - Hazard Identification and Assessment The hazard assessment demonstrates that all potential major hazards have been identified, the risk from the hazards has been evaluated and is understood, and the controls to manage the causes and consequences are in place. The Hazards and Effects Register presents, in a clear and concise form, the results of the analysis made of each hazard and effect associated with the operations. Bowtie diagrams are used, where appropriate, for the identified major risks and
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illustrate that suitable and sufficient barriers, and controls are in place to reduce the risks to people and the environment to ALARP. The Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) defines limitations on activities during periods of abnormal operating conditions, e.g. during concurrent high risk activities or unavailability of critical safety systems. Those HSE-Critical Tasks identified as essential to provide or maintain the necessary controls and recovery preparedness measures for hazards to meet the objectives of the HSE Case are described in this part of the HSE case. The tasks may be design, inspection and maintenance, operational, administrative or training tasks. This part also specifies who is responsible for the tasks, the inputs required to carry out each task and how it is verified that each task has been undertaken properly. Part 5 - Emergency Response Summary This part of the HSE Case describes the Emergency Response systems, plans and arrangement in place for the drilling operations at D-Island. Agip KCO has developed formal procedures which detail appropriate emergency actions in response to incidents associated with D-Island activities. To supplement these emergency response procedures, there are a number of “pre-incident” plans which cover specific identified emergency scenarios. Part 6 - Remedial Action Plan This provides a plan to resolve any shortfalls, deficiencies or outstanding actions identified and thereby improve the HSE performance of the operations. It includes priorities, responsibilities for ensuring completion and target completion dates. Part 7 - Conclusion and Statement of Justification for Operations This states the conclusion reached on achieving the HSE Case objectives and states the justification that conditions are satisfactory for continued operations. 1.7
USES The HSE Case is a living document, in that it will be reviewed, updated and used as part of the primary reference and guidance source for a number of activities essential for the HSE management of activities in the D-Island drilling program, as follows: •
A basis for assuring a common and consistent approach to the HSE management of operations by Agip KCO and contractors.
•
A means for improving the project HSE management and performance.
•
A systematic framework to enable management to assure themselves formally that the major accident hazards arising from the drilling, LQ arrangements, and local marine and helicopter operations within 500m of the island are adequately controlled.
•
A baseline for the systematic assessment of the risk associated with any future changes to the operations.
•
A guide for managers and supervisors in preparing hazard awareness training, handbooks, etc for the workforce.
•
A guide for all new personnel at all levels involved in the operations, whether with Agip KCO or contractors, to provide rapid familiarisation with the HSE-MS, the hazards and the associated technical and procedural controls used for managing them.
•
A framework upon which HSE and system compliance audits may be developed and programmed.
•
A reference for incident investigation, reporting and follow-up.
•
The HSE-Critical Tasks listing provides a reference for managers and supervisors of the HSEcritical tasks to be undertaken, who is responsible for them, the inputs required to carry out each task and how they will verify that each task has been undertaken properly.
•
An input to the contracts and design specifications of the HSE-critical issues to be addressed by contractors. D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
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•
A framework for demonstrating to the Republic of Kazakhstan Regulatory bodies that major HSE risks are being managed.
•
The Remedial Action Plan assigns corrective actions to individuals.
REVIEW PERIODS AND UPDATES Activities necessary to maintain the HSE Case will be implemented and co-ordinated by the Administrator, under the direction and authorisation of the Holder. These include: • Assignment of the HSE-critical Tasks lists and the Hazard and Effects Register to relevant Agip KCO and contractor company personnel. They are charged with the task of verifying the relevance, currency and accuracy of their designated tasks. • Management review of the HSE Case document following completion of modifications. • Re-issuing updated parts of the document as necessary, for example, after any major changes. • All signatory pages will require re-endorsement should the signatories change. • Following incident reviews/accident investigations, in accordance with Agip KCO requirements. • The Administrator will incorporate any deficiencies noted during the above maintenance activities into a revised version of the Remedial Action Plan. In this way the Remedial Action Plan is continuously updated with new actions and deficiencies, and closed-out actions removed. .
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PART 2 – DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS
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2
DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES
2.1
INTRODUCTION D-Island is an artificial island which will act as a hub for drilling and production operations for the Experimental Programme (EP) project. During the drilling phase of the project two drilling rigs (Rigs 401 and 402) will operate on the island, with living quarters on adjacent barges. The two drilling rigs can operate simultaneously with a total of 38 slots available (closest approach will be 13 slots [2]). It is currently planned to use 12 slots as per the drilling programme (see Section 2.5). Each rig is serviced by an adjacent mobile mud module containing five generators and mud processing. Pipe handling equipment is installed on the roof of the module. Common utilities are housed to the south of the island and include diesel and base oil storage (SE corner), mud conditioning, power generation (including emergency generator) and steam boilers (for winterisation). Accommodation is provided on grounded living quarters barges; the Shapagat (POB 120) and the Karlygash (POB 180), with integral TRs. Evacuation from the island will be by helicopter or IBEEV. The layout of the completed D-Island installation is presented in Figure 2.1 Specific operations covered by this case This HSE Case covers drilling and completions on D-Island, the accommodation barges, third party equipment, other activities where they interface with drilling activities, and marine (excluding those associated with construction activities) and helicopter operations within a 500m zone of the artificial island. All other activities required for the exploration program i.e. rig mobilisation/demobilisation, construction, aviation and marine operations outside the 500m zone and supply base operations, are also excluded.
2.2
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS The northern zone of the Caspian Sea was designated as a nature reserve by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1974, and modified by the decree of 1991 permitting oil exploration. In order to protect and conserve the natural environment, including flora, fauna and marine life, Agip KCO ensures that all of its operations cause minimal impact to the environment, being conducted in accordance with Agip KCO’s Environmental Strategy “zero spillage and minimum discharge”. This strategy requires that all liquid waste materials containing substances which may be harmful to aquatic life or wildlife, or injurious to life or property, are treated to avoid disposal of harmful substances into the sea. Drilling fluids are collected and shipped to shore for further treatment and disposal or re-use, and drilling cuttings, sand and other solids are not disposed of into the sea. Mud and mud chemicals containers (sacks, bags, pallets etc.) and other solid wastes are compacted and incinerated or transported ashore for disposal or recycling. Major accident events, such as blowouts or major oil spills, would pose a serious threat to the environment. These events are assessed in detail in Part 4 of this HSE Case, where specific controls to prevent their occurrence or mitigate their consequences are identified. Detailed assessment of the effects of such events on the surrounding environment is documented in the Environmental Impact Assessment [[3] and [4]].
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Figure 2.1 : D-Island General Arrangement D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
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2.3
GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION, GEOLOGY AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
2.3.1
Geographical Location The area of operation is the Kazakhstan sector of the north east Caspian Sea (Figure 2.2), which is characterised by shallow waters between 1 and 9m in depth with an average water depth of 6.2 m.
Figure 2.2 : Kazakhstan Sector of the Caspian Sea The artificial island is located approximately 70 km south east of Atyrau, in the north Caspian Sea at location latitude 46 deg. 22’ north and longitude 52 deg. 81’ east, in a nominal water depth of about two metres (Figure 2.3). Due to its position on the surge plain of the eastern side of the North Caspian, water levels are subject to both seasonal variations and weather-induced shortterm up- and down-surges. The down-surges may reduce the water level sufficiently to prevent logistical operations for short periods. The shallow water location of the island is sited away from normal shipping lanes.
Figure 2.3 : D-Island Location
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Safety Zone A Safety Exclusion Zone has been defined around the facility, the boundary of the Safety Exclusion Zone being 500 metres from the outer edge of any berm in its current configuration. The Agip Onshore Operations Manager is responsible for ensuring that systems are in place such that no vessels or any other parties, which are not invited or belonging to the Agip KCO operation, enter the Safety Zone without authorisation. The D-Island OIM is responsible for vessel entry; lawful or non lawful. Monitoring of vessels approaching the island is carried out by the Radio Operator in the living quarters, who is responsible for warning any unauthorised vessels that may encroach. EP Offshore Logistics will provide for marine vessel control in the form of the Offshore Marine Control Centre (OMCC). Marine Superintendents, Co-ordinators and Vessel Tracking specialist at the OMCC monitor and control project vessel movements. This is currently being developed.
2.3.3
Geo-technical Information The artificial island was constructed by placing a rock core on to the seabed with an impermeable 2 mm geo-membrane, placed between sand layers on top of this, and then approximately 1 m depth of further rock and compacted soil above this. The geo-membrane was included to prevent spill and contamination migration. The island surface was graded using gravel and prefabricated concrete slabs and foundations laid, the topside facilities then being installed, their foundations typically being made from pre-fabricated concrete slabs. A full survey of sea bottom conditions, and vulnerability to seismic events was carried out prior to construction of the artificial island. The carboniferous limestone formation targeted for the wells is approximately 3,800 m below the surface. An expected total drilling depth of 5,000 m is estimated.
2.3.4
Meteorological Conditions The average air temperature in the north Caspian Sea is 8-10ºC. The mean air temperature in January is between -7 and -10ºC, falling to a possible -30ºC with the arrival of the Arctic air masses. During the summer months of July and August the mean air temperature for the entire Caspian Sea is 24-26ºC, with a possible maximum of 42-44ºC. Water temperatures are subject to similar extreme variability. During the summer months, the shallows can exceed 26ºC. From November, the area starts to freeze over in the shallowest northeastern parts and, as the winter proceeds, the extent of ice cover increases and spreads westwards until most of the sea is frozen. The pack ice can be up to 0.9 m thick, with an average thickness of approximately 0.5 m. During severe winters, the ice period can last up to 170 days. Ice cover generally persists through to April. Winds tend to cause the ice to move northwards (mainly January), which, in some areas, creates ice ridges measuring one to two metres in height. This height has been allowed for in the design of the island height. The average wind speed is 4 – 6 m/s over the waters of the north east Caspian. Strong winds and storms occur mainly in springtime, with a frequency over the year of 30-40 days. Wind speeds can reach 25 m/s, with extremes of 30 m/s. These stronger winds can create storm surges, which are non-periodic fluctuations in sea level, lasting an average of 5 days. They occur most frequently between September and March, with a maximum rise in water level of 3-4m observed in the shallow areas of the north Caspian Sea. The wind rose for D-Island is illustrated in Figure 2.4 [6]. The characteristics of the wind-generated waves in the north Caspian Sea are strongly influenced by the shallow depths of the area and wave heights of up to 2 to 3 m can occur.
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Figure 2.4 : Windrose for the field 2.4
WELLS CHARACTERIZATION Drilling of the Kashagan wells can be broadly characterized in accordance with the following sections classification:
2.4.1
Post-Salt Section Between the salt diapirs and the surface lie normally pressured sedimentary rocks of Recent to Permian age. The bulk of these formations are composed of shales and sandstones which are not expected to give rise to significant drilling problems. Interbedded limestones are encountered in the Upper Cretaceous and Upper Jurassic intervals and while they may slow penetration rates significantly, they are not expected to give drilling problems.
2.4.2
Salt Section The salt layer overlying the carbonate reservoir varies considerably in thickness across the Kashagan field and even within the range of wells to be drilled from the Block A location. Characteristic salt diapir features generate salt intervals of up to 2,000 m, while salt withdrawal in other areas results in intervals of only a few tens of metres. To date, only minor problems from salt mobility have been encountered during drilling operations and analysis of samples has, so far, revealed an absence of the highly mobile potassium and magnesium based salts in preference for the less mobile halites with traces of the immobile anhydrites and carbonates. It is possible within the salt that rafted and perhaps over-pressured sediments could be encountered although only interbeds of anhydrite have been seen during drilling operations to date.
2.4.3
Pre-Salt Section (Reservoir Section) The reservoir is composed of Carboniferous sediments with the Artinskian sediments form the reservoir seal for Kashagan. The limestone reservoir section is encountered below the Artinskian Shale. Areas around the rim of the reservoir are expected to have secondary porosity in the form of karsts and fractures. According to current data it is possible that some parts of the Platform Interior may also exhibit some of these secondary porosity features but these areas will likely be limited in their extent. D-Island wells target Platform Interior.
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DRILLING AND COMPLETIONS PROGRAMME The D-Island drilling and completions programme from 2006 to 2009 is illustrated in Figure 2.11. It should be noted that operational requirements may lead to the programme being revised.
2.5.1
Drilling Methodology The traditional drilling technique involving overbalanced drilling mud circulated through the drill string and up the annulus while drilling the well is the main drilling approach through all well sections at D-Island. In principle, the mud column is the first barrier and the BOP is the second barrier [19]. However, drilling with overbalanced drilling mud through highly potential loss zones increases the possibility for loss of the primary barrier i.e. the mud column. For this reason a contingency has been made for the use of closed hole circulation drilling, (CHCD) at D-Island in cases of severe losses that might impair the safety of operation. In traditional drilling techniques mud returns to the surface and the pressure of the mud column is maintained between pore pressure and fracture gradient in the open hole section. The CHCD approach requires no return of mud to the surface as this technique consists of pumping a sacrificial fluid, (for D-Island this is seawater), through the drill string into the formation in the open hole section. During this operation the upper part the annulus is filled with mud heavier than seawater. The mud cap is pumped through the kill/choke lines with one of the mud pumps. The exerting pressure from the sacrificial fluid and the mud cap is maintained above the fracture pressure during actual drilling, but between pore pressure and fracture gradient during tripping and when making connections i.e. similar to traditional drilling approach. In order to prevent mud being returned to surface from the annulus during actual drilling a rotating circulation head (RCH) is installed on top of the BOP. The mud pump system consists of three mud pumps (see Section 2.10.5). While drilling with the traditional drilling method approach, two pumps will be used to pump drilling mud through the drill string and one will be kept in reserve. Whereas in the CHCD approach one pump will be used to pump sacrificial fluid through the drill string and one to pump mud cap mud through the kill/choke line to annulus, and one mud pump will be kept as reserve. The RCH is dynamic pressure rated to 2,500 psi and static pressure rated to 5,000 psi, while the BOP is rated to 15,000 psi. The CHCD approach can be compared with the well kill technique "bull heading" where kill mud is pumped through the drill string and the annulus in order to prevent formation fluid reaching the surface and to kill the well. One characterization of the CHCD approach is a continuous bullhead technique for drilling purposes, in a safe manner. Primary Well Barriers During overbalanced drilling, only the drilling fluid can be defined as the primary well barrier. As long as the exerting (static) pressure from the mud column is maintained between pore pressure and fracture gradient in the open hole section, the first barrier is intact regardless of equipment failure on the rig. Drilling with overbalanced drilling mud through highly potential loss zones increases the possibility for loss of the primary barrier i.e. the mud column, the CHCD approach has been introduced. During mud cap drilling with the CHCD technique, several components can be defined as the primary well barrier. It is the exerting (dynamic) pressure from the pumped fluid (sacrificial fluid and mud cap) that constitutes the main part of the barrier. However, there are several components on which the exerting pressure depends: •
Pumps for mud and sacrificial fluid;
•
Power system for pumps;
•
Sealing capability of rotating circulating head (RCH);
•
Supply of mud and sacrificial fluid;
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Kill/choke line for mud cap; and
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Kill/choke valves.
If any of the above components fail, the exerting pressure in the open hole section will be impaired, possibly causing formation fluid inflow into the well (see Figure 2.5). To prevent this, the secondary well barrier has to be activated in order to continue a safe operation. During tripping and when making connections in the CHCD mode, the well fluid will be in a static condition to prevent well fluid release on the drill floor. This implies that the exerting pressure from the well fluid in the open hole section must be maintained between pore pressure and fracture gradient. During these sub-activities in the CHCD mode, the primary well barrier is the same as the system for the traditional overbalanced drilling mode.
Figure 2.5 : Primary Well Barrier for Conventional and CHC Drilling Secondary Well Barriers During overbalanced drilling and CHCD (see Figure 2.6), the following components can be defined as the secondary well barriers: •
Casing shoe;
•
Casing;
•
Wellhead seal;
•
Kill/choke valves; and
•
BOP.
Given failures of the primary well barrier, failure of any of these components will result in a blowout. When drilling in High Pressure High Temperature (HPHT) conditions, utilizing traditional overbalanced drilling method, the first barrier, the mud column, is found to be highly unreliable, due to tight pressure margins. In HTHP wells, an average of one kick experienced per well drilled is not
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uncommon. The expected tight pressure margin conditions at the Kashagan field can be compared to these conditions while drilling HTHP wells. Using CHCD, the mud column is less critical because drilling can commence while fluid is pumped in to the well. In case the equipment related to CHCD should fail, the BOP will have to be closed. This is similar to drilling utilizing traditional drilling methods.
Figure 2.6 : Secondary Well Barriers for Conventional and CHC Drilling 2.6
COMPLETIONS METHODOLOGY The six main steps in a completion operation [64] include: 1) Displace the drilling mud with seawater for casing qualification; 2) Displace well with a heavy completion fluid; 3) Run completion string; 4) Nipple down BOP and install the X-mas tree; 5) Displace Base Oil with Completion Fluid; and 6) Set the production packer For the D-Island wells two methods have been used for carrying out the completions and are as follows; •
Overbalance using Micromax; and
•
Overbalance using a Caesium Formate completion fluid
In all cases two confirmed safety critical barriers must be maintained at all times between the formation hydrocarbons and the surface environment. In all cases the cemented casing and liner provides the primary barrier against the fluids in formation. The secondary barrier is provide by the hydrostatic head of the well completions fluid. (Figure 2.9) details the Casing and Liner profile and Figure 2.10 shows a schematic of the D-Island completions arrangement.
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COMMISSIONING METHODOLOGY Two operations will be performed as part of the commissioning programme, perforation and stimulation, and involve third party temporary equipment being located in the wellhead area and are described below. It is not intended to conduct well testing during the 2008/2009 winter period.
2.7.1
Perforation System Perforations are carried out using Tubing Conveyed Perforating (TCP) guns run downhole using coiled tubing (CT) through a specially designed BOP stack (two triple BOPs). The guns will be 22ft and 28ft lengths and run in by individual length using an AutoLatch™ system. As each section is lowered the top set of rams open and allow the CT and gun to be lowered whilst a lower set of rams remain closed around the CT providing a seal. The rig BOP will be fully open during this procedure but the lubricator valve (located further downhole) will be closed. An E-Line cable is run inside the CT to log depth and the charges are fired through a shielded electrical cable thus avoiding the need for radio silence. When perforations are taking place the well is slightly overbalanced, squeezing any fluids back into the formation with Base oil. The gun design eliminates the possibility of well fluids being brought to the surface on retrieval however the guns are flushed with 10bls of base oil before breaking out the guns. The used base oil is sent to surge tanks and any gas that may have accumulated is sent to the burner system operated by Schlumberger. The perforation equipment is operated by Halliburton and a HAZID and HAZOP were conducted for the perforation operation [69].
2.7.2
Stimulation System The stimulation system mixes and pumps hydrochloric acid into the formation once the wellbore has been perforated using Tubing Conveyed Perforating (TCP) guns. The acid is run from the wellhead down-hole using Coiled Tubing (CT) for the first stage stimulation and then via 4” pipe during Bullheading. Stimulation activities are carried out under the control and supervision of Halliburton. Stimulation equipment consists of the following items: •
2 x 6k High Pressure pumps on the acid tanks
•
15 x 2000gal acid tanks
•
2 x 32m Mixers
•
1 x 80m Mixer
•
1 x 80m Base oil storage tank
•
Various containers of additives and corrosion inhibitors
3 3 3
All of the above system is in a bunded area with the tanks also having drip trays and additional absorbent material lining the trays. The 4” line is secured with Grey locks and is chained down. A HAZID was conducted for the stimulation operation [70], the temporary location of the stimulation equipment in shown in Figure 2.7. 2.8
INSTALLATION LAYOUT
2.8.1
Island/LQ Orientation The orientation of the island and principal components of the installation are shown in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7 : Principal Components of the Installation The artificial island provides the base from which drilling operations are conducted. The accommodation and TR barges are moored on the south side of the island provide Living Quarters (LQ) and Temporary Refuge (TR) facilities. 2.8.2
Main Dimensions The overall dimensions of the rectangular island are 225 m long and 221 m wide and its surface is approximately 3.5 m above current sea level. The island has vertical sides protected by sheet piling and, on the north-west and south-west sides, there is a wall extending some 2 m above ground level, providing protection against wind and waves.
2.8.3
Island Layout Areas of the island are grouped according to function, and located with respect to each other according to hazard potential (see Figure 2.7), the principal areas being: •
Drilling rig and associated systems, situated at the centre of the island:
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Drilling rig (including draw works, wire line unit, mud logging, winches, rotary table, Driller’s control panel);
•
Mud and cuttings handling (including mud gas separator, trip tank, degassers, choke/kill manifold, shale shakers, centrifuges);
•
Power generation, distribution and utilities;
•
Pipe handling; and
•
Cuttings storage.
Ancillary equipment and systems, around the perimeter of the island, including: •
Cement unit;
•
Stimulation equipment
•
Diesel and lube oil storage;
•
Water storage;
•
Workshops and shelters; and
•
Cargo laydown areas.
ISLAND STABILITY AND INTEGRITY In the summertime, the environmental loads are generated by the wind, in combination with wave action and sea level surges. In the winter, when the Caspian Sea is frozen, moving ice sheets are generated, which build up as rubble ice around the island. Calculations by the island designers and engineers demonstrate that the artificial island, the rig and equipment on the island, are capable of withstanding the predicted operational, weather, environmental loads and temperatures imposed. The principal hazards associated with rig foundations or instability on the island arise from: •
Under scour of the island, causing the island to fail;
•
Wind and wave induced side forces in excess of the maximum design limit, causing damage to the islands structure; and
•
Ice induced side forces in excess of the maximum design limit, causing damage to the island’s structure.
The island is subject to inspection monthly in accordance with Agip KCO procedures. Any deterioration detected during these inspections will be referred to specialist Civil Engineers for an assessment of the island integrity. In the event of forces in excess of the predicted maximum, which result in structural damage (or predicted structural damage), which could cause the integrity of the island (or major piece(s) of equipment) to fail, the D-Island OIM will decide whether to cease operations and evacuate the island, in accordance with the requirements of the Emergency Response Plan [8]. Monitoring of sliding ice and lateral ice hazards on the island during the winter is described in detail in the Agip KCO ice management guideline [61]. 2.9.1
Well Design Well design is performed by Agip KCO and is described in the Kashagan Field Drilling Manual [11]. A schematic of the well design and casing and liner profile is shown in Figure 2.9. A simplified completion schematic is shown in Figure 2.10
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DRILLING RIGS The two identical drilling rigs, 401 and 402, were constructed by National Oilwell Varco (NOV), and consist of the Drilling Equipment Set (DES) and the Drilling Support Module (DSM). In addition a Common Area (CA) Module will be used by both rigs for various operations 13]. Rigs 401 and 402 are identical; reference to the DES and DSM will therefore refer to both rigs. The DES will be positioned on the northern part of the island. The DES consists of the skid base, substructure, drill floor, and “Bootstrap” mast. The north skid base is elevated 4’3” higher than the south skid base. There are 38 wells on the island but only 12 will be drilled, the DES and DSM skid East-West on a Lift & Roll System. The DES consists of 4 skid bases, substructure, drill floor and bootstrap mast and equipment for drilling including the Draw-works, Top drive, BOP Stacks, Rotary table, Drillers cabin, Hydraulic Power Unit and BOP Accumulator Unit. The DSM is located directly south of the DES. The module consists of 24 individual modules and 8 skid bases. The DSM, like the DES, skids East-West on a Lift & Roll System. The DSM consists of the Solids Control Equipment, Electrical Module, Casing and Drill Pipe Handling Equipment, Mud Pumps, Generators, and other various pieces of equipment. The overall dimensions for the drilling systems are presented in Table 2.1 and the DES and DSM are illustrated in Figure 2.12. Table 2.1 : Drill Rig Dimensions
DES Overall Dimensions
Skid base (4 sections)
Length (North-South)
Width (West-East)
Height
3.66 m
9.14 m
1.83 m
Note: Top of steel of the North Skid base at 1.3 m (4.3’ ft) higher Length (North-South)
Width (West-East)
Height
Substructure
16.15 m
14. 63 m
Drill Floor
24.11 m
14.63 m
17.17 m (Overall Height Of Substructure incl. Drill floor)
Mast
Base
Height
9.14 m X 9.14 m
48.77 m (Clear Working Height)
DSM Overall Dimensions Length (North-South)
Width (West-East
Height
44.12 m
35.94 m
15.55 m
Length (North-South)
Width (West-East
Height
40 m
150 m
18 m
CA Overall Dimensions
2.10.1
Driller’s Cabin and Control Panel Prime considerations for the design of the Driller’s cabin and control panel has been: •
Good communications with derrick (monkey board), drill floor and pipe deck personnel;
•
Excellent visual capabilities under a variety of weather and operating conditions;
•
Proper information availability without “information overload”; and a
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Safe working environment, including the provision of safety glass with mesh where required.
Rotary equipment The top-drive has an integrated travelling block and hook, rated load capacity 680 tonnes and is fitted with two Internal BOPs (IBOP) and a mud saver sub, and provides for wireline access. The top-drive pipe-handler link tilt shall is capable of full access to the mousehole and to latch on the pipe from the pipe chute to pick-up or lay-down of pipe. A 37½” bore rotary table is provided, rated at 590 tonne to support the load of the drill string or casing and to rotate the string during Kelly drilling (as back-up for the top-drive system). The 37½” minimum bore shall ensure that the 30” conductor and any required wellhead spools may pass through.
2.10.3
Pipe Handling System The system is design to meet the following requirement: •
Handling, loading and manipulating 3½” and 5 7/8” drill-pipe and tubing or casing (2 3/8” up to 20” on the pipe rack / catwalk assembly;
•
Handling of casing up to 14” of 100 ppf from make up to feeding the drill floor hoisting equipment;
•
Make-up and brake-out 3½”- 5 7/8” R3 drill-pipe of line;
•
Transfer of drill pipe, tubing and casing from V-door, to and from the rotary / top drive area or the mousehole; and
•
Remote make-up / break-out of drill pipe in the rotary / top drive or the mousehole.
An Iron Roughneck is provided capable of handling a stand of drill pipe every minute (60 per hr). It is capable of accessing the rotary table and is situated so that the operator has a full view of jaws during operation. Remote operated air actuated slips, controlled from Drillers console and locally, are provided for the full range of drill pipe anticipated. A hydraulic Cathead, with a line pull of 30,000 lbs, is located on the rig floor such that the tongs can be used safely and efficiently. Pipe doping is not carried out on the drill floor but before the pipe is lifted in the racks. The pipe handling system is illustrated in Figure 2.13 to Figure 2.16. The pipe loading and handling systems on Rigs 401 & 402 is currently not operational and an alternative method of carry out pipe handling operations is being used. A 110 tonne crawler crane is used to load pipe from the ground to the catwalk system, where an operator disconnects the pipe from the slinging equipment. In order to carry out this task the whole side of pipe deck has been removed to improve the visibility of the crane operator. The Bucking machine designed to make up and break out drill pipe is not being used as it does not function as required. 2.10.4 Drill Floor The drill floor layout allows for all required operations to be performed in a safe and efficient manner and, as far as possible, provide the maximum unobstructed working area. The drill floor has the following specification: •
A set-back area with a minimum capacity of 350 tonnes;
•
Set-back area is flush with rig-floor, incorporating a surface non-damaging to tool joints;
•
Ability to withstand drop impact of a 9-½” drill collar (3.1 tonnes), from a height of 1.0 m;
•
Fully sealed with drainage system, capable of handling all mud spillages (zero discharge);
•
Approved ‘non-slip’ oil resistant rubber type work surface in the area adjacent to the rotary table;
•
Pad-eye for a lower logging sheave rated to 22,480 lb (10,000 kg), recessed into the rigfloor and the recess provided with a cover;
•
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Personnel elevator with proper certification and classification from ground level to drill floor level with intermediate stop at the BOP deck;
•
Rigid gates to close off the top of all ramps;
•
Mouse-hole, designed for easy removal and safe efficient make up of drill pipe;
•
Rat-hole as back-up provision for Kelly drilling;
•
Three utility winches, two 5 tonne SWL on the drill floor and one (5 tonne SWL) on the BOP deck;
•
Two certified 500 kg SWL ‘man-rider’ winches; when required by the drilling operations;
•
Doghouse, mounted on the North side of the drill floor;
•
Drilling console, equipped with all required instrumentation for control and monitoring of operations;
•
BOP control panel;
•
Choke control panel; and
•
Cascade breathing air distribution system and Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA).
High Pressure Mud System Primary control of well pressure, whilst drilling, is provided by the hydrostatic head of the weighted drilling mud applying an overbalance to the formation with a certain safety margin. The mud system is described in the next section. Should a well kick occur, this will be controlled by using surface located pressure control equipment (secondary line of defence). The High Pressure Mud System enables circulation of the drilling fluid down the well bore using reciprocating triplex mud pumps. All components of the system are rated 7500 psi, working pressure. Each pressure containing component whose rating could be exceeded, are provided with a fast acting pressure relief system that vents and drains to the mud tanks. The system is equipped with both a kill manifold and a reverse circulation manifold. Each mud pump has a dedicated charge pump to ensure pump feed. Each pump has high pressure pulsation dampers, strainers and relief valves installed on the discharge side. The lines from the relief valves are self draining, and have clamps fitted at either end. The suctions of all pumps are manifolded together and the manifold includes the necessary isolation valves, strainers and low pressure suction dampers. The charge pump piping manifold and HP Pump discharge manifold are designed to allow lining up for the maximum number of pumping configurations. Any hose elements incorporated in the manifolding are safety-chained, in compliance with Agip KCO and drilling contractor practices. The high pressure mud pumps and the charge pumps can be operated from the Driller’s cabin; local maintenance control panels will also be available close to the pumps.
2.10.6
Mud Treatment System The primary mud treatment is on the drilling support module. Control of the mud treatment system is from local control stations. The treatment tanks maintain a constant liquid level by a series of overflow and underflow weirs. These weirs allow for the individual sections of the system to operate continuously and to reduce the potential for equipment to ‘run-dry’. The treatment tanks are covered over, with only the minimum of penetrations, with a view to contain the fumes given off by the returning warm mud and to reduce emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) to the environment. This arrangement creates a ‘user’ friendly environment and hence encourages the crew to provide more care and attention to the mud system. A high-capacity fume extraction and condensation system is provided above the shakers for use when drilling with oil base mud. The treatment tanks are small: 3
•
Returns (degasser) tank 10.0 m ;
•
Degassed / desilter tank 6.0 m ;
•
Centrifuge tanks 6.0 m ; and
3
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Transfer tank 6.0 m .
2.10.6.1 Solids Control Tanks All tanks are fed from the mud ditch which is provided for either access to, or bypass of, the mud treatment tanks for mud being circulated to the active / reserve system. Tanks can be by-passed to minimise surface volume in case of severe down-hole losses. Tank manifolding allows transfer of mud from/to active tank(s), and from/to decanting centrifuges. 2.10.6.2 Sand Trap A tank is located under the shale shakers. A suction line is provided to circulate fluidised mud solids from sand trap to one of the shale shakers for removing fines. The shaker is fitted with an ultra fine screen. A low pressure mud gun is provided to fluidise the settled solids. 2.10.6.3 Shale Shakers The Shale Shakers are multiple screen, Balanced Elliptical Motion (BEM) type. The system consists of 3 cascaded scalping shakers and 4 BEM shakers. The performance target of the equipment is to be able to process 110% of the return mud flow (minimum 50 Marsh Funnel viscosity) through 80 mesh screens irrespective of hole size, circulation rate or rate of penetration. The shakers are fitted with: •
Fume extraction hoods;
•
Screen beds capable of operating at a range of angles by use of a ‘adjustable while drilling’ system;
•
Flow divider with valves in the discharges to the shallow header boxes to allow for mud distribution over the secondary shakers;
•
A reversing line;
•
A spray line capable of using water, brine or base oil as a wash-down fluid; and
•
A high pressure screen cleaning facility capable of using water or base oil.
Mud return flow lines from flow divider enter from the rear at the base of each shale shaker header tank. The header tanks are shallow and have provisions to regulate flow over the screen bed, Shaker screens with cut range between 200 and 50 microns are available. 2.10.6.4 Vacuum Degasser (at sandtrap/solids control area) The degasser is sized so as to handle at least 50% of the maximum circulation rate. The suction is 3 taken from a degasser tank (nominal 6 m ) immediately downstream from sand trap(s) and fed from the mud ditch or line from Mud-Gas Separator. Degassed mud discharges into the next downstream tank. The vacuum degasser pump is integrated with a 20 HP motor. Gas is vented through a check valve into the main 12” vent line overboard (beyond island embankment). The vent line does not have any isolation valves and are routed so as to avoid bends or turns as far as is practicable. When the degasser is not in use the tank is isolated and kept empty in order to prevent the plugging of the suction end. 2.10.6.5 Decanting Centrifuge System Two variable speed centrifuges are provided. The units are manifolded to permit barite stripping from either Water or Oil based mud stored in either the active or the reserve tanks. Removed barite is discharged to the holding tank for re-use or diverted for discharge with cuttings. The centrifuges are arranged so that suction is taken from a solids control tank down stream of the shale shakers and degasser. The Centrifuges can be flushed with base oil after use. The centrifuges are fed by positive displacement, Mono-type pumps, with variable speed controls. Tanks are provided for: •
Centrifuge Tank System;
•
Holding Tank for Recovered Barite; and D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
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Fines Removal High Speed Centrifuges Suction Tank (2 Stage).
