IPRA Case Digest

HEIRS OF MADIO V. HEIRS OF LEUNG G.R. NO. 169161, AUGUST 17, 2007 FACTS: On September 9, 1960, Lot No. 8, located in P. Burgos Subdivision, Baguio City was awarded to Leung as the winning bidder in an auction sale thereof pursuant to his Townsite Sales Application. On July 29, 1964, Miguel Madio filed a protest for the cancellation of the Order of Award in question on the following grounds: (1) They are the claimants of Lot 8, having been in actual, continuous, open and adverse occupation of the same since 1947;(2) Leung failed to comply with specific requirements under the award; i.e., he did not introduce any improvement on the lot since the award was made to him on September 9, 1960;(3) They were never notified previously that Lot 8 was the subject of public bidding and that the same was awarded to Leung;(4)They have already built their houses on Lot 8 and made improvements thereon; and (5) Under Republic Act No. 730, they are entitled to acquire the property. On October 3, 1974, the Director of Lands informed Madio that his petition could not be given due course because the controversy over the award of Lot No. 8 to Leung had already been resolved in the order dated July 13, 1967 of the Regional Director in Dagupan City. However, the DENR OIC-Secretary invalidated the award and decreed that said lot 8 be sold to Madio instead. Aggrieved, Leung elevated the case to the Office of the President (OP). However, his appeal was dismissed in a resolution dated March 12, 1998 on the ground that the memorandum was not filed on time. ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President erred in dismissing Leung’s appeal HELD: The Supreme Court held that the OP erred in dismissing the case. The finding of the Court of Appeals that the memorandum was indeed filed on time as shown by the evidence presented is conclusive. Petitioners file copies of said documents clearly bear stamp markings indicating receipt by the OP Legal Office. But assuming that the necessary documents were indeed not filed, the imperatives of fair play would have impelled the OP to ask for an explanation, instead of proceeding with its outright dismissal action based on technicality, given that Leung’s case appears to be prima facie meritorious. In this regard, the court quotes with approval what the CA said: At any rate, assuming that the documents in question were not filed together with the motion for reconsideration, possibly due to oversight or inadvertence, the OP would have done well to require the submission of the omitted attachments, instead of out rightly denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Indeed, judicial action by a party-litigant must be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. LAMSIS, ET. AL. V. DONG-E G.R. NO. 173021, OCTOBER 20, 2010 FACTS: This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from petitioners. According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her familys ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-aps death, the property was inherited by his children, who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which included Lot No. 1. The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a P500.00 consideration, a Deed of Quitclaim on February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margaritas father). Sometime between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families. When Gilbert

Semon died in 1983, his children extrajudicially partitioned the property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita.The state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof.[16] Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose). Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting favorably on her and her siblings ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090-square meter property. ISSUE: 1. Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the National Commission on

Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over the reivindicatory action 2. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of

RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted HELD: 1. The Court held that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, hence, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.The third element is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor of the certification case. Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. 2. As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration. Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.

COLLADO, ET. AL. V. BOCKASANJO, ETC., G.R. NO. 107764, OCTOBER 4, 2002 FACTS:

Edna Collado and co- applicants filed with the land registration court for an application for registration of a parcel of land about 120 hectares. Attached to the

application was the technical description of the lot signed by the Bureau of Lands. The petitioners alleged that their possession have been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners and that they have declared the lot for taxation purposes and have paid all the corresponding real estate taxes. Petitioners trace their possession from Sesinado Leyva who was in open, notorious and continuous possession in the concept of owner since 1902. Petitioners also alleged that there have been nine transfers of rights since then and that there are twenty-five coowners. The application included a survey which stated that the lot is inside IN-2 Marikina Watershed. The Republic through the Solicitor General filed its opposition to the application of Collado et al., as there are no other oppositors; the land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors. However, in the course of the hearing before the Land Registration Court, the Republic failed to appear despite notices. The Land Registration Court, based on the evidence and testimonies presented by Collado et al., ruled in favor of petitioners. An order was issued the Land Regulation Authority to issue corresponding decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.

Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals for annulment of the decision on the ground that pursuant to section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129, there had been no clear showing that the lot had been previously classified as alienable and disposable. Bockasanjo ISF Awardes Association, Inc., filed with Court of Appeals their intervention stating that the lot in dispute is alienable and alleged that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF tree planting purposes. ISSUE: Whether or not Collado et al., have a registrable title over the lot

HELD:

Supreme Court ruled that Collado et al., does not have a registrable title over the lot. Firstly because since 1904, EO 33 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR) in Rizal, even the survey they petitioners presented stated that the lot is within the MWR. A watershed reservation is a natural resource and because of its importance and following the provisions Art. 67 of the Water Code if the Philippines (PD 1607), and Regalian Doctrine, the lots within the MWR remain to this day as inalienable properties of the State. The contention of the petitioners was that the EO 33 contained a saving clause that the reservation was subject to private rights, if any there be. This is bereft of merit because mere possession by private individuals of lands does not create the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable because Regalian Doctrine dictates that, all lands not otherwise appearing clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The petitioner cannot use the saving clause in EO 33 because they don’t have documentary title over the lot and that they have failed to acquire a valid enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession whether under CA 141 or under any of its amendments because their predecessor-in-interest, Sesinado Leyva, was only in possession of the lot for 2 years prior the issuance of EO 33. Period of occupancy after EO 33 could no longer be counted because it was then inalienable. The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

Absent any positive Act of the government declaring a parcel of land to be alienable and disposable or re-classifying an inalienable lot to be alienable, the lot remains inalienable. The petitioners were not able to present any evidence that the subject lot was released from the MWR to form part of the alienable and disposable public land. Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners because a a forested areas classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settler may have stripped if of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass and planted with crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classifies as “forest” is released on an official proclamation to that effect to that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

LBP V. ARANETA, G.R. NO. 161796, ETC., FEBRUARY 8, 2012 FACTS: At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares, which was originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla. On June 21, 1974, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1283, which carved out a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Rizal, and reserving the segregated area for Townsite purposes, subject to private rights. In 1977, Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1637, which increased the size of the Townsite Reservation by 20,312 hectares, subject to private rights. Prior to the issuance of the Townsite Proclamations, Presidential Decree No. 27, also known as Tenants Emancipation Decree, was issued. The Department of Agrarian Reform undertook to place under Operation Land Transfer Program all tenanted rice and corn lands. The tenants of Doronilla applied for Certificate of Land Transfer. The Department of Agrarian Reform processed the applications of 106 Certificate of Land Transfer covering 73 hectares of the property of Doronilla. However, only 75 Certificate of Land Titles were distributed. Due to Proclamation No. 1637, the survey of the property of Doronilla was stopped. In 1978, the Solicitor General filed with the CFI of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the property of Doronilla. Meanwhile, in 1979, Doronilla issued a Certification listing 79 bona fide planters. After nine years from the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the expropriation case. In 1983, Araneta acquired the property of Doronilla through court litigation. Pres. Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 131, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Republic Act No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, was enacted. Araneta wrote the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary to convert his lot from agricultural to commercial and industrial but it was not acted upon. He protested claiming that the property is not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, being a part of Townsite Reservation. The Office of the Provincial Adjudication Board instead scheduled a hearing to determine just compensation. The Land Bank of the Philippines paid three million as just compensation and notified Araneta of its entitlement. In 1990, 912 farmer beneficiaries were issued Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificate of Titles. Araneta filed at the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board against DAR and LBP for cancellation of compulsory coverage under Presidential Decree 27 and exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law coverage with regards to his property.

DARAB turned over the case to PARAD. The Regional Adjudicator dismissed the complaint of Araneta which was affirmed at the DARAB proper. The case went to Court of Appeals via Petition for Review and it ruled in favour of Araneta. ISSUE: Whether or not the lot of Araneta is entirely outside the ambit of the Tenant Emancipation Decree and Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, thereby excluded from Compulsory Agrarian Reform Coverage HELD: The Court held that the lot of Araneta is excluded from compulsory acquisition except the 75 Certificate of Land Titles issued prior to Proclamation No. 1283. The provisions of R.A. 6657 apply only to agricultural lands under which category, the property of Araneta, during the period material, no longer falls, having been effectively classified as non-agricultural under Proclamation No. 1637. It ceased to be agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the Townsite Reservation. Before Proclamation No. 1637 was issued, there were already P.D. 27 tenant farmers in the said property. In a very real sense, private rights belonged to them. CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands. It is referred to as lands devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. Agricultural lands are those which are arable. Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The 75 Certificate of Land Titles issued prior to Proclamation No. 1283 shall be declared valid but those subsequently issued are nullified.