A settling tank with an agitator and suction line agitates the mud when not circulating. Mud is pumped from the sand trap and discharged up stream of the shale shakers which are equipped with 325 mesh screen prior to being diverted to centrifuge rated in high speed mode. A mud ditch allows for either access to, or bypass of, the mud treatment tanks for mud being circulated to the active or reserve systems in order to minimize mud surface volume if required. Mud intended for storage and/or reconditioning is transferred to the Common Mud system for further processing. 2.10.6.6 Collector Tank 3
A 40 m volume collector tank, located in the vicinity of the flow line, recovers contaminated mud, spacers, and excess cement slurry, prior to routing to storage or disposal. This pit is equipped with agitators driven by an electrical motor. 2.10.6.7 Cuttings Transfer & Collection After processing through the mud treatment system on location, all cuttings, will ultimately be transferred to the base at Bautino for final disposition. A cuttings barge is located alongside the Drilling Island, enabling direct transfer of cuttings. Due to the shallow water conditions, barge loading will be limited in order to maintain sufficient draught. A ‘buffer’ pit is provided to handle cuttings during barge change out. A cuttings re-injection system may be made operational in some stage during the drilling programme. The cuttings transfer system is capable of efficiently moving 3 up to 22 m /hour of cuttings, per drilling rig from the mud treatment equipment to the dedicated storage and/or slurrification plant. Transfer is via a paddle conveyor from the shakers to either the cuttings blower (or skips as backup) and from there to either the cuttings storage pit, cuttings barge or skips storage area. 2.10.6.8 Mud Mixing on Rig With the goal of utilising common systems to the maximum advantage, the majority of the mud mixing requirements are provided by the Common System mud plant. There is however, the regular need to mix the various products to maintain optimum mud properties. The rig is capable of concurrently mixing two different fluids, assigned to two specific tanks or directly to suction tanks. In the event of closed hole circulation drilling (‘Mud Cap’) operations, the rig system is capable of mixing new fluid for annular injection, while simultaneously mixing, on-the-fly, required additives to the seawater sacrificial fluid being pumped down the drill-pipe. 3
The rig mud system has 400 m of combined active / reserve tankage. This system includes the following elements:
2.10.7
3
•
Two primary suction pits (50 m +1- ea);
•
Manifolding that allows capability of pumping to or from any pit;
•
Active/Reserve tanks compartmented to allow maximum flexibility;
•
Two slug / spill pits;
•
Reserve pits;
•
Two ‘Sidewinder’-type mixing hoppers;
•
5 m Surge tank for barite / bentonite;
•
High pressure mud shearing device; and a
•
Chemical mixing tank.
3
Pressure Control System In the event of primary control being lost, secondary well control is provided by a diverter, for surface hole drilling, and the blowout preventer (BOP), as soon as the first casing has been cemented.
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The equipment is H2S resistant for the high levels of H2S content expected for the planned wells based on the standards presented in NACE MR-01-075. Performance of the well control equipment is assured by initial integrity testing and certification, and periodic function and pressure testing. Well control equipment is in accordance with Agip STAP-M-1-SS-5703, unless specifically mentioned otherwise below. 2.10.7.1 BOP Stacks Low Pressure BOP Stack Size & Rating
20-3/4” x 3,000 psi (207 bar)
Type
Annular and two (2) rams (one pipe & one shear)
H2S High Pressure BOP Stack Size & Rating
H2S rated 13-5/8” x 15,000 psi (1034 bar)
Type
Four (4) rams (three pipe & one shear)
Annular BOP Size & Rating
13-5/8” x 10,000 psi (670 bar)
Type
Spherical Assembled on top of 13-5/8” BOP stack
CHCD BOP (RCD)
Rotating annular BOP, (rotating control head), rated 5,000 psi (static) / 2500 psi (rotating)
The BOP stacks are provided with transport frames and test stumps. Access is provided around the BOP stack for ram change out and for choke and kill line connection. On each outlet, there are two gate valves installed, one manual and one hydraulically operated. The stack is configured with ram-type preventers as provided for in EP 89-1500, one of which cavity is provided with variable bore pipe rams. 2.10.7.2 BOP Control Unit The BOP control unit is located in a Zone 2 area and well protected from any event at the wellhead or BOP area. Two remote control panels are provided; one is in the Driller’s control area and the other in the Toolpusher’s office. The control system complies with API RP 53 and API RP 16E. The accumulator bottles are certified and tested as per API Spec. 16D. Control lines are hard piped wherever possible, with steel clad hoses for sections where hard piping is inappropriate. Lines not in use are plugged off. The routing of the BOP control lines, with their associated couplings and seals is designed to minimize the risk of damage. The control lines are be certified fire resistant. The Driller’s BOP Control panel clearly indicate:
2.10.8
•
The individual valve status;
•
Alarm functions visual and audible; and
•
The BOP configuration in graphics.
Choke Manifold and Mud-Gas Separator The Choke Manifold is positioned to minimize the distance between BOP and Manifold so that the connecting lines are short and as straight as possible (all bends must have large radii). The manifold is located on the BOP deck in a winterised area. The gas from the mud gas separator is vented and the mud overflow directed to the degasser tank. The Choke Manifold arrangement has a second valve downstream of each choke but upstream of the buffer chamber. All valves in the manifold that are upstream of the Mud-Gas Separator are flanged gate valves equivalent to Cameron type F. All components, such as valves, chokes, crosses and flanges, have been manufactured and tested in accordance with API Spec 6A and comply with NACE MR 01-75. The Choke Manifold is rated at 15,000 psi working pressure upstream of chokes, 10,000 psi working pressure downstream and across the buffer tank, and equipped with two remote adjustable chokes D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
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and one manual adjustable choke. It is equipped with Mud Gas separator bypass lines and meets the requirements for drilling critical sour gas wells. Glycol injection ports are installed close to the chokes with dedicated, adjustable, injection pump. Temperature sensors are located both upstream and downstream of each remote choke. The remote chokes are operable from the manifold and in the Driller’s cabin. During operation of the remote chokes the drill-string pressure, the choke manifold pressure, the volume pumped (a stroke counter) and the fluid pump rate are all indicated. For manual choke operation the choke manifold pressure is displayed. A remote operated valve is fitted upstream of all chokes. Chokes are fitted with a bleeder valve to ensure that internally trapped pressure can be released prior to removal of the bonnet. One mud-gas separator is installed with a feed line from the Choke Manifold and with its own vent line. The separator is rated to 150 psi. Similarly, the 5000 psi rated mud-gas separator bypass line, incorporated into the Choke Manifold, and the 5000 psi rated relief (panic) line from the LP buffer tank on the Choke Manifold is directed to the north edge of the Island via a 12” discharge line [68]. 2.10.9
Trip Tank 3
The trip-tank dual compartment design has a nominal capacity of 8 m . It is constructed so that the fluid-level change per stand of drill-pipe equals or exceeds 5 cm. Fluid level changes are indicated by both an easily read, mechanical type indicator sensor fed, direct read-out totaliser indicated on the Driller’s console and a remote chart/logic read-out. Instrumentation is calibrated so that it gives a read out in triples/doubles stands for the size of drill pipe in use. A total tank volume indication is calibrated to be sensitive a volume change equivalent to a one joint of drill pipe The trip-tank is filled from the flow-line via the bell-nipple and has the ability to be bypassed and have overflows fitted. A separate fill-up line is also provided, fitted with a 2’ 1502 Weco connection. Two dedicated pumps take suction from the trip tank. The pump discharge is designed to enable the pump to directly fill up the hole and/or fill the drill pipe at the rig floor. The minimum pump 3 output 1m /min of 16.3 ppg (2.0 sg). Returns from the choke manifold are routed through the mud separator (poorboy) to the degasser tank. 2.10.10
Cementing System This system mixes and pumps cement to the well bore. Down hole tools and casing accessories are also provided for this function. The unit is located on the north-west edge of the island and the cement is stored in silos and transferred into pressurized tanks before use. Chemicals premixed in water are added to the cement to improve its quality. Cementing is carried out under Halliburton control and supervision using their own equipment. The cementing unit consists of a mixing station and 2 large high pressure pumps (which can also serve as well kill pumps) and is capable of performing the following activities: •
Mixing and pumping cement slurries down hole;
•
Pressure testing equipment (e.g. BOPs and choke manifold etc.);
•
Well integrity (leak-off) tests;
•
Well control functions;
•
Accurate fluid displacement;
•
Production well kill operations, via the kill header;
•
Emergency mud circulation (cross connected to HP mud pumps); and
•
Formation treatment, i.e. acidizing, squeezing, etc.
Seawater, freshwater, base oil, completion fluid and drilling mud are also supplied to the cement unit from the relevant supply tanks. 2.11
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL The drilling instrumentation system is equipped with a fully computerised data acquisition system enabling continuous monitoring and control of the systems presented in Table 2.2. D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
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Drilling Console
Choke Control Station
Other
Hook Load
Stand Pipe Pressure
Surface Torque
Weight on Bit
Annulus Pressure
-
Torque
Mud pump stroke totaliser 1
-
Depth
Mud pump stroke totaliser 2
-
Mud Pumps - Strokes Per Minute / Lag Strokes / for pumps 1 thru 4
-
-
Mud pump stroke totaliser I
-
-
Mud pump stroke totaliser 2
-
-
Pump Pressure
-
-
Stand Pipe Pressure I
-
-
Annulus pressure
-
-
Mud Pit Levels — Individual I Totalized
-
-
Trip Tank Level
-
-
Top drive or Rotary speed
-
-
Return Flow (%)
-
-
Gain / Loss — Assignable to any or all pits
-
-
Tong Pull
-
-
2.12
POWER GENERATION AND UTILITIES
2.12.1
Main Power Generation System Island AC power is generated on the island by 2 sets of five 60 Hz generators each capable of a continuous maximum power supply of 1,500 kVA which are controlled by a Silicon Controlled Rectifier (SCR) Control System. The rig power system is capable of provision of 110% combined rig load with one generator set offline. The initial generated voltage at 600 Vac is distributed to the primary bus in the generator/SCR cabinets for transformation to dc. Three primary transformers are provided reducing the 600 Vac to 440/220/110 Vac for distribution to the rig’s primary and secondary bus systems. Power distribution is determined by switching at the Driller’s console. The generators sets are located on the south side of the rig in the DSM, outside of the hazardous areas and clear of handling areas for drilling equipment. All equipment is earth bonded and lightning conductors are installed at appropriate locations. All switch rooms, MCC rooms, transformer rooms, SCR rooms and generator areas are equipped with electrical safety equipment and facilities including: •
Two (outward opening panic type) doors;
•
Restricted access posters, danger signs and caution notices;
•
BCE, CO2 or an approved equivalent fire extinguisher(s);
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•
Audible and visual alarm of initiation of fixed extinguisher(s);
•
Telephones and readily available telephone lists;
•
Readily visible key drawings and single line diagrams;
•
Readily accessible schematics wiring diagrams and fault finding I trouble shooting drawings;
•
Posted instructions for resuscitation of persons suffering from electric shock;
•
Fully voltage rated rubber insulation matting;
•
Lockout box complete with safety isolation padlocks and keys; and
•
All electrical equipment and bulk items such as junction boxes, light fixtures cables are tagged in accordance with the Agip KCO numbering system.
In addition, power to the common services area is provided by 3 containerised 60 Hz generators. These are located in the main common services winterised shelter. 2.12.2
Emergency Power and Lighting Systems Each rig is provided with an emergency power system that is capable of providing a separate uninterruptible ac power supply to support all critical rig systems. It consists of one ac diesel generator with a maximum power output of 150 kVA, auto start in the event of main circuit failure and a dedicated control panel. Manual start up is also possible. The island emergency power system uses the same distribution as the main power system. Critical rig systems supplied with emergency power are: •
Rig floor lighting;
•
All emergency lighting systems, including red aircraft warning lights on top of mast; and
•
Air compressor unit.
In the event of failure of both main and emergency island generator supplies, there is the following battery UPS provision:
2.12.3
•
Telecoms UPS;
•
Fire and gas system UPS;
•
Self-contained battery backed mast top lights; and
•
Self-contained (UPS) battery backed emergency lighting.
Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) The UPS supply is from a centralised robust UPS system with distributed and dedicated outlets. This is capable of operating without failure during the most onerous drilling conditions (and therefore the most onerous voltage and frequency transients and harmonic distortion). UPS endurance times are presented in Table 2.3. Table 2.3 : UPS Endurance Times System
Endurance Time
Fire and Gas detection and alarm
3 hours
ESD systems
30 minutes
Drilling monitoring and control
45 minutes
PA, audible alarms and status lights
3 hours
Navigation Aids
96 hours
CCTV
1 hour
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Lighting And Small Power Requirements General Lighting All drilling installation and associated island lighting utilise industrial fluorescent type lighting fixtures. General large area lighting uses high pressure high level sodium fixtures e.g. mounted on the mast and crane booms and supplemented by localised fluorescent type fixtures. Lighting fixtures for use in hazardous areas are certified. The lighting arrangements are shown in Figure 2.17. Emergency Lighting Emergency lighting is provided to allow a sufficient level of illumination to permit minimum operation of the entire island installation including inspection, testing, emergency support and black start. It can be summarised as follows: •
All emergency light fittings are supplied from the emergency generator;
•
Emergency light fittings comprise 25% of the total fittings as a minimum; and
•
Emergency light fittings are certified for Zone 1. Portable battery powered emergency lighting is provided in all SCR, MCC and generator locations. These light fittings are connected to the emergency supply.
Escape Lighting On the island, battery-backed escape lighting is provided which gives illumination, at all times, to escape routes, internal and external exits, ladders and walkways, sufficient to allow the safe movement of personnel for muster and evacuation. Emergency lighting is supplied with power from the island emergency generator and has battery back up. Special Lighting Special lighting includes: •
Marine Navigation Aids are provided and comply with, local regulations which are aligned with IALA recommendations. The units are certified for use in a hazardous area and have an UPS battery supply of 96 hours duration; and
•
Aircraft / Obstruction Warning lights, compliant with CAP 437 regulations.
2.13
TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
2.13.1
Navigation Aids An aviation flashing beacon at the top of the derrick is fitted to provide visual indication to aircraft of the presence of the installation. Warning lights are also provided on island corners and Shapagat, with a foghorn also fitted to Shapagat.
2.13.2
Communication Systems
2.13.2.1 Public Address System There is an installation wide public address (PA) system with coverage of the entire drilling site, excluding loading/unloading quays and Living Quarters. High survivability and high availability is assured through a duplicate A and B system. On the island, the PA system can be accessed to make announcements via the telephone system. The island PA system speaker ratings and locations have been designed to take account of estimated background noise levels. The PA system is repeated through to the LQ barges. 2.13.2.2 General Alarms (GA) The alarms for the Island facilities and LQ are described in the D-Island Station Bill (see Figure 5.1). The OIM has the capability to make announcements to inform personnel of the current status. Alarm Signals
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General Alarm:
Intermittent signal of a constant frequency (yellow flashing lamp).
Toxic Gas Alarm:
Continuous signal of a constant frequency (red flashing lamp).
Prepare for evacuation
Continuous signal of variable frequency
Each LQ barge has its own internal muster alarm. In high noise areas, visual fire and gas alarms are provided. There are 2 kinds of visual alarm lamps, red and yellow, configured to give 3 distinct alarms corresponding to the three audible alarms. In addition, local alarms are provided for rooms which are protected by CO2 systems. 2.13.2.3 Telephones Intrinsically safe telephone handsets are provided for the drill floor, cement unit, well test area, SCR room (with acoustic hoods and flashing lights) and for the mud logging unit. 2.13.2.4 Intercom There are intercoms on the island, to enable hands free calling between rig locations and also to enable personnel to page another individual. The intercom covers the following areas: Rig Offices; Dog house; Driller’s Cabin; Rig Floor; Choke Control Panel; Remote BOP Control Panel; Mud Pits; Pump Room; SCR Room; Shakers; Choke Manifold; Trip Tank; Substructure BOP deck area; Well head area; Monkey Board; Mud Logging Unit; BOP control unit and common area facilities. This system is totally independent of the LQs and is classified for use in hazardous areas. 2.13.2.5 CCTV The system is monitored and operated from the Drill floor cabin, Control room in Living Quarters Barge, Rig office (Rig Superintendent and Toolpusher) and Company man office. The CCTV display in the dog house is of a high intensity type. In addition there are 3 island cameras, one on each drill floor and one in the wellhead area, connected to the LQ CCTV system, which is monitored in the radio room on the LQ. The LQ CCTV system provides monitoring of the embarkation/disembarkation areas and also 360° coverage around the barge. 2.13.2.6 Meteorological Monitoring System Living Quarters barges are equipped with a meteorology system for measuring data required for aircraft and marine operations, including wind speed and wind direction. Two anemometers are deployed on each derrick. Windsocks are provided for the helidecks. 2.13.3
External Communications
2.13.3.1 Satellite Systems VSAT There is a VSAT System for limited satellite voice and data telecommunications (integrated into the Agip- KCO network) to I from the site. From its VSAT system, Agip KCO provide: •
Telephone (in the LQB and island offices);
•
PABX equipment and communications;
•
Fax equipment and communications;
•
Internet connection for business purposes (secure internet connection I VPN); and
•
PC Equipment including printers (networked).
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InMarSat Mini-M An InMarSat Mini-M portable terminal set up as a backup voice communication channel. The unit is to be located in the Command and Control Room/Radio Room. lnMarSat systems are not used when the VSAT based system is operational. 2.13.3.2 Radio Systems Portable Marine Band VHF radios for communications on and around the island are available. All units are intrinsically safe. A minimum of 6 operational units are available, together with two spare units, plus 10 headset radios provided for drilling. Radios designated for fire fighting team are equipped with throat microphones. Specific VHF frequencies are allocated to facilities in the North Caspian and to the Emergency Response Team. 2.14
FIRE & GAS I EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN A Fire & Gas I Emergency Shutdown (F&GIESD) system, provides coverage for the drilling rigs and common systems and have been designed to detect potential fire or toxic gas release early enough to prevent loss of control, and allowing enough time to initiate a planned response. The fire and gas system on the drill rigs are entirely autonomous, but interface with the Fire & Gas panel in the associated LQ/TR(s) in such a way that:
2.14.1
•
Full pre alarm and alarms status information is made available in the LQ/TR;
•
Full gas value analogue data is made available in the LQ/TR;
•
Full information regarding any tagged items, layouts and addressable loops is made available and shall be configured into the LQ/TR panel;
•
Initiation of the island audible and visual alarms from the LQ/TR panel is possible;
•
Audible alarms on the island are easily overridden so that the when drilling operations are taking place with the public address speakers installed, the audible alarm is initiated via the LQ/TR barge panel to the LQ/TR PA amplifiers and out to the island located speakers; and
•
A summary mimic of the F&GIESD status is located on the drill floor.
Fire and Gas Detection
2.14.1.1 Island The island is provided with a comprehensive fire and gas detection system to alert personnel and which comprises: •
Smoke, heat and flame detectors, supplemented by fusible links and manual call points. The network covers all the principal flammable loads on the island, including the well test area. It alarms to the LQ/TR radio room and alarm signals are also relayed to a repeater/status panel located on the drill floor;
•
Gas detectors for O2, CH4, H2S and SO2. The detector heads are principally located around the drill floor and the mud areas to provide early warning of any releases. Fire and H2S, CH4 detectors are located on the LQs. Temporary/portable detectors (Rig rats) are also available for the muster points and other areas;
•
The main island F&G panel, which receives data from the various detectors and directs signals to the main F&G panel on LQ/TR (in the radio room, which is manned 24 hours per day); and
•
A repeater F&G status panel located at the Driller’s control panel at the drill floor. This provides an indication of F&G status, taking a signal from the main LQ/TR F&G panel.
In addition as D-Island could be affected by a gas release from a neighbouring facility the following arrangements are in place: •
Radio communication between neighbouring facilities and D-Island to inform of gas release as part of ERP.
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A fire or gas alarm received at the main LQ/TR panel will activate a fire alarm on LQ/TR(s) and the island. In the event of an alarm, signals go direct from the LQ/TR panel to the alarm sounders, speakers and lights. All fire and gas panels have UPS or local battery back up. 2.14.1.2 Personnel H2S Detection Apparatus H2S personal gas detectors/monitors will be worn by all personnel working outside the accommodation during in reservoir drilling and completions operations. These will be issued in a controlled manner by the H2S Specialist. 2.14.2
Emergency Shutdown System (ESD)
2.14.2.1 Island Main ESD System The ESD system provides, in the event of a fire or gas release, a means of preventing escalation and controlling and minimising the effects by rapidly and safely shutting down operations. There are 3 levels of ESD [7] which are: •
ESD 1 – the higher level; shuts all the main electrical power generators, including the emergency generators, initiated manually either by a push button near the access bridge or in the LQ Radio Room;
•
ESD 2 – shuts down the electrical generation system with the exception of the emergency generator, initiated manually by a push button on the Driller’s control panel; and
•
ESD 3 (or Process Shutdown–PSD), by manual pushbuttons, Process Upsets and Loss of Compressor Seal Medium.
Individual equipment items can also be shutdown locally. No provision is made to automatically shutdown any telecoms or IT systems on the island. 2.14.3
Hazardous Area Classification Hazardous zones are established on the island, in accordance with the guidelines given in API standard RP 500 [42]. Electrical equipment within hazardous zones is to the appropriate standard of intrinsic safety, as defined in BS EN 50014 [43] and related standards (see Figure 2.18, Figure 2.19 and Figure 2.20). In addition H2S zones are established as per Shell standard EP 95-0317 [41].
2.14.4
Active Fire Protection Systems Fire Water The firewater system comprises 2 diesel driven firewater pumps, one duty and one back up, located at the south of the island. The system has appropriate frost/anti freeze protection. The fire pump starts automatically when pressure in the main drops to 3 bar and requires a manual stop. The fire pump generates water at 8bar in the main. The fire pumps can also be started manually from a local control panel. Two 100% redundant jockey pumps are provided to pressurize the fire main, of capacity to cope with minor demands on the fire-water system e.g. 1 fire hose delivering 3 30 m /hr. The jockey pump automatically starts when main pressure falls to 3.5 bar and automatically stops when the pressure reaches 8.5bar. There is no provision to start the fire pump from the fire and gas detection panel on LQ/TR. Fire water Main The fixed buried “wet” main services all outlets (hydrants, deluge branches and fire monitors etc.) and is a ring system enabling firewater to be supplied to any ‘user’ from two directions. The firewater main and all fixed and portable fire fighting equipment connected to the main are designed for 16 barg and operate at 8 barg. Fire Hydrants & Fire Hoses Pillar fire hydrants with certified 52 mm diameter 20 metre long fire hoses and fitted with approved quick connect couplings are positioned strategically around the drilling package and other fire risk areas. Fire main hydrants (with a 2” fire hose and instantaneous connectors) are positioned to
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cover cementing area, diesel tanks, workshop, drill floor, shakers, BOP, mud tanks, mud pumps generators and LQ/TRs. Hydrants are self draining with an internal isolation valve. Each hydrant has its own local manual isolation valve. It is possible to reach any area where a fire may occur on the island with at least two water jets from hoses connected to separate hydrants configured such that there is one hose connected to the nearest hydrant and no more than 2 hoses from an adjacent hydrant. Deluge System There is a deluge system, supplied by the firewater main, providing cooling water to the 3 substructure and BOP area. It provides water at 120 m /hr. Remotely actuated valves with manual over-rides are fitted to the deluge systems. Deluge systems are supplied from two independent sections of the firewater main which can be isolated from each other in event of a main failure. There is a normally closed manual valve, close to the derrick, on the rig floor access stairs in the line to the deluge system. The valve is not automatically activated in order to avoid spurious activation. The valve is outside the area it protects and should therefore remain accessible in the event of an emergency for sufficient time to activate the deluge. Foam System The fixed foam system protects areas where pools fires might occur such as the diesel storage 3 tanks and open mud tanks. Foam is supplied at a rate of 15 m /hour. The foam tank is supplied with water from the fire main and is located at the north east side of the rig. The system also protects the shakers. The isolation valves supplying water to the foam system are normally closed and are motor operated. The push button to activate the valve is close to the area to be protected. There is no provision to operate these valves and the foam systems remotely from the fire and gas panel. Portable and Mobile Fire Extinguishers Fire extinguishers are selected, installed and maintained in accordance with international standards. Wheeled extinguishers are provided where larger hazards exist, e.g. power generators. The provision of fire extinguishers on the island is outlined in Table 2.4. Table 2.4 : Fire Extinguisher Provision on the Island Location Of Fire Fighting Station
Number of Extinguishers
Type of Extinguisher
Diesel Fuel Storage area
2 x 50kg (wheeled)
Powder
Diesel Generator area
5 x 6kg
CO2
SCR/Main Control Cabin area
2 x 6kg
CO2
Mud Tanks area
6 x 9kg (portable)
Powder
1 x 50kg (wheeled)
Powder
Mud Pump area
1 x 9kg
Powder
BOP Accumulator area
2 x 9kg
Powder
Rig Floor area
3 x 9kg (portable)
Powder
1 x 50kg (wheeled)
Powder
1 x 9kg
Powder
Rig Site Office area
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2.15
WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
2.15.1
Liquid waste Liquid wastes include oil based fluids; water based fluids; drain water; corrosives. In general, each waste stream will require segregation and separate handling prior to primary treatment. The drilling contractor complies with Agip KCO requirements and RoK waste regulations, by containing wastes that are not permitted to be discharged to the sea, and transferring them for appropriate onshore treatment and disposal. Agip KCO’s waste management plan applies the principles of segregating wastes for re-use and recycling where this is appropriate. Hazardous wastes are segregated and returned to Bautino for appropriate disposal. Where recycling is not feasible, combustible waste is incinerated and inert material compacted. No liquid wastes are discharged to the environment from the island, and all waste is cleaned and monitored prior to discharge. Cuttings are normally transferred to a cutting barge via the fully automated cuttings handling system. Skips may be used in extremis. If cutting skips are used, they are transported to the quayside by fork lift truck and then emptied into a cutting barge using a crane.
2.15.2
Drains A geo-membrane is buried within the island structure below the drain system, to prevent any liquid contamination seeping into the underlying geology. A perforated PVC drain pipe system (DN80) is installed in the island rock formation, just above the geo-membrane, to direct drained fluids to one of a number of drain sumps. The sumps are located at various positions around the island. The fluid collecting above the geo-membrane will be periodically recovered from these drain pits using a vacuum tank or sump pump. Bunding is provided around tanks and for areas at which spillages may occur (e.g. diesel storage, cement area). All liquid wastes generated during the operation, including contaminated seawater and rainwater run off, are collected via the closed drains system. Material pumped from the closed sumps is disposed of in a controlled manner, either via the LQ disposal systems or returned to Bautino for further treatment. The hazardous open drains collect all oily/water/solids drainage from the various equipment packages and is routed to skimmer tanks and from there to a slurry tank. Major equipment is bunded and vacuum units used for minor spillages or wash downs. The Safe Open drains have a minimal throughput, the main effluent being rain and wash water. Deluge drainage is by natural flow directly on to the surrounding area. It is recognised however that some may discharge via the hazardous drain system.
2.15.3
Solid Wastes Republic of Kazakhstan regulations prohibit the disposal of drilling cuttings into the Caspian Sea. All cuttings must therefore be collected and shipped to shore, where they are subsequently treated and disposed. Drill cuttings make up the bulk of the solid wastes. These are conveyed, by the cutting transport systems, to a dedicated storage skip or to the cuttings barge, For other solid waste streams, compactors, of appropriate size and application, are available for dealing with: •
Bags, both paper and plastic, along with miscellaneous daily rubbish; and
•
Drums, both metal and plastic.
All drums are drained, rinsed and dried prior to compaction and disposal. 2.15.4
Sewage System There are no sanitary facilities provided on the drilling island; these are provided on the LQs.
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Spillage Management Small spills on the island will generally be contained and cleaned up in accordance with the Agip KCO HSE management system, as described in Part 3 of this HSE Case. The geo-membrane prevents any contamination seeping into underlying geology. Larger spills will be contained in the island drain system. A portable vacuum system provided on the island is available to clean up spillages, limit discharges to the drain system and empty drainage sumps. The island and the standby/supply vessels are equipped with spill control kits to be used to clean up minor spills and prevent them reaching the sea. The spill kits are made ready for use prior to any activity that might result in oil spillage. During hydrocarbon transfer operations from vessels/barges to the island, booms are deployed in the water from either end of the supply vessel side as a precautionary measure to prevent any oil spilled from spreading into open water and to enable speedy recovery. Additionally, the fuel oil transfer piping is contained in a plastic sling. During periods of high spill risk such as flaring operations or when approaching the reservoir, additional specialised offshore boom and recovery equipment will be provided from Agip KCO' s Bautino marine base. In the event of a larger spill to the sea that is, or may become, too big for equipment normally held on the island or LQ, Agip KCO has access to additional equipment retained onshore and by other local oil industry members. In addition, Agip KCO has guaranteed access to the international oil industry owned stockpile (Oil Spill Response/ East Asia Response Limited, Southampton, England), providing additional equipment and specialist oil spill response teams. All this equipment is ready for immediate dispatch and is palleted for air transport. Initial deliveries would be in Kazakhstan within 12 to 16 hours after request. In addition Agip KCO may also request oil industry support from Baku, Azerbaijan, where the local operators maintain a large and well equipped oil spill response base specialising in offshore marine spill response. Agip KCO actions in the event of an oil spill are defined in Agip KCO’s Oil Spill Contingency Plan, [5].
2.15.6
Airborne Emissions RoK has regulations for the maximum permissible concentrations of harmful substances in “work areas”. These include substances typically associated with engine exhausts, such as NO2, NO, CO, H2S, hydrocarbons and elemental sulphur. Throughout the operations, the release of harmful gases to the atmosphere will be minimised and emission levels of engine exhausts will be monitored and maintained within acceptance criteria required to meet these limits. This applies to both island and LQ. Gaseous emissions will principally arise from the operation of stationary equipment. Sample points have been built into the exhausts of the island main generators to facilitate the monitoring process. Portable equipment is used to measure compliance with targets from these and other sources.
2.16
UTILITY SYSTEMS AND PIPING REQUIREMENTS
2.16.1
Diesel Oil Filling and Transfer System
2.16.1.1 Island 3
Bulk diesel is stored in 20 x 60 m steel tanks located in a common bund at the north west edge of the island. Storage is at atmospheric pressure, and the tanks are fitted with a vent line which is monitored for VOC emissions during bunkering operations. Three tanks store untreated diesel, feeding, via an Alfa Laval treatment unit (also within the bund) to the fourth tank containing treated 3 diesel. User supply is from a 10 m day tank mounted above the treated tank, feeding, via gravity, to users e.g. main generators, logging unit, fire pumps, emergency generator and cementing unit. The user supply is via a buried 9 5/8” pipe containing two fuel lines.
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The storage tanks are raised above ground and are located within a bunded area with an impermeable floor. The bund is capable of containing the volume of any one tank and is fitted with a sump to allow for collection of any potentially contaminated water within the bund. The tanks are protected from the sea by the immediately adjacent island wall. Bunkering is from supply vessels which moor alongside the north-west face of the island and connect hoses to the fill lines on the top of the tanks, using transfer pumps on board the supply vessel. It is planned for these bunkering hoses to be contained within U-shaped plastic booms and also for the area to be boomed prior to bunkering start, to contain any spills. Local day tanks are located adjacent to users:
2.16.2
3
•
Emergency generator (3 m ) which is bunded;
•
Air compressor house (20 litres);
•
Cementing unit (800 – 1000 litres) which is bunded;
•
HPP (~120 litres);
•
Batch mixer (~200 litres);
•
Fire pumps;
•
Rig air compressors (150 litres each);
•
Rig day tanks (15 m per rig);
•
Common services day tank (15 m ); and
•
Island vehicles.
3
3
Water Systems Cooling Water A limited quantity of cooling water is required for the main island diesel generators, to supply their closed cooling circuit. This is provided from LQ as required. Each LQ main diesel generator has a self contained, pumped, cooling water system. Seawater There are two seawater intakes, both on the south side of the island. The intakes are attached to the side of the island close to the sheet pile with a special foundation (concrete pads/pit) to avoid mud/silt being sucked in. 3
3
There is storage capacity for 210 m sea water on the island, in three 70 m tanks. These are fed by one of a pair of sea water centrifugal pumps, with the other pump acting as standby. When demand for water is low (e.g. when there is no need for firewater or drilling water), one of two 3 30 m /hour seawater pumps is used to fill the storage tanks via a filter. In times of higher demand, 3 3 one of two 200 m /hour intake pumps is used (unfiltered). The facility exists for the 200 m /hour pumps to bypass the storage tanks and supply drill water directly. The water tanks have low level and high level indicators which are connected to the centrifugal pumps to trigger them to start and 3 stop automatically. It is a requirement that at least 90 minutes of firewater (150 m ) is maintained in the island storage tanks at all times. Consumers are supplied from the sea water storage tank by the different appropriate pumps. The sea water system is used to supply: •
Service water;
•
Drilling water; and
•
Fire fighting water.
Service Water
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Two service water pumps (1 duty, 1 standby) provide water to the draw-works cooling system, feed 3 the washing stations, the cement pumping unit, mud logging unit etc. at a flow rate of 30 m /h. The circuit is pressurised (3.5 bar). Permanent flow is not required. Drilling Water The mud system is supplied with water for water base mud fabrication and to make up losses in 3 circulation, etc. via one centrifugal pump. A supply of 100 m /h is required during the 8.5” drilling. 2.16.3
Rig Air System Each rig has two dedicated compressors for cuttings transfer and has two compressors for utility air. The utility air system is equipped with driers. There are two dedicated compressors for cuttings transfer within the common area. The systems supplies filtered air to such users and services as: •
BOP control (rig utility air);
•
Draw-works emergency bottle (rig utility air); and
•
Barites silos (at 40 psi) (common area utility air).
There are 3 compressors (8 bar) located in a container to the north of the island, adjacent to the 3 diesel generators. The maximum flow rate from each compressor is 5.5 m /min. The facility also exists to supply air to the generators and auxiliary connections. 2.17
COMMON SYSTEMS These systems are designed to service both of the drill rigs The tanks listed in Table 2.5, associated with operation of the rig, are constructed to both Kazakh and international standards. They are all set on plain foundations within bunded areas.
2.17.1
Mud Mixing System The active and reserve mud tank systems are capable of mixing, storing, cleaning and pumping weighted to 16 ppg (2.0 sg). All tanks have paddle agitators to maintain such a mud in suspension. The layout of the tanks is such that tripping hazards are avoided. All tanks are provided with suction lines in sumps that permit the complete emptying of tanks. Any external dump valves are secured closed in a ‘fail safe’ manner to prevent accidental spillage. 3
The active 400 m mud mixing and storage system incorporates the following basic functions: •
Mixing all the various OBM I WBM I Brine fluid systems;
•
Mixing any specialty fluids as required;
•
Mixing pills, sweeps and other small volume fluids;
•
Provide reserve mud storage for ORM / WBM systems;
•
Provide contingency storage for non-disposable displacement fluids; and
•
Provide high functionality manifold system for shipping I receiving the various fluids between as many individual pits and tanks as practical, i.e. rig-to rig, rig-to-plant, plant-to-barge, plant-to cementers.
The reserve mud mixing system provides a backup to the active mud mixing system and enables the use of the Bautino base to fill any shortfalls in either delivered new mud or reconditioned used mud. A loading station, complete with 2”, 4”, 5” and 6”lines / hoses is used to carryout the material transfer operations. The reserve/storage tank system has the capability of holding two (2) maximum hole volumes and may be arranged such that two different types of fluid may be stored at any one time. The system enables the addition of the required mud chemicals to the base drilling fluid in the mud tanks. Dry chemicals are supplied either via the bulk transfer system or manually via ‘sack and hopper’ method. Liquid mud additives shall be handled by chemical tote tanks.
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Fluid mixing and transfer, is achieved using three mud mix/transfer centrifugal pumps connected to the system. A manifold enables flexibility in the choice of supplying and receiving tanks / pits. A mud fume extraction system is provided over the shakers; the extracted fumes are filtered, condensed and exhausted to a safe area. Discharge manifolds allow for the discharge of any tank to be directed to the mixing hoppers to enable mixing on reserve and active systems simultaneously. It is possible to empty all the mud tanks by pumping fluids back to the mud storage system. Table 2.5 : Main Island Storage Tanks Content
3
3)
Capacity (m )
Number
Total Capacity (m
4 x 60
5
1200
21 days rig autonomy
70
3
210
Minimum of 150m held at any time
-
-
-
78 + 91
2
169
Drilling Mud
86 + 65 + 71 + 71 + 71
5
364
Barites Silos
75 tonnes
4
300 tonnes
Diesel Fuel
Notes
1 x 10 Sea Water Drilling Water Base Oil
2.17.2
3
As sea water Plus 3 iso tanks
Barite Storage The island has a storage capacity of 1,000 tonnes of barite. A pneumatic (90 psi), pressurized bulk storage and transfer system is used to transport the Barite around the island. A dust collection and recycling system is incorporated into the pneumatic conveying system. Bulk barite / bentonite is supplied either by, 1.5 tonnes “Big Bags”, delivered by supply boat or, bulk barge, with product pneumatically conveyed. The bulk product manifold allows for simultaneous filling of part of the silos (from either the quayside or from the bulking unit) and delivery of barite to the mixing system surge tanks and Hi-Rate mixers. The bulk silos and surge tanks are fitted with a load measurement system, with information fed to a common panel, local to control of the system.
2.17.3
Bulk Storage Storage is provided for the following: •
Base Oil (BO): BO storage tanks are in a non-winterised area. The system includes transfer manifold with pump from / to storage, mixing plant tanks, cement unit, shaker area, both rig mud tanks, and quaysides loading stations (supply vessels, barge transfer BO from onshore base to rig and return of base oil to onshore base).
•
Oil Based Mud (OBM): OBM tanks are in non-winterised area. The system includes transfer manifold with pump from / to storage, mixing plant tanks, cement unit, both rig mud tanks, and quaysides loading stations (supply vessels, barge transfer OBM from onshore base to rig and return of mud for treatment onshore).
•
Brine: Brine tanks are in a winterised area. The system is independent of the OBM system and is equipped with a dedicated transfer pump and transfer manifold to transfer brine to / from storage.
•
Industrial/Sea/Wastewater: Tanks are in a winterised area.
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Drum and Sack Storage A dedicated dry powder and drum store is used to store mud chemical sacks. All chemicals are stored on pallets. Liquid material are stored in bunded areas, with provision to hold 110% of the volume of the largest container within.
2.17.5
Island Paint Store Paint and its solvents are stored in a dedicated storage area at the mechanic’s workshop on the west corner of the island. Minimal quantities only are required for the support of the operations, and all are kept in sealed air-tight containers except when in use.
2.17.6
Island Explosives and Radioactive materials store A dedicated fenced off area is located on the south east corner of D-Island. Warning signs are posted around the area and any explosive and radioactive materials are stored in dedicated storage bunkers in compliance with R.o.K legislation requirements.
2.18
EMERGENCY EVACUATION AND RESCUE Further details are presented in Part 5 of the HSE case on the command and control system in place for Emergency Response.
2.19
PERSONNEL SAFETY AND HEALTH
2.19.1
Safety Showers and Eyewash Stations Free standing, self-contained safety showers and free standing, self-contained eyewash stations are provided, suitably protected for service in outdoors location in low temperature environment, or indoors as appropriate. The showers are connected to a dedicated tank for holding potable water. Eyewash is supplied through potable water eyewash bottles. They are located close to areas where hazardous substances are handled and / or stored, and at other locations where accidental spillage of drilling fluids or chemicals could occur (e.g. chemical store, battery room, all mud mixing area, drill floor, shakers, monkey board etc).
2.19.2
Personal Protective Equipment All personnel on the island, including visitors, are required to wear the following equipment: •
Fire resistant coveralls;
•
Safety glasses;
•
Safety Helmet; and
•
Safety Boots.
In addition, 22 minute H2S BA sets are provided for Escape and Evacuation for all personnel. The BA sets are rated for 20,000 ppm H2S. Ear protection is required in specific marked areas where there is a high noise level. Fireman suits and other specialist fire fighting equipment are used by personnel assigned to fire fighting duties. Additional Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for particular tasks is to be worn if specified in the Procedure or Job Safety Analysis (as per Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure) for the work, or if required by a Permit to Work. 2.20
SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED AS HSE CRITICAL Certain systems and equipment on the installation have been designated as HSE Critical. These are those systems and equipment that may contribute to or may have a role in preventing or mitigating any major accident. The systems and equipment assessed as HSE Critical for the installation are listed in Table 2.4 below. For ease of reference, HSE Critical systems and equipment have been divided into a set of main subject areas. A description of each HSE critical system and equipment is contained in the referenced section of this Part of the HSE Case.
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SHAPAGAT LIVING QUARTERS (LQ/TR) BARGE The Shapagat [12] (see Figure 2.21) is a self contained unit which is connected by a covered walkway to the island and is designed for a maximum capacity of 120 operating persons. The accommodation consists of 6 one-person cabins and 57 two-person cabins. The Command and Control centre is located on Shapagat. The Shapagat is located at the south side of the Drilling Island as far as practically possible from the well centre, to separate these facilities from the principal hydrocarbon hazard of a shallow gas blowout. Access between the island and the LQ is via a single bridge, which also carries communications links. Designated escape routes enable personnel to traverse from the drill floor and other areas of the island to the TR inside LQ, via the bridge. The Shapagat is equipped with generators, sewage treatment systems, fresh water generating systems and incinerators. Offices, Radio Room, Mess Room, Galley and recreation facilities are situated on the main deck. The TR (Temporary Refuge) is also located on the main deck and contains muster stations, Radio Room and Medical Rooms. The operational capacity between resupply is at least 21 days. Furthermore the barge is equipped with marine equipment as follows: •
Ballast systems;
•
Bilge system;
•
Fresh water cooling system;
•
Sewage System;
•
Fire water pump system;
•
Helicopter platform;
•
Bottom jetting system;
•
Various tanks;
•
Anchoring system;
•
Towing system;
•
Navigation lights;
•
Safety equipment; and
•
Gangway and railings;
The Shapagat is also equipped with a crane on the aft deck and has space to store additional reefer containers with power connections. 2.21.1
Shapagat Particulars The overall design parameters of the Shapagat are: Length over all Length moulded Breadth over all Breadth moulded Depth moulded Scantling draft Design draft Light draft Displacement on design draft Displacement on light draft Main generators
: 95.10 m : 95.00 m : 16.44 m : 16.40 m : 6.39 m : 6.00 m : 3.60 m : 1.75 m 3 : 5430 m 3 : 2495 m : 2 Caterpillar 3516B 400/230V 60 Hz TN-S 1285 eKW
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Emergency generator Class Build
: 1 Caterpillar 3412C 400/230V 60 Hz TN-S 480 eKW : Russian Maritime Register of Shipping: Kazakhstan Flag : Living quarters; Pharmadule Emtunga at Vara Sweden : Barge; Bruces shipyard at Landskrona Sweden : 9277591 : 120 beds, designed for 21 days endurance. 3 3 : 130 m (raw): 122 m (cleaned) 3 : 378 m 3 : 6000 m 3 :7m 3 : 14 m 3 : 103 m
IMO numbers Capacities Fuel oil (MDO) Fresh water (3 tanks) Ballast water (11 tanks) Hazardous drain Bilge water tank Waste water 2.21.2
Power systems Shapagat ac power is generated by two main 60Hz generator sets each capable of a continuous maximum power supply of 1285kVA. Generation capacity is equivalent to 110% minimum of the assessed peak accommodation load. The generators are situated on the lower deck.
2.21.3
Emergency Power The LQ is fitted with an emergency generator (480kVA) which auto starts on main power failure supplying the following: •
Area lighting;
•
Emergency lighting systems; and
•
Air compressor unit.
The generator is situated on the lower deck in a separate room to the main generators and is also capable of functioning as a black start machine. Shapagat is also equipped with battery UPS for:
2.21.4
•
Telecoms;
•
Fire and gas system; and
•
Self contained battery backed emergency.
Escape Lighting Shapagat has a battery-backed escape lighting which gives sufficient illumination, at all times, to escape routes, internal and external exits, sleeping cabins, ladders, walkways, TR, muster points and escape craft embarkation points, to allow the safe movement of personnel for muster and evacuation. Battery duration for all emergency lighting systems is 2 hours.
2.21.5
CCTV The 3 island cameras, one on each drill floor and one in the wellhead area, connects to the Shapagat CCTV system, which is monitored in the radio room on the LQ. The Shapagat’s CCTV system provides monitoring of the embarkation/disembarkation areas and also 360° coverage around the barge.
2.21.6
F&G detection system The Shapagat has a comprehensive, self contained fire and gas detection system which interfaces with that of the island. The vessel is divided into a number of discrete fire zones to enable fast response. Key equipment includes: •
Smoke detectors provided in all areas, rooms and voids, with heat detection in enclosed areas;
•
Detectors for combustible and toxic gases at accommodation HVAC inlets; and
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A fire and gas panel with UPS.
Active Fire Fighting Shapagat is fitted with a two main fire pumps (one duty, one standby) and an emergency fire pump, all diesel driven supplying fire hydrants and hoses located throughout the barge together with foam monitors e.g. at helideck. Additional fire protection is provided for generator rooms and the galley extraction hood. Portable fire extinguishers are provided according to the requirements of SOLAS and the MODU code.
2.21.8
Passive fire protection system All external walls of the TR are A60 rated and additional heat shielding is provided on the bridge and on the walkway from the bridge to the TR.
2.21.9
Helideck The helideck is located above the barge and is designed in accordance with the requirements of CAP 437, and certified for 9.2 tonnes weight limit (a Super Puma A5332L2 class helicopter). The helideck is provided with all necessary lighting, netting, chocks, non-slip surface, wind sock, and fire fighting equipment. A transit lounge is provided local to the helideck and is accessed by crossing from the TR door under the helideck to the Heli-lounge door some 10m away.
2.21.10
Temporary Refuge (TR) The Temporary Refuge (TR) is a protected space, within the Living Quarters, where personnel can safely muster whilst investigation, emergency response and evacuation pre-planning are undertaken. The TR provides a protected space to muster the entire POB and is capable of providing protection against expected blast overpressure, and will withstand thermal radiation from fire for 120 minutes. The TR is capable of providing protection from toxic gas by providing a cascade breathing air system. Confirmed gas detection in the Shapagat HVAC inlet will institute alarms and shutdown the TR fan and close the dampers. The TR is fully supported with medical and command support functions. If the TR within the Shapagat is compromised (e.g. by an internal event), an alternative muster area is provided in the winterisation shelter on the Island. If evacuation is required from this area, a portable satellite phone will be taken there to provide external communications. Due to the potential for high levels of H2S during an incident, a self contained breathing air system is provided within the TR, consisting of two separate banks of bottle racks supplying 14 breathing stations (capacity 10 persons/station) and two bottle filling stations. The system is designed for two hour usage by 120 people.
2.21.11
Shapagat Sanitation and Drains On the LQ drain lines connect to the top of the hazardous drains tank situated on the bottom deck: •
Diesel filling stations on the main deck (port and starboard sides combined);
•
Helideck (normal discharge is overboard, with manual switching in case of oil or fuel spill on helideck;
•
Diesel storage and filling;
•
Bilge water system; and
•
Bilge water separator.
A further line from the bilge water separator joins the suction side of the hazardous drain pump which discharges to either port or starboard connections. The liquid wastes comprise grey water, black water, kitchen and laundry residue, and hazardous drain water. Effluent to be discharged will comply with RoK regulations and standards. Grey and black water together pass through a biological water treatment unit followed by a filter press. Solids
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from the filter are disposed of in the incinerator. Liquids pass to a water collector from where they are treated by active charcoal and re-used in the sanitary system. All other island wastes are collected in skips for shipment to Bautino, or transferred to the incinerator on Shapagat. Non-combustible wastes are compacted, for which operation 2 compactors are provided on Shapagat. Wastes are segregated where required e.g. potentially hazardous waste. No solid wastes are discharged to the environment. 2.21.12
Diesel systems The diesel system consists of the following components: •
Filling stations on the main deck connected to two main diesel oil (MDO) storage tanks in the hull. The storage tanks are gravity filled under manual control based on level indication on the storage tanks.
•
The transfer system where diesel is pumped from the storage tanks to the following day tanks: •
Two MDO day tanks;
•
One emergency generator day tank;
•
One boiler day tank;
•
Two fire pump day tanks; and
•
One emergency fire pump day tanks.
Fuel is pumped from the storage tanks to the MDO day tanks by control panel operation, controlled by level indication in the day tanks. Monitoring of the level in the day tanks is a 24 hour operation. There is also the facility to return diesel to the filling stations if required. The emergency generator, boiler and fire pump day tanks are manually filled by pump and valve operation. •
The fuel purification system which cleans the oil from the storage tanks to ensure that it is of the quality required by the consumers.
Diesel consumers (supplied from the day tanks) are: •
Three diesel generators;
•
Three fire pumps; and
•
One boiler.
All tanks are bunded and any spillages are passed to the hazardous drains system for treatment and disposal. 2.21.13
Seawater system Seawater is taken from the sea chests for distribution to fire-water, equipment cooling and the potable water system.
2.21.14
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System There are two HVAC systems onboard LQB; barge and LQ. Each system maintains a 50 mbar differential between internal areas and the ambient air. Fire and gas dampers are provided at all HVAC penetrations and intakes/outlets, closing automatically on a fire and gas signal, on failure of the incorporated thermal device or manually (from pushbuttons in the TR). All dampers fail closed with the exception of the air supply to the fire pump.
2.21.15
Potable Water System 3
Shapagat is fitted with a reverse osmosis unit designed to desalinate 1.45 m /hr seawater, feeding to three potable water storage tanks. A minimum stock of 21 days consumption is held. There are no water making facilities on the island.
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Ballast System There are two ballast pumps taking from two sea chests (port/starboard) distributing to eleven ballast tanks.
2.21.17
Breathing Air Breathing air is supplied for personnel for a minimum of 2 hours through a cascade systems located within the muster areas. The LQ BA compressor can be used to fill island BA racks and SCBA bottles if necessary.
2.22
KARLYGASH LQ/TR BARGE The Karlygash [17] is a self contained unit which is connected by a covered walkway to the island and is designed for a maximum capacity of 180 operating persons. The accommodation consists of 6 one-person cabins and 87 two-person cabins. The Karlygash is located at the south side of the Drilling Island as far as practically possible from the well centre, to separate these facilities from the principal hydrocarbon hazard of a shallow gas blowout. Access between the island and the LQ is via a single bridge, which also carries communications links. Designated escape routes enable personnel to traverse from the drill floor and other areas of the island to the TR via the bridge. The whole of the accommodation has an A60 fire rating and is gas tight to form the TR. This ensures essential services equipment such as main or emergency power, HVAC, F&G, PAGA and associated UPSs are protected for the TR endurance period of 120 minutes, with blast overpressure withstand of 100 mbar. The Karlygash is equipped with generators, sewage treatment systems, fresh water generating systems and incinerators. Offices, Radio Room, Mess Room, Galley and recreation facilities are situated on the main deck. The operational capacity between resupply is at least 21 days. Furthermore the barge is equipped with marine equipment as follows: •
Ballast systems;
•
Bilge system;
•
Fresh water cooling system;
•
Sewage System;
•
Fire water pump system;
•
Helicopter platform;
•
Bottom jetting system;
•
Various tanks;
•
Anchoring system;
•
Towing system;
•
Navigation lights;
•
Safety equipment; and
•
Gangway and railings;
The Karlygash is also equipped with a crane on the starboard side of the barge fore end. 2.22.1
Karlygash Particulars The overall design parameters of the Karlygash are: Length overall
95.10 m
Length mld
95.00 m
Breadth overall (without removable walkway)
16.44 m
Breadth mld
16.40 m
Depth mld. to main deck
6.39 m
Scantling draft
6.00 m
Design draft
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Minimum draft (without storage, water, fuel, sewage and dry systems)
2.22.2
1.75 m
Main generators:
2 off normal power Generators make Caterpillar, 400/230V 60Hz TN-S.
Emergency generator
Generator make Caterpillar, 400/230V 60Hz TN-S.
Class:
Russian Maritime Register of Shipping Kazakhstan Flag
Power systems Karlygash ac power is generated by two main 60Hz generator sets each capable of a continuous maximum power supply. Generation capacity is equivalent to 110% minimum of the assessed peak accommodation load. The generators are situated on the lower deck.
2.22.3
Emergency Power The LQ is fitted with an emergency generator which auto starts on main power failure supplying the following: •
Area lighting;
•
Emergency lighting systems;
•
LQ/TR area central air conditioning systems;
•
Re-circulating units for essential area (designed Muster area);
•
LQ/TR and utilities air locks supply;
•
A stored air system with air compressors which will supply air to air locks; and
•
CO2 scrubbing system.
The generator is situated in a separate room to the main generators and is also capable of functioning as a black start machine. Karlygash is also equipped with a UPS system sized for a minimum of two hours of operation for:
2.22.4
•
Telecoms;
•
Fire and gas system;
•
The re-circulation system for essential areas (designated Muster Area); and
•
Emergency lighting.
Escape Lighting Karlygash has a battery-backed escape lighting which gives sufficient illumination, at all times, to escape routes, internal and external exits, sleeping cabins, ladders, walkways, TR, muster points and escape craft embarkation points, to allow the safe movement of personnel for muster and evacuation. Battery duration for all emergency lighting systems is 2 hours.
2.22.5
CCTV The Karlygash CCTV system provides monitoring of the embarkation/disembarkation areas, ice conditions and also 360° coverage around the barge. Two additional cameras enable monitoring of Rig/Island locations. The CCTV has 1 hour emergency back up time.
2.22.6
F&G detection system The Karlygash has a comprehensive, self contained fire and gas detection system which interfaces with that of the island. The vessel is divided into a number of discrete fire zones to enable fast response. Key equipment includes: •
Optical smoke detectors provided in all areas, rooms and voids, with heat detection installed in the galley;
•
Technical rooms within the LQ will be equipped with high sensitive smoke detection apparatus system utilizing air sampling for early detection;
•
Detectors for combustible and toxic gases (H2S) at accommodation HVAC inlets; and D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
• 2.22.7
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 64 of 310
A fire and gas panel with UPS.
Active Fire Fighting Karlygash is fitted with a two main fire pumps (one duty, one standby) and an emergency fire pump, all diesel driven supplying fire hydrants and hoses located throughout the barge together with foam monitors e.g. at helideck. Additional fire protection is provided for generator rooms and the galley extraction hood. Portable fire extinguishers are provided according to the requirements of NFPA, SOLAS, the Classification Society and RoK authorities. The fire extinguishing installed is as follows:
2.22.8
•
Diesel generator room: Seawater from fire main Portable fire extinguishers
CO2 fire fighting system
•
Pump room: Portable fire extinguishers
Sea water from fire main
•
Emergency Generator Room: Portable fire extinguishers
CO2 fire fighting system
•
Living Quarter: Portable fire extinguishers
Seawater from fire main
•
Helideck
Seawater from fire main
•
Switch Gear
Room Portable CO2 fire extinguishers
Passive fire protection system All external walls of the TR are A60 rated and additional heat shielding is provided on the bridge and on the walkway from the bridge to the TR.
2.22.9
Helideck The helideck is located above the barge and is designed in accordance with the requirements of CAP 437, and certified for 9.3 tonnes weight limit (a AS33212 class helicopter). The helideck is provided with all necessary lighting, netting, chocks, non-slip surface, wind sock, and fire fighting equipment. The system meets the UPS requirement in the MODU standard (18 hr). The helideck is not used due to approach angles not being attained due to the proximity of the Shapagat LQ/ TR barge.
2.22.10
Temporary Refuge (TR) The Living Quarters forms the Temporary Refuge (TR). Under emergency operational conditions the TR will accommodate 180 personnel for a minimum of two hours of operation. The TR has an A60 fire rated enclosure and is gas tight with 4 airlocks at the main external entrances to the TR. The airlocks are ventilated by the main HVAC system and positively pressurized to 50 mbar . On confirmed fire and gas detection magnetic door latches release and allow the door to shut. Executive actions automatically initiated by the fire & gas system will trip the HVAC systems, including closing of ventilation dampers and release of magnetic door latches. The TR is fully supported with medical and command support functions. If the TR within the Karlygash is compromised (e.g. by an internal event), an alternative muster area is provided on the island. If evacuation is required from this area, a portable satellite phone will be taken to the muster point to provide external communications. A duplicate system for pressurization of the LQ/TR with automatic switchover to stand-by units is provided. Under emergency conditions the pressurization of the essential area shall be maintained by use of the stored air system
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
2.22.11
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 65 of 310
Diesel systems The marine diesel oil system, (MDO), consists of one MDO storage tank, filling line from main deck, transfer system to main diesel generators, fire pumps, emergency diesel generator and filling station for external lifeboats. The diesel oil system is designed for use of ”arctic MDO” Low wax content. A diesel centrifuge and filtration system shall clean and transfer diesel from the raw to the clean storage tanks.
2.22.12
Seawater system Seawater is taken from the sea chests for distribution to fire-water, equipment cooling and the potable water system.
2.22.13
Liquid Waste Management System The Karlygash liquid waste management system is illustrated in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8 : Karlygash Liquid Waste Management System 2.22.14
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System A duplicated system for pressurization of the LQ/TR with automatic switchover to stand-by units is provided. Each system maintains a 50 mbar differential between internal areas and the ambient air. Fire and gas dampers are provided at all HVAC penetrations and intakes/outlets, closing automatically on a fire and gas signal, on failure of the incorporated thermal device or manually (from pushbuttons in the TR). All dampers fail closed with the exception of the air supply to the fire pump.
2.22.15
Potable Water System Karlygash is fitted with a potable water system designed to produce a minimum of 290 litres per person per day. A minimum stock of 21 days consumption is held. There are no water making facilities on the island.
2.22.16
Breathing Air The Karlygash is equipped with a compressed air bottle storage and hard pipe breathing air distribution system. Air is supplied to the system at 300 barg from cylinder storage banks within the TR. The system is also capable of providing TR pressurisation for a minimum of 2-hours at a constant demand in addition to the following services: •
Providing breathing quality air to the whole TR for 2-hours; D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
2.22.17
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 66 of 310
•
Providing over pressure to TR of 50 mbar;
•
Providing over pressure to air locks (4-off) to 40 mbar;
•
Providing required air changes to purge airlocks; and
•
Providing breathing quality air supply to externally mounted cascade panels (for portable bottle recharge and personnel plug-in breathing air umbilicals).
Medical Facilities - Hospital The Hospital consists of a two-bed ward, isolation ward, consultation area, shower/toilet room and connecting medics cabin with vision panel in partition with ward. The isolation ward is located so that it provides direct access to an outside area to allow a stretcher and 2 attendants to manoeuvre and transfer an injured or sick person to the helideck or support craft. The facilities include:
2.22.18
•
Full length examination couch, on rubber wheels, provided with brakes;
•
Examination chair;
•
Base unit with sink and double drainer. Elbow action taps;
•
Defibrillator;
•
Airway management system including face mask, ventilation bag and oxygen supply;
•
Pharmacy refrigerator;
•
Stretcher suitable for winching;
•
Collapsible stretcher;
•
Two hospital beds accessible from three sides with sufficient space on one side to allow transfer of patient from stretcher to bed; and
•
Wheel chair.
Telecommunications The Karlygash barge has a Radio Operator Room (ROR) (which can also to be used as the local incident command centre) and Telecom Equipment room (TER). The TER will house all Central telecom and IT equipment unless stated otherwise. A dedicated climate control system is installed o for the TER, capable of maintaining a temperature of 21 C during normal operation. All telecoms systems have a 3 hour autonomy time, except for SOLAS communications, which have 24 hour autonomy time and the NAVAIDS, which have a 96 hours back up time. The following equipment is installed: •
VSAT satellite system;
•
PABX telephone system;
•
LAN and telephone cabling;
•
Two marine band VHF radios, one fitted and one complete spare stored;
•
Four portable marine band VHF radios;
•
Two marine Single Side Band (SSB) radios, one fitted and one complete spare stored;
•
Two aviation band VHF radios, one fitted and one complete spare stored; and
•
Four portable aviation band VHF radios, these units to be provided with headsets and microphones for hands free transmission.
The TR telecomm room is wired for LAN and Telephone cabling and is connected to D-Island and LQ’s systems.
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
2.22.19
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 67 of 310
Public Address and General Alarm System A Public Address System with coverage of the entire TR Barge is fitted. The system has high survivability and high availability. Duplicate A and B system in accordance with offshore industry practice are provided. The system is interfaced with the digital PA amplifier system located on the LQ barge in such a way that announcements made from this location can be heard in the TR barge and vice versa. There are three live voice input/control positions into the system:
2.23
•
The OIM;
•
ROR; and
•
Muster point.
ICE BREAKING EMERGENCY EVACUATION VESSEL (IBEEV) The IBEEV is a marine vessel who’s primary purpose is to be used in an emergency evacuation situation (see Figure 2.26 and Figure 2.27). It is not normally manned, nor does it have facilities for crew to stay onboard. The IBEEV is an independent sea-going vessel and is operationally capable of evacuating in the ice conditions experienced in the region. IBEEV will always be supported by an IBSV in achieving this evacuation. The range of IBEEV is limited to a single voyage from DIsland to a safe haven, in times of emergency, it is planned that the IBEEV will be escorted by a dedicated standby vessel. In order to be able to operate in a hydrocarbon/toxic environment, the vessel can be completely closed to the outside atmosphere. The diesel engines driving the electrical generators are provided with stored combustion air to enable operation in this environment. The vessel is equipped with automation and instrumentation for normal duty operations with a crew of two, and a periodically unmanned engine room. The IBEEV has 4 airlocks with the ability to accommodate up to 30 persons per airlock. The IBEEV commonly uses only 3 airlocks in an evacuation scenario. During the ice season the IBSV or icebreaker will maintain managed ice channels for use by the IBEEVs in an emergency. The IBSV will meet the IBEEV(s) at the safe waypoint and escort the IBEEV(s) to shore.
2.23.1
IBEEV Particulars The overall design parameters of the IBEEV are: •
Length overall
: 45.10 m
•
Breadth, moulded (main deck)
: 8.00 m
•
Depth moulded (main deck)
: 3.60 m
•
Depth moulded (upper deck & side)
: 5.80 m
•
Draft, summer
: 2.00 m (maximum)
•
Draft, winter
: 2.10 m (maximum)
•
Classification
: DNV 1A1 ICE-1B DAT(-30C)
•
Vessel Weight Unladen
: 370 tonnes
• Full load Displacement Payload
: 455 tonnes (approx)
•
: 34 tonnes
Evacuees (including crew)
•
Fuel
: 8 tonnes
•
Emergency Combustion Air
: 11 tonnes
•
Freshwater
: 4 tonnes
•
Engine cooling water
: 16 tonnes
• Ice accretion allowance Propulsion (diesel electric)
: 12 tonnes
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
•
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 68 of 310
Diesel Generators
: 2x Caterpillar 800kW each
• Propulsion units Tank Capacities
: 2x Schottel azimuthal Z-drive
•
Fuel oil
: 9.5 m
3
•
Potable water
: 4.2 m
3
•
Water ballast/auxiliary cooling water
: 25 m
3
• Sewage/grey water holding tanks Complement
: 1.0 m
3
•
:2
Crew
•
Evacuees (seated)
: 328
•
Evacuees (on litters)
: 10
Performance •
Open water, free running speed=11knots (non ice conditions).
Vessel is intended for operation in the following environmental conditions:
2.23.2
•
Air temperatures ranging from -35° C to +45° C;
•
Seawater temperatures from 0° C to 32° C;
•
Level first year sea ice of up to 0.60 m; and
•
Water density 1.01 tonnes/m
3.
Power distribution systems Two main 400 V switchboards each feeding: •
One propulsion system;
•
400 V distribution panels;
•
Ship' s service transformers;
•
Larger individual loads; and
•
Port main switchboard designated as master.
Two main 230 V distribution boards feed individual loads and the 24v DC battery system 2.23.3
Combustion air System In the event of an emergency evacuation in a toxic/hydrocarbon gas cloud, the vessel is sealed and the air required for combustion is supplied from HP air cylinders. The system consists of 8 cylinders per machinery space with a system operating pressure of 350 bar.
2.23.4
Emergency Breathing air system In the event of an emergency evacuation, personnel enter the vessel through one of 4 designated airlocks. Once seated, personnel put on mouth pieces and nose clips (fitted under each seat). The mouth pieces will adsorb CO2 from exhaled air. The compartment Supervisor will monitor the CO2 and O2 levels in each compartment. The O2 level will be maintained within acceptable levels by manually deploying self-contained oxygen generators (oxygen candles). Each generator is capable of supplying 2600 litres of oxygen over a 75 minute period. The system is designed to provide the IBEEV' s full complement with breathing air for a 6 hour duration.
2.23.5
Active Fire Fighting Two independent general service pumps provide sea water to hydrants located in machinery spaces and evacuee compartments. A drenching system using fixed nozzles is used in both machinery spaces. Sea water is supplied from the general service pumps. The system is capable of local start from ER and remote start from the wheelhouse. Portable fire extinguishers are located in the machinery and evacuee spaces to enable local firefighting.
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
2.23.6
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 69 of 310
Passive fire protection system All interior bulkheads and deckheads from the upper deck to the waterline is fitted with A60 insulation. Additionally each evacuee space is insulated from the machinery space below and each machinery space is insulated from the adjacent space by A60 insulation on the transverse bulkheads.