CRUZ V. SENR G.R. NO. 135385, DECEMBER 6, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought a suit of prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A 8371 also known as Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Several groups such as Haribon ET. Al, and CHR filed motion to intervene which was granted by the court. Petitioners aver that provisions of RA 83171 in sections of IPRA particularly the sections 3(a) and 3(b), section 6, 7 and 8 and sections 57 and 58, being contrary to the regalia Doctrine. They also assailed the provisions of RA 8371 defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP on the ground that the provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed sections of the IPRA law are unconstitutional. HELD: The Court was divided equally, where 7 members voted for the dismissal and the other 7 voting for the grant of petition. As majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon, However after such redeliberation, the voting remained, pursuant to the Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed. Thus we look upon the separate opinions made by Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban to look upon how the issue was addressed in their opinions. SEPARATE OPINION BY JUSTICE PUNO Justice Puno voted to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Righrs Act of 1997. His separate opinion started by showing the history of land ownership and how it came to these days Torrens system. RA8137 does not violate the Regalian Doctrine. The ICCs/IPs has long been in possession of the lands they occupy, they have lived there even since time immemorial, thus, even before the Spaniards (who introduced the concept of jura regalia) came. Thus ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Thus Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Sec 3 Art XII of

the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into: a) agricultural; b) forest or timber; c) mineral lands, and; d) national parks. Sec. 5 of the same Art XII mentions ancestral lands and domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands under any of the four classes will render the enter IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. The 1987 Constitution mandates the state to “protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands” and that “Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.” It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral lands that breathe life into this constitutional provision. The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of public domain. The communal right is not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less corporate condominium rights. Thus communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extend to all generation of the ICCs/IPs, past present and future, to the domain. Examining IPRA there is nothing the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs ownership in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this “ownership: is expressly defined and limited in Sec 7 (a). Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to “manage and conserve” them for future generations, “benefit and share” the profits from their allocation and utilization and “negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration” for the purpose of “enduring ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures”. The right to negotiate terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to exploitation and development of natural resources. Justice Puno in his conclusion said that “…. If the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, it is this Court’s duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national system.” SEPARATE OPINION BY JUSTICE VITUG Justice Vitug voted to grant the petition of Isagani Cruz assailing the constitutionality of the RA 8371. IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain so-called ancestral domains covering literally millions of hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also forms of governance over the curved-out territory. Justice Vitug held in view that the provisions of IPRA, are in totality, in his view, beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication of Sate authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony thus , it violates the regalia doctrine. In his opinion he emphasizes that the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution cannot be overridden. It is in them that the sovereignty resides and from them that all government authority emanates. It is not then for court ruling or any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate. SEPARATE OPINION JUSTICE KAPUNAN Justice Kapunan opined that the challenged provisions of IPRA must be construed in view of such presumption of constitutionality. Further the interpretation of these provisions should take into account the purposes of the law, which is to give life to the constitutional mandate that the rights of the rights of the indigenous peoples should be recognized and protected. Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to ancestral lands, ancestral domains and natural resources are unconstitutional. Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain and other natural resources. Sec 3(a) of IPRA merely defines the coverage of ancestral domain, and

describes the extent, limit and composition of ancestral domain by setting forth standards and guidelines in determining whether the particular area is within the ancestral domains. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title. The IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also clear from the bicameral conference committee on section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains. The provisions of the IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional. The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources under sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (RA 7942) RA 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be opened for mining operations without prior consent if he indigenous cultural community concerned and in the event the members of such indigenous cultural community give their consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be paid to them by the parties to the mining contract. There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in the grant of concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by government entities. It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. SEPARATE OPINION JUSTICE MENDOZA The separate opinion was focused on whether petitioners had legal standing in the petition, which, they had none. He also opined that there is no genuine controversy in the matter before the court and that the presumption of constitutionality must be accorded to IPRA until an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA. SEPARATE OPINION JUSTICE PANGANIBAN Justice Panganiban opined that RA 8371 violates and contravenes the constitution insofar as : 1) it recognizes or, worse grants rights of ownership over “lands of the public domain, waters, x x x and other natural resources” which under sec 2 of Article XII of the Constitution , “ are owned by the State” and “Shall not be alienated”; and 2) it defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the state to oversee the “exploration, development and utilization of natural resources,” which the Constitution expressly requires to “be under the full control and supervision of the State”. Under Sec 3 (a) ancestral domains encompass the natural resources found therein and section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of their rights of ownership and possession over such domains. RA 8371 speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by mere definitions they could covers vast tract of the nation’s territory. RA 8371 abdicates the State duty ti take full control and supervision of natural resources. It relinquishes constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar, as natural resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the utilization therof. And they may exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like period. Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period. THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, ETC. V. MASWENG, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 180206, FEBRUARY 4, 2009 FACTS: The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and in violation of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1096 and Republic Act No. 7279. Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated September 19, 2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon of the intended