2.23.7
Diesel Engine Exhaust Cooling system To minimise the risk of high temperature exhaust gases igniting an external hydrocarbon/toxic gas o cloud, the diesel engine exhaust are water cooled to ensure the exhaust gases are 150°C Engine & turbine exhaust systems Steam piping Hot Fluids Temperatures 100-150 °C Temperatures >150 °C Cold Surfaces Process piping -25 to -80°C Piping equipment < -80°C
H-16.03 H-16.04 H-16.05 H-17 H-17.01 H-17.02 H-17.03 H-17.04 H-18 H-18.01 H-18.02 H-18.03 H-19 H-19.01 H-19.02 H-19.03 H-19.04 H-19.05 H-19.06 H-20 H-20.01 H-20.02 H-20.03 H-20.04 H-20.05 H-20.06 H-20.07 H-20.08 H-20.09 H-20.10 H-21 H-21.01 H-21.02 H-21.03 H-21.04 H-21.05 H-21.06 H-21.07 H-21.08 H-21.09 H-21.10 H-21.11 H-21.12 H-21.13 H-21.14 H-21.15 H-21.16 H-21.17 H-21.18 H-21.19 H-21.20 H-21.21 H-21.22 H-21.23 H-21.24
Cold Fluids Oceans, seas & lakes < 10°C Open Flame Heaters with fire tube Direct fired furnaces Flares Electricity Voltage > 50 - 600V in cables Voltage > 50- 600V in equipment Voltage > 600V Lightning discharge Electrostatic energy Batteries Stared charge (e.g. capacitors) Electromagnetic Radiation Ultraviolet radiation Infra red radiation (e.g. fired equipment) Microwaves Lasers E/M radiation: high voltage ac cables Ionizing Radiation - Open Source Alpha, Beta - open source Gamma rays - open source Neutron - open source Naturally occurring ionizing radiation /NORM Ionizing Radiation - Closed Source Alpha, Beta - closed source Gamma rays - closed source Neutron - closed source Asphyxiates Insufficient oxygen atmospheres Excessive CO2 Drowning Excessive N2 Halon Smoke Toxic Gas H2S, sour gas Exhaust fumes Nickel Carbonyl SO2 Ammonia Chlorine Welding fumes Tobacco smoke CFCs (Old Freons) HCFCs (New Freons) Toxic Liquid Mercury PCBs Biocides Methanol Brines Glycols Degreasers Isocyanates Sulphanol Amines Corrosion inhibitors Scale inhibitors Liquid mud additives Odorant additives Alcoholic beverages Recreational drugs Used engine oils Carbon tetrachloride Grey and/or black water Poly Aromatic Hydrocarbons Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) BTEX Hexane Furfaral
H-25.11 H-25.12 H-25.13 H-25.14 H-25.15 H-25.16 H-26 H-26.01 H-26.02 H-26.03 H-27 H-27.01 H-27.02 H-27.03 H-27.04 H-27.05 H-28 H-28.01 H-28.02 H-28.03 H-28.04 H-28.05 H-28.06 H-29 H-29.01
Catalysts (spent) Corrosive Substances Hydroflouric acid Hydrochloric acid Sulphuric acid Caustic soda Spent caustic Biological Hazards Poisonous plants Large animals Small animals Food borne bacteria Water borne bacteria (e.g. Legionella) Parasitic insects Disease transmitting insects Cold & flu virus HIV Other communicable diseases Ergonomic Hazards Manual materials handling Damaging noise Loud, steady noises >85dBA Heat stress Cold stress High humidity Vibration Work stations Lighting Incompatible hand controls Awkward location of workplaces and machinery Mismatch of work to physical abilities Mismatch of work to cognitive abilities Long & irregular working hours/ shifts Poor organization and job design Work planning issues Indoor climate Psychological Hazards Living on the job/away from family Working and living on a live plant Post traumatic stress Security Related Hazards Piracy Assault Sabotage Crisis Theft, pilferage Use of Natural Resources Land take Surface/Ground Water Air Trees, vegetation Gravel Habitat and Wildlife Medical Medical unfitness
H-21.25
MEK
H-29.02
Motion sickness
H-30 H-30.01
Dangerous Goods Dangerous goods in transport activities
H-06.01,2 H-06.03 H-06.04 H-06.05 H-06.06 H-07 H-07.01 H-07.02 H-08 H-08.01 H-08.02 H-08.03 H-08.04 H-08.05 H-08.06 H-08.07 H-08.08 H-09 H-09.01 H-09.02 H-09.03 H-10 H-10.01 H-10.02 H-10.03 H-10.04 H-11 H-11.01 H-11.02 H-12 H-12.01 H-12.02
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
H-22.14 H-22.15 H-22.16 H-23 H-23.01 H-23.02 H-23.03 H-23.04 H-23.05 H-24 H-24.01 H-24.02 H-24.03 H-24.04 H-24.05 H-24.06 H-24.07 H-24.08 H-24.09 H-24.10 H-25 H-25.01 H-25.02 H-25.02 H-25.03 H-25.04 H-25.05 H-25.06 H-25.07 H-25.08 H-25.09 H-25.10
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 193 of 310
Appendix B Hazard and Effect Register
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 194 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
A
E
R
-
-
-
-
5B
5A
5B
-
-
> Ignited blowout
5B
> Impact on A-Island, unignited release on DIsland
> Unignited release – Injury to personnel/adverse impact on drilling programme
Hydrocarbons
H-01.01
Crude Oil under Pressure
None Identified
-
-
-
H-01.02
Hydrocarbons including H2S
> Wellbore, Wellheads (Kick)
> Kick during CHCD or overbalance drilling
Loss of containment well fluids to surface
> Unignited blowout -
> Kick diverted to panic line
> Drilling into unexpected shallow gas pocket
Loss containment
Risk Controls
P
H-01
> Shallow gas pockets
Risk Potential Prevention Controls
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
-
-
-
5B
Design of well programme and reservoir analysis >Conventional drilling Mud hydrostatic BOP Bullheading procedure > CHCD Drilling Mud hydrostatic in annulus BOP - Rotating Head Conventional BOP Continuous monitoring of annulus pressure and injection of mud > >Real-time monitoring of drilling parameters e.g. mud levels > Well control procedures > Well kill packages / systems / procedures Bullheading > Competency programmes > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks, HSE meetings Suspended well Liner packer integrity testing Secondary packer, squeeze cementing Gas management systems for small kicks Kill and choke manifolds, circulation of mud, panic line, routed to side of island Well integrity management procedures
> 25 - 30 minutes as per study warning of a kick > Drill floor communications > Well control response plan - Defines actions for well control incidents - Level 1, level 2 etc response to the kick, including risk assessment, escalating up to evacuation > All vessel alert system in place > Operations instructions for marine vessels (update and integrate into Marine Manual) > Minimise number of personnel on drill floor > No construction activities on Island > Vessels kept outside of 500 MEZ far as practicable > Cascade breathing air system on drilling rigs > Gas detectors on drill floor > D-Island laid out with LQs / TRs Shapagat and Karlygash are equipped with integral TRs > IBEEVS (2 off) one in reserve, One IBEEV sufficient for all (340) personnel for use in managed ice > D-Island evacuation procedures (regular drills & exercises performed) > during ice escape routes maintained by ice breaking vessel > Fire and emergency response procedures > Spill clean up procedures >Tier 2 and Tier 3 support > Medical facilities >Medevac
See Bowtie H-01.01 Hydrocarbons encountered during – in reservoir drilling
4B
4B
Concurrent operations MOPO
Partial muster to TR Marine vessels leave 500 MEZ
5B
5B
5B
As for unignited release plus: > All equipment is intrinsically safe - zone rated
4B
-
-
-
5A
3A
1A
1A
-
> Communications to A-Island > A-Island ER plan, procedures and equipment
> Seismic surveys of Kashagan field do not indicate presence of shallow gas pockets > Offshore wildcat and appraisal wells have not encountered shallow gas > Real-time monitoring of drilling parameters e.g. mud levels > Well control procedures > Competency programmes > Risk Assessments > The risk of a shallow gas blowout is highest with the slots at either extreme of the template i.e. the first well drilled .After the first well is drilled and the uncertainty of shallow gas is reduced the risk is considered to reduce to A6.
> Minimise number of personnel on drill floor before setting first casing > Gas detectors on drill floor > D-Island laid out with LQs / TRs upwind of drilling facilities > D-Island evacuation procedures (regular drills & exercises performed) > Fire and emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
> First top hole section has been drilled and shallow gas has not been detected >The Diverter will not be used once shallow gas has been determined not to be a credible risk
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
RAP 82 : Update A-island HSE case and ERP to incorporate impact of DIsland incidents on AIsland - Complete
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard Under-balanced Completions – casing qualification
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 195 of 310
Sources > Drill pipe at bottom of hole, pumping fluid to bottom and return to surface, changing oil based mud to Caspian sea water.
Threats
Top Event
> Displacing 1.93 mud to 1.02 Caspian Sea water Under-balanced operation with drill pipe in the well
Loss of Containment
Risk Potential
Consequences > Fluid (hydrocarbons to the surface
Risk Controls
P
A
E
R
5B
3B
3B
4B
> Fatality/injury to personnel
> POOH (pulling out of Hole) > Completion Operations Run Sump Packer (plugged)
Prevention Controls >Well design and casing design and components. >Materials meet QA/QC standards Tested during drilling program BOP > Casing has been proven at this stage > Differential pressure is one third of that during Casing Qualification CHCD equipment is installed > Gauges on pumps > Bursting discs on pump discharges
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls > Close BOP > Procedures for Bullhead back into formation > Circulate kill fluid (ready to be used) > LCM (Loss Control Material) available for injection if required > Scavengers > Design of rig (see normal drilling controls) > EER > PPE > Toxic gas detection > Scavengers
Refer to Document ref: KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001. 000 D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
> Procedures in place to manage influx of > > HC into well (bullheading) > Provision for Circulating heavy mud under controlled conditions > Training and Competency of drill crew
> Set the sump packer with plug above liner
> Well Intervention Engineers (independent) on site during activities as defined in Agip KCO procedures Micromax based Completion Casing Qualification
> Drill pipe at bottom of hole, pumping fluid to bottom and return to surface, changing oil based mud to Caspian sea water.
> 1.92 mud to 1.02 Caspian Sea water the well is now in underbalance.
Loss of Containment
> Fluid (hydrocarbons) to the surface > Fatality/injury to personnel
5B
Caesium Formate Based Completion Casing Qualification
> Drill pipe at bottom of hole, pumping fluid to bottom and return to surface, changing oil based mud to Caspian sea water.
> 1.93 mud to 1.02 Caspian Sea water now Well is now in underbalance.
Loss of containment
> Fluid (hydrocarbons) to the surface
5B
Differential pressures between completion fluid and packer fluid
> Completions operations
> Interface between Mud chemicals and Base oil causing presetting of packer
Pre-setting of Production packer
> Workover > Financial consequence of workover
-
H-01.03
LPGs
> Propane used for welding / cutting > Additional sources may be required for carryover activity
> Overfilling > Dropped cylinder > Overpressuring manifold/cylinder (vent blockage) > External impact regulator knocked off > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse > Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure)
Loss of containment
> Fire/explosion > Missile damage
H-01.04
LNGs
None identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-01.05
Condensate, NGL
Condensates component of well fluids
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-01.06
Hydrocarbon gas
gas component of well fluids
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-01.07
Crude oil at low pressure
None identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-01.08
Wax
None identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3B
3B
5C
3A
1A
3B
3B
-
4B
4B
-
0A
3A
> Well design and casing design and components. > Materials meet QA/QC standards > L.H. positive inflow tested during drilling program > BOP > Procedures in place to manage influx of C into well (bullheading) > Provision for Circulating heavy mud under controlled conditions > Training and Competency of drill crew
> Close BOP > Procedures for Bullhead back into formation > Design of rig (see normal drilling controls) > EER > PPE > Toxic gas detection
> Well design and casing design and components. > Materials meet QA/QC standards Tested during drilling program > BOP > Procedures in place to mange influx of HC into well (bullheading) > Provision for Circulating heavy mud under controlled conditions > Training and Competency of drill crew
> Close BOP > Procedures for Bullhead back into formation > Design of rig (see normal drilling controls) > EER > PPE > Emergency drills > Toxic gas detection
Monitor circulation pressure, Monitor rate of displacement Forecast and monitor differential pressure
>Workover
> LPG cylinders are located remotely from burner and segregated in baskets > Storage and handling procedures > Maintenance schedule for bottled gases all cylinders are certified by a third party and a register of cylinders is maintained > Use of LPG cylinders controlled by PTW system > AKCO standards apply to all contractors > AKCO review contractor procedures > Contractor audits
> Fire and emergency response procedures > Fire fighting equipment > Medical facilities > Medevac
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Refer to Document ref: KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001. 000 D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Refer to Document ref: KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001. 000 D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Refer to Document ref: KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001. 000 D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case -
Hydrocarbons above auto ignition temp
Asphalt
H-02.06
Mineral oil for Oil Based Mud (OBM) (see also H22.08)
H-02.05
Diesel fuel
H-02.03
Aviation fuel, petrol
> Storage tanks > Drilling operations / equipment > Formulation > Hose transfer station
Hydraulic oil
H-02.02
H-02.04
> Vehicles - cranes, forklift > Mobile equipment > Main tank > Small tanks > Boilers > Main power generators > Emergency generator > Fire pump > Cement unit > Filling fuel tanks from boat > Refuelling tanks
Lube and seal oil
H-02.01
None identified
None identified
None identified
> Accumulators (3000 psi) > Koomey units, Hydraulic Power Units (2,000 psi) > Cranes
> Day tanks > Mobile equipment pumps, compressors, engines
Refined Hydrocarbons
None identified
Coal
Sources
H-02
Hazard
H-01.09
Hazard Ref.
Agip KCO
-
-
-
> Equipment failure valve gasket, flange, small bore connections, hose > Mechanical damage > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse > Maintenance activities (filling accumulators)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1C
-
-
-
-
3A
-
-
-
-
A
-
-
-
1C
2A
1C
0C
0C
-
E
Risk Potential
-
-
-
1C
1A
1C
-
-
-
R
Prevention Controls
-
-
-
> Oil based mud tanks are closed > Material specification > Preventative maintenance via AMOS > Storage/handling procedures > Pre-job meeting (Toolbox talk run, JSA, etc)
As for unignited release plus: > Control of ignition sources
> Material specification > Preventative maintenance programmes through AMOS system > Storage/handling procedures > Diesel supplied on skid with spill tray > Diesel storage areas bunded > Drip trays under generators
> PPE, including goggles > Material specification - MSDSs maintained for all materials on-site and also taken to work location > Preventative maintenance of equipment > BOP hydraulic hoses are high pressure rated and flame retardant > Rigid pipe used when possible > Storage/handling procedures > Some HP hydraulic hoses are chained down
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
-
-
-
> Spill clean up procedures > Eye washes, safety showers > Fire and emergency response teams > Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane > Vacuum system for spill cleanup > Fixed foam system on tank
As for unignited release plus: > Mobile fire fighting equipment
> Fixed foam system on tank > PPE > Spill clean up procedures > Eye washes, safety showers > Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane > Fire and emergency response teams > Booms / marine spill response equipment
> Spill clean up procedures > Drains around Koomey unit will contain local spills > Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills > Eye washes, safety showers > Fire and emergency response teams > Mobile fire fighting equipment > Portable fire extinguishers and first aid kits fitted in all vehicles
> Spill clean up procedures > Eye washes, safety showers > Fire and emergency response teams > Mobile fire fighting equipment > Portable fire extinguishers and first aid kits fitted in all vehicles > Bunding/secondary containment at storage > Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills
-
Risk Controls
> PPE, including goggles > Material specification - MSDSs maintained for all materials on-site and also taken to work location > Preventative maintenance of mobile/rotating equipment > Storage/handling procedures
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Spill of materials into environments
2A
Ignited release - fire Loss of containment
1C
Unignited release - contact with skin, dermatitis Environmental effects ground contamination
Loss of containment
Equipment failure mobile equipment, vehicles Mechanical damage Human error misconnection mishandling, misuse Vehicle impact Diesel tank failure (corrosion, mechanical impact, hose failure)
1C
> Unignited release - high pressure release, potential to spray into persons face/eyes, contact with skin, dermatitis > Potential for hose whip leading to serious injury/fatality > Environmental effects ground contamination > Ignited release - jet fire
Loss of containment
> Equipment failure valve gasket, flange, small bore connections, hose > Overpressure > Mechanical damage > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse > Maintenance activities (filling accumulators)
1C
-
P
> Unignited release potential to spray into face/eyes, contact with skin - dermatitis > Environmental effects ground contamination > Ignited release - fire e.g. spray onto hot manifold/hot surface
-
Consequences
Loss of containment
-
Top Event
> Maintenance activities > Equipment failure gasket, flange, small bore connections > Mechanical damage > Human error mishandling, misuse
-
Threats
-
-
Note: No helicopter refuelling on island
Note: For health effects see H22.08
Note: No credible ignition sources
-
-
-
-
Actions/Comments
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 196 of 310
Perforating gun charges
H-04.03
White spirit and other flammable solvents/ chemicals/oil based paints Carryover activities may present additional sources of hazard
-
Conventional explosives
Hydrogen
H-03.05
H-04.02
Dry vegetation
H-03.04
Explosives
Carbon fibre reinforced material
H-03.03
Detonators
Pyrophoric materials
H-03.02
H-04.01
Cellulosic materials
H-03.01
H-04
Other Flammable Materials
Hazard
H-03
Hazard Ref.
Agip KCO
> Damage to equipment > Damage to well bore > Free live gun
> Ignition > Stuck pipe
Explosion
> Stuck gun > Equipment failure > Premature ignition > Lube valve failure (open) > Operational error
> Perforation in wrong place
Explosives
Asset damaged
-
4A
2A
-
-
1B
2B
-
-
-
1A
2B
P
5C
5C
-
-
-
-
1B
2B
-
-
-
2A
2B
A
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0B
E
Risk Potential
1C
1C
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0A
1B
R
Prevention Controls
> Primary barriers still in place, run in at balanced pressure > Firing system locked out until at correct depth key held by JRC (Jet Research Centre) specialist. > Indication that charges have fired (but not all charges).
> Full rehearsal with dummy rig (same length but different weight) > Normal controls for down-hole work are in place
> Access to IBEEV controlled > Dedicated storage on bridge > Trained and competent personnel (IBEEV crew)
> Dedicated storage (locked) > PTW > Trained and competent personnel (specialist service contractor)
-
-
> Small quantities used for rig maintenance activities only > Control of ignition sources - PTW system > Personnel training and competence > Material specification - MSDSs > Storage and handling procedures (paint locker) > Segregated storage for flammable materials
>.Maintenance of UPS systems > No smoking policy
-
-
-
> Equipment specifications e.g. cable specification is for flame retardant material
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
-
> Medical stuff in here
-
-
-
-
>Medical stuff in here
Procedure for fishing for tools if gun gets stuck
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
> PPE > Mobile fire fighting equipment > Fire and emergency response procedures > Fire and emergency response teams > Portable fire extinguishers and first aid kits
>Smoke/fire detectors >Emergency Response Teams >Mobile fire fighting equipment
-
-
-
> Fire and emergency response procedures > Fire and emergency response teams > Mobile fire fighting equipment > Extinguishing systems in switch rooms > Fire detection systems
> Smoke detectors in LQ and offices (addressable) sets off fire alarm and indicates at fire panel > Escape & muster procedures (supported by T-Card system) > Fire and emergency response teams > Mobile fire fighting equipment > Portable fire extinguishers > Smoke hoods in LQ (training provided). > Hose reels on each deck connected up to main ring (independent firewater system for each barge)
Risk Controls
> All hot work performed under PTW > No smoking policy > Designated smoking area on LQ > Waste is segregated (hazardous / nonhazardous waste as per Agip KCO requirements, which are based on RoK requirements)
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Burns
Detonation
> Human error mishandling, misuse
Burns
> Flare guns (IBEEVs)
Detonation
> Human error mishandling, misuse
-
> Prima cords
-
None identified
-
> Localised fire in workshops, stores etc
Ignition
-
>Localised fire in ups system/room
-
-
Ignition
-
-
-
> None identified
See H-04.03
> Maintenance activities (cleaning) > Human error mishandling, misuse
> Aerosol sprays > Cans, bottles
> Refer H-04.03 (Perforating gun charges)
Vent blockage Extract failure
-
-
-
> Fire on Island e.g. pallets, cable fires, store rooms, etc
Ignition
> Electrical fault > Ignition source e.g. solar radiation, discarded cigarettes > Hot work
-
> Fire in LQ (worst case scenario) > Fire in Offices
Consequences
Ignition
Top Event
> Electrical fault > Ignition source e.g. solar radiation, discarded cigarettes > Hot work
Threats
> UPS battery recharging
None Identified
None identified
None Identified
> Combustible waste products (e.g. sacks, pallets, oil filters, paper, etc.) > Cable insulation > LQ furnishings > Galley > Stores, Workshops
Sources
Actions/Comments
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 197 of 310
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
H-04.04
Hazard
Explosive gases
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 198 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
Explosives (Deployment)
>Premature ignition >Electric current >Impact >Fire >Lightning > Dropping > Failure of deployment process leading to retrieval of guns > Working at height – (see section H-06.01)
Ignition
>Injury to personnel >Damage to equipment
None identified
-
-
-
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
P
A
E
R
5A
5A
1A
5A
-
-
-
-
Prevention Controls
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
> Locked away in controlled area > RoK certified storage area > Personnel certified by RoK for explosives handling > Separate transport for primary and secondary explosives > Separate storage for primary and secondary explosives > Guns cannot be fired without both components being in place. > No lifting over explosives or guns > Primary explosives stored in UN certified storage container > Explosives only brought together at final well site > Planning > Detailed procedure and checklist > Dummy run, > Trained and competent personnel > Supervised by TCP and Coiled Tube Supervisors. > PTW. > Lifting equipment certified. > Lifting equipment operated by trained and competent personnel. > Specialised make-up tools for the guns. > Scaffolding erected under Scaf/Tag system; (system type scaffolding; also scaffolding at drill floor and well head). > Working at height fall arrestor. > Tools on lanyards, > All equipment secured whilst on scaffolding. > Well Completion and Intervention Superintendant sign off for AKCO. > Lubricator valve closed - not under pressure
> Emergency Response plan > Medical facilities on island > PPE > First aid kits
-
-
-
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
-05
Pressure Hazards
H-05.01
Hydrocarbons under pressure
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 199 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
> Drilling mud (OBM) in hoses while drilling, making/breaking spool pieces during rig move, and also potentially in blinded hoses for Rig 402 during Rig 402 construction
> Maintenance activities > Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse > Rig move
Loss of containment
> Rupture, violent movement of pipework, hose or equipment
> Pressure testing
> Failure of casing bursting
Damage to formation
> Fracture of formation, loss of hydrostatic head leading to hydrocarbons to surface
Hydraulic hoses
-
-
-
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
P
A
E
R
1A
1A
0A
1A
5A
3B
3B
4B
-
-
-
-
Prevention Controls
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
-
> Equipment design for purpose > Systems pressure tested during commissioning > Preventative maintenance via AMOS system > PTW system for maintenance work in trenches > Hoses are all clamped and secured / located in trenches > Rig move procedure (hose joint make up/break out for mud lines) including pressure testing of all connections
> Fire and emergency response procedures > D-Island evacuation procedures (regular drills & exercises performed) > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
> Gauges on pumps > Bursting discs on pump discharges > Well design and casing design and components. > Materials meet QA/QC standards > Tested during drilling program > BOP > Procedures in place to mange influx of HC into well (bullheading) > Provision for Circulating heavy mud under controlled conditions > Training and Competency of drill crew
> Close BOP > Procedures for Bullhead back into formation > Design of rig (see normal drilling controls) > EER > PPE > Toxic gas detection > 1.5 times active volume of Muds on surface for injection to maintain pressure
-
-
Note: Refer to H-02.02
Refer to Document ref: KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001. 000 D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
H-05.02
Bottled gases under pressure
> Oxygen (doctor) > Air (calibration and breathing air bottles SCBA) > Air system on IBEEV (2 hours - engine), Shapagat/Karlygash 300 Bar air system, > Small aerosol cans > CO2 (portable fire extinguishers) > Nitrogen (Koomey units, pulsation damper on mud pumps) >portable BA systems on D-Island >Welding gases
> Overpressure > Dropped cylinder > Overpressuring manifold/cylinder (vent blockage) > External impact regulator knocked off > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse > Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Refilling of air bottles including cascade system
Loss of control/ uncontrolled release of energy
> Rupture, mechanical damage, missile/ projectile
2A
0A
-
0A
> Preventative maintenance schedule for bottled gases > Bottles are sent off-site for pressure testing by specialist service company > Storage and handling procedures > Design review > Specialist contractor refills air bottles (YKR)
> PPE > Fire and emergency response teams > Mobile fire fighting equipment > Medical facilities > Portable fire extinguishers > First aid kits
-
H-05.03
Water under pressure
> High pressure jet cleaning > Pressure Testing (Hydro testing) > Fire Water system
> Equipment failure (gasket, flange, hose , connection, rotating equipment) > Overpressure > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse > Inadvertent opening of equipment under pressure
Loss of control/ uncontrolled release of energy
> Rupture, violent movement of pipework, hose or projectile (rotating equipment) > Injury caused by HP water jet striking person
3B
-
-
1B
> Hydrotest procedure - gradual build up of pressure (up to 15,000 psi for BOPs) > Pressure rating of HP water pumps/equipment (30,000 psi), Risk assessment > Hydrotests of wellheads are performed by procedure and under PTW > HP hydrotest water pumps PSV on pump discharge
> Area cleared before starting hydrotest > Safety cable installed on HP water line to secure it and prevent movement > PPE > First aid kits > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
H-05.04
Non HC gas under pressure in pipeworks
None identified
>ESD on pump motor (manual activation or automatic on high amps) > Signage posted during hydrotesting > Personnel trained in using HP water guns > Fire teams trained in use of HP fire fighting equipment -
-
-
-
-
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 200 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
Actions/Comments
P
A
E
R
Prevention Controls
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
2A
-
-
-
> Preventative maintenance via AMOS > All equipment and pneumatic lines/hoses secured by straps to prevent movement during use > Pneumatic conveying system designed for duty including erosion and corrosion allowances
> PPE> First aid kits> Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-05.05
Air under high pressure
> Breathable Air Cascade system > Utility/instrument air> Portable air compressors (100 psi) > Air cylinders (120 psi)> Pneumatic equipment> SCBA > Air compressors on rigs (high pressure pneumatic conveying system 120 psi) > Mobile BA air compressor – air loop system
> Flange, small-bore piping, connection failure (corrosion, fatigue, material defect, mechanical failure) > Equipment overpressure (blockage, pressure rating exceeded )> Vehicle, mechanical impact > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse
Uncontrolled release of energy
> Rupture, violent movement of pipework, hose or equipment
H-05.06
Hyperbaric operations
None identified
-
-
-
H-05.07
Decompression
None identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-05.08
Trapped pressure in equipment
> Accumulators > Valves > Transfer lines (when blocked in) > Well control equipment (BOP) - residual pressure > Mud line > Pressurised P-Tanks containing barite/bentonite and loading line
> Maintenance activities > Drilling operations > Overpressure (thermal expansion) > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse, inadvertent opening of equipment under pressure
Uncontrolled release of energy
> Missile > Violent pressure release
3B
1B
-
1B
> Procedures > Audits > All maintenance activities performed under PTW system > Toolbox talks, safety awareness campaigns > Bleed down prior to removal > Maintenance procedures
> PPE > First aid kits > Medical facilities
-
H-05.09
High pressure equipment
> Accumulators > Air compressors > BOP testing unit > Cementing unit (HP ,15000 psi) > Mud system 7,500 psi > Pneumatic conveying unit
> Equipment overpressure (blockage, pressure rating exceeded) > Equipment failure (gasket, flange, hose , connection, rotating equipment) > Procedure failure > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse, inadvertent opening of equipment under pressure
Uncontrolled release of energy
> Missile > Violent pressure release
3B
1B
-
1B
> Contractor procedures > Contractor audits > Pressure testing of systems during commissioning > Certification of accumulators & WSoE > All maintenance activities performed under PTW system > Toolbox talks, safety awareness campaigns > Bleed down prior to removal > Maintenance procedures
> Signage posted during use of HP equipment > PPE > First aid kits > Medical facilities
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
> Lifebouys
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 201 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
H-06
Hazards associated with differences in height
H06.01,2
Personnel at height
> Scaffolding/ ladders > Elevated work areas > Work in mast (personnel working basket) and subbase > Man riding winches (preferred to scaffolding) > Island elevation
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue, material defect, mechanical failure) > Procedure failure - non adherence to wearing safety harnesses > Poor maintenance and inspection of safety equipment > Human error - incorrect assembly, use > Temporary access > Adverse weather conditions > Slippery surfaces (e.g. personnel climbing on top of Xmas tree) > Cargo transfer operations > Gangway to/from vessels
Fall of personnel to lower level
> Potential fatality/severe impact injury > Man overboard
H-06.03
Overhead equipment (excluding Drilling Rig)
> Trucks > Forklift loads > Mobile crane loads > BOP handling equipment > Cargo transfer to from vessels > Rig up operations > Cranes / fork lift trucks associated with carryover activity
> Crane sling failure/load drop, poor slinging/rigging techniques where objects not secured correctly > Exceeding lifting equipment SWL > Using damaged/poorly maintained lifting equipment > Equipment failure equipment component falling from height > Procedure failure > Human error e.g. rigging error, incompetent personnel, inadequate training > Loss of motive/control power > Exceed number of lift of IBCs/Cement bags etc
Loss of control/dropp ed object
Impact with personnel/equipment
> Inoperability of designed pipe handling systems > Manual handling of pipe > Use of external crane > Operator error > Maintenance error > Collisions > CCTV to monkey board (poor communication/failure) > Weather conditions
Loss of load
> 400te & 350te crane used in double lift largest lift 90te before winter season Mobile Cranes Hiab Cranes Crawler Crane
Overhead Equipment – Drilling Rig
>Pipe handling operations
Injury/fatality
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
A
E
R
Prevention Controls
4C
-
-
3C
> Working at height procedure > Harnesses and lanyards worn at all times above 1.5m > 2-point safety harness > Harness clipped to basket during man riding > Safety awareness campaigns, HSE meetings & Toolbox talks > Scaffolding certifications/Scaff-Tag > Scaffolding erected under PTW > Working at height in normally unmanned areas performed under PTW > Man riding activity under PTW > PPE, Trained and competent personnel > Safety training register > Procedures for working at height in certain weather conditions > Dedicated certified man riding winch operated by trained personnel only > On side of quay / jetty (within 3m) procedure to wear lifejackets > Enclosed gangways to LQs / TR
> Lifebuoys > Medical facilities
See Bowtie H-06.01,2 Persons at Height
2E/5 B
3C
-
3C
> Lifting equipment (slings, shackles, etc) register, lifting equipment recertified and colour coding changed six-monthly > Certification of lifting equipment (SWLs) > Barriers/drop zones > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks, HSE meetings > Competent personnel - trained crane operators, slingsman, banksman > Safety training register > Procedures for working in certain weather conditions > Lifting programme (plan) designed to manage space and avoid lifts over live equipment. > No night time lifting
> PPE > Medical facilities
Note: There has been an incident where a 70te crane fell over on site due to harmonic swing -- resulted in injury to driver.
> Training and competence of personnel > see previous controls (to be edited) > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks, HSE meetings > Gantry crane operator line of sight
> PPE > Medical facilities
2E/5 B
3B
-
3C
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
Actions/Comments
P
See Bowtie H-06.03a Objects Overhead
Bucking machine to be upgraded and re-installed Note; Drill pipe has been dropped in operating company but no fatality or major injury RAP 83 : Provide more information on loss pipe recovery systems and review – No action required following ALARP review See Bowtie H-06.03a Objects Overhead
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 202 of 310
Sources
Top Event
Consequences
> Derrick structural failure > Travelling block into crown > Malfunction of drawworks breaking system
Dropped load at drill floor
Dropped load at drill floor injury/fatality
Tubular storage
> movement of tubulars while personnel nearby
impact
Fall through ice
> Personnel carrying ice survey as part of ice management
Removal of propeller obstruction
H-06.05
Personnel below grade
Risk Controls
Actions/Comments
A
E
R
Prevention Controls
2E/5 B
4B
-
3C
> Successive safety barriers to prevent travelling block/crown collision also travelling block to drill floor collision > Operational controls and procedures on use of lifting equipment > Pneumatic system on draw-works, proximity magnet in derrick > Personnel presence controlled > Derrick checked after jarring operations for loose fittings prior to restart > Gantry crane operator line of sight > Bumpers and stops in place so that personnel have reduced risk of being hit by tubulars > BOP handling trolley > Automatic / semi-automatic pipe handling > Controlled access to drill floor (open area)
> Drill floor designed to resist impact load > PPE > Medical facilities
See Bowtie H-06.03b
injury/fatality
3B
1B
-
-
>wood chocks at end pipes
-
See Bowtie H-06.03 Objects Overhead
Drowning
Drowning
4B
-
-
-
> Procedures > risk assessment of ice management activity
> Communication > Floatation equipment > Medevac
-
> Ship operations
Drowning
Drowning
4B
-
-
-
> Diving by specialist contractor
-
-
Divers during repair / maintenance to water inlets
> Firewater demand
Sucked into firewater intake
Crush injuries / drowning
2A
2A
-
1A
> Diving managed by specialist contractor and PTW
> Medical facilities > Medical evacuation
-
See insufficient oxygen atmosphere (H-19.01)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Note: Trench for drilling rig hoses is only 0.8m deep and therefore too shallow to pose significant hazard
>Tubulars in piperack
Personnel under water
Risk Potential P
> Items suspended in derrick > Dropping travelling block
H-06.04
Threats
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
Objects Overhead
See Bowtie H-19.01,2 Asphyxiates H-06.06
Falling ice/snow
see weather
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
-
Note: Northern Caspian region has low levels of precipitation. Therefore, significant build-up of ice/snow on drilling is rig not considered to be credible.
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
H-07
Objects under induced stress
H-07.01
Objects under tension
H-07.02
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 203 of 310
Objects under compression
H-08
Dynamic Situation Hazards
H-08.01
On land transport (driving)
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
> Cranes, winches (man riding, lifting equipment) > Lifting equipment, slings, straps, ropes, chains for injector unit, > Monkey board descender (derrick escape line) > Mooring lines
> Equipment failure (corrosion, erosion, fatigue, material defect) > Human error - incorrect assembly, use > Overstressing (thermal expansion - ambient temperatures)
Uncontrolled release of energy
> Working stuck pipe >Raising the derrick
> Hydraulic failure > Equipment failure (corrosion, erosion, fatigue, material defect) > Human error - incorrect assembly, use > Overstressing
Wirelining
> Springs in actuators
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
Actions/Comments
P
A
E
R
Prevention Controls
> Wire whip > Crane boom failure, lifting equipment line failure
2B
4B
-
3B
> Lifting equipment (slings, shackles, etc) register, lifting equipment colour coding changed six-monthly > Certification of lifting equipment (SWLs) recertified every six months > Safety awareness campaign, toolbox talks > JSA associated with lifting plan for special operations specify additional requirements > preventative maintenance for vessels (ships)
> Emergency response procedures > PPE > Medical facilities
-
Uncontrolled release of energy
Potential fatality/injury
2B
1B
-
2B
> Operational procedures
> Emergency response procedures > PPE > Medical facilities
-
> Hydraulic failure > Equipment failure (corrosion, erosion, fatigue, material defect) > Human error - incorrect assembly, use > Overstressing
Uncontrolled release of energy
Potential fatality/injury
2B
1B
-
2B
> Wire lining operations performed by specialist service company - contractor procedures > Correct contractor selection > Agip-KCO supervise all wireling operations > PTW system > Agip-KCO standards for all contractors > Review of contractor procedures > Contractor audits
Emergency response procedures PPE Medical facilities
-
> Equipment failure (corrosion, erosion, fatigue, material defect) > Human error - incorrect assembly, use > Overstressing thermal expansion
Uncontrolled release of energy
Sudden release of actuator energy, violent pressure release, missile/ projectile
2B
-
-
-
> Maintenance work performed under PTW system > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks
> Emergency response procedures > PPE > Medical facilities
-
> Derrick collapse due to excessive load being applied to structure
> Excessive loading > Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue, material defect)
Derrick collapse
Telescope mast into drill floor resulting in damage to drill rig / injury or fatality to personnel on drill floor / in mast
4A
3A
-
3A
> Mast designed for purpose > Load indicators in doghouse > maintenance of mast structure > NDT inspection
> Weak point in structure to control direction of fall > Controlled access to the drill floor > Doghouse reinforced with shielding on roof > Emergency response procedures > PPE > Medical facilities
-
> Cranes > Trucks
> Vehicle mechanical failure > Driver error > Non adherence to traffic procedures > Weather/poor visibility (fog/wind/snow/ice) > Rig moves > Load movement > Edge of Island > Unsuitable surface for driving > Reversing/blind spots > Congested areas
Loss of control
> Impact with people/plant/other vehicle
4B
2B
-
-
> Formal procedures for normal operation of heavy equipment > Abnormal operations (e.g. drill rig moves, contractor heavy equipment) require PTW > Driver competence/training > Vehicles only moving at slow speed (10kph speed limit); > Vehicle maintenance > audible/visible warning on some vehicles > Lighting > banksman etc for crane operations > preventative maintenance of vehicles > Certification of drivers
> Seat belts are compulsory in all vehicles (follow Agip policy) > Emergency procedures
RAP 84 : Review controls/procedures against Agip KCO requirements for vehicle movements on D-Island
> Uncontrolled pipe movement > Operator error > Mechanical defect
Loss of control
> Competence and training of drivers > Maintenance system
> Seat belts are compulsory in all vehicles > Emergency response procedures
> BOP
> Bulldozers > Fork lifts > Drill rigs, heavy equipment > HMLs (cherry pickers)
Tubular handling - Fork lifts
Crushing, entanglement
4B
2B
-
-
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
Action complete See Bowtie H-06.03 Objects Overhead
See RAP item 26 : materials handling review – Action complete See Bowtie H-06.03 Objects Overhead
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref. H-08.02
Hazard On water transport (boating)
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 204 of 310
Sources > Barge transport > Ice breaking Supply Vessel > Ice breaker > tugs > crew change boats > IBEEV
Threats > Loss of propulsion system > Extreme weather > Shallow water in Caspian > Ice conditions > Collision with other vessels in area > loss of tow > Fouling by nets > loss of communications
Top Event Loss of control
Consequences > Vessel drifting > Foundering > Grounding > Cargo losses > Fuel/oil spill > Trapped vessel > Personnel injury/fatality > man overboard
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
P
A
E
R
Prevention Controls
4C/5 A
4A
2C
3C
> No personnel on cargo barges > Traffic management system -- GPS to coordinate vessel activity (from D Island) -all vessels have identification beacons (to be confirmed) > Vessel activity to comply with Agip KCO Marine Manual > Dedicated marine superintendent > Majority of marine contractor HSE cases in compliance with Contractor HSE Management system > Compliance with RoK and international marine legislation (SOLAS, IMO etc) > Shallow water > Ice class vessels used during ice season > Speed limit applies - 2 knots within atoll and 4 knots within 500 MEZ > Communications > Journey management plans
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls > Emergency response procedures > PPE (Life jackets worn by personnel) > Liferafts > OSR procedures / booms > Fast rescue craft
-
Navaids
H-08.03
In air transport (flying)
> Cargo delivery - barite, diesel, general supplies > Cuttings barges
> Hose/connection failure > Overpressure
Loss of containment
Spill of materials into environments
> Helicopter transportation
> Debris sucked up in downwash > Obstructions on/around landing area > Mechanical failure, breakdown > Pilot error> Adverse weather
Loss of control
Helicopter crash - ditching at sea, impact with DIsland facilities (Shapagat / Karlygash)
> Under slung loads (none anticipated)
-
-
-
-
-
1C
1C
> Transfer is manned operation > Training and competence of crane operator > Cranes and lift equipment maintained > OBM / barite / base oil / diesel transfer using tank capacity of supply vessels > CHCD drilling technique does not generate cuttings
> Emergency procedures, shut down on leak detection > Spill clean up procedures
-
5B
20
1B
3B
> Helideck separated from derrick
> Emergency response procedures > PPE > Fire and emergency response teams> Mobile fire fighting equipment > Medical facilities > CAP 437 helideck >ISBV/ SBV / daughter craft on standby during helicopter landing / take-off
See Bowtie H-08.03 Helicopter Transport
-
-
-
> Twin turbine helicopters -- Sikorsky S76C++ / Bell 212 / Dauphin EC 365 N3/ > CAP 437 helideck > HLO Manual
-
-
-
-
H-08.04
Boat collision hazard to other vessels
See H-08.02
> Vessel out of control > Vessel loss/lack of power > Navigation error
Collision
> Impact with D-Island barges > Impact with breakwater structure > Impact with other vessel
30
30
10
30
> Island marked on charts and equipped with navigation lights > Foghorn on island > D-Island radio room > Vessels meet requirements SOLAS > D-Island within atoll
> Emergency response procedures > Fire and emergency response teams > Mobile fire fighting equipment > Spill response procedures > Medical facilities
-
H-08.05
Equipment with moving/ rotating parts
> Grinders/ lathes > Pumps > Compressors > Power generators > Drill string, rotary table, top drive > Agitators in mud tanks > Fork lift trucks
> Equipment failure > Procedure failure > Operator error > Operation outside design limits > Inadequate isolation
Loss of control/ separation
> Crushing, entanglement > People or equipment hit by projectiles
2B
-
-
-
> Machinery guarding on all rotating equipment not enclosed > Competence and training of crew > Safe working procedures > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks > Monthly safety check and inspection for guarding
> PPE > Medical facilities
-
H-08.06
Use of hazardous hand tools
> Welding equipment > Drills, power tools > Hacksaws > Sandblasting > Pneumatic cutting equipment
> Equipment failure > Procedure failure > Operator error > Operation outside design limits > Inadequate isolation
Loss of separation
> Crushing, cutting, lacerations, electrocution
1B
-
-
-
> Competence and training of crew > Portable electrical tools register - all items inspected and tagged by Chief electrician > Safe working procedures > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks
> PPE > Medical facilities
Note: Semi-automated pipe handling and pipe make-up / break-out
H-08.07
Use of knives, machetes etc
> Utility knives e.g. for opening bags
> Operator error
Loss of separation
> Cuts, abrasions
1B
-
-
-
> Competence and training of crew
> PPE > Medical facilities
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 205 of 310
Hazard
H-08.08
Transfer from boat to offshore platform
H-09
Physical Environment Hazards
H-09.01
Weather
Sources None identified
Threats -
Top Event -
Consequences -
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
P
A
E
R
-
-
-
-
Prevention Controls -
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls -
-
Iron roughneck is intrinsically safe
> Rain
> Inadequate site/road drainage > Insufficient foundations
> Structural failure > Loss of visibility
> Localised flooding (flash flooding) > Ground subsidence resulting in asset damage > Structural failure of roads - vehicle accidents
-
-
-
-
> Limit on normal operations as per RoK regulations and Agip procedure / policy for adverse weather
-
Note: Low levels of precipitation in North Caspian region
> Extreme wind
> Erosion > Unsecured equipment > Personnel transportation
> Loose equipment > Loss of visibility
Loose equipment blown by wind (e.g. signs)
-
-
-
-
> Derrick wind load calculations/design > Limit on raising derrick > Limit on normal operations as per RoK regulations and Agip procedure / policy for adverse weather > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks
-
Note: Considered as a threat to release other hazard sources
> Snow/ice storm/low temperature
> Slippy surfaces > Frozen equipment, lines > Monkey Board man exposure to wind > Loss of helicopter medevac capability > Ice build up on roofs and walls
Loss of control/ containment
> Damage to equipment > Frost bite > Hypothermia > impact by falling ice > personnel trapped in buildings > Excessive snow loads on building
2C
1B
-
-
> Winterisation of equipment (steam trace heating and steam pipes in trenches) to ensure that temperature on rig does not fall below 1oC > Adverse weather procedures as per RoK / Agip requirements > Crushed rock surfaces for most walkways, so not smooth surfaces > Grit > PPE > Formal induction covers exposure to cold issues > Preventative barriers and precautionary relocation of equipment
> Medical facilities > multiple exits from normally manned locations > T-card system > Island Communications systems > Barriers to keep people away from icicles and snow on roofs
RAP 85: : complete and implement actions from review of protection of Monkeyboard man
> Ice sheet
> Ice grounding at berms > Wind causing Ice movement to close channels > Interaction with other Island (gas cloud from AIsland)
Loss of broken ice channel
> Escape route impaired
-
-
-
-
> Ice Management programme > Ice forecasting - Ice adviser reporting daily (or more frequently) to OIM > Supporting Ice team in Atyrau and on other facilities > Two escape routes maintained > Preferred route identified > Safe waypoint identified (28 ppm H2S contour)
> Ice breaker assigned to Island > additional vessel can be assigned to Island (if required by conditions) > Loss of escape route OIM will consider based on advice whether to shut down or not
See Bowtie H-01,02 and H20.01
> Ice sheet
> Ice ingress from North impacting on Island
Loss of separation
> Ice piling on Island injury to personnel/ damage to asset
-
-
-
-
> Ice protection berms in place around Island
-
-
> Fog (sea mist)
> Personnel transportation
Loss of visibility
-
-
-
-
-
> Navigation lights > Weather forecasts for crew changes > Adverse weather procedures as per RoK / Agip requirements > Vessel identification system (GPS) > No helicopter flights in poor visibility
_
Note: Considered as a threat to release other hazard sources
> Solar radiation
> Personnel working outdoors for prolonged periods
Overexposur e
> Heat stress, sun stroke/heat exhaustion > Acute and chronic health effects (sunburn, skin cancer)
2C
-
-
-
> Formal induction covers heat exhaustion issues > Water supplies and isotonic tablets > Wear hats and fire retardant overall (mandatory) in summer time to limit effects of radiation
> Medical facilities
-
Action complete
> TIOGA heating system on each rig
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref. H-09.02
Hazard Sea state/river currents
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 206 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
>High waves/High tides (wind driven, mainly from West)
Overtopping of walls
> Low sea levels
None identified
> Caspian sea
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
Actions/Comments
P
A
E
R
Prevention Controls
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
> Personnel swept to sea
40
-
-
-
> Design of island (wave / ice barriers) to calm sea state within atoll > Personnel training and competence > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks > Operating and maintenance procedures
> Lifebuoys and FRC (on LQ) for man overboard > Emergency response procedures PPE, > Life jackets worn by personnel
-
low sea level
> Loss of water intake to fire water and drill water > Unable to transfer personnel by boat > Loss of escape route to North of Island during Ice season
-
-
-
-
> Large buffer storage for drill water and firewater
-
Note: Considered as an escalation for consequences requiring firewater
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1B
-
-
-
> Design minimises contact with hot surfaces e.g. insulation and guarding > Personnel training and competence > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks > Operating and maintenance procedures > HAZOP action specified that all hot surfaces (>45degC?) are guarded
> PPE (gloves) > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-09.03
Tectonic activity
H-10
Hot Surfaces
H-10.01
Process piping equipment 60150°C
> Hot mud returns (ca. 90c) > Metal surfaces exposed to solar radiation > Galley
> Operator error > Well fluid sampling > Solar radiation
Contact with hot surface
> Burn injuries
H-10.02
Piping equipment > 150°C
None identified
-
-
-
H-10.03
Engine & turbine exhaust systems
> Cranes > Vehicles > Generators > Fork lifts
> Operator error
Contact with hot surface
> Burn injuries
1A
-
-
-
> Equipment guarding and insulation > Personnel training and competence > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks > Operating and maintenance procedures
> PPE (gloves) > Medical facilities
-
H-10.04
Steam piping
> Trace heating systems
> Operator error > Well fluid sampling > Solar radiation
Contact with hot surface
> Burn injuries
1B
-
-
-
> Design minimises contact with hot surfaces e.g. insulation and guarding > Personnel training and competence > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks > Operating and maintenance procedures > HAZOP action specified that all hot surfaces (>45degC?) are guarded
> PPE (gloves) > Medical facilities
-
H-10.05
Incinerator
> LQ incinerator
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-11
Hot Fluids
H-11.01
Temperatures 100150 °C
> Hot well fluids > Mud returns (c. 90oC) > Closed circuit cooling systems (generators, cranes, mobile equipment, vehicles)
> Leaks/sprays e.g. leak from cooling system > Operator error > Maintenance/sampling activities > Inadequate guarding > Cleaning of equipment with hot water
Contact with hot fluids
> Burn injuries
H-11.02
Temperatures >150 °C
None identified
-
-
-
-
H-12
Cold Surfaces
H-12.01
Process piping -25 to -80°C
> Exposed metal surfaces during night time/winter (derrick structure, tubulars, handrails)
> Operator error
Contact with cold surface
> Freeze burn injuries
H-12.02
Piping equipment < -80°C
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
1A
-
-
-
> Design minimises contact with hot fluid > Personnel training and competence > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks > Operating and maintenance procedures
> PPE > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1B
-
-
-
> Design minimises contact with hot fluid > Personnel training and competence > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks > Operating and maintenance procedures
> PPE > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
H-13
Cold Fluids
H-13.01
Oceans, seas & lakes < 10°C
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 207 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
> Caspian sea
> Operator error > Un-insulated surfaces > Inadequate guarding > Maintenance activities > leaks/sprays
Contact with cold fluids
> Man overboard
> Drawworks cooling system
Loss of coolant
Over heating
> Damage to equipment
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
Actions/Comments
P
A
E
R
Prevention Controls
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
4C
-
-
-
>Personnel training and competence > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks > Operating and maintenance procedures
> Lifebuoys and FRC (on LQ) for man overboard Emergency response procedures > PPE, > Life jackets worn by personnel
Score based on man over board incident on crew boat see H-08.02
-
-
-
-
-
-
RAP 86 : Investigate whether drawworks cooling system will be fully operational during winter season Action complete
H-14
Open Flame
H-14.01
Heaters with fire tube
None Identified
-
H-14.02
Direct fired furnaces
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-14.03
Flares
Well control equipment (divert to burner)
> Use of diverter during well control
Exposure to radiant heat/flame
> Radiant heat, noise, smoke > SO2 from flare
-
-
-
-
H-14.04
Other open flame sources
> Hot work (propane welding, flame cutting)
> Procedure failure - non adherence to safe working procedures > Human error > Poor housekeeping > Faulty equipment > Smoking
Contact with flame
> Burn injuries > Potential ignition source
1B
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-15
Electricity
H-15.01
Voltage > 50 - 600V in cables
> Electrical equipment > CPS (12V) > Lighting > Cables > UPS > IBEEV power supply
> Use of electrical tools > Maintenance activities on electrical equipment > Work on junction boxes etc. > Overloading sockets > Surface run cables > Third parties bringing in unsafe or inappropriate electrical equipment > Mechanical impact with cabling > Procedure failure - non adherence to PTW, lockout/ tagout systems, isolation procedures JSA, etc. > Human error
Contact with electricity
> Electrocution > Electrical fire, asset damage > Burn injuries
2B
-
H-15.02
Voltage > 50- 600V in equipment
See H-15.01
-
-
-
-
H-15.03
Voltage > 600V
> Motor control centres > Main generators > Emergency Generators > Step down transformers
> Construction activities interfere with high voltage cables/equipment > Operator error working on non-isolated system, unauthorised deisolation / energisation
Contact with electricity
> Electrocution , burn injuries > Electrical fire, transformer fire asset damage > Power failure/damage to high voltage cables/equipment > Production interruption
3B
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
> Restricted access when flaring
> Emergency response procedures > PPE (SCBA) > Medical facilities
Flare booms are not currently installed on DIsland (See RAP 8)
> All hot work performed under PTW system > Fire watchman > Safety campaigns, toolbox talks
> PPE > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
> Work on electrical equipment is controlled under PTW system > CPS is very low voltage (12V) > Earth Leakage Circuit Breakers (ELCBs). > Electrical classification of wellhead area intrinsically safe equipment only permitted inside 30m exclusion zone > ATEX certified equipment > All electrical equipment is earth-tested > Safety campaigns, toolbox talks > Training and competence of personnel
> PPE > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
> Electrical isolation during well maintenance activities (isolated at switchboard) > Lockout/tagout systems > PTW defines excavation area around high voltage cables > Signage - indicating presence of high voltage lines > Safety campaigns, toolbox talks > Training and competence of personnel
> PPE > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Hazard
Lightning discharge
Electrostatic energy
Batteries
Stored charge (e.g. capacitors)
Electromagnetic Radiation
Ultraviolet radiation
Infra red radiation (e.g. fired eqpt)
Microwaves
Lasers
E/M radiation: high voltage ac cables
Ionizing Radiation Open Source
Alpha, Beta - open source
Gamma rays - open source
Hazard Ref.
H-15.04
H-15.05
H-15.06
H-15.07
H-16
H-16.01
H-16.02
H-16.03
H-16.04
H-16.05
H-17
H-17.01
H-17.02
Agip KCO
None Identified
> weld inspections specialist contractor
Refer H-15.03
None Identified
> Satellite communications links,> Cell phones
> Instruments/ hand tools, temperature sensors
> Solar radiation > TIG / MIG welding > NDT > LQ water treatment plant
Residual electricity e.g. in bus bar CPS
Vehicles Engines
> Liquid handing - diesel, chemical transfer > Helicopter operations
Electrical storms
Sources
2B
Electrocution
Discharge / contact with electricity
> Maintenance activities > Operator error > Equipment failure
-
> Maintenance activities > Inspection activities
-
-
> Communications activities > Inadequate shielding > Maintenance works
> Normal operations > Maintenance activities
> Personnel working outdoors for prolonged periods > Maintenance activities (Welding, NDT)
-
Exposure to ionizing radiation
-
-
-
2A
-
-
-
1B
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1A
-
A
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E
Risk Potential
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
R
Prevention Controls
-
> Inspection undertaken by specialist service company > Source storage and handling procedures > PTW system > Area cleared > worked carried out in accordance with Ionisation radiation procedure and Agip KCO Ionisation safety guide
-
-
> Hazardous area rating as per RP500 > Use of cell phones in hazardous areas is prohibited > Safety campaigns, toolbox talks, notices posted in camp to reinforce policy > Hydrocarbons are not expected to be encountered during this phase of drilling
> PPE - goggles, face masks, full-length cotton coveralls > PTW system > Safety campaigns, toolbox talks > Safe distance maintained for flaring activities
> PPE - goggles, face masks, full-length cotton coveralls > PTW system > Safety campaigns, toolbox talks
> CPS is low voltage (12V) > Trained and competent electrician > Safety campaigns, toolbox talks
> Limited number of batteries > Trained and competent electrician
> Equipment, including transfer tanks and hoses are earthed/grounded > Operating procedures > Training and competence of personnel > Toolbox talks > Personnel with pacemakers are not allowed offshore - medical certificate
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
Note: Treated as a potential ignition source for other hazards.
> Active Fire Fighting systems> Fire and emergency response team> Medical facilities
-
> PPE > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
> PPE > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
Actions/Comments
> Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
> PPE > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
> PPE > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
> PPE > Fire and emergency response team > Mobile fire fighting equipment > Medical facilities
> PPE > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
Risk Controls > All equipment is properly earthed > Earth Leakage Circuit Breakers (ELCBs). > Lightning storms are rare in the North Caspian region > Adverse weather policy
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Acute and chronic health effects
-
-
Potential ignition source
Exposure to non-ionizing radiation
-
> Burn injuries
Exposure to non-ionizing radiation
1B
0B
Short circuit, electrocution
Contact with electricity
> Maintenance activities > Operator error > Equipment failure
> Arc eye > Burn injuries
1E
> Potential ignition source, fire, asset damage > Electric shock
Static discharge / contact with electricity
> Procedure failure - too high transfer rates > Operator error mishandling, misuse, error in setting flowrate > Use of volatile liquids (toluene, kerosene, diesel) > High ambient temperatures > Corrosion of grounding lines
Exposure to non-ionizing radiation
30
> Potential ignition source, fire > Electric shock
> Inadequately earthed equipment > Tall structure - Derrick, Cranes
Static discharge / contact with electricity
P
Consequences
Top Event
Threats
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 208 of 310
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 209 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
Risk Potential P
A
E
H-17.03
Neutron - open source
Well Logging equipment
> Drilling activities > Inspection activities > Handling and make-up of Tools
Exposure to ionizing radiation
Acute and chronic health effects
2A
H-17.04
Naturally occurring ionizing radiation
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-18
Ionizing Radiation Closed Source
H-18.01
Alpha, Beta - closed source
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
H-18.02
Gamma rays closed source
None Identified
-
-
-
-
H-18.03
Neutron - closed source
None Identified
-
-
-
Risk Controls R
Prevention Controls
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
> Well Tools deployed by specialist service company > Source storage and handling procedures > PTW system > Area cleared > Controls in compliance with RoK legislation
> PPE > Dosage monitoring > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
--
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-19
Asphyxiates
H-19.01
Insufficient oxygen atmospheres
> Tanks and pits > Rescue operations
> Procedure failure, inappropriate procedures > Human error, failure to follow procedures > Hydrocarbon spill response/clean-up
Loss of O2 atmosphere
> Asphyxiation > Potential fatality/severe injury
4B
-
-
-
> Confined space entry permit > Gas testing of space before entry permitted > Safety campaigns, toolbox talks > Buddy system / safety line
> Buddy system > Breathing apparatus (SCBA) -- if required > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
See Bowties H-19.01,2 Asphyxiates
H-19.02
Excessive CO2
> Extinguishing system on third party logging cabin
> Procedure failure, inappropriate procedures
Loss of O2 atmosphere
> Asphyxiation > Potential fatality/severe injury
4B
-
-
-
> Pressurised cylinder controls > Labelling and alarms > Controlled Access > Gas testing/purging before re-entry
-
RAP 87 :Confirm whether CO2 fixed fire system in engine rooms – No fixed CO2 system See Bowties H-19.01,2 Asphyxiates
Argon
> Welding activities
> Procedure failure, inappropriate procedures > migration of gas to lower level
Loss of O2 atmosphere
> Asphyxiation > Potential fatality/severe injury
H-19.03
Drowning
See H-08.02 & H-09.02
-
-
-
H-19.04
Excessive N2
> Nitrogen bottles > Pulsation dampers on mud pumps > Koomey unit
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse
Loss of O2 atmosphere
> Asphyxiation > Potential fatality/severe injury
H-19.05
Halon
None Identified
-
-
-
H-19.06
Smoke
> Incidents involving fire
> Engine operations > Fire fighting activities (ER)
Loss of O2 atmosphere
> Health effects acute and chronic > Localised air pollution
4B
-
-
-
> Vessel entry procedures - including ventilation, extraction, low level vent/dams etc > Risk assessment > Removal of equipment at breaks
> Buddy system > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
See Bowties H-19.01,2 Asphyxiates
-
-
-
-
-
-
Note: Treated as a consequence
2A
-
-
-
> N2 tank located downwind of wellhead (work area) > Open, naturally well ventilated area allowing rapid dispersion below dangerous levels > Insufficient volumes of N2 to pose significant asphyxiation hazard
> Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
See Bowties H-19.01,2 Asphyxiates
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2A
-
-
-
> Inspection and maintenance of equipment
> PPE - respirators > Medical facilities
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Toxic Gas
Toxic Gas
H2S, sour gas
Exhaust fumes
Nickel Carbonyl
SO2
Ammonia
H-20
H-20.01
H-20.02
H-20.03
H-20.04
H-20.05
Hazard
H-20
Hazard Ref.
Agip KCO
Maintenance activities
> Ignition of a blowout
> Ignited Blowout See H-01.02
> Bottles, cylinders
> Inadequate venting > Flange/gasket failure
-
Exposure to ammonia
Exposure to toxic gases (SO2)
Exposure to toxic gases (SO2)
-
Fumes
> Fumes venting into wireline cabin
-
0A
-
1E
-
-
1E
1A
-
E
-
-
-
-
-
-
1A
-
R
Prevention Controls
> Small quantities of ammonia used Material specification - MSDSs > Storage and handling procedures > Toolbox talks
-
All engines and equipment are located in the open - exhaust gases not discharged in confined areas
-
-
> All engines and equipment are located in the open - exhaust gases not discharged in confined areas
> See A-Island Safety case > Blowout from A-Island should be ignited (as required by RoK regulations) and therefore toxic gas cloud should not reach DIsland > Gas detection at D-Island > Radio room communication prior to flaring > A-Island ERP
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
Actions/Comments
-
> PPE (gloves, goggles, chemical suit) > Emergency showers, eye wash stations > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
-
-
Action complete
RAP 88 : complete review of impact of exhaust fumes on wireline cabin currently under investigation Occupational Hygiene
-
See Bowtie H-20.01 Toxic Gas
Note: Scavengers used in conventional drilling to prevent H2S in mud returns by adding to drilling mud
> as per blowout
Medical facilities
-
-
> Medical facilities
> D Island Emergency Response Procedures > D-Island evacuation procedures (regular drills & exercises performed) > Medical facilities > Joint training exercise with A-Island > Pre-incident plans and exercises > 24 hour radio room used to notify release > Call to muster TR/LQs (Shapagat and Karlygash) and then (if required) evacuate using IBEEV Transfer of personnel from TR to IBEEV wearing appropriate PPE
> Minimise number of personnel on drill floor > Cascade breathing air system on drilling rigs > Gas detectors on drill floor > D-Island laid out with LQs / TRs Shapagat and Karlygash are equipped with integral TRs > IBEEVS (2 off) one in reserve, One IBEEV sufficient for all personnel > during ice escape routes maintained by ice breaking vessel > D-Island evacuation procedures (regular drills & exercises performed) > Fire and emergency response procedures > Spill clean up procedures >Tier 2 and Tier 3 support > Medical facilities >Medevac> > Pre-incident plans and exercises > 24 hour radio room used to notify release
Risk Controls
>CHCD Drilling > Real-time monitoring of drilling parameters e.g. mud levels > Well control procedures > Well kill packages / systems / procedures > Competency programmes > Safety awareness campaigns, toolbox talks, HSE meetings
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
1A
-
-
> Health effects - corrosive to eyes, skin and respiratory tract > Environmental effects air pollution > Health effects > Environmental effects air pollution
-
-
20
-
-
-
1A
-
A
Risk Potential
> Health effects - corrosive to eyes, skin and respiratory tract > Environmental effects air pollution
-
2D
20
> Poisoning / asphyxiation
Exposure to toxic gases (COx, SOx, NOx)
> Inadequate venting > Flange/gasket failure > Incomplete combustion of burning hydrocarbon temporary flaring (green burners) > Vehicles > Breathing exhaust fumes
5A
> Unignited release chronic toxic effects, environmental effects - air pollution
Exposure to toxic gases (H2S)
-
P
> Loss of well control at A Island or ignition of flare during well test
> Unignited release chronic toxic effects, environmental effects - air pollution > 100 ppm IDLH (after 30 minutes impair escape) > 650 ppm 10% fatality > 800 ppm 50% fatality > 1000 ppm 90% fatality
Consequences
Exposure to toxic gases (H2S)
Top Event
> Loss of well control at D Island (See H-01.02)
Threats
> Combustion gases/exhausts
None Identified
> Engines > Cranes > Generators > Visiting vessels
> Release from A-Island 3.2 nm (approx 6km) NE of D-island or other nearby facilities
> Release from well Well fluids up to 20% H2S
Sources
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 210 of 310
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 211 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
P
A
E
R
Prevention Controls
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
H-20.06
Chlorine
Water treatment facilities
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue, material defect, mechanical failure) > Procedure failure - non adherence to wearing safety harnesses > Poor maintenance and inspection of safety equipment > Human error - incorrect assembly, use
Exposure to toxic gas (Cl)
> Health effects corrosive to eyes, skin and respiratory tract > Acute toxic effects at high concentrations
1A
-
-
-
> Small quantities of chlorine used Material specification - MSDSs > Storage and handling procedures > Safety campaigns, toolbox talks
> PPE (gloves, goggles, chemical suit) > Emergency showers, eye wash stations > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
-
H-20.07
Welding fumes
Maintenance activities, equipment repairs
Welding activities
Exposure to toxic gases (CO, ozone)
> Health effects respiratory irritants > Environmental effects air pollution
1B
-
0E
-
> Hot work PTW system > Personnel training, competence and supervision > PPE
> Medical facilities
-
30
-
-
-
Smoking in designated areas only
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1A
-
1A
-
> All A/C systems are enclosed loop systems > Maintenance performed by trained and competent mechanic. > MSDS includes hazards, precautions and recovery measures
> PPE > First aid kits > Medical facilities
-
> PPE
H-20.08
Tobacco smoke
Smoking
Passive smoking
Exposure to tobacco smoke
Health effects - respiratory irritant, irritant to eyes, carcinogen
H-20.09
CFCs (Old Freons)
None identified
-
-
-
H-20.10
HCFCs (New Freons)
> Air conditioning > Refrigerants
> Preventative maintenance - refilling, inspection > Equipment failure loss of containment from closed loop system
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects - cold burns, asphyxiation > Environmental effects air pollution
H-21
Toxic Liquid
H-21.01
Mercury
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-21.02
PCBs
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-21.03
Biocides
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H2S scavenger (Zinc compounds)
Oil Water separation/collection system (summer mainly)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Waste Management Procedures
-
-
H-21.04
Methanol
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-21.05
Brines
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-21.06
Glycols
Antifreeze
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
> Acute health effects irritating to eyes, possible corneal damage. > Chronic health effects may include skin and respiratory irritation, nausea, CNS and reproductive effects. > Environmental effects ground contamination
1A
-
1A
-
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling > Toolbox talks
> Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills > PPE, gloves, goggles > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Emergency response procedures > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
H-21.07
Degreasers
Maintenance activities, equipment repairs
Human error mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects - chronic health effects may include anaesthetic, skin irritation, allergic dermatitis > Environmental effects ground contamination
1A
-
1A
-
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling > Toolbox talks
> Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills, PPE, gloves, goggles > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Emergency response procedures > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
H-21.08
Isocyanates
Maintenance activities, equipment repairs
Human error mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects - chronic health effects may include anaesthetic, skin irritation, allergic dermatitis > Environmental effects ground contamination
2A
-
1A
-
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling > Toolbox talks
> Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills, PPE, gloves, goggles > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Emergency response procedures > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
H-21.09
Sulphanol
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 212 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
Risk Potential P
A
E
Risk Controls R
Prevention Controls
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
H-21.10
Amines
Corrosion inhibitor injection systems
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse > Continuous and batch injection in transfer lines
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects - skin and eye irritant, possible reproductive effects > Environmental effects ground contamination
1A
-
1A
-
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling > Toolbox talks
> Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills > PPE, gloves, goggles > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Emergency response procedures > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
H-21.11
Corrosion inhibitors
Well injection (nonAmines)
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects > Environmental effects ground contamination
1A
-
1A
-
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling > Toolbox talks
> Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills > PPE, gloves, goggles > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Emergency response procedures > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
H-21.12
Scale inhibitors
Hydrochloric acid
Refer H-23.02
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Refer H-23.02
H-21.13
Liquid mud additives
Drilling operations
> Human error mishandling, misuse > See other standard threats > Small drums
Loss of Containment
> Environmental effects ground contamination > Health effects dermatitis
1A
-
1A
-
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Handling/Operating procedures > Bunded storage
> Bunded storage > Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills > PPE, gloves, goggles > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Emergency response procedures > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
H-21.14
Odorant additives
None Identified
-
-
H-21.15
Alcoholic beverages
None Identified
-
-
H-21.16
Recreational drugs
None Identified
-
-
-
H-21.17
Used/waste engine/maintenance oils
> Vehicles > Mobile equipment
> Maintenance activities > Human error mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
> Environmental effects ground contamination > Health effects dermatitis
H-21.18
Carbon tetrachloride
None Identified
-
-
-
H-21.19
Grey and/or black water
> Septic tank > Sewage treatment at LQ
> Maintenance activities > Human error mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
> Environmental effects contamination through discharge > Health effects dermatitis
H-21.20
Poly Aromatic Hydrocarbons
None Identified
-
-
H-21.21
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
None Identified
-
H-21.22
BTEX
None Identified
H-21.23
Hexane
None Identified
H-21.24
Furfaral
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1A
-
1A
-
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Very small quantities of engine oil > Waste management procedures
> Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills > PPE, gloves, goggles > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Emergency response procedures > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1A
-
1A
-
> PPE > Sewage facilities operation and maintenance procedures
> Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities > Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 213 of 310
Sources > Maintenance of plate heat exchanger
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
> Maintenance activities > Human error mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
> Environmental effects ground contamination > Health effects - eye irritant
Risk Potential P 1A
A -
E
H-21.25
MEK
H-22
Toxic Solids
H-22.01
Asbestos
None Identified
-
-
-
H-22.02
Man made mineral fibre
> Construction material, insulating material
> Maintenance activities > Human error mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
>Health effects - eye, respiratory irritant
H-22.03
Cement dust
> Cementing operations
> Construction activities casing repairs, mixing cement, bulk transfer
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects include skin/eye/respiratory irritation, chronic lung damage, > Environmental effects air pollution
1A
-
1A
H-22.04
Sodium hypochlorite
> Small quantities added to water treatment systems
> Human error – mishandling; misuse
Exposure to/ release
>Health effects include skin/eye irritation
1B
-
H-22.05
Powdered mud additives
> Mud mixing > Sack handling >Barite
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Human error mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects include skin/eye/respiratory irritation, chronic lung damage, > Environmental effects air pollution
1B
H-22.06
Sulphur/Sulphur dust
None Identified
-
-
-
H-22.07
Pig trash
None Identified
-
-
-
H-22.08
Oil based muds
> Drilling operations
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Human error mishandling, misuse
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects include skin/eye/respiratory irritation, chronic lung damage, > Environmental effects air pollution see also H-02.03
H-22.09
Pseudo oil based muds
None Identified
-
-
H-22.10
Water based muds
None Identified
-
H-22.11
Cement Slurries
> Casing operations
H-22.12
Dusts
> Sand from island
-
Risk Controls
1A
-
> Material specification – MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling > Toolbox talks
> Geomembrane within Island provides impermeable membrane to protect environment from spills > PPE, gloves, goggles > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Emergency response procedures > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
-
-
> PPE, gloves, goggles > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Emergency response procedures > Medical facilities
-
-
> Cement normally transferred in slurry form > Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
> PPE - respirators, dust mask, eye protection > Eye wash stations > Medical facilities
-
1B
-
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling > Toolbox talks
> PPE - respirators, dust mask, eye protection > Eye wash stations > Medical facilities
-
-
1B
-
> Local extract at mud mixing facilities > Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
> PPE - respirators, dust mask, eye protection > Eye wash stations > Medical facilities
RAP 89: Complete and implement recommendations from trial on reduction Barite emission
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1C
-
1C
1C
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
> PPE - respirators, dust mask, eye protection > Eye wash stations > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
> Drilling activities cementing
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects > Environmental effects ground contamination
1B
-
1B
-
> Local extract at cement mixing facilities > Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
> PPE - respirators, dust mask, eye protection > Eye wash stations > Medical facilities
-
> Extreme wind - wind blown sand
Exposure to
> Health effects - irritant to eyes/skin/respiratory tract, chronic health effects may include silicosis > Effects operability of Fire and Gas detectors
10
-
-
-
> Work stops at wind speeds >15 knots > Weather monitoring and warnings >maintenance of detector optics
> PPE - dust masks, respirators, scarves, face masks, eye protection > Eye wash stations > Medical facilities
RAP 90 : Consider graveling whole Island to reduce dust emissions
-
-
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
-
-
-
Prevention Controls
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling > Toolbox talks
1A
-
R
-
Action complete
No action following ALARP review
H-22.13
Cadmium compounds & other heavy metals
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-22.14
Oil based sludges
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-22.15
Catalysts (fresh)
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-22.16
Catalysts (spent)
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Cuttings
Silica desiccants
Iron sulphide
Aluminium sulphate
Lime powder
Insecticides and poisons
Corrosive Substances
Hydroflouric acid
Hydrochloric acid
Sulphuric acid
Caustic soda
Spent caustic
Biological Hazards
Poisonous plants
Large animals
Small animals
-
-
-
-
-
H-23
H-23.01
H-23.02
H-23.03
H-23.04
H-23.05
H-24
H-24.01
H-24.02
H-24.03
Hazard
-
Hazard Ref.