demolition of the erected structures on October 17 to 20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas (hereinafter private respondents) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City through its Acting City Mayor, Reynaldo Bautista, the City Building and Architecture Office, the Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division, among others, (collectively called petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as Case No. 31CAR-06. In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained. Also, private respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation is subject to ancestral land claims. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922, which declared the area a forest reserve, allegedly did not nullify the vested rights of private respondents over their ancestral lands and even identified the claimants of the particular portions within the forest reserve. This claim of ownership is an exception to the government’s contention that the whole area is a forest reservation. Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP issued the two (2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all persons acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September 18, 2006; Demolition Order dated September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004; Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series of 2004, for a total period of twenty (20) days. Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated November 10, 2006 granting the private respondents’ application for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an injunctive bond each in the amount of P10, 000.00. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not NCIP has jurisdiction to issue has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction 2. Whether Respondents have the right to claim over the property HELD: The Court held that the NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto. In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws and have obtained a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.

In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the NCIP over claims and disputes involving ancestral lands and enumerates the actions that may be brought before the commission. Sec. 5, Rule III thereof provides: Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following: (1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO): a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs; b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs; c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals; d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing. (2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer: a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371. (3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission: a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.

Therefore, since based on the allegations of the respondents, they are members of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled in Baguio City claiming ownership of the property subject of the case as an ancestral land clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal, squarely qualify it as a "dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs" within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO.

Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. It provides that pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act Numbered Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven [,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be administered by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and protecting water and timber, the protection of the water supply being of primary importance and all other uses of the forest are to be subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or settlement the following described parcels of the public domain situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City of Baguio, Mountain Province, Island of Luzon, to wit: The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.

All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY V. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 184869, SEPTEMBER 21, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the State. In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those lands under Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162. Meanwhile, the government distributed more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging to the area’s cultural communities.

Forty-five years later, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMU’s registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon. On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.

The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion, however, and proceeded to hear CMU’s application for preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, respondents NCIP, et al moved for partial reconsideration of the RTC’s order denying their motion to dismiss.

On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP, et al’s motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMU’s action for lack of jurisdiction. Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act. The RTC said that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf. CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but the RTC denied the same on April 19, 2004. This prompted CMU to appeal the RTC’s dismissal order to the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station. However, the CA dismissed the case ruling that CMU’s recourse should have been a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions law—bearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310. The CA added that whether the trial court can decide the merits of the case based solely on the hearings of the motion to dismiss and the application for injunction is also a pure question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 310 can validly distribute lands already owned by CMU to the ICCs/IPs in Musuan, Marang, Bukidnon HELD: No, these state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and development of this country. It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMU’s use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands. Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that "property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested" upon its effectivity "shall be recognized and respected." In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA. ALCANTARA V. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 14583, JULY 20, 2001 FACTS: Sometime in 1993, petitioner Nicasio Alcantara was granted Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Under said FLGLA, Alcantara was allowed to lease Nine Hundred Twenty-Three (923) hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City for grazing purposes for a

period of twenty-five (25) years to expire on 31 December 2018. However, private respondent Rolando Paglangan together with Esmael Sabel and Lasid Acop filed a letter-complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares to the Blaan and Maguindanaoan tribes. The case was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-052. Petitioner filed his Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the case, since the dispute involved a claim for recovery of ancestral land. Petitioner claimed that the case should have been filed with the DENR since it is the latter which has jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands, including grazing lands. Notwithstanding petitioner’s objection to the COSLAPs exercise of jurisdiction over the case, said body continued the hearings thereon. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems has jurisdiction over the case HELD: The Court held that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP since he participated actively in the proceedings before said body by filing an Answer, a Motion for Reconsideration of the COSLAPs decision and a Supplement to Respondents Motion for Reconsideration. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the active participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to a recognition of that courts or body’s recognition and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the courts or bodys jurisdiction Moreover, Executive Order No. 561 creating the COSLAP, the law then prevailing when private respondents filed their complaint for cancellation of FLGLA No. 542, provides in Section 3, paragraph 2(a) thereof that said Commission may assume jurisdiction over land disputes involving occupants of the land in question and pasture lease agreement holders. The Commission shall promulgate such rules of procedure as will insure expeditious resolution and action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS Atty. Jerico G. Gay-ya

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