Agip KCO
> Rats, birds, lizards
> Wolves/Seal
None Identified
Refer H-23.04
> Mud additive, pH modifier > Water treatment facilities
> Vehicle batteries (Electrolyte sealed)
None Identified
None Identified
> Pest control operations
> Water treatment
> Water treatment
> Filters
> Maintenance activities
> Drilling operations
Sources
> Health effects - systemic poisoning > Environmental effects ground contamination > Health effects - systemic poisoning > Environmental effects ground contamination > Health effects - systemic poisoning > Environmental effects ground contamination
Exposure to/ release
Exposure to/ release
Exposure to/ release
Presence of small animals, droppings
Present in Ice season
-
Contact with
Contact with
-
-
4B
4B
-
-
1A
10
-
-
1A
1A
1A
1A
1A
1A
P
1A
1A
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A
-
-
-
-
1A
10
-
-
1A
1A
1A
1A
1A
1A
E
Risk Potential
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
R
Prevention Controls
> Awareness, safety campaigns > PPE (safety boots, gloves, coveralls) > Housekeeping arrangements > Remote location
> Awareness, safety campaigns > PPE (safety boots, gloves, coveralls) > Housekeeping arrangements > Remote location
-
-
> Maintenance procedures > MSDS > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
> Material specification - MSDS > Storage and handling procedures
-
-
> Maintenance procedures > MSDS > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
> Maintenance procedures > MSDS > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
> Maintenance procedures > MSDS > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
> Maintenance procedures > MSDS > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
> Maintenance procedures > MSDS > Operating procedures > Training in chemical handling
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
-
-
> Medical facilities
> Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
> PPE > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
> Eye wash stations, safety showers > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
-
> PPE > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
-
> PPE > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
Actions/Comments Note: Cutting skips used if pneumatic system not available
> PPE > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
> PPE > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
> PPE > Eye wash stations, safety showers > Mobile spill clean-up units > Spill clean up procedures > Medical facilities
-
Risk Controls > Closed pneumatic conveying system into barges > CHCD produces no cuttings > Waste Management procedures
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
> Bites - potential fatalities, injuries > Health effects - disease > Electrical cabling damage
> Injury
-
-
> Health effects include skin/eye/respiratory irritation, nausea. chronic lung damage, > Environmental effects air pollution
Exposure to/ release
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Human error misconnection, mishandling, misuse
-
> Health effects > Environmental effects ground contamination
Exposure to/ release
> Equipment failure (corrosion, fatigue material defect, mechanical failure) > Human error mishandling, misuse
-
> Health effects - systemic poisoning > Environmental effects ground contamination
-
-
Exposure to/ release
> Health effects - systemic poisoning > Environmental effects ground contamination
> Environmental effects ground contamination
Loss of Containment
Exposure to/ release
Consequences
Top Event
-
-
-
> Human error mishandling, misuse
> Maintenance activities Human error mishandling, misuse
> Maintenance activities Human error mishandling, misuse
> Filter handling Maintenance activities Human error mishandling, misuse
> Maintenance activities Human error mishandling, misuse
> Conventional drilling operations - cuttings transfer
Threats
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 214 of 310
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 215 of 310
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
H-24.04
Food borne bacteria
> Cooking facilities
> Poor hygiene > Contaminated food stuffs
Exposure to
> Food poisoning > Salmonella
H-24.05
Water borne bacteria (e.g. Legionella)
> Potable water
> Maintenance activities > Routine operations
Exposure to
H-24.06
Parasitic insects
> Ticks, fleas
> Presence of parasitic insects
H-24.07
Disease transmitting insects
> Mosquitoes, ticks
H-24.08
Cold & flu virus
H-24.09
H-24.10
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
Risk Potential P
A
E
3C/4 B
4B
-
> Legionella > E Coli > Coliforms
4A
-
-
Contact with
> Bites, illness, disease
4B
-
> Presence of parasitic insects
Contact with
> Bites, yellow fever
4B
-
-
-
-
HIV
> HIV infected persons
>ER activities -exposure of first aiders/medics
Contact with body fluids
Other communicable diseases
> Hepatitis B > Typhoid
> Exposure to infected persons > Poor hygiene - food preparation areas, communal laundry, wash facilities
> Tetanus
H-25
Ergonomic Hazards
H-25.01
Manual materials handling
Risk Controls R
Prevention Controls
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
>Good house keeping > Maintenance of food preparation areas > Personnel training, awareness and cleanliness
> Medical facilities
-
-
> Good house keeping > Personnel awareness and cleanliness
> Medical facilities
See Bowtie H-24 Health Hazards
-
-
> Good house keeping > Personnel awareness and cleanliness
> Medical facilities
See Bowtie H-24 Heath Hazards
-
-
-
> Good house keeping > Personnel awareness and cleanliness
> Medical facilities
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Note: Colds and flu may spread in the camps. However, does not represent a significant HSE hazard, only a nuisance
> Contract HIV
4B
-
-
-
> Medic and first-aiders fully trained in dealing with injuries (use of gloves, artificial respirators, etc.).
Medical facilities
-
Exposure to
> Illness, potential fatality
4B
-
-
-
> Personnel awareness > Vaccination where appropriate as per Agip guidance
Medical facilities
-
> Workplace activities
Penetrating wound
> Illness, potential fatality
4B
-
-
-
> Personnel awareness > Vaccination where appropriate as per Agip guidance
Medical facilities
-
> TB
> Exposure to infected persons
Exposure to
> Illness, potential fatality
4B
-
-
-
> Personnel awareness > Vaccination where appropriate as per Agip guidance
Medical facilities
-
> Materials (sacks, drums, bags) > Equipment (valves, pumps) > Pipe handling
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities
Loss of control
> Dropped object > Serious injury, permanent disability > Asset damage
3A
1A
-
-
> Manual handling safety campaigns, posters, videos, toolbox talks etc. > Manual handling procedures (max lift weights). > General training and supervision.
Medical facilities
-
Repetitive actions
>Repetitive strain injury/ permanent disability
3A
-
-
-
> Manual handling safety campaigns, posters, videos, toolbox talks etc. > Manual handling procedures (max lift weights). > General training and supervision.
> Medical facilities
-
> Repetitive tool use
H-25.02
Damaging noise
> Rotating machinery compressors, pumps, engines > venting via diverter
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities > Flaring/venting via diverter
Exposure to excessive noise levels
> Noise induced hearing loss (permanent, partial disability)
3A
-
-
-
Generators separated from LQ
> Hearing protection mandatory in high noise areas > Hearing tests as part of recruitment medicals
RAP 91 : Complete noise survey and implement recommendations
H-25.03
Loud, steady noises >80dBA
> Generator house > Mud pump house > Shale shaker room > Air pump > Drilling rig
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities
Exposure to excessive noise levels
> Noise induced hearing loss (permanent, partial disability)
3A
-
-
-
-
> Hearing protection mandatory in high noise areas > Hearing tests as part of recruitment medicals
See above
Heat stress
See H-09.01
-
-
-
-
RAP 92 : Complete thermal comfort survey being and implement recommendations
H-25.04
-
-
-
-
-
Ensure noise issues are reviewed and remediated in any rig down/ rig up design reviews for using rigs at other locations.
Action complete H-25.05
Cold stress
See H-09.01
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-25.06
High humidity
See Weather
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Awareness campaign Water coolers
-
-
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Vibration
Work stations
Lighting
Incompatible hand controls
Awkward location of workplaces and machinery
Mismatch of work to physical abilities
Mismatch of work to cognitive abilities
Long & irregular working hours/ shifts
Poor organization and job design
Work planning issues
H-25.08
H-25.09
H-25.10
H-25.11
H-25.12
H-25.13
H-25.14
H-25.15
H-25.16
Hazard
H-25.07
Hazard Ref.
Agip KCO
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities
> SIMOPS > Interaction of jobs, concurrent jobs in same area e.g. common isolation blinds > Overloading personnel - poor scheduling > Time constraints, inadequate time to perform jobs properly
> Reorganisation, downsizing > Inadequate supervision /manning > Inadequate communications
> High demand for overtime work > High demands on staff > Fatigue > Stress > Absenteeism
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities
> Poor, inappropriate training > Failure to recognise a hazard situation > Language difficulties Dyslexia
> High heat areas > Manual handling of heavy equipment > Inability to wear respiratory protection equipment masks > Colour blindness > Physical strength and size > Medical conditions (e.g. weak heart) > Balance problems
> Accident > Illness
> Accident
> Accident
Human error
Human error
Human error
Accident
Human error
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
R
Prevention Controls
> Work planning and scheduling
> Work planning and scheduling
> Work planning and scheduling > Standard shift patterns for ex pats and locals
> Competence assessment > Training and induction programs, including e-learning packages > Training & Development Co-ordinator > Translators provided > Hiring policy includes language abilities
> Pre-hire and annual medicals for all staff and contractors > Health campaigns
> Personnel awareness and training > Near miss incident reporting and corrective actions
> Training and supervision of personnel in use of equipment controls
> Lighting requirements assessed during construction, commissioning and operations
> Personnel awareness > Workstation design
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
-
-
Note: Treated as an escalation for other hazards
Note: Treated as an escalation for other hazards
Note: Also treated as an escalation for other hazards
Note: Treated as an escalation for other hazards
> Medical facilities
> Medical facilities
Note: Treated as an escalation for other hazards
Action complete
RAP 94 : Carry out an ergonomic assessment of normally manned areas including an assessment of the ability to rescue injured personnel
Action complete
RAP 93 : Complete lighting survey and implement recommendations
-
-
Actions/Comments
> Medical facilities
> PPE > Medical facilities
-
-
-
> Medical facilities
Risk Controls > PTW system > Manual handling safety campaigns, posters, videos, toolbox talks etc. Manual handling procedures.
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
-
-
1C
-
-
Accident
Human error
-
2C
> Slip, trip, fall > Injury/strain
Exposure to awkward locations, positions
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities > Inadequate positioning of controls and valves > Inaccessible, cramped work locations > Equipment located at height/beyond reach
-
-
> Inadvertent operation, potentially unsafe condition
Incompatible controls
> Maintenance activities > Human error > Inadequate commissioning
-
-
-
A
Risk Potential
-
> Eye strain > Accident
Exposure to poor lighting
2B
Injury/strain/illness
Exposure to inadequate work stations
> Routine operations > Repetitive actions > Inadequate positioning of controls > Inaccessible, cramped work locations
> Enclosed areas > Night working - human error
2B
> Vibration white finger > Vibration induced equipment failure
Exposure to excessive vibration
P
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities
Consequences
Top Event
Threats
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities
> Routine operations > Maintenance activities
Derrick Shale Shaker Cutting handling system pickup/laydown machine area
Remote and local control panels
> Enclosed areas > Night working
> Offices > Drillers cabin > Workshops
> Hand tools (drills) > Substructure vibration (derrick)
Sources
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 216 of 310
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
H-25.17
Indoor climate
H-26
Psychological Hazards
H-26.01
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 217 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
> Offices > LQ > Cranes > Doghouse
> Failure of A/C system > High/low ambient temperatures
Exposure to high/low indoor temperatures
Living on the job/away from family
Offshore operations
> Shift pattern > Remote work location, isolation > Fatigue > Stress
H-26.02
Working and living on a live plant
Offshore operations
H-26.03
Post traumatic stress
H-27
Security Related Hazards
H-27.01
Consequences
Risk Potential
Risk Controls Prevention Controls
Actions/Comments
P
A
E
R
> Heat exhaustion, tiredness, illness > Accident
1B
-
-
-
> AC systems > Facility and equipment maintenance programme
-
Note: Treated as an escalation for other hazards
Increased staff turnover/ absenteeism
> Inadequate manning > Loss of skills, expertise > Illness > Accidents
1C
-
-
-
> Work planning and scheduling > Shift rota pattern
-
Note: Also treated as an escalation for other hazards
> Shift pattern > Remote work location, isolation > Fatigue > Stress
Increased staff turnover/ absenteeism
> Inadequate manning > Loss of skills, expertise > Illness > Accidents
1C
-
-
-
> Work planning and scheduling > Shift rota pattern
-
Note: Also treated as an escalation for other hazards
-
> Previous accidents
Increased stress/ Human Error
Illness/accidents
-
-
-
-
Counselling as needed following incidents
Medical facilities
Note: Treated as an escalation for other hazards
Piracy
-
Local civil unrest
Unwanted presence
> Hostage taking, injury, execution > Asset damage, loss of property
-
-
-
-
> Remote location
-
-
H-27.02
Assault
-
> Workplace stress > Disputes between workers
Action against facilities/ personnel
> Injury/fatality > Asset damage
-
-
-
-
> Remote location
-
-
H-27.03
Sabotage
-
> Disgruntled employees (internal) > Terrorism > Criminal activity
Action against facilities/ personnel
> Injury/fatality > Asset damage
-
-
-
-
> Remote location
-
-
H-27.04
Crisis
-
> Military action > Civil disturbance > Terrorism > Criminal activity
Action against facilities/ personnel
> Injury/fatality > Asset damage
-
-
-
-
> Region is relatively politically stable
> AGIP KCO crisis management system
-
H-27.05
Theft, pilferage
Tools Portable equipment Supplies Ancillary materials Personal belongings
> Insecure facilities
Action against facilities/ personnel
> Frequent, low level asset loss
-
-
-
-
> Remote location > permanent security
-
Note: Access to site over ice during the winter
H-28
Use of Natural Resources
H-28.01
Land take
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
See AGIP KCO Book 1: Offshore Complex Volume 5: Environmental Impact Assessment
H-28.02
Surface/Ground Water
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
See AGIP KCO Book 1: Offshore Complex Volume 5: Environmental Impact Assessment
H-28.03
Air
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
See AGIP KCO Book 1: Offshore Complex Volume 5: Environmental Impact Assessment
H-28.04
Trees, vegetation
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Artificial Island
H-28.05
Gravel
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
See AGIP KCO Book 1: Offshore Complex Volume 5: Environmental Impact Assessment
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
Agip KCO
Hazard Ref.
Hazard
H-28.06
Habitat and Wildlife
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 - October 2008 Page 218 of 310
Sources
Threats
Top Event
Consequences
Risk Potential
Risk Controls
P
A
E
R
Prevention Controls
Actions/Comments
Mitigation/Recovery Controls
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
See AGIP KCO Book 1: Offshore Complex Volume 5: Environmental Impact Assessment
H-29
Medical
H-29.01
Medical unfitness
Refer to H-24.09 and H24.10
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-29.02
Motion sickness
None Identified
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-30
Dangerous Goods
H-30.01
Dangerous goods in transport activities
Addressed elsewhere (various)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H-98
Emergency Response
H-98.01
Island evacuation – Summer Season
See H-01.02
-
-
-
1B
-
-
-
IBEEVs available in Summer season Open Water season ERP in effect
-
Island evacuation – Winter Season
See H-01.02
-
-
-
2A
-
-
-
IBEEVs available in Winter season IBSV maintains primary and secondary broken ice channels Ice season ERP in effect
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 219 of 310
Appendix C Safety Critical Task Catalogue
Table C1 : Summary List of Safety Critical Tasks Table C2 : Detailed Description of Safety Critical Tasks
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 220 of 310 Table C1 : Summary List of Safety Critical Tasks
Code DI-01 DI-01.01 DI-01.02 DI-01.03 DI-01.04 DI-01.05 DI-01.06 DI-01.07 DI-02 DI-02.01 DI-02.02 DI-02.03 DI-02.04 DI-03 DI-03.01 DI-03.02 DI-03.03 DI-04 DI-04.01 DI-04.02 DI-04.03 DI-04.04 DI-04.05 DI-04.06 DI-04.07 DI-04.08 DI-04.09 DI-04.10 DI-04.11
Name Design and Construction Design of rigs 401 and 402 D-Island design Design of LQ and TR Design of well Design of IBEEVs Design and construction of marine fleet Equipment Design Well Project Management Drilling Site Surveys Prepare well design, drilling and completions programme Manage & co-ordinate third party specialist contractors Follow drilling and completions programmes Specialist Well Services Conduct mud logging operations Carry out cementing operations Manage TCP Operations Drill Rig/Well Control Operations Perform routine drill floor checks Monitor & secure well Perform pit & kick drills Manage drill floor operations Monitoring of drilling material inventories Review drilling and completions programmes Manage mud circulating/conditioning systems Implement shallow gas procedures Implement H2S procedures Monitor fluid volumes Manage mud / LCM supplies D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Responsible Design and Construction Design and Construction Design and Construction Design and Construction Design and Construction AKCO Offshore Project Manager Design and Construction Design and Construction Well Operations Manager D-Island Drilling Superintendent D-Island Drilling Superintendent Mud Logger Driller TCP Specialist Driller Driller Driller Toolpusher Installation Superintendent Toolpusher Derrickman Toolpusher D-Island OIM Driller Mud Engineer
Agip KCO
Code DI-05 DI-05.01 DI-05.02 DI-05.03 DI-05.04 DI-05.05 DI-05.06 DI-05.07 DI-05.08 DI-05.09 DI-05.10 DI-06 DI-06.01 DI-06.02 DI-06.03 DI-06.04 DI-06.05 DI-06.06 DI-06.07 DI-06.08 DI-06.09 DI-06.10 DI-07 DI-07.01 DI-07.02 DI-07.03 DI-07.04 DI-07.05
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 221 of 310
Name Responsible Lifting/Hoisting Operations Maintain certification of lifting equipment Lifting Equipment Supervisor Conduct crane/lifting operations Crane Operator Monitor the use of scaffolding Contractor Rig Superintendent Manage manriding on drilling rigs Toolpusher Rig up of lifting equipment Rigger Supervise lifting activities Lifting Equipment Supervisor Certification of lifting equipment Lifting Equipment Supervisor Carry out lifting operations using safe systems of work Crane Operator Oversee lifting operation Banksman Crane and scaffolding pre-mobilization inspections HSE Advisor Maintenance of Rig/D-Island Equipment and Systems Maintenance, inspection and testing of critical electrical equipment & systems Electrical Technician Maintenance, inspection and testing of critical drilling rig mechanical systems and Mechanic/mechanical engineer equipment Maintenance, inspection and testing of critical drilling/well control equipment Mechanic/mechanical engineer Maintenance, inspection and testing of critical emergency equipment and systems Mechanic/mechanical engineer Maintenance, inspection and testing of emergency shut-down systems Electrical Technician Maintenance, inspection and testing of portable electrical equipment Electrical Technician Maintain, inspection and testing of mobile equipment Mechanic/mechanical engineer Account for Safety Harnesses Warehouseman Maintain cascade and emergency SCBA equipment H2S Advisor Maintenance, inspection and testing of Non drilling rig critical mechanical systems and Supervisor services equipment Management of LQ and TR Maintenance of LQ/ TR infrastructure and safety critical systems Barge Engineer Carry out water sampling and air quality checks Barge Master Store Food Appropriately LQ/TR Camp Boss Carry out routine kitchen Inspections LQ/TR Camp Boss Provide LQ domestic and kitchen personnel suitable protective clothing LQ/TR Camp Boss
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
DI-11.06 DI-11.07 DI-11.08 DI-11.09 DI-11.10 DI-11.11 DI-11.12 DI-11.13
DI-11.04 DI-11.05
DI-11.03
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Maintain Primary and Secondary Ice channels Ice Breaking Standby Vessel / Standby Vessel Master Marine Operations Maintain, inspect and test all marine vessels and safety related equipment Marine Logistic Supervisor Ensure that all marine vessel passengers and crew have and can use appropriate PPE Marine Vessel Master and that emergency equipment is available Maintain marine vessels passive and active fire/toxic gas detection and fire fighting Marine Vessel Chief Engineer systems Maintenance, inspection and testing of vessel critical electrical equipment & systems Marine Vessel Chief Engineer Maintenance, inspection and testing of vessel critical mechanical systems and Marine Vessel Chief Engineer equipment Maintain, inspect and test vessel communications systems Marine Vessel Chief Engineer Monitor and control marine vessel operations Marine Vessel Master Implement drugs and alcohol policy on marine vessels Marine Vessel Master Maintain ship to shore communications AGIP-KCO Marine Superintendent Maintain shipping channels free of hazards to shipping District Logistics Manager Manage diving operations Diving Contractor Maintain 24 hour radio/communications watch Marine Radio Operator Implement check-in procedure, safety briefing and passenger/freight checks Marine Logistic Supervisor
District Logistics Manager Ice Breaking Standby Vessel / Standby Vessel Master
D-Island Medic Agip-KCO Doctor on-shore D-Island Medic
Helicopter Landing Officer AGIP Aviation Radio Operator Helicopter Pilot
DI-10.03 DI-11 DI-11.01 DI-11.02
Responsible
Name Helicopter Operations Manage helicopter take-off/landing operations at D-Island Carry out helicopter contractor audit Assist helicopter operations - communications Manage helicopter safety during flights Medical Support Provide medical/First Aid support Co-ordinate /arrange Medevac Ensure First Aid available at all times Standby Vessel/Ice Breaking Standby Vessel Carry out audit of SBV/IBSV contractor(s) Manage IBSV/SBV operations and emergency response drills
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 222 of 310
Code DI-08 DI-08.01 DI-08.02 DI-08.03 DI-08.04 DI-09 DI-09.01 DI-09.02 DI-09.03 DI-10 DI-10.01 DI-10.02
Agip KCO
Agip KCO
Code DI-12 DI-12.01 DI-12.02 DI-12.03 DI-12.04 DI-12.05 DI-12.06 DI-12.07 DI-12.08 DI-12.10 DI-12.11 DI-12.12 DI-12.13 DI-12.14 DI-12.15 DI-13 DI-14 DI-14.01 DI-14.02 DI-14.03 DI-14.04 DI-14.05 DI-14.06 DI-14.07 DI-14.08 DI-14.09 DI-14.10 DI-14.11 DI-14.12
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 223 of 310
Name HSE Management/Supervision Implement safe system of work Implement task risk identification / safety behaviour recognition programme Authorize installation of third party equipment Carry out induction/safety briefings Ensure that appropriate PPE is used and emergency equipment is available Implement management of change system Carry out hygiene inspections Maintain high quality hygiene conditions Implement waste management procedures Update safety cases Manage daily operation of D-Island PTW systems Collect and analyse data and provide ice management information Carry out safety awareness campaigns and training Issue permit for confined space entry work Not used Competence Assurance Ensure appropriate training/competence of personnel on D-island (Drilling Ops) Ensure appropriate training/competence of third party contractors (Drilling Ops) Ensure appropriate training/competence of LQ/TR personnel Ensure appropriate training/competence of IBSV/SBV master and crew Implement safe working at height procedures Ensure appropriate training/competency of catering contractors Ensure appropriate training/competence in use of emergency breathing systems General technical training and competency Training, competence and continual assessment of marine vessel personnel Carry out pre and post hire audits of marine contractor vessels Contractor Selection and Performance Monitoring Audit Crane operations
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Responsible D-Island OIM D-Island OIM D-Island Drilling Superintendent HSE Advisor HSE Advisor Agip-KCO Operations Director D-Island Medic LQ/TR Camp Boss Waste Management Coordinator Agip-KCO Operations Director Permit to Work Coordinator Ice Advisor HSE Advisor Permit to Work Coordinator
D-Island Drilling Superintendent Drilling Supervisor (Company Man) Barge Master Agip-KCO Operations Director Contractor Rig Superintendent LQ/TR Camp Boss H2S Advisor D-Island OIM Marine Logistic Supervisor Marine Logistic Supervisor District Logistics Manager HSE Advisor
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 224 of 310
Code DI-15 DI-15.01 DI-15.02 DI-15.03
Name Emergency Response Maintain emergency response capability Maintain POB accounting Provide onshore emergency support
Responsible
DI-15.04 DI-15.05 DI-15.06 DI-15.09 DI-15.10 DI-15.11 DI-15.12 DI-15.13 DI-15.14 DI-16 DI-16.01 DI-16.02 DI-16.03
Ensure adequate fire fighting/survival training Conduct regular emergency drills Implement emergency plans Implement neighbouring facility emergency response Implement SBV/IBSV emergency response Implement emergency response for LQ/TR Emergency Response Communicated Provide Emergency response for marine vessels Perform emergency response drills at all marine vessels IBEEV Operations Manage IBEEV operations and emergency response drills Maintain IBEEV Systems Audit LQ/TR facilities
D-Island OIM D-Island OIM D-Island OIM Neighbouring Facility OIM Ice Breaking Standby Vessel / Standby Vessel Master Barge Master Radio Operator Marine Logistic Supervisor Marine Vessel Master
D-Island OIM Radio Operator Agip-KCO Operations Director
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
IBEEV Master IBEEV Chief Engineer IBEEV Chief Engineer
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 225 of 310 Table C2 : Detailed Description of Safety Critical Tasks
AKCO Offshore Project Manager Activity DI-01.06
Name Design and construction of marine fleet
Description Ensure that all vessels meet Agip KCO standards and are to subject regular inspection
Associated Documents • Vessel design documents
Verification Marine survey reports
Design and Construction Activity DI-01.01
Name Design of rigs 401 and 402
Description Details of the drill rigs are presented in the Basis of Design Document number KE02B4-140-NO-C-RB-0001-000 Basis of Design, See Part 2 HSE Case
Associated Documents • KE01-B0-000-AK-A-RE-0009-000, EP Offshore Statement of Requirements. infrastructure in support of EER and Logistics During Project Operations at A and D Blocks • Agip KCO 2003-0689 – Provision of development drilling units – Scope of works and Technical specifications • KE02-B4-140-NO-C-RB-0001-000 Drilling facilities - basis of design
Verification Internal Assurance Audits completed
DI-01.02
D-Island design
• RoK Regulatory Requirements, AgipKCO Standards, International Standards, Design Studies including HAZIDs, HAZOPs, QRA and CFD modelling
Internal Assurance Audits completed
DI-01.03
Design of LQ and TR
D-Island Drilling Island design for climatic conditions and suitable for planned drilling and production operations. Safety critical systems in place including wind socks provided to indicate of wind direction are located at corners of drilling island. See Part 2 HSE Case LQ/TR design see Part 2 HSE Case
• KE01-B0-000-AK-A-RE-0009-000, EP Offshore Statement of Requirements. infrastructure in support of EER and Logistics During Project Operations at A and D Blocks • Schedule A1 Special Terms and Conditions Contract for Temporary Living Quarters between Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company N.V. and Goshen International B.V. CONTRACT NO. AGIP KCO/ 2004-1064 • Schedule D Scope Of Work Contract for Temporary Refuge Unit between Agip
Internal Assurance Audits completed
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 226 of 310
Activity
Name
Description
Associated Documents Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company and Uniteam International AS CONTRACT NO. AGIP KCO/ 2004-1063
DI-01.04
Design of well
Overbalance Drilling Primary Barrier - Drilling Fluid
• GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Safety Critical Systems Performance Well Construction Manual Standards verification scheme • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP) • GE00.WEL.A00.MA.0001.000: CHCD Operations, General Procedures Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0002.000; Well Operations Engineering Manual • GE00.WEL.K00.PR.0001.000: Well Design & Construction Process Flowchart • GE00.WEL.H00.MA.0001.000: Winter Well Operations and Ice Alert Manual • KE01.00.000.AK.A.RE.0019.000: Kashagan EP Well Design and Completion Basis
CHC Drilling Primary Barrier • mud and sacrificial fluid; • pumps for mud and sacrificial fluid; • power system for pumps; • sealing capability of rotating circulating head (RCH); • supply of mud and sacrificial fluid; • kill/choke line for mud cap; and • kill/choke valve
DI-01.05
Design of IBEEVs
DI-01.07
Equipment Design
DI-02.01
Drilling Site Surveys
Secondary Barrier • Casing shoe; • Casing; • Wellhead seal; • Kill/choke valves; and • BOP Design of casing linear material appropriate for reservoir, geology characteristics Design of casing shoe material appropriate for reservoir geology characteristics The IBEEV is an escape craft for use in emergency situations only. It is not normally manned, nor does it have facilities for crew to stay on-board. The IBEEV has been designed as an independent sea-going vessel, with limited ice-breaking capability, complying with all relevant Classification Society rules. See Part 2 HSE Case Design of modules and equipment includes suitable and sufficient lifting points to allow control whilst lifting. Centre of gravity calculations performed to allow safe lifting plan to be prepared. The appropriate location specific surveys have are carried out (e.g. seismic survey).
Verification
• IBEEV Basis of Design • IBEEV Model Ice Test Programme
Safety Critical Systems Performance Standards verification scheme Sea trials
• Equipment design documents
Field verification.
• Drilling surveys and field data
Review of survey data by the Drilling Contractor
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 227 of 310
Description Ensure that survey reports are passed to the Drilling Contractor for review and relevant information incorporated into operational planning (e.g. H2S contingency plan, shallow gas contingency plan, etc.).
Associated Documents
Verification Location specific contingency plans (e.g. H2S, Shallow Gas) Seismic Survey has been conducted - in drilling program.
Neighbouring Facility OIM Activity DI-15.09
Name Implement neighbouring facility emergency response
Description Inform D-Island of nature and extent of incident at facility to enable D-Island to take precautionary measures as appropriate
Associated Documents • Deutag Drilling, Kazakhstan Branch: HSE Case for the Provision of Drilling Rig T-47 and Living Quarters to Agip KCO
Verification Post incident reports and investigation
Activity DI-02.03
Name Manage & co-ordinate third party specialist contractors
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • GE00.KST.K10.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Corporate Management System (CMS) Manual • GE00.HSE.H20.SS.0001.000: Schedule D, Health, Safety and Environmental in Contracts (referred to within Schedule E of the EP contracts) • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
Verification Contractor HSE Accident/ Near Miss Report forms. Completed PTW forms Complete 3rd party equipment authorization forms
DI-04.09
Implement H2S procedures
Description Ensure that all third party specialist well services contractors (e.g. mud loggers, well testing contractors, cementing contractors etc.) are managed and coordinated in accordance with the relevant industry, third party specialist and Agip-KCO standards and procedures. Ensure all third party contractors are made aware of the safe systems of work adopted on the D-Island/rig (PTW) and that all third party equipment is suitable for use on the D-Island/rig(s). Note responsibility is devolved to AGIP KCO Drilling Rig Superintendent for drilling operations Implement rig/D-Island specific H2S procedures. Oversee the activities of specialist H2S contractors who provide and install additional equipment (including BA sets, cascade systems, gas detectors). Ensure all equipment is suitable for H2S duty.
• D-Island Safety Handbook • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan
Daily Report
DI-12.01
Implement safe system of work
Implement safe system of work and manage the D-Island PTW system for all routine and non-routine work activities where appropriate. Ensure that the permit forms are being correctly completed, posted and that the
• Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure
PTW records OIM daily walkabout
D-Island OIM
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 228 of 310
Activity
Name
Description appropriate/required PPE is being used by personnel involved in the work. Ensure all Hot Work, vessel entry, working at height is controlled by the PTW system. PTW system for non-routine operations. Audit for compliance.
Associated Documents • Agip-KCO Competency Assurance Programme • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure • KE00.LOG.O00.GL.0001.000 Adverse Working Weather Guidelines
Verification
DI-12.02
Implement task risk identification / safety behaviour recognition programme
• GE00.HSE.H20.MF.0002.000: Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) Framework Document • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure
Record of TRIC Talks/Meetings Safety Behaviour Recognition System
DI-12.03
Authorize installation of third party equipment
Ensure that task risk identification talks (Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure)are routinely held prior to all routine and nonroutine work activities, and that Job Hazard Analysis is carried out and communicated by TRIC (Toolbox talk Risk Identification Card) as required. These pre-job reviews should serve to identify potential hazards associated with the activity/operation and define the appropriate control measures. All relevant personnel involved in the activity/operation should be in attendance at the toolbox and encouraged to participate and develop the safe working practices. Ensure Safety Behaviour Recognition Program - SAFE-R [Shaping an Accident Free EnvironmentReporting] is implemented and ensure all personnel are actively participating in the program. Confirm that all third party equipment/systems (e.g. well test equipment) to be installed to support drilling/well test activities received has been fully maintained, inspected and tested and provided with full, current certification of fitness for use. ESD systems on third party equipment should be function tested before use. Audit/review contractors QA system.
• GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • Change Control Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • GE00.KST.K00.PR.0004.000: Change Management Framework
Authorization Records Completed PTW forms Temporary Equipment Log
• Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • Agip KCO Corporate Safety Directive D3.11 - Competence
Training Records Ongoing Performance Evaluation CVs Competency Assessment Records
Ensure that the Agip-KCO third party equipment authorization procedure is fully implemented and the PTW system applied where appropriate. DI-14.01
Ensure appropriate training/competence of personnel on D-island (Drilling Ops)
Ensure that all D-Island personnel are competent in carrying out their duties, in particular the Driller and drill crew; Maintenance supervisors and crew; Fire
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Name
General technical training and competency
Maintain emergency response capability
Activity
DI-14.08
DI-15.01
Agip KCO
Verification Radio Operator in possession of RoK certification Food hygiene course passed by catering crew is RoK legal requirement
Personnel Training Records; Training packages; HSE & management audit.
Current Emergency Response Procedures Pre-incident plans Emergency response drills/exercises
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • Agip-KCO Competency Assurance Programme
• GE00.HSE.H20.QP.0001.000 Agip KCO HSE Training Plan • Agip-KCO Competency Assurance Programme • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure
• GE00.HSE.H20.MF.0004.000: Incident Investigation and Reporting Process Framework • KE01-B0-000-AK-A-RE-0009-000, EP Offshore Statement of Requirements. infrastructure in support of EER and Logistics During Project Operations at A and D Blocks • Agip-KCO Occupational Health
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Description team; HLO; Radio Operator(s); Medic/First Aiders; Crane operators; roustabouts and catering personnel. All personnel should be competent to carry out all the routine and non-routine duties expected of them, including all supervisory roles and checks required of them. All Drill/Rig Crew should have undergone the relevant formal training appropriate for their position and duty. Ensure rig crew are aware of their HSE critical tasks and ensure HSE Policy and Mandatory Rules are followed. Ensure the night Toolpusher (NTP) supervises/checks that manual calculation of ton-miles is performed. Ensure that all personnel carrying out lifting and materials handling operations are suitably experienced, trained and competent to carry out all the routine and non routine duties expected of them. That they have undergone the relevant formal training appropriate for their position and duty. Maintain personnel training records and review to identify where individuals require refresher and/ or additional training. For example ensure that: - ER Team members have suitable training for their ER role. - Drivers have appropriate license. - Personnel undergo training for working at height, including identification and use of appropriate anchors. - Confined space entry training package is completed by anyone required to perform confined space entry or be standby man. - Electricians are trained to work on live/HV systems as required Maintain up to date emergency response procedures/plans which define the appropriate emergency response actions, roles and responsibilities in response to major accidents, such as, blow-out, fire/explosion, extreme weather, helicopter emergency, oil spill/environmental emergency (OBM, diesel), MEDEVAC. During the ice season ensure IBSV is available and maintaining ice channel. The procedures should define roles
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Name
Ensure adequate fire fighting/survival training
Conduct regular emergency drills
Implement emergency plans
Activity
DI-15.04
DI-15.05
DI-15.06
Agip KCO
• Agip-KCO Occupational Health Department Policies and Procedures • Combined/Simultaneous Operation HSE
In the event of an emergency situation, implement emergency plans in accordance with established emergency procedures.
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
• Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • Agip-KCO Occupational Health Department Policies and Procedures • Combined/Simultaneous Operation HSE Bridging Documents, HSE Execution Plans • GE00.HSE.H30.QP.0001.000: Agip KCO Oil Spill Response Plan • Well Control Response Manual • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan • GE00.DHS.H00.GL.0002.000 Guide to emergency drills offshore and onshore
Associated Documents Department Policies and Procedures • Combined/Simultaneous Operation HSE Bridging Documents, HSE Execution Plans • GE00.HSE.H20.YT.0003.000: Agip KCO ER Strategy • GE00.HSE.H20.YP.0002.000: Agip KCO ER Philosophy • GE00.HSE.H30.QP.0001.000: Agip KCO Oil Spill Response Plan • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan • GE00.DHS.H20.GL.0003.000 Falls to Ice - Rescue • Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • Agip-KCO Competency Assurance Programme • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan
All personnel will receive the appropriate emergency response training and be made aware of the various alarms and expected responses. Regular emergency drills should be conducted to test the emergency plans, mustering and the escape, evacuation and rescue arrangements. weekly tests carried out on audible and visual alarm systems. Specialist training provided for fire fighting, helicopter support teams, personnel rescue teams as appropriate. Drills should include the requirement to muster at primary and alternative muster stations. Carry out drills and exercises to planned programme. Conduct drills using Emergency Response Procedures.
Agip KCO to ensure that all personnel visiting/working offshore have completed basic fire fighting and survival training. including Helicopter Underwater Escape Training (HUET). Ensure that key personnel have been trained in their emergency duties.
Description and responsibilities, escape, evacuation and rescue arrangements, the formal chain of command, communications arrangements and interfaces with Agip-KCO and Contractors. Key actions such as the role of the fire team and isolation/control of ignition sources alternative muster points should be identified.
Post incident investigation and reports
Emergency Response Drill/Exercise Reports Station Bill
Training Certificates Maintenance logs for BA and gas detection equipment Agip HSE and H2S Induction records Life Safety Apparatus and Fire Fighting Equipment plans
Verification
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Name
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Audit of Third Party Contractors Management Systems Training Records Contractor Competency Assessment
• GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • Agip KCO HSE Audit Programme • GE00.HSE.H20.MF.0001.000: Agip KCO HSE Management System Manual
Carry out pre-hire and post hire audits to ensure that IBSV/SBV master and crew are suitably experienced, trained and competent and can carry out all the routine and nonroutine duties expected of them, including any supervisory roles or checks. Ensure
Ensure appropriate training/competence of IBSV/SBV master and crew
DI-14.04
A-Island Safety Case D-Island Safety Case
• Deutag Drilling, Kazakhstan Branch: HSE Case for the Provision of Drilling Rig T-47 and Living Quarters to Agip KCO
Ensure that A-Island safety case, emergency response procedures are updated to include impact on operations at D-Island and vice versa
Verification
Update safety cases
DI-12.11
Associated Documents Bridging Documents, HSE Execution Plans • GE00.HSE.H30.QP.0001.000: Agip KCO Oil Spill Response Plan • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan
Associated Documents Verification • GE00.KST.K03.PR.0001.000: Risk Completed design reviews Management Framework Authorisation for engineering modification • GE00.KST.K00.PR.0004.000: Change Management Framework • GE00.KST.K60.MA.0001.000: Information Management System Manual
Description Carry out risk assessment to assess which DIsland operations should be stopped. Coordinate personnel mustering to TR, transfer of personnel from TR to IBEEV & evacuation of D-Island. Take on role of On Scene Commander and co-ordinate the emergency response. Stop all hot work in the event of alarm. Ensure that a suitable standby vessel is available at all times. Ensure at all times that there is either a FRC or any other vessel capable of rescuing personnel from the water/broken ice. During Ice season ensure that ice channels are maintained. Minimize potential sources of ignition by control of Hot Work activities and good housekeeping practices to minimise accumulations of flammable material.
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Description Ensure that all modifications to the rig/DIsland facilities are carried out in accordance with Agip-KCO procedures and standards. All modifications shall be subject to a formal, documented design review prior to any work being carried out. Use of tools such as HAZOP/HAZID, Task Risk Assessment. Derrick structure designed to tolerate maximum possible loads with a safety margin.
Name Implement management of change system
Activity DI-12.06
Agip-KCO Operations Director
Activity
Agip KCO
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
DI-15.03
Provide onshore emergency support
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Description IBSV/SBV crew have undergone the relevant formal training (appropriate for their position and duty) and operate in accordance with the relevant industry, RoK, and AGIP KCO standards and procedures. Provide onshore support in the event of an emergency offshore. Provide/procure the necessary resources (e.g. onshore emergency response room, medical facilities, vessels, oil spill response resources etc.). Participate in joint onshore/offshore emergency response drills to test the effectiveness of the arrangements.
Associated Documents
Verification
• Agip-KCO Occupational Health Emergency drill reports Department Policies and Procedures Incident Reports • KE01-B0-000-AK-A-RE-0009-000, EP Offshore Statement of Requirements. infrastructure in support of EER and Logistics During Project Operations at A and D Blocks • GE00.HSE.H30.QP.0001.000: Agip KCO Oil Spill Response Plan • Agip KCO Aviation and marine search and rescue capability in the Caspian Region • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan • GE00.DHS.H00.QP.0001.000 Atyrau Crisis Management Plan
D-Island Drilling Superintendent Activity DI-02.04
Name Follow drilling and completions programmes
Description Ensure that the Agip KCO drilling and completions programmes are followed and the well engineered/constructed/completed as per the well design. Ensure that the drilling and completions programmes are fully understood by rig offshore supervisors.
Associated Documents • Agip KCO D-Island Well Drilling Schedule • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Construction Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP) • GE00.WEL.D30.MA.0001.000: Agip-KCO Well Completion Testing Manual • KG.00.DRL.D10.MA.0001.000: Well Operations Programmes Kashagan Field Drilling Manual • DCSG#14 – Atyrau 12, 13 March 2008 Well Completion Strategy
Verification Review/Supervision by Drilling Supervisor (Company Man) Daily Report IADC Report
DI-14.02
Ensure appropriate training/competence of third party contractors (Drilling Ops)
Ensure that all the contractors employed to support the drilling operations (e.g. well testing contractors, mud logging contractors, drilling fluid contracts etc.) are suitably experienced, trained and competent and can carry out all the routine and non-routine
• Agip KCO Corporate Safety Directive D3.11 - Competence • D-Island Safety Handbook • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.SS.0001.000: Schedule D,
Audit of Third Party Contractors Management Systems Training Records Performance Evaluation
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 233 of 310
Description duties expected of them, including any supervisory roles or checks. All such contractor personnel should have undergone the relevant formal training (appropriate for their position and duty) and operate in accordance with the relevant industry, AGIP KCO standards and procedures. All third party activities to be planned and approved as appropriate prior to commencing. Conduct regular audits of all third party contractor HSE Management arrangements.
Associated Documents Health, Safety and Environmental in Contracts (referred to within Schedule E of the EP contracts)
Verification
Description Agip KCO doctor to provide medical support to personnel on island, co-ordinating with offshore medic. Advise medevac when necessary. Ensure that medevac drills are carried out on regular basis and that lessons learned are incorporated into procedures
Associated Documents • D-Island Station Bill • Agip-KCO Occupational Health Department Policies and Procedures • Eni – E&P Division Operating Procedures for Medical Emergency Evacuation • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan • GE00.DIS.A50.PR.0001 District Medical Emergency Response Procedure
Verification Incident investigation and reports Post drill review and reports
Description Conduct a pre-hire audit of helicopter contractor to establish their suitability for use during drilling operations. The audit should address factors such as contractor personnel (pilot, ground staff, maintenance) competence and training, maintenance procedures and operating procedures. The audit should cover all relevant HSE aspects including lifesaving equipment standard, preflight briefings and emergency response procedures. The helicopters selected for use should be suitable for the helideck(s). All Helicopter Contractors should meet AGIP KCO standards and procedures, and conform to applicable international
Associated Documents • Agip KCO HSE Audit Programme • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.MF.0001.000: Agip KCO HSE Management System Manual
Verification Agip KCO Contractor Audit reports
Agip-KCO Doctor on-shore Activity DI-09.02
Name Co-ordinate /arrange Medevac
AGIP KCO Aviation Activity DI-08.02
Name Carry out helicopter contractor audit
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 234 of 310
Description legislation. Ensure that Helicopter Operator carries pre-flight briefings etc. prior to flight to D-Island.
Associated Documents
Verification
Description Prepare well design, formal drilling and completions program for D-Island wells. Ensure that the well design and completions program are issued to the Drilling and specialists contractors for review and operational planning purposes. Key issues should be raised (e.g. H2S, shallow gas) to allow the appropriate contingency measures to be planned and implemented by the Contractors. Seismic survey has been conducted - in drilling programme. To review with plan operations accordingly.
Associated Documents • KE02-B4-140-NO-C-RB-0001-000 Drilling facilities - basis of design • GE00.HSE.H20.GL.0002.000: Agip KCO HSEQ Policy Statement • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Construction Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP) • GE00.WEL.D30.MA.0001.000: Agip-KCO Well Completion Testing Manual • GE00.HSE.H20.QH.0001.000 Company HSE Plan
Verification Review of drilling program/well design by the Drilling Contractor Location specific contingency plans
Well Operations Manager Activity DI-02.02
Name Prepare well design, drilling and completions programme
AGIP KCO HSE Advisor Activity DI-05.10
Name Crane and scaffolding pre-mobilization inspections
Description Conduct pre-mobilization inspections for cranes, piling rigs and scaffolding to ensure that they meet specification, including: - certification; - maintenance records; - physical integrity; - cranes have functioning load indicators; - all cranes have load fall arresters; - SWL displayed on cranes and piling rigs
Associated Documents Verification • Equipment design documents Completed inspection check-list. • Equipment maintenance and operating instructions • GE00.AUD.K00.PR.0001.000 Internal Assurance Management Framework • GE00.HSE.H20.SS.0001.000: Schedule D, Health, Safety and Environmental in Contracts (referred to within Schedule E of the EP contracts)
DI-12.04
Carry out induction/safety briefings
Ensure that all personnel arriving on D-Island receive a formal safety induction and D-Island orientation briefing. Personnel should be briefed on the alarm, escape, muster, evacuation and rescue arrangements on D-Island and the general safe working practices/systems adopted. All personnel should be taken on an orientation walkdown and shown the evacuation
• D-Island Safety Handbook • Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • AGIP-KCO HSEQ Policy Statement • GE00.HRO.K14.PY.0001.000: Alcohol and Substance Abuse Policy
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Records of Briefings.
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
DI-12.05
Ensure that appropriate PPE is used and emergency equipment is available
DI-12.14
Carry out safety awareness campaigns and training
DI-14.12
Audit Crane operations
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Description arrangements. Prior to leaving D-Island all personnel should attend a helicopter pre-flight safety briefing. Maintain the T-card personnel registration system for accounting for all POB during an emergency. Personnel brief includes guidance on hygiene e.g. no work clothes in LQ, fluid intake, exposure to heat and cold etc.. All personnel to be supplied with appropriate PPE and Emergency equipment e.g. gas tight hoods, survival/immersion suits, and any additional equipment identified, as appropriate. Ensure adequate numbers of PPE and emergency equipment are maintained. Ensure equipment is periodically inspected to confirm its correct functioning / condition. Ensure that all personnel on board LQs have a smoke hood within their grab bag and are suitably trained in its use. Ensure that all personnel are trained to use safety critical systems including: > PPE > Harnesses > SCBA > LQ/TR airlock > IBEEV airlock and CO2 scrubbing units Carrying out themed safety awareness campaigns including > use of PPE > Hygiene > Dehydration > Exposure (heat and cold) > Hydrogen Sulphide > Lifting and handling > Confined space entry Perform periodic HSE audits of Crane operations. Audits address factors such as: - Maintenance and operating procedures/ records. - Training and competence of staff (training records, working hours etc.). - Suitability of vehicles and equipment. - Provision of appropriate PPE and safety equipment
Associated Documents
Verification
• GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • D-Island Safety Handbook
Inspection of work sites Records of Emergency Equipment Checks. Life Saving Apparatus and Fire Fighting Equipment plans
• Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • Agip KCO Corporate Safety Directive D-3.11 - Competence • GE00.HSE.H20.QP.0001.000 Agip KCO HSE Training Plan
Awareness campaign brochures and booklets Agip-KCO passports
• GE00.DHS.H20.PR.0001.000 Audit reports. Personnel Lifting • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0011.000 Safety of Lifting and Cargo Handling Operations
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
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IBEEV Master Activity DI-16.01
Name Manage IBEEV operations and emergency response drills
Description Carry out regular drills to ensure fast response to emergency on D-Island. Ensure that all emergency equipment including medical facilities are well maintained. Manage IBEEV airlocks to control number of personnel using airlock at any one time
Associated Documents • GE00.OPS.N00.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Marine Manual • IBEEV Operating and Maintenance Procedures • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan
Verification IBEEV log
IBEEV Chief Engineer Activity DI-16.02
Name Maintain IBEEV Systems
Description Associated Documents Carry out routine maintenance of IBEEV safety • IBEEV Operating and Maintenance critical systems including: engines, airlocks, air Procedures systems
DI-16.03
Audit LQ/TR facilities
Carry out regular reviews and audits of LQ/TR safety critical systems. Ensure that maintenance is adequate and that any deficiencies are addressed as soon as practicable
Verification IBEEV maintenance records
• KE01.00.000.AK.H.PR.0613.000: HSE Audit reports Performance Monitoring and Reporting • Schedule A1 Special Terms and Conditions Contract for Temporary Living Quarters between Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company N.V. and Goshen International B.V. CONTRACT NO. AGIP KCO/ 2004-1064 • LQ and TR operating and maintenance procedures/manuals • GE00.AUD.K00.PR.0001.000 Internal Assurance Management Framework
Permit to Work Coordinator Activity DI-12.12
Name Manage daily operation of D-Island PTW systems
Description Control issue of PTWs on D-Island. Review proposed work programmes and risk assessments with Agip-KCO and Contract personnel. Manage conflicting requirements. Ensure permits specify safety requirements. Maintain register of inhibits. Control crane over ride keys
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • GE00.KST.K03.PR.0001.000: Risk Management Framework • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.QP.0001.000 Agip KCO HSE Training Plan
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Verification Permit to Work records Risk assessments
Agip KCO
Activity DI-12.15
Name Issue permit for confined space entry work
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Description Ensure that confined space entry work are carried out: - In line with procedures including requirement for a standby man and no lone working. - Limit number of personnel entering confined spaces to those that are essential. - Permits are obtained and control measures implemented as described in the permit, e.g. forced ventilation if required. - Risk assessment is performed prior to entry. - Communication reporting intervals agreed between standby man and workers performing entry. - Gas testing performed prior to and at regular intervals during confined space entry. - Personnel wear appropriate PPE.
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
Verification Permit to Work records Risk Assessments
AGIP-KCO Marine Superintendent Activity DI-11.09
Name Maintain ship to shore communications
Description Maintain a 24 hour communications/radio watch on all marine vessels to provide early warning of possible collision hazard, coordinate boat movements for work in the same area, record/report local metocean conditions. Monitor ETA of vessels and notify ERC if overdue - maintain comms. with Caspian ports and agree vessel departure times, maintain communications with SBV. Schedule arrival of vessel to avoid congestion within D-Island atoll. Inform vessel master of activities at D-Island and any changes since last visit. Monitor radio traffic to check for illegal activity e.g. fishing vessels errant vessels
Associated Documents • GE00.LOG.K00.YT.0001.000: Marine Management Strategy for Operations in North Caspian Sea • GE00.OPS.N00.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Marine Manual
Verification Radio Log Telecoms with base.
Name Collect and analyse data and provide ice management information
Description Provide regular forecasting of ice conditions. Carry out surveys of ice conditions. Manage
Associated Documents Verification • Caspian Sea and regional weather data Log books • Caspian sea ice data - ground survey and
Ice Advisor Activity DI-12.13
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Name Provide medical/First Aid support
Ensure First Aid available at all times
Carry out hygiene inspections
DI-09.03
DI-12.07
Name
Activity DI-09.01
D-Island Medic
Activity
Agip KCO
Verification Audit of medical coverage/support arrangements Personnel health records
Verification Ice forecasting charts Daily report
Completed D-Island/Camp Hygiene Inspection • AGIP Health Management System Reports • Agip KCO HSE Audit Programme • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • Agip-KCO Occupational Health Department Policies and Procedures
• AGIP Health Management System • Agip-KCO Occupational Health Department Policies and Procedures
Associated Documents • AGIP Health Management System • Agip-KCO Occupational Health Department Policies and Procedures
Associated Documents satellite • GE00.LOG.K00.MA.0001.000 Ice Management Guideline
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Carry out weekly hygiene inspections of all food storage, handling and process areas. Check for obvious signs of infestation. Ensure that at least 14 days supply of drinking water and non-perishable food are maintained on LQ for full POB. Check medical certification of all personnel who handle foodstuffs on LQ
Description Ensure appropriate medical support coverage at all times. Provide rapid first aid response and co-ordinate with Agip KCO doctor onshore if required. All medical facilities should comply with RoK regulations and Agip-KCO standards and requirements. Maintain adequate stocks of medical equipment/provisions at the drilling location at all times. Maintain records of all medical consultations and treatments provided to personnel. Camp Boss to ensure all catering crew have current medicals to appropriate standards. Prepare regular drug inventory on a monthly basis and drug requisition. Maintain adequate stocks of medical equipment and provisions on the island. Include first aid facilities out-with the TR. Organise medevac in consultation with Agip-KCO onshore Doctor Ensure first aid coverage for D-Island at all times.
Description ice survey team, ensure that regular contact with base and that D-Island and A-Island OIMs are aware of Ice team locations. Provide advice on direction of Ice channels. Provide advice on ice thickness for emergency helicopter landing on ice.
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Agip KCO
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Radio Operator Activity DI-08.03
DI-15.02
DI-15.12
Name Description Assist helicopter operations - communications Maintain communications with helicopters, including: maintain radio contact with helicopter pilot, relay local weather conditions to pilot, monitor ETA of helicopter and notify ERT if overdue, maintain comms. with heliport and agree flight program, maintain comms. with SBV/IBSV. Note: final decision to land up to pilot. Maintain the T-card/Station Bill system for Maintain POB accounting accounting for all POB on D-Island and during an emergency. Conduct regular muster drills involving all appropriate personnel to test the muster/POB accounting system. The muster drill should be monitored/recorded. Shapagat Radio Room communicates via Emergency Response Communicated VHF, Satellite Phone and Inmarsat to vessels in area and neighbouring installations and Atyrau.
Associated Documents • Helicopter Flight Manual and Check Sheets • GE00.OPS.O65.MA.0001.000: Helicopter Landing Officers Manual • ABAS (Aviation) Emergency Response Plan
Verification Radio Log Telecoms with Bristow' s base.
• D-Island Station Bill
Records/Reviews of Drills & Exercises Daily Report Station Bill
• GE00.DHS.H00.GL.0002.000 Guide to emergency drills offshore and onshore • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan
Radio room logbook
Associated Documents • Helicopter Flight Manual and Check Sheets • GE00.OPS.O65.MA.0001.000: Helicopter Landing Officers Manual
Verification HLO Log
Helicopter Landing Officer Activity DI-08.01
Name Description Manage helicopter take-off/landing operations Conduct helicopter operations in accordance at D-Island with the Agip-KCO specific procedures. Key requirements include: conduct checks of helideck prior to helicopter operations; ensure crane operations are stopped; ensure fire team appropriately equipped and in position; initiate emergency response in the event of helicopter overdue/way-point not reported; prepare passenger/baggage manifest; coordinate passenger loading/unloading; standby vessel in close proximity; ensure personnel provided with/wear immersion suits/lifejackets (as appropriate for sea temperature); Wind direction and speed, cloud check, 1 hour before intended departure of helicopter Bristow' s procedure copied on island. Daylight flights only unless exceptional requirements. Loads slung under helicopter NOT permitted on passenger flights. Use of wheel chokes or tie down
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
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Description ropes. No loose head wear to be worn, or loose articles carried to helicopter. No use of plastic bags for transport of goods. Inform Radio Operator of obstructions to helicopter approach. Training helicopter support team
Associated Documents
Verification
Helicopter Pilot Activity DI-08.04
Name Manage helicopter safety during flights
Description Ensure safety of helicopter operations to/from DIsland. Ensure a helicopter safety briefing is given on departure from D-Island, including lifesaving equipment and its deployment. Ensure briefing in relevant languages. Ensure that a check is undertaken that all passengers have donned a lifejacket prior to take off. Ensure that boarding/loading procedures for rotors turning are followed. Carry out visual inspection before landing/take off. Observe adverse weather policy for helicopter operations and seek advice on local weather conditions at D-Island from HLO.
Associated Documents • Helicopter Flight Manual and Check Sheets • Agip-KCO Aviation adverse weather policy
Verification Weight calculation records Helicopter log book
Ice Breaking Standby Vessel or Icebreaker / Standby Vessel Master Activity DI-10.02
Name Description Manage IBSV/SBV operations and emergency Maintain ice free passages to D-island and response drills monitor vessels in 500 m exclusion zone. Carry out regular drills to ensure fast response to emergency on D-Island. Drills to include fire fighting, launch of FRC and emergency evacuation of D-island personnel. Ensure that all emergency equipment including medical facilities are well maintained
Associated Documents • GE00.OPS.N00.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Marine Manual • IBSV/SBV Operating and Maintenance Procedures • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan • GE00.DHS.H00.GL.0002.000 Guide to emergency drills offshore and onshore
Verification IBSV/SBV log
DI-10.03
Maintain Primary and Secondary Ice channels Taking the advice from the Ice advisor maintain IBEEV escape Ice channels for DIsland. Manage ice to ensure that ice block sized no greater than 60 cm. Ensure route is open to safe waypoint
• IBSV/SBV Operating and Maintenance Procedures • Caspian Sea and regional weather data • Ice Advisor daily reports • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan
Vessel log book
DI-15.10
Implement SBV/IBSV emergency response
• IBSV/SBV Operating and Maintenance Procedures
Vessel log Pre-incident plans
Ensure SBV/IBSV conducts regular emergency response drills including fire
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Name Carry out water sampling and air quality checks
Ensure appropriate training/competence of LQ/TR personnel
Implement emergency response for LQ/TR
DI-14.03
DI-15.11
Name
Activity DI-07.02
Barge Master
Activity
Agip KCO
Verification Water testing results
Training Records Ongoing Performance Evaluation CVs Competency Assessment Records Safe slinging procedure Radio Operator in possession of RoK certification Food hygiene course passed by catering crew is RoK legal requirement Training Records Post Drill reports
• GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.SS.0001.000: Schedule D, Health, Safety and Environmental in Contracts (referred to within Schedule E of the EP contracts) • Agip-KCO Competency Assurance Programme
• Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • D-Island Station Bill • D-Island Safety Handbook • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan • GE00.DHS.H00.GL.0002.000 Guide to emergency drills offshore and onshore
Verification Post incident reviews and logs
Associated Documents • Agip-KCO Occupational Health Department Policies and Procedures • Agip KCO HSE Audit Programme
Associated Documents • Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • KG00.DIS.H00.QP.0001.000 D-Island Emergency Response Plan • GE00.DHS.H00.GL.0002.000 Guide to emergency drills offshore and onshore
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Description Ensure that daily potable water sampling checks are carried out to ensure that water meets drinking water standards for bacterial load and trace compounds. Ensure that weekly water samples are sent to RoK authorities as required by RoK legislation. Ensure that regulation checks are carried out of emergency breathing air system Ensure that all members of the LQ/TR crew including Fire team; HLO; Radio Operator; Medic/First Aiders, crane operator; Catering Crew and deck hands are competent to carry out all the routine and non-routine duties expected of them, including all supervisory roles and checks required of them. Ensure that Barge Engineer and Camp Boss are aware of their HSE critical tasks and ensure HSE Policy and Mandatory Rules are followed. All personnel will receive the appropriate emergency response training and be made aware of the various alarms and expected responses. Regular emergency drills to be conducted to test the emergency plans, fire fighting, mustering and the escape, evacuation and rescue arrangements
Description fighting, Island evacuations, man overboard and H2S.
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Agip KCO
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Barge Engineer Activity DI-07.01
Name Maintenance of LQ/ TR infrastructure and safety critical systems
Description Ensure that the critical fire fighting, emergency and evacuation equipment (fixed fire fighting systems, gangways etc.) and protective systems are maintained, inspected and tested to the appropriate standards to ensure ongoing functionality on demand. Ensure that there is sufficient redundancy for these systems e.g. two fire pumps, additional extinguishers. All such equipment/systems are to be regularly function tested and certified in accordance with the relevant industry and Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Ensure that the fire water supplies - via sea dual seawater intakes are available to provide redundancy of water supplies. Carry out regular maintenance of TR including ensure that HVAC system, Breathing air system, airlocks and other safety critical systems are maintained and operational. Ensure that breathing air bottles are full and function correctly. Inspect and replace damage breathing hoods. Ensure that all food storage facilities, galley facilities, RO system and effluent treatment facilities are maintained according to requirements of manufacturers and/or LQ maintenance system
Associated Documents • LQ and TR operating and maintenance procedures/manuals • GE00.HSE.H20.SS.0001.000: Schedule D, Health, Safety and Environmental in Contracts (referred to within Schedule E of the EP contracts)
Verification LQ/TR maintenance system records Management inspections by Barge Master HSE inspection and audits
Description Ensure that electrical systems (including power supply, distribution, fire/gas detection, instrumentation, alarms, emergency power/generator, UPS battery supply, comms. lighting and associated equipment and protective systems are maintained, inspected and tested to the appropriate standards as required by the AMOS maintenance system to ensure ongoing functionality during operations. All such equipment/systems should be function tested and certified in accordance with the relevant
Associated Documents • AMOS System Manual • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE)
Verification Daily Reports Completed Permit to Work forms AMOS maintenance and test records
Electrical Technician Activity DI-06.01
Name Maintenance, inspection and testing of critical electrical equipment & systems
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
DI-06.05
Maintenance, inspection and testing of emergency shut-down systems
DI-06.06
Maintenance, inspection and testing of portable electrical equipment
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Description industry & Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Ensure that the equipment is maintained such that its functioning and condition is appropriate for its zone, in accordance with the rig' s and D-Island' s hazardous area classifications. Ensure that there are gas detectors on drill floor, shale shakers, mud process area & archive mud tank. Work to be performed in accordance with requirements of PTW (where applicable). Ensure that the Emergency Shut-down equipment (e.g. electrical systems shut-down, accommodation HVAC shut-down etc.) and systems are maintained, inspected and tested to the appropriate standards to ensure ongoing functionality on demand. All work to be performed in accordance with requirements of PTW system. All such equipment/systems should be regularly function tested and certified in accordance with the relevant industry & Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Ensure that the BOP system can be operated from the Drill Floor and remote BOP control panel in TR. Maintain record system for hand portable electrical equipment and undertake periodic maintenance, inspection and testing.
Associated Documents
Verification
• AMOS System Manual Maintenance Records • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Daily Reports Minimum Requirements and Standards for Completed Permit to Work forms. Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
• AMOS System Manual • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
Daily Reports Maintenance Records
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • AMOS System Manual
Verification Daily Reports Completed Permit to Work forms. Equipment register AMOS system records
Mechanic/mechanical engineer Activity DI-06.02
Name Description Maintenance, inspection and testing of critical Ensure that drill rig cascade systems and drilling rig mechanical systems and equipment SCBA are maintained and tested. Ensure that the rig mechanical systems (e.g. cranes, lifting arrangements, jacking systems, rotating machinery, waste compactor, incinerator, drain systems, bulk transfer & storage systems, rig vac. system for spill clean up, portable pumps, vacuum degasser, ventilation systems, etc.) and associated equipment and protective systems are maintained as required by AMOS, inspected and tested to
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
DI-06.03
Maintenance, inspection and testing of critical drilling/well control equipment
DI-06.04
Maintenance, inspection and testing of critical emergency equipment and systems
DI-06.07
Maintain, inspection and testing of mobile equipment
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Description the appropriate standards to ensure ongoing functionality during operations. All such equipment/systems should be function tested and certified in accordance with the relevant industry & Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Log must be available and auditable. All unserviceable equipment to be quarantined and removed from the certified equipment register. Ensure that the load control is in place. Ensure that all safety harness are in good condition and fit for use. Ensure all mud logging equipment / systems are maintained in working order. Ensure that the Critical Drilling/Well Control systems (BOP, diverter, koomey, pumps, mud circulating/conditioning/degassing systems etc.) associated equipment and protective systems are maintained, inspected and tested to the appropriate standards to ensure ongoing functionality during operations. All such equipment/systems should be regularly function tested and certified in accordance with the relevant industry & Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Ensure that the BOP design allows two sets of rams to be fitted to suit the drill pipe diameter. Ensure that the critical fire fighting, emergency and evacuation equipment (fixed fire fighting systems, gangways etc.) and protective systems are maintained, inspected and tested to the appropriate standards to ensure ongoing functionality on demand. Ensure that there is sufficient redundancy for these systems e.g. two fire pumps, additional extinguishers. All such equipment/systems are to be regularly function tested as per AMOS system and certified in accordance with the relevant industry & Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Ensure each area can be covered using a fire hose from two directions. Ensure that the fire water supplies - via sea dual seawater intakes are available to provide redundancy of water supplies. Ensure that all mobile equipment including cranes, fork lifts and cherry pickers are maintained, inspected and tested to the
Associated Documents
Verification
• GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • AMOS System Manual • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
AMOS maintenance system records Maintenance Records Daily Reports Completed Permit to Work forms.
• AMOS System Manual AMOS Maintenance Records • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Daily Reports Risk Assessment Procedure Completed Permit to Work forms. • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE)
• Equipment maintenance and operating instructions
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Equipment register, Lifting equipment register, Log books AMOS system records
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
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Description appropriate standards to ensure ongoing functionality during operations. All such equipment/systems should be regularly maintained and certified in accordance with the relevant industry & Agip-KCO standards and RoK legislation.
Associated Documents
Verification
Crane Operator Activity DI-05.02
DI-05.08
Name Conduct crane/lifting operations
Description Conduct all lifting operations in accordance with AgipKCO instructions and procedures. Ensure that all items to be lifted are provided with appropriate lifting points and are correctly rigged and slung. All loads should be controlled (via tag line) and direct communication maintained between crane operator, banksman and supply vessel personnel. Loads should be laid down in designated areas only. Crane operations to be co-ordinated and restricted according to requirements of other/conflicting D-Island operations (drilling, helicopter operations, etc.). Lifts to be conducted during appropriate weather/sea conditions. Inspection of crane structure and boom and wires for damage. Functional check of crane safety devices. Carry out lifting operations using safe systems Carry out duties in line with site policies and of work procedures, for example: - Conduct lifting operations in accordance with procedures, lifting plans and general method statements. - In cold conditions use temp/ strength reduction charts to calculate safe lifting parameters as per manufacturers specifications. - Use load/ radius charts to plan lifts. - Observe weather limits (e.g. temp, wind) for crane, contact supervisor or tower cranes to obtain conditions if instrumentation not fitted. - Adjust operating envelope of crane for prevailing weather conditions. - Ensure crane is suitable for load weight and radius of proposed lift. - Ensure that all items to be lifted are provided with appropriate lifting points and are correctly rigged and slinged. - Ensure all lifting/ hoisting equipment, especially
Associated Documents • Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • D-Island Safety Handbook • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0011.000 Safety of Lifting and Cargo Handling Operations
Verification PTW Toolbox talks Lifting plans
• GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0011.000 Safety of Lifting and Cargo Handling Operations • GE00.DHS.H20.PR.0001.000 Personnel Lifting • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
Log book; General supervision; HSE audits.
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Activity
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Name
Description personnel lifting baskets are checked prior to use. - All loads should be controlled (via tag line) and direct communication (visual/ radio) maintained with the signal man. - Perform daily crane inspection using check-list and fill out log book. - Conduct functional checks of crane safety devices. - Monitor load indicator to ensure no overloading, cease operations and make safe on overload alarm. - Do not override overload alarm system. - Comply with mandatory site policy "outriggers extended". - Check ground conditions are suitable prior to lift. - Ensure area around mobile cranes flagged off.
Name Manage mud circulating/conditioning systems
Description Perform regular inspections of the mud circulating/conditioning system (mud pumps, shakers, degassers, pits etc.). Maintain communication with drill floor at all times.
Associated Documents
Verification
Derrickman Activity DI-04.07
Associated Documents • Mud Logging Procedure • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Construction Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP)
Verification IADC Report Daily Reports Maintenance Records
Driller Activity DI-03.02
Name Carry out cementing operations
Description Ensure that all the cementing operations are carried out in accordance with the Agip KCO drilling program. Note that Agip KCO Drilling Supervisor is to be consulted as appropriate.
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H20.GL.0002.000: Agip KCO HSEQ Policy Statement • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • Agip KCO D-Island Well Drilling Schedule • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Construction Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP) • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Verification Review by Toolpusher and Drilling Supervisor (Company Man). Leak off test results
Name
Perform routine drill floor checks
Monitor & secure well
Perform pit & kick drills
Monitor fluid volumes
Activity
DI-04.01
DI-04.02
DI-04.03
DI-04.10
Agip KCO
• Mud Logging Procedure Daily Reports • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures Driller' s Log • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP)
• Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures IADC Report • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Kick Drill Record Construction Manual Daily Reports • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP) • Well Control Response Manual
Drilling and mud programme. • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures Toolpusher daily report • Agip KCO D-Island Well Drilling Schedule • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Construction Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP)
Associated Documents Verification Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • KG.00.DRL.D10.MA.0001.000: Well Operations Programmes Kashagan Field Drilling Manual • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures Daily Driller check-list • Agip KCO D-Island Well Drilling Schedule top drive daily check • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Construction Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP)
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Continuously monitor drilling fluid weights and volumes during drilling, tripping and making connections. Monitor mud tank level.
All well parameters should be continually monitored and logged in accordance with the drilling program, IADC requirements and well control manual. In the event that conditions deviate from the norm/expected the well should be managed, controlled and secured in accordance with the well control manual. Drilling and mud programme issued. Carry out function testing of equipment associated with cross checking ton-miles against well depths, number of trips. Monitor annulus pressure of suspended wells as appropriate. Carry out regular (weekly) well control/pit/kick drills in accordance with the drilling program, drilling contract and well control and HS&E manuals. The drills should involve all relevant drill floor/drilling operations personnel and should be formally documented and reviewed.
Complete a daily check of drill floor equipment items/structure (derrick, drill line, drawworks, travelling block, crown-o-matic etc.) to verify condition and integrity. Function test protective systems where appropriate and visually inspect general condition of drill floor / pipe handling equipment. If deemed not fit for purpose, stop operations (driller to consult Toolpusher).
Description
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Agip KCO
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Mud Engineer Activity DI-04.11
Name Manage mud / LCM supplies
Description Ensure that adequate stocks of drilling and completions materials, fluids and consumables (e.g. weighting materials, LCM, cement, Micromax etc.) are available for the drilling rig at all times for both routine and well control situations.
Associated Documents • Agip KCO D-Island Well Drilling Schedule • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Construction Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP) • GE00.WEL.D30.MA.0001.000: Agip-KCO Well Completion Testing Manual
Verification IADC Report Daily Reports Stock Records
Contractor Rig Superintendent Activity DI-04.05
Name Monitoring of drilling material inventories
DI-14.05
Implement safe working at height procedures
Description Monitor that adequate stocks of drilling materials, drilling fluids, completions fluids and consumables (e.g. weighting materials, LCM, Micromax, cement etc.) are available at DIsland at all times. Appropriate inventories should be continually monitored and maintained as required by the drilling program, completions programme, well control manual and emergency response procedures. Review the drilling and completions programmes to ensure that all equipment/supplies required for a particular well/stage of well development are in place. Ensure that adequate stocks of drilling materials, fluids and consumables (e.g. weighting materials, LCM, cement, Micromax etc.) are available onshore to support D-Island at all times for both routine and well control situations. Ensure that Derrickman and assistant Derrickman are fully trained and competent to carry out there roles and responsibilities. Ensure that they have received specific training in the safe operation of the man riding winch including · Safety inspection and maintenance of winches, with lines and riding belts. · Safe Handling of tools while working aloft. · Environmental considerations/awareness. Ensure users of Cherry pickers are trained and competent to use equipment and that harness are used at all times
Associated Documents • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Construction Manual
Verification Daily Reports Inventory Checks Driller' s Log
• GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
Competence and training records
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Ensure drilling and completions programmes are reviewed and drill floor operations planned accordingly prior to undertaking operations. All relevant drill floor/drilling personnel should be involved in the review/planning. Protection/mitigation measures (e.g. blow-out, well kick, high formation losses, H2S etc.) proposed in the drilling program should be fully tested and implemented.
Implement the rig/D-Island specific top hole drilling procedures and precautions. Ensure that shallow gas contingency plans are in place. Conduct shallow gas emergency drills.
Review drilling and completions programmes
Implement shallow gas procedures
Manage manriding on drilling Carry-out a pre-use inspection of harness to identify rigs any damage. Ensure that Manriding winch has been maintained and is fit for purpose. Ensure operator is wearing appropriate PPE and clothing to prevent dropped objects. Ensure that risk assessment has been carried out. Ensure that Raise, Stop and Lower hand and/or radio signals have been agreed and that there is clear agreement of the principle of "No Signal No Movement". Ensure that man riding register has been completed
DI-04.06
DI-04.08
DI-05.04
• Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP) • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • Man riding procedure and check-list • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.DHS.H20.PR.0001.000 Personnel Lifting
• Agip KCO D-Island Well Drilling Schedule • GE00.WEL.D25.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Construction Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP) • KG.00.DRL.D10.MA.0001.000: Well Operations Programmes Kashagan Field Drilling Manual • GE00.WEL.D30.MA.0001.000: Agip-KCO Well Completion Testing Manual • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0002.000; Well Operations Engineering Manual
Associated Documents • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures • Combined/Simultaneous Operation HSE Bridging Documents, HSE Execution Plans • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Description Drill floor operations are to be managed and coordinated in accordance with the drilling program, drilling contract, completions programme and Well Control Manual. All items signed off as being back down, as appropriate. Implement safe working practice on drill floor. Control access to drill floor area. Carry out risk assessment prior to any special lifts including lifts below rig sub structure and monitor lifting operation. Ensure all specialist contractors carry out work in accordance with agreed AKCO procedures
Name Manage drill floor operations
Activity DI-04.04
Toolpusher
Agip KCO
Equipment log book Maintenance records Manriding register
Daily Report Emergency Drill Records
Standing Instructions To Driller (SID) Emergency response procedures Location specific contingency plans (e.g. H2S, shallow gas) Toolpusher daily report
Verification Daily Reports Review by OIM and Drilling Supervisor (Company Man)
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Agip KCO
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Waste Management Coordinator Activity DI-12.10
Name Implement waste management procedures
Description Ensure Waste Management procedures are implemented on-board LQ/TR barges and Disland. Ensure compliance with RoK Legislation and Agip - KCO standards. Ensure that solid waste is segregated, combustible wastes are incinerated [when permitted by the OIM] and non-combustible waste is compacted before being shipped to shore. Ensure that drill cuttings are shipped to shore or stored in bins on the island if necessary. Ensure that spent mud, brine and other drilling fluids are stored and shipped to shore.
Associated Documents • Agip KCO HSE Audit Programme • Combined/Simultaneous Operation HSE Bridging Documents, HSE Execution Plans • GE00.HSE.H30.MA.0001.000: Kashagan Project Waste Management Manual
Verification Waste Disposal Records
Name Conduct mud logging operations
Description Provide mud logging services in accordance with AGIP KCO standards and procedures and the drilling program. Ensure that there is a direct communication route between the mud loggers / derrickman and the drill floor at all times. Provide back up warning of gas in mud returns to the driller. Advise the Driller of changes in mud properties. Prepare and obtain approval of mud logging plan prior to drilling. Monitor gas detection system for gas influx.
Associated Documents Verification • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Performance review by Drilling Supervisor Minimum Requirements and Standards for (Company Man) Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • Mud Logging Procedure • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures • GE00.WEL.D20.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Well Operations Interfaces & Planning Procedures (WI&PP) • KG.00.DRL.D10.MA.0001.000: Well Operations Programmes Kashagan Field Drilling Manual • GE00.WEL.D30.MA.0001.000: Agip-KCO Well Completion Testing Manual
Mud Logger Activity DI-03.01
District Logistics Manager Activity DI-10.01
Name Carry out audit of SBV/IBSV contractor(s)
Description Conduct a pre-hire audit of standby vessel contractors to establish their suitability for use.
Associated Documents • Agip KCO HSE Audit Programme • GE00.HSE.H20.MF.0001.000: Agip KCO
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Verification Pre-hire audit report Monitors provided for fire fighting and cooling.
Activity DI-06.08
Name Account for Safety Harnesses
Contract documentation Contract HSE Management plan
Verification SBV/IBSV is provided with medical facility for reception of evacuees and casualties. Based on OKOOA requirements.
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Associated Documents Verification • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Harness logbook Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • Safety harness check-list
• GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure
• Caspian Sea and regional weather data
Associated Documents HSE Management System Manual • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Description Check all safety harness prior to issue and on return from user. Maintain log of condition of harnesses. Discard damaged harnesses
Description The audit should address such factors as contractor personnel competence and training, maintenance/inspection and test procedures, operating procedures. The audit should cover all relevant HSE aspects including lifesaving equipment standards, emergency response procedures, vessel manoeuvrability, fire fighting provision, fast response vehicle provision, etc.. All standby vessel contractors should meet AgipKCO standards and procedures and conform to applicable international legislation. Ensure SBV/IBSV is aware of emergency procedures. Maintain shipping channels free of hazards Carry out routine surveys of shipping channels to to shipping ensure that shipping hazards such as debris, untethered buoys and fishing nets are removed Contractor Selection and Performance Ensure contractor meet RoK, Agip-KCO and ENI Monitoring requirement and standards. Develop and implement Contractor HSE Management plan. Work with RoK authorities and Contractors to resolve any conflicting requirements Develop key performance indicators and monitor contractor compliance
Name
Warehouseman
DI-14.11
DI-11.10
Activity
Agip KCO
Agip KCO
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TCP Specialist Activity DI-03.03
Name Manage TCP Operations
Description Oversee commissioning operations and ensure specialist contractors follow the agreed commissioning plan and use the procedures agredd with AKCO. Ensure that explosive handling procedures are followed and that explosives are only handled by trained and competent personnel. Oversee rig up and rig down of commissioning equipment in accordance with AKCO procedures. Carry out all pressure testing in compliance with AKCO procedures and Permit to work system. Ensure that all Working At Height and scaffolding is carried out in accordance with AKCO procedures.
Associated Documents • Agip KCO D-Island Well Drilling Schedule • GE00.HSE.H20.GL.0002.000: Agip KCO HSEQ Policy Statement • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • KE00.B4.000.AK.D.MA.0003.000: DIsland General Commissioning Operational • Drilling Rig (s) Operating Procedures • HII_KED-00_CT05_GG&P: Halliburton CT & TCP Intervention Procedures • GP-KAZ-HES-TCP-001: Halliburton Well Perforating Plan 2008/09
Verification Daily Reports Review by OIM and Drilling Supervisor (Company Man)
Description Ensure that scaffolding is erected to Agip scaffolding standards and/or complies with OSHA requirements concerning type of equipment, rated capacities, construction methods, and use. Ensure guard rail and top rails are fitted at the correct height and that platforms are fully planked or decked. Each scaffold and scaffold component must be capable of supporting its own weight plus at least four times the maximum intended load without failure. For suspended scaffolding each suspension rope must be capable of supporting at least six times the maximum intended load. Ensure that operatives erecting, altering or dismantling scaffolds are properly trained and have sufficient experience to carry out work safely and correctly. Implement Scaftag system to inform users and inspectors of scaffolding whether it has been inspected, when the next inspection is due, and whether or not it is fit for use. State the width and limitations of working platforms. Ensure the use of fall arrest equipment whilst erecting, altering or dismantling scaffolding
Associated Documents Verification • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Scaftag logs Minimum Requirements and Standards for PTW Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • AMOS System Manual • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • OSHA 3150 2002 (revised) A guide to scaffolding use in the construction industry • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
Scaffolding Supervisor Activity DI-05.03
Name Monitor the use of scaffolding
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
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Description Before each work shift and after any occurrence that could affect the structural integrity of the scaffolding ensure that it has been inspected for any visible defects. Carry out weekly audits and inspections of scaffolding
Associated Documents
Verification
Lifting Equipment Supervisor Activity DI-05.01
Name Maintain certification of lifting equipment
DI-05.06
Supervise lifting activities
Description Maintain a formal register of lifting equipment, ladders, man-riders and arrangements, such that currently certified equipment can be readily identified as being suitable for use. Non-certified/failed equipment to be quarantined and not be made available for use. Records of equipment certification to be maintained and be available for inspection. Slip and Cut/line change out/maintenance to be performed in accordance with manufacturers'recommendations and Agip-KCO standards and procedures. Arrange for independent third party certification of lifting equipment/arrangements, where appropriate. Load charts and associated documentation to be made available in crane cabin. Conduct all lifting operations in accordance with site policies, procedures & generic method statements. Through general supervision ensure that: - All personnel are aware of requirement to avoid lifting/ hoisting operation areas including flagging off areas around mobile cranes, not allowing vehicle movements in vicinity. - Ground conditions are suitable for lifting activities and outriggers are extended. - Items to be lifted/hoisted are provided with appropriate lifting points and are correctly rigged and slinged. - During lifts, loads are controlled and direct communication maintained between crane driver and signal man. - Weather restrictions on lifting/ hoisting operations are adhered to. - Load/ radius charts are available and used by crane drivers to plan lifts. - Correct PPE worn for work activity. Through direct supervision ensure that: - Permit conditions are met and lifting plans used for heavy/ complex/ critical/ personnel lifts as applicable. - Personnel baskets have a pre-use check, secondary retention system fitted and test lift prior to operation.
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Associated Documents • AMOS System Manual • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0011.000 Safety of Lifting and Cargo Handling Operations • GE00.DHS.H20.PR.0001.000 Personnel Lifting • Equipment design documents
Verification Lifting Equipment Register Maintenance System Records Equipment Certificates Daily inspection for compliance Toolpusher to verify that daily checks and maintenance are done.
• GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0011.000 Safety of Lifting and Cargo Handling Operations • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.DHS.H20.PR.0001.000 Personnel Lifting
Completed permit & risk assessments HSE inspection & audit.
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
DI-05.07
Certification of lifting equipment
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 254 of 310
Description Carry out: - Critical lift studies, field level risk assessments, fall protection plans, pre task meetings, tool box talks and JHA reviews as appropriate. - Estimation of load weight using manifest of incoming materials and/ or calculation. Equipment requires a Gosgortekhnadzor (GGTN) permit and has its own technical passport Maintain a formal register of lifting equipment and arrangements on site, such that currently certified equipment can be readily identified as being suitable for use. Ensure that all hoisting/ lifting/ piling equipment are subjected to regular 3rd party inspection and certification, records should be maintained on site available for inspection. Un-certified/failed equipment should be quarantined and not be made available for use.
Associated Documents
Verification
• Equipment design documents • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0011.000 Safety of Lifting and Cargo Handling Operations • GE00.DHS.H20.PR.0001.000 Personnel Lifting
Lifting equipment register; Maintenance records; Equipment certificates; HSE & management audits.
H2S Advisor Activity DI-06.09
DI-14.07
Name Maintain cascade and emergency SCBA equipment
Description Ensure that the critical fire fighting, emergency and evacuation equipment (fixed fire fighting systems, gangways etc.) and protective systems are maintained, inspected and tested to the appropriate standards to ensure ongoing functionality on demand. Ensure that there is sufficient redundancy for these systems e.g. two fire pumps, additional extinguishers. All such equipment/systems are to be regularly function tested as per AMOS system and certified in accordance with the relevant industry & Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Ensure that D-Island and LQ/TR cascade systems are maintained and fully functional. Ensure that SCBA are regularly inspected and tested. Defective SCBA are to be repaired or replaced as required. Ensure that all personnel are trained to use the D-Island and LQ/TR cascade Ensure appropriate training/competence in use breathing systems and SCBA. Ensure that personnel are aware of H2S risks. Ensure that personnel assigned to Karlygash are trained to use external of emergency breathing SCBA connection points while waiting to enter airlocks. Ensure personnel systems assigned to Shapagat are trained to use Shapagat cascade system. Ensure all personnel are trained in procedure for transfer to IBEEVs from TRs.
Associated Documents • AMOS System Manual • LQ and TR operating and maintenance procedures/manuals
Verification Maintenance records
• Agip KCO company and site HSE inductions • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • Agip-KCO Competency Assurance Programme • D-Island Safety Handbook • GE00.HSE.H20.QP.0001.000 Agip KCO HSE Training Plan
Training Records Ongoing Performance Evaluation Competency Assessment Records Review of drills and exercises
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 255 of 310
Rigger Activity DI-05.05
Name Rig up of lifting equipment
Description Carry out duties in line with policies and procedures, for example: - Perform daily inspection for damage. - Ensure that load weight is known; - Ensure that there is a factor of safety between load weight and rigging capacity. - Ensure that loads are controlled (via tag lines) during pick up and setting down. - Ensure that all items to be lifted/ hoisted are provided with appropriate lifting points and are correctly rigged and slinged. - For personnel lifts ensure that secondary retention system is used.
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure • Equipment maintenance and operating instructions • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0011.000 Safety of Lifting and Cargo Handling Operations • Equipment design documents
Verification General supervision.
LQ/TR Camp Boss Activity DI-07.03
Name Store Food Appropriately
Description Store all delivered food in appropriate conditions (freezers, fridges, dry stores, etc.). Store different types of food separately to avoid crosscontamination (e.g. fish, light meat, dark meat, vegetables/fruit).
Associated Documents • AGIP Health Management System • LQ and TR operating and maintenance procedures/manuals
Verification Records of Temperature Checks Kitchen Inspections
• LQ and TR operating and maintenance procedures/manuals
Inspection Reports
• GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure
Kitchen Inspections
• AGIP Health Management System
Audit/Inspection reports
Carry out checks of fridge and freezer temperatures three times each day. Freezers should be -18°C, fridges should be -2°C to +4°C. If fridge or freezer appears to be malfunctioning, request maintenance/repair through the Superintendent. DI-07.04
Carry out routine kitchen Inspections
DI-07.05
Provide LQ domestic and kitchen personnel suitable protective clothing
DI-12.08
Maintain high quality hygiene conditions
Provide ongoing supervision of all kitchen activities. Conduct checks of kitchen equipment and operations e.g. for cleanliness, that food handling/storage/hygiene procedures are being followed. Carry out formal, periodic inspections. Provide all staff with appropriate protective clothing and personal protective equipment (PPE) suitable for their duties. Make sure that clean clothing is worn every day.
Ensure high standards of hygiene are maintained in
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
Activity
Name
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 256 of 310
Description all food storage, processing and eating areas. In particular, ensure that: - all catering crew have current medicals to the appropriate standards; - all catering crew are trained in food hygiene; - all food is from identifiable and reputable sources - daily (twice) record of freezer / chiller temperatures; - at least 14 days supply of bottled drinking water are maintained on LQ for full POB; - at least 14 days supply of non-perishable food are maintained on island for full POB; - weekly hygiene inspections are carried out - ensure periodic checks by hygienist / pest control specialists. - stock rotation system is in place - ensure that all food is delivered from identifiable sources with appropriate certification processed under catering controlled systems. - ensure appropriate transport arrangements for delivery offshore.
DI-14.06
Ensure appropriate training/competency of catering contractors
Ensure that all personnel carrying food handling and food preparation in the LQs are trained in the health and safety aspects of food hygiene, RoK legislation and Agip-KCO requirements for catering. Training to include: > The cleaning of food production and consumption areas. > Maintaining a safe and secure working area, kitchen maintenance. > Receiving, handling and storage of food raw and cooked food products. > The safe handling of knives. > Preparing and cooking includes meat & poultry, offal, fish, deserts, vegetables and basic pasta & pizza products.
Associated Documents • Agip-KCO Occupational Health Department Policies and Procedures • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.SS.0001.000: Schedule D, Health, Safety and Environmental in Contracts (referred to within Schedule E of the EP contracts)
Verification Records
• Agip-KCO Occupational Health Department Training records Policies and Procedures • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.SS.0001.000: Schedule D, Health, Safety and Environmental in Contracts (referred to within Schedule E of the EP contracts) • Agip-KCO Competency Assurance Programme • GE00.HSE.H20.QP.0001.000 Agip KCO HSE Training Plan
Ensure that catering personnel have regular medicals (RoK sanitary passport)
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 257 of 310
Banksman Activity DI-05.09
Name Oversee lifting operation
Description Carry out duties in line with site policies and procedures, for example: - Maintain communications (visual or radio) with crane driver at all times during lift. - Ensure control of load is maintained during lift, give defined hand signals to crane driver to control lifting operations. - Communicate snagged load, changes of wind strength/ direction to crane driver. - Direct crane driver to stop lift if required. - Wear a fluorescent vest or gauntlet.
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0011.000 Safety of Lifting and Cargo Handling Operations • GE00.DHS.H20.PR.0001.000 Personnel Lifting • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
Verification General supervision; HSE inspection & audit.
Supervisor services Activity DI-06.10
Name Maintenance, inspection and testing of Non drilling rig critical mechanical systems and equipment
Description Ensure that mechanical systems (e.g. cranes, lifting arrangements, jacking systems, rotating machinery, vehicles, fork lifts, portable pumps, generators, ventilation systems, windsocks etc.) and associated equipment and protective systems are maintained, inspected and tested to the appropriate standards to ensure ongoing functionality during operations. All such equipment/systems should be function tested and certified in accordance with the relevant industry & Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Log must be available and auditable. All unserviceable equipment to be quarantined and removed from the certified equipment register. Ensure that the load control is in place. Ensure that all safety harness are in good condition and fit for use. Perform scheduled maintenance of lifting equipment e.g. unit davits, hoists, slings, equipment lugs and other lifting equipment as required. Ensure that all equipment is clearly marked to show whether it is safe to use. Check and calibrate mobile crane protective devices e.g. load cell, overload alarm. Arrange for external certification if required for any items e.g. load cells.
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • AMOS System Manual
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Verification Daily Reports Completed Permit to Work forms. Equipment register
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 258 of 310
Marine Vessel Chief Engineer Activity DI-11.03
Name Maintain marine vessels passive and active fire/toxic gas detection and fire fighting systems
DI-11.04
Maintenance, inspection and testing of vessel critical electrical equipment & systems
Description Carry out regular visual inspections and surveys of vessel structure, passive and active fire protection systems in accordance with the maintenance strategy Verify the maintenance, inspection and testing of passive fire protection arrangements including: - fire stopping; - wall penetrations; - fire rated divisions; - dampers; - fire doors and door closers; - fire detectors; - smoke detectors; and - heat detectors. Maintain the fire water ring mains, pumps, hydrants and fire monitors (where fitted). Maintain the CO2 suppression systems for electrical rooms and the associated warning systems. Follow CO2 maintenance procedure to avoid accidental discharge. Ensure the fire and gas detection systems are regularly function tested, as required by planned maintenance system. Ensure regular maintenance and inspection of the portable fire-fighting equipment - fire extinguishers, in accordance with the maintenance strategy. Ensure that sufficient numbers of self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) sets are available on the LQ and certified for use. Ensure that electrical systems (including power supply, distribution, fire/gas detection, instrumentation, alarms, emergency power/generator, UPS battery supply, comms. lighting and associated equipment and protective systems are maintained, inspected and tested to the appropriate standards as required by the maintenance system to ensure ongoing functionality during operations. All such equipment/systems should be function tested and certified in accordance with the relevant industry
Associated Documents • Equipment maintenance and operating instructions
Verification Reviewed by Onshore Head of Maintenance Audit and vessel inspection reports
• Equipment maintenance and operating instructions
Daily Reports Completed Permit to Work forms AMOS maintenance and test records
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Maintenance, inspection and testing of vessel critical mechanical systems and equipment
Maintain, inspect and test vessel communications systems
DI-11.05
DI-11.06
Name Ensure that all marine vessel passengers and crew have and can use appropriate PPE and that emergency equipment is available
Monitor and control marine vessel operations
Activity DI-11.02
DI-11.07
Marine Vessel Master
Name
Activity
Agip KCO
Daily Reports Completed Permit to Work forms. Equipment register Ships logs
Maintenance records. Periodic review by Vessel Master.
• Equipment maintenance and operating instructions
• Equipment maintenance and operating instructions
• GE00.LOG.K00.YT.0001.000: Marine Vessel Log book Management Strategy for Operations in Third part audits and inspections North Caspian Sea • GE00.OPS.N00.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Marine Manual
Monitor and control all marine vessel operations and maintenance activities, ensure all safety critical systems are fully functional and maintained in accordance with the vessel' s maintenance system. Ensure that vessel operations comply with RoK and Agip KCO waste management policies and comply with Class Society requirements. Ensure that all bunkering operations of fuel and water are carried out in accordance with procedures, and that the associated equipment is maintained to ensure no spillages occur. Ensure that all towing, lifting operations are carried out according to procedure. Carry out regular training of vessel personnel for both normal operations
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • D-Island Safety Handbook
Verification Life Saving Apparatus and Fire Fighting Equipment plans
Verification
Associated Documents
Description All personnel to be supplied with appropriate PPE e.g. SCBA, cold weather clothing, life vests and any additional equipment identified, as appropriate. Ensure adequate numbers of PPE and emergency equipment are maintained. Ensure equipment is periodically inspected to confirm its correct functioning / condition.
Description and Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Work to be performed in accordance with requirements of PTW (where applicable). Ensure that all marine safety critical systems, including infrastructure physical structure, hull, hoists, generators, drain systems, bulk transfer & storage systems, ventilation systems, etc.) and associated equipment and protective systems are maintained as required by the maintenance system, inspected and tested to the appropriate standards to ensure ongoing functionality during operations. All such equipment/systems should be function tested and certified in accordance with the relevant industry and Agip-KCO standards and legislation. Log must be available and auditable. Maintain, inspect and test all the communications system in accordance with the maintenance strategy. Ensure that communications between the vessel shore and D-Island are effective are maintained in a fully functional state. Call out specialist vendor as required to perform testing maintenance activities.
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 259 of 310
Agip KCO
Activity DI-11.08 DI-15.14
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 260 of 310
Name
Description and emergency response. Implement drugs and alcohol policy on marine Enforce drug and alcohol policy on-board vessel vessels Perform emergency response drills at all marine vessels
Associated Documents
Perform mustering and emergency response drills at all marine vessels involving all appropriate personnel. The muster drill should be monitored and reviewed and its effectiveness established. Any deficiencies should be identified and remedial actions proposed and implemented
Verification
• GE00.HRO.K14.PY.0001.000: Alcohol Medical records and Substance Abuse Policy OIM reports • GE00.DHS.H00.GL.0002.000 Guide to Vessels log book emergency drills offshore and onshore Drill reports • Marine vessel operating procedures
Marine Logistic Supervisor Activity DI-11.01
DI-11.13
DI-14.09
Name Description Maintain, inspect and test all marine Conduct maintenance, inspection and testing of all marine vessels and safety related equipment vessels and safety related equipment, against maintenance program for all categories of vessel. Programme for all marine vessels to include steering, propulsion, manoeuvring, mooring systems, escape, evacuation and rescue facilities. Programme for LQ to include fire detection system, smoke detectors in all rooms, passive fire protection/fire rated partitions and bulkheads, local fire protection equipment (hand held extinguishers, fire blankets, etc.) in cabins/corridors/galley/other rooms, CO2 deluge in engine/machinery room, electrical supply and distribution system and safeguards (circuit breakers, etc.), escape, evacuation and rescue facilities. Implement check-in procedure passenger travel to from DImplement check-in procedure, Island. Ensure briefing in relevant languages. Ensure that a safety briefing and check is undertaken that all passengers have donned a life passenger/freight checks jacket prior to departure. Conduct random baggage searches for hazardous/unauthorised goods. Ensure that baggage is restricted to the vessel payload Training, competence and continual Ensure that marine crews are competent through: safety awareness induction/orientation training, emergency assessment of marine vessel response training, basic fire-fighting and survival training, personnel galley safety, trade training (e.g. welding, cutting, fabrication activities), basic first aid/medical treatment training, marine operations experience. Safety induction briefings - ensure all personnel arriving on the Accommodation Vessel undergo safety induction briefings. The briefings should increase personnel awareness of potential major hazards and the controls in place to manage them. All personnel should be taken on a vessel orientation walk down and be made aware of their designated muster locations, alarm systems/philosophy and all escape, evacuation and rescue
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0001.000: Workplace Risk Assessment Procedure • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0002.000: Permit to Work System Procedure
Verification Inspection Reports Completed Check-lists
• Marine vessel operating procedures •GE00.OPS.N00.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Marine Manual
Manual check-lists. Unannounced searches for drugs and alcoholl at work locations. Periodic or random testing on employees at their consent.
• GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure
Practice demonstrates competence Certification records Training matrix Training and competence records held by HSE standards advisor
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Name
Carry out pre and post hire audits of marine contractor vessels
Provide Emergency response for marine vessels
Activity
DI-14.10
DI-15.13
Agip KCO
Pre-hire audit report All fire fighting equipment A1. Monitors provided for fire fighting and cooling. SBV is provided with medical facility for reception of evacuees and casualties. Based on OKOOA requirements.
Verification
• GE00.DHS.H00.GL.0002.000 Guide Vessel logs to emergency drills offshore and Drill and PiPs onshore • Agip KCO Aviation and marine search and rescue capability in the Caspian Region • GE00.OPS.N00.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Marine Manual
• GE00.HSE.H20.MF.0001.000: Agip KCO HSE Management System Manual • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure
Associated Documents
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Description arrangements. Ensure that all vessel crew have undergone appropriate training including: - Agip KCO Induction; - Standards off Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW); - Emergency Response training; - boat handling; - equipment handling; - basic marine engineering skills; - personal safety; - basic sea survival; and - reasonable English. Conduct pre-hire survey of all marine vessels against written specification of requirements for all categories of vessels. Requirements for all marine vessels to include seaworthiness (of steering, propulsion, manoeuvring, mooring systems), redundant means of control (auxiliary power supplies, manual systems, etc.), redundancy in number of mooring lines (4), mooring arrangements suitable for seabed conditions, vessel capabilities within expected metocean conditions and water depths, echo-sounders/depth monitors, adequate escape, evacuation and rescue facilities. Requirements for Accommodation Vessels to include: fire detection system, smoke detectors in all rooms, passive fire protection/fire rated partitions and bulkheads, local fire protection equipment (hand held extinguishers, fire blankets, etc.) in cabins/corridors/galley/other rooms, CO2 deluge in engine/machinery room, adequate electrical supply and distribution system for expected duty, electrical supply and distribution system safeguards (circuit breakers, etc.), adequate escape, evacuation and rescue facilities. Provide emergency response procedures for marine operations. Requirements to include dropping of anchors by drifting vessel, intervention of tugs for drifting vessel, plotting anchor locations on marine charts and marking with buoys, smaller vessels to manoeuvre to the lee of larger vessels in adverse weather, repositioning of anchors to improve stability in adverse weather, evacuation by lifeboat/life-rafts, weather limits on operations.
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 261 of 310
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 262 of 310
Diving Contractor Activity DI-11.11
Name Manage diving operations
Description Ensure that risk assessment is carried out prior to all diving operations. Ensure that divers are trained and competent, Ensure that divers are in communication with dive support vessel/crew at all times and that divers can be recovered to the marine vessel in short order
Associated Documents • GE00.HSE.H40.SP.0001.000: Agip KCO – Minimum Requirements and Standards for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) • GE00.HSE.H20.PR.0006.000: Contractor HSE Management Procedure • Caspian Sea and regional weather data • KE00.LOG.O00.GL.0001.000 Adverse Working Weather Guidelines
Verification Divers log book
Associated Documents • GE00.OPS.N00.MA.0001.000: Agip KCO Marine Manual
Verification Log books
Marine Radio Operator Activity DI-11.12
Name Description Maintain 24 hour radio/communications watch Maintain a 24 hour communications/radio watch on all marine vessels to provide early warning of possible collision hazard, coordinate boat movements for work in the same area, record/report local metocean conditions. Maintain muster count for all personnel on vessel.
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 263 of 310 Appendix D MOPOs
Figure D1 : Concurrent Drilling Operations
D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
Agip KCO
KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 – October 2008 Page 264 of 310
Figure D1 : Concurrent Drilling Operations
Key A green cell means that the concurrent activities are permitted under normal permit to work and other site controls.
Y
An orange cell means that the concurrent activities are permitted subject to additional controls and restrictions. As determined by a Risk Assessment and the D-Island OIM
R
A red cell means that the concurrent activities are forbidden.
N
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D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case
R R R
R R
Radioactive Sources Handling
Y R R Y
Fuel Transfer
Cold Work Y Y R R Y
Explosive Handling
R R R R R R
NDT Inspection Radiography
Hot Work
Logging out of reservoir
Logging in resevoir
Electric Wire Line
Rig up and Rig down
Rig up and Rig down
Slick Line Operations
Acid Wash/ Acid bullhead from Rig
Rig up and Rig down
Coiled Tubing Operations
Fire & Gas dection/alarm system failure
Alarm (Fire & flammable gas)
Loss of one barrier
Confirmed toxic gas
Drillpipe cutting
Rigsite Alert Condition
Back-off
Fishing / Jarring/overpulling
Well Control activities
Total loss circulation and Pack -off (Unable to circulate)
Unexpected Scenarios/Operations
Well Decompletion (Workover)
Ref: KE01.B0.000.AK.A.RE.0008.000 SIMOPS Review of hub 1 and Island “A” Winter Working Activities
Casing perforating
Completion Operations before casing perforating.
Y
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Y R
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Y Y R
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Y Y R
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Y
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Y Y
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